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Commits
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e906190bae |
fix(cli): refuse what the help already says is invalid (#7157)
* fix(cli): refuse what the help already says is invalid
- validate integer fields against the generated spec's own `kind`, so
`--limit 1.5` names the flag and the value instead of surfacing zod's
`expected int, received number`
- enforce `--limit` >= 1 on the two non-paginated row mutations, which the
help already promised and the server already required
- refuse a blank `-c/--conversation`: it is falsy, so it was dropped from
the body and silently started a new conversation instead of continuing one
- refuse a blank `chat` message before the request rather than after
- constrain `--recipe` to the recipes the generated body type declares, so
regenerating the surface breaks the build if they diverge
- announce truncation on `ls` the way `list` already does; the capped answer
was printed silently
- stop a successful message translation from vetoing itself: the veto now
reads the message the server sent, not the rewritten one, which restores
`--folder must name an existing folder` and unblocks 100+ operations
- drop "destructive" from the `--yes` help line; the gate also covers
operations that only add, such as `files unzip`
- fix the `logs follow` help, which illustrated `--workflow` with a file id
* fix(cli): refuse a fraction the integer parse silently drops
Above 2^52 a double's spacing is 1, so Number('4503599627370496.5') is an
integer and the safe-integer guard passed it — the API received a value the
caller never typed. Read the raw text alongside the parsed number. Digits
that are all zero are not a fraction, so 1.0 stays a whole number.
Also corrects a chat test comment that described a UUID check the command
does not perform; it refuses only a blank -c.
* fix(cli): redact the value the root-flag refusal suggests
The refusal prints a command for the caller to run, and interpolated the
value verbatim. A U+2028 in it split the terminal line, so the tail rendered
as a second, plausible-looking suggestion. redact() is what the other twenty
messages in this package already use, including one forty lines below.
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6bbabbbac6 |
fix(cli): close follow-up gaps (#7137)
* chore: run the orphaned migration-safety test, and stop publishing real-looking ids One of the eight script tests was reachable from no entrypoint, so it had never run in CI — it passes, it was simply never invoked. This is the second time that hand-maintained list has drifted from the files beside it; the audit runner's own header records the first. The guard against a third is a `check:*` script rather than a test, because the runner derives its list from that namespace and so picks the guard up by name — a test would have had to be hand-added to the very list it guards. A published spec sat outside the generator's manifest and so outside its drift check, and carried six example ids with the texture of real generated ones rather than the pandigital placeholders the rest of the repo uses. The new check globs the directory instead of reading the manifest, since the manifest is what omitted the file. The one pre-existing borderline id is allowlisted with a reason: loosening the threshold to admit it would have hidden one of the six. * fix(cli): close the gaps black-box testing the shipped CLI found `sim profiles <anything>` still exited 0, so a probe reading the exit code to ask whether a command exists was told yes — the one group the earlier guard missed. The exemption was written for commands that are both a group and a leaf, but only `files restore` takes an operand; `profiles` takes none. Registering its listing as a default subcommand puts it back among the pure dispatchers the existing guard already covers, so the guard itself did not need widening. Three commands refuse a workspace API key and said nothing, while their menu siblings said so — reading as though they accept one. They are hand-written, so they never reached the code that appends the note. That note now comes from a helper taking the operation, so a command names the operation it invokes and the two cannot disagree, and a test fails if a hand-written command ever calls a restricted operation without it. A blank numeric value in a request body still became a real zero, the same coercion already fixed for query strings: the guard keyed off the slot when the distinction is the field's declared type. Twenty-one fields across fifteen operations were affected. An empty body string still clears a description. Blank values for the root endpoint, workspace and profile flags fell back to what was configured instead of being refused, and a whitespace workspace was accepted verbatim. A hand-written profile name carrying padding listed as reachable but resolved to defaults rather than erroring. Two schema descriptions named request fields that no flag spells, and a rejected value was echoed unredacted by four messages while their siblings redacted it. A write now re-emits a section header it was not asked to touch byte for byte. The blank-line normalisation around it is left alone: making the writer position-faithful is a change to its model, not a fix. * fix(scripts): match example uuids case-insensitively in the spec audit The pattern only recognised lowercase hex, so an uppercase id in a published spec was never examined and the audit reported success without having looked at it. Matching case-insensitively is not enough on its own: hex is case-insensitive, so a mixed-case id counts `A` and `a` as two digits and reports twenty distinct ones rather than sixteen. That inflated count clears the threshold the texture test uses to recognise a hand-authored placeholder, so a real id could have passed for one. The allowlist is an exact-string lookup and would likewise have missed an uppercase spelling of an entry. Both checks and the lookup now take a normalised id, while the finding still reports the spelling as it appears in the file. * fix(cli): stop a refusal being swallowed, and gate example ids by name A blank root flag was refused everywhere except `profiles`, where the catch that lets a broken profile still list absorbed it and the command exited 0 after printing the table. The refusal now carries its own error class, which is what the listing rethrows on — the two are distinguished by type rather than by matching message text, and a genuinely broken profile still lists. The unknown-profile message redacted the name the caller typed but not the suggestion or the list of configured names beside it, which come from the same file and are equally attacker-influenced once it has been hand-edited. Those are redacted now, as is every other message in these two files that quotes a name read out of the config, and the profile listing flattens the names it renders the way it already flattened the error column. The example-id audit judged a uuid by its digit texture, on the premise that a real one essentially never looks hand-authored. Measured against ten million generated ids, 0.81% of them do — one in 124, where this change alone replaced six. Requiring each digit exactly twice takes that to zero but rejects all fourteen placeholders now in the specs, so it is no cheaper than the alternative. The audit now holds the eighteen ids the specs actually use, which is one file rather than the twenty-seven a reserved format would touch, and a new id fails until someone lists it — which is the review the check exists to force. * fix(scripts): match the uuid sentinels exactly rather than by shape Accepting any id built from at most two distinct hex digits let something through that was never on the approved list. A generated id essentially never has that shape, so the practical risk was small — but this check had just stopped being a shape test and become a list, and a structural exception is the one thing that undoes that. The two ids it exists for are the nil and max sentinels, and both are matched by value now. |
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c930830310 |
fix(v2,cli): second audit pass over the v2 API and CLI (#7126)
* fix(chat): resolve a caller-supplied conversation id through its owner The v2 chat route used the caller-supplied conversationId verbatim, with no existence, owner, or workspace check, against a store keyed by bare text with no owner column. A caller who knew another user's conversation id reached that conversation. Ids now resolve through the same owner-scoped loader the web chat path uses, and anything unresolvable answers one uniform 404 before any lifecycle work runs. Omitting the id mints a server-issued conversation. The contract also accepted any 1-128 character string for a column typed uuid, so a malformed id raised a driver error and rendered 500 while an unknown but well-formed id rendered 404 - a shape oracle, and a 500 on ordinary input. The ownership predicate had no coverage anywhere: the route test mocked the module and the lifecycle test drove a chain mock that ignores its where clause, so deleting the owner condition left both suites green. It is now asserted by composition and by condition count, which is what catches a dropped condition. Also renames the reply's model identifier away from a term the project's own copy rules forbid on a user-facing surface. * fix(v2): conceal workspace absence, and stop archived tables faulting their page Two reads answered a caller more than they were entitled to know. A workspace a caller cannot reach at all returned FORBIDDEN while one that does not exist returned NOT_FOUND, so a workspace-key holder could enumerate which workspace ids exist by diffing the two. Both now answer the same absence, using the concealment policy the billing routes already use. A refusal from inside the workspace - a member whose role is too low - still answers FORBIDDEN, because that caller already knows the workspace exists. Separately, archiving a folder cascades onto its tables but leaves each table pointing at the archived folder row. The archived listing resolved those paths strictly, so one such row faulted the whole page and no cursor could step past it - which also made the ids undiscoverable and left restore unreachable for exactly the tables that need it. The archived scope now resolves leniently to the root, where a restore would place them, matching the shipped workflows behavior. Active listings still fault loudly on a dangling folder. * fix(knowledge): validate upload processing options without stranding live sessions recipe and lang were accepted as free strings up to their length caps, silently discarded, and echoed back nowhere, so a typo was unobservable: uploading with a misspelled recipe returned 200 and quietly used the default. Both are now validated at the boundary and a bad value answers 400 naming what is accepted. The accepted recipe set deliberately includes the sentinel every first-party caller sends today alongside the three real chunker recipes, and the three are derived from the chunker's own union so removing one there is a compile error here rather than a silent 400 in production. The same schema also parses metadata read back off a persisted upload session, so tightening it would have thrown out of resume and complete for any session created before this - a 500 on work that could then never finish. The read-back path now drops a value it no longer recognises instead of rejecting it; the request boundary stays strict. Neither field reaches chunking, so nothing here moves chunk boundaries, embeddings, or search results. * fix(v2): honour a requested stats window, and answer a claimed graph id with a conflict Log statistics accepted a start and an end, filtered the totals by them, and then built the series against wall-clock now. Bucket width was computed over a span the caller never asked for, and every bucket past the requested end was structurally empty - so a bounded historical query returned a wrong-width series with fabricated trailing buckets, under a window label that disagreed with the request. Each edge now honours the bound it was given and keeps its previous derivation when omitted, so an unbounded request is unchanged. Separately, block, edge and subflow ids are global primary keys while the delete that precedes a state replace is scoped to one workflow. An id owned by another workflow survived that delete, the insert violated the key, and because callers pass their own transaction the driver error escaped unclassified as a server fault. The write now refuses such an id up front with a conflict naming it, and re-classifies the same violation if one races past the check, since the lock covers only the workflow being written. The dry run checks the ids a commit would insert and reports the warnings a commit would report, which is what its own contract already promised. * fix(secrets): let a workspace secret change its metadata without resending the value Restoring redaction cost more than removing it. The only way to flip a secret back to redacted was to re-send the plaintext, because the write required a value and omitting it fell into an interactive prompt that cannot run in CI. A workspace secret can now change its description or visibility on its own; the stored value is never re-encrypted or rewritten, a write that names no existing secret answers not-found rather than creating one, and a personal secret still requires a value because it has no other writable field. The path parameter was also one shared schema across the write and the delete, so a single description had to cover both and the delete documented an argument that could create and replace. Split, mirroring the credentials pair. The metadata write is a new update against the credentials table, so its scope is asserted by composition and by condition count: an unscoped update would let one workspace flip another workspace's identically-named secret out of redaction, and the cache invalidation would then carry that flag into the other workspace's runtime catalog. * fix(v2): say what an error means in terms the caller can act on A size-limit refusal collapsed every value under a kilobyte to "0 Bytes", so a 28-byte file over a 27-byte ceiling read "is 0 Bytes, above the 0 Bytes limit" - self-contradictory, and useless for choosing a value that would work. Errors and field descriptions also told callers to invoke raw HTTP endpoints. These strings serve the REST reference and the CLI's own help equally, so they now name the operation and its object rather than a method and a path. A sweep test walks every v2 schema description and holds the line, with the remaining offenders in files this change does not own recorded explicitly rather than left to be rediscovered. Listing the editors of a built-in skill claimed the skill did not exist, while reading the same id succeeded - a well-formed request for a real resource is not malformed, so the list answers an empty roster and only the mutations refuse. Bulk folder deletion recorded only the leaf name in its audit trail while the single delete recorded the full path, leaving two same-named folders under different parents indistinguishable after the fact. Bulk chunk enable, disable and delete each treated an unmatched id differently behind one sentence of documentation. They now follow one rule. A workspace-scoped list refused with the name of a resource the caller never addressed, which reads as an empty workspace rather than an unreachable one. * fix(cli): stop a config value forging a section it was never meant to write The config file is written by joining names and values into INI lines, and nothing checked what was in them. A profile name carrying a newline and a section header wrote a section that merged into a different profile and took over its endpoint - and the next command sent that profile's stored API key there. A workspace value could do the same from the other side, since only the endpoint flag validated its input. The refusal now lives at the writer, the single place untrusted text enters the document, with the flag-level checks kept for the better message. Either alone blocks the forgery; the pair is deliberate. Rejecting rather than escaping, because the format has no escape syntax and these files are hand-edited and read by other tools that would not decode one we invented. The forbidden set covers control characters and the two Unicode line separators, which the previous guard missed - those parse as an unreadable line, so the key silently vanished on read and the next write appended a duplicate while the command reported success. Login also wrote the key before the settings, so a malformed response from the deployment could leave a key on disk with no endpoint beside it, and the next command would send it to the default host. Settings are written first, and the response is checked before anything touches disk. Name validation applies only when creating a profile, so a hand-written one that predates the rule keeps working. * fix(docs): tell the reader which key a command needs, and stop the ids contradicting the CLI Around sixty v2 operations refuse a workspace API key, and the CLI's help said nothing about it - the caller found out from a 403 after the request went out. The restriction is already stated in the API spec, so the generator now reads it from there and the command description carries it. The sentinel sentences are imported from the spec's own constants rather than copied, so a reword cannot silently unmark every command, and the test pins the count as well as named operations because a reword confined to one family would otherwise slip past. The generated reference also rendered an empty default as a sentence pointing at nothing - "Defaults to ." - for every repeatable filter. Omitted now, while false and zero still render, which is the trap that shape of check usually walks into. The hand-written guides used a workflow-shaped id for workflows that the CLI's own help says never names one, and five other families were equally wrong. All of them now match the scheme the CLI declares, consistently per entity across pages, with the shared ones taken from that help text so the two read as one voice. The page documenting every flag was linked from nowhere; both landing links pointed at the overview instead. And the generator's test file was absent from the hand-maintained list CI runs, so its guards never executed. * fix(cli): stop a page-size default capping a destructive filter Every request field named limit inherited the pager's default of 100, but only a cursor-paginated command interprets that flag. The two filter-based row mutations declare no cursor, so the default went onto the wire as a row cap: a filter matching 250 rows deleted 100, exited 0, and said nothing - while the confirmation the user had just answered promised every matching row. The flag's own help offered 0 for everything, which those endpoints reject; the unbounded form is the field being absent. The pager's default now applies only where the pager runs, and the tests pin the omission on the request body rather than in help text. A cap typed alongside an explicit row list was silently ignored; it is now refused on the client, where refusing costs nothing to already-installed versions. Lists also truncated at a hundred with no signal in any format, and the two inventory endpoints that do report truncation had that field dropped on the way out - so a caller reconciling against a clipped list could not tell. One note now goes to stderr while stdout stays a bare array, and a flag raised on a later page survives the fold. Also: a folder whose name contains the separator no longer prints a path that resolves to a different folder; validation errors name the flag