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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Paweł Banaszewski
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8f5f15a92f |
fix: remove unbound Client() method from aibridged.Server (#27845)
Adds client context to `Client()` method in `aibridged.Server`, effectivly renaming `ClientContext()` method as `Client()`. Similarly `aibridged.ClientFuncWithContext` became `aibridged.ClientFunc`. `aibridged.Server.Client()` acquired a DRPC client with `context.Background()`, callers in theory could wait indefinitely for the daemon to connect to coderd. Every call site already had a context except the recorder callback. `aibridge.NewRecorder` takes a `func(context.Context) (Recorder, error)` and acquires against the record call's context. |
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Susana Ferreira
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db88ec3f6a |
fix: price AI usage by configured provider type (#27836)
## Problem AI Gateway records the aibridge provider on each interception, which is the upstream wire format and only ever `anthropic`, `openai`, or `copilot`. Prices are matched on exact provider and model equality, so a provider configured as Azure, Bedrock, Google, OpenRouter, or Vercel is priced as if it were native OpenAI or Anthropic, matching either the wrong price or no price at all. ## Changes - Resolve the configured provider type from `ai_providers` by provider name, which is unique among live providers, and key the price lookup on it instead of the aibridge provider. No schema change is needed. - Label `unpriced_token_usage_records_total` with the same provider value used for the lookup, so it names a provider an operator actually configured. - Treat a provider that cannot be resolved as unpriced, consistent with how a missing price is handled today. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-570/resolve-ai-model-prices-using-the-configured-provider-type Depends on the follow-up that extends the shipped price book to the remaining provider types: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-571/ship-prices-for-all-ai-governance-provider-types > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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Cian JohnstonandSusana Ferreira
|
60161fd375 |
chore: update model prices to include more providers (#27837)
Adds the full set of supported provider types to `scripts/aibridgepricesgen` and updates stored model prices. Notes: * We need to rename a few keys from models.dev JSON to match our internal provider types. * `prices.json` is now marked as generated. --------- Co-authored-by: Susana Ferreira <susana@coder.com> |
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Michael Suchacz
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6b8f820493 |
feat: remove native chat cost tracking in favor of AI Gateway cost data (#27330)
## Stack Context This stack makes AI Gateway data and budgets the source of truth for AI spend controls. 1. Re-back the per-chat cost endpoint with AI Gateway data (#27328, merged). 2. Remove native chat usage limits (#27329, merged). 3. **This PR, now based on `main`:** remove native chat cost tracking and its dedicated admin UI. ## Summary Removes native per-message price calculation, model pricing fields, cost persistence, aggregate cost queries, and admin cost API types. It also deletes the Analytics and Spend pages plus their legacy redirects. The AI Gateway-backed per-chat cost row and compact budget indicators remain. The spend documentation is renamed to `spend-management.md` and updated for the remaining surfaces, group budget APIs, CSV export, upgrade handling for native pricing and cost history, and the absence of a deployment-wide spend dashboard. The per-chat cost API documents that data follows AI Gateway retention and reports zero after all matching requests are purged. No schema is dropped in this release. `chat_messages.total_cost_micros` remains nullable and unwritten so replicas from the previous release can continue inserting messages during rolling upgrades. #27600 tracks removal after the compatibility window. > Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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f0e6ac64b3 |
feat: remove native chat usage limits in favor of AI Gateway budgets (#27329)
## Stack Context This stack makes AI Gateway data and budgets the source of truth for AI spend controls. 1. Re-back the per-chat cost endpoint with AI Gateway data (#27328, merged). 2. **This PR:** remove native chat usage limits. 3. Remove native chat cost tracking and its dedicated admin UI (#27330). ## Summary Removes the native usage-limit API, SDK types, SQL, and chat enforcement for deployment, user, and group chat limits. Compact AI Gateway budget indicators remain in the Agents sidebar, user menu, and group settings. Gateway budget rejections and provider quota failures continue to classify as usage-limit errors, including a 409 response for synchronous title generation. Budget-period labels now use the API's UTC boundaries, so users see the same dates in every browser timezone. The documentation explains the AI Gateway replacement, its licensing requirements, and the differences from native limits. No schema is dropped in this release. The usage-limit table, index, user and group columns, constraints, audit mappings, and generated scan fields remain for mixed-version rolling upgrades. #27600 tracks their removal after the compatibility window. ## Breaking change Native day, week, and month chat spend limits are removed and are not migrated. AI Gateway budgets are month-based, group-scoped with per-user overrides, and require the AI Gateway entitlement. Deployments without that entitlement no longer have chat spend enforcement. > Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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404bb2f663 |
refactor(coderd/x/chatd): own provider option construction in one function (#27705)
Stacked on #27704. Provider option conversion and reasoning effort injection both create OpenAI option structs, so each of the four call sites had to pair them in the right order and pick the same transport for each. `chatprovider.ProviderOptionsForCall` now owns both steps, and the two helpers it wraps are unexported. The advisor, main generation, compaction override, and quickgen paths each collapse to one call. The ARCHITECTURE section on transport selection is updated to match: `ProviderOptionsForCall` is described as the only entry point in `chatprovider` that builds provider options for a call, delegating OpenAI conversion to `chatopenai.ProviderOptionsFromChatConfig`, and it now records that the quickgen turn status label and chat summary paths deliberately send no provider options. > Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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0e16e356b0 |
refactor(coderd/x/chatd): read the OpenAI transport from the model (#27704)
Stacked on #27703. Provider option conversion, reasoning effort injection, and file part acceptance each recomputed the OpenAI wire format from `(provider, modelID, override)`. They now read it from `chatprovider.Model`, so a decision cannot drift from the client it was built for. `ProviderOptionsFromChatConfig` takes a `Transport`, `ApplyReasoningEffort` takes a `Model`, and `AcceptsFilePartMediaType` becomes a `Model` method. `UsesResponsesAPI` and `UsesResponsesOptions` are deleted. The override extraction is unexported and reachable only from `ModelFromConfig`, which now takes the model's `ChatModelOpenAIConfig` directly, removing the six scattered extractions at call sites. That also resolves the computer-use mismatch. The computer-use model is a hardcoded default with no config row of its own: its client was built without an override while request preparation applied the chat model's. Preparation now reads the computer-use model's own transport, so the two agree without one model's client settings following a different model. Passing the chat model's `openai_config` into the computer-use client would have made them agree on the wrong value. `TestModelTransportConsumersAgree` pins the invariant in one test: the HTTP path the client actually hits, the concrete provider option struct type, the type created by reasoning effort, and text/image file acceptance. > Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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b5c9e8e471 |
refactor(coderd/x/chatd): carry the resolved OpenAI transport on a model wrapper (#27703)
Stacked on #27683. The OpenAI wire format is decided when the client is built, then thrown away, so downstream sites recompute it from `(provider, modelID, override)`. Any disagreement fails silently: the SDK type-asserts the concrete provider options struct and discards every OpenAI option, and text attachments are dropped because Responses natively accepts only images and PDFs. This adds `chatprovider.Model`, which pairs a fantasy client with the transport resolved from that client's own identity. Its fields are unexported and only the constructor sets the transport, deriving it from the client, so no caller can pick a transport that disagrees with the client it wraps. `chatopenai.Transport`'s zero value is invalid and panics when read rather than defaulting to a wire format, following the existing precedent for construction invariants. `Model` is threaded through construction, the resolve paths, and the four struct fields that store a model for later request preparation. Terminal call sites keep taking `fantasy.LanguageModel` and receive `LanguageModel()`, which avoids a new package edge from `chatloop` and `chatadvisor` into `chatprovider`. No decisions move yet. The consumers still recompute the transport, and `UsesResponsesAPI` now delegates to `TransportFor` so the two agree by construction. #27704 makes the consumers read it from the model. > Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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c6cee10e8b |
feat: add per-model OpenAI Responses API toggle (#27683)
chatd hardcoded `WithUseResponsesAPI()`, so the provider SDK's static known-model list decided whether an OpenAI model spoke the Responses API or Chat Completions. A model absent from that list silently fell back to Chat Completions until the fantasy fork was patched. This exposes the SDK's `WithResponsesAPIFunc` hook as a per-model setting, `openai_config.use_responses_api`, stored in the existing `chat_model_configs.options` JSONB. Unset keeps the known-model list, `true` forces Responses, `false` forces Chat Completions. There is no migration. It sits in a new construction-time `openai_config` section rather than in `provider_options.openai` because it selects the API when the client is built, while `provider_options` holds per-request parameters. That placement is also load-bearing: a config setting only this field would otherwise materialize an OpenAI request-options struct and turn on provider-side response storage, since `Store` defaults to true there. Three places independently decided the transport and would silently disagree with the client actually built: | Site | Effect when it disagrees | | --- | --- | | `ModelFromConfig` | the transport being overridden | | `AcceptsFilePartMediaType` | text attachments dropped, since Responses natively accepts only images and PDFs | | `UsesResponsesOptions` | the SDK type-asserts the concrete options struct, so every OpenAI option is discarded | They share one predicate here, `chatopenai.UsesResponsesAPI`, with the override threaded to each. The rest of the stack removes that threading by resolving the transport once and carrying it. Compaction overrides and the quickgen debug model built clients without `ConfigOptions`, so they now pass it and pick up both this setting and the existing Anthropic beta headers. The toggle also makes transport-conditional option handling admin-switchable, so two hardening changes ride along. `ServiceTierFromChat` now maps every tier the codersdk enum advertises (`auto`, `default`, `flex`, `scale`, `priority`); it previously returned nil for `default` and `scale`, so flipping a model to Responses silently dropped a configured `service_tier` that the API accepts (fantasy forwards the value unchanged). And a new `TestProviderOptionsTransportParity` pins, per `provider_options.openai` field, which transport honors it, against a table in ARCHITECTURE.md, so a field honored on one transport and silently ignored on the other fails the test unless recorded as intentional. Review rounds also caught two lifecycle gaps around the new field. `isZeroChatModelCallConfig` now inspects `OpenAIConfig`, so a stored options blob whose only setting is this toggle survives into GET/list responses instead of reading as `model_config: null`; `TestIsZeroChatModelCallConfigCoversEveryField` sets each config field in isolation and fails if any field is invisible to the zero check. And the model editor's update path sends an explicit empty `model_config` when an edit clears the last field, since an omitted property preserves the stored options server-side; covered by the `EditClearingLastOptionSendsEmptyConfig` story. Azure keeps following the known-model list, because the Azure provider exposes no equivalent hook. The model editor renders Azure with the OpenAI option schema, so instead of shipping a visible but inert control, the option schema generator gains a `providers` struct tag that it emits as `visible_for_providers`. Gating uses the raw provider type rather than the alias table, so the control appears only for openai-typed providers. No hand-written frontend field: the editor renders it from the generated schema. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-874/add-completionsresponses-api-toggle-in-model-editor > Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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9bab7a8e06 | fix(coderd): preseed AI providers for title tests (#27564) | ||
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Steven Masley
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52423eb87b |
feat: promote MinimumImplicitMember experiment to GA (#27472)
Promotes the `minimum-implicit-member` experiment to GA and removes it.
