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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Hugo Dutka
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c2bb62446d |
fix(coderd): remove per-chat system prompt limit (#28294)
Per-chat system prompts longer than 10,000 characters are rejected during chat creation. Remove that validation so chat creation accepts longer system prompts within the existing request-body limit. |
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Ben Potter
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8a7e8d9d5b |
refactor: move chat prompt sanitization into codersdk (#28283)
Exports `SanitizePromptText` (and its helpers) from `codersdk` instead of `coderd/x/chatd`, so API consumers can sanitize prompt text exactly the way the server stores it. ## Why coder/terraform-provider-coderd#412 adds a `coderd_chat_system_prompt` resource whose `system_prompt` attribute compares values by their sanitized forms (otherwise the trailing newline from `file("system-prompt.md")` is perpetual drift, since the server stores the sanitized value). That currently requires a mirrored copy of the sanitizer in the provider, which can silently rot. Per review there ([discussion](https://github.com/coder/terraform-provider-coderd/pull/412#discussion_r3801110795)), the sanitizer should be exported from `codersdk` and imported instead. ## What - `coderd/x/chatd/sanitize.go` → `codersdk/promptsanitize.go` (pure move; package + doc-comment note about why it lives in codersdk) - `coderd/x/chatd/sanitize_test.go` → `codersdk/promptsanitize_test.go` - Callsites updated (`exp_chats.go`, `chatd.go`, `subagent.go`, `context_prompt.go`); no wrapper left behind, single source of truth - No behavior change > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @bpmct |
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Paweł Banaszewski
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63641b98c8 |
fix: treat a missing serve endpoint as a fatal dial error (#27864)
Adds 404 as a terminal error for establishing DRPC connection. A standalone AI Gateway pointed at a coderd that does not expose `/api/v2/ai-gateway/serve` gets a 404, which the connect loop classified as transient and retried forever. Redialing cannot fix a missing endpoint. 404 now is treated as terminal handshake failure. `--url` is expected to point directly at coderd, so a 404 from an intermediary is not distinguished. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-320/write-connection-tests --- Generated with Coder Agents. |
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Bobby Ho
|
663f41ffa9 |
feat: derive OAuth2 client type from token_endpoint_auth_method (#28043)
Adds an OAuth2 client type (public vs confidential, RFC 7591 §2) derived from the requested auth method instead of hardcoded confidential. The type is stored and guarded here, but no endpoint enforces on it yet; public behavior at the token endpoint follows in the next PR in the stack. - Client type is derived once and reused by both registration and redirect URI validation, so they can't disagree - IsPublic() fails closed: an unrecognized or missing value reads as confidential - RFC 7592 update (PUT) now rejects moving a client between public and confidential (400) instead of silently flipping it when the auth method is omitted - Discovery still doesn't advertise "none"; follows once the token endpoint honors it ### Behavior by client shape `client_type` is derived from `token_endpoint_auth_method` at POST and pinned at PUT. RFC 7592 GET/PUT authenticate with the registration access token, not the client secret, so neither endpoint reads a secret. | Registered with | Stored `client_type` / method | GET reports | PUT that flips the method | |------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------| | omitted, or `client_secret_basic` | `confidential` / `client_secret_basic` | `client_secret_basic` | `none` → 400 `invalid_client_metadata` | | `none` (new) | `public` / `none` | `none` | `client_secret_*` → 400 `invalid_client_metadata` | | `none` (before this PR) | `confidential` / `none` | `none` | either → 200, type stays `confidential` | - PUT still replaces every other RFC 7591 field. `client_type` is the only pinned one; the method may move within a type (`client_secret_basic` ↔ `client_secret_post`). - Row 3 is the only shape where the two columns disagree. The guard fires only on a method change that crosses the type line, so those clients keep managing themselves instead of being locked out of their own configuration endpoint. - The token endpoint does not consult `client_type` yet, so every client still authenticates with a secret and registration still issues one. Split out of #27873, second in the stack (on top of #28041). Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client |
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Andrew Aquino
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71e95a3611 |
feat(coderd/tracing): correlate request logs and spans by client_session_id (#27671)
## What Adds `client_session_id` correlation to coderd's HTTP request handling, per the [Connection log collection and correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Connection-log-collection-and-correlation-36ed579be5928025a56cd11fe58661fb). Clients attach a per-session correlation ID to every API request via W3C baggage using the `client_session_id` key. This change makes coderd's tracing middleware read that baggage member and: - add `client_session_id` to the **per-request log context** so all logs for a request (and the handlers it calls) can be correlated by a single ID, and - set `client_session_id` as a **span attribute** when tracing is enabled. Per RFC requirement 6.1, the value is added to the log context **even when tracing is disabled** (the middleware previously returned early when no tracer provider was configured, so baggage was never read). The `client_session_id` is validated as a 32-character hexadecimal string (a 16-byte value, per RFC requirement 1) to guard against logging arbitrary client-controlled baggage values. ## Scope This is `DEVEX-659` and is intentionally limited to the coderd tracing middleware. It is the first piece of a stack: the web terminal client change (`DEVEX-663`) that generates and sends the `client_session_id` will be stacked on top of this PR. No client currently sends `client_session_id` baggage, so this change is a no-op until the client work lands. ## Testing - `coderd/tracing`: new unit tests cover `validSessionID`, baggage extraction (`sessionIDFromHeaders`), and the middleware end to end, asserting `client_session_id` lands on the log context with tracing enabled **and** disabled, is exposed as a span attribute when tracing is enabled, and that absent/malformed baggage is ignored. - Existing `Test_Middleware` route-matching behavior is unchanged. <details> <summary>Design notes / decision log</summary> - **Where the value is read:** the existing `tracing.Middleware` runs high in the coderd middleware stack (`coderd/coderd.go`), before request-id and request-logger middleware, and already matches the `/api`, `/api/**`, app proxy, and external-auth routes. Reading baggage here means the `client_session_id` is on the context before the request logger and handlers run, so it flows into all downstream `slog` calls that use the request context. This mirrors the existing `request_id` pattern in `httpmw.AttachRequestID` (`slog.With(ctx, ...)` + span attribute). - **Works when tracing is off:** the middleware now gates only on the route matcher, extracts baggage and adds `client_session_id` to the log context for all matched routes, and only then branches on whether a tracer is configured. When a tracer is present, `client_session_id` is additionally set as a span attribute. - **Explicit baggage propagator:** extraction uses `propagation.Baggage{}` directly rather than the global text map propagator, so it does not depend on the global propagator being configured (also makes it deterministic in tests). - **Validation:** only a 32-char hex string is accepted (lower or upper case). Malformed values are dropped rather than logged, preventing log/attribute pollution from arbitrary client-supplied baggage. - **Out of scope for this PR (tracked elsewhere):** client generation/sending of `client_session_id` (`DEVEX-663`, web terminal), the equivalent agent-side middleware (RFC 6.2), `connection_logs.client_session_id` (RFC 12), and additional connection state-change logging (RFC 7-13). </details> --- _Opened by Coder Agents on behalf of @aqandrew._ |
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Jon Ayers
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821d91fabd | fix: log tailnet tunnel authorization decisions (#27819) | ||
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Bobby Ho
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166d92ba73 |
fix: bound request body size on JSON API endpoints (#28168)
## Summary `httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible. This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule that pins the invariant. Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392. ## Problem `httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a single admitted request may consume. ## Fix `Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body` in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of 4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site. `http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`: an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the regression guard for that specific failure, and `TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole requirement rests on. Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}` counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report. The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413 is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint. ## Behavior change `POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded archive is unchanged. The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its 64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to "Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint answers. Its tests are updated to match both. `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`, `path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with body size, such as agent log storage overflow. ## Reading this The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under its regenerated swagger, and cancel out. |
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Mathias FredrikssonandMichael Suchacz
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d3f08b1983 |
feat: audit chat system instructions changes (#27668)
Adds an audit record for administrative events on the deployment-wide
chat instruction settings (system prompt, the include-default toggle,
and the plan-mode instructions), per CODAGT-719 and operator decision
D5. Each endpoint records under a stable identity: resource type
`chat_instruction_settings`, a fixed resource ID and a human-readable
target ("System prompt", "Plan mode instructions"), so two changes to
one setting share an ID and history-by-setting works. A real change
exports a Write entry with the old-to-new text visible; a
value-identical PUT still upserts and still returns 204 but records
nothing.
Attempts are recorded, not only transitions. Identity is assigned before
the authorization check, so a denied PUT exports a 403 row with an empty
diff (no request content reaches it), a validation failure exports a 400
row, and a write failure exports a 500 row, each with an empty diff; an
operator can tell "nothing changed" from "something changed and capture
degraded" by the status code.
The write path stays authoritative. The advisory lock and, on plan-mode,
the transaction exist only to serve change-detection; if any of that
machinery fails (lock, begin, commit, rollback), the handler runs main's
idempotent write path directly and derives the response from it, so a
member-visible failure of audit-only infrastructure can never replace
main's successful response. Accepted consequence: when the lock cannot
be taken, two concurrent identical writes can produce two rows instead
of one. That is audit degradation, which is allowed; changing a member's
response is not. Write failures keep the exact response the endpoint
produced before this wiring (transaction error for the system prompt,
which was always transactional; the raw write error for plan mode, which
was not), and the full transaction error is logged so rollback failures
cannot vanish.
<details>
<summary>CODAGT-66 plan entry: S1 (verbatim)</summary>
**S1 `feat: audit chat system instructions changes`** (CODAGT-719; base:
main)
- Struct: `database.ChatSystemPromptSettings{ID uuid.UUID; SystemPrompt
string; IncludeDefaultSystemPrompt bool; PlanModeInstructions string}`
in `coderd/database/types.go` (ticket-sketched shape; one struct, both
endpoints).