the user typed instead of the wire field; an unknown subcommand with --help exits non-zero instead of printing the parent's help; a fractional or negative page size is refused rather than floored; an empty query filter is refused rather than silently returning everything; and the two spellings of the missing-workspace message became one. * fix(cli): gate destructive table imports and fix follow-mode rendering A `tables import --mode replace` empties the table before its first batch, so the only warning was in the describe. It now confirms, and the wording tells the truth per mode: cancelling a replace leaves a prefix of the new file with the originals already gone, while an append re-adds its rows if the file is imported twice. `--yes` skips the gate, and the gate runs before the file is opened. Import and export cancellation carried no describe at all; the import one now confirms, the export one records why it deliberately does not. Follow-mode output truncated cells to whatever the first row happened to measure, so a longer status or workflow name arrived clipped with no signal. Cells now clamp at a shared ceiling and pad to the lock, and the log columns carry width floors so a short first page cannot pin a column narrower than its own values. Interrupting a staged download left the staging directory behind; it is now removed on SIGINT and SIGTERM before the signal is re-raised. `--select-output` without `--follow` selected from a response that does not carry outputs, and said nothing. It is refused client-side, with a separate message for `--async`. Its describe now names what the path addresses. `secrets set` always read a value, even when only metadata flags were passed. Off a TTY that was an immediate refusal, so a metadata-only edit exited 1 in CI for a value it was never asked for; on a TTY it stopped to prompt, and the prompt rejects an empty entry, so there was no way to say "leave the stored value alone" short of re-typing the secret. The read is now skipped and the field omitted, which is what lets a metadata-only edit run unattended. On a TTY, setting only a description no longer prompts. Passing both spellings of the reveal flag is refused rather than silently resolved. Four mandatory hand-authored flags now say so, `billing logs` names its key-type scope, and the dispatch list declares its columns. * fix: close the gaps an adversarial review of this branch found A conflict handler added earlier in this branch was dead code. It read the Postgres error code off the thrown object, but the driver error arrives wrapped with the real one on `cause`, so the check returned false on its first line and the 409 never fired. Its test passed only because it threw a flat shape production never produces. It now reads through the cause chain with the shared helpers, compares the constraint name exactly instead of matching a substring of the SQL, and its test throws the real wrapped error. Resuming a conversation checked its workflow and its workspace but not its type, so a conversation created by the web surface could be continued as a CLI turn. It now refuses through the same uniform 404 as every other mismatch, which closes the same omission on the web posting path. Minting one no longer leaves a blank untitled row at the top of the Chat list. The pre-write check on a minted API key refused fewer characters than the writer does, so a key the check accepted could still fail at the write — after the endpoint beside it was already stored, pairing a new endpoint with the previous key. The two had drifted because the set was spelled three times; there is now one. A description claimed a processed count reported only the chunks that changed. The update returns every row it matched, so re-enabling chunks that were already enabled counts them all. Two OpenAPI sentences promised no conflict detection and no persistence warnings in a dry run, both of which the same branch had just made false. A described window was wrong whenever a start was supplied without an end. Listing the editors of a built-in skill answered a read with a modification refusal on the internal surface. Archived table listings could reach the strict folder projector again through a third scope value the input type still allowed. A metadata-only secret write skipped the guard its personal-scope twin has. The internal document boundary still took the two processing fields as unbounded strings. Truncation was reported only from the response envelope, so a clipped file body, row search and workflow-stats list said nothing. A staged download stopped watching for signals before it finished removing its directory, and cleared every listener for the signal rather than its own. Three tests asserted a contract constant against itself; they now drive rendered help, real argv, or real render output. * chore: regenerate the API reference, CLI surface, and CLI docs The published reference still marked a secret value required and described the delete parameter as one that also creates, the CLI surface still lacked the marker that says which operations refuse a workspace key, and the reference rendered an empty sentence for every repeatable filter whose default is an empty list. * test(cli): use the package's own delay helper in the staging poll The audit bans a hand-rolled setTimeout promise. `sim-cli` does not depend on the shared utils package, and its own idiom is `node:timers/promises`. * fix: act on a second review round, and correct two earlier claims The conflict pre-check read block ids from the wrong side. The writer inserts each block's own `id` field while the check read the record key, and the two can diverge because preparation copies a value under its key without reconciling them. Edges already read the value and subflows are genuinely keyed by the record key, so only blocks were wrong — collecting every family from the values, as first suggested, would have broken subflows instead. A minted API key carrying leading or trailing whitespace passed the pre-write check but failed the writer, leaving the new endpoint on disk beside the previous key. It is refused up front now rather than trimmed: a key is opaque, so trimming would store a value the server never issued and turn a loud failure into an unexplained 401 later. The endpoint normalizer does trim, which is what made a padded `--endpoint` fail only after the browser flow had already minted a key. A metadata-only secret write raced with deletion returned 500, because the follow-up read that only assembles the response body threw an unclassified error; it now reports the same not-found the non-racing miss already gave. An unusable output format in the environment silently printed a table instead of refusing. Two validation messages printed control characters verbatim. A dry run now reports the preparation warnings its own commit path returns. The chat route created a titled conversation and never wrote a message, so it appeared in the Chat list promising content it did not have. Both sides of a successful turn are now persisted; a failed turn still writes nothing, so a question is never stored without its answer. Two claims of mine were wrong. The earlier commit message said `secrets set` sent an empty value that overwrote the stored secret — it did not; the prompt refuses off a TTY and rejects empty on one, so the old behaviour was a clean refusal. And the delay helper commit said this package's idiom is `node:timers/promises`; the package carries its own `sleep`, which is the audit's sanctioned home and has five callers. It uses that now. Also: a test asserting a deadlock stays unclassified could not fail, since every candidate rejects it; it now pins a unique violation carrying no constraint name. Workflow ids spelled with the file prefix are corrected in the remaining fixtures, leaving the genuine file ids alone. * fix: close a credential-misdirection path this branch had opened Making the endpoint normalizer trim handled whitespace around a value but not a control character inside one, and the URL parser removes those from anywhere in its input — so a value that reads as one host could resolve to another, and the profile's key went with it. The flag and environment paths never touch the config writer, so its guard did not cover this. The normalizer now refuses the same character set the writer does, which also keeps the invariant that nothing it blesses can be refused by the write that stores it. Comparing the parsed URL back against its input was the alternative and is wrong: the parser rewrites percent-encoding, case, internationalized hosts and default ports, so legitimate endpoints would be refused. The blank-query guard tested for exactly empty, so a whitespace-only value still reached the wire — as a real zero on a numeric filter, an explicit false on a boolean one, and as an encoded space the server then rejected. It now refuses any value that is blank once trimmed, while a body string keeps its meaning, an explicit zero still sends, and a value with content around its whitespace is passed through untouched rather than trimmed. A graph-id conflict reported 409 on the v2 route and fell through the older persistence wrapper as an unclassified 500. That wrapper now classifies orchestration failures through the cause chain, which also fixes a pre-existing case where a workflow archived between authorization and the locked read reported 500 rather than 404. Persisting a chat turn claimed its row by id alone, so a conversation soft-deleted mid-turn still received the messages and was bumped back up the list. It now requires a live row. A turn whose caller hung up after the model had already answered persisted nothing, though the work was done and billed; it now persists and still reports the connection as closed. An empty workspace id from the login response was read as no workspace at all. A published description still promised a language-tag standard the schema does not enforce. The test asserting that a turn is stored before the final event drained the whole response first, so it held whichever order the code used. It now reads the stream incrementally and fails if the write moves after the event. |
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b724cd152d | improvement(cli): clarify npm package readmes (#7121) | ||
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437ffa3190 | fix(cli): exit after interactive secret input (#7118) | ||
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d86fdc152f |
feat(api): publish agent tool input schema (#7109)
* feat(api): publish agent tool input schema * fix(api): bound agent tool inputs |
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3645857ddb |
fix(v2): stop six responses reporting less than the layer beneath them knew (#7097)
* fix(v2): stop six responses reporting less than the layer beneath them knew
Findings from cubic's review of the v0.8.12 release PR, all on the v2 surface.
- `GET /workflows/{id}/runs/{runId}` documented `includeFileBase64` as
requiring `includeOutput`, and the read honours that — files are projected
inside the `includeOutput` branch alone. Nothing enforced it, so the flag
parsed, was accepted, and was then dropped: a 200 carrying no files and no
reason why. Now a 400 naming the missing flag, matching how `GET
/billing/logs` refuses a window bound its period will not read.
- `POST /files/{id}/unzip` rendered a malformed or over-cap archive as 500.
`ArchiveError` had no arm in the v2 policy, though the internal extract route
beside it has mapped the same failures to 400/413 all along.
- Both workflow-MCP lists cut their tool inventory at a ceiling and published
`nextCursor: null` regardless. The use cases were already returning
`truncated`; only the v2 presenters dropped it, while the copilot handler
published it. A reconciling caller read a partial set as the complete one.
- A table dispatch scoped by filter reported neither the filter nor its
exclusions, and `rowIds: undefined` documented itself as "every eligible
row" — so a filtered run and an unfiltered one were indistinguishable. The
compiled filter stays unpublished, as before; `selectAll` and
`excludeRowIds` name the distinction.
- `GET /files/uploads/{id}` promised the registered file after finalization and
passed null unconditionally, so a caller polling a transfer it lost track of
could watch a session reach `completed` and never learn what it created.
- `HEAD` on a run file resolved the file downstream of authorization, so it
answered 200 for an id the `GET` beside it would 404.
- v2 bulk table delete audited `FOLDER_DELETED.resourceId` from the
caller-keyed projection, writing a display path where the single-folder
delete writes the canonical id.
Two further findings needed no change: the audit-log cursor scope is bound by
`member_user_id_unique` and a membership check, so the cross-organization
replay it described cannot arise; and both documentation findings had already
been fixed on staging by #7092.
* fix(v2): report a dispatch's two narrowings separately
Review follow-up. `selectAll` was set from the stored filter alone, but the
run rejects only `rowIds` *with* `excludeRowIds` — so an exclusion set with no
filter is a scope a caller can create, and the walk applies it. Those
dispatches published exclusions with no discriminator beside them, which is
the shape the flag existed to rule out.
One flag could not cover both: an exclusion-only scope is neither filtered nor
unnarrowed. So the two narrowings are reported as what they are — `filtered`
for the unpublished stored predicate, `excludeRowIds` for the deselections —
and every combination is now distinguishable from a run over every eligible
row. `excludeRowIds` mirrors the walk's own condition and is withheld beside
`rowIds`, where the dispatcher would ignore it.
* fix(v2): let a failed file read fail, and point truncation at its own check
Two review follow-ups.
`getWorkspaceFile` logs and returns null on a read failure unless told
otherwise, so a transient database error would have reported a finalized
upload as fileless — to the one caller polling to learn what it created, who
would then stop, having been told there was nothing. Read with `throwOnError`
so the failure surfaces and the poll can retry, matching how the sibling
record read loads the same row. A file genuinely deleted still answers null,
which is a different question with a different answer.
The server list pointed callers at `/tools` for an authoritative inventory
without saying that endpoint applies the same ceiling. It now names the
`truncated` flag this PR added there, so "authoritative" has a condition
attached instead of being asserted.
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2d85c0d1e1 |
fix(cli): correct three descriptions the CLI publishes, and restore --no-recursive (#7093)
Follow-ups from review of the v0.8.12 release PR, all on surfaces the CLI audit touched. - `credentialId` was one shared schema across PATCH and DELETE, so the disconnect reference offered "update or disconnect" for an operation that cannot update. Split into two, matching the two components OpenAPI already publishes for them. - A boolean query param documents the spellings an HTTP caller may send and closes by calling them the whole accepted set. The CLI renders those fields as bare flags that take no value, leaving the sentence pointing at a list neither `--help` nor the reference ever prints. Stripped for bare flags only; the REST prose and OpenAPI specs are unchanged. - `files list --recursive` became a bare switch in the audit, which removed the only way to send false. The API turns it on by itself as soon as `--search` is set, so a folder search always descended. The twin is back, declared per flag so the one-way toggles do not grow a meaningless negation. |
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4508ec75d2 |
fix(cli): resolve blockers and majors from a full command-surface audit (#7083)
* fix(cli): resolve blockers and majors from a full command-surface audit Audit of all 222 CLI leaves against a live deployment, plus fixes for every defect it confirmed. Blockers: - An unrecognized --profile resolved to built-in defaults, so a typo silently targeted production and transmitted the API key there. - sim logs follow sent an undeclared query key and failed on every invocation. - sim workflows run exited 0 on a failed run, so CI reported success. - knowledge connectors documents update matched rows already in the target state, making exclude and restore permanent no-ops. - PDF text layers below the OCR threshold are transcribed by a model and stored verbatim with no record that it happened. Majors include: rollback --version was swallowed by the program-level flag and silently did nothing; nullable string flags could not send null despite their help promising it; six protocol commands discarded excess arguments, dropping files on upload; sim chat crashed with EPIPE when piped to head; tables import dropped malformed CSV rows without reporting them; audit-logs required an organization id no API surface exposed; secrets could not opt out of redaction or read a value from a file; bulk deletes and moves exited 0 having done nothing; and MCP registrations were destroyed by undeploy rather than restored. Adds extraction_method to documents so OCR output is distinguishable from parsed text, and reports the applied scope on billing logs so the two ledger questions are no longer indistinguishable. * fix(mcp): bound MCP restore by server and re-check uniqueness under the lock Two gaps in the archive/restore lifecycle this branch introduced. The candidate query bounded archived rows and deduplicated to one per server afterwards, so several archived generations stacked on one server consumed the whole budget and every other server the workflow had been published on fell out of the result with no warning. Deduplication moves into SQL so the bound applies to servers, preserving most-recently-updated-per-server. The live-registration check ran before the server lock was acquired, so a concurrent tool create could land in between and the restore would un-archive a second live row for the same server and workflow, violating the partial unique index and rolling back the whole deployment. That check now runs under the lock alongside the tool-name, capacity, and metadata-budget checks it belongs with. * fix(review): address round-three review findings across CLI and server Restore now picks candidate servers by recency: DISTINCT ON forces its own key to lead the sort, so bounding on that statement kept the lexicographically lowest server ids and left a workflow's most recently used servers archived. Deduplication and bounding are now separate stages. CLI: a total miss on tables move reported only in notFound exited 0; unsetting a key or removing a profile mutated the first duplicate INI block while reads merged later ones, so the removal appeared to succeed and did nothing; an import that rejected cells but no rows showed a clean progress line; and the --run-id help implied idempotency it does not provide. Server: a run with no recorded output projection let block-name selectors past the new validation; the billing window comparison still fired on a bound that parsed but failed the shared schema; CSV rejection accounting reached only the streaming path, so buffered and synchronous imports still dropped records silently, through to the Copilot tool that reports them; case-insensitive tag name uniqueness now serializes on the knowledge-base row the delete paths already lock; and a failed sync claim reports the lifecycle reason rather than always claiming a sync is in progress. Reverts an over-scrub from the previous commit: workspace-file-imports is consumed only by Copilot, so naming save_upload and glob there is the correct remediation rather