feat: add network calls summary to AI session threads API (#27417)

Backend for the AI session network summary. Exposes total/blocked
network calls and top destination domains on the session threads
endpoint (`GET /api/v2/ai-gateway/sessions/{id}`).

Total and blocked reuse the existing Agent Firewall aggregation from the
sessions list query, so the numbers match the sessions table. Top
domains are a new server-side aggregation
(`GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains`) over boundary logs, using the same
interception-window correlation. There is no network-error state,
matching the current data model.

Frontend consuming these fields is in a separate stacked PR.

### PR map (merge strictly bottom-up)

This change is a 4-PR stack. Each PR depends on all the ones below it,
so merge in this exact order:

1. #27417 — backend network summary (base `main`)
2. #27418 — frontend summary rows (base #27417)
3. #27425 — backend per-call list `network_call_logs` (base #27418)
4. #27426 — frontend network-calls panel (base #27425)

Refs AIGOV-463

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cian Johnston <cian@coder.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sas Swart
2026-07-30 13:09:46 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8 Cian Johnston
parent 3660ffecdd
commit 841a1765f7
16 changed files with 644 additions and 21 deletions
+29
View File
@@ -15597,6 +15597,17 @@ const docTemplate = `{
}
}
},
"codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"count": {
"type": "integer"
},
"domain": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
@@ -15623,6 +15634,24 @@ const docTemplate = `{
"type": "string"
}
},
"network_calls": {
"description": "NetworkCalls summarizes the Agent Firewall network calls made during the\nsession. A nil value means the session did not pass through Agent\nFirewall, so network call monitoring was not active, which the UI\nsurfaces as \"Disabled\".",
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary"
}
]
},
"network_domain_count": {
"type": "integer"
},
"network_top_domains": {
"description": "NetworkTopDomains lists the most contacted destination hosts, ordered by\ncall count descending. NetworkDomainCount is the total number of distinct\ndomains, used to render a \"+N more\" overflow beyond the listed domains.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain"
}
},
"page_ended_at": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
+29
View File
@@ -13891,6 +13891,17 @@
}
}
},
"codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"count": {
"type": "integer"
},
"domain": {
"type": "string"
}
}
},
"codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
@@ -13917,6 +13928,24 @@
"type": "string"
}
},
"network_calls": {
"description": "NetworkCalls summarizes the Agent Firewall network calls made during the\nsession. A nil value means the session did not pass through Agent\nFirewall, so network call monitoring was not active, which the UI\nsurfaces as \"Disabled\".",
"allOf": [
{
"$ref": "#/definitions/codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary"
}
]
},
"network_domain_count": {
"type": "integer"
},
"network_top_domains": {
"description": "NetworkTopDomains lists the most contacted destination hosts, ordered by\ncall count descending. NetworkDomainCount is the total number of distinct\ndomains, used to render a \"+N more\" overflow beyond the listed domains.",
"type": "array",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain"
}
},
"page_ended_at": {
"type": "string",
"format": "date-time"
+19
View File
@@ -1153,6 +1153,7 @@ func AIBridgeSessionThreads(
toolUsages []database.AIBridgeToolUsage,
userPrompts []database.AIBridgeUserPrompt,
modelThoughts []database.AIBridgeModelThought,
topDomains []database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow,
) codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse {
// Index subresources by interception ID.
tokensByInterception := make(map[uuid.UUID][]database.AIBridgeTokenUsage, len(interceptions))
@@ -1243,6 +1244,24 @@ func AIBridgeSessionThreads(
if !session.EndedAt.IsZero() {
resp.EndedAt = &session.EndedAt
}
// NetworkCalls is only meaningful when the session passed through Agent
// Firewall. When it did not, leave it nil so the UI renders "Disabled"
// rather than a misleading zero count.
if session.FirewallActive {
resp.NetworkCalls = &codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary{
Total: session.NetworkCallsTotal,
Blocked: session.NetworkCallsBlocked,
}
}
for _, d := range topDomains {
resp.NetworkTopDomains = append(resp.NetworkTopDomains, codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain{
Domain: d.Domain,
Count: d.Count,
})
// TotalDomains is the same on every row (a window aggregate); take it
// from the last row processed.
resp.NetworkDomainCount = d.TotalDomains
}
return resp
}
+7
View File
@@ -2821,6 +2821,13 @@ func (q *querier) GetAIBridgeInterceptions(ctx context.Context) ([]database.AIBr
return fetchWithPostFilter(q.auth, policy.ActionRead, fetch)(ctx, nil)
}
func (q *querier) GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx context.Context, arg database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams) ([]database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow, error) {
if err := q.authorizeContext(ctx, policy.ActionRead, rbac.ResourceAibridgeInterception); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return q.db.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx, arg)
}
func (q *querier) GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID(ctx context.Context, interceptionID uuid.UUID) ([]database.AIBridgeTokenUsage, error) {
// All aibridge_token_usages records belong to the initiator of their associated interception.
