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513292f17b
* feat(sso): DNS domain verification gating org SSO registration
Add org-scoped domain ownership verification (DNS TXT challenge) as the
security precondition for configuring SSO. Closes the first-come domain-claim
vuln where any org could wire another company's domain to its own IdP.
- New sso_domain table + migration 0266; existing org SSO domains are
grandfathered as verified so live tenants are unaffected
- Verified-domains settings UI (enterprise-gated) with add/verify/remove
- Register route now requires a verified domain for org-scoped registration;
personal SSO and already-grandfathered domains are unaffected
- Self-host register script writes the verified sso_domain row directly, so
script-driven registration stays backwards compatible
* fix(sso): harden domain verification against concurrency + fix CI lint
Addresses review findings on state invariants under concurrent/failed writes:
- Add unique index on (organization_id, domain) so concurrent claims can't
create duplicate pending rows; POST re-reads and stays idempotent on conflict
- Verify flips the row only if it's still the exact pending challenge checked
(guards deletion/token-rotation mid-DNS-lookup) and maps the partial unique
index violation to 409 instead of an unhandled 500
- Wrap the self-host script's provider write + verified-domain upsert in a
transaction so a failed ownership write can't leave a provider committed
- Format 0266 snapshot/journal with biome (fixes @sim/db lint:check)
* fix(sso): re-check domain verification before provider write (TOCTOU)
The register gate checked the verified sso_domain row only at handler entry,
then ran OIDC discovery before writing the provider. A verified row removed
during that window could still complete registration. Extract the check into a
closure and call it both as an entry fast-fail and authoritatively right before
registerSSOProvider, alongside the existing domain-conflict re-check.
* fix(sso): stop rotating verification token on idempotent re-add
Re-adding a pending domain rotated its verification token, which invalidated a
TXT record the admin may have already published and — under two concurrent
re-adds — could return a token the racing write had already superseded, so the
admin's DNS record would never verify. Return the existing row unchanged
instead; the pending token is always shown in the UI, so it is never lost.
* fix(sso): close register TOCTOU with compensating delete + harden edges
Audit-driven hardening:
- Close the residual register TOCTOU: registerSSOProvider is create-only (throws
if the providerId exists), so a compensating delete after the write is provably
safe — it can only remove the just-created row. If verification was revoked
during the write, roll the provider back and 403.
- Verify is now idempotent under concurrency: a same-org row already flipped to
verified by a racing request returns 200, not a confusing 409.
- Grandfather backfill + self-host script now match normalizeSSODomain's dominant
transforms (lower + trim + strip leading wildcard) so a non-canonical legacy
domain can't miss the runtime gate's lookup. Prod backfill result is unchanged.
- Cleanup: drop dead default export, align card radius to sibling convention.
* fix(sso): redact domain tokens from non-admins + fix script stale-update
Round-5 review findings:
- GET /domains redacted the pending TXT verification token (a management
secret) to any org member. Now only owner/admins read it; members see the
list and status without it. Non-Enterprise orgs get an empty list (entitlement
flag only), never the domains/tokens.
- Self-host script decided update-vs-insert from a read taken OUTSIDE the
transaction; a provider deleted mid-flight made the UPDATE match zero rows
silently while the verified-domain upsert still committed (orphaned domain).
The decision now happens inside the transaction from the UPDATE's row count.
* docs(sso): drop unshipped enforce-SSO / auto-join copy from verified domains
Verified domains currently only gate SSO configuration. Remove the
forward-looking references to enforcing SSO and auto-joining members (deferred
to a later release) from the docs, settings copy, nav description, and schema
comment so we don't promise unshipped features.
* fix(sso): guard rollback to new providers only + Enterprise-gate domain removal
Round-6 review findings:
- The compensating provider rollback now only fires when the provider did not
exist before this request (providerExistedBefore). registerSSOProvider is
create-only today so reaching the rollback already implies a fresh create, but
this makes the safety local and future-proof: if Better Auth ever allowed
updating an existing provider, a revoked-verification rollback must not delete
that pre-existing row.
- DELETE /domains now requires an Enterprise plan like add/list/verify, so all
domain mutations share one entitlement (the UI already hides removal from
non-Enterprise orgs). Adds a delete-route test.
* fix(sso): roll back the SSO provider by row id, not logical keys
The compensating rollback deleted by (providerId, orgId). providerId is unique,
so if this request's row were deleted and recreated by a concurrent registration
in the narrow window before the rollback, the logical-key delete would remove
that other request's provider. Delete by the primary-key id registerSSOProvider
returns instead, so only the exact row this request created is ever removed.