than a leak, and the sweep that guards against leaks now exempts it explicitly. Corrects two contract descriptions that promised a bulk tag save would rename or relocate an occupied slot, which it deliberately no longer does. * fix(cli): remove flags a caller cannot use, and correct three that misled Removes surface that should not have shipped: - `files uploads get` is hidden. Its `--upload-token` was required, and the token is minted and consumed inside a single `files upload`, which completes or aborts its session before returning. Nothing in the CLI could produce the value, so the command answered every invocation by asking for something unobtainable. The same flag is dropped from the two table-import commands, where a CLI-created import is already queryable without it. - The `--no-<flag>` companion that sent JSON null is gone. `--no-X` means "send boolean false" on thirty-seven other flags, and one spelling should not carry two meanings. `--description ''` already clears the displayed value, and the help now warns that the literal word null is stored as text rather than suggesting a substitute, because on the OAuth client fields null revokes a stored grant and an empty string does not. - The document extraction method column and its contract field are reverted. Nothing read them, they were null for every existing document, and the name collided with the parser metadata field that already exists. Corrects flags that misled: the workflow move destination is `--to`, matching its two siblings rather than meaning the opposite of `--folder` one command over; `files list --recursive` is a bare flag like the four folder deletes rather than a twelve-alias string; the dispatch row cap takes a count instead of its wire object; `--yes` no longer claims to be required on commands that accept `--dry-run`; cancelling every run on a table is confirm-gated; and the retry-processing negation, which the route rejects, is suppressed. Extends the guard that missed all of this: it swept only `--x-` prefixes over generated commands, so a header spelled without one was invisible to it. It now derives every header name from the operation table and sweeps the assembled program. * fix(mcp): budget MCP restore against the workflow's live server fanout Restore bounded its candidates at the per-workflow server limit counting archived rows only, never subtracting the memberships the workflow already holds live. The fanout validation a few lines later in the same deploy transaction counts live servers against that same limit, so a workflow with both live and archived registrations could restore past it and roll the whole deployment back. The candidate query now bounds on the remaining headroom, and the budget is re-checked under the server locks and spent once per accepted candidate, so a create that lands between the count and the unarchive cannot push it over. Candidates that do not fit are dropped by recency, matching how the set is already selected, and stay archived with a warning naming the workflow, the server, and the reason — restore still never throws inside the deploy transaction. One residual is left open deliberately: a create on a server outside the candidate set is serialized by neither the locks nor the recount. Closing it would need a workflow-level lock, which would change the ordering every other writer here depends on, and the create path runs its own limit check. * fix(mcp): stop restore spending its budget on servers it cannot restore A server can hold both a live registration and archived ones for the same workflow: the partial unique index constrains only the live row. Such a server was counted twice — once shrinking the restore budget, once consuming one of its slots — before the liveness check under the lock skipped it. While the bound was the full server limit that waste was invisible; once the bound became the remaining headroom, every slot spent that way cost a registration that could have been restored. The candidate query now excludes servers the workflow is already live on, so the budget and the candidate set agree. The exclusion sits on the inner stage, before deduplication and the bound, and is a pre-lock optimisation only: the check under the server lock stays authoritative, because the query can go stale between reading and unarchiving. Candidates rejected for a tool-name collision, the per-server cap, or the metadata budget are still not replaced. That case is only knowable under the lock, so replacing it would mean fetching past the bound and locking servers outside the candidate set, widening an ordering every writer here relies on. |
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0c38037bf1 |
fix(knowledge): harden ingestion pipeline (#7077)
* fix(knowledge): harden ingestion pipeline * fix(knowledge): correct bounded ingestion edge cases * fix(knowledge): tighten redaction and chunk validation * fix(knowledge): close bounded ingestion gaps * fix(files): preserve parser complexity limits |
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32a15fde2f |
improvement(access-control): wire tool and model permissions into copilot editing (#7080)
* improvement(access-control): wire tool and model permissions into copilot editing Permission groups already supported a per-tool denylist (deniedTools) and model restrictions, but only the canvas honored them. The copilot edit path gated on block type alone, so Sim could build workflows using tools and models the user was not allowed to run — the executor refused them at run time instead. Enforce both at authoring time, and stop advertising what the viewer cannot use. * fix(access-control): use the path alias for the permission-groups type import * fix(access-control): close two denied-tool leaks in copilot discovery The VFS stamped every integration schema from the shared static map before the per-viewer loop re-authored the permitted subset, so a denied operation's schema stayed published. Skip the shared copy for integration paths; the viewer loop is the only projection that knows the denylist. Block metadata resolved denied operations from the catalog's `operation.toolId`, which the projection fills only from `tools.config.tool` — a block whose operation ids are its tool ids left it undefined and read as fully permitted. Resolve through the shared operation gate instead. * fix(access-control): key the copilot schema cache on permission policy The deferred integration-tool schemas now depend on the viewer's permission group, but the cache key encoded only identity and block visibility, so an admin's change to deniedTools took effect only when the entry expired. Resolve the config before the key and add a gate signature alongside the existing visibility signature, mirroring how block visibility already keys the same cache. The read moves out of the cached section rather than being added: what the entry caches is a user-tool schema per exposed integration tool, which dominates it. |
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656840a1b1 |
feat(api): make the platform operable headless over v2 (#6912)
* feat(v2): download run output files by API key
Adds GET /api/v2/workflows/{id}/runs/{runId}/files/{fileId}, closing the
async-run loop for headless callers. A run's output carries UserFile URLs
pointing at /api/files/serve/..., which rejects x-api-key outright, so an
async run that produces a file previously had no byte path out for an API
key at all.
The file is addressed by the id the run reported and resolved against the
run's own recorded execution data, from which the storage key is read. The
request never supplies a storage key, so the endpoint cannot be aimed at
bytes the run did not produce. Resolution deliberately reads the
materialized-but-undisplayed recording, because the display projection
strips exactly the `key`/`context` fields a byte read needs.
Also hardens normalizeStartFile to derive a file's storage key only from a
validated internal serve URL, discarding any caller-supplied `key`/`context`.
A workspace API key has no human subject, so the executor resolves its actor
to the workspace billing owner (preprocessing.ts -> resolveSystemBillingAttribution);
verifyFileAccess then authorizes a workspace-context key as that owner, whose
reach is not bounded by the key's workspace. Accepting an attacker-authorable
key made that substitution exploitable as a confused deputy. Normalization is
all-or-nothing, so a forged file now drops the whole files input.
* feat(workflows): one graph-write door, principal-derived audit source, and v2 authoring endpoints
Extract replaceWorkflowNormalizedState as the single persistence primitive for a
workflow graph replace and route both the internal editor save and the Copilot
edit tool through it, so neither can skip state preparation, the row lock, the
lastSynced stamp, or custom-tool extraction by choosing a different entry point.
Derive the audit source from the acting principal instead of hardcoding
'copilot', then widen workflows.variables.apply_operations and
workflows.bulk.move to every principal kind.
Add GET/PUT /api/v2/workflows/{id}/state, POST /operations, /duplicate,
/restore, PATCH /variables, and POST /api/v2/workflows/move over surface-neutral
application use cases; move the edit engine to lib/workflows/editing.
* test(workflows): cover the graph-write primitive, audit source, and the v2 authoring surface
Pin the two-doors fix (preparation runs, the row is locked, custom-tool
extraction is post-commit and best-effort) and the false-audit fix (a session
principal writes source: 'session', a delegated one writes its service). Both
were verified to fail with the fix reverted.
Add the application matrix for replaceWorkflowState, applyWorkflowOperations,
readWorkflowGraph, and restoreWorkflow — role floor, principal-kind rejection
before canonical load, asserted-scope concealment, lock, validation, atomic
conflict, plan gate, and audit-then-notify ordering — plus route tests for
every new endpoint.
* test(workflows): pin the internal graph-write door and the v2 list scope
Characterize saveWorkflowNormalizedState's statuses, messages, and notification
after the persistence extraction, and cover the new scope filter on
GET /api/v2/workflows including a cursor replayed under a different scope.
* feat(api): add v2 block, tool, connector-type, and enrichment catalogs
Adds six read endpoints under /api/v2 that publish Sim's code-defined
catalogs: GET /blocks, GET /blocks/{blockId}, GET /tools,
GET /tools/{toolId}, GET /connector-types, and GET /enrichments.
These read like static reference data and are not. What a caller may
place is decided per workspace by its permission-group integration
allowlist, per organization by which unreleased blocks have been
revealed, per deployment by ALLOWED_INTEGRATIONS, and per workspace
again by the workflows it has deployed as blocks. So all six are plain
defineWorkspaceOperation reads at minimumRole 'read' with
workspaceApiKey 'allow' — the exact policy of credentials.providers.list
— and every response keeps Cache-Control: private, no-store, because an
unrevealed preview block's existence must not leak across organizations
through a shared cache.
Trigger blocks ride as ?capability=trigger rather than a second
endpoint, and workspace custom blocks ride inside /blocks discriminated
by `source`, so "what may I place?" stays a one-call question.
The block projection is extracted out of the Copilot get_blocks_metadata
tool and rewritten onto @/tools/metadata and @/tools/metadata-outputs.
That cuts the tool's own @/tools/registry edge as a side effect: its
module graph drops from 6,756 to 1,318, and the new routes land at
1,673-1,734, next to the shipped /v2/credentials/providers baseline of
1,668.
Supporting changes:
- scripts/sync-tool-metadata.ts derives hostedApiKey ('always' |
'conditional' | 'none') from each tool's `hosting`. The config itself
stays excluded because it holds closures, but "does Sim host the key"
is a first-order authoring question, so the answer is emitted.
- getCopilotToolDescription takes hostedApiKey as an option instead of
reading `hosting` off the tool, so both an executable ToolConfig and
the generated metadata can answer it through one shared derivation.
- principalUserId / allowedIntegrationTypes move out of
lib/credentials/application/provider-catalog.ts into
lib/integrations/principal-scope.server.ts. Two copies of the
workspace integration gate would diverge first on the workspace-key
path, which has no user for permission groups to key on.
- scripts/check-tool-registry-boundary.ts walked page.tsx/layout.tsx
under app/workspace only, so a route importing the executable registry
passed green. It now walks a list of entry sources, seeded with the
four catalog route subtrees and the shared projection barrel. Routes
are covered per subtree rather than wholesale because 122 of ~1,130
route files legitimately execute tools.
Registry sweeps parse every block, tool, connector type, and enrichment
through its published response schema and compare against the wire
round-trip. They caught a real drift while being written: an operation's
inputs were typed as a union of the tool-param and block-input shapes,
and the union resolved to whichever member matched first, silently
dropping a block input's `schema`.
* docs(api): stop publishing a 413 GET /workflows/{id}/state cannot emit
* feat(v2): read upload-session state
Adds GET /api/v2/files/uploads/{uploadId}. Only DELETE was exported, so a
caller that lost track of a transfer could abort it but could not ask
whether the session was still alive, already finalized, or failed — the
resume story was missing.
Runs on a new files.upload.read operation at minimumRole 'read' rather than
reusing uploadCancel, which is a 'write': asking about a session must not
require permission to destroy it. The GET is a control leg like every other,
so it carries the signed upload token and re-authorizes the caller's present
workspace permission through reauthorizeWorkspaceUploadPurpose instead of
resolving the session on its id alone.
* fix(api): reconcile v2 catalog and workflow-authoring integration
Merging the catalog and workflow-authoring branches surfaced four issues
that neither produced in isolation.
- Route and OpenAPI counters were bumped to the same value on both
branches, so git merged them as one change while the merged tree holds
the sum. Corrects the route ratchet to 1142 and the workflows document
to 29 operations (152 total), then regenerates the OpenAPI documents
and the CLI surface from the reconciled contracts.
- The seven new workflow operations were published in the spec but absent
from the workflow API reference groups, which `check:openapi` rejects.
- `route-policies.ts` reached `WorkflowOperationsNotAppliedError` through
`apply-workflow-operations`, dragging the edit engine — and its diff and
comparison dependencies, which reach a client OAuth hook — into every
route that uses the shared workflow error policies. The class moves to
its own leaf module, mirroring `WorkflowImportError`, and each importer
now takes it from there.
- The operations route test shadowed that class inside its module mock, so
`instanceof` matched a fake and the assertion pinned a message the
production class never emits. It now uses the real class and asserts the
real message.
* feat(v2): extract ZIP archives over the public API
Adds POST /api/v2/files/{fileId}/extract and widens files.extract_archive
from principalKinds ['session'] / workspaceApiKey 'deny' to admit personal
and workspace API keys at the unchanged 'write' role.
The widening is an authorization change, so the justification lives in the
operation's TSDoc: extraction grants no capability an API key lacks, since
every file it writes could be created one at a time through files.create and
files.upload.create, both already 'allow' at the same role. It only collapses
many calls into one. The previous ['session'] restriction read as an artifact
of the UI having been the only caller. Delegated services stay out — no
copilot or executor caller exists and admitting one is a separate decision.
The response is counts plus the destination folderPath, never the extracted
files: a large archive would otherwise materialize thousands of objects into
one body. Callers page GET /api/v2/files?folderPath=... instead. The use case
returns the internal display path and the adapter projects it to a v2 path,
keeping the use case surface-neutral.
* feat(v2): extract file text over the public API
Adds GET /api/v2/files/{fileId}/text. Text extraction previously sat behind
checkInternalAuth on /api/files/parse, a route that also mixes in external-URL
fetching, execution-file upload, and multi-file aggregation, so it could not be
reused. The parse call is lifted into a thin application use case instead.
Runs on the existing files.read_content operation unchanged — it is already
workspaceApiKey 'allow' at the read role, and turning bytes it already
authorizes into text grants no further reach.
`degraded` is a required, non-optional boolean on the response. The legacy doc
and ppt parsers deliberately return best-effort or placeholder content rather
than throwing, so an omittable flag would let a client that never checks it
treat guessed text as extracted text. It is reported honestly rather than
converted into an error, because the parsers' behaviour is deliberate and
characterization-tested.
The read is bounded on its input at 25 MiB before extraction rather than on its
output after, given the parsers' documented DoS history; a caller may lower the
ceiling but never raise it.
* feat(v2): restore archived folders and list the archived set
DELETE /api/v2/files/folders archives recursively, so a recursive delete was
unrecoverable over the API: the archived files stayed visible through
GET /api/v2/files?scope=archived, but nothing could rebuild the folder
structure.
Adds POST /api/v2/files/folders/restore, path-addressed like the rest of the
v2 folder family, and a `scope` selector on the folder list so a caller can
find the archived path to hand it.
`scope` extends the files folder-list query rather than the shared
v2ListFoldersQuerySchema: only workspace files have an archived folder set, so
adding it to the shared schema would give tables, workflows, and knowledge a
parameter they ignore. GET /api/v2/files/folders is a FULL_SET_LIST, not paged,
so no cursor binding changes — list-pagination.test.ts passes unchanged.
Restore resolves the archived folder from its path by scanning the archived
set rather than walking the live tree, which by definition does not contain
the folder being restored. The folder-restored analytics hook now reports the
folder actually restored rather than the requested selector, which carries no
id on a path-addressed surface.
* feat(v2): bulk-download a file selection as a zip
Adds GET /api/v2/files/bulk-download, an adapter over the existing
downloadWorkspaceFileItems use case and its internal binary route.
Path collision: a static segment beside [fileId] permanently shadows a file
whose id equals it, and workspaceFileIdSchema does accept [A-Za-z0-9_-]+.
Rather than invent a new shape, this follows the existing bulk-delete sibling:
the hyphenated form cannot be produced by either minted id shape (UUID v4 or
wf_<shortId>), so the shadowed id is unreachable in practice. Documented on
the contract so the reasoning is not lost.
Folders are addressed by path, matching the rest of the v2 file surface. The
paths resolve against the folder set the selection already loads, so it costs
no extra query, and a path matching no folder is rejected rather than silently
dropped — a misspelled folder must not yield a zip of whatever else was
selected. The empty-selection and folder-count guards now account for
folderPaths, which a path-only selection would otherwise have tripped.