## What changes
- The `minimum-implicit-member` experiment constant, its
`RoleOptions.MinimumImplicitMember` toggle, and the global
`rbac.MinimumImplicitMember()` accessor are deleted. The minimal-member
behavior is now the only behavior: `organization-member` and
`organization-service-account` carry only the floor (read-self records,
notifications, and similar) and grant **no workspace permissions**.
Workspace access lives exclusively on the
`organization-workspace-access` role.
- The experiment gate on customizing `default_org_member_roles` (`PATCH
/organizations/{org}`) is removed; the built-in-roles-only validation
remains.
- The dashboard's Default Roles section and the implied-roles display on
the members page are no longer experiment-gated.
- Admin docs: new "Default member roles" section in
`docs/admin/users/organizations.md`, cross-linked from
`groups-roles.md`.
## Why this is safe for existing deployments
Migration `000516` (shipped earlier) backfilled
`default_org_member_roles` with `['organization-workspace-access']` on
every organization. Members therefore keep exactly the effective
permissions they had with the experiment off; the workspace elevation
flows through the default role instead of being baked into
`organization-member`.
**Rollback caveat:** rolling back past this release restores the bundled
elevation, silently re-granting workspace access to members of
organizations that cleared their default roles.
## Review
Deep-review R1 findings are addressed in `chore: address deep-review
findings` (copy fixes, read-only Default Roles for viewers, removable
overlapping explicit grants, RBAC prose restoration, test
de-tautologizing, docs). Point-by-point disposition is in the PR
comments.
---
Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.
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Steven Masley
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76eb43a78e |
test(coderd): drain dormancy audit log before reset in StartWakesUpDormantWorkspace (#27541)
Closes PLAT-219 / [coder/internal#1532](https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1532). The reported failure (`should have 2 item(s), but has 3`) was the stop build's outcome audit landing after `auditor.ResetLogs()`; that path was already deflaked by #26232 and the pre-reset drain added in #25037. This closes the remaining hole in the same class: the dormancy update's audit log is exported in a middleware `defer` after the API response, so it can also land after `ResetLogs` and break the exact `len == 2` assertion. Extend the pre-reset poll to drain the dormancy write entry alongside the stop build entry. Verified with `go test ./coderd -run TestWorkspaceDormant -count=5` and `-race`. > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk. |
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Michael Suchacz
|
fc24c27dfd |
fix: reserve chat hook dispatch capacity for running turns (#27656)
## Context Follow-up fix from live UAT of the merged chat lifecycle hooks stack (#27430). Its companion UAT fix (#27655) has merged, so this targets `main` directly. ## Why? UAT measured a burst of 1,500 concurrent chat creations against a consumer with 1.2s latency. 255 were admitted and 1,245 got `502 hook_dispatch_failed (over_capacity)`, which is correct fail-closed behavior. The collateral wasn't: the same burst failed 24 `stop` dispatches, parking chats that had already been admitted and had already executed tools. One 256-slot semaphore served every event, so new-work admission could take every slot and kill turns in flight. Callers now classify each dispatch as admission or generation, and admission draws from a 192-slot gate held *before* the shared pool. At least 64 shared slots stay reachable only by dispatches for work a chat already admitted. The dispatcher is per `coderd` replica, so these limits are per replica, not deployment-wide, and the docs say so. **The caller classifies, not the event type.** Event type isn't a reliable proxy in either direction: a subagent spawn dispatches `user_prompt_submit` from inside a running turn, and the edit path dispatches `session_start` at admission time. `CapacityClassUnset` is rejected in `Dispatch`, so a new call site fails closed rather than silently inheriting a share. **Acquisition order is load-bearing.** Admission takes its own gate first. Taking a shared slot first would let admissions queued on the gate occupy the very capacity the reserve protects. `acquireCapacity` is the only path that takes either pool, so the order can't be bypassed. ## What this does not guarantee Nothing bounds how many turns generate concurrently, so the 192/64 split is a judgement call, not a derived ceiling. This stops an *admission* burst from consuming every slot; it does not make the remainder sufficient. A large enough generation load can still exhaust the reserve and error a running chat. The docs say so explicitly rather than promising a guarantee the code doesn't deliver. Generation can now take all 256 slots, so generation traffic starves admission harder than before. That's the intended priority: rejecting a new prompt is recoverable, ending a turn that already ran tools is not. ## Testing Red-green proved both new tests. Removing the release-on-failure path fails `RefusedSharedAcquireReleasesAdmission` deterministically; removing the expired-deadline check fails `ExpiredDeadlineRefusesFreeSlot` in 18/30 runs. That deadline check fixes a real race found in review. `acquire` previously shared one `time.Timer` across both acquires. Because `select` picks a ready case at random, an admission dispatch could take a slot after its capacity deadline had passed. Measured over 300 trials: 135 late acquisitions, worst overshoot 2.1ms. `acquire` now takes an absolute deadline and refuses an expired one before selecting, which measures 0/300. Go: `coderd/x/agenthooks/...` and `coderd/x/chatd/...`, plus `-race -count=3` on the dispatcher. > Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Fabien Penso
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7bd9f5ec93 |
fix: correct authorization header spelling in api docs (#27721)
Corrects the misspelled `Authorizaiton` Swagger header name to `Authorization` in the source annotation and checked-in generated API documentation. This prevents generated API specs and SCIM examples from documenting the wrong HTTP header name. |
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Michael Suchacz
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df1c0f9710 |
feat: show what a chat lifecycle hook changed (#27655)
## Stack Context Follow-up fixes from live UAT of the merged chat lifecycle hooks stack (#27430). Two PRs: 1. **This PR**: make hook effects visible and correctly attributed in the transcript. 2. [`mike/chat-hooks-uat/dispatch-capacity`]: reserve dispatch capacity so an admission burst can't fail running turns. ## Why? UAT found three ways the transcript misrepresented what a lifecycle hook did. All three are user-visible and share the same surface (`chathooks/effects.go`, `codersdk.ChatMessagePart`, the conversation timeline), so they're reviewed together. **A prompt `input_override` silently discarded attachments.** `ComposeUserPromptContent` replaced the entire submitted part list with one text part, dropping `file` and `file-reference` parts along with their `chat_file_links`. The user saw their attachments vanish with no explanation. The override now replaces submitted *text* parts only and preserves non-text parts in order. A consumer that wants to block attachments uses `deny`, which is the documented mechanism for refusing a submission. **Every user-visible `system` row was labelled "Lifecycle hook".** The timeline keyed the notice off `role === "system"`. That was correct only by accident, because the hook `user_message` was the sole client-visible system row. The backend now emits the notice as a typed `hook-notice` part and the timeline renders on that, so a future system row can't be mislabelled as a policy notice. **Nothing marked a tool call the hook had rewritten.** A consumer could replace tool input via `input_override` and the transcript showed the rewritten input as if the model had produced it. `ChatMessagePart` gains `hook_rewritten`, set from `preflight.Overrides` on the same path that already carries `ToolCallCreatedAt`, and the tool row renders a "Modified by policy" badge. `ToolCall.PolicyProvider` renders the badge itself, at four wrap sites: the `Tool` dispatch wrapper, the `ReadFilesTool` aggregate and its per-file rows, and `ReadFileTimelineBlock` (grouped and single `read_file` rows bypass `Tool`). Renderer props do not include the flag; descendants consume it through the provider context. The badge is emitted by the provider rather than by the shared header because several renderer branches return early without one, including the auth-required `execute` card, a completed `ask_user_question`, and an empty question payload. Those branches would drop the attribution with no type or runtime error, and the gap is not greppable: every renderer file contains a header somewhere, only individual branches do not. Emitting at the provider removes the possibility instead of enumerating the cases. A rewritten call is wrapped in a group labelled by its badge, so one rewritten file inside a merged read is attributed on its own rather than inheriting the group's badge. `HeaderButton` still appends the policy wording to an explicit `ariaLabel`, since an explicit `aria-label` replaces the name computed from descendants. Provider-executed calls are excluded from attribution. Hooks never see them, and duplicate tool-call ID rejection deliberately skips them, so a reused ID would otherwise mark a provider-executed call as policy-rewritten. ## Testing Go: `coderd/x/chatd/...`, `coderd/x/agenthooks/...`, `codersdk/...`, and `coderd -run 'Hook|Chat'`. Frontend: `tsc` plus every `AgentsPage` story; the only failures are `MCP Tool Completed` and `Scroll To Bottom Button Works With Inverse Scroll`, both of which fail on trunk. A registry-wide story asserts every registered renderer shows the badge, verified against three inverted toggles: removing the badge, hiding it with `display:none`, and skipping the provider for one renderer (which names that renderer). Storybook also covers the rewritten subagent spawn, a completed empty question payload, a non-hook system message, and a failed `read_file` guarding the accessible name. > Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Sas SwartandClaude Opus 4.8
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8886a5749a |
feat: add network calls list to AI session threads API (#27425)
The AI session threads API returned only a network call *summary* (total/blocked counts + top domains). This adds the per-call list so the session detail can render individual Agent Firewall network calls. `ListAIBridgeSessionNetworkCalls` reuses the same sequence-number windowing as the existing summary and includes all protocols. The list is exposed as `network_call_logs` on the threads response and is capped server-side at 100 rows. The summary (`network_calls.total`/`blocked`) remains authoritative for whole-session totals: the list length and its blocked count equal the summary only when a session has at most 100 calls, and are truncated beyond that. ### PR map (merge strictly bottom-up) This change is a 4-PR stack. Each PR depends on all the ones below it, so merge in this exact order: 1. #27417 — backend network summary 2. #27418 — frontend summary rows 3. #27425 — backend per-call list `network_call_logs` 4. #27426 — frontend network-calls panel Refs AIGOV-464 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Josh FreeandCopilot
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2acfe7e829 |
feat(coderd/externalauth/gitprovider): use conditional requests for GitHub JSON reads (#27628)
Fixes #27627. ## What The chat diff-status gitsync worker polls open pull requests on a fixed 10s interval and re-downloads the full JSON body every tick, even when nothing changed, because the GitHub client never sends `If-None-Match` / ETag. This adds a small, concurrency-safe, bounded in-memory ETag+body cache (`coderd/externalauth/gitprovider/conditional.go`) and wires it into `githubProvider.decodeJSON`. When an ETag is cached for a request, we send `If-None-Match`; on `304 Not Modified` we decode the cached body; on `200` we cache `{etag, body}` when an ETag is present and the body is under a size cap. ## Why `304` responses do not count against GitHub's primary rate limit, but full `200`s do. Today every unchanged poll burns quota that the same token also needs for interactive Git and API operations, so busy instances can hit rate-limit errors and stalls elsewhere. Unchanged PRs now revalidate for free with no behavior change; only genuine changes transfer a body. ## Details - Cache key = request URL + a hash of the token, so one token's response is never served under another; raw tokens are not retained. - Bounded by entry count (LRU eviction, default 2048) and per-body size (1 MiB) to cap memory. - Scope limited to the JSON reads through `decodeJSON`; the raw-diff path (`fetchDiff`, up to `MaxDiffSize`) is intentionally left out to avoid caching large bodies. ## Tests `TestConditionalRequestReuse` in `github_test.go` covers: - `NotModifiedReusesCachedBody` — a warm poll sends `If-None-Match` with the prior ETag and reuses the cached body on `304`, yielding the same result with exactly two upstream requests. - `DifferentTokenDoesNotShareCache` — a different token never sends another token's cached ETag. Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Copilot-Session: 4959e1f9-f8e6-4e97-a487-f395a0123c79 |
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Susana Ferreira
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7b104b6a98 |
fix: add info log level to unpriced models message (#27693)
Change the unpriced models log to info level. Refs https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27678 |
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3f3fd1c4d7 |
feat: show network request summary on AI session detail card (#27418)
Frontend for the AI session network summary. Adds Network calls, Blocked network requests, and Top domains rows to the Session summary card on the individual AI session detail page, driven by the network fields on the session threads response. Renders "Disabled" when network monitoring was not active and "No activity" when there were no calls. Covered by Storybook stories for each state. ### PR map (merge strictly bottom-up) This change is a 4-PR stack. Each PR depends on all the ones below it, so merge in this exact order: 1. #27417 — backend network summary 2. #27418 — frontend summary rows 3. #27425 — backend per-call list `network_call_logs` 4. #27426 — frontend network-calls panel Refs AIGOV-463 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Cian Johnston <cian@coder.com> |
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841a1765f7 |
feat: add network calls summary to AI session threads API (#27417)
Backend for the AI session network summary. Exposes total/blocked
network calls and top destination domains on the session threads
endpoint (`GET /api/v2/ai-gateway/sessions/{id}`).