if err := q.authorizeAIBridgeInterceptionAction(ctx, policy.ActionRead, interceptionID); err != nil {
+6
View File
@@ -6969,6 +6969,12 @@ func (s *MethodTestSuite) TestAIBridge() {
check.Args(params, emptyPreparedAuthorized{}).Asserts()
}))
s.Run("GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains", s.Mocked(func(db *dbmock.MockStore, faker *gofakeit.Faker, check *expects) {
params := database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams{SessionID: "sess", Limit: 5}
db.EXPECT().GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(gomock.Any(), params).Return([]database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow{}, nil).AnyTimes()
check.Args(params).Asserts(rbac.ResourceAibridgeInterception, policy.ActionRead).Returns([]database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow{})
}))
s.Run("ListAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionIDs", s.Mocked(func(db *dbmock.MockStore, faker *gofakeit.Faker, check *expects) {
ids := []uuid.UUID{{1}}
db.EXPECT().ListAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionIDs(gomock.Any(), ids).Return([]database.AIBridgeTokenUsage{}, nil).AnyTimes()
+8
View File
@@ -1113,6 +1113,14 @@ func (m queryMetricsStore) GetAIBridgeInterceptions(ctx context.Context) ([]data
return r0, r1
}
func (m queryMetricsStore) GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx context.Context, arg database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams) ([]database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow, error) {
start := time.Now()
r0, r1 := m.s.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx, arg)
m.queryLatencies.WithLabelValues("GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains").Observe(time.Since(start).Seconds())
m.queryCounts.WithLabelValues(httpmw.ExtractHTTPRoute(ctx), httpmw.ExtractHTTPMethod(ctx), "GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains").Inc()
return r0, r1
}
func (m queryMetricsStore) GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID(ctx context.Context, interceptionID uuid.UUID) ([]database.AIBridgeTokenUsage, error) {
start := time.Now()
r0, r1 := m.s.GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID(ctx, interceptionID)
+15
View File
@@ -1918,6 +1918,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAIBridgeInterceptions(ctx any) *gomock.Call
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAIBridgeInterceptions", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAIBridgeInterceptions), ctx)
}
// GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx context.Context, arg database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams) ([]database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains", ctx, arg)
ret0, _ := ret[0].([]database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains indicates an expected call of GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx, arg any) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains), ctx, arg)
}
// GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID(ctx context.Context, interceptionID uuid.UUID) ([]database.AIBridgeTokenUsage, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+21
View File
@@ -309,6 +309,21 @@ type sqlcQuerier interface {
// the root), we return its own ID as the root.
GetAIBridgeInterceptionLineageByToolCallID(ctx context.Context, toolCallID string) (GetAIBridgeInterceptionLineageByToolCallIDRow, error)
GetAIBridgeInterceptions(ctx context.Context) ([]AIBridgeInterception, error)
// Returns the most contacted destination hosts for an AI session, ordered by
// call count descending and limited to the top @limit_ rows. total_domains is
// the number of distinct domains across the whole session, used to render a
// "+N more" overflow beyond the returned rows. Only HTTP egress is considered;
// dns/git/fs boundary logs do not carry a domain in the same shape.
//
// Windowing mirrors the network_calls aggregation in ListAIBridgeSessions:
// each interception's boundary logs fall in the open interval (this seq, next
// interception's seq) within the same firewall session. The exclusive lower
// bound drops the interception's own LLM-provider call. next_seq considers all
// interceptions in the firewall session so windows never bleed across AI
// sessions that share one firewall session, and falls back to the maximum
// sequence_number for the last interception so the window stays an
// index-satisfiable range.
GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx context.Context, arg GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams) ([]GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow, error)
GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID(ctx context.Context, interceptionID uuid.UUID) ([]AIBridgeTokenUsage, error)
GetAIBridgeToolUsagesByInterceptionID(ctx context.Context, interceptionID uuid.UUID) ([]AIBridgeToolUsage, error)
GetAIBridgeUserPromptsByInterceptionID(ctx context.Context, interceptionID uuid.UUID) ([]AIBridgeUserPrompt, error)
@@ -1250,6 +1265,12 @@ type sqlcQuerier interface {
// Pagination-first strategy: identify the page of sessions cheaply via a
// single GROUP BY scan, then do expensive lateral joins (tokens, prompts,
// first-interception metadata) only for the ~page-size result set.
// The last interception in a session has no next row, so next_seq uses
// the largest sequence_number instead of NULL. The lookup stays a plain
// range, so the (session_id, sequence_number) index answers it alone.
// With NULL and an OR check, the index cannot bound the range: each
// interception reads every log to the end of the session and throws
// most of them away.