* chore(sso): final-review polish — trim script read, unify copy, doc migration edge
Cosmetic cleanup from a final 4-track adversarial review (no bugs found in the
new logic):
- Self-host script: narrow the pre-transaction existence read to select({ id })
instead of SELECT * (it only feeds a log line now).
- Unify invalid-domain copy ("for example acme.com") and the verified-elsewhere
409 wording ("is already verified by another organization") across routes.
- p-3 shorthand on the domain row card.
- Document the migration's rare two-orgs-share-a-domain grandfather behavior
(login unaffected; validated no such duplicates in prod).
* fix(sso): apply attribute mapping + make SSO edit work; drop dead guard
Two pre-existing SSO bugs the final review surfaced (prod has one SSO org, RVW,
script-registered with the default mapping, so neither change affects it):
- Attribute mapping was passed at the top level of the register payload, which
Better Auth ignores — it reads oidcConfig.mapping / samlConfig.mapping. Nest it
so custom mappings actually apply. (Default mapping is unchanged, so existing
logins are unaffected.)
- Editing an SSO provider was broken: registerSSOProvider is create-only and
threw on the existing providerId → generic 500. Route now detects a provider
the caller already owns and updates it via Better Auth's updateSSOProvider, and
surfaces Better Auth's own error status/message instead of a blanket 500.
Also drops the now-unnecessary providerExistedBefore guard (the rollback deletes
by the created row's primary-key id and register is create-only) and the earlier
final-review polish (script read, unified copy, migration edge note).
Smoke-test SSO login + edit on staging before merge (auth-path change).
* fix(sso): require null org on personal-mode provider lookups (gate bypass)
The personal branch of both provider-ownership lookups keyed on
(providerId, userId) without requiring organizationId IS NULL. Because org
providers store userId = their creator and providerId is globally unique, an org
admin could send a personal-mode request (no orgId) — which skips the membership
check and the domain-verification gate — yet still match, and then via the new
update path move, their org's provider to an unverified domain. Add
isNull(organizationId) to the personal branch of both clauses so it can only
match a genuinely personal provider, matching the route's own isOwnedByCaller.
Found by an adversarial review of the update path added in 394bda9f7.
* fix(sso): script updates the observed provider by id, not providerId
Inside the registration transaction the script updated WHERE providerId — the
logical key. If the observed provider was deregistered and a replacement created
with the same providerId before the transaction ran, that update would clobber
the replacement's config and ownership. Update the specific observed row by its
primary-key id instead; if it's gone we insert, which fails cleanly on the
providerId unique constraint rather than overwriting the replacement.
* fix(sso): script upserts provider via delete-then-insert (no unique constraint)
sso_provider.provider_id is a plain (non-unique) index and prod holds legitimate
duplicates, so the previous "update by id, else insert" could create a duplicate
provider when the observed row was deregistered and replaced before the
transaction — the fallback insert would succeed. Delete every row for the
providerId then insert exactly one, inside the transaction, so the providerId
ends up as exactly this config atomically. Linked accounts key on the providerId
string (not the row id), so existing logins are unaffected.
* fix(sso): guard compensating-delete row id so rollback can't silently no-op
* chore(sso): regenerate migration as 0268 after merging staging
Staging landed migrations 0266/0267, colliding with our 0266. Removed our
migration, merged staging, and regenerated cleanly with drizzle-kit as
0268_sso_domain_verification (identical sso_domain table + indexes), then
re-appended the grandfather backfill. api-validation baseline reconciled to 973
(staging 970 + our 3 domain routes). Also make the register-route test's
registerSSOProvider mock return an id so the guarded compensating delete runs.
* refactor(sso): share normalizeSSODomain via @sim/utils so script matches gate
The self-host script canonicalized SSO domains with a minimal inline transform
(lower+trim+wildcard) that diverged from the app's full normalizeSSODomain
(protocol, port, path, trailing dot, email local part) — equivalent spellings
could store a different ownership key than the runtime gate looks up. Move
normalizeSSODomain into @sim/utils/sso-domain (a pure function) so the register
route, the domain-claim route, and the script all use the identical canonicalizer.
The script now skips the verified-domain record when SSO_DOMAIN isn't a valid
registrable domain instead of storing a malformed key.