* Add type for GitLab ProvisionToken
* Add default behaviour for domain
* Add IDTokenClaims for GitLab
* Add gitlab token source and token validator
* Thread GitLab support through auth and tbot packages
* Adjust cluster name fetching in token validator
* Initialize GitLab token validator in auth
* Improve comment on `sub`
* Working GitLab CI delegated joining
* Add additional token rule fields
* Add checking for new configuration fields
* add additional test cases for validation of gitlab config struct
* Add TestAuth_RegisterUsingToken_GitLab
* Add tests for IDTokenSource
* Fix imports
* Add tests for GitLab Token Validator
* Fix some comments that were incomplete
* Add license headers
* Use `ctx` rather than `context.TODO()` where available
* Further propagation of context
* Use `context.Background()` instead of `context.TODO()` where appropriate in tests
* Further remove `context.TODO` from tests
* Appease linter on parameter order
Proxy already has a `gRPC` server when using the `teleport-proxy-grpc` ALPN protocol. Still, that server does not impose mTLS auth since it's used by nodes when joining the cluster with dynamic joining methods.
Since we require that the user identity is available in the handler, this PR introduces a new gRPC server that imposes mTLS under the ALPN protocol `teleport-proxy-gprc-mtls`.
Part of #20324
Related to #19573
This commit adds a new joinMethod as described in https://github.com/gravitational/teleport/pull/17905
This method allow pods running in the same Kubernetes cluster than the auth servers to join the Teleport cluster. It relies on Kubernetes tokens to establish trust. The goal is to be able to deploy proxies and auths separately and join them in a single cluser.
Pre Kubernetes 1.20, the tokens are static, long-lived, not bound to pods. We support them for compatibility reasons. Starting with Kubernetes 1.20, tokens are bound to pods (and starting with 1.21 they can be mounted through projected volumes). Starting with 1.21 we should only accept bound tokens. The chart will ensure tokens are properly mounted with projected volumes so we can benefit from the 1h to 10min token lifetime.
* Add API types for CircleCI joining
* Add validation for CircleCI configuration
* Add JoinMethodCircleCI across codebase
* Add token validator and token source for circleci
* Update join methods RFD
* Add CircleCI token source to register.go
* Add serverside support for circleci joining
* Add test for TokenSource
* Add success case for token validation test
* Add expired test case
* Add test case for token from another org
* Test RegisterWithToken for CircleCI
* Refactor GitHub RegisterUsingToken tests
* Refactor CircleCI RegisterUsingToken tests
* Add tests for ProvisionTokenSpecV2
* Appease linters
* Go Imports files
* Fix failing test for msising IDtoken
* Update lib/auth/join_circleci.go
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zac.bergquist@goteleport.com>
* Move test server cleanup closer to initialisation
* Fix weird import reordering
* Include unexpected type in error message
* Simplify boolean algebra :)
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zac.bergquist@goteleport.com>
clients close the stream and any connection when they are done with it
servers close the stream after a 1 minute timeout
proxy JoinService gRPC server closes idle connections with no RPC calls after 10 seconds
* Introduce Github Actions join support
* Go mod tidy
* run goimports on source files
* Address PR comments
* More PR review comments
* Changes to tests based on PR feedback
* Improve error message in github rule validation
* Add support for SHA
* Add short message describing which fields shouldb be included
* Add client side circuit breaker to auth clients
In order to apply back pressure we can utilize a circuit breaker that
monitors error responses from auth server. When tripped it will prevent
all outbound requests to auth for a period of time. This can also help
prevent a potential thundering heard when auth is in an unhealthy state.
By default the circuit breaker will only be tripped if 90% of the
requests made in the monitoring interval fail.
* convert GetDomainNAme endpoint to gRPC
* migrate GetClusterCACert from http to grpc
* fix tests failing due to switch to gRPC transport
* Correct mispelt json tag
* remove `GetLocalClusterName` and `UpsertLocalClusterName` which are unused
* remove unused prefix constant from presence
* Optionally provide ca_pin as a file path
* Fix lint errors
* Test CA pin reads from file and from string
* Simplify ApplyCAPins
* Update lib/service/cfg.go
Co-authored-by: Alan Parra <alan.parra@goteleport.com>
* Update lib/utils/utils_test.go
Co-authored-by: Alan Parra <alan.parra@goteleport.com>
* Move length check into ApplyCAPins
* Rename token.go to config.go
* Add test for statictoken parsing
* Refactor token parsing test
* Error on empty ca_pin file
* Warn if config value is a path to an empty file
* Update lib/config/fileconf_test.go
Co-authored-by: Alan Parra <alan.parra@goteleport.com>
* Log empty file warning instead of printing
* Allow multiple entries in files referenced by config values
* Update static token parsing test
* Test reading multiple tokens/pins from a file referenced by a config
* Update lib/config/fileconf.go
Co-authored-by: Alan Parra <alan.parra@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Alan Parra <alan.parra@goteleport.com>
* Add certificate renewal bot
This adds a new `tbot` tool to continuously renew a set of
certificates after registering with a Teleport cluster using a
similar process to standard node joining.
