Commit Graph
296 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Fable 5 957049e563 improvement(billing): paginate and parallelize the cycle-close sweep (#7103)
* improvement(billing): paginate and parallelize the cycle-close sweep

The sweep previously loaded every lagging candidate in one select and
closed them serially — correct at any scale (per-subscription guarded
marker claims make any interleaving safe) but O(fleet) in memory and
wall clock. It now iterates candidates in keyset pages and closes each
page with bounded concurrency; a total mapper keeps one failure from
rejecting its page, and an interrupted sweep resumes from the durable
markers on the next run.

The member-lock select gains a deterministic ORDER BY: today
member_user_id_unique keeps org rosters disjoint and every other locker
is single-row, so no deadlock is currently constructible — the ordering
is hygiene that also holds if membership exclusivity is ever relaxed.

A partial index on exactly the sweep's candidate predicate (built
CONCURRENTLY behind the runner's COMMIT breakpoint) keeps the scan
O(lagging) rather than O(fleet); closes shrink it as they land.

Validated end-to-end against Stripe test mode: one sweep over 304
staged lagging subscriptions (300 synthetic + 2 multi-member orgs
closing concurrently + 2 real test-clock subscriptions with genuine
overage) closed 304/304 with failed=0 in 667ms — the same fleet took
~302s serially — while both real subscriptions produced exactly one
paid overage invoice each at the expected amounts, with zero invoices
for the no-overage fleet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): restore the runner's lock_timeout and inline entitled statuses for the sweep index

The concurrent-index migration now restores lock_timeout='5s' after its
post-COMMIT section, matching the runner convention every prior
CONCURRENTLY migration follows — without it, later pending files' DDL in
the same session would wait indefinitely instead of hitting the runner's
55P03 retry path.

The sweep's status filter becomes inlined literals derived from
ENTITLED_SUBSCRIPTION_STATUSES: the planner can only prove a query
implies a partial index's predicate from literals, and the parameterized
generic plan demonstrably seq-scans where the literal form uses
subscription_cycle_close_lagging_idx.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 23:17:11 -07:00
Waleed 0c38037bf1 fix(knowledge): harden ingestion pipeline (#7077)
* fix(knowledge): harden ingestion pipeline

* fix(knowledge): correct bounded ingestion edge cases

* fix(knowledge): tighten redaction and chunk validation

* fix(knowledge): close bounded ingestion gaps

* fix(files): preserve parser complexity limits
2026-08-25 17:55:56 -07:00
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Fable 5 a25d993266 improvement(billing): ledger-only usage + period-advance cycle close (#7078)
* improvement(billing): make usage ledger-only and close cycles off period advance

Usage is now the attributed usage_log ledger everywhere: the userStats
baselines (currentPeriodCost / currentPeriodCopilotCost), the
includeLegacyBaseline compatibility flag, the pro-snapshot join/leave
machinery, and departedMemberUsage accrual are removed from all read and
write paths. Cycle rollover (final sub-threshold overage collection,
billedOverageThisPeriod reset, last-period bookkeeping) moves off the
invoice.finalized payload parsing — dead for org subscriptions since May —
onto a period-advance sweep with a durable per-subscription close marker
(subscription.last_closed_period_start), transaction-enlisted Stripe
outbox invoicing, and stamp-matched ledger sums. Enterprise closes are
bookkeeping-only; reporting-anchor orgs advance the marker alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): include departed actors in close refresh and gate threshold billing on close currency

Cycle close now unions current members with every actor holding org-stamped
ledger rows in the closed period, so a departed member's daily-refresh
consumption offsets the final overage exactly like their billed usage.
Threshold billing defers with a pending-cycle-close no-op while a
subscription's close marker lags its current period, so the shared
billedOverageThisPeriod tracker can never mix an elapsed period's
settlements with the new period's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): seal cycle-close races and align refresh actors with billed usage

Threshold settlement revalidates the close marker and period under the
tracker lock via the same isSubscriptionCycleCloseCurrent predicate the
preflight uses, so a rollover between check and transaction aborts as a
concurrent-state retry instead of settling against the wrong cycle.
Terminal bookkeeping claims the close marker with its tracker reset, so a
deletion racing an in-flight sweep close serializes through the one marker
and the loser rolls back rather than re-billing settled overage; anchored
enterprise deletions only claim the marker since their windows derive from
the anchor, not Stripe bounds. A close with overage due but missing Stripe
identifiers now defers loudly instead of claiming the marker and silently
forgiving the money, the closed window's start derives from the ledger's
own period stamps so anchor-day drift cannot misalign the refresh window,
calculateSubscriptionOverage unions departed ledger actors into the org
refresh deduction like the close does, and blocked accounts report their
real ledger usage while staying blocked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): defer ownerless org closes and make the drift test load-bearing

A close with overage due but no owner-role member now defers loudly like
the missing-Stripe-identifier case instead of claiming the marker and
silently forgiving the money. The stamp-drift test pins the marker before
the stamped boundary so only the ledger-stamp lookup can produce the
asserted window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(helm): bump chart to 1.6.0 for the billing-cycle-close cron job

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): revalidate the org roster under close locks and align invoice labels

The close re-reads the member roster inside its transaction and defers on
any change, mirroring threshold billing — an owner transfer moves the
billed-overage tracker between rows, so a pre-lock roster could settle
against the wrong tracker. Invoice labels now use the closed period's end
month like every other overage path, and the sweep test's rows are shaped
like rows the candidate query can actually return.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): hold cycle close for a settlement grace after rollover

Billing attribution is frozen at run start, so a run straddling a
rollover can insert elapsed-period-stamped rows after the period ends.
Closing only once the rollover is older than any possible in-flight run
guarantees the close's ledger sums are final; the sweep picks the period
up on a later run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): resolve reporting windows through the canonical period resolver

The close paths now ask resolveSubscriptionUsagePeriod whether a
subscription derives its windows from a reporting anchor instead of
re-checking metadata shape locally, so a malformed hand-edited anchor that
the resolver rejects (falling back to Stripe bounds) books its
Stripe-stamped ledger rows normally instead of skipping bookkeeping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): union departed ledger actors in org threshold settlement

