* Move the authorizer into its own package.
The Authorizer and associated functions and constants have been moved into
their own package `authz`. This will allow us to more easily create separate
services for gRPC functionality so that we're not pushing as much into the
`lib/auth` package.
Though this PR is large, the only actual code change here is making
`ContextForLocalUser` exported and changing the `permissions_test.go` so that
it doesn't rely on the `lib/auth` package.
* Use context functions.
* Test and linting fixes.
* Add in a temporary alias file to ensure e still compiles.
* Use functions instead of var aliases for performance reasons.
* Adding in godocs, cleaning up tests.
* Fix tests.
* Add a few more aliases.
`auth.Middleware` to make use of them. This allows for less redundancy
per RPC and provides the ability to perform session control when grpc
connections are established.
The `auth.Middleware.withAuthenticatedUser` function was called from all
interceptors of any gRPC server that leveraged `auth.Middleware`. This
was constructing the identity of the client from the TLS certificate
per RPC. Since the identity of a connection cannot change between RPCs
there is no need to construct the identity in an interceptor. Instead,
the new `auth.TransportCredentials` can build the identity once after the
TLS handshake completes. When interceptors or gRPC handlers need to
acquire the identity they can do so using the same
mechanism via `peer.Peer.AuthInfo` and assert on the new `auth.IdentityInfo`
type:
```go
peerInfo, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return
}
connInfo, ok := peerInfo.AuthInfo.(auth.IdentityInfo)
if !ok {
return
}
identity := connInfo.IdentityGetter.GetIdentity()
connState := connInfo.TLSInfo.State
```
The gRPC server that is served on the Proxy ssh port needs to hold the
same invariants as the ssh server available on the same port. This
means that connection limits need to be enforced when new connections
are established. To achieve this the new `auth.TransportCredentials` can
be provided with an `auth.ConnectionEnforcer` and an `auth.Authorizer`
to first build an identity, then ensures that the user is authorized and
finally that the user has not exceeded their connection limits.
Other minor changes include providing the cluster name to the
`auth.Middleware` instead of it looking the value up from the cache every
time an identity is created. Some interceptors were also moved around or
removed to eliminate the chances of having duplicate interceptors end up in
the interceptor chain.
Part of #19812
WrapContextWithUser has been split into two functions that allows for using
the TLS connection state logic without having an actual TLS connection. This
will be used by the SAML IdP logic to wrap the user context information into
the request context.
This change has several parts: cluster registration, cache updates,
routing and a new tctl flag.
> cluster registration
Cluster registration means adding `KubernetesClusters` to `ServerSpec`
for servers with `KindKubeService`.
`kubernetes_service` instances will parse their kubeconfig or local
`kube_cluster_name` and add them to their `ServerSpec` sent to the auth
server. They are effectively declaring that "I can serve k8s requests
for k8s cluster X".
> cache updates
This is just cache plumbing for `kubernetes_service` presence, so that
other teleport processes can fetch all of kube services. It was missed
in the previous PR implementing CRUD for `kubernetes_service`.
> routing
Now the fun part - routing logic. This logic lives in
`/lib/kube/proxy/forwarder.go` and is shared by both `proxy_service`
(with kubernetes integration enabled) and `kubernetes_service`.
The target k8s cluster name is passed in the client cert, along with k8s
users/groups information.
`kubernetes_service` only serves requests for its direct k8s cluster
(from `Forwarder.creds`) and doesn't route requests to other teleport
instances.
`proxy_service` can serve requests:
- directly to a k8s cluster (the way it works pre-5.0)
- to a leaf teleport cluster (also same as pre-5.0, based on
`RouteToCluster` field in the client cert)
- to a `kubernetes_service` (directly or over a tunnel)
The last two modes require the proxy to generate an ephemeral client TLS
cert to do an outbound mTLS connection.
> tctl flag
A flag `--kube-cluster-name` for `tctl auth sign --format=kubernetes`
which allows generating client certs for non-default k8s cluster name
(as long as it's registered in a cluster).
I used this for testing, but it could be used for automation too.