Selections are comma-separated only: v2 rejects a query parameter sent more
than once, so a repeated-parameter form would never reach the schema. Pinned by
a test so the contract cannot advertise a form the boundary rejects.
* feat(v2): expose run output files and optional inline bytes on the runs read
GET /api/v2/workflows/{id}/runs/{runId} now reports the files a run produced,
each with the downloadPath that fetches its bytes, and can inline them as
base64 on request.
Gated by includeOutput, matching `output`'s nullability: a caller that did not
ask for output does not receive a file list it did not request. The async
execute request's rejection of includeFileBase64 is deliberately left alone —
at submit time the run has not happened, so there is nothing to inline; reading
a finished run is the first moment the question means anything.
Inlining is capped per file at the executor's 16 MiB inline ceiling, which a
caller may lower but never raise. A file above it answers 413 naming that
file's downloadPath, so the caller is told exactly how to get the bytes rather
than being left stuck.
The descriptor deliberately omits the storage key — files are addressed by id
and the key is re-derived from the run's recording — and omits an expiry, which
the recording does not carry and which would be fabricated if published.
The route becomes headSafe: false, since inlining reads object storage. The
builder enforces that this requires the use case to expose authorize(), so HEAD
still answers from a real authorization rather than from authentication alone.
* feat(v2): permanently delete an archived file
DELETE /api/v2/files/{fileId} only archives — the OpenAPI says its stored bytes
are never removed — so there was no way to actually destroy a file over the API.
Adds the repository primitive, application use case, operation, and
DELETE /api/v2/files/{fileId}/permanent.
A distinct path rather than a flag on the ordinary delete: a query parameter
that turns a recoverable archive into an irreversible destruction is set by
accident, and the two acts carry different minimum roles, which one route
declaration cannot express. The file must already be archived; a live file
answers 409 naming the archive step, so no single request can turn a live file
into lost bytes.
minimumRole 'admin', which forces workspaceApiKey 'deny' since the workspace-key
ceiling is 'write' — the desired policy anyway: unattended credentials should
not destroy bytes.
Row first, then object. The two legs commit independently, so one can survive a
crash between them: deleting the row first leaves at most an orphaned object for
the storage sweep, while the reverse would leave a live row pointing at bytes
that no longer exist — a file that lists and opens but can never be read. A
failed object delete is therefore reported as objectDeleted: false rather than
thrown, because the request has genuinely succeeded once the row is gone. Both
directions are pinned by failure-injection tests, verified to fail when the
order is reversed.
Audited as a distinct FILE_PERMANENTLY_DELETED action, not a reuse of
FILE_DELETED, which records the recoverable archive step.
* feat(api): v2 log analytics, itemized cost, filters, and sortable query
Adds the aggregate and rich-read halves of the public logs surface, and
fixes three defects the existing reads carry.
Aggregate analytics. `GET /api/v2/logs/stats` returns time-bucketed run
counts, success rate, error count, mean latency, and the window bounds,
per workflow and for the workspace. The first-party route was a raw
handler with inline SQL and inline aggregation, so it is split into a
repository (`lib/logs/stats-queries.ts`), a pure aggregator
(`lib/logs/stats.ts`), and an application use case. That route keeps its
legacy authorization — it answers a caller without workspace access with
a zeroed 200, where v2 conceals the workspace as a 404 — and consumes
only the two surface-neutral halves.
`segmentCount` had no `.int()`, `.min()`, or `.max()`, so `0` divided by
zero and `1e9` allocated two billion-element arrays: both caller-reachable
500s. Bounded on both contracts. `workflows` is capped, with the workspace
totals still computed from every workflow and the cut reported as
`workflowsTruncated`.
Detail reads gain the itemized `cost.items` ledger (`null` and `[]` are
distinct answers and both reachable) and `workflowInput`, restoring a
v1→v2 regression.
The list gains `workflowName` and `status` filters, and `includeJobRuns`,
which unions Chat and Sim-agent job runs into the sequence behind a new
`kind` discriminator — without it a job run is indistinguishable from a
run whose workflow was deleted. A filter no job row can answer drops the
branch outright rather than meaning two things across the union.
`POST /api/v2/logs/query` carries the additional sort columns. `GET /logs`
is untouched: its single `order` param rests on there being exactly one
sortable column, and both escapes from that are ruled out, so the rich
read gets its own endpoint — the split the table surface already ships.
It uses the shared keyset scheme with the two nullable sort columns read
through a sentinel, since a keyset cannot compare against null.
`folderPaths` now covers a folder's whole subtree on the public path, as
it already did everywhere else; it previously omitted every nested run
with no error. The path strings did not change, so a folder-scope version
is stamped into the cursor and in-flight tokens restart rather than
silently skipping rows.
Also fixes `folderName`, which ILIKEd `workflow.name` — a copy of the
clause above it — and so searched workflow names instead of folders.
`buildLogSortCursorCondition`'s `IS NULL` disjunct is documented and
pinned: under `NULLS LAST` the null block is only reachable through it,
so removing it as a duplicate-row fix makes those runs unpageable.
Ratchets: route count 1142 -> 1144; logs OpenAPI operations 2 -> 4; total
operations 152 -> 154.
* feat(api): v2 tables run state, dispatch polling, batch update, bulk, archive
Closes the headless gaps on the v2 tables surface.
- Per-cell run state is now readable through an opt-in `includeRunState` on
`GET /rows`, `POST /query`, and `GET /rows/{rowId}`. The default projection
is byte-identical; a page whose sidecar outgrows its byte budget is a 413
rather than a silent truncation.
- Run dispatches are addressable: `GET /tables/dispatches/{dispatchId}`
publishes the column's full four-state domain so polling a finished run is
not a 500, and `GET /tables/{tableId}/dispatches` lists what is in flight.
- `POST /rows/batch-update` takes one distinct patch per row. Its transaction
moved out of the Copilot-only module into a surface-neutral use case both
surfaces now call.
- `GET .../enrichment/{groupId}` publishes the provider cascade, cost, and
timing behind one enrichment cell.
- `POST /tables/bulk-move` and `/bulk-delete` reach the existing bulk use
cases, which now accept folders by canonical path and resolve them inside
the application layer.
- `DELETE` is recoverable: `scope=archived` on the table list plus
`POST /tables/{tableId}/restore`.
* feat(api): expose knowledge chunks, tag writes, archive/restore on v2
Closes the knowledge cluster's remaining public-surface gaps.
Chunks: list/read/create/update/delete/bulk under
`/api/v2/knowledge/{id}/documents/{documentId}/chunks`. `queryChunks` gains
an `id` tiebreaker on every sort so the list pages on a keyset rather than an
offset — `tokenCount` and `enabled` are both non-unique, so a page boundary
inside a run of equal values used to repeat or drop the tied rows. The
internal offset caller is unchanged; the two positioning schemes share one
read.
Tag definitions: create, update, delete, next-slot, usage, and the
document-scoped save and cleanup. Without them a caller could write a tag
value into a slot with no definition and then had no way to name it, so
tag-filtered retrieval was unbuildable end-to-end. `v2KnowledgeTagSchema`
gains `id`, without which PATCH and DELETE are unaddressable. The
document-scoped DELETE is pinned to `action: 'cleanup'`: the domain's `'all'`
deletes the whole knowledge base's tag vocabulary from a document path.
Archive/restore: `GET /api/v2/knowledge/archived` as a sibling route rather
than a `scope` param — the two reads bind different operations and a v2 route
declares one — plus `POST /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/restore`. `knowledge.restore`
is a new workspace operation carrying `delete`'s policy, since an operation's
inverse must not be harder to reach; the internal session route now delegates
its workspace branch to the shared use case and keeps only the legacy personal
one.
Also: `POST .../documents/from-workspace-files` surfaces `addWorkspaceFiles`,
so a file already in workspace storage no longer has to be re-uploaded
byte-for-byte to be indexed; the `chunkingConfig` write widens to the
first-party five-key schema with its refines and separator bounds, while the
response stays `.catchall` so a legacy JSONB row cannot 500; and
`CONNECTOR_MANAGED_RESOURCE_READ_ONLY` joins `FORBIDDEN_DETAIL_CODES` now that
the bare 403 on connector-managed chunk writes is wire-reachable.
Document upsert is deliberately not included.
* feat(api): add v2 credential rotation and a gate-exempt capabilities endpoint
PATCH /api/v2/credentials/{credentialId} rotates service-account secret
material or renames a credential in place, preserving the credential id so
existing workflow, deployment, paused-run, connector, and webhook references
keep working. Re-posting to POST /api/v2/credentials answers 409, and
delete-and-recreate mints a new id, so rotation previously had no door.
The route is adapter-only: updateWorkspaceCredentialUseCase already owned the
rotation, its audit projection, and credentials.update. It gains one additive
assertedWorkspaceId field for the v2 workspace assertion, and the per-principal
credential-type table that deleteCredentialUseCase already applied is lifted
into requireManageableCredentialType so both operations share it. Without it a
personal API key could rename an env_workspace row and toV2Credential's throw
would surface as a caller-reachable 500.
CredentialProviderOperationError now maps to 503 with Retry-After when the
provider is unreachable, instead of the 400 its OrchestrationError('validation')
base projected. A transient outage rendered as a permanent input error invites a
caller to revoke a working credential.
GET /api/v2/meta reports the calling key's rollout cohort, type, and expiry.
It is the one route declaring the new typed gate: 'exempt' option, because the
rollout gate and the unknown-path catch-all answer byte-identical 404s and a
gated /api/v2/meta could never resolve that ambiguity. Authentication still runs
first, so the only fact disclosed is one about the caller's own credential.
* feat(api): publish deployment lifecycle and workflow-MCP v2 surfaces
Adds the four deployment-lifecycle operations v2 was missing, and the
workflow-as-MCP publishing surface, both as adapters over application use
cases that already existed.
Deployment lifecycle:
- PATCH /api/v2/workflows/{id}/versions/{version} relabels a version.
Deliberately not the internal route's body-shape dispatch between
"rename" and "promote to live".
- POST .../versions/{version}/activate promotes a version. Same use case
as rollback under a different transition, on its own path because the
two mean opposite things to a caller.
- POST .../versions/{version}/revert overwrites the draft. Accepts the
literal `active` alongside a version number.
- PATCH /api/v2/workflows/{id}/deployment toggles unauthenticated public
execution.
`workflows.public_api.update` widens from session-only to session plus
personal API key: it is an admin-role change the same accountable human
may make from a script. Workspace keys stay denied. Its EE refusal now
carries PUBLIC_SHARING_NOT_ALLOWED instead of a bare forbidden.
Workflow MCP servers:
- /api/v2/workflow-mcp-servers list, create, update, delete, plus
publish and unpublish of a workflow as a tool. Named apart from
/api/v2/mcp-servers, which registers the external servers Sim calls.
- The six mcp_servers.workflow_deployments operations widen from
['delegated'] to admit sessions and personal API keys; roles and the
workspace-key denial are unchanged.
- The server list gains keyset pagination, matching its external
sibling, since nothing caps how many a workspace publishes.
- Server, tool, and workflow reads move out of the use case into
lib/mcp/queries.
Route ratchet 1150 -> 1160; OpenAPI operations 161 -> 171.
* feat(api): extract chat deployments and publish the v2 surface
Chat deployment was a shipped module with no public API and two
authorization systems: `lib/workflows/application/chat-deployments.ts`
had deploy/undeploy extracted, but only Copilot used them — the REST
routes reimplemented workflow authorization inline, and `PATCH
/api/chat/manage/[id]` additionally owned password encryption, the
auth-type field-clearing matrix, identifier uniqueness, the
redeploy-gating protocol with two 409s, a raw db.update, and a manual
recordAudit.
New `lib/chat-deployments` domain:
- `chat_deployments.list/read/update/delete`, keyed on the deployment
whose workspace is derived by joining its workflow. Creation stays
`workflows.chat.deploy`, which is keyed on the workflow.
- The PATCH extraction, including the field-clearing matrix and the
asynchronous-cutover invariant the route had hand-mirrored from
`performChatDeploy`.
- One `buildChatDeploymentUrl`, replacing three constructions that had
already drifted onto two different host helpers. There is no chat
subdomain, so nothing publishes a host.
- Repository reads moved out of the use cases into
`lib/chat-deployments/queries`.
Internal routes are now adapters over those use cases. `GET /api/chat`
is deliberately not migrated: it scopes by `chat.userId` while every
other chat operation authorizes by workspace admin, and reconciling the
two is a product decision. `PATCH` keeps its 400 for an identifier
collision through a typed `ChatIdentifierInUseError`; v2 reports the
409 the condition actually is.
v2 surface at `/api/v2/chat-deployments`: list, create, read, update,
delete. Workspace-scoped, keyset-paged, and a stored password is never
readable — reads carry `hasPassword` only, and the session-only reveal
endpoint deliberately has no v2 counterpart.
Also: an email- or SSO-gated chat with an empty allow-list is now
refused in the use case rather than only at the internal boundary, since
it is unenterable; and the doc comment on `processHostedKeyCost`
claiming a `usageLog` write is corrected — no such write exists.
Route ratchet 1160 -> 1165; OpenAPI operations 171 -> 176.
* fix(api): close three review findings, two of them caller-reachable
- Run output files are filtered to keys under the run's own execution
prefix. The recording they came from is not a trustworthy key source:
the start block copies every caller-supplied input field verbatim into
its output and `collectUserFilesById` accepts anything carrying the
`UserFile` shape, so a caller could name any storage key and have the
download and base64 paths — neither of which authorizes per file — serve
it back.
- `getBlock` reads own keys only. `BLOCK_REGISTRY` is an object literal,
so `constructor`, `toString` and friends returned inherited functions
that every consumer then treated as a block, turning a path segment into
a 500. `getToolMetadata` already guarded this way.
- A folder-scoped log page no longer unions in every job run in the
workspace. The guard read `filters.folderIds`, which the public surface
never sets — it carries the folder filter in `folderScope` — so the page
contradicted the contract's promise that job runs are dropped whenever a
filter they cannot answer is set.
Also: the log cursor stamps `includeJobRuns` only when it is on, so its
`.default(false)` no longer puts a constant in every fingerprint and
rejects cursors minted before it existed; and the `folderName` subquery is
scoped to the workspace and to workflow folders instead of scanning the
whole `folder` table.
* fix(api): close two more review findings, one an authorization bypass
- `workflows.operations.apply` no longer admits a workspace API key. The
use case authorizes against three per-user policies — the EE permission
config, block visibility, and credential reachability — and all three
take a human subject. An actorless key has none, and both substitutes
fail open: attributing to the workspace billing owner evaluates the
batch as the least-restricted account in the workspace, and passing no
user makes `getUserPermissionConfig` return `null`, which every caller
reads as unrestricted. Either way a workspace constrained by an
allowlist was edited as though it were not. Personal keys keep the
capability, so headless editing is unaffected for a credential that
names a human.
- `GET /workflows/{id}/state` reads its variables through
`parseWorkflowVariables`, and the stored variable response schema drops
the two assertions the column cannot honour. The column has carried a
JSON string and a legacy array as well as the current record, the
realtime `variable.add` op types `type` as `z.any()`, and the parser
writes `name` through verbatim — so the input bounds on the read turned
a stored workflow into a 500 on the endpoint that opens it. The write
schema keeps them, which is where they can still be honoured.