Organization threshold billing now reads the period ledger per user and
unions the actors holding org-attributed rows with the current roster
before computing refresh deductions — the same actor set
calculateSubscriptionOverage and the cycle close use — so a departed
member's usage cannot be settled without their daily-refresh offset.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): claim the terminal period before deletion settlement and delete vestigial refresh bounds

Subscription deletion now claims the close marker from the fresh
subscription row before computing or charging final overage, serializing
with the cycle-close sweep so both paths can never bill the same period —
an in-flight close fails its guarded claim and rolls back, and the
deletion settles against the row's real period instead of a possibly
stale webhook payload. The per-user refresh bounds machinery is deleted
outright: its only source was proPeriodCostSnapshotAt, which this PR
stopped writing, and ledger entity stamps already scope refresh to
org-attributed rows — a joiner's pre-join usage is user-stamped and can
never enter the org refresh scan, while a departed member's org-stamped
rows participate exactly like a current member's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): scope daily refresh by entity stamps and close lagging periods before deletion settlement

The refresh actor-list threading (userIds + departed-actor unions) violated
the entity-stamp principle the ledger sums already follow: org-attributed
rows from departed members counted in pooled usage but never consumed
refresh on the monitor/resolved-usage paths. Daily refresh now scopes rows
by the same write-time entity and period stamps as the ledger — no actor
list anywhere — which deletes the unions, the rollup memberIds, and the
org-specific refresh variant.

Deletion settlement now closes any elapsed-but-unclosed period (grace
bypassed — no later sweep revisits a canceled sub) before claiming the
terminal period, so a deletion racing the sweep can no longer jump the
marker past an unsettled period and silently forgive its final overage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): bucket refresh by clamped day so stamped stragglers stay in the deduction

Refresh membership is now the entity/period stamps alone — identical to the
ledger sums it offsets. A row written after the rollover but stamped to the
elapsed period (attribution frozen at run start) is billed by the stamp-based
close, so it must consume refresh too; created-at now only assigns the day
bucket, clamped into the period, instead of excluding the row entirely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): pair the overage tracker with the marker's period and pin test clocks

billedOverageThisPeriod only ever holds collections for the period that
began at the close marker — the threshold gate blocks settlement whenever
the marker lags. Both consumers now honor that pairing: a close that
skipped forgiven periods counts nothing from the tracker against the
period it bills, and the deletion settlement ignores the tracker when the
marker was still lagging at claim time. Ignoring is provably safe in both
cases because a lagging marker means no current-period collections exist.

The cycle-close and daily-refresh suites pin the system clock: their grace
and window checks compare fixed period fixtures against Date.now(), which
made them dependent on the host date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): reject lagging terminal claims and thread billingInterval into deletion bookkeeping

claimTerminalPeriod no longer advances the marker over an unclosed elapsed
period: a lagging marker is reported without a write so the deletion handler
can run the elapsed close once more (healing a rollover that committed
between close and claim) and only then seal the marker explicitly, with an
error log, when the period is genuinely unclosable. Sealing preserves the
in-flight-sweep abort guarantee.

Deletion bookkeeping now passes the subscription's billingInterval through,
so an enterprise reporting subscription whose interval lives on the row
column (not metadata) still resolves as reporting-anchored and keeps its
bookkeeping no-op, matching every other resolver call site.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-25 16:34:44 -07:00
Theodore Li 4c0bd944dc feat(slack): launch v2 triggers and backfill custom bots (#6873)
* feat(slack): launch v2 triggers and backfill custom bots

* fix(slack): propagate legacy webhook dispatch failures

* fix(slack): continue shared legacy webhook fanout

* fix(slack): acknowledge filtered webhook deliveries

* fix(slack): finalize custom bot migration rollout

* fix(slack): dedupe migrated bots per workflow

* fix(slack): harden custom bot rollout

* fix(slack): acknowledge permanently ignored deliveries

* fix(slack): retry failed webhook deliveries
2026-08-25 14:11:02 -04:00
Vikhyath Mondreti 0a5b3801ea feat(secrets): let workspace secrets opt out of redaction (#7045)
* feat(secrets): let workspace secrets opt out of redaction

* fix(secrets): certify no sandbox exemptions once the registry is incomplete

* feat(secrets): carry visible secret values on the v2 list and document visibility

* fix(secrets): read visible values by own property so prototype-named secrets cannot poison the list
2026-08-24 13:46:57 -07:00
Waleed a20a5465ef perf(db): optimize recurring query paths (#7014)
* perf(db): optimize recurring query paths

* perf(logs): batch keyset export reads

* fix(workspaces): type nullable member count targets

* fix(db): harden query performance changes

* fix(logs): guard export stream cancellation
2026-08-23 17:15:10 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti 7ea8692e7d fix(files): read a file nobody vouched for, as an untracked one already is (#6986)
* fix(files): read a file nobody vouched for, as an untracked one already is

A workspace file whose secret provenance could not be recorded was refused by every model and
runtime boundary at once — attachments, mounts, and the tool routes that parse, transcribe or
describe a file. A file that was never tracked at all returned exact-empty and worked fine.
Both say exactly as much about their contents: nothing. So the refusal was a permanent penalty
for having tried to record provenance and failed, with no way back, since nothing rewrites a
file's provenance but another content write.

Workspace files now do what the other durable surfaces do — proceed and record an audit entry
naming the surface and the count, so the people who own the secrets are told. The state is
distinguished from the four that really are unknown (missing row, version mismatch, stale
binding, malformed), which stay refused; only a current sidecar that says so reads as
unrecorded.

Absence survives a merge rather than dropping through to exact, so a derived file cannot
launder an unrecorded input into a positive claim. Script migration 0007 clears the files
already stranded in the old state, taking the parent lock first in id order to match the live
writer, with the unknown status re-checked under it so a concurrent write is never undone.

Nothing changes for a legacy file: no sidecar row still means untracked, still reads
exact-empty. The enforcement flag stays in place.