Total and blocked reuse the existing Agent Firewall aggregation from the
sessions list query, so the numbers match the sessions table. Top
domains are a new server-side aggregation
(`GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains`) over boundary logs, using the same
interception-window correlation. There is no network-error state,
matching the current data model.
Frontend consuming these fields is in a separate stacked PR.
### PR map (merge strictly bottom-up)
This change is a 4-PR stack. Each PR depends on all the ones below it,
so merge in this exact order:
1. #27417 — backend network summary (base `main`)
2. #27418 — frontend summary rows (base #27417)
3. #27425 — backend per-call list `network_call_logs` (base #27418)
4. #27426 — frontend network-calls panel (base #27425)
Refs AIGOV-463
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cian Johnston <cian@coder.com>
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Susana Ferreira
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3660ffecdd |
fix: add warn log level to unpriced models message (#27678)
When a model is missing from the price table, token usage is still recorded but with a NULL cost, so AI spend for that model goes unattributed. This was logged at debug level, which means it is invisible in a default deployment. Log it at warn level instead so admins can see which provider/model pairs need a price row and act on it. |
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Michael Suchacz
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95a2c2ba02 |
feat: back the per-chat cost endpoint with AI Gateway data (#27328)
## Stack Context
This stack removes native chat cost tracking and native chat usage
limits, making the AI Gateway the single source of AI spend data and
budget enforcement.
1. **This PR:** re-back the per-chat cost endpoint with AI Gateway data.
2. Remove native chat usage limits end to end, rewiring the sidebar
indicator to gateway spend.
3. Remove native chat cost tracking end to end, deleting the
Analytics/Spend cost UI.
## What?
`GET /api/experimental/chats/{chat}/cost` summed
`chat_messages.total_cost_micros`, which native chat cost tracking
maintained. It now aggregates AI Gateway interception data instead, and
has no native fallback.
- New `GetAIBridgeChatCost` query, authorized through the root chat so
members can read their own chat's cost without gaining access to raw
interception rows.
- Response fields renamed: `priced_message_count` -> `request_count`,
`unpriced_messages_having_usage_count` -> `unpriced_request_count`.
- The chat summary sidebar keys its cost cache by root chat, and hides
the cost row where the AI Gateway is off or unlicensed. The root cost is
invalidated when a chat leaves an active status and when a generated
title lands, since title generation bills its own gateway request.
`GetChatModelUsageCostByChatID` and the rest of native cost tracking are
untouched here; PR 3 removes them.
## Why?
Native cost tracking duplicates what the AI Gateway already records, and
the two disagree. Repointing the endpoint first means the cost UI keeps
working while the native implementation is deleted later in the stack.
Two behaviour changes follow from gateway semantics and are intentional:
- **Requests, not messages.** The gateway records interceptions, so
counts are requests. Title-generation traffic now counts.
- **Whole-tree totals.** The gateway records the *spawning* chat's ID as
the interception session ID, so a subagent's requests are attributed to
its immediate parent, not always the root. Only a whole chat tree can be
summed, so the query resolves the root and aggregates the tree, and
every chat in a tree reports the same total. Native returned per-subtree
totals.
## Attribution and counting semantics
The aggregate groups token usage per interception before counting, so
the reported numbers are per request even though a request records one
usage row per provider response:
- `RequestCount` counts finished `Coder Agents` interceptions in the
tree, including unpriced ones.
- `UnpricedRequestCount` counts requests with at least one usage row the
gateway could not price. It is a subset of `RequestCount`.
- `TotalCostMicros` omits only unpriced usage, so a partially priced
request still contributes its priced portion. The sidebar therefore says
`Excludes unpriced usage from N request(s)` rather than claiming whole
requests were dropped.
A recorded cost of zero is a free request, not an unpriced one. Usage
without an effective group is excluded, matching what never reached
`ai_user_daily_spend`.
## Authorization
Reads go through `ExtractChatParam` plus `ResourceChat`, with no
cost-specific RBAC widening. `TestGetChatCost/MemberCanReadOwnChat`
covers a scoped `agents-access` member reading their own chat's cost,
and `MemberCannotReadOtherUsersChat` still asserts 404 for a non-owner.
Plain members without `agents-access` cannot create or read chats at
all, so they never reach this endpoint.
## Known limitation
AI Gateway data has its own retention period, 60 days by default and
configured independently of chat retention, so spend for requests older
than that is no longer reported. A chat whose gateway records have all
been purged reports zero cost, which is indistinguishable from genuinely
free usage under this contract. The endpoint documents the caveat;
#27330 documents it on the Spend Management page.
In-flight interceptions are excluded, since cost is only known once the
response is recorded. A chat's cost therefore lags the active turn by
one request.
## Rebase note
Rebased onto `main` after #27579 removed the `ai-gateway-cost-control`
experiment. The per-chat cost row is now gated on the `aibridge` feature
alone, matching how #27579 degated the other cost-control surfaces.
> Mux prepared this PR on Mike's behalf.
|
||
|
Jaayden Halko
|
54d5eb7ec2 |
feat: add hourly hb_agent_runtime_v1 usage events for Coder Agent runtime (#27312)
closes CODAGT-839 closes CODAGT-843 closes CODAGT-773 ## Summary Adds a new heartbeat usage event type, `hb_agent_runtime_v1`, measuring the total agent-loop runtime of Coder Agents (chats) per UTC hour, plus a reconciler that generates one event per hour with self-healing backfill over a trailing 7-day window. Events flow to Tallyman through the existing publisher unchanged. This measures the new Coder Agents (the `chats` tables), not the deprecated Tasks counted by `dc_managed_agents_v1`. Independent of #27508, which fixes the dead ai-seats cron registration. Both PRs carry the identical `usage_event` create permission hunk for the usage-publisher subject (this feature's generator and the ai-seats cron each need it for heartbeat inserts), so they can land in either order and the overlap merges cleanly. > [!WARNING] > **Do not include this in a release until Tallyman accepts `hb_agent_runtime_v1`.** The publisher marks permanently rejected events as done-forever, and the generator then sees those buckets as complete locally, so their usage would be silently and permanently lost. ## Details Each event's payload is `{"runtime_ms": N}`: the sum of `chat_messages.runtime_ms` for messages created in the hour bucket `[H, H+1)`, across all chats (sub-agents, API-created, archived, and soft-deleted messages included). Events use deterministic IDs (`hb_agent_runtime_v1:<bucket start>`) with `created_at` set to the bucket start, so concurrent replicas race safely via `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING` without locking, and daily rollups attribute backfilled hours to the correct day. Idle hours produce zero-valued events. A bucket becomes eligible 5 minutes after it closes; hours missing for longer than the 7-day window are forfeited, which can only undercount. Note that this makes `usage_events.created_at` explicitly the *event occurrence time* rather than the row insertion time; the two only diverge for backfilled events. It already behaved as the occurrence timestamp (it drives the daily rollup day and is shipped to Tallyman/Metronome as the event timestamp), and the migration now documents this with a `COMMENT ON COLUMN`, which also surfaces as a Go doc comment on `UsageEvent.CreatedAt`. The new `usage.Generator` runs unconditionally in enterprise builds; the `publish_usage_data` license flag continues to gate egress only, so air-gapped deployments still fill their local ledger. The `aggregate_usage_event()` trigger sums `runtime_ms` per day into `usage_events_daily` (unlike `hb_ai_seats_v1`, which takes the daily max). `InsertHeartbeatUsageEvent` now takes an explicit `createdAt` so generators can backfill historical buckets; the cron passes `clock.Now()` to preserve its existing behavior. ## Tallyman follow-up <details> <summary>Prompt for the Tallyman-repo agent</summary> > **Task**: Add support for the new Coder usage event type `hb_agent_runtime_v1` so Tallyman accepts, validates, and forwards it to Metronome. > > **Background**: coder/coder PR (this PR) adds hourly heartbeat events measuring Coder Agent runtime. Events arrive via the existing `/api/v1/events/ingest` endpoint with: `event_type: "hb_agent_runtime_v1"`, `event_data: {"runtime_ms": <int64 >= 0>}`, deterministic `id` of the form `hb_agent_runtime_v1:2026-07-15_14:00:00` (UTC hour bucket start), and `created_at` set to the bucket start (may be up to ~8 days in the past due to backfill; within Metronome's 34-day dedup window). Zero-value events are normal (idle hours). > > **Work**: > 1. Update Tallyman's vendored/imported `coderd/usage/usagetypes` (or equivalent) to the coder/coder commit that adds `UsageEventTypeHBAgentRuntimeV1` and `HBAgentRuntime`. > 2. Ensure ingestion validation accepts the type (`Valid()` switches) and rejects negative `runtime_ms`. > 3. Ensure Metronome forwarding maps the event with transaction ID derived from the event `id` as for existing types, passing `runtime_ms` through as the property for a SUM-aggregated billable metric ("Coder Agent Hours" = `SUM(runtime_ms) / 3,600,000`). > 4. Do NOT permanently reject unknown-but-well-formed future `hb_*` types if avoidable; at minimum confirm current behavior for unknown types (temporary vs permanent rejection) and report it. > 5. Tests: ingest accept/validate, dedup by ID, Metronome payload mapping. > > **Constraint**: this must be deployed to tallyman-prod **before** any coder/coder release containing the event generator; coderd treats permanent rejections as terminal per event. </details> |
||
|
McKayla はな
|
2b28515d9b | refactor: migrate story snapshot params to pixel (#26844) | ||
|
Susana Ferreira
|
3deecb481e |
chore: remove ai-gateway-cost-control experiment flag (#27579)