- Registration: union entry (diff.go), table.go entry (`id`
ActionIgnore, other three ActionTrack), `AuditActionMap` Write-only;
four request.go cases (`ResourceTarget` "", `ResourceID` from struct,
`ResourceType` new enum value `chat_system_prompt_settings`,
`ResourceRequiresOrgID` false with the "Artificial ID / deployment
singleton" comment convention).
- Migration: `ALTER TYPE resource_type ADD VALUE IF NOT EXISTS
'chat_system_prompt_settings';` comment-only no-op down (000558 shape);
number picked at push per the numbering constraint.
- codersdk: constant + prose `FriendlyString` ("chat system prompt
settings"); `TestAuditDBEnumsCovered` forces both. `coderd/audit.go`
presentation switches: rely on safe defaults (no link, generic
description); no FE changes (filter label falls back to capitalized
value; acceptable per precedent).
- Wiring `putChatSystemPrompt` and `putChatPlanModeInstructions`:
InitRequest with Action Write; artificial `ID: uuid.New()` on `New` only
when a change is detected; no-op suppression by leaving both aReq sides
unset (nil resource IDs skip the log, request.go skip rule); the write
path itself stays byte-identical (upserts still run unconditionally).
- `putChatSystemPrompt` (writes two keys conditionally in one existing
tx): inside that tx, read the pair via `GetChatSystemPromptConfig` for
`Old`, perform the conditional writes exactly as today, then RE-READ the
pair for `New`. The re-read is load-bearing:
`include_default_system_prompt` is computed from the toggle row AND the
prompt, so a prompt-only write can flip the effective value without the
request carrying the pointer. `PlanModeInstructions` stays zero on both
sides.
- `putChatPlanModeInstructions` (no tx exists today): wrap its
read-upsert in `InTx` (behavior-preserving: same single write);
`Old`/`New` populate only `PlanModeInstructions`; the two system-prompt
fields stay zero on both sides; no cross-key reads.
- Change detection compares the populated payload fields only (never the
artificial ID).
- Tests: handler-level coderdtest with `audit.NewMock()` asserting Write
entry on change and NO entry on a value-identical PUT, for both
endpoints (this also exercises `ResourceRequiresOrgID` end to end); the
fallback-flip case (no explicit include-default row, nonempty prompt set
to empty, effective boolean flips: entry emitted with the boolean diff);
diff assertions (old->new prompt text tracked, not secret) in
`enterprise/audit/diff_internal_test.go`; `TestAuditableResources`
passes by construction.
- Bookkeeping at PR open: correct CODAGT-719's no-op premise ("matches
the existing 204-on-unchanged behavior" does not exist on main;
suppression is new, write path unchanged).
- Review focus: Old capture and the New re-read inside the tx (three of
four existing singletons never set Old; do not copy them; and the
computed include-default value makes a naive New construction wrong);
the skip-on-no-op mechanism; prompt text deliberately visible in diffs.
</details>
Note: the plan excerpt above predates operator decision D5 (2026-07-30),
which this PR implements: the resource type is
`chat_instruction_settings` (not `chat_system_prompt_settings`), each
setting carries a stable ID and a display-name target (not a per-write
artificial ID and an empty target), no-op suppression runs through
`InitRequestWithCancel` (not the nil-ID skip), and attempts (denied,
failed, capture-degraded) record rows with real statuses and empty
diffs. Ticket bookkeeping for CODAGT-719 was corrected on Linear at
kickoff: the ticket's "matches the existing 204-on-unchanged behavior"
premise does not exist on main; suppression is new, and the write path
is unchanged.
> 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and _will be_
reviewed by a human. 🏂🏻
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Suchacz <203725896+ibetitsmike@users.noreply.github.com>
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Michael Suchacz
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affeeaf9c8 |
feat: extend agent chat MCP tools for remote UAT evidence loops (#28233)
Extends the Agent-chat MCP tools so an unattended UAT evidence loop can
fetch artifacts, monitor long runs, and find prior runs without burning
model context.
## Backend
- New `chat_files_token` crypto key feature (migration 000571) with
rotator support and a dedicated signing keycache on coderd.
- `POST /api/experimental/chats/files/{file}/download-url`
(authenticated) mints a short-lived (5 min) signed URL and returns it
with `sha256`, `size_bytes`, `name`, `mime_type`, and `expires_at`.
- `GET /api/experimental/chats/files/{file}/download?token=` (no session
token) redeems the signed URL: verifies the JWS, requires the token's
`file_id` to match the path, and re-checks the minting user's RBAC
access live at redemption. Clients can `curl -o` artifacts with zero
credentials in the URL consumer.
- `ChatFileMetadata` gains `size_bytes` (via `octet_length`, no bytes
fetched).
## MCP tools (`codersdk/toolsdk`)
- `coder_download_chat_file`: by `file_id` or `chat_id`+`file_name`;
returns the signed URL plus checksum and size instead of base64.
- `coder_await_chat`: blocks (bounded `wait_secs`, 1-120) until a chat
leaves `running`/`interrupting`, using the existing watch stream with
subscribe-before-read.
- `coder_list_chats`: label, query, and limit filtering; chat
projections now include labels.
- `coder_get_chat_messages`: `after_id` forward cursor with
`next_after_id` (exact incremental reads), plus per-message `files`
metadata so artifact-bearing messages are identifiable.
- `coder_get_chat`: file listings now include `size_bytes` and
`created_at`.
- `coder_list_templates`: exposes `agents_allowed` for pre-flight
checks.
## Testing
- coderd: mint/redeem happy path with an unauthenticated client,
expired/tampered/file-mismatched tokens, auth still required on the
plain file endpoint, non-owner mint rejection.
- toolsdk: harness + integration coverage for all new/changed tools,
including signed-URL redemption with checksum verification,
forward-cursor exactness, await transition/timeout paths, and label
filtering.
- Remote dogfood UAT (dev.coder.com Coder Agent) passed all six
acceptance scenarios end to end over both MCP transports.
Note: `go test ./codersdk/toolsdk/` has a pre-existing goleak flake on
main (leaked `agentssh` non-PTY session goroutines from SSH exec tests;
reproduced 3/3 on clean `b4971bc49f1`). It is unrelated to this diff.
> Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-sonnet-4-6 thinking=high -->
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Michael Suchacz
|
7724ee281a |
feat: defer MCP tool schemas behind a find_tools search (#28225)
## Summary When the `mcp-tool-search` experiment is enabled, chatd stops inlining connected MCP tool schemas into every generation. It instead exposes a built-in `find_tools` tool whose description carries a compact catalog of the deferred tools, and only ships full JSON schemas for tools the model has activated by searching or by calling them directly. Closes [CODAGT-760](https://linear.app/coder/issue/CODAGT-760). ## Problem Tool-heavy agent configurations (GitHub, Linear, Notion, and dev-tooling MCP servers) inline over 100k tokens of tool schema definitions into every generation. Initial uncached requests reached ~216k tokens with time-to-first-token close to nine minutes, while the model typically invokes only a handful of tools per turn. ## How it works - `decideMCPToolSearch` defers external and workspace `.mcp.json` MCP tools whenever the experiment is enabled. Native, dynamic, provider, skill, and transport tools are never deferred. - `find_tools` embeds a server-grouped catalog in its tool description (degrading to names-only, then counts-only, then a constant-size summary past a context-scaled size cap) and scores keyword matches across tool names, descriptions, parameter schemas, and server metadata. Queries can scope to one server with a `server:` prefix, and exact `names` arguments always activate. - Activation state is ephemeral: it is re-derived each generation from surviving chat history (`find_tools` results and direct calls to deferred tools), so activations naturally lapse when compaction summarizes them away. Aggregate activated schema weight is capped at 10% of the context window, shedding the least recently activated schemas first; `find_tools` shares that budget across parallel calls in one step. No new persistence. - Deferred tools stay registered for execution, so the model can call a cataloged tool directly without searching first; the schema is activated for subsequent steps. - Fail-open: the experiment being disabled, an empty candidate set, or an MCP tool named `find_tools` all disable deferral, leaving today's behavior byte-identical on the wire. - Prometheus counters/histograms track `find_tools` calls, matches, activations, and deferred token weight. - The conversation timeline renders `find_tools` calls with a collapsed search summary and expandable match list, falling back to the generic renderer on malformed payloads. ## Validation - Unit tests for the catalog, matcher, experiment-gated decision, and activation derivation; end-to-end chatd generation tests covering search-then-call, direct-call activation, experiment-off wire parity, compaction lapse, and subagent tool gating. - Storybook interaction tests for the timeline rendering and malformed-payload fallback. - Remote dogfood UAT on dev.coder.com passed: deferral with a real MCP server and Anthropic model, direct calls without prior search, activation persistence across turns, experiment-off parity, and clean UI/console. > Disclosure: Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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J. Scott Miller
|
62f4afbb60 |
perf(coderd): build the workspace build fan-out maps once per batch (#28074)
`convertWorkspaceBuild` rebuilt seven maps from the caller's global slices on every call and rescanned the provisioner daemon rows to filter by job ID. `convertWorkspaceBuilds` calls it once per build with identical slices, so map construction cost `O(builds x rows)` where `O(rows)` suffices — quadratic in the number of workspaces on `GET /api/v2/workspaces`. The maps move into a `workspaceBuildIndex` built once per batch, keyed exactly as before and now including daemons by job ID. `convertWorkspaceBuild` takes the index instead of eight slices. Its parent already hoisted `workspaceByID`, `jobByID`, and `templateVersionByID` out of the same loop; this makes the rest consistent. Agents are sorted while the index is built, so a resource read by several builds is sorted once rather than once per build. Same comparator over the same rows, so the order is unchanged; `TestConvertWorkspaceBuildsAgentOrder` covers it. `BenchmarkConvertWorkspaceBuilds`, 5 resources x 2 agents x 4 apps per build: | builds | ns/op | B/op | allocs/op | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | 48.3k -> 48.1k | 121k -> 125k | 342 -> 359 | | 25 | 12.7M -> 1.34M | 38.0MB -> 3.2MB | 69,621 -> 8,347 | | 100 | 186M -> 5.67M | 596MB -> 13.0MB | 1,024,941 -> 33,080 | Single-build conversion is a wash (one extra struct allocation); the quadratic term is gone. Addresses the map-allocation half of PLAT-386 / #27205. Bounding the page size is separate (#28040) and does not remove this cost: at 100 workspaces per page it is still 100 passes over every resource, agent, app, script, log source, status, and daemon row in the page. --- Created with Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller. |