* fix(files): narrow an initialization to a status the column accepts

The union carries three states; the sidecar's CHECK constraint accepts two. Only the replace
path discriminated — initialize forwarded the status verbatim, so an 'unrecorded' would have
reached the database as a value it rejects, aborting the enclosing transaction rather than
writing a bad row. Nothing passes one today, which is why it belongs here and not in a caller.

Also names the storage mismatch on the type itself: a stored 'unknown' reads back as
'unrecorded', not as the union's 'unknown'. Same word, two layers, different meanings.

* fix(provenance): repair only what the reader calls an absence

The repair selected on status alone, which is wider than the branch it was meant to undo. The
reader answers 'unrecorded' only for a sidecar that is version 1, bound to the file's current
bytes, and holding a well-formed entries array; anything else is a fault it refuses and no
policy relaxes.

Clearing a fault was not a smaller claim but a larger one. Deleting the sidecar sets
secret_provenance_version to NULL, and a NULL version reads as exact-empty — so a file refused
because its provenance described bytes it no longer holds would have come back positively
vouched for, silently, with no audit entry. Four such rows exist in production today.

Both the candidate query and the delete now carry every condition, so a concurrent write
cannot lose the distinction between an absence and a fault. Stale, unversioned and malformed
sidecars stay refused exactly as the surface refuses them, and recover as they always have, on
the next content write.

* fix(provenance): store an absence apart from a refusal

Relaxing a stored `unknown` assumed it always meant "nobody recorded this". It did not. The
sidecar collapsed two opposite claims into one value: bytes nobody recorded, and bytes a writer
refused on purpose — a child of an archive whose parent provably held secrets, a generated
asset whose safety decision came back false, a transcode whose scanner knew secrets were
present and could not locate them. Relaxing the second would have walked known-secret-bearing
content through every model boundary at once.

The decision type already told them apart: a registry that never ran is `safe: true`, while
every refusal is `safe: false`. Only storage lost it. Writers now persist `unrecorded` and
`unknown` separately, readers relax the first and refuse the second, and the constraint is
widened to accept it.

Only workspace files store this distinction, deliberately. Every other durable surface produces
a non-exact sidecar from one condition — an incomplete incoming bundle or registry — which is
always an absence. Files are the only surface that derives one stored object from another, so
they are the only one that can refuse on purpose. The shared policy is unchanged and uniform:
read an absence and audit it, refuse a taint.

Also aligns the metadata batch classifier, which answered `unknown` where the single-file reader
answers `unrecorded`, leaving two classifiers describing one policy differently.

* test(provenance): assert the enforcement switch on a row it can act on

The test that pins "closing the surface refuses an unrecorded file again" used a stored
unknown, which the split had just turned into a taint. A taint is refused whatever the flag
says, so the assertion held with enforcement off too and proved nothing about the switch this
posture rests on. It now uses a recorded absence, and fails if the flag is ignored.

* fix(files): copy a recorded absence as an absence

The copy path required an exact source, so a stored unrecorded one fell in with the refusals
and the target was written as a taint the source never carried. A workspace fork or a chat file
copy therefore turned a readable file into a permanently refused one — the pathology this
surface exists to undo, reached by copying — and nothing rewrites a file's provenance but
another content write.

Safe past the scope checks it now precedes: those exist to stop one workspace's secret entries
landing in another's file, and a recorded absence has no entries to carry.

The legacy Function export marker keeps writing unknown. Its record had resolved secret names
in scope and an unreadable bundle, so whether that is an absence is not something this change
can establish, and guessing in the readable direction is what caused this round.
2026-08-22 15:05:39 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti b861062370 fix(provenance): clear the rows that went unknown after the first repair (#6982)
* fix(provenance): clear the rows that went unknown after the first repair

0005 is finished and will not run again — the runner records a name in
script_migrations and never offers it back, which is the contract a
run-once repair wants. But it cleared the backlog that existed at the
instant it ran, and the writer that produced that backlog kept running
until the fix in this branch. Nothing heals such a row in place, so each
one goes on reporting on every later read; a few dozen of them account
for thousands of log lines a week.

A second entry rather than deleting the first's tracking row: the
registry is append-only, and a repair that ran twice should say so
twice. It shares 0005's walk rather than restating it — the parent-first
lock ordering and the status re-check under that lock are subtleties
worth having once — and is idempotent, so it costs one empty query if
there is nothing left to repair.

* chore(provenance): record the deploy ordering the second pass depends on

promote-images needs migrate, so a script migration runs while the
previous image is still serving. A row an old instance creates between
this walk and the end of the rollout sits behind the cursor, and the
name is recorded on success, so it is never offered again. Widening the
walk would not help — the exposure is the minutes after it returns, not
the milliseconds during — so the requirement is to ship it in a release
after the writer fix is already promoted, which the file now says.
2026-08-22 13:35:06 -07:00
Waleed 8937bb3550 fix(kb): let the server say a connector sync is queued (#6968)
* fix(kb): let the server say a connector sync is queued

The connector chip inferred "a sync is coming" from `createdAt` inside a
2-minute window, because nothing on the row distinguished a queued sync from
an idle connector until a worker took the lock. The guess was wrong under
queue backlog and under client clock skew, and it forced a pile of client
state to stand in for it.

Adds `pending`, written as the sync is handed to the queue and cleared when a
worker takes the lock or the hand-off is found to have been lost. It is a
phase of the same lock `syncing` holds, so it opens the lease and takes an
ownership token the same way — the lease is what the scheduler ages a stranded
queue entry against (`updatedAt` cannot serve: a pending connector is still
editable, so any unrelated write would renew the recovery it should trigger),
and the token is what proves a late release belongs to this dispatch.

Deletes the 2-minute window, the in-flight id sets, the 5-minute cooldown
timers and the forced re-render they needed. The cooldown lived in a ref
inside a modal, so it evaporated whenever the modal closed; the disable now
comes from durable server state and is shared across tabs.