## Description Closes [AIGOV-443](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-443/remove-ai-gateway-cost-control-experiment-flag-once-feature-is-stable). The AI Gateway cost control feature is planned for GA on the upcoming release, so this removes the `ExperimentAIGatewayCostControl` experiment and all of its gating. The cost control API endpoints remain gated by the `FeatureAIBridge` license feature (the AI Governance add-on), so this only drops the experiment layer. ## Changes - **`codersdk/deployment.go`**: remove the `ExperimentAIGatewayCostControl` const, its `DisplayName()` case, and its `ExperimentsKnown` entry. - **`enterprise/coderd/coderd.go`**: remove the `httpmw.RequireExperiment(...)` gating from the AI cost control routes. They keep `RequireFeatureMW(codersdk.FeatureAIBridge)`. Affected endpoints: - `GET /organizations/{organization}/groups/ai/spend` - `GET /organizations/{organization}/groups/{groupName}/members/ai/spend` - `GET /organizations/{organization}/ai/spend/export` - `GET /groups/{group}/members/ai/spend` - `GET /groups/{group}/ai/spend` - `GET/PUT/DELETE /users/{user}/ai/budget/override` and `GET /users/{user}/ai/spend` - **`enterprise/coderd/aibridge_test.go`**: drop the experiment from test setup and remove the now-obsolete `RequiresExperiment` negative-path tests. - **Frontend (`site/src/...`)**: remove the `ai-gateway-cost-control` experiment checks from the cost control UI (Groups pages, user dropdown) and their stories/mocks. The feature is now driven solely by the `aibridge` feature visibility. - **Generated**: regenerated `coderd/apidoc/*`, `docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, and `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`. ## Out of scope The dogfood `CODER_EXPERIMENTS` config lives in a separate infra repo, not `coder/coder`. Leaving `ai-gateway-cost-control` there is harmless: unknown experiment values are logged as `"ignoring unknown experiment"` at startup and otherwise ignored, so no ordering dependency or breakage. That cleanup can be a follow-up. <details> <summary>Implementation notes</summary> - Verified how unknown experiments are handled in `coderd/coderd.go` `ReadExperiments`: unknown values produce a warning log and are inert, so removing the definition before the dogfood config is updated is safe. - Noticed the group `ai/budget` routes (`/groups/{group}/ai/budget`) were already gated only by `FeatureAIBridge`, never by the experiment. After this change all cost control routes are uniformly feature-gated, resolving that inconsistency. - Removed an obsolete `RequiresExperiment` subtest in `TestUserAISpendStatus` that only asserted a 403 from the experiment gate; with the gate gone it would no longer be blocked pre-RBAC. </details> --- _This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira._ |
||
|
Susana Ferreira
|
d6a5c8e9f8 |
refactor: make user AI budget and spend endpoints consistent (#27611)
## Description
Makes the user AI cost control endpoints consistent.
## Changes
- Replaces the flat `spend_limit_micros` and `limit_source` fields on
`GET /users/{user}/ai/spend` with a nested `effective_budget`, reusing
the type behind `group_budget`. The flat pair made it possible to encode
a limit without a source.
- Renames `AIGroupBudget` to `AIBudgetLimit`, since it also carries
`user_override` limits and is no longer group-specific. The type name is
not part of the wire format.
- Moves `/users/{user}/ai/budget` to `/users/{user}/ai/budget/override`.
The endpoint only ever managed the per-user override, which the type,
the handlers, and the operation IDs all already said; the path was the
only place that didn't.
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by
@ssncferreira
|
||
|
Susana Ferreira
|
e71249a821 |
fix: ai cost control cap configurable AI spend limit (#27640)
## Problem A configured AI spend limit was only validated as `gte=0`, with no upper bound. The group spend query multiplies the per-member limit by the number of attributed members, so a large enough limit overflows `bigint` and fails the whole query, returning an error for every group in the request rather than just the misconfigured one. ## Changes - Add `MaxAISpendLimitMicros`, $1,000,000 per member per budget period. - Reject group budgets and per-user overrides above the maximum with a 400 naming the limit. - Bound both budget forms in the UI so they show the valid range before submitting. Follow-up https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27589#discussion_r3668956350 Depends on https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/27589 > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
1c722ff969 |
fix(coderd/database): order the chat prompt query and its boundary by id (#27619)
## Stack context Follows #27495 (merged), which gives `chat_messages.id` an append-order guarantee and moves the history reads onto it. This PR applies the same fix to the query that builds the model prompt. ## Why? `GetChatMessagesForPromptByChatID` mixed two orderings. It selected the compaction boundary with `created_at DESC, id DESC`, then applied that boundary with an `id >` comparison, and returned rows with `created_at ASC, id ASC`. `created_at` is `now()`, so it is the transaction start time. Every row in one insert batch shares it, and concurrent transactions can commit in the opposite order to the one they started in. Two consequences, both reaching the provider: - **Malformed prompts.** A tool result could be ordered ahead of the assistant message that requested it. `chatprompt.injectMissingToolResults` does not repair this: it only handles tool rows already contiguous after an assistant row, and adds missing results. It never moves a tool row that precedes its assistant, and nothing re-sorts the rows in Go. - **Wrong compaction boundary.** The boundary is picked by timestamp but compared by id, so a stale compressed summary could be retained while the actual latest one was dropped. ## Changes Both the boundary CTE and the outer query order by `id`. The `id >` predicate is unchanged, which is the point: the ordering now matches the comparison that was always being made. **The boundary index was dead, so it is rebuilt to match.** `idx_chat_messages_compressed_summary_boundary` was created for exactly this lookup, but its predicate requires `role = 'system'` while compaction writes its summary with the user role (`message_conversion.go:334`, the only writer of `compressed = true`). It matched zero rows, and no other query can use it. Migration `000560` rebuilds it as `(chat_id, id DESC) WHERE compressed AND NOT deleted AND visibility = 'model'`, which also matches the new order key. Measured on PostgreSQL 13 with a 20k-message chat, 11 summaries, and 14 sibling chats so `chat_id` is selective: | boundary lookup | plan | buffers | |---|---|---| | old predicate | Index Scan `idx_chat_messages_chat`, 19,989 rows filtered | 267 | | rebuilt index | Index Only Scan | 2 | Not in scope: the outer `SELECT` still inspects every row of the chat, because its `role = 'system' AND compressed = FALSE` disjunct has no lower `id` bound. That predates this PR and needs a query rewrite rather than an index. ## Testing Two subtests, both verified red by reverting the `ORDER BY` and regenerating: - `OrdersByIDWhenTimestampsDisagree` returned `[4,3,2,1]` instead of `[1,2,3,4]`, placing the tool result before the assistant call. - `CompactionBoundaryUsesID` selected the stale summary and leaked the messages between the two summaries into the prompt. Existing subtests pass unchanged. Migration up/down tests pass, and the rebuilt index was verified red-green: restoring the old predicate returns the plan to a 267-buffer scan, and the old predicate matches 0 rows in the fixture. > Opened by Mux on behalf of Mike. |
||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
c17bed25e0 |
feat: wire chat lifecycle hooks into chatd (#27429)
Wires chat lifecycle hooks into chatd, gated by the `agent-lifecycle-hooks` experiment. Part of the lifecycle hooks stack (#27401, #27428, #27430). See `docs/admin/setup/chat-lifecycle-hooks.md` for the consumer-facing contract. ## Summary When a hook URL is configured, chatd dispatches `session_start`, `user_prompt_submit`, `pre_tool_use`, `post_tool_use`, `pre_compact`, `post_compact`, and `stop` events to the consumer and applies its responses. ## Design - **Stateless**: Coder stores no hook dispatch or decision state. Delivery is at least once; consumers deduplicate on stable payload identifiers (chat ID, event type, tool-use ID) and answer duplicates with the same decision. - **Admission-time prompt effects**: `user_prompt_submit` dispatches exactly once per submission (create, send, queue, edit, subagent spawn) and folds its effects into the stored prompt as typed message parts: original-or-overridden user parts, then model-only `hook-context`, then a user-visible `hook-notice`. Hook context is stripped from every client-facing conversion; hook notices are excluded from model prompts. The server rejects hook parts in client-submitted content. - **Tool gating**: `pre_tool_use` allow can override tool input; deny becomes a synthetic denied tool result, with any returned model context persisted as a model-only transcript row so it never reaches clients. The denial text identifies an external policy (the deployment's lifecycle hook) as the source and marks the decision as persistent, so the model explains the denial instead of retrying it or misreporting it as an infrastructure failure. - **Fail closed**: a dispatch failure rejects the triggering request or moves the chat to the error state in the same transaction as the affected step, so a runnable state is never published with unapproved content. - **Admission before persistence**: `pre_tool_use` is dispatched for the calls the model produced, before the assistant message is stored. See "Staged tool admission" below. - **Fresh dispatch per tool call**: every non-provider-executed tool call is decided by its own `pre_tool_use` dispatch; Coder never reuses an earlier decision on the consumer's behalf. Retries re-dispatch the same logical event. ## Structure All hook dispatch flows through one seam: entry points build a `chathooks.Chat` (chat identity) and a `chathooks.Message` (event details) and call `Trigger.Trigger`, the only component that talks to the dispatcher. The integration lives in the `coderd/x/chatd/chathooks` subpackage, split by responsibility: - `trigger.go`: the trigger seam; builds the wire envelope per event, normalizes deny into a typed error, and holds the package's single enabled-check. - `effects.go`: pure conversion of hook results into transcript rows and prompt parts. - `errors.go`: failure classification (dispatch error messages, denial mapping, tool-result dispatch-failure scanning). - `tooluse.go`: the tool-call gate (`pre_tool_use` preflight, `post_tool_use` payloads, applying admitted input to the step). Server-bound glue stays in `coderd/x/chatd/hook_server.go`: the chat-parking dispatch error handlers, the step-commit row insertion wrappers, and the dynamic post-tool-use state loader, which depends on chatd validation types. This PR adopts the `codersdk/x/agenthooks` and `coderd/x/agenthooks/dispatch` import paths introduced at the tip of #27401; intermediate commits still reference the pre-move paths and are not individually buildable. ## Staged tool admission `pre_tool_use` originally ran at tool execution time, which is after the assistant message carrying the tool call was already committed. An `input_override` therefore had to rewrite stored message content in place. @hugodutka pointed out that chatd treats message content as immutable, and that the rewrite was a shortcut rather than a requirement. It was also a correctness problem in its own right: the rewrite only updated the database, so the transcript could show one input while a different one had executed. The hook now runs before the step is persisted: ```text provider stream ends (tool calls complete, in memory) -> pre_tool_use dispatch per call -> ONE transaction: assistant row with admitted inputs, synthetic denials, hook rows -> execute ``` The step is inserted once, carrying the input the tool runs with. `UpdateChatMessageContentByID` and `Tx.UpdateMessageContent` are deleted from #27428, so message content stays immutable. Two consequences, both intentional: - **Clients converge rather than wait.** Tool-call parts still stream live, so a rewritten call briefly shows the model's proposed input before the committed message replaces it. The chat store already clears stream state when an assistant message arrives, so the stored input wins with no frontend change and no added latency before tool cards appear. - **A call already in history was already admitted.