ListAIBridgeSessions(ctx context.Context, arg ListAIBridgeSessionsParams) ([]ListAIBridgeSessionsRow, error)
ListAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionIDs(ctx context.Context, interceptionIds []uuid.UUID) ([]AIBridgeTokenUsage, error)
ListAIBridgeToolUsagesByInterceptionIDs(ctx context.Context, interceptionIds []uuid.UUID) ([]AIBridgeToolUsage, error)
+104 -2
View File
@@ -1325,6 +1325,101 @@ func (q *sqlQuerier) GetAIBridgeInterceptions(ctx context.Context) ([]AIBridgeIn
return items, nil
}
const getAIBridgeSessionTopDomains = `-- name: GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains :many
WITH session_boundary_logs AS (
SELECT bl.detail
FROM aibridge_interceptions afi
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT COALESCE(MIN(nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number), 2147483647) AS next_seq
FROM aibridge_interceptions nxt
WHERE nxt.agent_firewall_session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
) w ON true
JOIN boundary_logs bl
ON bl.session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND bl.sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
AND bl.sequence_number < w.next_seq
WHERE afi.session_id = $2::text
AND afi.ended_at IS NOT NULL
AND afi.agent_firewall_session_id IS NOT NULL
AND afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number IS NOT NULL
AND bl.proto = 'http'
),
extracted AS (
-- Strip an optional scheme, then keep the host up to the first port, path,
-- query, or fragment delimiter. This assumes HTTP egress detail is a plain
-- scheme+host(+port) URL: it does not handle userinfo (user@host, which
-- would be captured into the host) or IPv6 literal hosts ([::1], where the
-- leading '[' is captured and the ':' terminates early). Boundary HTTP logs
-- do not currently emit those forms; revisit this extraction if they do.
SELECT substring(detail from '^(?:[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://)?([^/:?#]+)') AS domain
FROM session_boundary_logs
),
domains AS (
SELECT domain, COUNT(*)::bigint AS count
FROM extracted
WHERE domain IS NOT NULL AND domain != ''
GROUP BY domain
)
SELECT
-- COALESCE keeps sqlc from typing the grouped column as nullable; the
-- domains CTE already filters out NULL/empty hosts.
COALESCE(domain, '')::text AS domain,
count,
COUNT(*) OVER ()::bigint AS total_domains
FROM domains
ORDER BY count DESC, domain ASC
LIMIT COALESCE(NULLIF($1::integer, 0), 5)
`
type GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams struct {
Limit int32 `db:"limit_" json:"limit_"`
SessionID string `db:"session_id" json:"session_id"`
}
type GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow struct {
Domain string `db:"domain" json:"domain"`
Count int64 `db:"count" json:"count"`
TotalDomains int64 `db:"total_domains" json:"total_domains"`
}
// Returns the most contacted destination hosts for an AI session, ordered by
// call count descending and limited to the top @limit_ rows. total_domains is
// the number of distinct domains across the whole session, used to render a
// "+N more" overflow beyond the returned rows. Only HTTP egress is considered;
// dns/git/fs boundary logs do not carry a domain in the same shape.
//
// Windowing mirrors the network_calls aggregation in ListAIBridgeSessions:
// each interception's boundary logs fall in the open interval (this seq, next
// interception's seq) within the same firewall session. The exclusive lower
// bound drops the interception's own LLM-provider call. next_seq considers all
// interceptions in the firewall session so windows never bleed across AI
// sessions that share one firewall session, and falls back to the maximum
// sequence_number for the last interception so the window stays an
// index-satisfiable range.
func (q *sqlQuerier) GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx context.Context, arg GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams) ([]GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.QueryContext(ctx, getAIBridgeSessionTopDomains, arg.Limit, arg.SessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var items []GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow
for rows.Next() {
var i GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow
if err := rows.Scan(&i.Domain, &i.Count, &i.TotalDomains); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Close(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const getAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID = `-- name: GetAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionID :many
SELECT
id, interception_id, provider_response_id, input_tokens, output_tokens, metadata, created_at, cache_read_input_tokens, cache_write_input_tokens, effective_group_id, input_price_micros, output_price_micros, cache_read_price_micros, cache_write_price_micros, cost_micros
@@ -2217,12 +2312,13 @@ LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
-- (logged at exactly its sequence number), leaving the agent's other
-- egress. next_seq considers all interceptions in the firewall session so
-- windows never bleed across AI sessions that share one firewall session.