This makes some modifications to user certificate generation to allow
for certificates that can be renewed beyond their original TTL, and
exposes new gRPC endpoints:
* `CreateBotJoinToken` creates a join token for a bot user
* `GenerateInitialRenewableUserCerts` exchanges a token for a set of
certificates with a new `renewable` flag set
A new `tctl` command, `tctl bots add`, creates a bot user and calls
`CreateBotJoinToken` to issue a token. A bot instance can then be
started using a provided command.
* Cert bot refactoring pass
* Use role requests to split renewable certs from end-user certs
* Add bot configuration file
* Use `teleport.dev/bot` label
* Remove `impersonator` flag on initial bot certs
* Remove unnecessary `renew` package
* Misc other cleanup
* Do not pass through `renewable` flag when role requests are set
This adds additional restrictions on when a certificate's `renewable`
flag is carried over to a new certificate. In particular, it now also
denies the flag when either role requests are present, or the
`disallowReissue` flag has been previously set.
In practice `disallow-reissue` would have prevented any undesired
behavior but this improves consistency and resolves a TODO.
* Various tbot UX improvements; render SSH config
* Fully flesh out config template rendering
* Fix rendering for SSH configuration templates
* Added `String()` impls for destination types
* Improve certificate renewal logging; show more detail
* Properly fall back to default (all) roles
* Add mode hints for files
* Add/update copyright headers
* Add stubs for tbot init and watch commands
* Add gRPC endpoints for managing bots
* Add `CreateBot`, `DeleteBot`, and `GetBotUsers` gRPC endpoints
* Replace `tctl bot (add|rm|ls)` implementations with gRPC calls
* Define a few new constants, `DefaultBotJoinTTL`, `BotLabel`,
`BotGenerationLabel`
* Fix outdated destination flag in example tbot command
* Bugfix pass for demo
* Fixed a few nil pointer derefs when using config from CLI args
* Properly create destination if `--destination-dir` flag is used
* Remove improper default on CLI flag
* `DestinationConfig` is now a list of pointers
* Address first wave of review feedback
Fixes the majority of smaller issues caught by reviewers, thanks all!
* Add doc comments for bot.go functions
* Return the token TTL from CreateBot
* Split initial user cert issuance from `generateUserCerts()`
Issuing initial renewable certificate ended up requiring a lot of
hacks to skip checks that prevented anonymous bots from getting
certs even though we'd verified their identity elsewhere (via token).
This reverts all those hacks and splits initial bot cert logic into a
dedicated `generateInitialRenewableUserCerts()` function which should
make the whole process much easier to follow.
* Set bot traits to silence log messages
* tbot log message consistency pass
* Resolve lints
* Add config tests
* Remove CreateBotJoinToken endpoint
Users should instead use the CreateBot/DeleteBot endpoints.
* Create a fresh private key for every impersonated identity renewal
* Hide `config` subcommand
* Rename bot label prefix to `teleport.internal/`
* Use types.NewRole() to create bot roles
* Clean up error handling in custom YAML unmarshallers
Also, add notes about the supported YAML shapes.
* Fetch proxy host via gRPC Ping() instead of GetProxies()
* Update lib/auth/bot.go
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix some review comments
* Add renewable certificate generation checks (#10098)
* Add renewable certificate generation checks
This adds a new validation check for renewable certificates that
maintains a renewal counter as both a certificate extension and a
user label. This counter is used to ensure only a single certificate
lineage can exist: for example, if a renewable certificate is stolen,
only one copy of the certificate can be renewed as the generation
counter will not match
When renewing a certificate, first the generation counter presented
by the user (via their TLS identity) is compared to a value stored
with the associated user (in a new `teleport.dev/bot-generation`
label field). If they aren't equal, the renewal attempt fails.
Otherwise, the generation counter is incremented by 1, stored to the
database using a `CompareAndSwap()` to ensure atomicity, and set on
the generated certificate for use in future renewals.
* Add unit tests for the generation counter
This adds new unit tests to exercise the generation counter checks.