** Execution consumes the stored input instead of dispatching a second decision, which keeps one dispatch and one set of hook effects per call. A consumer policy change between admission and execution applies to later calls, not to calls already admitted. The per-chat debug endpoint still records the provider's original tool input. Its purpose is to report provider behavior, and it requires an explicit per-chat debug flag; the invariant here covers the transcript. ## Configuration Adds `chat-hook-url`, `chat-hook-secret`, `chat-hook-timeout`, and `chat-hook-enabled` deployment options with startup validation. The flags are hidden from `coder server --help` while the feature is experimental; the setup guide documents them. ## Tool input validation Built-in tool arguments reach a consumer as raw JSON with key spelling preserved, but the tools decode those bytes with Go, which matches struct fields case-insensitively and keeps the last match. A policy reading `path` could therefore authorize one value while the tool executed another, and a lone case variant such as `{"PATH":"/secret"}` was invisible to a policy checking for `path`. Coder now rejects a built-in tool call whose input repeats a key or spells a schema property with different capitalization, before the `pre_tool_use` dispatch, so a consumer is never asked to authorize bytes whose meaning depends on the reader. Rejected calls produce an error result the model can retry; unambiguous calls in the same batch still run. A consumer-authored `input_override` is rechecked after the dispatch and fails the turn closed, because the model cannot correct it. Dynamic and MCP inputs are excluded because the client and the workspace agent execute those calls rather than coderd. Two paths needed more than a schema check. Execution resolves a deprecated tool name to its canonical tool, so validation resolves aliases first. The `edit_files` decoder also reads `search` and `replace`, which its schema does not advertise, so those aliases are now matched exactly and their case variants ignored. A hook denial now returns a structured 403 carrying `kind: "hook_denied"`, mirroring the dispatch-failure response that already carries its own kind. Without it a client cannot tell a policy decision apart from a generic failure, and the chat UI titled a denial "Request failed". Adding a kind needs no migration: `ChatErrorKind` is persisted only inside the JSONB `chats.last_error` column, whose decoder accepts unknown kinds. The hook docs also correct the tool-input convergence window. A batch dispatches sequentially before the assistant row commits, so the original input stays visible for a span that scales with the number of tool calls in the step rather than a single hook timeout. > This PR was written by Mux, an AI coding agent, on Mike's behalf. |
||
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Michael Suchacz
|
91c7232d97 |
feat: add chat suffix messages, idle failure, and content update support (#27428)
Adds generic chat state and query capabilities that the lifecycle hooks integration (#27429) builds on. Part of the lifecycle hooks stack (#27401, #27429, #27430). - `chatstate`: `EditMessage` accepts caller-provided suffix messages inserted after the replacement in the same transaction, transitions can carry a typed error kind, and `FinishError` is also allowed from waiting chats so admission-time failures can park an idle chat in error. - `chatstate`: `ValidateToolResults` holds the submitted-tool-result rules (duplicate, invalid JSON, missing, unexpected) in one place, so `CompleteRequiresAction` and API-level prechecks reject the same payloads with the same typed causes. - `database`: `InsertChat` accepts an optional caller-provided ID. No hook-specific state or behavior is introduced here; these primitives are usable by any caller. An earlier revision added a message-content rewrite primitive so a `pre_tool_use` override could update an already-committed tool call. Message content is immutable by design, and @hugodutka pushed back on changing that. The rewrite is gone: #27429 now dispatches the hook before the assistant message is stored, so the stored input is the one that runs and nothing needs updating. > This PR was written by Mux, an AI coding agent, on Mike's behalf. |
||
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Cian Johnston
|
5d2a69d85a |
fix(coderd/x/chatd/chaterror): extract plain-text provider error bodies (#27597)
Follows up #27538. Fixes an issue where `chaterror` would not classify a plain-text aibridge budget error 403 as ChatErrorKindUsageLimit. Root cause: Anthropic adapter drops the body from `ProviderError.Message`, and `providerErrorResponseMessage` extracted only JSON. - Parses the dumped response with `http.ReadResponse` (strips headers, de-chunks, leaves non-dump payloads like Google's raw messages whole). - When JSON extraction yields nothing, falls back to the trimmed first line of the body. - Falls back on `Content-Type: text/plain` only, and never on valid JSON as `Detail` is user-facing. - Adds an end-to-end regression test that Anthropic-shaped 403 budget error → `usage_limit`, not retryable (was `auth`). - Adds table-driven test cases: HTML skipped, whitespace skipped, first-line-only, JSON-without-message, chunked, Google raw message. --- > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @johnstcn. |
||
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Susana Ferreira
|
0b4095085e |
fix: report combined member limit in group AI spend (#27589)
## Problem The organization groups page showed each group's AI budget as the group's per-member limit, so the total it displayed was effectively group members × group budget. That ignores per-user budget overrides charged to the group, so a group where one member has an override reported a limit that doesn't match what its members can actually spend. ## Changes - Add `total_spend_limit_micros` to the organization groups AI spend payload, the combined budget of the members attributed to the group, with each member's override replacing their share. - Return `null` for the total when the group has no budget, since its members spend without a cap. - Both the organization groups and single group spend endpoints report the new field, as they share the same query. - Use the total as the denominator on the groups page AI budget column. Depends on #27568 |
||
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Michael Suchacz
|
e96d8646e2 |
fix(coderd): give chat message ids an append-order guarantee (#27495)
Chat message ordering was derived from `created_at`, which is `now()` and therefore the transaction start time. That makes it unusable as an append-order column for two independent reasons: every row in one `InsertChatMessages` batch shares a single timestamp, and two concurrent transactions can commit in the opposite order to the one they started in. This PR gives `chat_messages.id` a real append-order guarantee and moves the history reads onto it. ## Changes **`InsertChatMessages` had no input-order guarantee.** Callers index the returned slice by input position. That only worked because PostgreSQL happens to evaluate the `BIGSERIAL` default in row order. Ids are now allocated up front and the k-th smallest is assigned to input index k, so the pairing does not depend on where the column default is evaluated. Returned rows are explicitly `ORDER BY id`. **Three history reads now order by `id`.** | Query | Was | Now | |---|---|---| | `GetChatMessagesByChatID` | `created_at ASC` | `id ASC` | | `GetChatMessagesByRevisionForStream` | `created_at ASC, id ASC` | `id ASC` | | `GetLastChatMessageByRole` | `created_at DESC, id DESC` | `id DESC` | `GetChatMessagesByChatID` paginated by `id` while ordering by `created_at`, which is incoherent on its own terms. The other two matter because of who consumes them. The stream query supplies incremental updates on the same socket that emits a full `GetChatMessagesByChatID` snapshot on history reset, so once that snapshot moved to `id` the two disagreed under timestamp skew. `GetLastChatMessageByRole` returns an id that is then used as an id cursor, both as `AfterID` when synthesizing tool cancellations and as `chats.last_read_message_id`, where a stale anchor leaves later assistant messages permanently unread. A tie-breaker would not have fixed either one. It only resolves equal timestamps; leading with `created_at` is the actual defect. **`GetLastChatMessageByRole` loses its index, so this adds one.** `ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC` could take an ordered scan of `idx_chat_messages_chat_created`. Nothing in the schema can supply `ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1` for a given `chat_id` and `role`, so the planner switches to a backward scan of the primary key and filters every newer row in the table, scanning all of it when the chat has no message in that role, which is the routine case for a fresh chat. Migration `000559` adds `(chat_id, role, id DESC) WHERE deleted = false`, the same shape as the existing `idx_chat_messages_user_prompts`. This matters because the query is hot: it runs on every stream connect and disconnect, and once per turn when synthesizing tool cancellations. `GetChatMessagesForPromptByChatID` has the same defect and is fixed in the stacked PR, because its compaction boundary change is semantic and deserves a separate review. Auto-archive stays timestamp-based deliberately: it measures activity, not order. Wrapping the insert in a CTE (needed because `INSERT` cannot take `ORDER BY`) makes sqlc synthesize `InsertChatMessagesRow`. It is structurally identical to `ChatMessage`, so the call sites use a direct struct conversion that stops compiling if the two ever diverge. ## Testing Behavior tests write `created_at` values inverted against id order, so a reader that leads with `created_at` returns the batch backwards. All three queries were verified red by reverting the `ORDER BY` and regenerating: the stream query returned `[3,2,1]` for `[1,2,3]`, and `GetLastChatMessageByRole` picked id 1 instead of id 3. `TestInsertChatMessagesOrderContract` asserts against the generated SQL, covering what a behavior test cannot: PostgreSQL evaluates the id default in row order anyway, so a batch still looks ordered once the guarantee is removed. `TestChatMessagesSequenceCacheIsOne` guards the cross-batch half of the invariant. Ids follow chat row lock order only while the sequence hands out one value at a time; sequence cache blocks are per session, so with a cache above one a backend holding stale cached values can lock second and still commit lower ids. Bumping a sequence cache is an ordinary throughput tweak, and it would silently corrupt history order. The index was checked on a 200k row fixture. Without it, the zero-match lookup filters all 200,000 rows over 2763 buffers; with it, the plan is an index scan with both `chat_id` and `role` in the index condition, no sort node, and 3 buffers. Note that the within-batch mapping does not depend on the cache size. It is established by `ROW_NUMBER() OVER (ORDER BY id)` over the allocated ids, so it holds regardless of `nextval` evaluation order. ## Note on the deleted subagent hand-sort The subagent history reader's hand-sort stays deleted, but calling it redundant was imprecise. It sorted by `created_at` then `id`, so it is only equivalent to `id` ordering when the two agree. When they disagree the old code selected a different "latest assistant". This is a deliberate behavior change to match the new invariant, not dead-code removal. > Opened by Mux on behalf of Mike. |
||
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Jaayden Halko
|
06ceb4253d |
feat: add agent runtime hour license claims and entitlement feature (#27459)
Licenses can now carry three agent runtime hour claims:
`agent_runtime_hours_allocation`, `agent_runtime_hours_limit_soft`, and
`agent_runtime_hours_limit_hard` (unit: hours). They surface as the new
usage-period feature `agent_runtime_hours` in `GET
/api/v2/entitlements`, where `limit` carries the allocation and the new
optional `soft_limit` / `hard_limit` fields on `codersdk.Feature` carry
the thresholds.