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Michael Suchacz
|
119f2b1dd9 |
feat: limit concurrent chat agents with pooled admission (#27902)
Limits concurrent chat generation on capped deployments to 5 root chats and 10 delegated subagent chats. The pools are deployment-wide and independent, so delegated work can continue while root capacity is full. The default caps live in AGPL code. Enterprise contributes only a licensing unlock, so unlicensed deployments stay capped and cannot fail open. Licensed deployments are uncapped while Agent Hours usage stays below an explicit hard limit. Deployments without a hard limit remain uncapped, and reaching the Agent Hours allocation only triggers warnings. Admission happens before a worker takes chat ownership. Capped deployments serialize admission across replicas with a transaction-scoped advisory lock and derive active and queued state from current ownership plus fresh runner heartbeats, rather than persisted queue markers or per-replica state. The acquisition query returns a bounded, pool-interleaved candidate set instead of ranking the whole backlog; a migration replaces the acquisition index with a pool-aware one. Refused chats stay running but unowned, and interrupt requests bypass admission so users can stop queued or over-cap chats. The single-chat API derives `queued_for_capacity` from live pool state; list endpoints do not report it. The UI polls that value every 5 seconds while a chat is running and shows a callout when the chat is waiting for capacity. Updates the administrator documentation and deployment-wide Prometheus gauges for active and queued agents. Replica-level values must be aggregated with `max`, not `sum`. > Mux updated this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Cian Johnston
|
6079c514ee |
fix: follow-up fixes for conditional VCS requests (#27711)
Follow-ups from #27627 - Memoizes `Config.Git()` with a mutex so the provider's ETag response cache survives across calls. Only successful construction is cached; errors are retried. - Moves the HTTP client onto `Config.HTTPClient`, wired through `ConvertConfig`, so `Git()` no longer takes a per-call argument that would be silently ignored after memoization. - `newGitHub` and `newGitLab` now return `(Provider, error)`, eliminating the typed-nil-interface class in `gitprovider.New` rather than the single instance. - Gates the 304 branch on a `haveCached` flag instead of a nil body check. - Only caches bodies that decode successfully, preventing poisoned entries. - Keys the response cache on the full token digest rather than a truncated prefix. - Tests added: `TestConfigGitMemoizesProvider`, `TestConfigGitRetriesOnConstructorError`, `TestGitLabConstructorErrorReturnsNilInterface`, `TestResponseCacheStore`, `TestConditionalRequestReuse/MalformedResponseNotCached`; `TestConvertYAML/CustomScopesAndEndpoint` now asserts `Config.HTTPClient` wiring. Follow-ups tracked in #28139, #28140, #28141, #28142. > 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @johnstcn. |
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Jaayden Halko
|
fa8ffe4eda |
feat: report agent runtime hours usage in entitlements (#27985)
Populate `FeatureAgentRuntimeHours.Actual` on every entitlements refresh for licenses that grant the feature. A new `GetTotalUsageHBAgentRuntimeV1` query sums `runtime_ms` over the license's usage period, reading `usage_events` directly: `hb_agent_runtime_v1` is exactly one row per hourly bucket deployment-wide with `created_at` at the bucket start, enforced by the unique partial index introduced in #27983. The measurement reuses the shared `measureUsage` policy from #27984 through a new `AgentRuntimeMsFn` closure (usage publisher subject): failures publish the stable `LicenseAgentRuntimeUsageUnavailableErrorText` and log the cause. Usage is floored to whole hours, matching the unit of the `agent_runtime_hours_*` claims, and at most one warning is emitted per refresh: reaching the allocation supersedes the advisory soft limit. The dashboard renders the soft-limit advisory muted without a sales link and treats the runtime usage-unavailable text as a diagnostic. **Precise usage.** `Feature.ActualMs` (JSON `actual_ms`), set only for `agent_runtime_hours`, carries the exact stored milliseconds backing the floored `Actual` so clients can render fractional hours (e.g. `10.3`). It has the same freshness as `Actual`; the whole-hour warning thresholds are unchanged. **Unlimited licenses.** A license minted with the unlimited (`-1`) allocation decodes to an enabled feature with a nil `Limit` (#27984), so the warning write-back now guards the allocation dereference: no thresholds can exist for an unlimited license, so no runtime hours warning is ever emitted, while `Actual` is still measured and published. `Feature.Compare` is unchanged; for usage-period features the issued-at/end dates decide first, so a metered feature outranks an unlimited one only on an exact timestamp tie, an edge pinned by a `TestFeatureComparison` case and documented on `decodeAgentRuntimeHours`. **Grandfathered premium licenses.** Premium licenses without `agent_runtime_hours_*` claims are now granted the feature disabled with a zero limit over the license term, identical to an explicit `allocation: 0`: usage is measured and published for every Premium deployment, and chatd's pooled admission (#27902) caps concurrent agentic chats until a license with a positive allocation is added. The default carries a fixed early `UsagePeriod.IssuedAt` (2026-08-01, the same mechanism as the managed-agents default) so any license actually carrying the claims outranks it in the `AddFeature` merge regardless of the licenses' relative issue dates; the constant must stay earlier than the earliest legitimately issued claim-bearing license. Zero allocations (explicit or grandfathered) emit no deployment-wide warning banner: those deployments are steered by the in-page upgrade CTA and the concurrency cap. Enterprise licenses are unchanged. Part 3 of a 3-PR stack splitting up #27796 (see there for review history). Stack: #27983 → #27984 → this PR. Closes CODAGT-852. |
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|
Asher
|
b5d18bb9c9 | feat: add redirect URL override for external auth (#28082) | ||
|
Cian Johnston
|
aa80fa3550 | fix(coderd/externalauth): also retry on 503 (#28218) | ||
|
Susana Ferreira
|
95328f1ead |
fix: label unpriced token usage metric by provider name and type (#28210)
## Problem The `provider` label was inconsistent between AI Gateway metrics. Every metric emitted by the gateway labels `provider` with the provider instance name, for example `anthropic-eu`, while `coder_ai_gateway_cost_control_unpriced_token_usage_records_total` used the provider type, for example `anthropic`. The two could not be correlated on `provider`. The metric was also inconsistent with itself: the path where a provider fails to resolve labelled by instance name, and the path where a model has no price labelled by type. The type is still worth exposing, since prices are keyed on `(provider_type, model)` and that is what an operator needs to add a price. ## Changes - Label the metric with `provider` (the instance name, consistent with the other gateway metrics) and add `provider_type` (the configured type the price is keyed on). - Use `unknown` for `provider_type` when the provider does not resolve to a configured type. - Log the unresolved-provider case at `warn` instead of `info`. A missing price is an expected steady state, but a provider that cannot be resolved is not. - Update the metrics docs and the `metricsdocgen` fixture. Closes [AIGOV-574](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-574) > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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|
Jaayden Halko
|
20c376a575 |
fix: enforce uniqueness and hour alignment for agent runtime usage events (#27983)
The usage generator writes `hb_agent_runtime_v1` rows with `created_at` at the UTC hourly bucket start and exactly one row per bucket, but nothing in the schema enforced either invariant. A duplicate bucket row under a different id would be double-counted by any consumer summing `runtime_ms`, and a misaligned `created_at` would skew which usage period a bucket is attributed to. This replaces the non-unique partial index `idx_usage_events_agent_runtime` (from migration 000561) with a unique index of the same shape and adds an hour-alignment `CHECK` constraint. Both statements validate existing rows: every supported writer has always produced conforming data, so a pre-existing violator is anomalous and failing the migration loudly beats silently rewriting usage rows. `generateBucket` treats a unique violation on the bucket index as another replica having won the race, mirroring the existing `ON CONFLICT (id)` no-op for committed rows. The `coderd/notifications` sync commit and its revert cancel out (the drift they addressed was fixed on main by #27979); the PR's net diff is only the usage-event changes. Part 1 of a 3-PR stack splitting up #27796 (see there for review history). Stack: this PR → #27984 → #27985. |
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|
Michael Suchacz
|
521c383f6b |
fix: repair stale chat agent bindings after workspace rebuild (#28152)
## Problem When a chat is bound to a workspace, chatd persists `chats.agent_id` pointing at a specific workspace agent, and it only rebinds on the next chat turn. A workspace stop/start creates a new agent with a new ID in the latest build, so the chat page resolves the stale agent ID to `undefined` and the right sidebar silently drops Terminal, Desktop, Browser, apps, and ports even though the workspace is running. The existing read-time enrichment only filled nil agent IDs and skipped stale non-nil ones, so refreshing did not help until the user sent another message. ## Fix - `coderd/exp_chats.go`: single-chat reads now repair agent IDs that no longer resolve in the workspace's latest build, using the same `agentselect.FindChatAgent` selection chatd uses. A repaired binding also carries the latest build's ID so the response never pairs the new agent with the previous build. Bindings that still resolve are preserved, and repair stays best-effort and response-only (no write-on-read). List reads keep the previous nil-fill-only behavior because validating existing bindings would cost a per-workspace authorization lookup per listed chat. - `site/src/pages/AgentsPage/AgentChatPage.tsx`: the workspace watch update handler detects when a running workspace's latest build no longer contains the chat's bound agent and invalidates the chat query once per chat/build/binding key for immediate recovery, and the chat query polls every 30 seconds while the binding remains unresolved so a transiently failed repair retries even when an idle workspace publishes no further watch events. The watch stream replays the current workspace on every (re)connect, so this covers rebuilds that happen while the page is open or disconnected; page loads are covered by the server-side repair. The workspace-watcher bailout now also keys on `latest_build.id` so a rebuild propagates while the page is open. - `site/src/api/queries/chats.ts`: chat watch events replay the persisted (pre-repair) binding, so the summary merge adopts a snapshot's `build_id` only when the snapshot agrees on `agent_id`, keeping the repaired agent/build pair atomic in the caches. ## Testing - `go test ./coderd -run TestEnrichChatAgentIDs` covering repair, keep-valid, selection-error, list-mode-skips-bound, and no-workspaces cases. - Storybook interaction story `RecoversSidebarAfterWorkspaceRebuild` exercising the watch-event to chat-refetch to sidebar-recovery flow (verified red without the invalidation, green with it). - `pnpm test AgentChatPage.test.ts` covering the binding-resolution predicate. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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|
Wyatt FryandEthan Dickson
