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fix(security): SSRF pinning, Twilio webhook auth, copilot token leak, audit-log tenant scoping (#4899)
* fix(clickhouse): pin outbound HTTP connection to validated IP (DNS rebinding) clickhouseRequest() validated config.host via validateDatabaseHost() but discarded the resolved IP and called fetch() with the original hostname, triggering a second DNS lookup. A workflow author controlling the host parameter could use DNS rebinding to pass validation against a public IP and then connect to an internal/private address (SSRF). Replace fetch() with secureFetchWithPinnedIP(), connecting to the validated resolvedIP while preserving the hostname for Host/TLS SNI — the same DNS-pinning pattern used by the other DB tools. Set Content-Length explicitly so request framing is identical to the previous fetch. Add tests locking the contract: connection targets the validated IP not the hostname, no request is issued on validation failure, http/https and allowHttp are selected from secure, and body/headers propagate. * fix(mcp): pin auth-type probe to validated IP to close SSRF/DNS-rebinding window The MCP auth-type probe (detectMcpAuthType) issued raw, unpinned fetch() calls against the user-supplied server URL, re-resolving DNS independently of validateMcpServerSsrf. This re-opened the exact DNS-rebinding (TOCTOU) window the pinned McpClient path was built to close: a hostname that resolves to a public IP during validation could resolve to an internal IP during the probe. The probe now pins to the IP already validated by the caller via createMcpPinnedFetch(resolvedIP); when no pre-validated IP is available it falls back to createSsrfGuardedMcpFetch(), which validates and pins each request. The best-effort session-close DELETE reuses the same pinned fetch. Both call sites (test-connection route and performCreateMcpServer) thread the resolved IP into the probe. * fix(security): stop returning plaintext OAuth access tokens from copilot credentials GET /api/copilot/credentials returned each connected account's live, post-refresh OAuth access token in plaintext to any session for that user. The endpoint is only used for credential display/masking and no client reads the token, so drop accessToken from the get_credentials tool output and the copilot credentials response contract. Also removes the incidental refreshTokenIfNeeded side-effect on this read path. Adds regression tests: - get-credentials: asserts the response exposes only masked metadata and never leaks the access/refresh token. - revoke: locks in that revokeMcpOauthTokens routes OAuth discovery and RFC 7009 revocation through the SSRF-guarded fetch (no raw fetch to an attacker-controlled revocation_endpoint). * fix(webhooks): verify X-Twilio-Signature on Twilio SMS webhooks The twilio (SMS) provider handler implemented no verifyAuth, so the webhook dispatcher queued workflow executions for any request to a known SMS trigger path without validating the Twilio signature — allowing forged inbound SMS events. Only the twilio-voice handler performed signature verification. Extract the shared HMAC-SHA1 signature validation into twilio-signature.ts and wire it into both the SMS and Voice handlers. Verification is enforced when an auth token is configured (parity with Voice); requests without a configured token pass through per the provider-wide optional-secret convention. Add regression tests for both handlers. * fix(connectors): route user-controlled connector hosts through DNS-validated, IP-pinned fetch Knowledge connectors that accept a custom service host/endpoint (S3-compatible endpoints, self-managed GitLab/Sentry hosts, Obsidian vault URLs) performed server-side fetches without the repository's SSRF guard, letting an authenticated user with KB write access probe internal/loopback hosts from the backend. Add secureFetchWithRetry (validateUrlWithDNS + secureFetchWithPinnedIP + the same retry/backoff as fetchWithRetry) and route every request in the s3, gitlab, sentry, and obsidian connectors through it - including pagination and hydration. Gate the S3 plain-http loopback exception to self-hosted deployments. * fix(audit-logs): scope enterprise audit log access to organization boundary Actor membership was used as a standalone tenant predicate, letting org admins read members' audit activity from personal workspaces and other tenants. Scope queries to org-attached workspaces plus org-level events, with actor membership only narrowing the scope; validate workspaceId filters against the caller's organization. * fix(webhooks): warn when Twilio webhook has no auth token configured Addresses PR review: when no auth token is set, verifyTwilioAuth skips signature verification (optional-secret convention). Log a warning so operators can detect a webhook running unauthenticated. * fix(audit-logs): include system events (null actor) in default org audit scope SQL IN never matches NULL, so system/automated events inside org workspaces were hidden unless includeDeparted=true. The default scope now matches current members OR null-actor rows, still inside the org boundary. * fix(auth): type-safe access to OAuth2Tokens raw payload Installed better-auth's OAuth2Tokens no longer declares the raw property; access it through an intersection cast (no behavior change) so type-check passes. * fix(build): keep connector SSRF fetch out of the client bundle The connectors SSRF fix routed s3/gitlab/sentry/obsidian through secureFetchWithRetry, which transitively imports input-validation.server (and its Node-only `dns/promises`). connectors/registry.ts is imported by client components for connector metadata, so the connector sync code — which only ever runs in server API routes — gets pulled into the client bundle, and Turbopack fails to resolve `dns/promises` (no browser shim). - Move secureFetchWithRetry into a dedicated `secure-fetch.server` module so the shared documents/utils stays client-safe; connectors import from there. - Add a browser-only `turbopack.resolveAlias` stub for `dns`/`dns/promises` (the documented Next 16 remedy). Server bundles keep the real module, so SSRF validation is unaffected — only the never-executed client copy is stubbed. Verified with a full `next build` (compiles successfully, no module errors).
This commit is contained in:
Waleed
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { formatAuditLogEntry } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/format'
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import {
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buildFilterConditions,
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buildOrgScopeCondition,
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getOrgWorkspaceIds,
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queryAuditLogs,
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} from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/query'
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@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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return authResult.response
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}
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const { orgMemberIds } = authResult.context
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const { organizationId, orgMemberIds } = authResult.context
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const parsed = await parseRequest(
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listAuditLogsContract,
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@@ -57,7 +58,13 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
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cursor,
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} = parsed.data.query
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const scopeCondition = await buildOrgScopeCondition(orgMemberIds, includeDeparted)
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const orgWorkspaceIds = await getOrgWorkspaceIds(organizationId)
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const scopeCondition = buildOrgScopeCondition({
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organizationId,
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orgWorkspaceIds,
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orgMemberIds,
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includeDeparted,
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})
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const filterConditions = buildFilterConditions({
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action,
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resourceType,
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@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ export const POST = withRouteHandler(
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// Skip unauth connect when the server returns an RFC 9728 OAuth challenge.
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if (testConfig.url) {
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const detectedAuthType = await detectMcpAuthType(testConfig.url)
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const detectedAuthType = await detectMcpAuthType(testConfig.url, resolvedIP)
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if (detectedAuthType === 'oauth') {
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result.authRequired = true
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result.authType = 'oauth'
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@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
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/**
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* @vitest-environment node
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*/
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import type { ClickHouseConnectionConfig } from '@/tools/clickhouse/types'
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const { mockValidateDatabaseHost, mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP, mockValidateSqlWhereClause } =
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vi.hoisted(() => ({
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mockValidateDatabaseHost: vi.fn(),
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mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP: vi.fn(),
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mockValidateSqlWhereClause: vi.fn(),
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}))
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vi.mock('@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server', () => ({
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validateDatabaseHost: mockValidateDatabaseHost,
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secureFetchWithPinnedIP: mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP,
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validateSqlWhereClause: mockValidateSqlWhereClause,
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}))
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import { executeClickHouseInsert, executeClickHouseQuery } from '@/app/api/tools/clickhouse/utils'
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function makeConfig(
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overrides: Partial<ClickHouseConnectionConfig> = {}
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): ClickHouseConnectionConfig {
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return {
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host: 'clickhouse.example.com',
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port: 8123,
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database: 'default',
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username: 'default',
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password: 'secret',
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secure: false,
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...overrides,
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}
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}
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function okResponse(body: string, summary?: string) {
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return {
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ok: true,
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status: 200,
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statusText: 'OK',
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text: async () => body,
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headers: {
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get: (name: string) =>
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name.toLowerCase() === 'x-clickhouse-summary' ? (summary ?? null) : null,
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},
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}
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}
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describe('clickhouseRequest DNS pinning', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks()
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mockValidateDatabaseHost.mockResolvedValue({
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isValid: true,
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resolvedIP: '93.184.216.34',
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originalHostname: 'clickhouse.example.com',
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})
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mockValidateSqlWhereClause.mockReturnValue({ isValid: true })
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mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP.mockResolvedValue(okResponse('{"data":[{"x":1}],"rows":1}'))
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})
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it('pins the connection to the validated IP, not the attacker-controlled hostname', async () => {
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await executeClickHouseQuery(makeConfig({ host: 'rebind.attacker.example' }), 'SELECT 1')
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expect(mockValidateDatabaseHost).toHaveBeenCalledWith('rebind.attacker.example', 'host')
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expect(mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
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const [url, pinnedIP, options] = mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP.mock.calls[0]
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// The actual TCP target is the validated IP — re-resolution of the hostname can never happen.
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expect(pinnedIP).toBe('93.184.216.34')
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// The hostname is preserved only in the URL (for Host header / TLS SNI), never used to connect.
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expect(url).toContain('rebind.attacker.example')
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expect(options.method).toBe('POST')
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})
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it('never issues the request when host validation fails (no SSRF window)', async () => {
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mockValidateDatabaseHost.mockResolvedValue({
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isValid: false,
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error: 'host resolves to a blocked IP address',
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})
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await expect(executeClickHouseQuery(makeConfig(), 'SELECT 1')).rejects.toThrow(
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'host resolves to a blocked IP address'
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)
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expect(mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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})
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it('uses https and disallows http redirects when secure is true', async () => {
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await executeClickHouseQuery(makeConfig({ secure: true, port: 8443 }), 'SELECT 1')
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const [url, , options] = mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP.mock.calls[0]
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expect(url).toMatch(/^https:\/\//)
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expect(options.allowHttp).toBe(false)
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})
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it('allows http for the initial request when secure is false', async () => {
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await executeClickHouseQuery(makeConfig({ secure: false }), 'SELECT 1')
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const [url, , options] = mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP.mock.calls[0]
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expect(url).toMatch(/^http:\/\//)
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expect(options.allowHttp).toBe(true)
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})
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it('sends the statement as the body with a matching Content-Length and auth headers', async () => {
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await executeClickHouseInsert(makeConfig(), 'events', { id: 1 })
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const [, , options] = mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP.mock.calls[0]
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expect(options.body).toContain('INSERT INTO `events` FORMAT JSONEachRow')
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expect(options.headers['Content-Length']).toBe(String(Buffer.byteLength(options.body, 'utf-8')))
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expect(options.headers['X-ClickHouse-User']).toBe('default')
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expect(options.headers['X-ClickHouse-Key']).toBe('secret')
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})
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it('propagates non-ok responses as errors with the body text', async () => {
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mockSecureFetchWithPinnedIP.mockResolvedValue({
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ok: false,
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status: 400,
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statusText: 'Bad Request',
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text: async () => 'Code: 62. DB::Exception: Syntax error',
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headers: { get: () => null },
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})
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await expect(executeClickHouseQuery(makeConfig(), 'SELECT 1')).rejects.toThrow(
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'Code: 62. DB::Exception: Syntax error'
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)
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})
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})
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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import {
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secureFetchWithPinnedIP,
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validateDatabaseHost,
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validateSqlWhereClause,
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} from '@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server'
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@@ -81,24 +82,21 @@ async function clickhouseRequest(
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url.searchParams.set('readonly', '1')
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}
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const controller = new AbortController()
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const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)
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let response: Response
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try {
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response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: {
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'X-ClickHouse-User': config.username,
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'X-ClickHouse-Key': config.password,
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'Content-Type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
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},
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body: statement,
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signal: controller.signal,
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})
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} finally {
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clearTimeout(timeout)
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}
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// Pin the connection to the IP that passed validation. Without this, fetch()
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// would re-resolve `config.host` and a DNS-rebinding hostname could point the
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// actual request at an internal/private address after validation succeeded.
