fix: prevent IP leaks via external chat images (#27362)

site/src/pages/AgentsPage/components/ChatElements/MarkdownImage.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+import { ImageIcon } from "lucide-react";
+import { useState } from "react";
+import { cn } from "#/utils/cn";
+import {
+	externalImageHost,
+	isExternalImageSource,
+} from "#/utils/externalImageSources";
+
+/**
+ * Renders chat markdown images. External sources render a
+ * click-to-load placeholder so viewing a chat never discloses the
+ * viewer's IP to the image host (Cure53 CDM-02-006).
+ */
+export const MarkdownImage = ({ src, alt }: { src?: string; alt?: string }) => {
+	const [consented, setConsented] = useState(false);
+
+	if (!src) {
+		return null;
+	}
+
+	if (consented || !isExternalImageSource(src)) {
+		return (
+			<img src={src} alt={alt ?? ""} loading="lazy" className="max-w-full" />
+		);
+	}
+
+	const host = externalImageHost(src);
+	// Sources without a resolvable host (for example javascript: or
+	// otherwise malformed URLs) are never safe to load, so they get a
+	// placeholder without a load affordance.
+	if (!host) {
+		return (
+			<span className="inline-flex items-center gap-1.5 rounded-md border border-solid border-border-default bg-surface-secondary px-2 py-1 text-xs text-content-secondary">
+				<ImageIcon aria-hidden className="size-3.5 shrink-0" />
+				Blocked image{alt ? `: ${alt}` : ""}
+			</span>
+		);
+	}
+
+	return (
+		<button
+			type="button"
+			onClick={() => setConsented(true)}
+			aria-label={`Load external image from ${host}`}
+			className={cn(
+				"inline-flex max-w-full cursor-pointer items-center gap-1.5",
+				"rounded-md border border-solid border-border-default bg-surface-secondary",
+				"px-2 py-1 text-xs text-content-secondary",
+				"hover:bg-surface-tertiary hover:text-content-primary",
+			)}
+		>
+			<ImageIcon aria-hidden className="size-3.5 shrink-0" />
+			<span className="truncate">
+				{alt ? `${alt}: ` : ""}external image from {host}
+			</span>
+			<span className="shrink-0 font-medium text-content-link">Load</span>
+		</button>
+	);
+};

site/src/pages/AgentsPage/components/ChatElements/Response.stories.tsx

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import type { Meta, StoryObj } from "@storybook/react-vite";
-import { expect, waitFor, within } from "storybook/test";
+import { expect, userEvent, waitFor, within } from "storybook/test";
 import { Response } from "./Response";
 
 const sampleMarkdown = `
@@ -191,6 +191,90 @@ export const JsxInProse: Story = {
 	},
 };
 
+// A 1x1 transparent PNG. Streamdown's sanitize plugin strips data:
+// image sources before our img component sees them, so these render
+// as nothing: inert, and never a network request.
+const dataImagePNG =
+	"";
+
+const externalImageURL = "https://external-image-host.invalid/image.png";
+
+// Verifies the IP-leak fix for Cure53 CDM-02-006: externally hosted
+// markdown images must not be fetched when a chat is rendered. The
+// viewer gets a consent placeholder and the <img> element only
+// appears after clicking it.
+export const ExternalImageConsentGate: Story = {
+	args: {
+		children: `Before\n\n![diagram](${externalImageURL})\n\nAfter`,
+	},
+	play: async ({ canvasElement }) => {
+		const canvas = within(canvasElement);
+
+		// The placeholder must render instead of the image.
+		const loadButton = await canvas.findByRole("button", {
+			name: /load external image from external-image-host\.invalid/i,
+		});
+		expect(loadButton).toBeInTheDocument();
+
+		// No <img> in the document may point at the external host.
+		expect(canvasElement.querySelector("img")).toBeNull();
+
+		// Clicking the placeholder opts in and renders the image.
+		await userEvent.click(loadButton);
+		await waitFor(() => {
+			const img = canvasElement.querySelector("img");
+			expect(img).not.toBeNull();
+			expect(img?.getAttribute("src")).toBe(externalImageURL);
+		});
+	},
+};
+
+// data: image sources are stripped by the sanitize plugin, so they
+// render as nothing: no <img>, no consent gate, no request.
+export const DataImageStrippedBySanitizer: Story = {
+	args: {
+		children: `Before\n\n![inline](${dataImagePNG})\n\nAfter`,
+	},
+	play: async ({ canvasElement }) => {
+		const canvas = within(canvasElement);
+		await canvas.findByText("After");
+		expect(canvasElement.querySelector("img")).toBeNull();
+		expect(canvas.queryByRole("button")).toBeNull();
+	},
+};
+
+// Deployment-relative images (for example emoji or uploaded icons)
+// are same-origin, so they render immediately without a consent gate.
+export const RelativeImageRendersImmediately: Story = {
+	args: {
+		children: "![emoji](/emojis/1f4bb.png)",
+	},
+	play: async ({ canvasElement }) => {
+		await waitFor(() => {
+			const img = canvasElement.querySelector("img");
+			expect(img).not.toBeNull();
+			expect(img?.getAttribute("src")).toBe("/emojis/1f4bb.png");
+		});
+		expect(within(canvasElement).queryByRole("button")).toBeNull();
+	},
+};
+
+// The consent gate must also apply while streaming.
+export const StreamingExternalImageConsentGate: Story = {
+	args: {
+		children: `![diagram](${externalImageURL})`,
+		streaming: true,
+	},
+	play: async ({ canvasElement }) => {
+		const canvas = within(canvasElement);
+		const loadButton = await canvas.findByRole("button", {
+			name: /load external image/i,
+		});
+		expect(loadButton).toBeInTheDocument();
+		expect(canvasElement.querySelector("img")).toBeNull();
+	},
+};
+
 // Verifies that streaming mode closes incomplete inline markdown via
 // remend so the user never sees raw syntax during the reveal animation.
 export const StreamingInlineMarkdown: Story = {