--
SELECT
COUNT(*)::bigint AS total,
COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE bl.matched_rule IS NULL)::bigint AS blocked
FROM aibridge_interceptions afi
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT MIN(nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number) AS next_seq
SELECT COALESCE(MIN(nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number), 2147483647) AS next_seq
FROM aibridge_interceptions nxt
WHERE nxt.agent_firewall_session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
@@ -2230,7 +2326,7 @@ LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
JOIN boundary_logs bl
ON bl.session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND bl.sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
AND (w.next_seq IS NULL OR bl.sequence_number < w.next_seq)
AND bl.sequence_number < w.next_seq
WHERE afi.id = ANY(sr.interception_ids)
AND afi.agent_firewall_session_id IS NOT NULL
AND afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number IS NOT NULL
@@ -2285,6 +2381,12 @@ type ListAIBridgeSessionsRow struct {
// Pagination-first strategy: identify the page of sessions cheaply via a
// single GROUP BY scan, then do expensive lateral joins (tokens, prompts,
// first-interception metadata) only for the ~page-size result set.
// The last interception in a session has no next row, so next_seq uses
// the largest sequence_number instead of NULL. The lookup stays a plain
// range, so the (session_id, sequence_number) index answers it alone.
// With NULL and an OR check, the index cannot bound the range: each
// interception reads every log to the end of the session and throws
// most of them away.
func (q *sqlQuerier) ListAIBridgeSessions(ctx context.Context, arg ListAIBridgeSessionsParams) ([]ListAIBridgeSessionsRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.QueryContext(ctx, listAIBridgeSessions,
arg.AfterSessionID,
+69 -2
View File
@@ -528,12 +528,19 @@ LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
-- (logged at exactly its sequence number), leaving the agent's other
-- egress. next_seq considers all interceptions in the firewall session so
-- windows never bleed across AI sessions that share one firewall session.
--
-- The last interception in a session has no next row, so next_seq uses
-- the largest sequence_number instead of NULL. The lookup stays a plain
-- range, so the (session_id, sequence_number) index answers it alone.
-- With NULL and an OR check, the index cannot bound the range: each
-- interception reads every log to the end of the session and throws
-- most of them away.
SELECT
COUNT(*)::bigint AS total,
COUNT(*) FILTER (WHERE bl.matched_rule IS NULL)::bigint AS blocked
FROM aibridge_interceptions afi
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT MIN(nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number) AS next_seq
SELECT COALESCE(MIN(nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number), 2147483647) AS next_seq
FROM aibridge_interceptions nxt
WHERE nxt.agent_firewall_session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
@@ -541,7 +548,7 @@ LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
JOIN boundary_logs bl
ON bl.session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND bl.sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
AND (w.next_seq IS NULL OR bl.sequence_number < w.next_seq)
AND bl.sequence_number < w.next_seq
WHERE afi.id = ANY(sr.interception_ids)
AND afi.agent_firewall_session_id IS NOT NULL
AND afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number IS NOT NULL
@@ -551,6 +558,66 @@ ORDER BY
sp.session_id DESC
;
-- name: GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains :many
-- Returns the most contacted destination hosts for an AI session, ordered by
-- call count descending and limited to the top @limit_ rows. total_domains is
-- the number of distinct domains across the whole session, used to render a
-- "+N more" overflow beyond the returned rows. Only HTTP egress is considered;
-- dns/git/fs boundary logs do not carry a domain in the same shape.
--
-- Windowing mirrors the network_calls aggregation in ListAIBridgeSessions:
-- each interception's boundary logs fall in the open interval (this seq, next
-- interception's seq) within the same firewall session. The exclusive lower
-- bound drops the interception's own LLM-provider call. next_seq considers all
-- interceptions in the firewall session so windows never bleed across AI
-- sessions that share one firewall session, and falls back to the maximum
-- sequence_number for the last interception so the window stays an
-- index-satisfiable range.
WITH session_boundary_logs AS (
SELECT bl.detail
FROM aibridge_interceptions afi
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT COALESCE(MIN(nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number), 2147483647) AS next_seq
FROM aibridge_interceptions nxt
WHERE nxt.agent_firewall_session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND nxt.agent_firewall_sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
) w ON true
JOIN boundary_logs bl
ON bl.session_id = afi.agent_firewall_session_id
AND bl.sequence_number > afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number
AND bl.sequence_number < w.next_seq
WHERE afi.session_id = @session_id::text
AND afi.ended_at IS NOT NULL
AND afi.agent_firewall_session_id IS NOT NULL
AND afi.agent_firewall_sequence_number IS NOT NULL
AND bl.proto = 'http'
),
extracted AS (
-- Strip an optional scheme, then keep the host up to the first port, path,
-- query, or fragment delimiter. This assumes HTTP egress detail is a plain
-- scheme+host(+port) URL: it does not handle userinfo (user@host, which
-- would be captured into the host) or IPv6 literal hosts ([::1], where the
-- leading '[' is captured and the ':' terminates early). Boundary HTTP logs
-- do not currently emit those forms; revisit this extraction if they do.
SELECT substring(detail from '^(?:[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://)?([^/:?#]+)') AS domain
FROM session_boundary_logs
),
domains AS (
SELECT domain, COUNT(*)::bigint AS count
FROM extracted
WHERE domain IS NOT NULL AND domain != ''
GROUP BY domain
)
SELECT
-- COALESCE keeps sqlc from typing the grouped column as nullable; the
-- domains CTE already filters out NULL/empty hosts.