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const response = await secureFetchWithPinnedIP(url.toString(), hostValidation.resolvedIP!, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: {
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'X-ClickHouse-User': config.username,
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'X-ClickHouse-Key': config.password,
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'Content-Type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
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'Content-Length': String(Buffer.byteLength(statement, 'utf-8')),
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},
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body: statement,
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timeout: REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS,
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allowHttp: !config.secure,
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})
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const text = await response.text()
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@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
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/**
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* @vitest-environment node
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*
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* Tests for GET /api/v1/audit-logs/[id] — verifies the lookup is constrained
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* by the organization scope and 404s for rows outside it.
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*/
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import { createMockRequest, dbChainMock, dbChainMockFns } from '@sim/testing'
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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const {
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mockCheckRateLimit,
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mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess,
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mockBuildOrgScopeCondition,
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mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds,
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} = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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mockCheckRateLimit: vi.fn(),
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mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess: vi.fn(),
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mockBuildOrgScopeCondition: vi.fn(),
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mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds: vi.fn(),
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}))
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vi.mock('@sim/db', () => dbChainMock)
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vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/middleware', () => ({
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checkRateLimit: mockCheckRateLimit,
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createRateLimitResponse: vi.fn(),
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}))
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vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/auth', () => ({
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validateEnterpriseAuditAccess: mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess,
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}))
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vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/query', () => ({
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buildOrgScopeCondition: mockBuildOrgScopeCondition,
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getOrgWorkspaceIds: mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds,
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}))
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vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/logs/meta', () => ({
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getUserLimits: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
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createApiResponse: vi.fn((body: unknown) => ({ body, headers: {} })),
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}))
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import { GET } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/[id]/route'
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const ORG_ID = 'org-1'
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const MEMBER_IDS = ['admin-1', 'member-1']
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const ORG_WORKSPACE_IDS = ['ws-org-1']
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const SCOPE_SENTINEL = { type: 'org-scope-sentinel' }
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const AUDIT_ROW = {
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id: 'log-1',
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workspaceId: 'ws-org-1',
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actorId: 'member-1',
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actorName: 'Member',
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actorEmail: 'member@example.com',
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action: 'workflow.created',
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resourceType: 'workflow',
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resourceId: 'wf-1',
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resourceName: 'My Workflow',
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description: 'Created workflow',
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metadata: {},
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ipAddress: '127.0.0.1',
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userAgent: 'test',
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createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
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}
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function callRoute(id: string) {
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const request = createMockRequest(
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'GET',
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undefined,
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{},
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`http://localhost:3000/api/v1/audit-logs/${id}`
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)
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return GET(request, { params: Promise.resolve({ id }) })
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}
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describe('GET /api/v1/audit-logs/[id]', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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vi.clearAllMocks()
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mockCheckRateLimit.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true, userId: 'admin-1' })
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mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess.mockResolvedValue({
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success: true,
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context: { organizationId: ORG_ID, orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS },
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})
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mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds.mockResolvedValue(ORG_WORKSPACE_IDS)
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mockBuildOrgScopeCondition.mockReturnValue(SCOPE_SENTINEL)
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})
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it('constrains the lookup with the org scope condition (includeDeparted)', async () => {
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dbChainMockFns.limit.mockResolvedValueOnce([AUDIT_ROW])
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const response = await callRoute('log-1')
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expect(response.status).toBe(200)
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expect(mockBuildOrgScopeCondition).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
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organizationId: ORG_ID,
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orgWorkspaceIds: ORG_WORKSPACE_IDS,
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orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS,
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includeDeparted: true,
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})
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expect(dbChainMockFns.where).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
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expect.objectContaining({
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type: 'and',
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conditions: expect.arrayContaining([SCOPE_SENTINEL]),
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})
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)
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})
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it('returns 404 when the row is outside the organization scope', async () => {
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dbChainMockFns.limit.mockResolvedValueOnce([])
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const response = await callRoute('log-outside-org')
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expect(response.status).toBe(404)
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const body = await response.json()
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expect(body.error).toBe('Audit log not found')
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})
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it('excludes ipAddress and userAgent from the response', async () => {
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dbChainMockFns.limit.mockResolvedValueOnce([AUDIT_ROW])
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const response = await callRoute('log-1')
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const body = await response.json()
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expect(body.data.id).toBe('log-1')
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expect(body.data.ipAddress).toBeUndefined()
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expect(body.data.userAgent).toBeUndefined()
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})
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})
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@@ -4,24 +4,26 @@
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* Get a single audit log entry by ID, scoped to the authenticated user's organization.
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* Requires enterprise subscription and org admin/owner role.
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*
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* Scope includes logs from current org members AND logs within org workspaces
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* (including those from departed members or system actions with null actorId).
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* Scope is the organization boundary: logs within org-attached workspaces and
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* org-level events (including those from departed members or system actions
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* with null actorId).
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*
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* Response: { data: AuditLogEntry, limits: UserLimits }
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*/
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import { db } from '@sim/db'
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import { auditLog, workspace } from '@sim/db/schema'
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import { auditLog } from '@sim/db/schema'
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import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
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import { getErrorMessage } from '@sim/utils/errors'
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import { generateId } from '@sim/utils/id'
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import { and, eq, inArray, or } from 'drizzle-orm'
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import { and, eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
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import { type NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import { v1GetAuditLogContract } from '@/lib/api/contracts/v1/audit-logs'
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import { parseRequest } from '@/lib/api/server'
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import { withRouteHandler } from '@/lib/core/utils/with-route-handler'
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import { validateEnterpriseAuditAccess } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/auth'
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import { formatAuditLogEntry } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/format'
|
||||
import { buildOrgScopeCondition, getOrgWorkspaceIds } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/query'
|
||||
import { createApiResponse, getUserLimits } from '@/app/api/v1/logs/meta'
|
||||
import { checkRateLimit, createRateLimitResponse } from '@/app/api/v1/middleware'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -53,25 +55,20 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(
|
||||
return authResult.response
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const { orgMemberIds } = authResult.context
|
||||
const { organizationId, orgMemberIds } = authResult.context
|
||||
|
||||
const orgWorkspaceIds = db
|
||||
.select({ id: workspace.id })
|
||||
.from(workspace)
|
||||
.where(inArray(workspace.ownerId, orgMemberIds))
|
||||
const orgWorkspaceIds = await getOrgWorkspaceIds(organizationId)
|
||||
const scopeCondition = buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds,
|
||||
orgMemberIds,
|
||||
includeDeparted: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
const [log] = await db
|
||||
.select()
|
||||
.from(auditLog)
|
||||
.where(
|
||||
and(
|
||||
eq(auditLog.id, id),
|
||||
or(
|
||||
inArray(auditLog.actorId, orgMemberIds),
|
||||
inArray(auditLog.workspaceId, orgWorkspaceIds)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
.where(and(eq(auditLog.id, id), scopeCondition))
|
||||
.limit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!log) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Tests for the enterprise audit-log tenant boundary. The global drizzle-orm
|
||||
* mock returns structured operator objects, so these tests assert directly on
|
||||
* the predicate tree.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { dbChainMock, dbChainMockFns } from '@sim/testing'
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@sim/db', () => dbChainMock)
|
||||
|
||||
import { buildOrgScopeCondition, getOrgWorkspaceIds } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/query'
|
||||
|
||||
const ORG_ID = 'org-1'
|
||||
const MEMBER_IDS = ['user-1', 'user-2']
|
||||
const WORKSPACE_IDS = ['ws-1', 'ws-2']
|
||||
|
||||
interface MockCondition {
|
||||
type?: string
|
||||
conditions?: MockCondition[]
|
||||
column?: string
|
||||
values?: string[]
|
||||
left?: string
|
||||
right?: string
|
||||
strings?: string[]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function asCondition(value: unknown): MockCondition {
|
||||
return value as MockCondition
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Asserts the condition matches null-workspace rows tied to the organization
|
||||
* via metadata or the organization resource itself.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function expectOrgLevelCondition(condition: MockCondition, organizationId: string): void {
|
||||
expect(condition.type).toBe('and')
|
||||
const [nullCheck, orgLink] = condition.conditions!
|
||||
expect(nullCheck).toMatchObject({ type: 'isNull', column: 'workspaceId' })
|
||||
|
||||
expect(orgLink.type).toBe('or')
|
||||
const [metadataMatch, orgResourceMatch] = orgLink.conditions!
|
||||
expect(metadataMatch.strings?.join('?')).toContain("->>'organizationId' =")
|
||||
expect(metadataMatch.values).toContain(organizationId)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(orgResourceMatch.type).toBe('and')
|
||||
expect(orgResourceMatch.conditions).toEqual([
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'eq', left: 'resourceType', right: 'organization' }),
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'eq', left: 'resourceId', right: organizationId }),
|
||||
])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('buildOrgScopeCondition', () => {
|
||||
it('never uses actor membership as a standalone boundary (default scope)', () => {
|
||||
const condition = asCondition(
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId: ORG_ID,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: WORKSPACE_IDS,
|
||||
orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS,
|
||||
includeDeparted: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(condition.type).toBe('and')
|
||||
const [orgScope, actorFilter] = condition.conditions!
|
||||
|
||||
expect(orgScope.type).toBe('or')
|
||||
const [workspaceScope, orgLevel] = orgScope.conditions!
|
||||
expect(workspaceScope).toMatchObject({
|
||||
type: 'inArray',
|
||||
column: 'workspaceId',
|
||||
values: WORKSPACE_IDS,
|
||||
})
|
||||
expectOrgLevelCondition(orgLevel, ORG_ID)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(actorFilter).toMatchObject({
|
||||
type: 'or',
|
||||
conditions: [
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'inArray', column: 'actorId', values: MEMBER_IDS }),
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'isNull', column: 'actorId' }),
|
||||
],
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('omits the actor filter entirely when includeDeparted is true', () => {
|
||||
const condition = asCondition(
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId: ORG_ID,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: WORKSPACE_IDS,
|
||||
orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS,
|
||||
includeDeparted: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(condition.type).toBe('or')
|
||||
const [workspaceScope, orgLevel] = condition.conditions!
|
||||
expect(workspaceScope).toMatchObject({
|
||||
type: 'inArray',
|
||||
column: 'workspaceId',
|
||||
values: WORKSPACE_IDS,
|
||||
})
|
||||
expectOrgLevelCondition(orgLevel, ORG_ID)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(JSON.stringify(condition)).not.toContain('actorId')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('falls back to the org-level branch alone when the org has no workspaces', () => {
|
||||
const condition = asCondition(
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId: ORG_ID,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: [],
|
||||
orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS,
|
||||
includeDeparted: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expectOrgLevelCondition(condition, ORG_ID)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('still applies the actor filter on top of the org scope with no workspaces', () => {
|
||||
const condition = asCondition(
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId: ORG_ID,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: [],
|
||||
orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS,
|
||||
includeDeparted: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(condition.type).toBe('and')
|
||||
const [orgLevel, actorFilter] = condition.conditions!