Invalid combinations reject the entire license via `validateClaims`
(both at upload and when computing entitlements for stored licenses):
soft/hard without allocation, negative allocation, soft outside `0 <=
soft < allocation`, or `hard < allocation`.
Soft and hard limits are not comparison inputs in `Feature.Compare`;
they ride along with whichever license wins (newest `iat`, existing
behavior). None of the three claim names is a feature name, so old
servers ignore them via the existing unknown-claim tolerance, protecting
rollout of licenses minted with the new claims.
The claim name constants defined in `enterprise/coderd/license` are the
canonical contract for `github.com/coder/license` (X1).
Part of
[CODAGT-837](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-837/a1-agent-runtime-license-claims-and-entitlement-feature).
Blocks B4 (usage wiring + warnings), C1 (hard-limit admission gate), F1
(licenses page), A4 (managed-agent coexistence), X1 (licensor).
Out of scope, handled by follow-up issues: `Actual` usage wiring,
threshold warnings, admission gating, premium defaults, and FE surfacing
beyond regenerated types.
<details>
<summary>Implementation plan and decision log</summary>
## Decisions (confirmed by jaayden, 2026-07-23)
1. **Claim names / unit:**
- `agent_runtime_hours_allocation` - allocation (unit: hours, int64)
- `agent_runtime_hours_limit_soft` - soft limit
- `agent_runtime_hours_limit_hard` - hard limit
- None of the three claim names is itself a `FeatureName`; all three map
to the single new usage-period feature `agent_runtime_hours`
(`FeatureAgentRuntimeHours`), mirroring how `managed_agent_limit_soft`
mapped onto `managed_agent_limit`. Old servers therefore ignore all
three claims via the `FeatureNamesMap` check.
2. **Reject-license.** Invalid claim combinations reject the whole
license via `validateClaims` (upload returns 400 via
`ParseClaimsIgnoreNbf`; already-stored licenses produce an `Invalid
license ... parsing claims` entitlements error and contribute nothing).
## Design notes
- `codersdk.Feature` had a `SoftLimit` field until
|
||
|
Bobby Ho
|
fbac602456 |
feat!: add admin-controlled dynamic client registration toggle (#27316)
`POST /oauth2/register` (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) has exactly one gate today: `ExperimentOAuth2`, a static, process-lifetime flag that wraps the entire `/oauth2/*` route tree as an all-or-nothing switch. That flag is scheduled for removal at GA, which would leave DCR with zero admin control at all once it is gone. Add a persistent, DCR-specific `oauth2_dcr_enabled` deployment setting, independent of the experiment system, so admin control over DCR survives GA. `POST /oauth2/register` checks the flag and rejects new registrations with an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled; discovery metadata (`GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`) conditionally omits `registration_endpoint`. A new audited `GET`/`PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings` endpoint lets an owner toggle it live, no restart required. The setting defaults to disabled, matching the canonical design proposal; disabling only stops new self-registrations, clients that already registered continue to authorize and exchange tokens normally. Address issue described in [ENG-3056](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3056/oauth2-dcr-admin-configurable-enabledisable). ## Where this sits in the request path ```mermaid sequenceDiagram autonumber participant A as Admin participant S as coderd participant DB as site_configs<br/>(oauth2_dcr_enabled) participant C as OAuth2/MCP Client Note over A,S: Admin toggles DCR (new) A->>S: PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings<br/>{dynamic_client_registration_enabled: false} S->>S: authorizeContext(ActionUpdate, ResourceDeploymentConfig) S->>DB: UPSERT oauth2_dcr_enabled = false S-->>A: 200 OK (audited) Note over C,S: Client discovery + registration afterward C->>S: GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache) DB-->>S: false S-->>C: 200 metadata, registration_endpoint omitted C->>S: POST /oauth2/register S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache) DB-->>S: false S-->>C: 403 invalid_request,<br/>"Dynamic client registration is disabled" Note over C,S: A client that registered before the change is unaffected C->>S: GET /oauth2/authorize?client_id=... Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally) C->>S: PUT/DELETE /oauth2/clients/{client_id} (RFC 7592 self-management) Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path either S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally) ``` ## Files changed: manual vs. generated Reviewers should focus on the **manual** files. The **generated** ones are `make gen` output that follows mechanically from the manual changes and don't need direct review. <details> <summary><b>Manual files (26)</b> — click to expand, grouped the same way as "Suggested review order" below</summary> **1. Database** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` | New `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` query pair on the existing generic `site_configs` table. No schema change. | | `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` | RBAC check (`rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig`) on the two new query methods; extends the `subjectSystemOAuth2` system-actor role with read-only `ResourceDeploymentConfig` access, needed so the public discovery/registration endpoints can read the flag via `dbauthz.AsSystemOAuth2`. | | `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` | RBAC assertion coverage for `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` in the method-coverage test suite. | **2. Request gating (the actual feature)** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` | The actual gate: `CreateDynamicClientRegistration` reads the flag first and returns an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled (defaults disabled if never configured). | | `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` | New unit test, `TestCreateDynamicClientRegistration_DCREnabled`: calls the handler directly (no HTTP server), covering enabled / explicitly disabled / never-configured. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` | `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` conditionally omits `registration_endpoint` from discovery metadata when DCR is disabled. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` | New unit test, `TestGetAuthorizationServerMetadata_DCREnabled`: same three states, for the discovery handler. | **3. Admin settings endpoint** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `codersdk/oauth2.go` | New `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type plus `Client.OAuth2ProviderSettings`/`PutOAuth2ProviderSettings` methods. | | `coderd/oauth2.go` | New `oauth2ProviderSettings`/`putOAuth2ProviderSettings` admin handlers (audited via `audit.InitRequest`); updates the `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` call site to pass `api.Database`. | | `coderd/coderd.go` | Registers `GET`/`PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings`. | | `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` | New test file: admin `GET`/`PUT` round-trip, default-disabled-before-any-`PUT`, and `403` for a non-owner on both `GET` and `PUT`. | **4. Audit wiring** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/database/types.go` | New `database.OAuth2ProviderSettings` audit-only struct (mirrors `NotificationsSettings`). | | `coderd/audit/diff.go` | Adds the new struct to the `Auditable` type union. | | `coderd/audit/request.go` | Adds the new struct to all four dispatch switches (`ResourceTarget`, `ResourceID`, `ResourceType`, `ResourceRequiresOrgID`). | | `codersdk/audit.go` | New API-facing `ResourceTypeOAuth2ProviderSettings` constant and its `FriendlyString` case. | | `enterprise/audit/table.go` | Field-level audit action map (`ActionTrack`/`ActionIgnore`) for the new struct. | | `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.up.sql` | Adds `oauth2_provider_settings` to the `resource_type` Postgres enum, required for the audit wiring above (`resource_type` is a real enum, not a Go-only value). | | `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.down.sql` | No-op (`ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE` can't be reverted). | **5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` | New shared test helper, `EnableDCR`, since DCR now defaults to disabled and many pre-existing tests need it turned on to register a client. | | `coderd/oauth2_test.go` | Adds `TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled` (registers a client, disables DCR, verifies new registration is rejected while the existing client's self-management, authorize, and token exchange all keep working); calls `EnableDCR` in every pre-existing test that registers a client. | | `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go` | Calls `EnableDCR` in every test that registers a client, so RFC-error-format assertions aren't masked by the new disabled-by-default gate. | | `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` | Same: `EnableDCR` added to every registration-dependent test. | | `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go` | Same. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go` | Same (near-duplicate of `oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` in a different package). | | `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go` | Same. | | `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go` | Same, for the MCP end-to-end dynamic-registration flow test. | </details> <details> <summary><b>Generated files (12)</b> — from <code>make gen</code>, no need to review directly</summary> `coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`, `coderd/database/dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`, `coderd/database/dbmock/dbmock.go`, `coderd/database/dump.sql`, `coderd/database/models.go`, `coderd/database/querier.go`, `coderd/database/queries.sql.go`, `docs/admin/security/audit-logs.md`, `docs/reference/api/enterprise.md`, `docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`. </details> ## Suggested review order ### 1. Database Establishes the persisted setting and its RBAC rule; everything else builds on `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled`. 1. `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` — the two new queries. Same boolean-encoding pattern as the existing `oauth2_github_default_eligible` key right above them in the same file. 2. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` — the RBAC wrapper for those two queries, plus the `subjectSystemOAuth2` role extension (search this file for `ResourceDeploymentConfig`, it appears in both spots). 3. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` — asserts the RBAC checks from (2) actually fire. ### 2. Request gating (the actual feature) Where `POST /oauth2/register` and discovery metadata change behavior. 1. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` — the primary gate. Read this first; it's the feature. 2. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` — its new unit test, exercising the gate's three states directly against the handler. 3. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` — the same gating pattern applied to the discovery `GET` endpoint. 4. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` — its new unit test. ### 3. Admin settings endpoint How an owner flips the setting live. 1. `codersdk/oauth2.go` — the `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type and `Client` methods first; this is the public contract everything below implements against. 2. `coderd/oauth2.go` — the `GET`/`PUT` handlers themselves. 3. `coderd/coderd.go` — route registration, to see where those handlers get wired in. 4. `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` — round-trip and permission tests. ### 4. Audit wiring Plumbing required so step 3's `PUT` is auditable; mechanical except for (3). 1. `coderd/database/types.go` — the audit-only struct; everything else in this layer exists to plumb it through. 2. `coderd/audit/diff.go` — adds it to the `Auditable` type union (the compiler enforces this one). 3. `coderd/audit/request.go` — the four dispatch switches; the one part of this layer worth reading closely. 4. `codersdk/audit.go` — the API-facing resource type constant. 5. `enterprise/audit/table.go` — the field-action map. 6. `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.{up,down}.sql` — read last; a consequence of needing a new `resource_type` enum value for (1)-(5), not a design decision of its own. ### 5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip 1. `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` — the new `EnableDCR` helper. Read first to understand the fix pattern before seeing it applied repeatedly. 2. `coderd/oauth2_test.go` — next, since it also contains the new `TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled`, not just `EnableDCR` call sites. 3. The rest, in any order, they're mechanical repeats of the same one-line addition: `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go`, `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go`. ## Explicitly out of scope Per the design proposal: rate limiting on `POST /oauth2/register` (tracked separately), retroactively affecting already-registered clients when DCR is disabled (this only gates new self-registration), and an Initial Access Token requirement (a separate, follow-up ticket). |