- `GET /workflows?scope=archived` projects folder paths tolerantly.
Archiving a folder cascades onto the workflows inside it but leaves
their `folderId` dangling — which is why restore has to null it — so the
strict projector threw a bare `Error` and took the whole page down with
no cursor able to step past the row.
* fix(files): bind Start-block file keys to the executing workspace
The Start block derived a file's storage key by parsing the caller's own
`url`, which `isInternalFileUrl` matches on any host and
`extractStorageKey` returns verbatim — so a request body could name any
tenant's bytes. The key is now accepted only when its own layout names
the workspace the execution runs in, and every file is dropped when the
execution carries no workspace.
Also bounds `includeFileBase64` with an aggregate response ceiling and a
worker pool instead of an unbounded `Promise.all`, scopes the bulk
download's authorization resource to the workspace when folder paths are
requested, makes the folder-restore selector mutually exclusive at the
type level, and names the bound in the `maxBytes` validation message.
* fix(api): close v2 log review findings
Cursor scope: `scope` on the workflow and table lists carries
`.default('active')`, so it entered every fingerprint as a constant and
refused every cursor minted before the param existed — with the
"cursor does not match the requested filters" 400, which is actively
misleading for a caller that changed nothing. Both now stamp the
default as absent, so only a caller who asked for `archived` gets a new
sequence.
Dashboard stats: `maxWorkflows` capped the response, not the
allocation. Segment series are now densified after the cut instead of
before, so returning 200 series no longer materializes one
`segmentCount`-length array per workflow in the window. The aggregate
still sums every workflow, now from the sparse per-workflow maps.
Cost keyset: `cost_total` is an unconstrained `numeric`, so its anchor
travelled through `Number()` and was compared back at full precision —
rows differing beyond float64 collapsed onto one anchor. Adds
`decimalKey`, which carries the digit string and binds it `::numeric`.
Run detail: `cost_total` is a backfilled projection, so a run predating
the backfill reported `cost: null` even with a real ledger, making
`items` unreachable for exactly the runs the ledger explains. Falls
back to the ledger total.
Also caps the log folder-path index reads at MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE
like every other reader, publishing the folder-tree 413 on the four log
operations; reverts a dead `status` widening in `v2CommaListSchema`;
drops an unread `executionData` select; corrects the segment-count and
searchLogs prose; and replaces the sort-cursor SQL-text assertions with
a two-page walk over a fixture with a null block.
* fix(api): close knowledge v2 review findings
- widen knowledge.list_archived to the delete/restore policy so a workspace
API key can discover what it may restore
- escape LIKE wildcards on the now-public chunk search
- derive tag slot capacity from TAG_SLOT_CONFIG per field type
- type updateKnowledgeBase's chunkingConfig as ChunkingConfig and project
every declared field explicitly
- attribute a restore to the calling surface instead of a literal 'api'
- gate 'knowledge chunks batch-update' behind --yes, since it can delete
- present the tag-cleanup action from the parsed request rather than
faulting on the domain result after the delete committed
- unbind asserted-scope workspaceId from the nested knowledge cursors,
matching the table-row lists
- add executed-SQL coverage for the chunk keyset
* fix(catalog): close the catalog and registry-boundary review findings
The module-graph ratchet treated an entry with no baseline row as
informational, so the six catalog routes and the projection barrel were
unratcheted while the summary still read "within their module-count
baseline". An unbaselined entry now fails --check, the summary counts only
what was actually compared, and the baseline is re-recorded.
The Copilot block-metadata tool — the reason the shared projection exists,
6,756 modules down to 1,321 — was in no guarded subtree. It is now an entry
source and a catalog boundary root.
Catalog behaviour:
- hostedApiKey is gated on the deployment, so a self-hosted install reports
none instead of promising 127 tools' keys it will never supply
- block detail resolves an unversioned base type to its newest version and
projects through the viewer's visibility, so it can no longer 404 a block
the list contains or name it differently
- offset-cursor ordering compares code units rather than the process locale
- projections copy every array they publish instead of handing out the
registries' own
- an options function returning a thenable throws rather than silently
widening the providers-store substitution across the event loop
- a throwing block projection costs the Copilot tool one block, not all of them
- the trigger-kind log returns to debug: chat/manual/api are entry-point
kinds, not authoring defects
Also sweeps the custom-block detail branch against its response schema,
guards each projection module rather than the dead barrel over them, and
drops a provably dead branch in processHostedKeyCost.
* fix(workflows): close v2 workflow-authoring review findings
- Read a blockless draft back as an empty graph. `PUT /state` of
`{ blocks: {}, edges: [] }` — the contract's own published example —
deletes every block row, and the loader answers `null` for a blockless
workflow, so the following `GET /state` answered 404 while the list
endpoint still showed the workflow. Existence is the workflow row's to
decide; the null is now projected as an empty graph.
- Rewrite the `readWorkflowGraph` authorization test so it can fail. It
called `authorize?.()` and asserted only a negative, so deleting
`authorize` or replacing it with a no-op both passed — the invariant the
head-safe `HEAD` path depends on.
- Route `setWorkflowBlockEnabled` through `replaceWorkflowNormalizedState`,
the same door the other two graph writes use, instead of writing the
normalized tables itself without state preparation or custom-tool
extraction.
- Count applied operations directly. Enablement refusals landed in the same
skipped-item array and were subtracted from the operation count, which
`Math.max(applied, 0)` then masked when it went negative.
- Give a `disabled_ancestor` refusal its own member of the published skip
enum instead of reporting it as `block_locked`.
- Refuse an `atomic` batch whose credential or hosted API key would be
stripped, and carry the dropped inputs in the 409 details.
- Publish the whole lint report — `sources`, `sinks`, `orphanBlocks`,
`emptyOutgoingPorts`, `invalidBranchPorts`, `invalidConnectionTargets`,
`fieldIssues`, and the `kind` discriminator on unresolved references —
rather than only free-text reference prose.
- Stop reporting unresolved lint references as `inputValidationErrors`.
`collectUnresolvedReferences` is read-only, so those values stay
persisted; they were double-reported, and falsely as dropped inputs.
- Replace two unfalsifiable negative-principal tests, which used a
principal kind `Exclude`d from `PrincipalKind`, with a reachable one.
- Nits: drop a stranded TSDoc block; assert the membership predicate in the
selector-validator admin test; make the HEAD test assert a representation;
assert the sanitized graph is what `replaceWorkflowState` writes; add a
route test rejecting `baseGraph` in a v2 body; carry
`principalAuditSource` on restore/duplicate/moveBulk audit; unify the two
`base64MaxBytes` ceilings on `MAX_INLINE_MATERIALIZATION_BYTES`.
* fix(api): close seven v2 review findings, one an authorization bypass
Raise mcp_servers.workflow_deployments.update_server to admin: its body
carries isPublic, and a public server executes with no Sim credential, so a
write member could remove authentication from every workflow it publishes.
create_server already grants the same visibility at admin.
Pin the widened operations in registry tests — the six workflow-MCP ones,
the four workflow widenings, and files.extract_archive.
Reject secret fields on a credential that has no rotatable secret instead of
dropping them behind a 200, classify a non-transient provider 4xx as caller
error rather than a retryable outage, and reconcile a provider outage to 503
with Retry-After on all three surfaces.
Give /v2/meta a declarative principal policy through a new defineOperation
factory, carry the key expiry on the auth context instead of reading the
api_key table from the application layer, and make the impossible principal
branch an invariant error rather than a codeless 403.
Enforce the rollout-gate exemption at definition time, against the one
contract path it is reserved for, and remove the gate parameter from the
exported admission helper so the builder is its only door.
* fix(tables): bound the run-state sidecar, and close six v2 review findings
Enforces the 2 MiB run-state ceiling INSIDE the sidecar drain rather than
over its materialized result, refuses the unbounded query form paired with
it, and normalizes the two stored blobs the v2 surface publishes from bare
`as` casts.
- The run-state budget now travels into `loadExecutionsByRow`, which drains
row ids in bounded chunks and refuses before fetching the next one. The
post-hoc `requireBoundedRunState` walk is gone: it measured a spike that
had already happened, and re-serialized every entry to do it.
- Both row reads that accept `includeRunState` cap the page at
`V2_MAX_RUN_STATE_ROW_LIMIT`, and `POST /tables/{id}/query` additionally
refuses the flag paired with `limit: 0`.
- `runState.status` and the enrichment cascade blob are projected onto the
published shape before presentation; both were caller-reachable 500s on a
well-formed read.
- `sim tables bulk-delete` now gates behind `--yes`, and the CLI sweep that
should have caught it covers destructive non-DELETE forms.
- `POST /tables/{id}/restore` is idempotent (200, no audit) like its
knowledge sibling, and bulk folder selection deduplicates after resolution.
- The batch-update backstop keeps the looser Copilot ceiling and says so in
TSDoc: it is a backstop no surface reaches, because the contracts stop a
v2 caller at 1000 and the Copilot tool stops itself at 5000. Each caller
sees the bound that actually applies to it; neither surface's cap moved.
* fix(chat-deployments): close v2 chat review findings
Fixes the chat-deployments slice of the v2 review, several of which are
regressions the application-operation extraction introduced.
- Stop a `500` on schemaless JSONB: the response now declares a stored
shape without bounds and `toV2ChatDeployment` projects
`customizations`, `outputConfigs`, and `allowedEmails` onto it. The
request schemas keep `.strict()` and their bounds.
- Restore the specific validation message on `POST /api/chat` and
`PATCH /api/chat/manage/[id]`, and the deleted test that pinned it.
- Restore `chat_deployments.read` to workspace `admin`; the detail read
serves the visitor gate.
- Narrow the list projection so `chat_deployments.list` can stay a
`read` operation reachable by a workspace API key: `allowedEmails`,
`hasPassword`, and `customizations` are gone from the list entry and
available only from the admin-gated detail read. Serialized field by
field so a field added to the detail shape cannot reach the list by
default.
- Classify create-path failures: `performChatDeploy` carries an
`errorCode`, so an in-flight deployment is a `409` and an invariant
failure a `500` instead of every refusal being a `400`.
- Delete the callerless `GET /api/chat`, which served the encrypted
password column with no response contract.
- Propagate undeploy infrastructure failures instead of concealing them
as `404`, and return `ChatDeploymentView` from both delete paths.
- Name `CHAT_AUTH_MODE_NOT_PERMITTED` on the create path.
- Guard `getBaseUrl` inside `buildChatDeploymentUrl`, which otherwise
throws on a self-host with no `NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL`.
- Correct the published allow-list claim: a replacement `allowedEmails`
is applied after the auth-type clear, so it does survive.
- Assert `workspaceId` on the v2 detail routes and reconcile the
concealment TSDoc with what the error policy actually renders.
- Move `resolveActiveWorkspaceApplicationContext` to the workspaces
domain so chat-deployments no longer imports workflow application code.
* test(credentials): pin the reconciled provider-outage status
The internal route alone answered 502 where the v2 surface, the shared
status helper and `PROVIDER_OUTAGE_CODES`' own TSDoc all say 503. The
test pinned the divergence; it now pins the reconciliation, including the
`Retry-After` a 503 carries. Corrects a stale comment that still named
502 as the value callers see.
* fix(executor): restore cloud-storage Start files, dropped by the key rule
The ownership check accepted a key only when it could be parsed out of an
internal `/api/files/serve/...` URL. But the server-side uploader for run
inputs returns a *presigned cloud* URL whenever object storage is
configured, whose path is the bucket key — so every chat-deployment
attachment, API `files[]` payload and generic-webhook file field resolved
no key, and because normalization is all-or-nothing the entire `files`
input was dropped with no error. It passed locally and under vitest only
because the uploader falls back to an internal URL when no object storage
is configured, which is exactly why no test caught it.
The test is ownership, not provenance: a key is accepted when its own
layout names the executing workspace, whether it arrives directly or is
parsed out of the URL. Neither field has to be trusted, since both are
caller-authored and both are held to the same check. A payload whose key
and URL disagree is refused rather than resolved in the caller's favour —
a genuine uploader writes the two consistently, so only a forged pairing
is turned away.
`context` is now derived from the accepted key rather than read from the
payload or the URL's `?context=`, so an owned key can no longer be
labelled with a bucket its bytes do not live in — the hardening the
previous comment claimed but did not perform.
* fix(api): close four defects the fix pass introduced
- `resolveLatest` built a `RegExp` from the caller's block id and read the
registry with a bare lookup, so the catalog detail route — moved onto it
by the version-alias fix — routed around the `ownBlock` guard added for
exactly this. `GET /api/v2/blocks/%5B` was a `SyntaxError` 500 and
`.../constructor` an inherited function. Matched by string comparison
now, the way `tools/tool-ids.ts` resolves the same convention, and read
through `ownBlock`.
- The run-state byte budget was applied inside `queryRows` rather than at
the callers that publish it, so the first-party table grid — which reads
run state at five times the row limit and publishes no ceiling — turned
a large page into a hard failure, with an error naming a parameter it
does not expose. The budget is now an explicit option the public reads
pass and internal callers omit.
- Three graph-write CLI commands shipped ungated because the sweep meant
to catch them matched only the names already enumerated, so it could
never fail. It now forces every non-`GET` operation into a destructive
or non-destructive list, and the three carry confirmations.
- Unbinding `workspaceId` from the knowledge-documents cursor was right on
the merits and wrong in effect: the value is constant per sequence, so
removing it changed the fingerprint and refused every cursor already in
flight. Restored there; the chunks list is new in the same change and
keeps the cleaner reading.
* fix(api): resolve a detail read to a version the viewer can see
`getLatestBlockForViewer` took the newest version and then hid it, which
inverted the contradiction it was written to close: `slack_v2` and
`table_v2` are preview-gated while their v1 deliberately stays in the
toolbar, so an unrevealed viewer got a `404` on a detail read for a type
`GET /api/v2/blocks` was listing in the same breath. It now walks versions
newest-first and answers with the first one visible to that viewer.
Also:
- The chat password guard ran after `performFullDeploy`, so a request that
could never succeed burned a real workflow deployment version and then
answered 400. Its two sibling gate guards already refuse ahead of the
deploy; this one now does too.
- The Copilot sub-block serializer published the registry's own `options`
and `dependsOn` arrays by reference. Pre-existing, but the catalog
projection this parallels copies every array it publishes precisely
because they are process-global and shared by every request.
* fix(api): restore the locked read-modify-write and the password validator
Two findings verified as real regressions against staging, out of ten
checked — the rest were pre-existing, latent, or false.
`setWorkflowBlockEnabled` read the graph outside the row lock and wrote it
back inside a later transaction. The editor's own save takes that same
lock, so an autosave committing in the window was silently discarded: this
operation writes a whole graph, not a delta. The persistence primitive now
accepts a reader that runs after the lock is taken, and the toggle
re-reads and re-decides there. Its lock predicate is also scoped to the
workspace and to a live row again, so a workflow archived mid-flight is
refused rather than written.
The v2 chat-deployment contracts inlined their own password rule twice
instead of using `chatDeploymentPasswordSchema`, losing the refusal of a
whitespace-only password — which the internal contract rejects precisely
because it strands the deployment behind a password the visitor form will
not submit. Both sites use the canonical validator now.