|
||||
expectOrgLevelCondition(orgLevel, ORG_ID)
|
||||
expect(actorFilter).toMatchObject({
|
||||
type: 'or',
|
||||
conditions: [
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'inArray', column: 'actorId', values: MEMBER_IDS }),
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'isNull', column: 'actorId' }),
|
||||
],
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('only matches system events when the org has no current members', () => {
|
||||
const condition = asCondition(
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId: ORG_ID,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: WORKSPACE_IDS,
|
||||
orgMemberIds: [],
|
||||
includeDeparted: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(condition.type).toBe('and')
|
||||
const [, actorFilter] = condition.conditions!
|
||||
expect(actorFilter).toMatchObject({ type: 'isNull', column: 'actorId' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('getOrgWorkspaceIds', () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('selects workspaces by organization ownership, not member ownership', async () => {
|
||||
const ids = await getOrgWorkspaceIds(ORG_ID)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(ids).toEqual([])
|
||||
expect(dbChainMockFns.where).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ type: 'eq', left: 'organizationId', right: ORG_ID })
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
|
||||
import { AuditResourceType } from '@sim/audit'
|
||||
import { db } from '@sim/db'
|
||||
import { auditLog, workspace } from '@sim/db/schema'
|
||||
import type { InferSelectModel } from 'drizzle-orm'
|
||||
import { and, desc, eq, gte, ilike, inArray, lt, lte, or, type SQL, sql } from 'drizzle-orm'
|
||||
import { and, desc, eq, gte, ilike, inArray, isNull, lt, lte, or, type SQL, sql } from 'drizzle-orm'
|
||||
|
||||
type DbAuditLog = InferSelectModel<typeof auditLog>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -68,33 +69,61 @@ export function buildFilterConditions(params: AuditLogFilterParams): SQL<unknown
|
||||
return conditions
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export async function buildOrgScopeCondition(
|
||||
orgMemberIds: string[],
|
||||
includeDeparted: boolean
|
||||
): Promise<SQL<unknown>> {
|
||||
if (orgMemberIds.length === 0) {
|
||||
return sql`1 = 0`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!includeDeparted) {
|
||||
return inArray(auditLog.actorId, orgMemberIds)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const orgWorkspaces = await db
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Returns the IDs of all workspaces attached to the organization.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function getOrgWorkspaceIds(organizationId: string): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||
const rows = await db
|
||||
.select({ id: workspace.id })
|
||||
.from(workspace)
|
||||
.where(inArray(workspace.ownerId, orgMemberIds))
|
||||
.where(eq(workspace.organizationId, organizationId))
|
||||
return rows.map((row) => row.id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const orgWorkspaceIds = orgWorkspaces.map((w) => w.id)
|
||||
export interface OrgScopeParams {
|
||||
organizationId: string
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: string[]
|
||||
orgMemberIds: string[]
|
||||
includeDeparted: boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (orgWorkspaceIds.length > 0) {
|
||||
return or(
|
||||
inArray(auditLog.actorId, orgMemberIds),
|
||||
inArray(auditLog.workspaceId, orgWorkspaceIds)
|
||||
)!
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Builds the tenant-boundary predicate for organization audit log access:
|
||||
* rows in org-attached workspaces, plus org-level rows (`workspace_id IS
|
||||
* NULL`) tied to the org via `metadata.organizationId` or the organization
|
||||
* resource itself. Actor membership is never a standalone boundary — when
|
||||
* `includeDeparted` is false it only narrows the org scope to current members
|
||||
* and system events (null actor).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function buildOrgScopeCondition(params: OrgScopeParams): SQL<unknown> {
|
||||
const { organizationId, orgWorkspaceIds, orgMemberIds, includeDeparted } = params
|
||||
|
||||
const orgLevelCondition = and(
|
||||
isNull(auditLog.workspaceId),
|
||||
or(
|
||||
sql`${auditLog.metadata}->>'organizationId' = ${organizationId}`,
|
||||
and(
|
||||
eq(auditLog.resourceType, AuditResourceType.ORGANIZATION),
|
||||
eq(auditLog.resourceId, organizationId)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
)!
|
||||
|
||||
const orgScope =
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds.length > 0
|
||||
? or(inArray(auditLog.workspaceId, orgWorkspaceIds), orgLevelCondition)!
|
||||
: orgLevelCondition
|
||||
|
||||
if (includeDeparted) {
|
||||
return orgScope
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return inArray(auditLog.actorId, orgMemberIds)
|
||||
const currentActorCondition =
|
||||
orgMemberIds.length > 0
|
||||
? or(inArray(auditLog.actorId, orgMemberIds), isNull(auditLog.actorId))!
|
||||
: isNull(auditLog.actorId)
|
||||
|
||||
return and(orgScope, currentActorCondition)!
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function buildCursorCondition(cursor: string): SQL<unknown> | null {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Tests for GET /api/v1/audit-logs — verifies filters are validated against
|
||||
* the caller's organization and the scope is built from the org context.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { createMockRequest } from '@sim/testing'
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
|
||||
const {
|
||||
mockCheckRateLimit,
|
||||
mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess,
|
||||
mockBuildOrgScopeCondition,
|
||||
mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds,
|
||||
mockQueryAuditLogs,
|
||||
mockBuildFilterConditions,
|
||||
} = vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
mockCheckRateLimit: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockBuildOrgScopeCondition: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockQueryAuditLogs: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockBuildFilterConditions: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/middleware', () => ({
|
||||
checkRateLimit: mockCheckRateLimit,
|
||||
createRateLimitResponse: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/auth', () => ({
|
||||
validateEnterpriseAuditAccess: mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/query', () => ({
|
||||
buildFilterConditions: mockBuildFilterConditions,
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition: mockBuildOrgScopeCondition,
|
||||
getOrgWorkspaceIds: mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds,
|
||||
queryAuditLogs: mockQueryAuditLogs,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/app/api/v1/logs/meta', () => ({
|
||||
getUserLimits: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
|
||||
createApiResponse: vi.fn((body: unknown) => ({ body, headers: {} })),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
import { GET } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/route'
|
||||
|
||||
const ORG_ID = 'org-1'
|
||||
const MEMBER_IDS = ['admin-1', 'member-1']
|
||||
const ORG_WORKSPACE_IDS = ['ws-org-1', 'ws-org-2']
|
||||
const SCOPE_SENTINEL = { type: 'org-scope-sentinel' }
|
||||
|
||||
function makeRequest(query: string) {
|
||||
return createMockRequest('GET', undefined, {}, `http://localhost:3000/api/v1/audit-logs${query}`)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('GET /api/v1/audit-logs', () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks()
|
||||
mockCheckRateLimit.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true, userId: 'admin-1' })
|
||||
mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess.mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
success: true,
|
||||
context: { organizationId: ORG_ID, orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS },
|
||||
})
|
||||
mockGetOrgWorkspaceIds.mockResolvedValue(ORG_WORKSPACE_IDS)
|
||||
mockBuildOrgScopeCondition.mockReturnValue(SCOPE_SENTINEL)
|
||||
mockBuildFilterConditions.mockReturnValue([])
|
||||
mockQueryAuditLogs.mockResolvedValue({ data: [], nextCursor: undefined })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects an actorId that is not a current org member', async () => {
|
||||
const response = await GET(makeRequest('?actorId=outsider-1'))
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(400)
|
||||
const body = await response.json()
|
||||
expect(body.error).toBe('actorId is not a member of your organization')
|
||||
expect(mockQueryAuditLogs).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a workspaceId that does not belong to the organization', async () => {
|
||||
const response = await GET(makeRequest('?workspaceId=ws-other-org'))
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(400)
|
||||
const body = await response.json()
|
||||
expect(body.error).toBe('workspaceId does not belong to your organization')
|
||||
expect(mockQueryAuditLogs).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('accepts a workspaceId that belongs to the organization', async () => {
|
||||
const response = await GET(makeRequest('?workspaceId=ws-org-1'))
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(mockQueryAuditLogs).toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('builds the scope from the organization context, never from actors alone', async () => {
|
||||
const response = await GET(makeRequest('?actorId=member-1'))
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(mockBuildOrgScopeCondition).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
|
||||
organizationId: ORG_ID,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds: ORG_WORKSPACE_IDS,
|
||||
orgMemberIds: MEMBER_IDS,
|
||||
includeDeparted: false,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
const [conditions] = mockQueryAuditLogs.mock.calls[0]
|
||||
expect(conditions[0]).toBe(SCOPE_SENTINEL)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('passes includeDeparted through to the scope builder', async () => {
|
||||
const response = await GET(makeRequest('?includeDeparted=true'))
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(mockBuildOrgScopeCondition).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
|
||||
expect.objectContaining({ includeDeparted: true })
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns the auth failure response when enterprise access is denied', async () => {
|
||||
const denied = new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'nope' }), { status: 403 })
|
||||
mockValidateEnterpriseAuditAccess.mockResolvedValue({ success: false, response: denied })
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await GET(makeRequest(''))
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(403)
|
||||
expect(mockQueryAuditLogs).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import { formatAuditLogEntry } from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/format'
|
||||
import {
|
||||
buildFilterConditions,
|
||||
buildOrgScopeCondition,
|
||||
getOrgWorkspaceIds,
|
||||
queryAuditLogs,
|
||||
} from '@/app/api/v1/audit-logs/query'
|
||||
import { createApiResponse, getUserLimits } from '@/app/api/v1/logs/meta'
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
|
||||
return authResult.response
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const { orgMemberIds } = authResult.context
|
||||
const { organizationId, orgMemberIds } = authResult.context
|
||||
|
||||
const parsed = await parseRequest(
|
||||
v1ListAuditLogsContract,
|
||||
@@ -85,7 +86,21 @@ export const GET = withRouteHandler(async (request: NextRequest) => {
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const scopeCondition = await buildOrgScopeCondition(orgMemberIds, params.includeDeparted)
|
||||
const orgWorkspaceIds = await getOrgWorkspaceIds(organizationId)
|
||||
|
||||
if (params.workspaceId && !orgWorkspaceIds.includes(params.workspaceId)) {
|
||||
return NextResponse.json(
|
||||
{ error: 'workspaceId does not belong to your organization' },
|
||||
{ status: 400 }
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const scopeCondition = buildOrgScopeCondition({
|
||||
organizationId,
|
||||
orgWorkspaceIds,
|
||||
orgMemberIds,
|
||||
includeDeparted: params.includeDeparted,
|
||||
})
|
||||
const filterConditions = buildFilterConditions({
|
||||
action: params.action,
|
||||
resourceType: params.resourceType,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
|
||||
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { getErrorMessage, toError } from '@sim/utils/errors'
|
||||
import { GitLabIcon } from '@/components/icons'
|
||||
import type { SecureFetchResponse } from '@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server'
|
||||
import { isSameOrigin } from '@/lib/core/utils/validation'
|
||||
import { fetchWithRetry, VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import { secureFetchWithRetry } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/secure-fetch.server'
|
||||
import { VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import type { ConnectorConfig, ExternalDocument, ExternalDocumentList } from '@/connectors/types'
|
||||
import { computeContentHash, joinTagArray, parseTagDate } from '@/connectors/utils'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -461,8 +463,8 @@ async function fetchProject(
|
||||
encodedProject: string,
|
||||
accessToken: string,
|
||||
retryOptions?: typeof VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS
|
||||
): Promise<Response> {
|
||||
return fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
): Promise<SecureFetchResponse> {
|
||||
return secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
`${apiBase}/projects/${encodedProject}`,
|
||||
{ method: 'GET', headers: authHeaders(accessToken) },
|
||||
retryOptions
|
||||
@@ -760,7 +762,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
continued: Boolean(state.fileNextUrl),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -816,7 +818,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
const url = `${apiBase}/projects/${encodedProject}/wikis?with_content=1`
|
||||
logger.info('Listing GitLab wiki pages', { host, project: encodedProject })
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -891,7 +893,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
incremental: Boolean(lastSyncAt),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -954,7 +956,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
if (!slug) return null
|
||||
|
||||
const url = `${apiBase}/projects/${encodedProject}/wikis/${encodeURIComponent(slug)}?render_html=false`
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -975,7 +977,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
if (!iidStr || Number.isNaN(iid)) return null
|
||||
|
||||
const url = `${apiBase}/projects/${encodedProject}/issues/${iid}`
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1002,7 +1004,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
accessToken
|
||||
)
|
||||
const url = `${apiBase}/projects/${encodedProject}/repository/files/${encodeURIComponent(path)}?ref=${encodeURIComponent(ref)}`
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1078,7 +1080,7 @@ export const gitlabConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
|
||||
const userRef = typeof sourceConfig.ref === 'string' ? sourceConfig.ref.trim() : ''
|
||||
if (userRef && activePhases(choice).includes('repo')) {
|
||||
const refResponse = await fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
const refResponse = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
`${apiBase}/projects/${encodedProject}/repository/commits/${encodeURIComponent(userRef)}`,
|
||||
{ method: 'GET', headers: authHeaders(accessToken) },
|
||||
VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { toError } from '@sim/utils/errors'
|
||||
import { ObsidianIcon } from '@/components/icons'
|
||||
import { validateExternalUrl } from '@/lib/core/security/input-validation'
|
||||
import { fetchWithRetry, VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import { secureFetchWithRetry } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/secure-fetch.server'
|
||||
import { VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import type { ConnectorConfig, ExternalDocument, ExternalDocumentList } from '@/connectors/types'
|
||||
import { joinTagArray, parseTagDate } from '@/connectors/utils'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,18 +25,15 @@ interface NoteJson {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Normalizes the vault URL and validates it against SSRF protections.