|
a005e5cd22 |
feat: add username and email user search filters (#27922)
## Summary User search can now resolve exact `email:` and `username:` terms through `GET /api/v2/users` instead of only supporting fuzzy free-text matches. The database query already had exact email and username filters; this wires the public search parser and API handler to those filters so clients can ask for a single user by email without fetching every user or depending on substring matching. This is the API half of coder/terraform-provider-coderd#403: that provider PR adds `data.coderd_user.email`, and this PR gives it an efficient exact lookup path. ## Testing - `go test ./coderd/searchquery -run '^TestSearchUsers$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestGetUsersFilter$' -count=1` - Live API test: - Built local enterprise Coder from this branch. - Started Coder on `http://127.0.0.1:39991` against a clean Postgres database. - Created `lookup-target@example.com`. - Verified `GET /api/v2/users?q=email:LOOKUP-TARGET@EXAMPLE.COM&limit=2` returned exactly one user: ```json { "count": 1, "users": [ { "id": "efc6f909-ce0a-4731-bd2f-6e4df417aaa7", "username": "lookup-target", "email": "lookup-target@example.com" } ] } ``` ---   --------- Co-authored-by: Ethan Dickson <ethanndickson@gmail.com> |
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|
Bobby Ho
|
1aa3553b52 |
fix(coderd): set Cache-Control: no-store on OAuth2 responses (#28143)
No response from the `/oauth2` route tree set `Cache-Control` at all, so
an intermediary cache or customer-operated reverse proxy was free to
apply a heuristic freshness lifetime to a response carrying a live
credential. RFC 6749 §5.1 and OAuth 2.1 §3.2.3 both make an affirmative
`no-store` directive a MUST for the authorization server.
Adds `httpmw.NoStore`, mounted on the `/oauth2` and
`/api/v2/oauth2-provider` trees, setting `Cache-Control: no-store` and
`Pragma: no-cache` on every response from them. OAuth 2.1 drops `Pragma`
because RFC 9111 §5.4 deprecates it as a request-only field, so sending
both is conformant under either reading. Not operator-configurable,
since both specs say MUST.
## Scope
- **Both trees, not just `POST /oauth2/tokens`.** The mount is one line
either way, and the wider scope also covers DCR registration, client
configuration read and update, the authorize 302 whose `Location` query
carries the code, and `POST /oauth2-provider/apps/{app}/secrets`, which
returns a plaintext client secret. A route added later inherits the
headers, which matters for PLAT-449.
- **A middleware, not a hook in `httpapi.Write`.** Three write paths
never call it: `POST /oauth2/revoke` and `DELETE
/oauth2/clients/{client_id}` write a bare status, and
`writeOAuth2RegistrationError` encodes its own JSON.
- **`/.well-known/*` deliberately excluded.** Public discovery metadata,
and RFC 9728 §5 asks for the opposite treatment. Assertions pin the
exclusion so a later hoist onto a higher router fails CI.
- **Session-credential routes left alone.** `/users/login`,
`/users/otp/change-password`, and `/users/{user}/keys/*` have the same
gap, but PLAT-448 is scoped to OAuth2 and reaching into session auth
changes the risk profile.
Every credential-returning route here is a `POST`, and RFC 9111 §3 bars
heuristic caching of `POST` responses, so this is defense-in-depth
against a non-conformant intermediary rather than a live caching bug.
Both specs say MUST regardless of what caches would actually do.
## Note for PLAT-498
`DELETE /oauth2/tokens` now carries `no-store` and is wrapped in
`apiKeyMiddleware`, which is mounted inside the `/oauth2` tree and
therefore runs after this middleware. It is the one route where both can
write `Cache-Control`, and PLAT-498's write must not replace `no-store`
with something weaker such as `private`. `POST /oauth2/tokens` cannot
overlap, since it deliberately has no `apiKeyMiddleware`.
## Two assumptions testing corrected
- `GET /oauth2/does-not-exist` returns **200**, not 404. Chi runs the
subrouter's middleware chain for unmatched paths, so both headers are
present, but the request falls through to the root router's SPA handler.
The test asserts the headers and deliberately not the status.
- The experiment-disabled case is unreachable from a test binary, since
`RequireExperimentWithDevBypass` short-circuits on `buildinfo.IsDev()`.
A unit test covers the consequence against the `RequireExperiment` it
delegates to.
No schema, `codersdk`, or serpent option changes, so `make gen` produces
no diff. Rollback is a revert.
Refs PLAT-448
|
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Michael Suchacz
|
93c6faf1de |
fix(coderd): send assigned chat model IDs verbatim (#28144)
Fixes #27361 (CODAGT-832). ## Problem When an Agents model was configured under a non-gateway provider type (e.g. Anthropic or OpenAI) with a model ID whose first `/`- or `:`-segment matched a built-in provider name (`anthropic`, `azure`, `bedrock`, `google`, `openai`, `openai-compat`, `openrouter`, `vercel`), `chatprovider.ResolveModelWithProviderHint` parsed it as a canonical `provider/model` reference: the prefix was stripped and the request rerouted to the embedded provider type, overriding the provider the admin explicitly assigned. LLM gateways (e.g. LiteLLM) that namespace their catalogs as `bedrock/...` or `anthropic/...` behind an Anthropic- or OpenAI-type provider failed with an opaque upstream "Model not found", and escaping was impossible (`bedrock/bedrock/...` still rerouted). ## Fix A valid provider hint is now authoritative: `ResolveModelWithProviderHint` returns the assigned provider and the verbatim model ID whenever a hint is present. Canonical `provider/model` and `provider:model` parsing applies only to hint-less resolution paths. Every production call site derives the hint from the model config's explicitly assigned AI provider, so the assignment always wins. The save-time guard rejecting slash-namespaced models on OpenRouter-like providers typed as `openai` (provider named `openrouter` or hosted at `openrouter.ai`) is kept: that combination remains a misconfiguration whose correct fix is the `openrouter` provider type, and rejecting it early beats a confusing upstream error. Its wording no longer claims prefix stripping happens. ## Back-compat note A pre-existing config that relied on stripping (e.g. model `anthropic/claude-x` assigned to an Anthropic-type provider pointing at the real Anthropic API) now sends the prefixed ID verbatim and will get a clear upstream model-not-found error; the admin fixes it by editing the model ID. Nothing in the product ever suggested the canonical form for assigned models. ## Validation - Unit: `TestResolveModelWithProviderHint` updated (hints preserve `bedrock/...`, `anthropic/...`, `provider:...` verbatim; hint-less canonical parsing unchanged), red-green verified against the old ordering. Gateway and openai-type provider routing tests assert verbatim pass-through end to end. - Full `./coderd/x/chatd/...` suites plus `TestCreateChatModelConfig`, `TestUpdateChatModelConfig`, and `TestValidateChatModelConfigProviderModel` pass. - Remote dogfood UAT on real models (PASS): an openai-type provider pointed at a Vercel AI Gateway mount returned a real completion for `anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5`, with trace logs confirming `provider=openai model=anthropic/claude-haiku-4.5` (verbatim, not rerouted); gateway-type (`openai-compat`) routing with `deepseek/deepseek-v4-pro-0813` and the model catalog/picker regressions pass. > Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR. |
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Michael Suchacz
|
d5bb35a49a |
fix(coderd): deflake TestChatMessageWithFiles/FileCapExceeded (#28091)
Fixes the flake tracked in [CODAGT-926](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-926/flake-testchatmessagewithfilesfilecapexceeded). ## Problem `TestChatMessageWithFiles/FileCapExceeded` asserted the rollback of a rejected over-cap send by comparing message counts taken before and after the send. `CreateChat` starts assistant generation asynchronously, so the assistant reply can be persisted between the two reads, making the count check fail even though the rejected message was correctly rolled back ("should have 1 item(s), but has 2"). ## Fix Replace the count comparison with a semantic assertion that the rejected `one too many` message was not persisted, hardened through Codex review rounds: - Scan message history for the rejected marker instead of comparing counts. - Also scan `QueuedMessages`: a busy chat queues the send before file-link validation, so a rollback regression could leave the rejected message queued rather than in history. - Close the queue-promotion race: `getChatMessages` reads history and the queue in two separate database reads, so the assertion first waits for the queue to observe empty; a promoted message must then appear in a fresh history read. ## Verification - Deterministic repro of the exact CI failure signature: waiting for the async assistant reply before the old count assertion reproduced `should have 1 item(s), but has 2` every run. - The new assertion passes under that same forced condition. - Assertion liveness (all temporary red checks reverted): persisting the marker in history fails the history scan; queuing the marker fails the queued scan; queuing the marker and letting it promote fails the post-drain history scan 3/3. - `go test ./coderd -run 'TestChatMessageWithFiles/FileCapExceeded' -count=100` and the full `TestChatMessageWithFiles` parent both pass. > Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR. |
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Michael Suchacz
|
48e1e28638 |
fix(coderd/x/chatd/chattool): make edit_files schema and errors actionable for models (#28121)
## Problem Chat `45b87e40-ffe7-49e5-8932-5fd0bdb9e542` on dev.coder.com failed 57 of 75 `edit_files` tool calls. Every failure was the same: the model omitted `files[].path` (it batched edits per file but only filled in `edits`), and the error relayed back to the model was: ``` POST http://[fd7a:115c:...]:4/api/v0/edit-files: unexpected status code 400: "path" is required ``` The model retried the identical malformed call dozens of times. Two gaps made this sticky: 1. The `edit_files` input schema had no field descriptions, so `path` was only a bare required property. 2. The agent API error reached the model wrapped in HTTP transport noise (method, internal tailnet URL, status code) with no indication of which `files` entry was broken. ## Changes - Add `description` tags to every `edit_files` schema field and state the path requirement in the tool description. - Validate `files` entries in the tool before plan-turn checks and the workspace connection lookup, returning entry-indexed errors such as `files[1].path is required; provide the absolute path of the file to edit; no files in this batch were applied`. - Relay agent API failures with `Message`, `Helper`, `Detail`, and `Validations` from `codersdk.Error` instead of the raw transport-prefixed string. ## Validation - `go test ./coderd/x/chatd/chattool` passes; new tests cover the schema description, entry-indexed validation errors, and transport-noise stripping (each verified red-green by toggling the fix off). - `go build ./...`, `go vet`, and pre-commit (fmt + lint) pass. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Bobby HoandClaude Opus 5
|