* fix(api): one folder projection, one dynamic-provider list, honest 413s
- `toV2Folder` existed twice, and the second copy had been written without
the name/path invariant — so a row the list read refuses loudly would
have been served with a mismatched pair by the restore read. One
definition, guard included.
- The catalog projection restated `DYNAMIC_MODEL_PROVIDERS` and had
drifted by one member. Derived from the canonical list instead.
- The tables reads documented a `413` for run state that they cannot emit
— the budget became opt-in, and the row limit is the bound now — so the
claim is removed rather than declared. The workflow run read has the
opposite problem: it genuinely emits one, on a single file *or* the
run's inlined total, and declared neither. Now declared, and the
sentence covers both.
- Reclassifies the operations staging added into the destructive sweep, so
the triage stays exhaustive.
* fix(v2): classify storage and uniqueness failures, drop permanent file delete
- remove the permanent file-delete endpoint; the platform offers no such
action in the UI, and its manager wrote outside a transaction with no
storage accounting
- extract a generated document's text from its compiled artifact rather than
its generation source, matching the download path; a `.pdf` source was a
500 and a `.docx` source returned generator JavaScript as clean content
- report a run file whose object retention has already swept as 404 rather
than 500, on both the inline base64 read and the download stream
- report a knowledge tag that loses at a unique index as 409, naming whether
the slot or the display name is taken
- gate `workflows versions revert` behind a CLI confirm; it overwrites the
draft graph and was classified non-destructive
* feat(v2): report lint from both graph writes and add dry-run previews
- `PUT /workflows/{id}/state` now returns the same `lint` report as
`POST /operations`; an agent authoring a graph from scratch needs the
findings at least as much as one editing incrementally
- extract the report into one shared builder so the two writes cannot drift,
and one shared presenter so the wire shape is identical
- skip the credential/tool reference pass when the caller has no human
subject, rather than resolving it against the workspace billing owner:
that would misreport what the workflow can reach and disclose another
person's grants. `lint.notes` says when it was skipped
- add `?dryRun=true` to both graph writes: validates and lints, persists
nothing, records no audit, notifies nobody. A query param, not a body
field, since the body of a PUT is the resource itself
- CLI: a dry run no longer demands `--yes`; requiring confirmation to preview
a change teaches callers to pass `--yes` reflexively
- CLI: name the graph commands for their verbs — `workflows state get`,
`workflows state replace`, `workflows operations apply` — instead of the
derived `state list` / `state update` / `operations create`
- document when to use `rollback` vs `versions/{version}/activate` on both
* chore(docs): sync generated docs manifest for the new CLI pages
* feat(v2): add the missing workflow-MCP reads and align bulk naming
- add `GET /workflow-mcp-servers/{serverId}` and
`GET /workflow-mcp-servers/{serverId}/tools`. The resource could be
PATCHed and DELETEd but never read, and its tools could be published and
unpublished but never listed — the server list reports tool names only, so
nothing published the `workflowId` that addresses a tool for deletion.
Both mirror `mcp-servers` beside them, and carry that family's
workspace-API-key denial rather than the wider `mcp_servers.read` policy
- rename `POST /tables/bulk-move` to `POST /tables/move`, so tables matches
the shipped `files` resource exactly (`move` + `bulk-delete`)
- name the CLI commands for their operations instead of the derived
`... create`: `tables move`, `workflows move`, `tables bulk-delete`, and
`tables rows update-each` for the per-row batch, which sits beside the
existing filter-based `tables rows batch-update`
`POST /tables/{id}/rows/batch-update` keeps its name: a distinct payload per
resource is precisely AIP-234 BatchUpdate, and `bulk-` would have collided
one word away from the filter form.
* fix(v2): correct documented statuses and a caller-reachable 500
- duplicating a workflow into a locked destination folder answered 500:
`FolderLockedError` is a plain Error carrying `status = 423`, which the v2
error policy does not classify. Converted to OrchestrationError('locked')
at the application boundary, matching the bulk-move path
- restore workflow promised a 413 for an oversized folder tree that its
response list never published; the cap is real, so the status now is too
- move workflows and apply variables documented 409/423 they cannot emit:
every per-item lock and conflict is reported in `failed`, not thrown
- bulk download and delete knowledge tag can both 409 and did not say so;
cleanup tag definitions cannot and did say so
- apply workflow operations denies workspace API keys but never documented it
- the dry-run responses are not byte-identical to a committed write:
`needsRedeployment` describes the pre-write state and persistence warnings
cannot appear. Reworded rather than overclaimed
- read file text and get file upload are head-safe, so the "HEAD skips the
effect" sentence did not apply to them
* fix(v2): guard tag field-type changes and publish the 415 every body route can return
- `PATCH /knowledge/{id}/tags/{tagId}` accepted a `fieldType` incompatible
with the slot the tag already occupies. Slots are enumerated per field
type, so a text tag could be relabelled `number` and every later read
would interpret its values as the wrong type. Create checked this; update
now runs the same two checks
- derive `415` from the contract the way `413` already is: the JSON builder
answers UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE for any body under a content type it cannot
read, so all 100 body routes could return a status none of them published
- give version activation its own result component instead of publishing it
as `RollbackResult`; the shipped rollback keeps that name
- correct descriptions that promised behaviour the code does not have: a
`processingStatus` field never returned, a `gmail_send` resolution example
that short-circuits, bucket widths that overflow the window, a bulk tag
save that relocates rather than overwrites, and per-server tool names
actually gathered under a page-wide budget
- drop 409 from three knowledge and upload reads that cannot emit it
* docs(v2): correct the upload transfer contract and 16 other published claims
The upload transfer step was documented as Sim's own data plane on every
deployment: "success is 204" and "a failure is the v2 error envelope". That
holds only when Sim stores objects itself. With object storage configured the
URL is the provider's presigned URL, so S3 and GCS answer 200 and Azure 201,
and a failure is the provider's XML — a client written to the old text reads a
successful cloud upload as a failure. Also states that part ETags do not need
retaining: completion takes no body because Sim lists the parts from the
provider itself.
Other corrections, all to shipped descriptions rather than behaviour:
- DELETE table and bulk-delete files archive rather than erase, and neither
said so; bulk delete also cannot emit the 409 it declared
- complete knowledge upload published a 402 only the create leg can raise
- billing status conceals a foreign workspace id as 404, not the 403 its
TSDoc and description both claimed
- audit entries null a folder's resourceId and strip folder ids from metadata
at every level; neither redaction was documented
- details=full adds the workflow summary to workflow runs only, never to job
runs; GET /logs folderPaths covers a subtree like its two siblings; getLog
now carries the retention sentence
- list secrets returns description too, and the logs and resources documents
described only part of what they serve
* improvement(api): consolidate the v2 surface and close seven defects
Endpoint consolidation:
- Fold POST /logs/query into GET /logs; add sortBy/sortOrder, cap the
comma lists, and move the list onto the shared keyset codec
- Fold GET /knowledge/archived into GET /knowledge?scope=archived,
matching files, tables, and workflows
- Re-home chat deployments as a singleton under the workflow they
belong to; keep the workspace-scoped discovery list
- Move the tag-definition writes off the document path onto
/knowledge/{id}/tags, where they already acted
- Nest the table export and dispatch reads under their parent table
Defects:
- Publish isPublicApi on the deployment read; it was write-only, so a
workflow could be opened to unauthenticated execution unauditably
- Stop publishing raw storage keys and an unusable URL in log files
- Classify a chat-identifier unique violation as 409 rather than 500
- Fall back to the root path instead of throwing when a knowledge
base's folder is archived
- Cap bulk-download at the ceiling it actually enforces
- Normalize variables through one helper on both graph write paths
- Fix a folder-name log filter that matched workflow names
Naming and gaps:
- Rename /files/{id}/extract to /unarchive, /rows/find to /rows/search,
/rows/batch-update to /rows/bulk-update, /columns/run to /dispatches
- Type the last six generic [id] path segments
- Add table folder restore and id-addressed dispatch cancel
* chore(audits): record the v2 catalog routes in the boundary baseline
* fix(api): accept a null chat password and correct three published claims
- performChatDeploy validated `password: null` as a password, so the
replace-shaped chat PUT answered 400 for every mode that owns no
password — public (the default), email, and sso. The declared payload
type has always allowed null, and the stored value is cleared by
authType regardless, so null needs no validation of its own. The route
test could not catch it: it mocks the orchestration module and pinned
the exact null the real guard refused.
- Redirect the two docs slugs this branch retired that were genuinely
published: findTableRows and runTableColumns.
- The table folder restore described an idempotent no-op for an already
active folder; it answers 404. Say so, and say where the path comes
from, since the tables folder list cannot yet report archived folders.
- Name the customizations exception to the chat PUT's replace semantics.
- A cursor-binding case used status=error, which is a level and not a
status, so it failed contract validation and never reached the cursor
check. Use an accepted value and pin the reason, not just the status.
* chore(cli): classify the new v2 chat operation as non-destructive
* feat(cli): expose canonical resource URLs
* fix(api): close three caller-reachable failures found by the final probe
- GET /files/{fileId}/text called parseBuffer unguarded, and parseBuffer
signals every failure as a bare Error that no v2 policy classifies. A
zero-byte upload or a mislabelled archive was an unhandled 500. Empty
bytes now answer empty text — a zero-length file has no text — and
unparseable bytes answer 409, matching the rendered-artifact resolver.
- GET /workflows/{workflowId}/state asserted write-side bounds over
stored data. workflow_blocks.name and .type are bare text() and the
realtime rename op accepts z.string(), so a block renamed past 255
characters made the workflow unreadable, and unrepairable, over v2.
The read shape now takes the same input/stored split the variable
schema already had. Stored subflow conditions are coerced in the
loader beside the existing numeric guards.
- GET /knowledge stamped scope into the cursor fingerprint
unconditionally. scope defaults to active and is new on that list, so
every cursor the deployed build handed out would have been refused
with a message saying the caller changed a filter they never sent.
Its siblings already carry the guard and the comment.
Also: POST /workflow-mcp-servers answers 201 like every other v2 create;
GET /logs/stats reuses the log list's entry ceilings; the execute and
resume routes install the media-type-aware 415 they publish; and a
rationale citing an endpoint that never reached the wire is corrected.
* fix(tables): carry the dispatch terminal timestamps through the stale sweep
Staging's abandoned-dispatch recovery builds its own `DispatchRow`, and
this branch had added `completedAt`/`cancelledAt` to that shape for the
id-addressed dispatch read and cancel. The merge was textually clean and
left the new mapping short two fields.
* fix(workflows): deny workspace API keys on the graph replace
`PUT /workflows/{workflowId}/state` stores blocks and their tool wiring
wholesale, but the policies deciding which of those a member may add —
the EE permission config and block visibility — take a human subject.
A workspace API key has none, and both substitutes fail open: the
billing owner is a different, typically less-constrained person, and
passing no user makes the permission lookup return null, which every
caller reads as unrestricted.
That made the replace a second graph-write door storing what its sibling
`POST /workflows/{workflowId}/operations` refuses, which denies workspace
keys for exactly this reason. Both doors now agree. Personal keys keep
the capability, so headless authoring is unaffected for a credential
that names a human.
* chore(api): drop the enrichment catalog endpoint
GET /api/v2/enrichments listed the code-defined table enrichments. The
per-row enrichment run detail stays; only the catalog read goes.
Removes the route, contract, response and query schemas, the semantic
operation, the use case, the projection module, its registry-boundary
entry, and the CLI command. The "not found" and "blank search" cases it
covered are repointed at the connector-type sibling so the shared
behaviour stays tested rather than deleted with it.
* improvement(api): make the workflow operations endpoint self-describing
Two things stood between this endpoint and a caller who has only the
published spec.
The accepted `params` keys existed only in the edit engine's source. The
spec said "the accepted keys depend on the target block type", so a
caller reading it could create a nameless empty block and nothing more —
while the Copilot tool catalog, over the same engine, has always spelled
out the envelope. That guidance now lives in the contract, shared by the
add, edit, and insert_into_subflow parameter schemas so the two surfaces
cannot describe one engine differently: `inputs` keyed by sub-block id,
`retry`/`triggerMode`/`advancedMode` beside it rather than inside it,
`connections` keyed by source handle, and `removeEdges` for dropping one
edge without restating the rest.
A `block_id` that is not already a UUID is replaced with a minted one,
and the mapping was computed and then dropped. A caller could not
reference the block it had just created except by re-reading the graph
and matching on name. The engine now returns it and the response
publishes it as `mintedBlockIds`, with the in-batch versus cross-request
rule stated in the operation description.
* fix(api): close the pre-merge scan's blocking findings
Docs and public wire, all of it permanent surface once released.
- Two published tag groups, Catalog and Meta, had no sidebar entry in any
locale, so six operations shipped unbrowsable. Added to all six, and a
test now fails when a published tag has no entry.
- deleteWorkflowChatDeployment pointed callers at DELETE on /deployment;
the undeploy verb is on /deploy.
- PUT /state still promised workspace API keys a degraded lint pass after
the operation began rejecting them outright. It also lived in a
single-quoted string, so the shared clause would not have interpolated.
- POST /tables/move took targetFolderPath as nullable-but-required, which
rendered the CLI flag as a required `<json|@file>`: `--to /Archive`
failed to parse and omitting it failed outright, while the docs said
"omit for root". Now optional and a plain string, matching
POST /files/move; the route supplies the null the use case wants.
- Table dispatch status and row run state published `cancelled` beside
imports, exports, and job state publishing `canceled`, and the note
explaining the split was wrong about its own sibling. Both new schemas
now publish `canceled`; the stored column is unchanged and mapped at
the presenter. The shipped `cancelled` count field is left alone.
- applyWorkflowVariables can answer 423 and both workflow-MCP deletes can
answer 409; none declared it. Hand-assembled error lists replaced with
the shared sets.
- /files/{fileId}/unarchive became /unzip. `extract` reads as "extract
text" and `unarchive` reads as the inverse of restore on a resource
where archived means soft-deleted; unzip collides with neither and is
what the implementation calls itself.
* improvement(cli,docs): finish the naming and clear the enrichment leftovers
- Four single-record GETs derived to `list` while returning one thing:
meta, a workflow's chat deployment, log stats, and file text. Renamed to
`meta status`, `workflows chat status`, `logs stats`, `files read`,
matching the `workflows deployment status` correction already in this
branch. None of the old spellings shipped.
- Dropped five `renamedFrom` aliases pointing at spellings that never
existed, each of which built a hidden command and a permanent
deprecation warning for argv nobody could have typed. `tables rows find`
keeps its alias — that one really shipped.
- Removed the enrichment catalog from three prose sites left behind when
the endpoint went: the resources spec description, its Catalog tag, and
the contract and pagination-test comments.
- Documented the six new command groups in the CLI index table. That page
is a guide page, so the docs staleness check cannot flag it.
- Published the `customizations` exception to the chat replace semantics.
It was in the route TSDoc and invisible to every caller reading the
spec, which is where the claim "Replace, not merge" is made.
