Files
sim/packages/security/src/encryption.ts
T
5f0f0edd63 improvement(repo): separate realtime into separate app (#4262)
* improvement(repo): restructuring to make realtime image narrower scoped

* improvements

* chore(repo): rebase fixes and quality improvements for realtime split

Addresses merge-time issues and gaps from the realtime app split:
- Retarget stale vi.mock paths to @sim/workflow-persistence/subblocks
- Restore README branding, fix AGENTS.md script reference
- Restore TSDoc on workflow-persistence subblocks helpers
- Use toError() from @sim/utils/errors in save.ts
- Add vitest config + local mocks so @sim/audit tests run standalone
- Move socket.io-client to devDependencies in apps/realtime
- Add missing package COPY steps to docker/app.Dockerfile
- Add check:boundaries/check:realtime-prune scripts and wire into CI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(security): consolidate crypto primitives into @sim/security

Move general-purpose crypto primitives out of apps/sim into the
@sim/security package so both apps/sim and apps/realtime can share them.

@sim/security exports (all pure, dependency-free):
  ./compare    safeCompare (constant-time HMAC-wrapped equality)
  ./encryption encrypt/decrypt (AES-256-GCM, iv:cipher:tag format)
  ./hash       sha256Hex
  ./tokens     generateSecureToken (base64url)

Migrate apps/sim call sites to use these + @sim/utils helpers:
  crypto.randomUUID()            -> generateId() from @sim/utils/id
  createHash('sha256').digest    -> sha256Hex
  timingSafeEqual on hashed hex  -> safeCompare
  new Promise(setTimeout)        -> sleep from @sim/utils/helpers

No behavior change: encryption format, digest output, and token
length are preserved exactly.

* refactor(copilot): use toError in remaining otel/finalize sites

Replace the last two `error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))`
patterns with toError from @sim/utils/errors. Completes the sweep of clean
candidates — no behavior change.

* refactor(security): consolidate HMAC-SHA256 primitives into @sim/security

Adds hmacSha256Hex and hmacSha256Base64 to @sim/security/hmac and migrates
15 webhook providers plus 5 other hot paths (deployment token signing,
outbound webhook requests, workspace notification delivery, notification
test route, Shopify OAuth callback) off bare `createHmac` calls. Secret
parameter accepts `string | Buffer` to cover base64-decoded Svix-style
secrets (Resend) and MS Teams' HMAC scheme. AWS SigV4 signing in S3 and
Textract tools intentionally retains direct `createHmac` usage — its
multi-step key derivation chain doesn't fit a generic helper.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(packages): post-audit test + packaging polish

- Add safeCompare unit tests (identity, length mismatch, hex-nibble diff).
- Add Buffer-secret cases to hmac tests to lock in Svix/MS-Teams contract.
- Declare `reactflow` as a peerDependency on @sim/workflow-types — only used for type imports.
- Add a barrel export to @sim/workflow-persistence for consumers that prefer package-level imports; subpath exports retained.
- Document the data-field invariant in load.ts for loop/parallel subflow patching.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(realtime): address PR review feedback

- Remove redundant SOCKET_PORT=3002 env from Dockerfile runner stage
  (env.PORT already defaults to 3002 via zod schema).
- Reorder PORT fallback so an explicitly-set SOCKET_PORT wins over
  the schema default for PORT; keeps SOCKET_PORT functional as an
  override instead of dead code.
- Add dedicated type-check CI step for @sim/realtime so TS errors
  surface pre-deploy (the Dockerfile runs source TS via Bun and has
  no implicit build-time type check).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(realtime): remove unused SOCKET_PORT env var

SOCKET_PORT has lived in the socket server since the June 2025 refactor
but was never actually set in any deploy config — docker-compose.prod,
helm values/templates, .env.example, and docs all use PORT or the 3002
default exclusively. No self-hoster was ever pointed at SOCKET_PORT, so
removing it is safe.

Simplifies realtime port resolution to `env.PORT` (zod-validated with a
3002 default) and drops the orphaned sim-side schema entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Waleed Latif <walif6@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-22 23:06:16 -07:00

69 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
/**
* AES-256-GCM encryption primitive. Produces a self-contained string in the
* format `iv:ciphertext:authTag` (all hex-encoded) that can be stored and
* later passed directly to {@link decrypt}.
*
* @param plaintext - UTF-8 string to encrypt
* @param key - 32-byte encryption key
*/
export async function encrypt(
plaintext: string,
key: Buffer
): Promise<{ encrypted: string; iv: string }> {
assertKey(key)
const iv = randomBytes(16)
const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv, { authTagLength: 16 })
let encrypted = cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8', 'hex')
encrypted += cipher.final('hex')
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag()
const ivHex = iv.toString('hex')
return {
encrypted: `${ivHex}:${encrypted}:${authTag.toString('hex')}`,
iv: ivHex,
}
}
/**
* AES-256-GCM decryption primitive. Expects input produced by {@link encrypt}
* in the format `iv:ciphertext:authTag`. Throws when the format is malformed
* or when the GCM auth tag does not verify (tampered ciphertext, wrong key).
*/
export async function decrypt(encryptedValue: string, key: Buffer): Promise<{ decrypted: string }> {
assertKey(key)
const parts = encryptedValue.split(':')
if (parts.length < 3) {
throw new Error('Invalid encrypted value format. Expected "iv:encrypted:authTag"')
}
const ivHex = parts[0]
const authTagHex = parts[parts.length - 1]
const encrypted = parts.slice(1, -1).join(':')
if (!ivHex || !authTagHex) {
throw new Error('Invalid encrypted value format. Expected "iv:encrypted:authTag"')
}
const iv = Buffer.from(ivHex, 'hex')
const authTag = Buffer.from(authTagHex, 'hex')
const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', key, iv, { authTagLength: 16 })
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag)
let decrypted = decipher.update(encrypted, 'hex', 'utf8')
decrypted += decipher.final('utf8')
return { decrypted }
}
function assertKey(key: Buffer): void {
if (key.length !== 32) {
throw new Error('Encryption key must be 32 bytes (256 bits)')
}
}