||
|
|
1a6a8be96c |
feat: log tailnet tunnels to the connection log (#27423)
Co-authored-by: Chris DiGiamo <cd@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Chris DiGiamo <cdigiamo@anthropic.com> |
||
|
George KandBobby Ho
|
8cc7f2bb0e |
fix(coderd): reject workspace proxy hostname prefixes (#27544)
A workspace proxy hostname prefix could be accepted as a valid proxy access URL. An authenticated user could then be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain with an application-connect API key in the URL. Require proxy access URL matches to have a hostname boundary after the candidate hostname, allowing only the end of the URL, a port, or a path. Add regression coverage for proxy access URL and wildcard hostname prefixes. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-384 --------- Co-authored-by: Bobby Ho <bobbidinho@gmail.com> |
||
|
Andrew Aquino
|
09a69e624a |
feat: search users by display name (#27398)
Free-text member search previously matched only username and email, so typing a person's display name returned no results even though the UI shows the display name as the primary label. This broadens the free-text `@search` filter to also match `users.name`. The change is in three queries: `GetUsers`, `PaginatedOrganizationMembers`, and `GetGroupMembersByGroupIDPaginated`. This covers every server-filtered surface: the Users page, the Organization Members page, the Group Members page, and the `UserAutocomplete` / `WorkspaceUserAutocomplete` pickers (which query `GetUsers` with `q`). The org member picker (`MemberAutocomplete`) filters client-side via cmdk, so display name is added to its `keywords`. Explicit filters (`name:`, `username`/`email`) and pagination counts are unchanged; the group members count still comes from the filtered `COUNT(*) OVER()` in the same query. Refs DEVEX-484 Refs DEVEX-565 <details> <summary>Implementation plan</summary> ## Problem Member search (both the global Users page and the Organization Members page) matches only on `username` and `email`. It does not match on the user's display name (`users.name`), even though the Organization Members table shows `name` as the primary title. So typing a person's full name in the search box returns nothing. Today a bare search term (`alice`) is routed to the SQL `@search` filter, which only checks `email`/`username`. Display name is only matched if the user explicitly types `name:alice`, which is undiscoverable. ## Design decision Include `name` in the free-text `@search` condition in the affected SQL queries. A bare term then matches `email OR username OR name`, using the same case-insensitive substring `ILIKE` already in place. This keeps the existing explicit `name:` filter working. Tradeoff: this broadens the meaning of free-text `search` globally (anything using these queries now also matches display name). This is the intended behavior, confirmed against DEVEX-565 (display name search in the user picker). ## Affected files Backend: - `coderd/database/queries/users.sql` (`GetUsers`) - `coderd/database/queries/organizationmembers.sql` (`PaginatedOrganizationMembers`) - `coderd/database/queries/groupmembers.sql` (`GetGroupMembersByGroupIDPaginated`) - `coderd/database/queries.sql.go` regenerated via `make gen` Frontend: - `site/src/components/UserAutocomplete/UserAutocomplete.tsx` (add `name` to client-side cmdk keywords) Tests: - `coderd/coderdtest/users.go` (shared `UsersFilter` helper): added a `DisplayNameSearch` case and extended search-based expectations to include `name`. Exercised by `TestGetUsersFilter`, `TestGetOrgMembersFilter`, and `TestGetGroupMembersFilter`. Docs: - `docs/admin/users/index.md`: documented that free-text search matches username, email, and display name. ## Frontend surface coverage | Surface | Sends | Backend | Query | |---|---|---|---| | Users page | `q` | `GET /users` | `GetUsers` | | Organization Members page | `q` | paginated members | `PaginatedOrganizationMembers` | | Group Members page | `q` | `groupMembers` | `GetGroupMembersByGroupIDPaginated` | | User pickers (server-filtered) | `q` | `GET /users` | `GetUsers` | | Org member picker (client-filtered) | local cmdk | n/a | keyword change | ## Out of scope - Trigram/similarity (fuzzy) matching; keeps `ILIKE` substring semantics. - Sort/pagination ordering (still `LOWER(username)`). </details> --- _Created by Coder Agents on behalf of @aqandrew._ |
||
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Cian Johnston
|
75fd7bc09a |
fix: remove chatd usage limit enforcement (#27535)
This PR surgically removes enforcement of Agents spend limits: - Adjusts the relevant function that checks usage to always return nil - Deletes tests that expect a usage limit error. |
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Mathias Fredriksson
|
eb905702c8 |
fix(coderd/util/syncmap): match sync.Map semantics in the typed wrapper (#27582)
Fixes CODAGT-869 |
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Zach
|
85984ff142 |
feat: add enable/disable support for user secrets (#27537)
Users can now disable a secret to stop it from being injected into workspaces without deleting it, and re-enable it later. Disabled secrets stay visible and editable everywhere they already appear. An enabled secret must have at least one injection target; a secret with no target can be stored only while disabled. Existing target-less secrets are migrated to disabled to preserve current behavior. Support spans the REST API, SDK, CLI, dashboard, and audit log. |
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Danielle Maywood
|
be226409b8 | fix: delete the unused ChatMessagePart.Signature field (#27588) | ||
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Michael Suchacz
|
8ea2586189 |
feat: add chat lifecycle hook dispatch backend (#27401)
Adds the chat lifecycle hook wire contract and dispatch plumbing, first PR of the lifecycle hooks stack (followed by #27428, #27429, #27430). - `codersdk/x/agenthooks`: event and response wire types, JWT creation and verification with the shared secret (HS256, request body digest, expiry and not-before freshness checks), and an HTTP handler helper so consumers only implement the events they use. The `codersdk/x` location marks the consumer SDK as experimental. - `coderd/x/agenthooks/dispatch`: a stateless dispatcher that signs and posts hook events, enforces a concurrency cap under one configured timeout that bounds both the capacity wait and both post attempts, retries one connection failure with the same JWT, sends a distinctive `coderd-agenthooks/<version>` User-Agent, and records Prometheus metrics. Delivery is at least once; consumers own durable decision state, audit records, and deduplication keyed by the stable payload identifiers. Nothing is persisted by Coder. - Response bodies decode strictly: unknown fields, duplicate JSON keys (including inside `input_override`), and trailing data fail the dispatch closed as protocol errors instead of silently reading as allow. - `coderd/util/xnet`: shared timeout and connection error classification used by the dispatcher retry logic. Transient HTTP/2 stream aborts count as connection errors, so the documented single retry also applies to h2 consumers, which is the shape Go's default transport negotiates against any TLS consumer. Deterministic protocol failures stay terminal. Only the struct form of a stream error is matched, because `net/http` bundles its own HTTP/2 types and `h2_error.go` bridges only that shape. - `scripts/agenthooks-server`: a reference consumer that logs events and demonstrates consumer-owned pre-tool decision deduplication. It requires an explicitly configured JWT audience rather than deriving one from the request, and its startup output names the mode it is running in so an operator can see that the example policy flags need `-log-only=false`. - `scripts/apitypings`: generate TypeScript types for the hook wire contract. Dispatch failures log without the error's stack frames, since a failed dispatch is an expected, operator-visible condition. Nothing dispatches these events yet; chatd wiring lands in #27429. > This PR was written by Mux, an AI coding agent, on Mike's behalf. |
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Jake Howell
|
bd5d640f1e |
fix(coderd/database/migrations): resolve duplicate 000554 migration collision (#27581)
> 🤖 This PR was written by Coder Agents on behalf of Jake Howell. ## Problem `main` currently has **two migrations sharing version `000554`**: - `000554_aibridge_token_usage_spend_export_index.{up,down}.sql` - `000554_legacy_none_login_to_password.{up,down}.sql` (from #26851) Both merged around the same time. #26851 was renumbered to `000554` when `000553` was the latest, but `aibridge_token_usage_spend_export_index` claimed `000554` and merged too, leaving a duplicate version number on `main`. Duplicate migration versions break the migration sequence. ## Fix Renumber the legacy none login migration to the next free slot, `000555`, leaving the aibridge migration at `000554`: - `000554_legacy_none_login_to_password.{up,down}.sql` -> `000555_legacy_none_login_to_password.{up,down}.sql` - `migrate_test.go`: `TestMigration000554...` -> `TestMigration000555...`, `priorMigrationVersion` `553` -> `554`, and the `os.ReadFile` filename. The migration is data-only and unchanged; only its version number moves. `TestMigration000555LegacyNoneLoginToPassword` passes locally. The same collision exists on `release/2.36` via the backport (#27578), which has been renumbered to `000555` to match. Resolves [DEVEX-226] follow-up. [DEVEX-226]: https://linear.app/issue/DEVEX-226 |
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Jake HowellandSushant P
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0e104f38e0 |
fix!: deprecate login_type=none, convert existing users to password login (#26851)
> 🤖 This PR was modified by Coder Agents on behalf of Jake Howell. Deprecates `login_type=none` (legacy passwordless machine users) in favour of premium **service accounts**, and migrates existing accounts off the deprecated path while preserving their identity. Resolves [DEVEX-226]. ## What this does - **Creation is gated** — `POST /users` and `coder users create` reject `login_type=none` (and the deprecated `--disable-login`) unless a service account is requested. - **Existing users are converted** — migration `000554_legacy_none_login_to_password` rewrites legacy non-system, non–service-account `login_type='none'` accounts to `login_type='password'`. Email addresses are **preserved** and existing API tokens remain valid. Admins can set a password if interactive login is desired. ## Why convert to `password` and not `is_service_account`? Migration `000433_add_is_service_account_to_users` adds two CHECK constraints: - `users_email_not_empty`: `(is_service_account = true) = (email = '')` - `users_service_account_login_type`: `is_service_account = false OR login_type = 'none'` Turning a real, email-bearing `login_type=none` user into a service account would require **blanking their email**. Converting to `password` instead preserves the account and its email. > ⚠️ **Breaking / one-way.** The `down` migration cannot restore which users originally had `login_type='none'`. Decision log - **Goal:** move existing `login_type=none` users off the deprecated path while preserving their identity/email. - **Constraint discovered:** the `is_service_account` CHECK constraints (migration `000433`) make a literal `none → service account` conversion require blanking emails, so this PR converts to `password` instead to keep emails intact. - **Implementation:** creation-gating in `cli/usercreate.go` and `coderd/users.go`, matching test updates, plus the `000554_legacy_none_login_to_password.{up,down}.sql` migration. - **CI fix:** the branch was behind `main` and its migration originally numbered `000534`, which collided with main's `000534_drop_chat_model_configs_provider`. Merged `main` and renumbered to `000554` (next free after main's `000553`). `make gen` produces no drift (the migration is data-only). > The service-account conversion alternative (#27182, which blanked emails) was closed in favour of this password-preserving approach. > > Docs follow-up: #27333. [DEVEX-226]: https://linear.app/issue/DEVEX-226 --------- Co-authored-by: Sushant P <zenithwolf1000@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Susana Ferreira
|
ed37483ff7 |
feat: add group AI spend endpoint (#27568)
## Description
Adds `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/spend`, returning the AI spend limit
and aggregate spend for a single group over the current budget period.
The period is derived from the deployment's configured budget period
rather than being caller-specified, matching the other AI spend
endpoints.
## Changes
- Add the `groupAISpend` handler and route, gated by the
`aigateway-cost-control` experiment and the `AIBridge` feature.