* improvement(cli): use batch- for the tables bulk delete, matching its siblings
The CLI renames a bulk form only when it would collide with its singular
sibling, and uses AWS's `batch-` prefix when it does — `files
batch-delete`, `tables rows batch-delete`, `knowledge chunks
batch-update`. `tables delete` exists, so `tables bulk-delete` was that
same rename reaching for the other word, and the only `bulk-` command on
the surface. No `bulk-` CLI command has ever shipped, so this costs
nothing now and would be permanent later.
`files bulk-download` keeps its name: there is no `files download` to
collide with, and it is one archive rather than N operations. Its config
block now says why it exists at all, since the command is never built —
the builder skips non-JSON response modes, but the contract sweeps still
read the entry and require the folder-path field to be marked.
* fix(workflows): allow operations on blockless drafts
* feat(workflows): add manual and run-from-block execution
* fix(cli): update workflow run description test
* fix(tests): align fixtures with current contracts
* fix(api): derive chat activity from workflow deployment
---------
Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai>
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0a5b3801ea |
feat(secrets): let workspace secrets opt out of redaction (#7045)
* feat(secrets): let workspace secrets opt out of redaction * fix(secrets): certify no sandbox exemptions once the registry is incomplete * feat(secrets): carry visible secret values on the v2 list and document visibility * fix(secrets): read visible values by own property so prototype-named secrets cannot poison the list |
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8104c33bba |
Fix knowledge connector sync follow-up (#6927)
* Fix knowledge connector sync follow-up * Fix connector sync pause race * fix(knowledge): surface connector sync dispatch failures * fix(knowledge): make connector sync recovery durable * fix(knowledge): deduplicate connector sync dispatches * fix(knowledge): preserve pending connector syncs * fix(knowledge): lock connector sync snapshot |
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8937bb3550 |
fix(kb): let the server say a connector sync is queued (#6968)
* fix(kb): let the server say a connector sync is queued The connector chip inferred "a sync is coming" from `createdAt` inside a 2-minute window, because nothing on the row distinguished a queued sync from an idle connector until a worker took the lock. The guess was wrong under queue backlog and under client clock skew, and it forced a pile of client state to stand in for it. Adds `pending`, written as the sync is handed to the queue and cleared when a worker takes the lock or the hand-off is found to have been lost. It is a phase of the same lock `syncing` holds, so it opens the lease and takes an ownership token the same way — the lease is what the scheduler ages a stranded queue entry against (`updatedAt` cannot serve: a pending connector is still editable, so any unrelated write would renew the recovery it should trigger), and the token is what proves a late release belongs to this dispatch. Deletes the 2-minute window, the in-flight id sets, the 5-minute cooldown timers and the forced re-render they needed. The cooldown lived in a ref inside a modal, so it evaporated whenever the modal closed; the disable now comes from durable server state and is shared across tabs. Also fixes, all found while tracing the lifecycle: - An on-demand sync on a paused or disabled connector silently resumed it for good. Nothing could put the pause back: success writes `active`, a lost queue entry writes `error`, and the due-sweep keeps syncing that. Refused. - A failed hand-off no longer advances the connector's auto-disable breaker. A queue outage would otherwise increment every connector in the fleet until they all disabled themselves for a fault that was never theirs. - Manual sync on an established connector gave no feedback at all: the poll only ran while the predicate matched, which it never did. - Four over-broad invalidations that refetched every cached chunk page and chunk search in a base when one connector document was excluded. - The dead-process reporter re-sent a PATCH per stale document on every poll. * fix(kb): refuse to start a queued run on a paused connector The queue outlives the decision to sync. Pausing a connector after its run was queued cleared the queue entry's token but left the task itself alive, and the lock CAS accepted any row that was not already `syncing` — so the worker took the paused row and wrote its own terminal `active` over the pause. Moves the rule to the two points that can enforce it: an explicit `LOCKABLE_CONNECTOR_STATUSES` allowlist on the lock acquisition, and the same allowlist on `markSyncPending`, which closes the mirror race where a dispatch already in flight rewrites a just-paused row back to `pending`. Queueing and starting now agree on one rule, and a skipped hand-off is reported as its own outcome rather than a concurrency conflict. Also patches the connector detail cache alongside the list on an optimistic status write, so an already-expanded card starts its own sync poll instead of showing stale history behind the list's spinner. * fix(kb): make a queued sync prove it is the run that was queued `markSyncPending` minted an ownership token but only `releaseFailedDispatch` checked it, so the worker could consume a queue entry that was not its own. A task delayed past its lease is reclaimed and replaced; the status check alone let that stale task take the replacement's entry and run superseded options — a plain sync where the user had just asked for a full resync — while the replacement was turned away as `sync_in_progress`. Carries the token in the task payload and matches it at lock acquisition, the same discipline `holdsSyncLockToken` already applies to the `syncing` phase, extended to the phase before it. A superseded run is now reported as such rather than as a concurrency conflict. The payload field is optional for the rollout window only: tasks already in the queue carry no token, and stranding them would be worse than letting them fall back to the status check for one deploy. * fix(kb): report a paused connector as paused, not superseded Pausing a queued connector releases its token, so testing ownership before status reported every pause-while-queued — the common case — as a superseded dispatch. The mismatch is the symptom there; the status is the reason. * fix(kb): stop a status update landing on a run that already started The update's guards ran against a row read moments earlier and the write carried no compare-and-set, so a worker taking the lock in between meant the write landed on a `syncing` row — overwriting the run's status and, because leaving `pending` also clears the lock columns, wiping the token its heartbeat and terminal write match on. That stranded a sync that had already begun. The write is now conditional on the status the request was authorized against, and a lost race is reported as a conflict rather than "not found". Also restores the in-flight guard on the pause control. The optimistic status flip relabels it Pause -> Resume immediately, so a second click could send `active` before the first pause settled and resume a connector the user meant to pause. Read from the mutation's own pending state rather than the local id set this PR removed — React Query already knows which row is in flight. |
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58aa6379e0 |
feat(cli): add chat command (#6937)
* feat(cli): add chat command * fix(cli): harden chat command execution |
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5b28da1989 |
fix(tables): accept plain row query predicates (#6916)
* fix(tables): accept plain row query predicates * fix(cli): show table predicate group syntax |
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a99f61bee9 |
feat(api): add v2 resource management endpoints (#6900)
* feat(api): add v2 resource management endpoints * fix(cli): gate destructive v2 commands * fix(test): update v2 request-slice count * feat(cli): add shared workspace profiles |
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4f9d5f33b0 |
improvement(search): search every folder, and document real API error bodies (#6861)
* improvement(search): search every folder, and document real API error bodies Search on Files, Tables, and Knowledge was ANDed with the open folder, so a query only ever matched that folder's direct children — and the query was not cleared when you entered a folder, filtering the folder you just opened down to the same matches. A non-empty query now searches the whole workspace, a Location column names each result's folder, and opening a folder ends the search. Also gives GET /api/v2/files a `recursive` flag, and replaces the single shared OpenAPI error example — which showed `BAD_REQUEST` under every status tab — with one real body per status. * fix(search): discard the search term on clear instead of masking it `useSearchFilterValue` returned the debounced term whenever the input was non-empty, so clearing only hid the settled needle. The mask lifted on the next keystroke while the debounce still held the pre-clear term — opening a folder and typing within the window searched the whole workspace for the query the user had just abandoned. A clear now resets the settled term rather than hiding it, adjusted during render so the reset is visible to the render that follows the clear. The initial state is seeded from the first value so a deep-linked `?search=` still filters on the first render. |
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374c1064ea |
chore(cli): release 2.1.0 (#6826)
The publish workflow derives the npm version from this field, and on `main` it uses it verbatim: `2.0.0` was already on the registry, so the release step skipped and every change since then stayed unpublished. Staging and dev never showed it because they append `-preview.N` and `-dev.N`, which are always new. So the merged CLI work — the redirect refusal, the default endpoint, folder path encoding, the request bound, the User-Agent, `run --follow`, `runs wait` and `logs follow` — is on `main` but not on npm, and `sim@latest` is still the build whose every write is dropped by the apex redirect. Minor rather than patch: three commands are new and the default endpoint changed. |
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1c69372cba |
feat(cli): follow a run, wait for one, and tail the log (#6813)
* feat(cli): follow a run, wait for one, and tail the log Three commands the surface was missing, each polling or streaming something the generated command layer cannot express. `workflows run --follow` renders the SSE the execute route already emits, so a multi-minute agent run stops printing nothing until it ends. It rides on the generated `run` leaf rather than a sibling command — same operation, one different response encoding — and delegates to the handler it replaced, so every non-follow invocation still runs the generated path. Answer text, thinking and tool calls go to stderr; only the final envelope reaches stdout, so redirecting still yields the result. Reasoning and tool frames need the `X-Sim-Stream-Protocol` header, which is sent only when asked for, because negotiating also switches answer text to live chunks the server may retract. `workflows runs wait` closes the loop `--async` opens. Terminal is completed, failed or cancelled; `redacting` is not, since a run whose output is still being scrubbed is not yet a run you can read. A time pause keeps polling because the server resumes it, and a human pause stops with the resume command rather than burning the bound and calling it a timeout. Distinct exit codes keep cancelled and paused from reading as failure. The bound is `--wait-timeout` and not `--timeout`, because SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS already bounds one request and two knobs of the same name hide each other. `logs follow` tails runs as they arrive. Dedup keys on run id, not on the timestamp: a schedule fan-out starts many runs in the same millisecond, so a timestamp watermark either drops the siblings or reprints them. JSON output is one object per line, because a follow never closes an array, and the table header is printed once so columns stay aligned across polls. * fix(cli): disclose a truncated burst, and clear a stale retry notice Two review findings in `logs follow`, both verified against the code first. The page budget bounds one poll so an enormous burst cannot stall the follow, but on reaching it the live cursor was discarded: the remainder is older than everything collected and the next poll restarts at the newest page, so those runs were never printed and nothing said so. The budget stays — draining without one trades a bounded poll for unbounded buffering in a process meant to run for hours — but hitting it now warns on stderr, naming the count and pointing at `sim logs list`. That notice is written even off a terminal, because a piped log is where an unexplained hole is hardest to spot. The retry notice was cleared after the empty-rows check, so a poll that recovered but found nothing left "retrying in Ns…" on screen while the follow was already healthy. Clearing now happens as soon as a poll succeeds. The second test needed two failures to be worth anything: the teardown clears the line either way, so what separates fixed from broken is whether a bare erase lands before the second notice or only at the end. The first version passed against the bug. * test(cli): pin that a mixed page is the watermark, not a truncation A page holding a run already printed proves the follow caught up, so the truncation warning must not fire there — that is how every healthy poll terminates, and warning would report a hole on the ordinary path. The straggler sharing that page is still collected, because the filter takes every unprinted row on it rather than only those above the known one. * fix(cli): say when the requested backlog was larger than a page holds The logs API clamps `limit` into 1–1000 rather than rejecting it, so `logs follow -n 5000` came back with 1000 rows, anchored the floor to that partial page, and said nothing. The seed already knew — it computes whether a live cursor remained — but the caller discarded the answer. Guarded on both halves. Fewer rows than asked for is only a shortfall when more were waiting: a workspace holding ten runs answers `-n 50` with ten and nothing is missing, so warning on the row count alone would fire on every small workspace. The cursor is what separates the two. |
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0e84e92d39 |
fix(cli): bound, trace, and explain the requests the CLI makes (#6798)
* fix(cli): bound, trace, and explain the requests the CLI makes Four transport gaps, all of which failed silently. A request had no timeout, so a connection that was accepted and then never answered hung the terminal indefinitely. `SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` now bounds one, defaulting to 3600s — deliberately above every timeout the server itself applies, since a synchronous workflow run is allowed 3000s on a paid plan and a tighter default would abort real work and report it as a transport failure. `0` removes the bound, for a self-hosted deployment that runs executions without one of its own. The caller's abort signal is composed with the timeout rather than replaced, so neither masks the other. Node ignores HTTP(S)_PROXY unless NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY opts in, and only from v22.21 and v24.5, so on a network that reaches the API only through a proxy every command failed to connect while the variable that would have fixed it was already set. The CLI cannot enable that from inside the process — Node reads it at startup — so it says what to do rather than bundling an HTTP stack for a setting the platform now owns. An API key was sent to any http:// endpoint with no signal. Now a warning, not a refusal: http is the documented way to reach a local dev server, and a deployment terminating TLS at a gateway is real. Loopback stays silent. `SIM_DEBUG=1` traces method, URL, status and duration. Bodies and headers are deliberately absent — the request carries the API key, and `secrets set` carries the secret itself. All four write to stderr, so a piped stdout stays parseable. * fix(cli): make the request bound safe on every runtime it supports Two ways the new timeout could fail before the request was made. `AbortSignal.any` arrived in Node 20.3 and this package supports Node 20, so composing a caller's abort signal with the timeout threw a bare TypeError on the earliest 20.x releases. It is now used when present and composed through an AbortController when not. `AbortSignal.timeout` rejects a fractional millisecond outright, and past 2^31-1 ms it does not fail at all — it clamps to 1ms, so the longest timeout anyone asked for became the shortest. The value is now rounded and refused above what Node can actually wait, pointing at 0 for an unbounded wait. Also unstubs env vars between tests: `stubEnv` is not undone by `unstubAllGlobals`, so a SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS set for one test configured every test after it. * fix(cli): correct the proxy version table, and classify a timeout mid-body `runtimeCanProxy` treated any release between 22 and 24 as capable, so on Node 23 — which reached end of life before the backport — a configured proxy was ignored and the CLI stayed silent about it, which is the exact failure the warning exists to report. The table is now the two lines that shipped the support, and anything after them. `AbortSignal.timeout` keeps firing after `fetch` resolves, so a bound that elapsed while the body was still being read — a large `files get` — escaped the client's own handling and printed a raw TimeoutError stack. The top-level handler now names it, which covers the streaming path as well as the JSON one. A user's own Ctrl-C raises AbortError and is deliberately left alone. * fix(cli): report a timed-out download as a timeout `files get --output-file` streams the body to disk, and `streamToFile` converted anything the stream threw into a write failure. So a request bound elapsing mid-download read as `Could not write <path>: ...`, sending the reader to check permissions and free space for a timeout they can raise, and hiding the one instruction that resolves it. The predicate and that instruction now live beside the timeout that raises them, so the client, the top-level handler and the download path all say the same thing. The wrapping stays where it is: the staged-download cleanup runs off that failure, and rethrowing past it would leak the temporary directory. * fix(cli): keep a sub-millisecond timeout bounded Zero is how this function says "no bound", so rounding a positive SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS down to zero inverted the request: anything under 0.0005s asked for the shortest possible timeout and got none at all, leaving a stalled request to hang. Introduced by the rounding that fixed the fractional-millisecond rejection. Floored at 1ms for every positive value; only a literal 0 still disables. |
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0b4d34137b |
feat(secrets): add optional descriptions to workspace secrets (#6796)
* feat(secrets): add optional descriptions to workspace secrets Workspace secrets already have a backing credential row with a description column, but nothing surfaced it. Teammates had no way to record what a secret is for. - Add a Description field to the secret detail page, matching the integrations credential page, gated on workspace-secret admin - Fold the value and description editors into one Save/Discard pair and one unsaved-changes guard; two guards cannot coexist, since each seeds its own same-URL history entry - Match descriptions in the secrets settings search - Expose description on GET/PUT /api/v2/secrets and in the CLI Descriptions are workspace-only: env_personal credential rows are per-workspace mirrors of one user-global secret, so one saved there would exist in a single workspace, and a personal secret has no teammates to inform. The API rejects a description on personal scope rather than silently dropping it, and omitting it on PUT leaves any existing description untouched so a value rotation cannot erase it. * fix(secrets): address review findings on secret descriptions - Patch the credential detail cache optimistically on update. `onMutate` cancelled the detail query but only patched the lists, so a detail-backed editor stayed dirty after a successful save until the refetch landed — long enough for Discard to restore the pre-save value over the committed one, and for Back to open the unsaved-changes guard. - Memoize `useSecretValue`'s returned callbacks and object, per the hook convention, so the composed form's save/discard stop churning per render. - Reject a description on a personal secret in the domain layer rather than only at the v2 boundary. The internal credential update path accepted one for any type, writing data every reader hides. - Normalize an empty description to null so the API and UI agree. - Correct the secrets documentation, which described a Display Name field the detail view does not have and omitted the scope rule. - Drop the CLI's copy of the 500-character bound; it can't import the contract, so a copy only drifts from the message the API already returns. - Collapse a redundant save guard and align the description write gate with the render gate. Leaves the integrations credential page byte-identical to staging. * fix(secrets): keep the API docs example and CLI column order stable Backward-compatibility fixes for anyone who never sets a description. - Move the blank-to-null normalization out of the contract and into the route. A Zod `.transform()` on any property drops the whole request schema's OpenAPI examples, which had silently removed the Set Secret request example from the published docs. - Append the CLI `description` column instead of inserting it before `updated`. `--output text` is positional, so inserting would shift every field an existing script cuts. - Reject a description on a personal secret with a message that says so, rather than dropping the field and falling through to the generic "no updatable fields" error. |
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3abac09dc3 |
fix(cli): name SIM_CONFIG_DIR in help, and fix the similarity score width (#6795)
Two loose ends from the command-surface audit. `--help` stated where the profile files live and named only `~/.sim`, so it was wrong for anyone who had set `SIM_CONFIG_DIR` — which every CI job pointing the CLI at a scratch directory has. The variable is documented in the README and the guides; help was the one place that omitted it. `knowledge search` printed the raw similarity double, `0.2818957269585687`: a nineteen-character column whose last dozen digits cannot separate one result from another. A `score` format fixes it to four decimals, the width `cost` already uses, so the column stays put down the page. `json` and `yaml` still carry the full double, which is what a script compares. |
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fe4480d3f7 |
fix(cli): keep a path prefix in the login URLs (#6793)
* fix(cli): keep a path prefix in the login URLs
`sim login` built both of its URLs with `new URL('/path', endpoint)`. A
leading-slash path is absolute, so it resolves against the endpoint's origin
and drops any path the endpoint carries: a deployment served at
`https://host/sim` sent the browser to `https://host/cli/auth` and polled
`https://host/api/cli/auth/poll`, neither of which exists there.