Also fixes, all found while tracing the lifecycle:
- An on-demand sync on a paused or disabled connector silently resumed it for
  good. Nothing could put the pause back: success writes `active`, a lost
  queue entry writes `error`, and the due-sweep keeps syncing that. Refused.
- A failed hand-off no longer advances the connector's auto-disable breaker. A
  queue outage would otherwise increment every connector in the fleet until
  they all disabled themselves for a fault that was never theirs.
- Manual sync on an established connector gave no feedback at all: the poll
  only ran while the predicate matched, which it never did.
- Four over-broad invalidations that refetched every cached chunk page and
  chunk search in a base when one connector document was excluded.
- The dead-process reporter re-sent a PATCH per stale document on every poll.

* fix(kb): refuse to start a queued run on a paused connector

The queue outlives the decision to sync. Pausing a connector after its run was
queued cleared the queue entry's token but left the task itself alive, and the
lock CAS accepted any row that was not already `syncing` — so the worker took
the paused row and wrote its own terminal `active` over the pause.

Moves the rule to the two points that can enforce it: an explicit
`LOCKABLE_CONNECTOR_STATUSES` allowlist on the lock acquisition, and the same
allowlist on `markSyncPending`, which closes the mirror race where a dispatch
already in flight rewrites a just-paused row back to `pending`. Queueing and
starting now agree on one rule, and a skipped hand-off is reported as its own
outcome rather than a concurrency conflict.

Also patches the connector detail cache alongside the list on an optimistic
status write, so an already-expanded card starts its own sync poll instead of
showing stale history behind the list's spinner.

* fix(kb): make a queued sync prove it is the run that was queued

`markSyncPending` minted an ownership token but only `releaseFailedDispatch`
checked it, so the worker could consume a queue entry that was not its own. A
task delayed past its lease is reclaimed and replaced; the status check alone
let that stale task take the replacement's entry and run superseded options —
a plain sync where the user had just asked for a full resync — while the
replacement was turned away as `sync_in_progress`.

Carries the token in the task payload and matches it at lock acquisition, the
same discipline `holdsSyncLockToken` already applies to the `syncing` phase,
extended to the phase before it. A superseded run is now reported as such
rather than as a concurrency conflict.

The payload field is optional for the rollout window only: tasks already in
the queue carry no token, and stranding them would be worse than letting them
fall back to the status check for one deploy.

* fix(kb): report a paused connector as paused, not superseded

Pausing a queued connector releases its token, so testing ownership before
status reported every pause-while-queued — the common case — as a superseded
dispatch. The mismatch is the symptom there; the status is the reason.

* fix(kb): stop a status update landing on a run that already started

The update's guards ran against a row read moments earlier and the write
carried no compare-and-set, so a worker taking the lock in between meant the
write landed on a `syncing` row — overwriting the run's status and, because
leaving `pending` also clears the lock columns, wiping the token its heartbeat
and terminal write match on. That stranded a sync that had already begun.

The write is now conditional on the status the request was authorized against,
and a lost race is reported as a conflict rather than "not found".

Also restores the in-flight guard on the pause control. The optimistic status
flip relabels it Pause -> Resume immediately, so a second click could send
`active` before the first pause settled and resume a connector the user meant
to pause. Read from the mutation's own pending state rather than the local id
set this PR removed — React Query already knows which row is in flight.
2026-08-21 20:53:16 -07:00
Justin Blumencranz 3d40003482 improvement(tables): backfill default views for existing tables (#6899) 2026-08-21 19:25:58 -07:00
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Opus 5 71129cd112 feat(custom-blocks): let a publisher decide whether their block's runs reach consumer traces (#6950)
* feat(custom-blocks): let a publisher decide whether their block's runs reach consumer traces

Joining a custom block's child run into its caller's trace shipped on by default,
gated at read time by whether the person reading could already open the source
workspace. That gate is doing the wrong job: a custom block's whole point is that
consumers need no access to the source, so the check refuses exactly the readers
the feature exists for, and it makes the answer depend on who is looking rather
than on what the block's owner agreed to publish.

The decision moves to the party whose data it is. `custom_block.trace_child_runs`
is set by the publisher in Settings, applies org-wide, and is the entire policy —
nothing downstream re-checks a caller. `getCustomBlockAuthority` already resolves
per invocation and is the one lookup both the canvas handler and the Agent-tool
runner pass through, so one column covers both surfaces and no consumer input can
assert it.

It defaults to FALSE. With the viewer check gone, an opted-in block publishes the
source workflow's block names, inputs, outputs, and prompts to anyone who can read
a consuming workflow's log. That is the same boundary curated outputs and redacted
errors hold, so it opens by an affirmative act of the publisher or not at all —
never as the residue of a column default on rows nobody revisited.

Closed means the handle is withheld outright rather than persisted behind a flag:
with no `childExecutionId` there is nothing for a reader, a migration, or a later
refactor to join. What replaces it is a `_childTraceDisabled` marker, because a
boundary span with no children renders exactly like a leaf block and an untraced
run would otherwise read as one that did nothing. The consumer-facing failure
`ref` is untouched either way — it is the only thing that makes an untraced
failure reportable.

Custom blocks invoked as Agent tools now join too. The child's handle already
reached the agent's persisted `toolCalls[].result` (`postProcessToolOutput` strips
only `__`-prefixed keys); nothing lifted it onto the tool span. Both span builders
lift and strip it, and `hydrateChildTraces` needs no change — its boundary walk
already recurses. The same handle is stripped from the model-facing copy of the
tool result in `executeProviderTool`, the single point where the raw and model
copies diverge: an opaque execution id in a tool result reads to a model like data
the tool returned.

The live SSE stream keeps one condition beyond the policy: an identified consumer.
Not an authorization check — no workspace query — but chat deployments and the
public API leave `liveTraceViewerUserId` unset because their consumer may be
anonymous, and opting into org-wide tracing is not consent to stream a publisher's
raw agent tokens to the internet.

Copilot deliberately cannot set the field; exposing a team's internals org-wide is
a human decision, not one an agent makes while publishing on their behalf.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(custom-blocks): read the publisher's trace policy at read time, not from the handle's presence

Treating a persisted `childExecutionId` as proof of publisher consent is only true
for handles this PR's writer produced. Every handle written before it meant
something else — "a child ran; authorize the reader" — and the rows carrying them
outlive the migration, so removing the reader check turned them into an open door:
a consumer could open an old parent log and receive the source workflow's block
names, inputs, outputs, and prompts from a block whose publisher never opted in.