990d24dc42 |
feat: add oauth2 scope columns and single-use delete queries (#28007)
OAuth2 tokens issued by Coder ignore scope entirely. The authorize endpoint parses the `scope` parameter and then discards it, and both grant paths mint API keys with full API access regardless of what the client requested or what the app's allowlist permits. There is also nowhere to put a negotiated scope: nothing carries one from the authorize step to the token it produces. Schema and query groundwork for that pipeline. No behavior change on its own. - Migration `000569` adds a `scope` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes` and `oauth2_provider_app_tokens`, so a negotiated scope can travel from a code to the token it is exchanged for, and from a token to its refreshed successor. - Existing rows are backfilled to `coder:all`, then both columns become NOT NULL with a non-empty CHECK. Every OAuth2 key is unrestricted in fact today, so the backfill only writes that down, and a caller that omits the column now fails instead of silently issuing full access. - Adds `DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByIDReturningRow` and `DeleteAPIKeyByIDReturningRow`, which return `sql.ErrNoRows` when the row is already gone. Postgres serializes concurrent deletes on the row lock, so exactly one caller gets a row back, which is what will let the grant paths enforce single use of a code or refresh token without a read-then-write race. - No callers yet. The existing blind deletes and all of their call sites are untouched, and codes and tokens record `coder:all` until a later phase negotiates a real value. Phase 1 of [PLAT-470](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-470), tracked as [PLAT-478](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-478/phase-1-schema-and-queries). Scope validation at authorize, applying the negotiated scope in the code grant, and refresh narrowing follow as separate PRs. Verified locally: `make gen` and `make lint` clean, the migrations suite passes both up and down, and dbauthz's `TestMethodTestSuite` passes. <details> <summary>End-to-end scope enforcement flow (green marks what this PR touches)</summary> ```mermaid flowchart TD subgraph authorize["/oauth2/authorize"] AZ1["ShowAuthorizePage (GET)<br/>renders consent page"] AZ2["ProcessAuthorize (POST)<br/>scope parsed, then discarded"] Q1["InsertOAuth2ProviderAppCode<br/>gains a Scope param"] AZ1 --> AZ2 --> Q1 end Q1 --> CODES[("oauth2_provider_app_codes<br/>new column: scope text NOT NULL")] subgraph codegrant["POST /oauth2/token, grant_type=authorization_code"] G1["authorizationCodeGrant"] Q2["GetOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByPrefix<br/>now returns Scope"] Q4["DeleteOAuth2ProviderAppCodeByIDReturningRow<br/>added, no caller yet"] G2["apikey.Generate + UserRBACSubject<br/>hardcoded to full access"] G1 --> Q2 --> G2 G1 -.-> Q4 end CODES --> G1 G2 --> Q3 Q3["InsertOAuth2ProviderAppToken<br/>gains a Scope param"] Q3 --> TOKENS[("oauth2_provider_app_tokens<br/>new column: scope text NOT NULL")] subgraph refresh["POST /oauth2/token, grant_type=refresh_token"] G3["refreshTokenGrant"] Q5["GetOAuth2ProviderAppTokenByPrefix<br/>now returns Scope"] Q6["DeleteAPIKeyByIDReturningRow<br/>added, no caller yet"] G3 --> Q5 G3 -.-> Q6 end TOKENS --> G3 Q5 --> Q3 subgraph enforce["Every authenticated API request"] E1["httpmw ExtractAPIKey"] --> E2["APIKey.ScopeSet()"] --> E3["UserRBACSubject"] --> E4["dbauthz authorize"] end TOKENS --> E1 classDef changed fill:#c8e6c9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,color:#1b3c1e classDef dormant fill:#c8e6c9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,stroke-dasharray:5 3,color:#1b3c1e class Q1,Q2,Q3,Q5,CODES,TOKENS changed class Q4,Q6 dormant ``` Solid green is added or changed here. Dashed green exists but has no caller yet. Everything else is unchanged, including the enforcement engine at the bottom, which already reads a key's scopes correctly and only needs real data fed into it. </details> <details> <summary>Suggested reading order</summary> Most of the diff is generated. `dump.sql`, `models.go`, `querier.go`, `queries.sql.go`, `check_constraint.go`, and the dbmock and dbmetrics packages all come from `make gen`. 1. `migrations/000569_oauth2_scope_columns.{up,down}.sql`: additive column, backfill, NOT NULL, CHECK, and a `COMMENT ON COLUMN` on each. 2. `queries/oauth2.sql` and `queries/apikeys.sql`: `scope` added to both insert column lists, plus the two new returning-row deletes alongside the untouched originals. The `Get...ByPrefix` selects needed no edit, since they are `SELECT *`. 3. `dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: hand-written wrappers for the two new queries, each fetching by ID, authorizing delete against the fetched object, then delegating. The generic `deleteQ` helper does not fit, since it requires the delete to return only `error`. 4. `oauth2provider/authorize.go` and `oauth2provider/tokens.go`: the only production changes, all behavior-neutral. 5. `dbgen/dbgen.go` and `dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go`: seed threading, plus a case per new query. `MethodTestSuite` fails with "Method never called" for anything untested. Neither type needs to become auditable, which `make lint` confirms by not erroring on `enterprise/audit/table.go`. </details> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Michael Suchacz
|
8d4d0b35dd |
feat: add Coder Agents chat tools to the MCP toolsdk (#28025)
Exposes the experimental Coder Agents chats API through the MCP tool registry, so MCP clients (the hosted `/api/experimental/mcp/http` server and `coder exp mcp server`) can start and drive server-side coding agents. New tools in `codersdk/toolsdk`, all thin wrappers over existing `codersdk.ExperimentalClient` methods: | Tool | Wraps | |---|---| | `coder_create_chat` | `CreateChat` (prompt, optional org, model config, labels) | | `coder_get_chat` | `GetChat` (status, last error, last turn summary, workspace, files) | | `coder_get_chat_messages` | `GetChatMessages` (user-facing parts, chronological, cursor pagination, queued prompts) | | `coder_send_chat_message` | `CreateChatMessage` (queue or interrupt busy behavior) | | `coder_interrupt_chat` | `InterruptChat` | | `coder_archive_chat` | `UpdateChat` with `archived: true` | | `coder_list_chat_model_configs` | `ListChatModelConfigs` (enabled configs with default flag) | Both MCP servers register tools from `toolsdk.All`, so no additional wiring is needed. Responses are trimmed to what an MCP caller needs (IDs as strings, user-facing transcripts) rather than full SDK payloads. No new endpoints and no database changes. Also adds MCP [prompts](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/server/prompts) for the chat workflows, defined once in `codersdk/toolsdk` and registered by both servers: | Prompt | Purpose | |---|---| | `coder_agents_delegate` | delegate a task to a Coder Agents chat and monitor it to completion | | `coder_agents_check` | check the status and recent activity of an existing chat | Each prompt declares the tools its workflow needs; the stdio server skips prompts whose tools are excluded by `--allowed-tools`. Tests run the tools against a chat-enabled coderdtest instance (fake OpenAI-compatible provider plus in-process AI bridge), covering the full lifecycle, an interrupt against a blocked turn, pagination cursors, permission-dependent model config filtering, and argument validation. Prompt coverage spans SDK rendering, the hosted `prompts/list`/`prompts/get` round trip, and the stdio server including allowlist gating. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Steven Masley
|
0d0f5b4392 |
test: skip racey tasks test (#28033)
tasks is being removed, so fixing tests is not worth it Closes: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1635 |
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Susana Ferreira
|
2d9b6eda8f |
feat: add experimental CLI to price unpriced AI models (#27926)
## Description AI Gateway computes the cost of an interception from `ai_model_prices`, which is seeded on every server start from a price book embedded in the binary. A model the price book does not cover records a NULL cost, so its spend is invisible to cost reporting and is not enforced against budgets. The only fix was to wait for a Coder release that added the model. This adds an experimental CLI, backed by an experimental HTTP endpoint, for pricing those models. Models the price book already covers are rejected, because the seeder re-applies the book on every start and would overwrite an operator price. Support for custom pricing will be handled in https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-589/extend-experimental-cli-command-to-set-custom-ai-model-prices. ## Commands ``` coder exp ai-model-prices list [--provider] [--model] coder exp ai-model-prices update [file|-] [--provider] [--model] [--input-price] [--output-price] [--cache-read-price] [--cache-write-price] [--yes] ``` ## Changes - Add `GET` and `POST /api/experimental/ai/model-prices`, gated behind the AI Bridge entitlement and the existing `ai_model_price` RBAC resource. - Add a `GetAIModelPrices` query with optional `provider` and `model` filters applied in SQL. - Validate the whole request before writing anything, so one bad entry cannot leave the table half updated, and report every problem at once. - Reject prices for models the embedded price book already covers, through a new `prices.IsDefaultPriced`. - Add the `coder exp ai-model-prices` command with `list` and `update`. `update` accepts a JSON document or the single-model flags and prints a plan, asking to confirm unless the document is piped in or `--yes` is passed. - Consolidate the supported provider list into `coderd/aibridge/prices/providers` so the price generator and the server share one definition. - Add `codersdk` types and client methods for both endpoints, and bound the request body at 1 MiB. - Document the command in the AI Gateway cost controls page. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-567/experimental-cli-command-to-set-prices-for-unpriced-ai-models > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 5, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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Michael Suchacz
|
e92fd8e96f |
chore: retire mark3labs/mcp-go dependency (#28061)
## Stack Context PR 6 of 6 in a stack that migrates every Coder MCP surface from the archived `github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go` library to the official `github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk` v1.7.0. Stack: #28056 -> #28057 -> #28058 -> #28059 -> #28060 -> #28061 ## Why With every production surface migrated, this PR removes the mark3labs dependency entirely and converts the remaining test fixtures. - Migrates the remaining mark3labs test fixtures (coderd MCP e2e tests, chatd fixtures, mcpclient fixtures, and the Force On MCP policy tests) to official stateless SDK servers. - Removes `github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go` from `go.mod` and drops the corresponding dependabot ignore entry. Zero references remain repo-wide. - Updates the MCP docs for the 2026-07-28 protocol: stateless Streamable HTTP behavior, the supported 2024-11-05 through 2026-07-28 protocol range, and explicit non-features (resources, prompts, structured output, elicitation, MCP Tasks). - The e2e ping assertion is removed because MCP 2026-07-28 removed the ping method. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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c8e8b21a88 |
feat: migrate aibridge injected-MCP proxy to official MCP Go SDK (#28060)