|
||||
* Normalizes the vault URL and runs an early structural SSRF check via the
|
||||
* shared `validateExternalUrl` policy (hosted Sim blocks localhost/private/HTTP;
|
||||
* self-hosted allows http://localhost only).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The Obsidian Local REST API plugin runs on the user's own machine, so there
|
||||
* is no SaaS domain to allowlist — the vault URL is fully user-controlled. We
|
||||
* defer to the shared `validateExternalUrl` policy:
|
||||
* - hosted Sim: blocks localhost, private IPs, HTTP (forces HTTPS)
|
||||
* - self-hosted Sim: allows http://localhost (built-in carve-out), still
|
||||
* blocks non-loopback private IPs and dangerous ports (22, 25, 3306,
|
||||
* 5432, 6379, 27017, 9200)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This does not defend against DNS rebinding; for hosted deployments the user
|
||||
* must expose the plugin through a public URL (tunnel, port-forward).
|
||||
* The authoritative SSRF boundary is enforced at request time: every vault
|
||||
* request goes through {@link secureFetchWithRetry}, which resolves DNS,
|
||||
* re-checks the resolved IP, and pins the connection to it — closing the
|
||||
* DNS-rebinding gap a synchronous string check cannot. On hosted Sim the plugin
|
||||
* must be exposed through a public URL.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function resolveVaultEndpoint(rawUrl: string | undefined): string {
|
||||
let url = (rawUrl || DEFAULT_VAULT_URL).trim().replace(/\/+$/, '')
|
||||
@@ -57,12 +55,12 @@ async function listDirectory(
|
||||
baseUrl: string,
|
||||
accessToken: string,
|
||||
dirPath: string,
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof fetchWithRetry>[2]
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof secureFetchWithRetry>[2]
|
||||
): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||
const encodedDir = dirPath ? dirPath.split('/').map(encodeURIComponent).join('/') : ''
|
||||
const endpoint = encodedDir ? `${baseUrl}/vault/${encodedDir}/` : `${baseUrl}/vault/`
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
endpoint,
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
@@ -88,7 +86,7 @@ async function listVaultFiles(
|
||||
baseUrl: string,
|
||||
accessToken: string,
|
||||
folderPath?: string,
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof fetchWithRetry>[2],
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof secureFetchWithRetry>[2],
|
||||
depth = 0
|
||||
): Promise<string[]> {
|
||||
if (depth > MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) {
|
||||
@@ -134,9 +132,9 @@ async function fetchNote(
|
||||
baseUrl: string,
|
||||
accessToken: string,
|
||||
filePath: string,
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof fetchWithRetry>[2]
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof secureFetchWithRetry>[2]
|
||||
): Promise<NoteJson> {
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
`${baseUrl}/vault/${filePath.split('/').map(encodeURIComponent).join('/')}`,
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
@@ -304,7 +302,7 @@ export const obsidianConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
`${baseUrl}/`,
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ import crypto from 'crypto'
|
||||
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { getErrorMessage, toError } from '@sim/utils/errors'
|
||||
import { S3Icon } from '@/components/icons'
|
||||
import { fetchWithRetry, VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import { isHosted } from '@/lib/core/config/feature-flags'
|
||||
import { secureFetchWithRetry } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/secure-fetch.server'
|
||||
import { VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import type { ConnectorConfig, ExternalDocument, ExternalDocumentList } from '@/connectors/types'
|
||||
import { parseTagDate, readBodyWithLimit } from '@/connectors/utils'
|
||||
import { encodeS3PathComponent, getSignatureKey } from '@/tools/s3/utils'
|
||||
@@ -112,9 +114,11 @@ function isSupportedKey(key: string, allowedExtensions: Set<string>): boolean {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Returns true when the host is a loopback address for which plain `http://`
|
||||
* is tolerated (local MinIO development). Any other host must use `https://` so
|
||||
* that credentials are never transmitted over cleartext.
|
||||
* Returns true when the host is a loopback address for which plain `http://` is
|
||||
* tolerated (local MinIO development on a self-hosted deployment). Any other
|
||||
* host must use `https://`. This is only an early check — the SSRF boundary is
|
||||
* enforced at request time by {@link secureFetchWithRetry}, which blocks
|
||||
* loopback/private targets on hosted Sim regardless of what this parser accepts.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function isLoopbackHost(host: string): boolean {
|
||||
const bare = host.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '')
|
||||
@@ -160,9 +164,9 @@ function parseEndpoint(raw: string): S3Endpoint {
|
||||
|
||||
const host = url.hostname
|
||||
if (!host) throw new Error('Endpoint is missing a host')
|
||||
if (scheme === 'http' && !isLoopbackHost(host)) {
|
||||
if (scheme === 'http' && !(isLoopbackHost(host) && !isHosted)) {
|
||||
throw new Error(
|
||||
'Plain http:// endpoints are only allowed for localhost — use https:// otherwise'
|
||||
'Plain http:// endpoints are only allowed for localhost on self-hosted deployments — use https:// otherwise'
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -261,7 +265,7 @@ function buildUrl(ctx: S3Context, encodedPath: string, canonicalQueryString: str
|
||||
* Reuses {@link getSignatureKey} from the s3 tool utilities.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The signed headers embed `x-amz-date` and are reused verbatim across
|
||||
* `fetchWithRetry` attempts. S3 allows a 15-minute clock-skew window; the
|
||||
* `secureFetchWithRetry` attempts. S3 allows a 15-minute clock-skew window; the
|
||||
* retry helper's worst-case total backoff (~31s default, ~10s in validate) is
|
||||
* far inside that window, so a stale timestamp never triggers
|
||||
* RequestTimeTooSkewed.
|
||||
@@ -449,7 +453,7 @@ async function listObjectsPage(
|
||||
ctx: S3Context,
|
||||
prefix: string,
|
||||
continuationToken: string | undefined,
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof fetchWithRetry>[2],
|
||||
retryOptions?: Parameters<typeof secureFetchWithRetry>[2],
|
||||
maxKeys: number = LIST_MAX_KEYS
|
||||
): Promise<{ objects: S3ObjectEntry[]; isTruncated: boolean; nextContinuationToken?: string }> {
|
||||
const queryParams: Record<string, string> = {
|
||||
@@ -466,7 +470,7 @@ async function listObjectsPage(
|
||||
|
||||
const url = buildUrl(ctx, bucketPath, canonicalQueryString)
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, { method: 'GET', headers }, retryOptions)
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, { method: 'GET', headers }, retryOptions)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok) {
|
||||
const errorText = await response.text()
|
||||
@@ -616,7 +620,7 @@ export const s3Connector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
const headers = buildSignedHeaders(ctx, 'GET', encodedPath, '')
|
||||
const url = buildUrl(ctx, encodedPath, '')
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, { method: 'GET', headers })
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, { method: 'GET', headers })
|
||||
|
||||
if (response.status === 404) return null
|
||||
if (!response.ok) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
|
||||
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { getErrorMessage, toError } from '@sim/utils/errors'
|
||||
import { SentryIcon } from '@/components/icons'
|
||||
import { fetchWithRetry, VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import { secureFetchWithRetry } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/secure-fetch.server'
|
||||
import { VALIDATE_RETRY_OPTIONS } from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
import type { ConnectorConfig, ExternalDocument, ExternalDocumentList } from '@/connectors/types'
|
||||
import { parseTagDate } from '@/connectors/utils'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ async function fetchLatestEvent(
|
||||
): Promise<SentryEvent | null> {
|
||||
const url = `${apiBase}/organizations/${encodeURIComponent(organization)}/issues/${encodeURIComponent(issueId)}/events/latest/`
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -507,7 +508,7 @@ export const sentryConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
maxIssues,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url.toString(), {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url.toString(), {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ export const sentryConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
|
||||
const url = `${apiBase}/organizations/${encodeURIComponent(organization)}/issues/${encodeURIComponent(externalId)}/`
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await fetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(url, {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: authHeaders(accessToken),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -629,7 +630,7 @@ export const sentryConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
* scope and the project-scoped path style, and gives a precise "not found"
|
||||
* message when the org or project slug is wrong.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const projectResponse = await fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
const projectResponse = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
`${apiBase}/projects/${encodeURIComponent(organization)}/${encodeURIComponent(project)}/`,
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
@@ -670,7 +671,7 @@ export const sentryConnector: ConnectorConfig = {
|
||||
issuesProbeUrl.searchParams.set('query', DEFAULT_QUERY)
|
||||
issuesProbeUrl.searchParams.set('limit', '1')
|
||||
|
||||
const issuesResponse = await fetchWithRetry(
|
||||
const issuesResponse = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
issuesProbeUrl.toString(),
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
|
||||
import type { SecureFetchResponse } from '@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Strips HTML tags from content and decodes common HTML entities.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ export function parseMultiValue(value: unknown): string[] {
|
||||
* Returns null when the cap is exceeded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function readBodyWithLimit(
|
||||
response: Response,
|
||||
response: Response | SecureFetchResponse,
|
||||
maxBytes: number
|
||||
): Promise<Buffer | null> {
|
||||
if (!response.body) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -430,7 +430,6 @@ const copilotConnectedCredentialSchema = z.object({
|
||||
serviceName: z.string(),
|
||||
lastUsed: z.string(),
|
||||
isDefault: z.boolean(),
|
||||
accessToken: z.string().nullable(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
const copilotNotConnectedServiceSchema = z.object({
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2543,7 +2543,8 @@ export const auth = betterAuth({
|
||||
* marker disambiguates it from a legacy bot id (same `U.../B...` shape);
|
||||
* absent it, we keep the legacy format and today's behavior.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
const authedUser = tokens.raw?.authed_user as { id?: string } | undefined
|
||||
const rawTokens = (tokens as typeof tokens & { raw?: Record<string, unknown> }).raw
|
||||
const authedUser = rawTokens?.authed_user as { id?: string } | undefined
|
||||
const installerUserId = authedUser?.id
|
||||
const userSegment = installerUserId
|