`hydrateChildTraces` now resolves the policy live, per boundary, from
`custom_block.trace_child_runs`. The child log row's `workflowId` is the key —
publish enforces one block per workflow — which also covers an Agent-tool boundary,
whose span carries no block type to look up. A workflow with no block row (never
published, or since deleted) has no publisher left to consent and stays shut, as
does a failed policy read.

This is not redundant with the write-time withholding. The handler still emits no
handle for a block that was closed when the run executed, so such a run stays
closed forever even if the block is opened later; this check decides whether the
runs that DO carry a handle may still be shown. Turning the policy off therefore
also closes what is already recorded, which is what a governance switch has to do
to mean anything.

Reported by Greptile on #6950.

Also drops `any` from the trace-policy tests: outputs read through
`Record<string, unknown>` (the handler's declared return does not name these
internal keys) and failures narrow through `ChildWorkflowError.isChildWorkflowError`,
which pins the failure type as well as its fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(logs): sum the child-trace drop counters from the struct, not a hand-listed set

`totalDropped` re-listed four of the five counters, so a read whose only drops were
policy refusals computed zero and skipped the log entirely. That is the commonest
drop there is now — every handle written before the publisher policy existed refuses
at that gate — so the one signal telling an operator the live check is closing joins
went silent exactly when it started mattering.

Summed from the struct instead. A hand-maintained list beside a struct is stale the
moment a field is added, which is precisely how `policyClosed` was left out.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot on #6950.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): renumber the custom-block trace migration around a 0299 collision

Staging landed its own 0299 (`table_run_dispatches.heartbeat_at`) while this
branch was open. The two migrations are independent — different tables, no shared
statement — so only the number and drizzle's snapshot chain collided.

Regenerated rather than hand-merged: a drizzle snapshot is a full-schema dump
whose `prevId` links it to its parent, so editing one by hand to sit after a
migration it was not generated against is how the chain silently stops matching
the database. Staging's 0299 and its snapshot are taken verbatim; this is 0300,
generated against them, and its SQL is byte-identical to what it replaced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 18:21:08 -07:00
Waleed 7b6c58113d fix(knowledge,tables): recover abandoned dispatches, bound the sweep and the workbook preview (#6945)
* fix(tables,knowledge): recover abandoned dispatches and bound the sweep

Three defects measured in production this afternoon.

A dispatcher killed by an OOM left `table_run_dispatches` at `dispatching`
forever. Every terminal transition on that table is user- or flow-initiated, so
nothing reclaimed the row: four dispatches were stranded in one afternoon,
pinning each table's "X running" overlay and blocking re-runs, with no way to
clear them from the product. The `table_run_dispatches_watchdog_idx` index has
existed for this sweep since the table was created, unused.

Liveness comes from a new `heartbeat_at`, stamped by the per-window writes that
already advance `cursor` and `processed_count`, so a slow-but-live dispatch is
spared however long it runs — the in-process path has no duration ceiling, so
ageing from `requested_at` would reclaim live self-hosted work. The sweep reads
`COALESCE(heartbeat_at, requested_at)` so rows written before the column stay
reclaimable rather than NULL-false forever, and runs as the last arm of the
existing stale-execution cron at the same 95-minute window its table-job sibling
uses. Rows are cancelled, not completed: the scope never finished.

The OOM itself is not a leak. Peak RSS is a flat plateau — 457 MB at 20-45s and
461 MB past 200s, so ten times the duration buys four megabytes — that has crept
about two percent per release for a month, from 446 MB in late July to 545 MB,
past the 512 MiB `small-1x` ceiling. CPU peaks at 0.19, so the larger preset is
bought for RAM alone. `maxAttempts` never covered the kill either: Trigger.dev
retries `TASK_PROCESS_OOM_KILLED` only when `retry.outOfMemory.machine` names a
preset, and all four runs recorded `attempt_count = 1` while the docstring
claimed they resumed from the persisted cursor.

The connector stuck-document sweep dispatched without a bound. Its chunk size
paced the loop but the candidate query had no limit, so one connector enqueued
2,959 documents in fifteen seconds onto the queue every workspace shares.
Nothing was double-billed — those documents were genuinely unindexed — but one
connector monopolized the queue, and each dispatch mints a fresh requestId, so
the idempotency key differs every pass and none of it deduplicates. Candidates
are now taken oldest-first and capped per sync; a deeper backlog is deferred to
the next sync rather than dropped.

* fix(file-parsers): read officeparser's entry point across module systems

`officeparser` is CommonJS — `main: officeParser.js`, no `type`, no `exports`
map — so what `await import('officeparser')` yields depends on who built the
code. Node and webpack synthesize named exports from `module.exports`, so
`.parseOfficeAsync` is there. esbuild, which builds the Trigger.dev worker
bundle, puts `module.exports` on `.default` and leaves the named export
undefined, and the package is in neither `build.external` nor
`additionalPackages`, so it is bundled.

Reading the named export directly therefore worked everywhere except the
worker, where calling it threw `TypeError: parseOfficeAsync is not a function`.
All four parsers treat that as "the library failed" and answer with a scrape of
the archive, which returns `degraded: true`, and the document pipeline rejects a
degraded parse outright. The visible result was every `.pptx` and legacy `.doc`
reporting "No text could be extracted from this file — it may be scanned,
image-only, or password-protected", naming a cause that had nothing to do with
the fault. 118 pptx and 14 doc failures landed in a single burst when one
connector's sync first succeeded after ten consecutive crashes.

Resolved in one shared loader rather than per bundler: externalizing the package
has to be repeated in every build config this code runs under and regresses
silently the day one is missed.

The shape handling is split into a pure `resolveParseOfficeAsync` because the
failing shape cannot be reproduced by mocking the specifier — Vitest's
module-namespace proxy throws on a missing export rather than yielding the
`undefined` a real bundle produces, so a test going through `import` can only
assert the shape that already worked. That is also why the existing parser
suites never caught this: each mocks `officeparser` with a fabricated named
export, which presupposes the interop being broken here.