Additionally, it fixes two other renewable cert tests that were
failing.
* Remove certRequestGeneration() function
* Emit audit event when cert generations don't match
* Fully implement `tctl bots lock`
* Show bot name in `tctl bots ls`
* Lock bots when a cert generation mismatch is found
* Make CompareFailed respones from validateGenerationLabel() more actionable
* Update lib/services/local/users.go
Co-authored-by: Nic Klaassen <nic@goteleport.com>
* Backend changes for tbot IoT and AWS joining (#10360)
* backend changes
* add token permission check
* pass ctx from caller
Co-authored-by: Roman Tkachenko <roman@goteleport.com>
* fix comment typo
Co-authored-by: Roman Tkachenko <roman@goteleport.com>
* use UserMetadata instead of Identity in RenewableCertificateGenerationMismatch event
* Client changes for tbot IoT joining (#10397)
* client changes
* delete replaced APIs
* delete unused tbot/auth.go
* add license header
* don't unecessarily fetch host CA
* log fixes
* s/tunnelling/tunneling/
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
* auth server addresses may be proxies
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
* comment typo fix
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
* move *Server methods out of auth_with_roles.go (#10416)
Co-authored-by: Tim Buckley <tim@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Tim Buckley <tim@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Roman Tkachenko <roman@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Tim Buckley <tim@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Nic Klaassen <nic@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Roman Tkachenko <roman@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
* Address another batch of review feedback
* Addres another batch of review feedback
Add `Role.SetMetadata()`, simplify more `trace.WrapWithMessage()`
calls, clear some TODOs and lints, and address other misc feedback
items.
* Fix lint
* Add missing doc comments to SaveIdentity / LoadIdentity
* Remove pam tag from tbot build
* Update note about bot lock deletion
* Another pass of review feedback
Ensure all requestable roles exist when creating a bot, adjust the
default renewable cert TTL down to 1 hour, and check types during
`CompareAndSwapUser()`
Co-authored-by: Zac Bergquist <zmb3@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Nic Klaassen <nic@goteleport.com>
Co-authored-by: Roman Tkachenko <roman@goteleport.com>
In Teleport 8 we migrated all uses of this API to GRPC, but left
the JSON API in place so that Teleport 7 nodes could still join
the cluster.
In Teleport 9, the oldest nodes we support are v8, which use the
GRPC API, so we can safely remove the old API.
This commit contains 2 changes:
1. Rename GenerateServerKeys to GenerateHostCerts.
This is a more accurate name and consistent with the existing
GenerateUserCerts endpoint.
2. Change the request type to include a single role, rather than a
list of roles. We only ever allowed a single role in the list
anyway, so this change will prevent future mis-use of the API.
Note: a side effect of this change is we now have two similar endpoints:
- GenerateHostCert: old API that generates SSH cert only
- GenerateHostCerts: a newer API that generates SSH and TLS certs
To avoid making this change too big, we'll aim to deprecate
GenerateHostCert in the future.
* Require that public TLS and SSH keys are provided to register via token
The original behavior attempted to make providing public keys optional,
and would generate keys if they were not provided. This had several
problems:
- The auth server is generating private keys for nodes and is
potentially able to share them over the network.
- The return value for keys.Key would sometimes be set and sometimes
be empty (the key is only set if the auth server generated it and
knows what the key is)
- We only ever relied on this behavior as a shortcut in test code.
In the production code this behavior was never used (and actually
never worked due to a bug that would overwrite and discard the
generated private key)
This commit requires that public keys are always provided, ensuring
that the private key is generated locally and never known by the
auth server.
It also results in a cleaner error message when either or both of the
public keys are missing from the request.
* Address review comments
* Fix tests that relied on certs being generated
The logic of `auth.Register` is adapted so that it attempts the proxy mode connection first in case the first of the auth servers to register with has port `defaults.HTTPListenPort` (= 3080).
The node first tries using the token with auth server. If that fails, it
tries the same address as a proxy server.
If both fail, user only sees the error from the latter attempt. If using
CA pin, this error will be "x509: certificate signed by unknown
authority", which is confusing.
Log both errors, and mention that a fallback is happening. The output
looks like:
ERRO [AUTH] Failed to register through auth server: "my-hostname" [3e53a982-afd1-4d2f-8864-54c25fbe5865] can not join the cluster with role Node, the token is not valid; falling back to trying the proxy server auth/register.go:123
ERRO [PROC:1] Node failed to establish connection to cluster: failed to register through proxy server: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority. time/sleep.go:149
Noah Stride