||||
? `usr_${installerUserId}`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Regression test: the credentials response must expose only display metadata,
|
||||
* never the connected account's OAuth access/refresh token.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
|
||||
const SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN = 'ya29.a0SECRET_GOOGLE_BEARER_TOKEN_DO_NOT_LEAK'
|
||||
|
||||
const { selectMock, getAllOAuthServicesMock, getPersonalAndWorkspaceEnvMock, jwtDecodeMock } =
|
||||
vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
selectMock: vi.fn(),
|
||||
getAllOAuthServicesMock: vi.fn(),
|
||||
getPersonalAndWorkspaceEnvMock: vi.fn(),
|
||||
jwtDecodeMock: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@sim/db', () => ({
|
||||
db: { select: selectMock },
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/oauth', () => ({
|
||||
getAllOAuthServices: getAllOAuthServicesMock,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/environment/utils', () => ({
|
||||
getPersonalAndWorkspaceEnv: getPersonalAndWorkspaceEnvMock,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('jwt-decode', () => ({
|
||||
jwtDecode: jwtDecodeMock,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
import { getCredentialsServerTool } from './get-credentials'
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Wires the two sequential `db.select()` reads the tool performs:
|
||||
* 1. `select().from(account).where()` → account rows (awaited directly)
|
||||
* 2. `select({...}).from(user).where().limit(1)` → user row
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function wireDb(accountRows: unknown[], userRows: Array<{ email: string }>) {
|
||||
const whereThenable = {
|
||||
then: (resolve: (rows: unknown[]) => unknown) => resolve(accountRows),
|
||||
limit: () => Promise.resolve(userRows),
|
||||
}
|
||||
const builder = { from: () => builder, where: () => whereThenable }
|
||||
selectMock.mockReturnValue(builder)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('getCredentialsServerTool', () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks()
|
||||
|
||||
wireDb(
|
||||
[
|
||||
{
|
||||
id: 'acct-google-1',
|
||||
providerId: 'google-default',
|
||||
accountId: '1234567890',
|
||||
idToken: 'jwt-token',
|
||||
accessToken: SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN,
|
||||
refreshToken: 'refresh-secret',
|
||||
updatedAt: new Date('2026-04-17T02:26:05.546Z'),
|
||||
},
|
||||
],
|
||||
[{ email: 'brent@cellular.so' }]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
getAllOAuthServicesMock.mockReturnValue([
|
||||
{
|
||||
providerId: 'google-default',
|
||||
name: 'Google',
|
||||
description: 'Google account',
|
||||
baseProvider: 'google',
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
providerId: 'slack',
|
||||
name: 'Slack',
|
||||
description: 'Slack workspace',
|
||||
baseProvider: 'slack',
|
||||
},
|
||||
])
|
||||
|
||||
getPersonalAndWorkspaceEnvMock.mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
personalEncrypted: {},
|
||||
workspaceEncrypted: {},
|
||||
conflicts: [],
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
jwtDecodeMock.mockReturnValue({ email: 'brent@cellular.so' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('never returns access tokens for connected OAuth credentials', async () => {
|
||||
const result = await getCredentialsServerTool.execute({}, { userId: 'user-1' })
|
||||
|
||||
const credentials = result.oauth.connected.credentials
|
||||
expect(credentials).toHaveLength(1)
|
||||
|
||||
for (const credential of credentials) {
|
||||
expect(credential).not.toHaveProperty('accessToken')
|
||||
expect(credential).not.toHaveProperty('refreshToken')
|
||||
expect(credential).not.toHaveProperty('idToken')
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns only masked display metadata for each credential', async () => {
|
||||
const result = await getCredentialsServerTool.execute({}, { userId: 'user-1' })
|
||||
|
||||
expect(result.oauth.connected.credentials[0]).toEqual({
|
||||
id: 'acct-google-1',
|
||||
name: 'brent@cellular.so',
|
||||
provider: 'google-default',
|
||||
serviceName: 'Google',
|
||||
lastUsed: '2026-04-17T02:26:05.546Z',
|
||||
isDefault: true,
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not leak the token value anywhere in the serialized response', async () => {
|
||||
const result = await getCredentialsServerTool.execute({}, { userId: 'user-1' })
|
||||
|
||||
expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain(SECRET_ACCESS_TOKEN)
|
||||
expect(JSON.stringify(result)).not.toContain('refresh-secret')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects unauthenticated callers without touching the database', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(getCredentialsServerTool.execute({}, undefined)).rejects.toThrow(
|
||||
'Authentication required'
|
||||
)
|
||||
expect(selectMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ import { eq } from 'drizzle-orm'
|
||||
import { jwtDecode } from 'jwt-decode'
|
||||
import { createPermissionError, verifyWorkflowAccess } from '@/lib/copilot/auth/permissions'
|
||||
import type { BaseServerTool } from '@/lib/copilot/tools/server/base-tool'
|
||||
import { generateRequestId } from '@/lib/core/utils/request'
|
||||
import { getPersonalAndWorkspaceEnv } from '@/lib/environment/utils'
|
||||
import { getAllOAuthServices } from '@/lib/oauth'
|
||||
import { refreshTokenIfNeeded } from '@/app/api/auth/oauth/utils'
|
||||
|
||||
interface GetCredentialsParams {
|
||||
workflowId?: string
|
||||
@@ -76,9 +74,7 @@ export const getCredentialsServerTool: BaseServerTool<GetCredentialsParams, any>
|
||||
serviceName: string
|
||||
lastUsed: string
|
||||
isDefault: boolean
|
||||
accessToken: string | null
|
||||
}> = []
|
||||
const requestId = generateRequestId()
|
||||
|
||||
for (const acc of accounts) {
|
||||
const providerId = acc.providerId
|
||||
@@ -104,19 +100,6 @@ export const getCredentialsServerTool: BaseServerTool<GetCredentialsParams, any>
|
||||
const service = allOAuthServices.find((s) => s.providerId === providerId)
|
||||
const serviceName = service?.name ?? providerId
|
||||
|
||||
let accessToken: string | null = acc.accessToken ?? null
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const { accessToken: refreshedToken } = await refreshTokenIfNeeded(
|
||||
requestId,
|
||||
acc as any,
|
||||
acc.id
|
||||
)
|
||||
accessToken = refreshedToken || accessToken
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
logger.warn('Failed to refresh OAuth access token', {
|
||||
error: toError(error).message,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
connectedCredentials.push({
|
||||
id: acc.id,
|
||||
name: displayName,
|
||||
@@ -124,7 +107,6 @@ export const getCredentialsServerTool: BaseServerTool<GetCredentialsParams, any>
|
||||
serviceName,
|
||||
lastUsed: acc.updatedAt.toISOString(),
|
||||
isDefault: featureType === 'default',
|
||||
accessToken,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Browser fallback for Node-only builtins (e.g. `dns/promises`) that get pulled
|
||||
* into the client bundle by server-only code which never executes in the
|
||||
* browser — notably the connector registry, whose `ConnectorConfig` objects are
|
||||
* imported by client UI for metadata while their `listDocuments`/`getDocument`
|
||||
* fetch logic (which transitively imports `input-validation.server`) only ever
|
||||
* runs in server API routes.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Wired in via `turbopack.resolveAlias` with the `browser` condition only, so
|
||||
* the real Node module is still resolved on the server and SSRF validation
|
||||
* remains fully intact. See `next.config.ts`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export default {}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
||||
import {
|
||||
type SecureFetchOptions,
|
||||
type SecureFetchResponse,
|
||||
secureFetchWithValidation,
|
||||
} from '@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server'
|
||||
import {
|
||||
type HTTPError,
|
||||
isRetryableError,
|
||||
type RetryOptions,
|
||||
retryWithExponentialBackoff,
|
||||
} from '@/lib/knowledge/documents/utils'
|
||||
|
||||
export interface SecureFetchRetryOptions extends RetryOptions {
|
||||
allowHttp?: boolean
|
||||
timeout?: number
|
||||
maxResponseBytes?: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* SSRF-safe counterpart to {@link fetchWithRetry} for connector requests to
|
||||
* user-controlled hosts. Every attempt re-runs {@link secureFetchWithValidation}
|
||||
* (DNS resolution, private/loopback/reserved-IP rejection, IP-pinned connection,
|
||||
* redirect re-validation); retry/backoff semantics mirror {@link fetchWithRetry}.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Lives in a `.server.ts` module because it pulls in Node-only `dns/promises`
|
||||
* via {@link secureFetchWithValidation}; importing it from the shared
|
||||
* `documents/utils` barrel would drag that into client bundles.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
options: SecureFetchOptions = {},
|
||||
retryOptions: SecureFetchRetryOptions = {}
|
||||
): Promise<SecureFetchResponse> {
|
||||
const { allowHttp, timeout, maxResponseBytes, ...retry } = retryOptions
|
||||
|
||||
return retryWithExponentialBackoff(async () => {
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithValidation(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
{
|
||||
...options,
|
||||
...(allowHttp !== undefined ? { allowHttp } : {}),
|
||||
...(timeout !== undefined ? { timeout } : {}),
|
||||
...(maxResponseBytes !== undefined ? { maxResponseBytes } : {}),
|
||||
},
|
||||
'url'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!response.ok && isRetryableError({ status: response.status })) {
|
||||
const errorText = await response.text()
|
||||
const error: HTTPError = new Error(
|
||||
`HTTP ${response.status}: ${response.statusText} - ${errorText}`
|
||||
)
|
||||
error.status = response.status
|
||||
error.statusText = response.statusText
|
||||
|
||||
const retryAfter = response.headers.get('retry-after')
|
||||
if (retryAfter) {
|
||||
const waitMs = Number.isNaN(Number(retryAfter))
|
||||
? Math.max(0, new Date(retryAfter).getTime() - Date.now())
|
||||
: Number(retryAfter) * 1000
|
||||
if (waitMs > 0) {
|
||||
error.retryAfterMs = waitMs
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
throw error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return response
|
||||
}, retry)
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,39 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
|
||||
const { mockSecureFetchWithValidation } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server', () => ({
|
||||
secureFetchWithValidation: mockSecureFetchWithValidation,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
import { secureFetchWithRetry } from './secure-fetch.server'
|
||||
import { isRetryableError } from './utils'
|
||||
|
||||
/** Builds a minimal SecureFetchResponse-shaped object for tests. */
|
||||
function fakeResponse(
|
||||
status: number,
|
||||
options: { headers?: Record<string, string>; body?: string } = {}
|
||||
) {
|
||||
const headers = options.headers ?? {}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
ok: status >= 200 && status < 300,
|
||||
status,
|
||||
statusText: `status-${status}`,
|
||||
headers: { get: (name: string) => headers[name.toLowerCase()] ?? null },
|
||||
body: null,
|
||||
text: async () => options.body ?? '',
|
||||
json: async () => JSON.parse(options.body ?? '{}'),
|
||||
arrayBuffer: async () => new ArrayBuffer(0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const FAST_RETRY = { initialDelayMs: 1, maxDelayMs: 2, maxRetries: 3 }
|
||||
|
||||
describe('isRetryableError', () => {
|
||||
describe('retryable status codes', () => {
|