* fix(knowledge): bound the workbook preview to the rows it emits

`sheet_to_json` allocates from a worksheet's DECLARED `!ref` range rather than
its populated cells, and Excel routinely writes an inflated range from stray
formatting. The 1,000-row preview cap was applied to the result, so it bounded
the emitted string while the allocation it was meant to bound had already
happened. An 880 KB workbook exhausted an 8 GB worker; the same content
exhausted 16 GB when this ran inside the connector sync. No machine size fixes
that, because the allocation scales with a number the file declares about
itself — fleet p99 for this task is 691 MB against 8 GB, so this is a cliff, not
pressure.

Passing the window into the conversion is what makes the cap real. `defval` goes
with it: defaulting every cell in the range made each row dense, so allocation
scaled with columns x declared rows rather than with populated cells, and
because no row was left empty it silently defeated the `blankrows: false` beside
it. Reported totals still come from the declared range, so bounding the
conversion does not change what the metadata says the workbook holds.

The eleven documents killed this way recorded `attempt_count = 1`: `maxAttempts`
does not cover `TASK_PROCESS_OOM_KILLED`, which Trigger.dev retries only when a
larger preset is named. Adding that escalation is a safety net rather than the
fix, and the same gap the dispatcher had.

Also corrects the machine comment, which claimed `large-1x` was 2 vCPU / 2 GB.
It is 4 vCPU / 8 GB, and believing the stale figure makes a resize look like the
answer when the parser is what is unbounded.

* fix(tables): keep a cancelled dispatch cancelled when a step claims it

`dispatcherStep` reads the dispatch, then awaits the table load before writing
`dispatching`. Keying that write on the id alone resurrected a dispatch
cancelled inside that window — a Stop-all, or now the stale-dispatch sweep —
and the fresh heartbeat it writes would then buy the resurrected row another
full window before the sweep could reclaim it again.

The race predates the sweep, but the sweep is a new writer of `cancelled` that
no user action drives, so it is newly reachable without anyone touching Stop.
Re-asserting the status the step already read is the whole fix.

* fix(tables,knowledge): spare a live window, and restore the truncation notice

A lease needs its heartbeat interval to sit well under its TTL. The dispatch
heartbeat is stamped between windows, not during them, and `batchTriggerAndWait`
checkpoints the loop for the whole window — so the interval is really "one
window", which nothing bounds: the window ends when its cells do, and the
in-process path has no ceiling at all. A window outliving the stale threshold
had its dispatch cancelled while it was plainly alive.

Its cells carry the signal the checkpointed parent cannot — `updatedAt` on every
in-flight row execution, written by the cell tasks themselves. Both signals must
be stale before a dispatch is reclaimed, so a slow window is spared for as long
as its cells keep reporting while a run with nothing beating and nothing
executing is still collected. The subquery rides the partial `(table_id,
status)` index that already covers exactly those three statuses.

Bounding the workbook conversion also made its truncation notice unreachable:
the converted length can no longer exceed the window it was compared against, so
every sheet larger than the preview cap silently stopped reporting that it had
been cut. Compared against the declared row count instead, which is what the
comparison meant before the conversion was bounded.

* fix(tables,knowledge): act on the claim outcome and scope liveness to the dispatch

Three defects, two of them created by the previous round's fixes.

Guarding the pending-to-dispatching claim without reading its outcome was the
worse half of a fix. When a Stop-all or the stale sweep won the race the row
correctly stayed `cancelled`, while the step went on to announce `dispatching`,
stamp cells and enqueue a window for it — and an empty window would then reach
the unguarded `markDispatchComplete` and overwrite `cancelled` with `complete`.
The step now ends when it did not claim the row.

The cell-liveness probe was table-scoped, and `table_row_executions` carries no
dispatch column, so a live dispatch's cells vouched for an abandoned dispatch
beside it and the abandoned row was never reclaimed — turning the stuck overlay
this sweep exists to clear into a permanent one. Narrowed to the dispatch's own
groups, which it already stores. Two active dispatches over the same groups can
still mask each other, but that is the state `markActiveDispatchesCancelled`
already prevents.

Truncation asks whether the window cut the sheet short — a question about the
declared range against the cap. Comparing the converted length to the cap made
it unreachable once the conversion was bounded; comparing the declared count to
the converted length then reported truncation for any sheet merely containing
blank rows, which are now skipped rather than defaulted into existence.

* fix(tables): scope dispatch liveness to its rows, not just its groups

The previous round narrowed the cell-liveness probe to the dispatch's groups on
the reasoning that two active dispatches over the same groups cannot coexist,
because starting a run cancels prior work on its scope. That reasoning was
wrong. `cancelPriorRuns` in `workflow-columns` requires `isManualRun`, so
auto-fired runs never cancel anything, and the per-row path is explicitly a
no-op for dispatch cancellation. Same-group coexistence is ordinary.

A dispatch that names rows now only accepts liveness from those rows, which
covers the auto-fired and row-scoped runs that reach this state. What remains is
two table-wide dispatches over the same groups, where nothing in the row
execution says whose work it is; closing that needs a `dispatch_id` column on
`table_row_executions` threaded through six write sites, including the shared
cell-write path every cell task uses. That residue is a delay rather than a
permanent mask — the live dispatch's cells stop updating when it finishes, and
the next sweep after a quiet window reclaims the abandoned row.

* refactor(tables): name the dispatch liveness predicate and bound its fan-out

Extracts the cell-activity check into `hasRecentCellActivity`, so the stale
predicate reads as its two conditions — nothing beating, nothing executing —
rather than a twenty-line SQL blob nested inside an `and()`. No behaviour
change; this is the code three review rounds found defects in, and being able
to read it is what makes those defects findable.

Bounds the terminal-event fan-out with `mapWithConcurrency`, matching how the
scheduler already fans out. The sibling cancel paths emit over one table's
dispatches; this sweep can carry a whole tick's worth across many tables, and
each event is its own write.

Also repairs the test that covers it. `collectChunks` walks into the
`tableRowExecutions` table object the fragment interpolates, so every column
name appears in the chunks whether the predicate references it or not — the
group, row, table and timestamp assertions all passed with their predicates
deleted. Matching the literal SQL instead makes them fail, which mutating each
clause now confirms.