Every other command builds its URL by concatenation and was unaffected, so
the endpoint looked correct and login alone failed.
Both now go through the client's `buildUrl`, which is exported for it rather
than duplicated — one URL builder for the whole CLI is the point, since two
of them is how the halves drifted apart. Its TSDoc now names the trap.
* test(cli): restore fetch with spyOn so the stub cannot outlive its test
vi.stubGlobal is not undone by restoreAllMocks, so the completed-auth
response would have leaked into whatever ran next. The rest of this file
already spies on globalThis.fetch, which the existing teardown restores.
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5c37778bbd |
fix(cli): identify the CLI to the API and name the remedy on every key refusal (#6792)
Sends a `User-Agent` on both request paths. Without one a CLI request is indistinguishable from any other API traffic, so a bug that reproduces on a single CLI version cannot be found in the server's own logs; the runtime and platform ride along because they are the first things asked about a transport failure only some users hit. The version moves into its own module so the HTTP client can read it. It could not import `program.ts` — program builds the commands, which reach the client — and duplicating the manifest read would let the two disagree. Also recognises `PRINCIPAL_KIND_NOT_PERMITTED`. The same refusal is raised at two layers under two codes, and only the workspace-key one was matched, so the audit-log commands reported "Principal kind workspace_api_key cannot perform operation audit_logs.list" — accurate, written for a server log, and missing the one sentence that tells the reader a personal key resolves it. |
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60097c89b4 |
fix(cli): default to the host that serves the API (#6791)
`sim.ai` answers /api/** with a 301 to `www.sim.ai`, and the client refuses to follow redirects — a 301 rewrites a POST into a bodyless GET, so following one turns a write into a silent no-op and hands the API key to whatever host Location names. Defaulting to the apex therefore failed every command for anyone who never set an endpoint. Before the refusal shipped it was quieter and worse: reads succeeded while writes did nothing. Also trims the provider catalogue from eleven inferred columns to seven. `docsUrl`, `helpText`, `requiresClientGeneratedCredentialId` and the nested `fields` are what you read once you have chosen a provider, not what you scan to choose one, and they pushed the table well past a terminal. Both ids stay: `credentials connect` names an OAuth provider by `serviceId`, `credentials create` matches a service account on `providerId`. |
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ae2147645c |
fix(cli): resolve findings from a full command-surface audit (#6788)
* fix(cli): resolve findings from a full command-surface audit Exercised all 147 commands against a live deployment. Fixes the defects that surfaced, plus the docs and generator drift they exposed. Transport - Stop following redirects. A bare domain that 301s to www silently converted POST to GET and dropped the body, so reads worked while every write failed with a misleading validation error and login returned 405. Both the client and the device flow now explain the redirect and name the endpoint to configure, rather than carrying credentials off-origin. - Report a non-JSON response as one instead of printing the HTML page. - Name the personal-API-key remedy on a workspace-key refusal, reading the machine-readable code the API actually sends. - Drop union-branch noise from validation errors that contradicted itself. - Show paging progress on stderr for multi-page fetches. Output - Clamp record values for table only. text is the format built for pipes, and it was truncating signed URLs and tool source mid-value. - Infer timestamp, duration, bytes and boolean formatting for API-owned keys so undeclared commands stop printing raw ISO and float ms. Skips user-defined table cells and leaves json/yaml on the raw payload. - Render a declared-but-absent field as an em dash; billing credits were vanishing silently. Paths, naming and validation - Percent-encode folder paths per segment and decode them for display, so a folder reads and types as the name shown in the app. - Reject a malformed endpoint where it is set and where it resolves, instead of crashing with a URL parse trace. - Request the detail level logs list's own columns need; its workflow column could never populate. - Rename three commands that described themselves wrongly and align two flags with their siblings. Old spellings still work: hidden, warned on stderr, and kept out of help and docs. - Verify whoami against the API, separating a bad key from an unreachable endpoint, and report the workspace by name. - Correct the --yes help text, which advertised skipping a prompt that does not exist. Docs - Teach the docs generator that a flag required by the runtime is required, and that hidden commands are not documented. * fix(cli): clear the paging progress line when a page fails Progress is written without a trailing newline so it can be overwritten in place, and both paging loops cleaned it up only on success. A page that threw part-way through left `fetched 1200…` on the line the error was then printed onto, so the two ran together. * fix(cli): name a working API root when an endpoint redirects The suggested endpoint was the redirect target's origin, which drops a path prefix. A self-hosted deployment reached at https://host/sim was told to set https://www.host — not an API root, so following the advice replaced one broken endpoint with another. Derive it by stripping the request's own path from the target instead, so a prefix survives, and say nothing about --set-endpoint when the target resolves to the endpoint already configured: a trailing-slash or path normalization redirect keeps the origin, and naming the value the caller already has explains nothing. The login poll shared both faults and now shares the helper. |
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d152fad788 |
chore(deps): bump js-yaml to 4.3.1 in sim-cli and drop the aged-out release-age waivers (#6784)
js-yaml < 4.3.1 has quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj / CVE-2026-59870). sim-cli builds with --packages=bundle, so its dev-scoped js-yaml is bundled into the published CLI. 4.3.1 is already what apps/sim pins, so this collapses sim-cli onto the hoisted copy. The minimumReleaseAge waivers for js-yaml and mermaid were temporary and have both aged past the 7-day window; leaving them behind would disable the supply-chain gate for those packages indefinitely. |
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025ea4d2bd |
fix(docs): serve JSON-LD in the HTML, fix sidebar spacing, and tighten the CLI guides (#6763)
* docs(cli): use -g for the install, and cut the prose that was not pulling weight
`--global` is valid but `-g` is what every comparable CLI documents, and the
long form only came from the package README. Also drops the yarn tab: it read
`yarn global add sim`, which works on Yarn 1 only — Yarn 2 removed global
installs, so that command fails for anyone on a modern Yarn. Adds `npx sim` for
running without installing.
The guides had accumulated design rationale that belongs in code comments rather
than user docs — why the filter grammar is JSON, why the config section naming
is asymmetric, why an unexpected error keeps its stack trace. Surveying how gh,
Vercel, Turborepo, Deno, Bun and Supabase write theirs, none carry that kind of
justification, and callouts are reserved for content whose absence produces a
wrong result rather than for general asides.
So: 1016 lines to 763, and 12 callouts to 3. The three that remain are the
pairing-code check, that `sim logout` does not revoke the key, and the
`--limit 100` default on `batch-delete`/`batch-update`, which silently truncates
a larger match. Troubleshooting drops the entries whose error message already
contained its own fix and keeps the seven whose cause is not obvious.
* fix(docs): render JSON-LD as native script tags so it reaches the HTML
All four structured-data blocks — WebSite, TechArticle, BreadcrumbList,
SoftwareApplication — were rendered with `next/script`, which never emitted a
script tag. Measured on a production build, `/api-reference/getting-started`
contained zero `<script type="application/ld+json">` elements; the payload
existed only in the `__next_s` client-injection queue and the RSC flight data,
so anything reading the served HTML saw no structured data at all. React was
also logging "Encountered a script tag while rendering React component" on every
page.
`next/script` is for loading and executing JavaScript. JSON-LD is data, and
Next's own guidance is a native `<script>` in the component. `serializeJsonLd`
already escapes the `<` character to its unicode form, which is the
sanitization that guidance calls for, so only the element changes.
Same build, after: three valid tags per page with `WebSite` in `<head>`, and the
injection queue gone entirely.
* fix(docs): scope the flush-separator rule to a container's first separator
`[data-separator]:not([data-separator] ~ [data-separator])` was meant to keep the
first sidebar group flush against the top padding, but `~` only reaches siblings,
so it also matched the first separator inside every expanded folder. Under
Self-Hosting, "Install" lost its top margin and crowded the "Architecture" link
above it — 25px of gap where "Configure" and "Operate" below it had 40px.
`:first-child` expresses the intent directly. Only the four sidebar roots open
with a separator; every nested folder starts with a page, so the intended case
still goes flush and nothing else changes.
* fix(docs): move the flush-separator rule onto the separator component
Keeps the styling with the component that owns it, per the repo standard, and
lets the global rule be deleted outright rather than corrected — `global.css`
now only loses a rule in this PR. Tailwind's `first:` variant compiles to the
same `:first-child` selector, so behavior is unchanged: the build emits
`.first\:mt-0:first-child{margin-top:0}` and the prerendered HTML carries the
class on the separator.
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fed891f69d |
docs(cli): add a CLI docs section generated from the command tree (#6762)
* docs(cli): add a CLI section, generated from the command tree
The `sim` CLI shipped with no coverage in the docs site. Adds a fourth
top-level tab for it, and moves Academy last.
The command reference is generated. `sim` exposes 147 leaf commands across
33 groups, most of them derived at runtime from the v2 route contracts, so a
hand-written reference would be wrong the week after it was written. The
generator walks the command tree `buildProgram()` hands to commander — the
same tree the terminal parses — rather than re-deriving it from the contract,
which would be a second implementation free to describe commands nobody can
invoke. `check:cli-docs` is a zero-arg `check:*` script, so the existing audit
runner picks it up and stale pages fail CI.
Generating against the real tree surfaced a collision it had been hiding:
`bulkUpdateKnowledgeDocuments` and `updateKnowledgeDocument` both derived to
`sim knowledge documents update`. Commander resolves a duplicate to the first
match, so the bulk form shadowed the single-document one and its flags were
unreachable while still appearing in `--help`. The bulk form is now
`batch-update`, matching how `tables rows batch-delete`/`batch-update` already
handle the same REST overload, and the generator fails on any duplicate path
so the next one cannot land silently.
Five hand-written guides cover install, auth, configuration, output formats,
and scripting. Also corrects two commands in the package README that do not
exist as documented (`tables columns <tableId>`, and `--sort score:desc`,
which is JSON).
* docs(cli): document every flag from the contracts, add troubleshooting and a single-page reference
The command reference was structurally complete but said almost nothing: 223 of
377 flags rendered as "Set sort by" because the CLI only ever read flag help
from its own contract overrides, and fell back to restating the flag name.
The prose already existed. The v2 route contracts carry 931 `.describe()` calls
and the OpenAPI specs publish all of them — 327 parameters and 282 body
properties, 100% coverage — but the generated operation table dropped every one,
carrying only a per-operation summary. It now carries the field descriptions,
the path-parameter descriptions, and positional help, so `--help` and the docs
explain a flag the same way the API reference does. Placeholder descriptions are
now zero, and 147/147 commands, 377/377 flags and 130/130 arguments are
documented.
`check:cli-docs` fails on a request field with no `.describe()` rather than
letting it render as documentation that says nothing.
Also in this pass:
- Commands are root-level sidebar entries under a Commands heading rather than
a folder, and headings are the command's description, so the table of
contents distinguishes entries at the first word instead of repeating
"sim knowledge documents …" fourteen times. A guard fails the build if two
descriptions on a page collide, since they would share an anchor.
- A single-page `Complete reference` carrying all 147 commands, for in-page
search and for agents fetching `/cli/reference.mdx`. It keys on exact command
paths because descriptions are only unique within a group.
- A troubleshooting page, with every message copied from the source.
- Table columns are sized by a local component; the flag column was starved
while descriptions kept most of the row empty.
- The prerelease install channels are dropped from the docs and the package
README, which is what npm renders.
* fix(docs): match the CLI tab by path segment, and escape backslashes before pipes
`pathname.includes('/cli')` also matches `/integrations/clickup` and
`/integrations/clickhouse`, so both existing integration pages lit the CLI tab
and unlit Documentation. Matching is now per path segment. Anchoring to the
start would not work either — a non-default locale prefixes the path, as in
`/ja/cli` — so the segment is matched wherever it sits.
Table cells now double a backslash before escaping pipes. A value ending in one
turned `a\` + `|` into `a\\|`, which the table parser reads as an escaped
backslash followed by an unescaped pipe, splitting the cell early. Nothing in
the command surface contains a backslash today, so this was latent rather than
visible.
The reference page's global options table is two-column and was being wrapped in
`CommandTable`, which sizes the second column for the `Required` cell of the
three-column tables and crushed the description into 5.5rem. It now matches the
overview page, which leaves that table unsized.
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337a53f12c |
feat(cli): Sim CLI with AWS-style profiles and a platform key exchange (#6147)
* improvement(api): pull in the v2 external endpoint surface Cherry-picks improvement/v2-endpoints ( |