||||
it.concurrent('returns true for 429 on Error with status', () => {
|
||||
@@ -150,3 +180,93 @@ describe('isRetryableError', () => {
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('secureFetchWithRetry', () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mockReset()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('routes the request through secureFetchWithValidation and returns the response', async () => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mockResolvedValue(fakeResponse(200, { body: 'ok' }))
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry('https://example.com/api', {
|
||||
method: 'GET',
|
||||
headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(mockSecureFetchWithValidation).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
const [url, options, paramName] = mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mock.calls[0]
|
||||
expect(url).toBe('https://example.com/api')
|
||||
expect(options).toMatchObject({ method: 'GET', headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
|
||||
expect(paramName).toBe('url')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('propagates SSRF validation failures without retrying', async () => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mockRejectedValue(
|
||||
new Error('url resolves to a blocked IP address')
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(
|
||||
secureFetchWithRetry('https://attacker.test', { method: 'GET' }, FAST_RETRY)
|
||||
).rejects.toThrow('blocked IP address')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(mockSecureFetchWithValidation).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('retries on a retryable status (503) and succeeds', async () => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(fakeResponse(503, { body: 'try later' }))
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(fakeResponse(200, { body: 'ok' }))
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
'https://example.com/api',
|
||||
{ method: 'GET' },
|
||||
FAST_RETRY
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(mockSecureFetchWithValidation).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not retry a non-retryable status (404) and returns it to the caller', async () => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mockResolvedValue(fakeResponse(404, { body: 'missing' }))
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
'https://example.com/api',
|
||||
{ method: 'GET' },
|
||||
FAST_RETRY
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(404)
|
||||
expect(mockSecureFetchWithValidation).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('forwards allowHttp / timeout / maxResponseBytes to the pinned fetch', async () => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mockResolvedValue(fakeResponse(200))
|
||||
|
||||
await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
'http://localhost:9000',
|
||||
{ method: 'GET' },
|
||||
{ allowHttp: true, timeout: 5000, maxResponseBytes: 1024, ...FAST_RETRY }
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const [, options] = mockSecureFetchWithValidation.mock.calls[0]
|
||||
expect(options).toMatchObject({ allowHttp: true, timeout: 5000, maxResponseBytes: 1024 })
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('honors Retry-After (seconds) on a 429 before retrying', async () => {
|
||||
mockSecureFetchWithValidation
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(fakeResponse(429, { headers: { 'retry-after': '0' } }))
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(fakeResponse(200))
|
||||
|
||||
const response = await secureFetchWithRetry(
|
||||
'https://example.com/api',
|
||||
{ method: 'GET' },
|
||||
FAST_RETRY
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expect(response.status).toBe(200)
|
||||
expect(mockSecureFetchWithValidation).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { randomFloat } from '@sim/utils/random'
|
||||
|
||||
const logger = createLogger('RetryUtils')
|
||||
|
||||
interface HTTPError extends Error {
|
||||
export interface HTTPError extends Error {
|
||||
status?: number
|
||||
statusText?: string
|
||||
retryAfterMs?: number
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
|
||||
const {
|
||||
mockCreateMcpPinnedFetch,
|
||||
mockCreateSsrfGuardedMcpFetch,
|
||||
mockPinnedFetch,
|
||||
mockGuardedFetch,
|
||||
} = vi.hoisted(() => {
|
||||
const mockPinnedFetch = vi.fn()
|
||||
const mockGuardedFetch = vi.fn()
|
||||
return {
|
||||
mockPinnedFetch,
|
||||
mockGuardedFetch,
|
||||
mockCreateMcpPinnedFetch: vi.fn(() => mockPinnedFetch),
|
||||
mockCreateSsrfGuardedMcpFetch: vi.fn(() => mockGuardedFetch),
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/mcp/pinned-fetch', () => ({
|
||||
createMcpPinnedFetch: mockCreateMcpPinnedFetch,
|
||||
createSsrfGuardedMcpFetch: mockCreateSsrfGuardedMcpFetch,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
import { detectMcpAuthType } from '@/lib/mcp/oauth/probe'
|
||||
|
||||
function makeResponse(init: { status?: number; headers?: Record<string, string> }): Response {
|
||||
const status = init.status ?? 200
|
||||
return {
|
||||
status,
|
||||
ok: status >= 200 && status < 300,
|
||||
headers: new Headers(init.headers ?? {}),
|
||||
} as unknown as Response
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('detectMcpAuthType — connection pinning (SSRF / DNS-rebinding)', () => {
|
||||
let globalFetchSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks()
|
||||
globalFetchSpy = vi.fn()
|
||||
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', globalFetchSpy)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('pins the probe to the pre-validated IP when resolvedIP is supplied', async () => {
|
||||
mockPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse({ status: 200 }))
|
||||
|
||||
const authType = await detectMcpAuthType('https://rebind.example.com/mcp', '203.0.113.10')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(authType).toBe('none')
|
||||
expect(mockCreateMcpPinnedFetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith('203.0.113.10')
|
||||
expect(mockCreateSsrfGuardedMcpFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
expect(mockPinnedFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
// The unpinned global fetch must never be used — that was the SSRF sink.
|
||||
expect(globalFetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('falls back to the SSRF-guarded fetch when no resolvedIP is supplied', async () => {
|
||||
mockGuardedFetch.mockResolvedValue(makeResponse({ status: 200 }))
|
||||
|
||||
const authType = await detectMcpAuthType('https://example.com/mcp')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(authType).toBe('none')
|
||||
expect(mockCreateSsrfGuardedMcpFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
expect(mockCreateMcpPinnedFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
expect(mockGuardedFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
expect(globalFetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('classifies an RFC 9728 OAuth challenge as oauth via the pinned fetch', async () => {
|
||||
mockPinnedFetch.mockResolvedValue(
|
||||
makeResponse({
|
||||
status: 401,
|
||||
headers: {
|
||||
'www-authenticate':
|
||||
'Bearer resource_metadata="https://example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"',
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
const authType = await detectMcpAuthType('https://example.com/mcp', '203.0.113.10')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(authType).toBe('oauth')
|
||||
expect(globalFetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not probe (no network call) for non-https, non-loopback URLs', async () => {
|
||||
const authType = await detectMcpAuthType('http://example.com/mcp', '203.0.113.10')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(authType).toBe('headers')
|
||||
expect(mockCreateMcpPinnedFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
expect(mockCreateSsrfGuardedMcpFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
expect(globalFetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('reuses the pinned fetch for best-effort session cleanup (DELETE)', async () => {
|
||||
mockPinnedFetch
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ status: 200, headers: { 'mcp-session-id': 'sess-1' } }))
|
||||
.mockResolvedValueOnce(makeResponse({ status: 200 }))
|
||||
|
||||
const authType = await detectMcpAuthType('https://example.com/mcp', '203.0.113.10')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(authType).toBe('none')
|
||||
// POST probe + DELETE cleanup, both through the pinned fetch.
|
||||
await vi.waitFor(() => expect(mockPinnedFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2))
|
||||
const deleteCall = mockPinnedFetch.mock.calls[1]
|
||||
expect(deleteCall[1]).toMatchObject({ method: 'DELETE' })
|
||||
expect(globalFetchSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +1,26 @@
|
||||
import { extractWWWAuthenticateParams } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/auth.js'
|
||||
import type { FetchLike } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/shared/transport.js'
|
||||
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { isLoopbackHostname } from '@/lib/core/utils/urls'
|
||||
import { createMcpPinnedFetch, createSsrfGuardedMcpFetch } from '@/lib/mcp/pinned-fetch'
|
||||
import type { McpAuthType } from '@/lib/mcp/types'
|
||||
|
||||
const logger = createLogger('McpOauthProbe')
|
||||
|
||||
const PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000
|
||||
|
||||
export async function detectMcpAuthType(url: string): Promise<McpAuthType> {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Probes an MCP server URL to classify its auth requirement.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The probe must never re-resolve DNS independently of the caller's SSRF
|
||||
* validation, or it re-opens the DNS-rebinding window. When the caller passes a
|
||||
* pre-validated `resolvedIP` the connection is pinned to it; otherwise an
|
||||
* SSRF-guarded fetch validates and pins each request itself.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function detectMcpAuthType(
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
resolvedIP?: string | null
|
||||
): Promise<McpAuthType> {
|
||||
let parsed: URL
|
||||
try {
|
||||
parsed = new URL(url)
|
||||
@@ -18,11 +31,16 @@ export async function detectMcpAuthType(url: string): Promise<McpAuthType> {
|
||||
if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHttp) {
|
||||
return 'headers'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const probeFetch: FetchLike = resolvedIP
|
||||
? createMcpPinnedFetch(resolvedIP)
|
||||
: createSsrfGuardedMcpFetch()
|
||||
|
||||
const controller = new AbortController()
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS)
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = await fetch(url, {
|
||||
const res = await probeFetch(url, {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
redirect: 'manual',
|
||||
headers: {
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +62,7 @@ export async function detectMcpAuthType(url: string): Promise<McpAuthType> {
|
||||
|
||||
const sessionId = res.headers.get('mcp-session-id')
|
||||
if (sessionId) {
|
||||
void closeMcpSession(url, sessionId)
|
||||
void closeMcpSession(url, sessionId, probeFetch)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (res.status === 401) {
|
||||
@@ -71,14 +89,19 @@ export async function detectMcpAuthType(url: string): Promise<McpAuthType> {
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Best-effort DELETE to release the streamable-HTTP session the probe just
|
||||
* allocated. Failures are ignored — the session will expire on the server side.
|
||||
* allocated. Reuses the probe's pinned fetch so this cleanup hop stays pinned.