* fix(tables): make the row bypass NULL-safe and guard the post-wait completion

`jsonb_typeof(scope -> 'rowIds') <> 'array'` was the table-wide bypass, but a
table-wide dispatch has no `rowIds`: the extraction is SQL NULL, `jsonb_typeof`
returns NULL, and `NULL <> 'array'` is UNKNOWN rather than TRUE. The bypass
never fired, so no live cell could satisfy the probe and the sweep reclaimed
exactly the long-running table-wide dispatches the row filter was added to
protect — inverting it. `IS DISTINCT FROM` is the NULL-safe form, and the same
pitfall is already handled with `coalesce` in `markActiveDispatchesCancelled`.

`completeDispatch` also wrote through the unguarded `markDispatchComplete`. Both
its callers run AFTER the window's wait, so a Stop-all or the sweep landing
during that wait leaves the row `cancelled` and the write overwrote it with
`complete`, publishing a completion event after the cancellation one. The claim
guard cannot cover this — the cancel arrives long after the claim. It now goes
through `completeDispatchIfActive`, which already exists for exactly this, and
emits nothing when the transition does not land.

* fix(knowledge): give connector sync logs a retention pass

Nothing pruned `knowledge_connector_sync_log`, so it grew by one row per sync
run forever — a connector on a fifteen-minute interval writes about 35,000 rows
a year by itself. That cost lands on `loadPreviousListingObservation`, which
reads the newest `completed` row per connector through an index covering
`connector_id` alone, so every retained row makes the sort behind the
deletion-safety corroboration slower.

Added as another arm of the cleanup cron, batched the same way as its two
sibling prunes. Two `exists` guards are load-bearing rather than defensive: the
newest row per connector always survives, and so does the newest `completed`
one, because that is the row `loadPreviousListingObservation` reconstructs the
previous listing from — and that reconstruction decides whether a suspect
listing is corroborated, i.e. whether reconciliation may delete documents.
Pruning it would silently change deletion behaviour. `started` rows are never
eligible; they are in flight or waiting on the scheduler's own sweep.

* fix(tables): funnel every post-claim completion through the guarded write

The empty-window exit still wrote through the unguarded `markDispatchComplete`,
and it runs after the claim like the other two — so a cancel landing during its
window query was overwritten with `complete`. Shorter window than the two
post-wait exits, same defect, and leaving one of three unguarded is how this
came back twice already.

All three now route through `completeDispatch`, so the guard lives in one place
and covering it once covers every exit. The redundant test for this path went
with it: it could not be made to fail against the mock, and a test that cannot
fail is worse than none — the guard is held by the test on the shared funnel.

* fix(tables): bound how long cell activity may spare a dispatch

The liveness probe cannot tell whose cells it is looking at when two table-wide
dispatches share a group, because `table_row_executions` carries no dispatch
column. On a quiet table that is only a delay — the neighbour finishes and the
next sweep reclaims — but a busy table with continuous auto-fired work can keep
an abandoned dispatch masked indefinitely, which is the stuck overlay this sweep
exists to clear.

A ceiling bounds it: past a day without a heartbeat, a dispatch is reclaimed
whatever its cells are doing. That is safe because a live dispatch stamps its
heartbeat between windows regardless of cell activity, so only a single window
outliving the ceiling could be reclaimed wrongly, and no window lasts a day on
any path — the Trigger.dev run ceiling is ninety minutes.

The real fix is a `dispatch_id` on the executions row. Threading it through the
patch layer and the upserts underneath it is a change to the hottest write path
in tables and belongs in its own review, not on the sixth round of this one.

* refactor(tables): give the stale predicate one definition of "last beat"

`COALESCE(heartbeat_at, requested_at)` was written twice — once for the stale
threshold and again for the absolute ceiling — so the two could drift into
disagreeing about what proof of life means. One `lastBeat` fragment, one
`notBeatingSince(cutoff)` helper, both cutoffs expressed through it.

Also corrects the ceiling's comment: it triggers a day past the stale
threshold, not a day past now.

* fix(tables): delete the unguarded completion rather than guard it a fourth time

The two pre-claim exits — table missing, no target groups — still wrote through
`markDispatchComplete`. Last round I argued they run before the claim, "where
forcing a terminal state is the intent". That was wrong twice over: the table
lookup is awaited, so a cancel lands in that window like any other, and a
dispatch cancelled mid-lookup has not completed its scope any more than one
cancelled mid-window has.

Routing them through `completeDispatchIfActive` left `markDispatchComplete` with
no callers, so it is gone. That is the part worth having: this is the fourth
place the same defect appeared, each time because an unguarded writer was
sitting there to be reached. With it deleted, `completeDispatchIfActive` is the
only way to complete a dispatch and the class cannot recur.

* fix(tables): re-read the dispatch before committing a window

Several round trips separate the claim from the enqueue — the window query, the
executions prefetch, the tombstone filter — and nothing rechecked the dispatch
across them. A Stop-all or the stale sweep landing in that gap had the step
stamp cells and run a whole window for a dispatch already recorded as cancelled;
the existing recheck sits after the window, which is too late to prevent it.

Mirrors that existing check on the other side of the enqueue. It narrows the gap
to a single statement rather than closing it — a cancel arriving after this read
still races the enqueue, and no check can fix that. The cell-level
`cancellationGuard` and the `isExecCancelledAfter` tombstone filter are what
catch the remainder.
2026-08-21 15:02:12 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti 81ebb37563 fix(delivery): stable provider idempotency tokens, and correctness fixes around them (#6943)
* fix(delivery): stable provider idempotency tokens, and correctness fixes around them

Six independent fixes found while investigating a Slack transport failure. None
of them are that failure; all of them are live.

**Money writes could be delivered twice.** Square (8 tools), Brex (5) and Outlook
Calendar minted their provider idempotency token with `generateId()` at
request-build time. That is stable inside the transport retry loop —
`prepareToolRequest` runs once above it — but a BLOCK-level retry re-enters the
handler and mints a fresh one, defeating the provider's dedupe. A builder ticking
"retry" on a Square block turned a committed write into a second card charge, and
a Brex one into a second money transfer. Tokens now come from
`deriveDeliveryKey`, a pure function of execution + block + tool + invocation, so
every retry layer derives the same value. Stripe joins them: all ~50 tools
previously sent no `Idempotency-Key` at all.