## Stack Context PR 5 of 6 in a stack that migrates every Coder MCP surface from the archived `github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go` library to the official `github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk` v1.7.0. Stack: #28056 -> #28057 -> #28058 -> #28059 -> #28060 -> #28061 ## Why The aibridge injected-MCP proxy now owns an official `*mcp.Client`, `*mcp.StreamableClientTransport`, and `*mcp.ClientSession`. - The proxy constructor accepts an optional `*http.Client` instead of mark3labs options; the header-injecting wrapper shallow-copies a supplied client so its Timeout, Jar, and redirect policy survive. - Manual protocol version negotiation and the mark3labs five-second close workaround are removed; the SDK negotiates during `Connect` and fails when no mutually supported version exists. - Repeated `Init` closes the previous session, and a failed tool fetch closes the just-created session so transports do not leak. - Tool and intercept types use the official pointer content types; embedded resource blobs are re-encoded to base64 for model-facing text because the SDK decodes them into raw bytes. - `aibridge/mcpmock` is regenerated, and its stale `go:generate` source path is corrected. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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1e546ea8a3 |
feat(coderd/x/chatd/mcpclient): migrate external MCP client to official Go SDK (#28058)
## Stack Context PR 3 of 6 in a stack that migrates every Coder MCP surface from the archived `github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go` library to the official `github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk` v1.7.0. Stack: #28056 -> #28057 -> #28058 -> #28059 -> #28060 -> #28061 ## Why The chatd external MCP client (admin-configured MCP servers used by Agent chat) now holds `*mcp.ClientSession` connections created via `mcp.NewClient` and `Client.Connect`, with `StreamableClientTransport` or `SSEClientTransport` per server config. - Auth and identity headers are injected through a custom `http.RoundTripper` because the official SDK has no per-header transport options. - Tool input schemas are extracted from the SDK's `map[string]any` decoding. - Content conversion handles the official pointer content types; the SDK decodes blob resources into raw bytes, so binary content is handled without an extra base64 round trip. - Test fixtures are official stateless Streamable HTTP servers. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
|
08a1525f78 |
feat: migrate coderd MCP server to official MCP Go SDK (#28056)
## Stack Context PR 1 of 6 in a stack that migrates every Coder MCP surface from the archived `github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go` library to the official `github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk` v1.7.0, adding MCP 2026-07-28 support while keeping compatibility with clients speaking 2024-11-05 through 2025-06-18. Stack: #28056 -> #28057 -> #28058 -> #28059 -> #28060 -> #28061 ## Why The coderd Streamable HTTP MCP server (`/api/experimental/mcp/http`) is the foundation layer: it introduces the official SDK dependency and the shared `RegisterSDKTool` helper the CLI server reuses. - The server runs the SDK handler in stateless mode with `JSONResponse: true`, preserving the previous `application/json` POST wire format. GET and DELETE return 405, and no `Mcp-Session-Id` is issued, both permitted by the Streamable HTTP spec. - `DisableLocalhostProtection` is set because coderd commonly listens on loopback behind a reverse proxy with a public Host header; the endpoint's bearer authentication is the relevant access control. - Tool registration builds raw JSON object schemas and omits empty `required`, keeping `tools/list` output byte-identical to the previous server (verified with a golden comparison). - SDK logs are adapted to `cdr.dev/slog/v3`; only warnings and errors are forwarded because the SDK logs several INFO lines per stateless request. - Tests cover the modern 2026-07-28 flow, legacy 2025-06-18 initialize, unsupported protocol version rejection (`-32022`), and non-POST method behavior. ## Known behavior deltas vs the old endpoint Both deltas come from the SDK enforcing the Streamable HTTP spec where mark3labs was lenient, on an experimental endpoint: - POST requests whose `Accept` header lists `application/json` without `text/event-stream` are now rejected with 400 (the spec requires clients to list both; a missing `Accept` header is still tolerated). mark3labs did not validate `Accept` at all. - The old server generated an unvalidated `Mcp-Session-Id` response header; the stateless SDK handler issues none. Clients that merely echo the header back are unaffected. ## Validation Beyond unit/integration tests, a remote dogfood UAT ran protocol conformance against a live dev server built from the stack tip: version negotiation matrix (2024-11-05 through bogus/omitted values), auth, session/method semantics, tool schema sanity, tools/call happy and error paths (unknown tool, schema-violating args, malformed JSON, jsonrpc "1.0"), and a concurrency smoke test. No 500s or connection drops; error shapes are clean JSON-RPC/HTTP errors. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Cian JohnstonandCopilot Autofix powered by AI
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3f9e8cca2a |
chore: add test coverage for chatd compaction (#28053)
## Summary Adds test coverage for the three compaction-decision functions in chatd that had zero tests: `latestPromptUsage`, `shouldCompactPromptUsage`, and `contextTokensFromUsage`. AIGOV-585 hypothesized that chatd's token counting logic was incorrect — that it compared a cumulative sum of prompt tokens across all agentic-loop steps against the context window. The tests disprove this: `latestPromptUsage` returns the last persisted assistant message's usage, not a sum. The actual bug was in the aibridge streaming interceptor, which summed usage across SSE chunks and persisted inflated values (fixed in `ad100452d4`). ## What's tested - `TestLatestPromptUsage` — pins that the compaction path reads the last step's usage (5,400), not a cumulative sum across steps (15,600). If someone wires `TotalUsage` into the compaction path as the issue suggested, this fails. - `TestShouldCompactPromptUsage` — covers the threshold decision with the inflated value from the issue (417,012 → compacts), the correct value (6,000 → doesn't compact), cache token counting, and both disable guards (threshold=100, contextLimit=0). <details> <summary>Plan / investigation notes</summary> - Traced the full flow: `chatloop.go:993` sets `result.usage = part.Usage` from the per-step `StreamPartTypeFinish` event, not the accumulated `TotalUsage` from `agent.go:544`. chatd never calls fantasy's `Agent` interface. - The `TotalUsage` accumulation in `agent.go:544` is only used for cost attribution, not context occupancy. - Commit `ad100452d4` fixed the real bug in `aibridge/intercept/chatcompletions/streaming.go` (cross-chunk usage summation for vLLM-style backends). - Tests reuse existing `dbMessage` and `withUsage` helpers from `message_conversion_test.go` (same package). </details> Generated by [Coder Agents](https://coder.com) --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Bobby Ho
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209d1ca498 |
fix: reject PKCE code_verifier below RFC 7636 length floor (#28003)
The token endpoint accepted any non-empty `code_verifier`, so a one-character verifier was enough to authenticate. RFC 7636 §4.1 requires 43 to 128 characters from the unreserved set. That fix plus the related gaps review surfaced in the same path: - Enforce the length and charset floor on the verifier before the S256 comparison runs. - Validate the challenge at the authorize endpoint too. It was only checked for non-emptiness, so a malformed challenge was stored and then failed late at token exchange, blaming the wrong parameter. - A malformed verifier now returns `invalid_request` (RFC 6749 §5.2); a well-formed but wrong one still returns `invalid_grant` (RFC 7636 §4.6). Both looked identical before, so a client had no way to tell a syntax error from a hash mismatch and would retry the same bad verifier forever. - Revoke the authorization code when a PKCE check fails. Without that, a leaked code could be replayed with unlimited verifier guesses for its remaining lifetime, and RFC 6749 §10.5 requires codes to be single use. - Fix verifier generation in `scripts/oauth2/*.sh` and the docs example. They deleted reserved base64 characters instead of translating them to the URL-safe alphabet, so most runs produced verifiers under the new floor. Also carries #28041, which merged into this branch: public clients may register bare custom schemes such as `vscode://` again, with `mailto`, `tel`, and `sms` rejected. Split out of #27873 (public OAuth2 client support). PKCE is already mandatory for every client, so this stands on its own. <details> <summary>Manual verification</summary> Ran against a local dev server on this branch, using a session token and a throwaway app from `scripts/oauth2/setup-test-app.sh`. 1. Happy path unchanged: HTTP 200, verifier length 43. 2. `code_verifier=short`, and a 43-character verifier ending in `!`: both HTTP 400 `invalid_request`, so charset is enforced and not just length. 3. `code_challenge=tooshort` at authorize: HTTP 400 `invalid_request`, no code issued. An empty challenge still hits the older "required and cannot be empty" message. 4. Well-formed but wrong verifier: HTTP 400 `invalid_grant`, distinct from the cases above. 5. Retrying that same code with the correct verifier: HTTP 400, code already revoked by the failed check. 6. `generate-pkce.sh` produces a 43-character verifier (20 out of 20 runs); the docs example produces 128. 7. `scripts/oauth2/test-mcp-oauth2.sh` passes end to end. The two bearer-token failures in its output are a pre-existing script bug (`09c50559f3`, July 2025) that reuses a resource-scoped token against the real API, not a regression here. </details> |
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Michael Suchacz
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0acd9785fa | fix(coderd/x/agenthooks/dispatch): deflake TestDispatcherTimeoutNoRetry (#28050) | ||
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Michael Suchacz
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1458d27d78 |
fix: allow manual chat compaction from the error state (#28022)
A chat that fails generation with a context overflow (for example `Input
length 262625 exceeds the maximum allowed input length of 262112
tokens`) is stuck in a catch-22: `POST /chats/{id}/compact` returns 409
because the `RequestCompaction` transition is only allowed from the
waiting state, and the only other way out of the error state is sending
or editing a message, which re-runs generation with the same oversized
prompt and fails again. Compaction is exactly the recovery a
context-overflowed chat needs, and it is unreachable exactly when it is
needed.