|
||||
* Failures are ignored — the session will expire on the server side.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function closeMcpSession(url: string, sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
async function closeMcpSession(
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
sessionId: string,
|
||||
probeFetch: FetchLike
|
||||
): Promise<void> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const controller = new AbortController()
|
||||
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS)
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await fetch(url, {
|
||||
await probeFetch(url, {
|
||||
method: 'DELETE',
|
||||
headers: { 'Mcp-Session-Id': sessionId },
|
||||
signal: controller.signal,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Regression test: `revokeMcpOauthTokens` must route both metadata discovery
|
||||
* and the RFC 7009 revocation POST through the SSRF-guarded fetch, since
|
||||
* `revocation_endpoint` comes from attacker-controlled server metadata. Uses
|
||||
* the real `createSsrfGuardedMcpFetch` so it fails if revoke.ts regresses to a
|
||||
* raw `fetch`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
|
||||
|
||||
const BLOCKED_ENDPOINT = 'http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/'
|
||||
const PUBLIC_SERVER_URL = 'https://mcp.attacker.com'
|
||||
const PUBLIC_SERVER_IP = '203.0.113.10'
|
||||
|
||||
const {
|
||||
MockAgent,
|
||||
mockUndiciFetch,
|
||||
mockValidateMcpServerSsrf,
|
||||
mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo,
|
||||
mockLoadOauthRow,
|
||||
mockDecryptSecret,
|
||||
mockDbSelect,
|
||||
} = vi.hoisted(() => {
|
||||
class MockAgent {
|
||||
close() {
|
||||
return Promise.resolve()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
MockAgent,
|
||||
mockUndiciFetch: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockValidateMcpServerSsrf: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockLoadOauthRow: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockDecryptSecret: vi.fn(),
|
||||
mockDbSelect: vi.fn(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
vi.mock('undici', () => ({ Agent: MockAgent, fetch: mockUndiciFetch }))
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/core/security/input-validation.server', () => ({
|
||||
createPinnedLookup: vi.fn(() => 'pinned-lookup-fn'),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/mcp/domain-check', () => ({
|
||||
validateMcpServerSsrf: mockValidateMcpServerSsrf,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
vi.mock('@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/auth.js', () => ({
|
||||
discoverOAuthServerInfo: mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/mcp/oauth/storage', () => ({
|
||||
loadOauthRow: mockLoadOauthRow,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
vi.mock('@/lib/core/security/encryption', () => ({
|
||||
decryptSecret: mockDecryptSecret,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
vi.mock('@sim/db', () => ({
|
||||
db: { select: mockDbSelect },
|
||||
}))
|
||||
|
||||
import { __resetPinnedAgentsForTests } from '@/lib/mcp/pinned-fetch'
|
||||
import { revokeMcpOauthTokens } from './revoke'
|
||||
|
||||
function wireServerRow(row: Record<string, unknown>) {
|
||||
const builder = {
|
||||
from: () => builder,
|
||||
where: () => builder,
|
||||
limit: () => Promise.resolve([row]),
|
||||
}
|
||||
mockDbSelect.mockReturnValue(builder)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('revokeMcpOauthTokens — SSRF guard', () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
vi.clearAllMocks()
|
||||
__resetPinnedAgentsForTests()
|
||||
|
||||
mockLoadOauthRow.mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
tokens: { access_token: 'access-secret', refresh_token: 'refresh-secret' },
|
||||
clientInformation: { client_id: 'client-123' },
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
wireServerRow({
|
||||
url: PUBLIC_SERVER_URL,
|
||||
oauthClientId: 'client-123',
|
||||
oauthClientSecret: null,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo.mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
authorizationServerMetadata: {
|
||||
issuer: PUBLIC_SERVER_URL,
|
||||
revocation_endpoint: BLOCKED_ENDPOINT,
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
mockUndiciFetch.mockResolvedValue(new Response('ok'))
|
||||
|
||||
// Catches a regression to raw globalThis.fetch without hitting the network.
|
||||
vi.spyOn(globalThis, 'fetch').mockResolvedValue(new Response('ok'))
|
||||
|
||||
// Public server host resolves; the revocation endpoint is blocked.
|
||||
mockValidateMcpServerSsrf.mockImplementation(async (target: string) => {
|
||||
if (target.startsWith(BLOCKED_ENDPOINT) || target.includes('169.254.')) {
|
||||
throw new Error('MCP server URL resolves to a blocked IP address')
|
||||
}
|
||||
return PUBLIC_SERVER_IP
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('routes metadata discovery through the SSRF-guarded fetch', async () => {
|
||||
await revokeMcpOauthTokens('server-1')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
||||
const [, options] = mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo.mock.calls[0]
|
||||
expect(typeof options?.fetchFn).toBe('function')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('validates the attacker-controlled revocation_endpoint before issuing the request', async () => {
|
||||
await revokeMcpOauthTokens('server-1')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(mockValidateMcpServerSsrf).toHaveBeenCalledWith(BLOCKED_ENDPOINT)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('never issues an outbound request to the blocked revocation endpoint', async () => {
|
||||
await revokeMcpOauthTokens('server-1')
|
||||
|
||||
const allCalls = [
|
||||
...mockUndiciFetch.mock.calls,
|
||||
...(globalThis.fetch as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mock.calls,
|
||||
]
|
||||
for (const call of allCalls) {
|
||||
const target = typeof call[0] === 'string' ? call[0] : String(call[0])
|
||||
expect(target).not.toContain('169.254.170.2')
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('swallows the SSRF rejection — revocation is best-effort and never throws', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(revokeMcpOauthTokens('server-1')).resolves.toBeUndefined()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('still issues the revocation POST when the endpoint resolves to a public IP', async () => {
|
||||
const publicEndpoint = 'https://mcp.attacker.com/oauth/revoke'
|
||||
mockDiscoverOAuthServerInfo.mockResolvedValue({
|
||||
authorizationServerMetadata: {
|
||||
issuer: PUBLIC_SERVER_URL,
|
||||
revocation_endpoint: publicEndpoint,
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
await revokeMcpOauthTokens('server-1')
|
||||
|
||||
expect(mockValidateMcpServerSsrf).toHaveBeenCalledWith(publicEndpoint)
|
||||
const revokeCalls = mockUndiciFetch.mock.calls.filter((call) => {
|
||||
const target = typeof call[0] === 'string' ? call[0] : String(call[0])
|
||||
return target === publicEndpoint
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(revokeCalls.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
|
||||
expect(revokeCalls[0][1]).toMatchObject({ method: 'POST' })
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -86,17 +86,24 @@ export interface PerformMcpServerResult {
|
||||
authType?: McpAuthType
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function validateMcpServerUrl(url: string): Promise<PerformMcpServerResult | null> {
|
||||
type ValidateMcpServerUrlResult =
|
||||
| { ok: true; resolvedIP: string | null }
|
||||
| { ok: false; result: PerformMcpServerResult }
|
||||
|
||||
async function validateMcpServerUrl(url: string): Promise<ValidateMcpServerUrlResult> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
validateMcpDomain(url)
|
||||
await validateMcpServerSsrf(url)
|
||||
return null
|
||||
const resolvedIP = await validateMcpServerSsrf(url)
|
||||
return { ok: true, resolvedIP }
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
if (error instanceof McpDomainNotAllowedError || error instanceof McpSsrfError) {
|
||||
return { success: false, error: error.message, errorCode: 'forbidden' }
|
||||
return { ok: false, result: { success: false, error: error.message, errorCode: 'forbidden' } }
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (error instanceof McpDnsResolutionError) {
|
||||
return { success: false, error: error.message, errorCode: 'bad_gateway' }
|
||||
return {
|
||||
ok: false,
|
||||
result: { success: false, error: error.message, errorCode: 'bad_gateway' },
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
throw error
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +113,8 @@ export async function performCreateMcpServer(
|
||||
params: PerformCreateMcpServerParams
|
||||
): Promise<PerformMcpServerResult> {
|
||||
const validation = await validateMcpServerUrl(params.url)
|
||||
if (validation) return validation
|
||||
if (!validation.ok) return validation.result
|
||||
const validatedIP = validation.resolvedIP
|
||||
|
||||
const transport = params.transport || 'streamable-http'
|
||||
const timeout = params.timeout || 30000
|
||||
@@ -142,7 +150,7 @@ export async function performCreateMcpServer(
|
||||
resolvedAuthType = (existingServer.authType ?? 'headers') as McpAuthType
|
||||
} else if (params.url && !hasHeaders) {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
resolvedAuthType = await detectMcpAuthType(params.url)
|
||||
resolvedAuthType = await detectMcpAuthType(params.url, validatedIP)
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
logger.warn('Probe failed, defaulting to headers', { url: params.url, error: e })
|
||||
resolvedAuthType = 'headers'
|
||||
@@ -281,7 +289,7 @@ export async function performUpdateMcpServer(
|
||||
): Promise<PerformMcpServerResult> {
|
||||
if (params.url) {
|
||||
const validation = await validateMcpServerUrl(params.url)
|
||||
if (validation) return validation
|
||||
if (!validation.ok) return validation.result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const oauthClientSecretEncrypted =
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
|
||||
import crypto from 'crypto'
|
||||
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { safeCompare } from '@sim/security/compare'
|
||||
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
|
||||
import type { AuthContext } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/types'
|
||||
|
||||
const logger = createLogger('WebhookProvider:TwilioSignature')
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Validate `X-Twilio-Signature`: HMAC-SHA1 over the callback URL plus each POST
|
||||
* param key/value sorted alphabetically.