COALESCE(domain, '')::text AS domain,
count,
COUNT(*) OVER ()::bigint AS total_domains
FROM domains
ORDER BY count DESC, domain ASC
LIMIT COALESCE(NULLIF(@limit_::integer, 0), 5);
-- name: ListAIBridgeSessionThreads :many
-- Returns all interceptions belonging to paginated threads within a session.
-- Threads are paginated by (started_at, thread_id) cursor.
+18 -1
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,13 @@ type AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary struct {
Blocked int64 `json:"blocked"`
}
// AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain is one destination host contacted during a
// session, with the number of network calls made to it.
type AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain struct {
Domain string `json:"domain"`
Count int64 `json:"count"`
}
type AIBridgeListSessionsResponse struct {
Count int64 `json:"count"`
Sessions []AIBridgeSession `json:"sessions"`
@@ -185,7 +192,17 @@ type AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse struct {
StartedAt time.Time `json:"started_at" format:"date-time"`
EndedAt *time.Time `json:"ended_at,omitempty" format:"date-time"`
TokenUsageSummary AIBridgeSessionThreadsTokenUsage `json:"token_usage_summary"`
Threads []AIBridgeThread `json:"threads"`
// NetworkCalls summarizes the Agent Firewall network calls made during the
// session. A nil value means the session did not pass through Agent
// Firewall, so network call monitoring was not active, which the UI
// surfaces as "Disabled".
NetworkCalls *AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary `json:"network_calls,omitempty"`
// NetworkTopDomains lists the most contacted destination hosts, ordered by
// call count descending. NetworkDomainCount is the total number of distinct
// domains, used to render a "+N more" overflow beyond the listed domains.
NetworkTopDomains []AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain `json:"network_top_domains,omitempty"`
NetworkDomainCount int64 `json:"network_domain_count,omitempty"`
Threads []AIBridgeThread `json:"threads"`
}
// AIBridgeSessionThreadsTokenUsage represents aggregated token usage
+11
View File
@@ -195,6 +195,17 @@ Alias: also available at /api/v2/aibridge/sessions/{session_id} for backward com
"models": [
"string"
],
"network_calls": {
"blocked": 0,
"total": 0
},
"network_domain_count": 0,
"network_top_domains": [
{
"count": 0,
"domain": "string"
}
],
"page_ended_at": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
"page_started_at": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
"providers": [
+45 -15
View File
@@ -655,6 +655,22 @@
| `blocked` | integer | false | | |
| `total` | integer | false | | |
## codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain
```json
{
"count": 0,
"domain": "string"
}
```
### Properties
| Name | Type | Required | Restrictions | Description |
|----------|---------|----------|--------------|-------------|
| `count` | integer | false | | |
| `domain` | string | false | | |
## codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse
```json
@@ -675,6 +691,17 @@
"models": [
"string"
],
"network_calls": {
"blocked": 0,
"total": 0
},
"network_domain_count": 0,
"network_top_domains": [
{
"count": 0,
"domain": "string"
}
],
"page_ended_at": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
"page_started_at": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
"providers": [
@@ -758,21 +785,24 @@
### Properties
| Name | Type | Required | Restrictions | Description |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------|-------------|
| `client` | string | false | | |
| `ended_at` | string | false | | |
| `id` | string | false | | |
| `initiator` | [codersdk.MinimalUser](#codersdkminimaluser) | false | | |
| `metadata` | object | false | | |
| » `[any property]` | any | false | | |
| `models` | array of string | false | | |
| `page_ended_at` | string | false | | |
| `page_started_at` | string | false | | |
| `providers` | array of string | false | | |
| `started_at` | string | false | | |
| `threads` | array of [codersdk.AIBridgeThread](#codersdkaibridgethread) | false | | |
| `token_usage_summary` | [codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsTokenUsage](#codersdkaibridgesessionthreadstokenusage) | false | | |
| Name | Type | Required | Restrictions | Description |
|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `client` | string | false | | |
| `ended_at` | string | false | | |
| `id` | string | false | | |
| `initiator` | [codersdk.MinimalUser](#codersdkminimaluser) | false | | |
| `metadata` | object | false | | |
| » `[any property]` | any | false | | |
| `models` | array of string | false | | |
| `network_calls` | [codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary](#codersdkaibridgesessionnetworkcallsummary) | false | | Network calls summarizes the Agent Firewall network calls made during the session. A nil value means the session did not pass through Agent Firewall, so network call monitoring was not active, which the UI surfaces as "Disabled". |
| `network_domain_count` | integer | false | | |
| `network_top_domains` | array of [codersdk.AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain](#codersdkaibridgesessionnetworkdomain) | false | | Network top domains lists the most contacted destination hosts, ordered by call count descending. NetworkDomainCount is the total number of distinct domains, used to render a "+N more" overflow beyond the listed domains. |
| `page_ended_at` | string | false | | |
| `page_started_at` | string | false | | |
| `providers` | array of string | false | | |
| `started_at` | string | false | | |
| `threads` | array of [codersdk.AIBridgeThread](#codersdkaibridgethread) | false | | |
| `token_usage_summary` | [codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsTokenUsage](#codersdkaibridgesessionthreadstokenusage) | false | | |
## codersdk.AIBridgeSessionThreadsTokenUsage
+14 -1
View File
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ func (api *API) aiBridgeGetSessionThreads(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques
toolUsages []database.AIBridgeToolUsage
userPrompts []database.AIBridgeUserPrompt
modelThoughts []database.AIBridgeModelThought
topDomains []database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsRow
)
err = api.Database.InTx(func(db database.Store) error {
// Validate cursor IDs before querying threads. The SQL
@@ -435,6 +436,18 @@ func (api *API) aiBridgeGetSessionThreads(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques
return xerrors.Errorf("list model thoughts: %w", err)
}
// Aggregate the session's top network destination. Scoped by session
// ID (not the page) so the summary reflects the whole session. The
// summary card renders only the single most-contacted domain plus a
// "+N more" count derived from NetworkDomainCount, so we fetch one row.