site/src/pages/AgentsPage/components/ChatElements/Response.tsx

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import {
 } from "streamdown";
 import { ScrollArea } from "#/components/ScrollArea/ScrollArea";
 import { cn } from "#/utils/cn";
+import { MarkdownImage } from "./MarkdownImage";
 
 interface ResponseProps extends Omit<ComponentPropsWithRef<"div">, "children"> {
 	children: string;
@@ -44,6 +45,8 @@ type HastNode = {
 
 type MarkdownComponentProps = {
 	href?: string;
+	src?: string;
+	alt?: string;
 	children?: ReactNode;
 	node?: HastNode;
 	type?: string;
@@ -184,6 +187,12 @@ const createComponents = (
 			);
 		},
 
+		// Gate externally hosted images behind viewer consent so
+		// rendering a chat never discloses the viewer's IP address
+		// to an attacker-controlled host (Cure53 CDM-02-006).
+		img: ({ src, alt }: MarkdownComponentProps) => (
+			<MarkdownImage src={src} alt={alt} />
+		),
 		// Horizontal rule: reset browser default inset/ridge border
 		// (preflight is disabled) to a clean 1px solid line.
 		hr: () => (

site/src/utils/externalImageSources.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import {
+	externalImageHost,
+	isExternalImageSource,
+} from "./externalImageSources";
+
+describe("isExternalImageSource", () => {
+	// jsdom serves tests from http://localhost/.
+	it.each([
+		["", false],
+		["   ", false],
+		["/emojis/1f4bb.png", false],
+		["relative/path.png", false],
+		["./relative.png", false],
+		["", false],
+		["blob:http://localhost/1234-5678", false],
+		[`${location.origin}/icon/aws.svg`, false],
+		["https://attacker.example.com/img.png", true],
+		["http://attacker.example.com/img.png", true],
+		["HTTPS://ATTACKER.EXAMPLE.COM/img.png", true],
+		["  https://attacker.example.com/img.png  ", true],
+		["//attacker.example.com/img.png", true],
+		["/\\attacker.example.com/img.png", true],
+		["\\\\attacker.example.com\\img.png", true],
+		["javascript:alert(1)", true],
+		["file:///etc/passwd", true],
+		["ftp://attacker.example.com/img.png", true],
+	])("isExternalImageSource(%j) === %j", (src, expected) => {
+		expect(isExternalImageSource(src)).toBe(expected);
+	});
+});
+
+describe("externalImageHost", () => {
+	it("returns the hostname for absolute URLs", () => {
+		expect(externalImageHost("https://cdn.example.com/a.png")).toBe(
+			"cdn.example.com",
+		);
+	});
+
+	it("returns undefined for unparsable sources", () => {
+		expect(externalImageHost("https://[")).toBeUndefined();
+	});
+});

site/src/utils/externalImageSources.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/**
+ * Classifies image sources rendered from untrusted content (for
+ * example LLM-generated chat markdown). Fetching an external source
+ * discloses the viewer's IP address to that host (Cure53 CDM-02-006),
+ * so callers must not render one without explicit viewer consent.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Returns true when loading `src` in an <img> would issue a request
+ * to a host other than the current deployment. Unparsable sources are
+ * treated as external so the failure mode is "blocked", never
+ * "leaked".
+ */
+export const isExternalImageSource = (src: string): boolean => {
+	// Browsers treat backslashes in http(s) URLs as slashes, so
+	// "/\evil.com" navigates to "//evil.com". Treat any backslash as
+	// external rather than trying to mirror WHATWG parsing quirks.
+	if (src.includes("\\")) {
+		return true;
+	}
+	let parsed: URL;
+	try {
+		parsed = new URL(src, location.origin);
+	} catch {
+		return true;
+	}
+	switch (parsed.protocol) {
+		case "data:":
+		case "blob:":
+			return false;
+		case "http:":
+		case "https:":
+			return parsed.origin !== location.origin;
+		default:
+			// javascript:, file:, ftp:, and anything else is never a
+			// safe image source.
+			return true;
+	}
+};
+
+/** Hostname shown in the consent placeholder, if determinable. */
+export const externalImageHost = (src: string): string | undefined => {
+	try {
+		const host = new URL(src, location.origin).hostname;
+		return host === "" ? undefined : host;
+	} catch {
+		return undefined;
+	}
+};