Three semantic changes:
- Allow `RequestCompaction` from the error states: `E0 -> R0` and `E1 ->
R1` (queued messages are preserved and processed after the compaction
turn).
- Clear `last_error` in `Tx.RequestCompaction`, matching the
architecture rule that transitions leaving `E0`/`E1` clear the stored
error. Without this a successful compaction would land in waiting with a
stale persisted error.
- Grant the compaction turn a fresh history epoch: a
`grant_history_epoch` flag on `UpdateChatExecutionState` sets
`history_version = snapshot_version`, resets `generation_attempt`, and
clears `retry_state` in the same atomic update that clears `last_error`
(mirroring the `chat_messages` trigger postcondition). The transition
inserts no history, so without this the turn inherits the failed turn's
spent retry budget, and resetting the counter alone could collide with
message part episode keys still retained on the erroring replica.
No frontend change is required: the chat input is already enabled in the
error state and `/compact` submission already handles both the success
and 409 paths. Also updates ARCHITECTURE.md (transition matrix,
endpoint, and manual compaction sections), the endpoint's swagger
description, and SDK comments.
> Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-sonnet-4-6 thinking=high -->
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Danielle Maywood
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5a33b669b4 | feat: redesign the advisor tool row (#28069) | ||
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Danielle Maywood
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c424a76a12 | feat: wire chat search box to full-text search (#27973) | ||
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Michael Suchacz
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88e113554a | fix: report per-request Anthropic usage in chat token accounting (#27966) | ||
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Michael Suchacz
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bde38e9d10 |
fix(coderd/x/chatd): synchronize aibridgeTestFactory recorded fields (#28031)
Fixes the data race in the chatd test helper `aibridgeTestFactory` reported in CODAGT-917 (`test-go-race-pg` flake in `TestAwaitSubagentCompletion/Timeout`). `TransportFor` recorded `providerName` and `source` with plain field writes. Tests that start the chat worker share one factory between concurrently running chat runners (parent chat and spawned subagent), so two runners resolving models at the same time raced on those writes. The fix guards the recorded fields with a mutex and reads them through a locked `recorded()` accessor at the three asserting call sites. Verified with a red-green repro: concurrent `TransportFor` calls on one factory failed `go test -race` with the exact CI signature (lines 37-38) before the fix and pass after it. Also ran `go test -race ./coderd/x/chatd -run TestAwaitSubagentCompletion -count=10` and the full `go test -race ./coderd/x/chatd` package, both clean. Audited every other `aibridge.TransportFactory` implementation and `aibridgeTestFactory` use site for the same defect: `chattest.MockAIBridgeTransport` is already mutex-guarded, `stubTransportFactory` (coderd/aibridge_test.go) records via a channel, `providerRoutedTransportFactory` (chatd_test.go) is a stateless lookup, and the production factories keep no recorded state. No other occurrence exists. Closes CODAGT-917. > Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR. |
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J. Scott Miller
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866e676320 |
feat: invalidate provisioner daemon sessions on key deletion (#26532)
## Summary Closes PLAT-305. When a provisioner key is deleted, the associated daemon kept operating on its existing WebSocket connection, because authentication was only checked at connection establishment and deletion was a bare `DELETE` with no session invalidation. This adds four layers of defense so a deleted key promptly stops doing work: 1. **Publish on delete.** `deleteProvisionerKey` publishes to a new per-key pubsub channel (`coderd/pubsub.ProvisionerKeyDeletedChannel`) after a successful delete. Publish errors are logged but still return `204`, since layer 3 is the durable backstop. 2. **Subscribe and tear down.** The daemon serve handler subscribes to its key's channel and terminates the DRPC session on a deletion event. Termination is deferred while a job claimed by the session is active: the daemon may finish and report the in-flight job (`UpdateJob`/`CompleteJob` have no key check), and the last active job's completion performs the cancellation. Because Postgres `LISTEN`/`NOTIFY` does not buffer for non-listeners, the handler also performs a synchronous key-existence re-check immediately after subscribing to close the race between auth and subscription. The subscription uses `SubscribeWithErr` so that an `ErrDroppedMessages` signal (emitted when the pubsub listener reconnects) triggers the same key re-check, closing the listener-outage window in which a deletion notification could be missed. 3. **Backstop on acquire.** `AcquireJob` and `AcquireJobWithCancel` verify the key still exists before waiting for a job, and the `Acquirer` claims jobs in a transaction that first locks the worker's deletable key (`LockProvisionerKeyByIDForShare`, a `FOR KEY SHARE` row lock held until commit) before running the `AcquireProvisionerJob` claim, so a claim cannot commit after the key's deletion. This guards against a missed pubsub message. A missing key row surfaces as its own result rather than overloading the claim query's no-rows response: the acquire terminates with `ErrProvisionerKeyDeleted` (terminating the session, with the same active-job deferral) and hands the consumed wakeup to another waiting daemon in the same domain, rather than silently re-parking and starving peers of job postings. 4. **Heartbeat watchdog.** The per-session heartbeat loop (1m interval) also re-checks the key, so even a session whose deletion notification was silently lost terminates within one heartbeat interval instead of living until the connection breaks (same active-job deferral as layer 2). Reserved keys skip the check. A job that is claimed but never delivered (the session or connection dies between the database claim and the stream send) is marked failed immediately on a fresh context, instead of staying assigned to the worker until the job reaper. Reserved keys (built-in, user-auth, PSK) are exempt throughout, since they are not deletable rows. The acquire-time lookup runs as `dbauthz.AsSystemReadProvisionerDaemons`, because the provisionerd role cannot read provisioner keys and a provisioner key's RBAC object is a provisioner daemon. A single key can back many daemons (and span HA replicas), so the per-key channel fans out to invalidate all of them at once. Per-key channels keep the `LISTEN` count proportional to distinct keys rather than waking every daemon on unrelated deletions. ### Known limitations - **`UpdateJob`/`CompleteJob` intentionally have no key check.** By the time those RPCs arrive the work has already run; rejecting completion would strand a build in "running" (until the job reaper fails it) with real infrastructure left unreconciled. Session termination is deferred while a job is active so the completion can be reported; the daemon may not receive the final RPC response when the deferred termination fires, but the job's outcome is already persisted. - **After termination, the daemon process redials and receives 401s until restarted.** The dial-time exit logic only triggers on 403, and the auth middleware returns 401 for an invalid key; this dial behavior predates this PR and is tracked as a follow-up in [PLAT-452](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-452) (return 403 for invalid provisioner keys). ## Tests - `coderd/provisionerdserver`: `TestAcquireJob_ProvisionerKeyDeleted` (both RPC variants), `TestAcquireJob_ReservedProvisionerKey`, `TestHeartbeat_ProvisionerKeyDeleted` (heartbeat watchdog cancels the session after key deletion), `TestAcquirer_ProvisionerKeyDeleted` (a dead-key acquiree exits terminally and its clearance is promoted to a peer in the same domain), and `TestTerminateSession_Deferral` (termination is immediate when idle and deferred until the last active job finishes). - `coderd/database`: `TestAcquireProvisionerJob/ProvisionerKeyLock` covers the lock query against real Postgres: it returns the key ID while the row exists and no rows once it is deleted. The lock-then-claim composition is pinned by `TestAcquirer_ProvisionerKeyDeleted`. - `enterprise/coderd`: `TestProvisionerDaemonServe/KeyDeletionClosesSession` asserts an active session closes after its key is deleted. `KeyDeletedDuringSetupClosesSession` covers the post-subscribe re-check when a key is deleted between auth and subscription, and `DroppedMessageClosesSession` covers the `ErrDroppedMessages` re-check when a deletion is missed during a listener outage. ## Validation - `make` pre-commit (gen/fmt/lint/build) passed via git hooks. - Targeted tests pass; existing acquire tests pass with no regression. - Manual: brought up a dev deployment (coder-in-coder) with a Premium license, created a deletable provisioner key, and started an external daemon with `coder provisionerd start`. Confirmed it authenticated via the key and connected, appearing as `idle` in both `coder provisioner list` (with the key name) and the organization Provisioners UI. - Manual, idle teardown: deleted the key while the daemon was idle. The server logged `provisioner key deleted, terminating session`, the daemon's session closed immediately, and it dropped from `coder provisioner list` (then entered the known 401 redial loop, PLAT-452). - Manual, deferred termination: ran a workspace build (tagged template, `sleep 45` in `local-exec`) pinned