topDomains, err = db.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomains(ctx, database.GetAIBridgeSessionTopDomainsParams{
SessionID: sessionIDParam,
Limit: 1,
})
if err != nil {
return xerrors.Errorf("get session top domains: %w", err)
}
return nil
}, &database.TxOptions{
Isolation: sql.LevelRepeatableRead,
@@ -456,7 +469,7 @@ func (api *API) aiBridgeGetSessionThreads(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques
return
}
resp := db2sdk.AIBridgeSessionThreads(session, threadRows, tokenUsages, toolUsages, userPrompts, modelThoughts)
resp := db2sdk.AIBridgeSessionThreads(session, threadRows, tokenUsages, toolUsages, userPrompts, modelThoughts, topDomains)
httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
+225
View File
@@ -1562,6 +1562,39 @@ func TestAIBridgeConcurrencyLimiting(t *testing.T) {
}
}
type boundaryLogSeed struct {
seq int32
proto string
detail string
allowed bool
}
// seedBoundaryLogs writes boundary logs for a firewall session via the raw
// store. A non-empty matched_rule marks a call allowed; a blocked call stores a
// NULL rule. No RBAC role grants boundary_log:create, so tests seed directly.
func seedBoundaryLogs(t *testing.T, db database.Store, fw, ownerID uuid.UUID, at time.Time, seeds []boundaryLogSeed) {
t.Helper()
logs := make([]database.BoundaryLog, 0, len(seeds))
for _, s := range seeds {
rule := ""
if s.allowed {
rule = "allow " + s.detail
}
logs = append(logs, database.BoundaryLog{
SessionID: fw,
OwnerID: uuid.NullUUID{UUID: ownerID, Valid: true},
SequenceNumber: s.seq,
CapturedAt: at,
CreatedAt: at,
Proto: s.proto,
Method: "GET",
Detail: s.detail,
MatchedRule: sql.NullString{String: rule, Valid: rule != ""},
})
}
dbgen.BoundaryLogs(t, db, logs)
}
func TestAIBridgeGetSessionThreads(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
@@ -1672,6 +1705,198 @@ func TestAIBridgeGetSessionThreads(t *testing.T) {
require.Nil(t, res.Threads[1].AgentFirewallSequenceNumber)
})
t.Run("NetworkSummary", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Use the raw store so boundary logs can be seeded directly. No RBAC
// role grants boundary_log:create; they are written by the agent path.
db, ps := dbtestutil.NewDB(t)
opts := aibridgeOpts(t)
opts.Options.Database = db
opts.Options.Pubsub = ps
client, _, firstUser := coderdenttest.NewWithDatabase(t, opts)
ctx := testutil.Context(t, testutil.WaitLong)
now := dbtime.Now()
fw := uuid.New()
// One interception marked at firewall seq 0, so its window is (0, +inf)
// and the LLM-provider call logged at seq 0 is excluded.