|
||||
* @see https://www.twilio.com/docs/usage/security#validating-requests
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async function validateTwilioSignature(
|
||||
authToken: string,
|
||||
signature: string,
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
params: Record<string, unknown>
|
||||
): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (!authToken || !signature || !url) {
|
||||
logger.warn('Twilio signature validation missing required fields', {
|
||||
hasAuthToken: !!authToken,
|
||||
hasSignature: !!signature,
|
||||
hasUrl: !!url,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
const sortedKeys = Object.keys(params).sort()
|
||||
let data = url
|
||||
for (const key of sortedKeys) {
|
||||
data += key + params[key]
|
||||
}
|
||||
const encoder = new TextEncoder()
|
||||
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
|
||||
'raw',
|
||||
encoder.encode(authToken),
|
||||
{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-1' },
|
||||
false,
|
||||
['sign']
|
||||
)
|
||||
const signatureBytes = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, encoder.encode(data))
|
||||
const signatureArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(signatureBytes))
|
||||
const signatureBase64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...signatureArray))
|
||||
return safeCompare(signatureBase64, signature)
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
logger.error('Error validating Twilio signature:', error)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Reconstruct the public callback URL Twilio signed, recovering the original
|
||||
* host/proto from forwarding headers when Sim runs behind a proxy. Forged headers
|
||||
* don't help an attacker: without the auth token they can't match the signature.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
function getExternalUrl(request: Request): string {
|
||||
const proto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto') || 'https'
|
||||
const host = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host') || request.headers.get('host')
|
||||
|
||||
if (host) {
|
||||
const url = new URL(request.url)
|
||||
return `${proto}://${host}${url.pathname}${url.search}`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return request.url
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Shared `verifyAuth` for Twilio webhook providers (SMS and Voice). Enforces a
|
||||
* valid `X-Twilio-Signature` when an auth token is configured; skips verification
|
||||
* when none is set (the provider-wide "optional secret" convention).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export async function verifyTwilioAuth(
|
||||
{ request, rawBody, requestId, providerConfig }: AuthContext,
|
||||
providerLabel: string
|
||||
): Promise<NextResponse | null> {
|
||||
const authToken = providerConfig.authToken as string | undefined
|
||||
|
||||
if (!authToken) {
|
||||
logger.warn(
|
||||
`[${requestId}] ${providerLabel} webhook has no auth token configured — accepting request without signature verification. Configure an auth token to require signed requests.`
|
||||
)
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const signature = request.headers.get('x-twilio-signature')
|
||||
if (!signature) {
|
||||
logger.warn(`[${requestId}] ${providerLabel} webhook missing signature header`)
|
||||
return new NextResponse('Unauthorized - Missing Twilio signature', { status: 401 })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let params: Record<string, string> = {}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (typeof rawBody === 'string') {
|
||||
const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(rawBody)
|
||||
params = Object.fromEntries(urlParams.entries())
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
logger.error(
|
||||
`[${requestId}] Error parsing ${providerLabel} webhook body for signature validation:`,
|
||||
error
|
||||
)
|
||||
return new NextResponse('Bad Request - Invalid body format', { status: 400 })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const fullUrl = getExternalUrl(request)
|
||||
const isValidSignature = await validateTwilioSignature(authToken, signature, fullUrl, params)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!isValidSignature) {
|
||||
logger.warn(`[${requestId}] ${providerLabel} signature verification failed`, {
|
||||
url: fullUrl,
|
||||
signatureLength: signature.length,
|
||||
paramsCount: Object.keys(params).length,
|
||||
authTokenLength: authToken.length,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return new NextResponse('Unauthorized - Invalid Twilio signature', { status: 401 })
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import crypto from 'crypto'
|
||||
import { createMockRequest } from '@sim/testing'
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { twilioVoiceHandler } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/twilio-voice'
|
||||
|
||||
/** Twilio canonical signature: HMAC-SHA1(authToken, url + sorted(key+value)) base64. */
|
||||
function signTwilio(authToken: string, url: string, params: Record<string, string>): string {
|
||||
const data = Object.keys(params)
|
||||
.sort()
|
||||
.reduce((acc, key) => acc + key + params[key], url)
|
||||
return crypto.createHmac('sha1', authToken).update(Buffer.from(data, 'utf8')).digest('base64')
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('twilioVoiceHandler', () => {
|
||||
describe('verifyAuth', () => {
|
||||
const authToken = 'voice-auth-token'
|
||||
const url = 'http://localhost:3000/api/test'
|
||||
const params = { CallSid: 'CA123', From: '+15551234567', To: '+15557654321' }
|
||||
const rawBody = new URLSearchParams(params).toString()
|
||||
const signature = signTwilio(authToken, url, params)
|
||||
|
||||
it('skips verification when no auth token is configured', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, {})
|
||||
const res = await twilioVoiceHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: {},
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns 401 when the signature header is missing', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, {})
|
||||
const res = await twilioVoiceHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res?.status).toBe(401)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns 401 when the signature is invalid', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, { 'x-twilio-signature': 'bad' })
|
||||
const res = await twilioVoiceHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res?.status).toBe(401)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('returns null when the signature is valid', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, { 'x-twilio-signature': signature })
|
||||
const res = await twilioVoiceHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('extractIdempotencyId', () => {
|
||||
it('prefers MessageSid, falls back to CallSid', () => {
|
||||
expect(twilioVoiceHandler.extractIdempotencyId!({ MessageSid: 'SM1' })).toBe('SM1')
|
||||
expect(twilioVoiceHandler.extractIdempotencyId!({ CallSid: 'CA1' })).toBe('CA1')
|
||||
expect(twilioVoiceHandler.extractIdempotencyId!({})).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
|
||||
import crypto from 'crypto'
|
||||
import { createLogger } from '@sim/logger'
|
||||
import { safeCompare } from '@sim/security/compare'
|
||||
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
|
||||
import { verifyTwilioAuth } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/twilio-signature'
|
||||
import type {
|
||||
AuthContext,
|
||||
FormatInputContext,
|
||||
@@ -10,118 +8,9 @@ import type {
|
||||
} from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/types'
|
||||
import { convertSquareBracketsToTwiML } from '@/lib/webhooks/utils'
|
||||
|
||||
const logger = createLogger('WebhookProvider:TwilioVoice')
|
||||
|
||||
async function validateTwilioSignature(
|
||||
authToken: string,
|
||||
signature: string,
|
||||
url: string,
|
||||
params: Record<string, unknown>
|
||||
): Promise<boolean> {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (!authToken || !signature || !url) {
|
||||
logger.warn('Twilio signature validation missing required fields', {
|
||||
hasAuthToken: !!authToken,
|
||||
hasSignature: !!signature,
|
||||
hasUrl: !!url,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
const sortedKeys = Object.keys(params).sort()
|
||||
let data = url
|
||||
for (const key of sortedKeys) {
|
||||
data += key + params[key]
|
||||
}
|
||||
logger.debug('Twilio signature validation string built', {
|
||||
url,
|
||||
sortedKeys,
|
||||
dataLength: data.length,
|
||||
})
|
||||
const encoder = new TextEncoder()
|
||||
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
|
||||
'raw',
|
||||
encoder.encode(authToken),
|
||||
{ name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-1' },
|
||||
false,
|
||||
['sign']
|
||||
)
|
||||
const signatureBytes = await crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', key, encoder.encode(data))
|
||||
const signatureArray = Array.from(new Uint8Array(signatureBytes))
|
||||
const signatureBase64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...signatureArray))
|
||||
logger.debug('Twilio signature comparison', {
|
||||
computedSignature: `${signatureBase64.substring(0, 10)}...`,
|
||||
providedSignature: `${signature.substring(0, 10)}...`,
|
||||
computedLength: signatureBase64.length,
|
||||
providedLength: signature.length,
|
||||
match: signatureBase64 === signature,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return safeCompare(signatureBase64, signature)
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
logger.error('Error validating Twilio signature:', error)
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function getExternalUrl(request: Request): string {
|
||||
const proto = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-proto') || 'https'
|
||||
const host = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-host') || request.headers.get('host')
|
||||
|
||||
if (host) {
|
||||
const url = new URL(request.url)
|
||||
const reconstructed = `${proto}://${host}${url.pathname}${url.search}`
|
||||
return reconstructed
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return request.url
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const twilioVoiceHandler: WebhookProviderHandler = {
|
||||
async verifyAuth({ request, rawBody, requestId, providerConfig }: AuthContext) {
|
||||
const authToken = providerConfig.authToken as string | undefined
|
||||
|
||||
if (authToken) {
|
||||
const signature = request.headers.get('x-twilio-signature')
|
||||
|
||||
if (!signature) {
|
||||
logger.warn(`[${requestId}] Twilio Voice webhook missing signature header`)
|
||||
return new NextResponse('Unauthorized - Missing Twilio signature', {
|
||||
status: 401,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let params: Record<string, string> = {}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
if (typeof rawBody === 'string') {
|
||||
const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(rawBody)
|
||||
params = Object.fromEntries(urlParams.entries())
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (error) {
|
||||
logger.error(
|
||||
`[${requestId}] Error parsing Twilio webhook body for signature validation:`,
|
||||
error
|
||||
)
|
||||
return new NextResponse('Bad Request - Invalid body format', {
|
||||
status: 400,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const fullUrl = getExternalUrl(request)
|
||||
const isValidSignature = await validateTwilioSignature(authToken, signature, fullUrl, params)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!isValidSignature) {
|
||||
logger.warn(`[${requestId}] Twilio Voice signature verification failed`, {
|
||||
url: fullUrl,
|
||||
signatureLength: signature.length,
|
||||
paramsCount: Object.keys(params).length,
|
||||
authTokenLength: authToken.length,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return new NextResponse('Unauthorized - Invalid Twilio signature', {
|
||||
status: 401,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return null
|
||||
verifyAuth(ctx: AuthContext) {
|
||||
return verifyTwilioAuth(ctx, 'Twilio Voice')
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
extractIdempotencyId(body: unknown) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @vitest-environment node
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import crypto from 'crypto'
|
||||
import { createMockRequest } from '@sim/testing'
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
|
||||
import { twilioHandler } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/twilio'
|
||||
|
||||
/** Twilio canonical signature: HMAC-SHA1(authToken, url + sorted(key+value)) base64. */
|
||||
function signTwilio(authToken: string, url: string, params: Record<string, string>): string {
|
||||
const data = Object.keys(params)
|
||||
.sort()
|
||||
.reduce((acc, key) => acc + key + params[key], url)
|
||||
return crypto.createHmac('sha1', authToken).update(Buffer.from(data, 'utf8')).digest('base64')
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
describe('twilioHandler', () => {
|
||||
describe('verifyAuth', () => {
|
||||
const authToken = 'test-auth-token'
|
||||
const url = 'http://localhost:3000/api/test'
|
||||
const params = { From: '+15551234567', To: '+15557654321', Body: 'hello', MessageSid: 'SM123' }
|
||||
const rawBody = new URLSearchParams(params).toString()
|
||||
const signature = signTwilio(authToken, url, params)
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a forged request with no signature header', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, {
|
||||
'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
|
||||
})
|
||||
const res = await twilioHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res?.status).toBe(401)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a request with an invalid signature', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, {
|
||||
'x-twilio-signature': 'not-the-real-signature',
|
||||
})
|
||||
const res = await twilioHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res?.status).toBe(401)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('accepts a request with a valid signature', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, {
|
||||
'x-twilio-signature': signature,
|
||||
})
|
||||
const res = await twilioHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('skips verification when no auth token is configured (optional-secret convention)', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest('POST', undefined, {})
|
||||
const res = await twilioHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: {},
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('reconstructs the public URL from forwarding headers when validating', async () => {
|
||||
const publicUrl = 'https://sim.ai/api/webhooks/trigger/twilio-sms-abc123'
|
||||
const fwdSignature = signTwilio(authToken, publicUrl, params)
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest(
|
||||
'POST',
|
||||
undefined,
|
||||
{
|
||||
'x-twilio-signature': fwdSignature,
|
||||
'x-forwarded-proto': 'https',
|
||||
'x-forwarded-host': 'sim.ai',
|
||||
},
|
||||
'http://internal-host:3000/api/webhooks/trigger/twilio-sms-abc123'
|
||||
)
|
||||
const res = await twilioHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('rejects a forged body even with a forwarded host (no valid token)', async () => {
|
||||
const request = createMockRequest(
|
||||
'POST',
|
||||
undefined,
|
||||
{
|
||||
'x-twilio-signature': signTwilio('attacker-guess', url, params),
|
||||
'x-forwarded-host': 'sim.ai',
|
||||
},
|
||||
url
|
||||
)
|
||||
const res = await twilioHandler.verifyAuth!({
|
||||
request: request as any,
|
||||
rawBody,
|
||||
requestId: 'r1',
|
||||
providerConfig: { authToken },
|
||||
webhook: {},
|
||||
workflow: {},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(res?.status).toBe(401)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('extractIdempotencyId', () => {
|
||||
it('prefers MessageSid, falls back to CallSid', () => {
|
||||
expect(twilioHandler.extractIdempotencyId!({ MessageSid: 'SM1' })).toBe('SM1')
|
||||
expect(twilioHandler.extractIdempotencyId!({ CallSid: 'CA1' })).toBe('CA1')
|
||||
expect(twilioHandler.extractIdempotencyId!({})).toBeNull()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
|
||||
import type { WebhookProviderHandler } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/types'
|
||||
import { verifyTwilioAuth } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/twilio-signature'
|
||||
import type { AuthContext, WebhookProviderHandler } from '@/lib/webhooks/providers/types'
|
||||
|
||||
export const twilioHandler: WebhookProviderHandler = {
|
||||
verifyAuth(ctx: AuthContext) {
|
||||
return verifyTwilioAuth(ctx, 'Twilio SMS')
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
extractIdempotencyId(body: unknown) {
|
||||
const obj = body as Record<string, unknown>
|
||||
return (obj.MessageSid as string) || (obj.CallSid as string) || null
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +91,17 @@ const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
|
||||
'./lib/execution/sandbox/bundles/*.cjs',
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
turbopack: {
|
||||
resolveAlias: {
|
||||
// `dns/promises` has no browser shim. Server-only connector fetch logic
|
||||
// (which imports `input-validation.server`) is statically reachable from
|
||||
// the client bundle via the connector registry, but never runs there.
|
||||
// Stub it for the browser only; the server keeps the real module so SSRF
|
||||
// validation is unaffected.
|
||||
'dns/promises': { browser: './lib/core/security/empty-node-fallback.browser.ts' },
|
||||
dns: { browser: './lib/core/security/empty-node-fallback.browser.ts' },
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
experimental: {
|
||||
optimizeCss: true,
|
||||
preloadEntriesOnStart: false,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user