Files
teleport/lib/auth/saml.go
T
Roman Tkachenko 143b834e57 Changes for the upcoming teleport pro:
* Allow external audit log plugins
* Add support for auth API server plugins
* Add license file path configuration parameter (not used in open-source)
* Extend audit log with user login events
2017-11-21 17:35:58 -08:00

363 lines
12 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"bytes"
"compress/flate"
"encoding/base64"
"io/ioutil"
"time"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/defaults"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/events"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/services"
"github.com/gravitational/teleport/lib/utils"
"github.com/beevik/etree"
"github.com/gravitational/trace"
saml2 "github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
func (s *AuthServer) UpsertSAMLConnector(connector services.SAMLConnector) error {
return s.Identity.UpsertSAMLConnector(connector)
}
func (s *AuthServer) DeleteSAMLConnector(connectorName string) error {
return s.Identity.DeleteSAMLConnector(connectorName)
}
func (s *AuthServer) CreateSAMLAuthRequest(req services.SAMLAuthRequest) (*services.SAMLAuthRequest, error) {
connector, err := s.Identity.GetSAMLConnector(req.ConnectorID, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
provider, err := s.getSAMLProvider(connector)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
doc, err := provider.BuildAuthRequestDocument()
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
attr := doc.Root().SelectAttr("ID")
if attr == nil || attr.Value == "" {
return nil, trace.BadParameter("missing auth request ID")
}
req.ID = attr.Value
req.RedirectURL, err = provider.BuildAuthURLFromDocument("", doc)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
err = s.Identity.CreateSAMLAuthRequest(req, defaults.SAMLAuthRequestTTL)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
return &req, nil
}
func (s *AuthServer) getSAMLProvider(conn services.SAMLConnector) (*saml2.SAMLServiceProvider, error) {
s.lock.Lock()
defer s.lock.Unlock()
providerPack, ok := s.samlProviders[conn.GetName()]
if ok && providerPack.connector.Equals(conn) {
return providerPack.provider, nil
}
delete(s.samlProviders, conn.GetName())
serviceProvider, err := conn.GetServiceProvider(s.clock)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
s.samlProviders[conn.GetName()] = &samlProvider{connector: conn, provider: serviceProvider}
return serviceProvider, nil
}
// buildSAMLRoles takes a connector and claims and returns a slice of roles. If the claims
// match a concrete roles in the connector, those roles are returned directly. If the
// claims match a template role in the connector, then that role is first created from
// the template, then returned.
func (a *AuthServer) buildSAMLRoles(connector services.SAMLConnector, assertionInfo saml2.AssertionInfo, expiresAt time.Time) ([]string, error) {
roles := connector.MapAttributes(assertionInfo)
if len(roles) == 0 {
role, err := connector.RoleFromTemplate(assertionInfo)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("[SAML] Unable to map claims to roles or role templates for %q: %v", connector.GetName(), err)
return nil, trace.AccessDenied("unable to map claims to roles or role templates for %q: %v", connector.GetName(), err)
}
// figure out ttl for role. expires = now + ttl => ttl = expires - now
ttl := expiresAt.Sub(a.clock.Now())
// upsert templated role
err = a.Access.UpsertRole(role, ttl)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("[SAML] Unable to upsert templated role for connector: %q: %v", connector.GetName(), err)
return nil, trace.AccessDenied("unable to upsert templated role: %q: %v", connector.GetName(), err)
}
roles = []string{role.GetName()}
}
return roles, nil
}
// assertionsToTraitMap extracts all string assertions and creates a map of traits
// that can be used to populate role variables.