endedAt := now.Add(time.Minute)
dbgen.AIBridgeInterception(t, db, database.InsertAIBridgeInterceptionParams{
InitiatorID: firstUser.UserID,
Provider: "anthropic",
Model: "claude-sonnet-4-20250514",
StartedAt: now,
ClientSessionID: sql.NullString{String: "net-session", Valid: true},
AgentFirewallSessionID: uuid.NullUUID{UUID: fw, Valid: true},
AgentFirewallSequenceNumber: sql.NullInt32{Int32: 0, Valid: true},
}, &endedAt)
seedBoundaryLogs(t, db, fw, firstUser.UserID, now, []boundaryLogSeed{
{0, "http", "https://api.github.com/llm", true}, // LLM call, excluded
{1, "http", "https://api.github.com/repos/coder", true}, // github egress
{2, "http", "https://api.github.com/repos/other", true}, // github egress
{3, "http", "https://registry.npmjs.org/lodash", false}, // npm egress, blocked
{4, "http", "https://api.github.com/repos/more", true}, // github egress
{5, "dns", "example.com", true}, // non-http, ignored by top domains
{6, "http", "https://api.github.com:8080/repos", true}, // port-suffixed; host stripped to api.github.com
})
res, err := client.AIBridgeGetSessionThreads(ctx, "net-session", uuid.Nil, uuid.Nil, 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
// total counts seq 1-6 (LLM call at seq 0 excluded); one blocked.
require.NotNil(t, res.NetworkCalls)
require.EqualValues(t, 6, res.NetworkCalls.Total)
require.EqualValues(t, 1, res.NetworkCalls.Blocked)
// Top domains covers HTTP egress only and is capped at one row (the
// summary card renders a single domain). github wins with 4 HTTP calls:
// seqs 1, 2, 4, and the port-suffixed seq 6 whose host strips to
// api.github.com (proving the port is not treated as a separate host).
// The dns log (seq 5) is excluded from domains. NetworkDomainCount is a
// window aggregate independent of the row cap, so it still reports the
// two distinct HTTP domains (github, npm).
require.Len(t, res.NetworkTopDomains, 1)
require.Equal(t, "api.github.com", res.NetworkTopDomains[0].Domain)
require.EqualValues(t, 4, res.NetworkTopDomains[0].Count)
require.EqualValues(t, 2, res.NetworkDomainCount)
})
t.Run("NetworkMultipleInterceptions", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Two interceptions in the same firewall session must produce two
// consecutive, non-overlapping windows: (0, 5) for the first and
// (5, +inf) for the second. Each interception's own LLM call (logged at
// its own sequence) is excluded by the exclusive lower bound.
db, ps := dbtestutil.NewDB(t)
opts := aibridgeOpts(t)
opts.Options.Database = db
opts.Options.Pubsub = ps
client, _, firstUser := coderdenttest.NewWithDatabase(t, opts)
ctx := testutil.Context(t, testutil.WaitLong)
now := dbtime.Now()
fw := uuid.New()
for _, seq := range []int32{0, 5} {
endedAt := now.Add(time.Minute)
dbgen.AIBridgeInterception(t, db, database.InsertAIBridgeInterceptionParams{
InitiatorID: firstUser.UserID,
Provider: "anthropic",
Model: "claude-sonnet-4-20250514",
StartedAt: now,
ClientSessionID: sql.NullString{String: "multi-net", Valid: true},
AgentFirewallSessionID: uuid.NullUUID{UUID: fw, Valid: true},
AgentFirewallSequenceNumber: sql.NullInt32{Int32: seq, Valid: true},
}, &endedAt)
}
seedBoundaryLogs(t, db, fw, firstUser.UserID, now, []boundaryLogSeed{
{0, "http", "https://api.github.com/llm", true}, // interception 1 LLM call, excluded
{1, "http", "https://api.github.com/a", true}, // window (0,5)
{2, "http", "https://api.github.com/b", true}, // window (0,5)
{3, "http", "https://registry.npmjs.org/x", false}, // window (0,5), blocked
{5, "http", "https://api.github.com/llm2", true}, // interception 2 LLM call, excluded
{6, "http", "https://api.github.com/c", true}, // window (5,+inf)
{7, "http", "https://registry.npmjs.org/y", false}, // window (5,+inf), blocked
})
res, err := client.AIBridgeGetSessionThreads(ctx, "multi-net", uuid.Nil, uuid.Nil, 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Both windows contribute: seqs 1,2,3,6,7. The two LLM calls (0, 5) are
// excluded. Blocked = seqs 3 and 7.
require.NotNil(t, res.NetworkCalls)
require.EqualValues(t, 5, res.NetworkCalls.Total)
require.EqualValues(t, 2, res.NetworkCalls.Blocked)
// github: seqs 1,2,6 = 3; npm: seqs 3,7 = 2. Two distinct domains.
require.Len(t, res.NetworkTopDomains, 1)
require.Equal(t, "api.github.com", res.NetworkTopDomains[0].Domain)
require.EqualValues(t, 3, res.NetworkTopDomains[0].Count)
require.EqualValues(t, 2, res.NetworkDomainCount)
})
t.Run("NetworkSharedFirewallSessionNoBleed", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
// Two AI sessions share one firewall session. next_seq considers every
// interception in the firewall session, so session A's window is bounded
// by session B's interception and B's calls never bleed into A's counts.