- Reuse the existing `GetOrganizationGroupsAISpend` query with a single
group ID, so no new query or authorization path is introduced.
- Add the `GroupAISpend` codersdk type and client method.
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-475/implement-apiv2groupsgroupaispend
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by
@ssncferreira
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||
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Susana Ferreira
|
c3895ff9c0 |
feat: add CSV export for AI spend data (#27491)
## Description
Adds `GET /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/ai/spend/export`,
returning `text/csv` with per-user, per-group, per-model, per-provider
aggregated AI spend. The data is built from the raw AI Gateway token
usage tables rather than the `ai_user_daily_spend` rollup, but stays
consistent with it: spend is attributed through the token usage's
effective group and bucketed by the token usage `created_at`, the same
values the daily rollup derives from.
The period defaults to the current UTC month, narrowed to the configured
AI Gateway retention window when the month begins before retained data
does. Explicit `period_start`/`period_end` params must be provided
together, are interpreted as UTC, and may span at most 31 days. Unlike
the default period, an explicit period that begins before the retention
window is rejected rather than narrowed. Every row echoes the applied
bounds, so a narrowed window is visible in the export.
The endpoint requires organization-level admin permissions.
## Changes
- Add the `ExportOrganizationAISpend` query aggregating
`aibridge_token_usages` joined to `aibridge_interceptions`, scoped to
the organization via the effective group, resolving the username, group
name, and organization name alongside their IDs.
- Add the `exportOrganizationAISpend` handler and route, gated by the
`aigateway-cost-control` experiment and the `AIBridge` feature,
returning the CSV in a single response.
- Add the `ExportOrganizationAISpend` codersdk client method.
- Require organization-wide `ResourceGroupMember` read, since the export
aggregates every user in the organization. The per-row filter stays in
`dbauthz` as defence in depth.
- Escape leading formula characters in the free-text columns, so a model
or provider name recorded from an intercepted request cannot be
evaluated when the CSV is opened in a spreadsheet.
- Add an index on `aibridge_token_usages (effective_group_id,
created_at)`, which the period and group predicates otherwise cannot
use.
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-293/add-csv-export-for-ai-spend-data
> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira
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Susana Ferreira
|
c351280a37 |
feat: add Prometheus metrics for AI Governance cost control (#27490)
## Description Adds Prometheus metrics for AI budget cost control, emitted by the aibridged server under the `cost_control` subsystem (full names are prefixed `coder_ai_gateway_`). - `blocked_requests_total` (counter) — labels: `group_id` - `blocked_users` (gauge) — labels: `group_id` - `unpriced_requests_total` (counter) — labels: `provider`, `model` - `enforcement_duration_seconds` (histogram) — labels: `outcome` ## Changes - Add `GetOverBudgetUsersPerGroup` query (plus dbauthz/dbmetrics/dbmock wiring) to count over-budget users per effective group. - Add a background collector that refreshes the `blocked_users` gauge on an interval, started only when Prometheus is enabled. - Wire `Metrics` through the aibridged server, coderd API, `cli/server.go`, and the enterprise AI gateway handler; recording is nil-safe when metrics are unset. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-296/add-prometheus-metrics-for-cost-control > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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J. Scott Miller
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1ab4ed8db5 |
feat: exclude AI Bridge usage from AI Governance seat counting (#27280)
Under the new `ai-gateway-seat-exclusion` experiment, AI Bridge usage stops counting toward AI Governance seats. ## Seat recording Under the experiment, `RecordInterception` no longer records `ai_seat_state` usage for the initiator: AI Gateway access is licensed by the AI Governance add-on rather than per seat. This experiment is independent of `workspace-capable-licensing` (#27279) so the two licensing behaviors can be enabled separately. Task workspace builds still claim AI Governance seats. ## Manual verification Verified live on a dev deployment (provider chained to dev.coder.com's gateway, model `gpt-5.6-luna`): with the experiment off, the first bridge request from each identity type (admin, plain member, service account) wrote an `ai_seat_state` row (`aibridge` reason); with it on, requests recorded interceptions but left seat state untouched — no new rows, and existing rows' `last_used_at` did not advance. Part of the gateway-accounts feature. ## Stack Part 2 of the gateway-accounts stack: 1. **#27279**: permission-based license seat counting. Behind the `workspace-capable-licensing` experiment and gated on the AI Governance add-on, `user_limit` counts only users the RBAC engine authorizes to create workspaces. 2. **This PR**: stops AI Bridge usage from claiming AI Governance seats under the new `ai-gateway-seat-exclusion` experiment. 3. ~~**#27281**: adds a `use_shared` capability precondition for workspace ACL grants, so workspace sharing is ineffective for (and rejected toward) users without workspace capabilities, evaluated live on every authorization.~~ This will be done in follow-up work when we have time to look into the performance impact. Related but independent: **#27278** hides the Workspaces page create CTAs for users without workspace-create permission. |
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J. Scott Miller
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6c102cc3f3 |
feat: count only workspace-capable users toward license seats (#27279)
Adds permission-based license seat counting behind the
`workspace-capable-licensing` experiment. When the experiment is enabled
and a valid license carries the AI Governance add-on, the `user_limit`
feature counts only active users the RBAC engine authorizes to create a
workspace, instead of every active user. Users without workspace-create
capability ("gateway accounts", e.g. AI-Gateway-only users) no longer
consume seats.
## How it works
- A new `GetActiveUsersAuthorizationRoles` bulk query returns effective
roles (implied member roles, org default member roles) and group
memberships for every seat-eligible user (active, not deleted, not
system, not a service account), matching `GetActiveUserCount` semantics.
- `license.CountWorkspaceCapableUsers` evaluates `workspace.create`
against the any-organization object form, which covers site-wide grants,
membership grants, and org-scoped bans in one check. Evaluation is
deduplicated on a sha256 of each user's canonical subject JSON (a fixed
sentinel user ID, sorted deduplicated roles and groups), so cost scales
with unique subjects rather than user count, and every subject field
participates in both the evaluation and the key.
- The AI Governance add-on is only known after license claims are
parsed, so `Entitlements()` passes a lazy `WorkspaceCapableUserCountFn`
(following the `ManagedAgentCountFn` precedent) and
`LicensesEntitlements` resolves it when a validated add-on is present.
Each license's `user_limit` claim becomes a candidate pair of limit and
counting mode, the most favorable pair is selected (see Behavior notes),
and the selected pair's limit, entitlement, and count become the
`user_limit` feature's terms; the warnings read the same values.
`license.Entitlements` gains `logger`, `authorizer`, and `experiments`
parameters.
- All custom roles are prefetched in a single query before evaluation
(new exported `rolestore.PrefetchCustomRoles`), and each count emits one
Info log line (capable count, eligible active users, unique subjects,
elapsed) whose presence identifies the counting mode. The count is
bounded by a 60s timeout.
## Behavior notes
- Without the experiment or without the add-on, the legacy
`GetActiveUserCount` path is unchanged.
- When the mode is active, the over-limit and expired-limit warnings say
"workspace-capable users" instead of "active users", since that is what
was counted.
- With multiple licenses, each license's `user_limit` claim forms a
candidate pair of limit and counting mode (workspace-capable for add-on
licenses, all active users otherwise), and the most favorable pair is
enforced: a pair satisfied by its own count wins over any unsatisfied
one, then higher entitlement, then higher limit. One license's limit is
never combined with another license's counting mode, so a small add-on
license can neither borrow a bigger non-add-on limit nor suppress it.
- Licenses in their grace period still gate the count; it reverts to the
legacy count only on hard expiry. While the add-on exists only on
grace-period licenses, a warning tells admins the counting mode will
revert and states the legacy active-user count they will then be
measured by.
- Count errors (database failures, timeout) abort the entitlements
computation, matching the legacy count's error semantics: the refresh
fails and the caller keeps the previous entitlements rather than a
silently different count. One exception: a stored role string that fails
to parse is logged and treated as not workspace-capable instead of
failing the refresh, since authorization fails closed on such roles
anyway.
- The experiment is deliberately not in `ExperimentsSafe`.
Part of the gateway-accounts feature; no behavior changes for
deployments without the experiment.
## Stack
Part 1 of the gateway-accounts stack. Each PR builds on the previous:
1. **#27279 (this PR)**: permission-based license seat counting. Behind
the `workspace-capable-licensing` experiment and gated on the AI
Governance add-on, `user_limit` counts only users the RBAC engine
authorizes to create workspaces.
2. **#27280**: adds the `organization-ai-gateway-access` org role
carrying the AI Bridge interception permissions (extracted from the
member floors, backfilled into org default roles by migration) and
enforces it at AI Gateway authentication; bridge usage stops claiming AI
Governance seats under the experiment.
3. ~~**#27281**: gates workspace ACL grants on matching member-level
capability (each granted action only takes effect while the recipient
holds that action in the org), so workspace sharing is ineffective for
(and rejected toward) users without workspace capabilities, evaluated
live on every authorization.~~ Tabled — excluded from the
gateway-accounts MVP.
Related but independent: **#27278** hides the Workspaces page create
CTAs for users without workspace-create permission.
## Benchmarks
`BenchmarkCountWorkspaceCapableUsers` (in `usercount_bench_test.go`, run
manually with `go test ./enterprise/coderd/license/ -bench
BenchmarkCountWorkspaceCapableUsers -benchtime 5x -run '^$'` — never
executed by CI) measures the count across user-scale and role-diversity
shapes:
| Scenario | Users | ~Unique subjects | per count |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uniform | 1k | 4 | 8.5ms |
| Uniform | 10k | 4 | 71ms |
| Uniform | 50k | 4 | 344ms |
| ManyOrgs (100 orgs) | 10k | ~200 | 112ms |
| CustomRoles (1000 org-scoped roles) | 10k | ~1000 | 168ms |
| UniquePairs (every user a distinct subject) | 10k | ~10,000 | 2.66s |
Summary:
- **Row-side cost is ~7µs per user, linear** (role parsing, subject
canonicalization, and sha256 per row). The bulk query + subject dedupe
handles 50k users in ~350ms; extrapolated 100k ≈ 0.7s. A non-issue at
the 10-minute refresh cadence.
- **Unique subjects are the dominant axis at ~0.26ms each** (role
expansion + one any-organization rego evaluation per subject). The
worst-case scenario — every user a distinct subject — costs ~2.7s at 10k
users, extrapolating to ~13s at 50k.
- **Realistic deployments sit near the cheap rows.** Subject diversity
tracks orgs × role/group combinations, not user count; only per-user
custom roles or per-user org-membership patterns approach the worst
case.
- Caveat encountered while building the harness: the roles query's plan
depends on accurate table statistics. With stale stats (e.g. right after
a bulk user import, before autovacuum ANALYZEs), the planner picks a
nested-loop plan that re-runs the aggregation per user row — a ~300×
regression (1.08s for 1k users). Fresh statistics restore the hash-join
plan; the harness ANALYZEs after seeding, so the numbers above reflect
the healthy plan.
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