func assertionsToTraitMap(assertionInfo saml2.AssertionInfo) map[string][]string {
traits := make(map[string][]string)
for _, assr := range assertionInfo.Values {
var vals []string
for _, value := range assr.Values {
vals = append(vals, value.Value)
}
traits[assr.Name] = vals
}
return traits
}
func (a *AuthServer) createSAMLUser(connector services.SAMLConnector, assertionInfo saml2.AssertionInfo, expiresAt time.Time) error {
roles, err := a.buildSAMLRoles(connector, assertionInfo, expiresAt)
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
traits := assertionsToTraitMap(assertionInfo)
log.Debugf("[SAML] Generating dynamic identity %v/%v with roles: %v", connector.GetName(), assertionInfo.NameID, roles)
user, err := services.GetUserMarshaler().GenerateUser(&services.UserV2{
Kind: services.KindUser,
Version: services.V2,
Metadata: services.Metadata{
Name: assertionInfo.NameID,
Namespace: defaults.Namespace,
},
Spec: services.UserSpecV2{
Roles: roles,
Traits: traits,
Expires: expiresAt,
SAMLIdentities: []services.ExternalIdentity{{ConnectorID: connector.GetName(), Username: assertionInfo.NameID}},
CreatedBy: services.CreatedBy{
User: services.UserRef{Name: "system"},
Time: time.Now().UTC(),
Connector: &services.ConnectorRef{
Type: teleport.ConnectorSAML,
ID: connector.GetName(),
Identity: assertionInfo.NameID,
},
},
},
})
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
// check if a user exists already
existingUser, err := a.GetUser(assertionInfo.NameID)
if err != nil {
if !trace.IsNotFound(err) {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
}
// check if exisiting user is a non-saml user, if so, return an error
if existingUser != nil {
connectorRef := existingUser.GetCreatedBy().Connector
if connectorRef == nil || connectorRef.Type != teleport.ConnectorSAML || connectorRef.ID != connector.GetName() {
return trace.AlreadyExists("user %q already exists and is not SAML user", existingUser.GetName())
}
}
// no non-saml user exists, create or update the exisiting saml user
err = a.UpsertUser(user)
if err != nil {
return trace.Wrap(err)
}
return nil
}
func parseSAMLInResponseTo(response string) (string, error) {
raw, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(response)
doc := etree.NewDocument()
err := doc.ReadFromBytes(raw)
if err != nil {
// Attempt to inflate the response in case it happens to be compressed (as with one case at saml.oktadev.com)
buf, err := ioutil.ReadAll(flate.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(raw)))
if err != nil {
return "", trace.Wrap(err)
}
doc = etree.NewDocument()
err = doc.ReadFromBytes(buf)
if err != nil {
return "", trace.Wrap(err)
}
}
if doc.Root() == nil {
return "", trace.BadParameter("unable to parse response")
}
// teleport only supports sending party initiated flows (Teleport sends an
// AuthnRequest to the IdP and gets a SAMLResponse from the IdP). identity
// provider initiated flows (where Teleport gets an unsolicited SAMLResponse
// from the IdP) are not supported.
el := doc.Root()
responseTo := el.SelectAttr("InResponseTo")
if responseTo == nil {
log.Errorf("[SAML] Teleport does not support initiating login from an identity provider, login must be initiated from either the Teleport Web UI or CLI.")