to the external daemon and deleted the key mid-build. The server logged `deferring session cancellation until active jobs finish`; the heartbeat watchdog re-checked mid-build and re-deferred rather than force-killing. The build ran to completion (`Apply complete`, workspace `Started`) and only then did `canceling session after job completion` fire. The documented caveat reproduced: the daemon lost the final `CompleteJob` ack, and the build outcome was still persisted correctly. <details> <summary>Implementation plan and design decisions</summary> ### Design - **Per-key vs global channel:** chose per-key (`provisioner_key_deleted:<keyID>`) so daemons do not wake on unrelated deletions. The cost is one `LISTEN` per distinct key per replica on the shared listener connection, which is negligible against Coder's existing channels. - **Missing-key behavior on acquire:** returns an error that tears down the acquire rather than silently returning an empty job. - **Subscribe-startup race:** ordering is `authorize -> UpsertProvisionerDaemon -> Subscribe -> GetProvisionerKeyByID`. The post-subscribe re-check handles a deletion that committed before the `LISTEN` registered (Postgres does not buffer notifications for non-listeners; the in-process buffer only smooths bursts and drops on overflow). - **`NewServer` change:** `KeyID` was added to `provisionerdserver.Options` to avoid a positional signature change across call sites. The in-memory (built-in) daemon leaves it unset and is therefore exempt. ### Files - `coderd/pubsub/provisionerkeydeleted.go` (new) — channel helper. - `enterprise/coderd/provisionerkeys.go` — publish on delete. - `enterprise/coderd/provisionerdaemons.go` — subscribe, re-check, cancel session; pass `KeyID`. - `coderd/provisionerdserver/provisionerdserver.go` — `KeyID` option and acquire-time existence check. </details> --- This pull request was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller. |
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Atif Ali
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c6e3be5090 | chore(coderd/x/chatd): bump computer-use models to current frontier releases (#28026) | ||
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Atif Ali
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d7953bd046 | fix(coderd): use service account wording in account notifications (#27536) | ||
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Hugo Dutka
|
7f75e625cc |
fix(coderd/x/chatd): deflake TestRunner_StartsRealInterruptTask (#28024)
Closes [ENG-2869](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-2869/flake-testpostchatmessagesbusyinterrupt). The test used to assert a transient chat state, so I got rid of that assertion. There was also a related race in `interruptChat` where the test pubsub message buffer could be cleared after a runner posted the pubsub message that tests look for. |
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Michael Suchacz
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57f38b5c24 |
fix: keep chat attachments while a linking chat exists
Fixes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-616/keep-chat-attachments-while-chats-remain-unarchived Chat attachments could disappear even though the chat was still available. This happened when a message was saved without recording which attachments it used, or when cleanup deleted attachments before an archived chat itself was removed. Creating a chat, sending or queuing a message, and editing a message now record both the message and which attachments it uses as one operation. If the chat is already at the 50-attachment limit, the chat change fails without being partially saved. Concurrent attachment writes serialize the 50-file cap per chat. Cleanup locks candidates and checks again for new links before deleting. If a file becomes unavailable after input validation, create, send, and edit return a clear client error and roll back the chat change. An attachment stays available while any chat that uses it still exists. After an archived chat reaches the end of its retention period and is deleted, an old attachment that no remaining chat uses can be cleaned up. The retention guide and unavailable-attachment UI text document this lifecycle. This change cannot restore attachments that were already deleted. The database migration adds two indexes so attachment cleanup stays fast as attachments accumulate. > This PR was authored by Mux (AI) on Mike's behalf. |
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Michael Suchacz
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2e5353bde7 |
feat: add built-in Browser tab for agent-browser (#27910)
Adds a built-in Browser tab to the Agents page right panel, alongside the built-in Terminal and Desktop tabs, when the chat's bound agent has an app with the well-known slug `agent-browser`. The tab shows only while the app is embeddable and its health is `healthy` (or `disabled`, for templates without a healthcheck), so it appears and disappears live as the daemon comes up or goes down. The iframe stays mounted across tab switches to preserve session state. To avoid duplicates, the generic Add Tab menu and persisted workspace-app tabs now exclude the `agent-browser` app. Detection uses the existing `coder_app` slug and healthcheck signals already present in the workspace data model. The workspace watch handler compares the agent app fields the chat UI consumes, so health transitions propagate without re-render churn on every heartbeat. On the backend, the chat `execute` tool now exports `AGENT_BROWSER_SESSION=<chat id>` on every process it starts. agent-browser resolves its default session from that variable, so browser automation from each chat lands in its own isolated session (named by the chat id in the embedded dashboard) instead of a shared default browser. > Mux created this PR on Mike's behalf. |
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Thomas Kosiewski
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37b3f11243 | fix(coderd): block SSRF in MCP OAuth2 discovery and client registration (#27989) | ||
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Thomas Kosiewski
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91d3027498 | fix(coderd): enforce Force On MCP server policy on the backend (#27990) | ||
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Michael Suchacz
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c97f4da3ac |
chore: sync fantasy fork with upstream v0.40.0 and openai-go with v3.50.0 (#27981)
Our fantasy fork had drifted far behind upstream charmbracelet/fantasy (base v0.31.0 vs current v0.40.0). This PR updates the pinned forks after reconciling which fork hacks upstream has fixed and which we still need, and adapts this repo to the new APIs. ## Fork updates - `charm.land/fantasy` -> [coder/fantasy#51](https://github.com/coder/fantasy/pull/51) (merged): `coder_2_33` synced with upstream v0.40.0, pinned at the merge commit `bb10946892ef`. - `github.com/openai/openai-go/v3` -> [coder/openai-go#10](https://github.com/coder/openai-go/pull/10) (merged): `coder/pinned` rebased from v3.16.0 onto upstream v3.50.0 (required by upstream fantasy), pinned at the merge commit `92b5addb22d2`. - `coder/anthropic-sdk-go` pin unchanged; the fantasy fork now tracks the same revision this repo ships. ## Hack reconciliation summary Dropped from our fantasy diff (upstream now has equivalents, often stricter): truncated-stream fail-closed detection, Anthropic EffortXHigh / computer use / thinking effort / thinking display, replay fidelity for signed reasoning and web_search errors, PDF and text documents with sanitized filename titles, refusal finish-reason mapping (upstream also maps Bedrock `content_filtered`/`guardrail_intervened`), gpt-5.5/5.6 Responses routing, the Go 1.25 downgrade, and the openai-go SSE decoder and appendCompact patches. Still fork-only and preserved: OpenAI computer use, OpenAI Responses replay continuity validation, Anthropic pre-4.6 budget-thinking conversion plus explicit thinking disable for effort none, Anthropic RefusalMetadata parsing, Bedrock cross-region inference profile region mirroring, and openai-go deferred body serialization with the WithJSONSet fix. Picked up new upstream features: stream transport retry with in-band SSE error classification, Bedrock expired-credential refresh, per-message cache markers for OpenAI-compatible models, tool panic recovery, extra usage fields in provider metadata, and ClientMetadata on tool results. ## Changes in this repo - `aibridge/intercept/responses`: `ResponseOutputItemUnion.Arguments` became a union type in openai-go v3.50; read function-call arguments via `.OfString` (plus test literal updates). - `coderd/x/chatd/chatdebug`: register the new fantasy `Call.Headers`, `ObjectCall.Headers`, and `ToolResultPart.ClientMetadata` fields in the normalization coverage map (all skipped). - `aibridge/internal/integrationtest`: make the RST test listener drain the request before resetting the connection. The new SDK's write path exposed the previous 1-byte-read race as sporadic `use of closed network connection` failures; the fix holds over 40 consecutive runs. - `go.mod`: rewrite the fork provenance comments to describe the post-sync state. ## Validation - `go build ./...` and `go vet ./...` clean (vet findings identical to base). - Fresh (`-count=1`) runs of `./coderd/x/chatd/...`, `./aibridge/...`, `./coderd/aibridged/...`, `./coderd/database/db2sdk/`: 37 packages pass. - `TestClientAndConnectionError` stress-tested 40x clean. - Both fork PRs have green CI. > Mux acted on Mike's behalf to create this PR. |
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Andrew Aquino
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6e07e2610f |
feat: add paginated API endpoint for groups (#27603)
backend-only changes from #27271; see that PR for summary of changes + implementation details |