db, ps := dbtestutil.NewDB(t)
opts := aibridgeOpts(t)
opts.Options.Database = db
opts.Options.Pubsub = ps
client, _, firstUser := coderdenttest.NewWithDatabase(t, opts)
ctx := testutil.Context(t, testutil.WaitLong)
now := dbtime.Now()
fw := uuid.New()
// Session A anchored at firewall seq 0; session B at seq 10.
for _, s := range []struct {
session string
seq int32
}{{"sess-a", 0}, {"sess-b", 10}} {
endedAt := now.Add(time.Minute)
dbgen.AIBridgeInterception(t, db, database.InsertAIBridgeInterceptionParams{
InitiatorID: firstUser.UserID,
Provider: "anthropic",
Model: "claude-sonnet-4-20250514",
StartedAt: now,
ClientSessionID: sql.NullString{String: s.session, Valid: true},
AgentFirewallSessionID: uuid.NullUUID{UUID: fw, Valid: true},
AgentFirewallSequenceNumber: sql.NullInt32{Int32: s.seq, Valid: true},
}, &endedAt)
}
seedBoundaryLogs(t, db, fw, firstUser.UserID, now, []boundaryLogSeed{
{0, "http", "https://api.github.com/llm-a", true}, // A's LLM call, excluded
{1, "http", "https://api.github.com/a1", true}, // A's window (0,10)
{2, "http", "https://registry.npmjs.org/a2", false}, // A's window (0,10), blocked
{10, "http", "https://api.github.com/llm-b", true}, // B's LLM call, excluded
{11, "http", "https://api.github.com/b1", true}, // B's window (10,+inf)
{12, "http", "https://api.github.com/b2", true}, // B's window (10,+inf)
{13, "http", "https://registry.npmjs.org/b3", false}, // B's window (10,+inf), blocked
})
// Session A sees only its own two calls (seqs 1, 2), not B's.
resA, err := client.AIBridgeGetSessionThreads(ctx, "sess-a", uuid.Nil, uuid.Nil, 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resA.NetworkCalls)
require.EqualValues(t, 2, resA.NetworkCalls.Total)
require.EqualValues(t, 1, resA.NetworkCalls.Blocked)
// Session B sees only its own three calls (seqs 11, 12, 13), not A's.
resB, err := client.AIBridgeGetSessionThreads(ctx, "sess-b", uuid.Nil, uuid.Nil, 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resB.NetworkCalls)
require.EqualValues(t, 3, resB.NetworkCalls.Total)
require.EqualValues(t, 1, resB.NetworkCalls.Blocked)
})
t.Run("NetworkSummaryDisabled", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
client, db, firstUser := coderdenttest.NewWithDatabase(t, aibridgeOpts(t))
ctx := testutil.Context(t, testutil.WaitLong)
now := dbtime.Now()
endedAt := now.Add(time.Minute)
// No firewall correlation: network monitoring was not active.
dbgen.AIBridgeInterception(t, db, database.InsertAIBridgeInterceptionParams{
InitiatorID: firstUser.UserID,
Provider: "anthropic",
Model: "claude-sonnet-4-20250514",
StartedAt: now,
ClientSessionID: sql.NullString{String: "no-fw-session", Valid: true},
}, &endedAt)
res, err := client.AIBridgeGetSessionThreads(ctx, "no-fw-session", uuid.Nil, uuid.Nil, 0)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Nil(t, res.NetworkCalls)
require.Empty(t, res.NetworkTopDomains)
require.EqualValues(t, 0, res.NetworkDomainCount)
})
t.Run("ThreadsWithAgenticActions", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
client, db, firstUser := coderdenttest.NewWithDatabase(t, aibridgeOpts(t))
+24
View File
@@ -162,6 +162,16 @@ export interface AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary {
readonly blocked: number;
}
// From codersdk/aibridge.go
/**
* AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain is one destination host contacted during a
* session, with the number of network calls made to it.
*/
export interface AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain {
readonly domain: string;
readonly count: number;
}
// From codersdk/aibridge.go
/**
* AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse is the response for GET
@@ -181,6 +191,20 @@ export interface AIBridgeSessionThreadsResponse {
readonly started_at: string;
readonly ended_at?: string;
readonly token_usage_summary: AIBridgeSessionThreadsTokenUsage;
/**
* NetworkCalls summarizes the Agent Firewall network calls made during the
* session. A nil value means the session did not pass through Agent
* Firewall, so network call monitoring was not active, which the UI
* surfaces as "Disabled".
*/
readonly network_calls?: AIBridgeSessionNetworkCallSummary;
/**
* NetworkTopDomains lists the most contacted destination hosts, ordered by
* call count descending. NetworkDomainCount is the total number of distinct
* domains, used to render a "+N more" overflow beyond the listed domains.
*/
readonly network_top_domains?: readonly AIBridgeSessionNetworkDomain[];
readonly network_domain_count?: number;
readonly threads: readonly AIBridgeThread[];
}