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Theodore LiandClaude Opus 5
8348592d38
* fix(copilot): make tool write gates fail closed The three handler-map management tools (manage_custom_tool, manage_mcp_tool, manage_skill) gated writes with `context.userPermission && perm !== 'write' && perm !== 'admin'`. userPermission is optional on the execution context, so an absent value skipped the check entirely and the write proceeded unguarded — while the server-tool router's equivalent gate is fail-closed. Both paths now share copilotToolCanWrite, built on the canonical permissionSatisfies (null/undefined never satisfies). manage_custom_tool additionally resolved its target as `params.workspaceId || context.workspaceId`, so a model-supplied workspace id won while the permission check was resolved for the context workspace — and upsertCustomTools performs no authz of its own. It now uses the server-set context only, matching its two siblings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(copilot): gate materialize_file writes and enforce the deploy mutation lock materialize_file's save/extract/import all create workspace resources, but the handler-map path has no central permission check, so a read-only member could create files and workflows through the agent. Gate on write access after param validation. assertWorkflowMutable moves into performFullDeploy / performFullUndeploy / performActivateVersion, where performRevertToVersion already had it. The check previously lived only in the deploy routes, so the copilot deploy tools — which call the orchestration functions directly — could deploy, undeploy, and activate versions of a locked workflow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(copilot): enforce secret-admin on env writes and gate KB indexing on usage Two more paths where the agent is a weaker route to the same write than the UI. upsertWorkspaceEnvVars was a weakened copy of the environment route's write: no per-key secret-admin check, no advisory lock, no audit row. Its only caller is the set_environment_variables copilot tool, which gates on workspace 'write' alone — so any write-level member could have the agent overwrite a workspace secret they do not administer, with nothing in the audit log and a lost-update race against the route's locked transaction. The gate now lives in the function so every caller inherits it, reusing getWorkspaceEnvKeyAdminAccess rather than restating the route's logic. knowledge_base add_file computed a billing attribution and then indexed without calling checkAttributedUsageLimits, which every upload route applies before accepting indexing work — an over-quota workspace could index without limit through the agent. The same file's query operation already gated correctly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(copilot): return lock denials and stop bootstrapping a legacy secret's ACL Two defects in the previous commits, both found by review. assertWorkflowMutable throws, and the three orchestration entry points awaited it outside any try/catch, so a locked workflow escaped as an exception instead of the { success: false } result the callers consume — performChatDeploy and the copilot deploy tools would have surfaced a generic 500 rather than a lock denial. performRevertToVersion already converted it; the three now do too, through a shared helper. upsertWorkspaceEnvVars derived newKeys for createWorkspaceEnvCredentials from the credential rows rather than the stored variables. A secret written before credential rows existed has no ACL, so overwriting it looked like adding a new key: it minted a credential and made the caller that secret's admin. The environment route derives newKeys from the locked jsonb read for exactly this reason, and now so does this. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style(env): collapse the merged test import onto one line Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PCXbU36FwJBmtJKaH83BUm * fix(env): give the workspace env denial its own write-access message WorkspaceEnvAccessError reported "must be an admin of these secrets" for both denials, so a caller lacking workspace write to ADD a key was told to get secret-admin on a key that does not exist yet. Carry the reason and mirror the route's two messages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PCXbU36FwJBmtJKaH83BUm --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>