return "", trace.BadParameter("identity provider initiated flows are not supported")
}
if responseTo.Value == "" {
return "", trace.BadParameter("InResponseTo can not be empty")
}
return responseTo.Value, nil
}
// SAMLAuthResponse is returned when auth server validated callback parameters
// returned from SAML identity provider
type SAMLAuthResponse struct {
// Username is authenticated teleport username
Username string `json:"username"`
// Identity contains validated SAML identity
Identity services.ExternalIdentity `json:"identity"`
// Web session will be generated by auth server if requested in SAMLAuthRequest
Session services.WebSession `json:"session,omitempty"`
// Cert will be generated by certificate authority
Cert []byte `json:"cert,omitempty"`
// Req is original SAML auth request
Req services.SAMLAuthRequest `json:"req"`
// HostSigners is a list of signing host public keys
// trusted by proxy, used in console login
HostSigners []services.CertAuthority `json:"host_signers"`
}
// ValidateSAMLResponse consumes attribute statements from SAML identity provider
func (a *AuthServer) ValidateSAMLResponse(samlResponse string) (*SAMLAuthResponse, error) {
requestID, err := parseSAMLInResponseTo(samlResponse)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
request, err := a.Identity.GetSAMLAuthRequest(requestID)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
connector, err := a.Identity.GetSAMLConnector(request.ConnectorID, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
provider, err := a.getSAMLProvider(connector)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
assertionInfo, err := provider.RetrieveAssertionInfo(samlResponse)
if err != nil {
log.Warningf("SAML error: %v", err)
return nil, trace.AccessDenied("bad SAML response")
}
if assertionInfo.WarningInfo.InvalidTime {
log.Warningf("SAML error, invalid time")
return nil, trace.AccessDenied("bad SAML response")
}
if assertionInfo.WarningInfo.NotInAudience {
log.Warningf("SAML error, not in audience")
return nil, trace.AccessDenied("bad SAML response")
}
log.Debugf("[SAML] Obtained Assertions for %q", assertionInfo.NameID)
for key, val := range assertionInfo.Values {
var vals []string
for _, vv := range val.Values {
vals = append(vals, vv.Value)
}
log.Debugf("[SAML] Assertion: %q: %q", key, vals)
}
log.Debugf("[SAML] Assertion Warnings: %+v", assertionInfo.WarningInfo)
log.Debugf("[SAML] Applying %v claims to roles mappings", len(connector.GetAttributesToRoles()))
if len(connector.GetAttributesToRoles()) == 0 {
return nil, trace.BadParameter("SAML does not support binding to local users")
}
// TODO(klizhentas) use SessionNotOnOrAfter to calculate expiration time
expiresAt := a.clock.Now().Add(defaults.CertDuration)
if err := a.createSAMLUser(connector, *assertionInfo, expiresAt); err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
identity := services.ExternalIdentity{
ConnectorID: request.ConnectorID,
Username: assertionInfo.NameID,
}
user, err := a.Identity.GetUserBySAMLIdentity(identity)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
response := &SAMLAuthResponse{
Req: *request,
Identity: identity,
Username: user.GetName(),
}
var roles services.RoleSet
roles, err = services.FetchRoles(user.GetRoles(), a.Access, user.GetTraits())
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
sessionTTL := roles.AdjustSessionTTL(utils.ToTTL(a.clock, expiresAt))
bearerTokenTTL := utils.MinTTL(BearerTokenTTL, sessionTTL)
if request.CreateWebSession {
sess, err := a.NewWebSession(user.GetName())
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
// session will expire based on identity TTL and allowed session TTL
sess.SetExpiryTime(a.clock.Now().UTC().Add(sessionTTL))
// bearer token will expire based on the expected session renewal
sess.SetBearerTokenExpiryTime(a.clock.Now().UTC().Add(bearerTokenTTL))
if err := a.UpsertWebSession(user.GetName(), sess); err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
response.Session = sess
}
if len(request.PublicKey) != 0 {
certTTL := utils.MinTTL(sessionTTL, request.CertTTL)
allowedLogins, err := roles.CheckLoginDuration(roles.AdjustSessionTTL(certTTL))
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
cert, err := a.GenerateUserCert(request.PublicKey, user, allowedLogins, certTTL, roles.CanForwardAgents(), request.Compatibility)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
response.Cert = cert
authorities, err := a.GetCertAuthorities(services.HostCA, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, trace.Wrap(err)
}
for _, authority := range authorities {
response.HostSigners = append(response.HostSigners, authority)
}
}
a.EmitAuditEvent(events.UserLoginEvent, events.EventFields{
events.EventUser: user.GetName(),
events.LoginMethod: events.LoginMethodSAML,
})
return response, nil
}