The comment on `brex/create_transfer.ts` claimed a fresh key per transfer
*prevents* duplicate money movement. That is inverted — fresh per *attempt* is
what permits it — and is corrected here.

**`invocationId` is required, not optional.** Deriving from `executionId` alone
would be worse than the bug: five loop iterations paying five invoices would
share one token, the provider would honour the first and silently drop four real
payments, and it would look like five successes.

Also:

- `INTERNAL_API_BASE_URL` is now ignored on Trigger.dev workers. It names a route
  that resolves only inside the app container, and several modules run in both
  runtimes — `guardrails/mask-client.ts` says so in its own TSDoc — so setting it
  produced `PII redaction failed: Unable to connect` on every worker-side
  redaction. Mirrored into `packages/testing`'s urls mock, which reimplements the
  function and would otherwise have diverged.
- `engines.bun` raised to >=1.3.14. Measured on 1.2.15, which the old floor
  permitted: a fully-delivered POST is silently replayed and the caller sees 200.
- CloudWatch `put-metric-data` pinned to `maxAttempts: 1`. The AWS SDK default of
  3 already replayed it, and `PutMetricData` aggregates rather than overwrites, so
  a duplicate silently corrupts the customer's metric series and alarm thresholds.
- `webhookIdempotency` given a bounded in-progress lease. An untimed run held a
  SEVEN DAY lease while concurrent duplicates polled it once a second.

Verified: `tsc --noEmit` clean, 30,100 tests pass.

* fix(ci): restore staging files the branch split had reverted, and format

Three problems, all from assembling this branch by checking paths out of a WIP
branch built on an older `staging`. Anything `staging` changed since that base
came back as a revert.

- Root `package.json` had lost the `opentype.js` / `@types/opentype.js`
  dependencies `staging` added, which desynced `bun.lock` and failed `bun audit`.
  It also carried a `check:outbound-delivery` script belonging to other work.
  Every `package.json` is now taken from `staging` with only the `engines.bun`
  line re-applied.
- `executor/utils/block-data.test.ts` — a 77-line file `staging` added — was
  deleted outright. Restored.
- `executor/handlers/generic/generic-handler.test.ts` had lost a test `staging`
  added. Restored, with only the one `blockId` assertion re-applied.

Also formats `keyed-invocation-identity.test.ts` and sorts imports in
`internal-api-base-url.test.ts`, which is what `lint:check` failed on.

* fix(providers): thread the model's tool-call id into keyed tool execution

`prepareToolExecution` accepted an `invocationId` but no provider supplied one,
so a keyed tool invoked through an agent always hit the incomplete-context
fallback and minted a fresh token — leaving Stripe, Square, Brex and Outlook
Calendar writes able to double-deliver under the hosted-key retry layer even
though the block path was fixed.

The id is now a positional parameter rather than another optional field on
`request`, so a provider that cannot supply one fails to compile instead of
silently falling through. 22 of the 27 call sites already had the OpenAI-shaped
`toolCall` in scope; `tsc` identified the other five, of which Anthropic
(`toolUse.id`) and Bedrock (`toolUse.toolUseId`) name it differently.

Gemini is left deliberately unthreaded and documented: its function-call parts
carry no model-supplied identifier — the streaming loop has to synthesize a local
one — and a positional index would not survive the model re-emitting the call. A
token that only looks stable is worse than the loud fallback, which names the
missing fields.

* fix(executor): keep execution order monotonic across a resume

`executionOrder` is not carried in the pause snapshot, so a resumed run
restarted the counter at 0 and a loop or parallel body executing on both sides
of a pause could reuse a pre-pause value.

That was cosmetic while the number only ordered logs. It stops being cosmetic
once identity is derived from it: a `keyed` tool takes its provider idempotency
token from this value, so two distinct writes would present the same token and
the provider would silently drop the second. Suppressing a real payment is worse
than the duplicate the token exists to prevent, because it looks like success.

The counter is now seeded from the highest `executionOrder` among the restored
block logs rather than from a new snapshot field, so snapshots written before
this change are repaired on resume instead of needing a migration.

* fix(providers): thread the tool-call id through the streaming loops too

The previous commit only reached call sites written as a single-line
three-argument call. The streaming loops are formatted across lines, so
openai-compat (Groq, DeepSeek and everything else routing through it), Anthropic
and Bedrock still omitted the id and kept falling back to a fresh token.

Both Gemini paths now pass `part.functionCall?.id` — the RAW model id, not the
`ensureToolCallId` value used for stream events. That helper allocates an
execution-local id when Gemini supplies none, and it is freshly allocated per
attempt: passing it would complete the keyed context, silencing the "could not
derive" warning, while leaving the token just as unstable. Gemini frequently
omits the id, in which case this is `undefined` and the loud fallback stands.

All 27 call sites are now covered.

* fix(providers): make the tool-call id argument required, not optional

The TSDoc claimed a provider that cannot supply an id would fail to compile, but
the parameter was declared `toolCallId?: string` — so a new call site could omit
it entirely, typecheck, and silently take the unstable-token path the positional
parameter exists to close. The comment promised a guarantee the type did not
enforce.

It is now `string | undefined`: required in position, nullable in value. A
provider with no model-supplied id must pass `undefined` explicitly and take the
loud fallback, rather than being able to forget the argument.

All 27 existing call sites already pass it, so this is enforcement only. Verified
by deleting the argument at one site: `tsc` rejects it.
2026-08-21 13:35:20 -07:00
Waleed 63569a2459 fix(connectors): count hard-kill failures and cap deletion blast radius (#6909) 2026-08-21 09:41:21 -07:00
Waleed 1ced0b6065 fix(knowledge): stop the stuck-document sweep reclaiming still-queued documents (#6921)
* fix(knowledge): stop the stuck-document sweep reclaiming still-queued documents

The sweep gave 'processing' a staleness cutoff but gave 'pending' and 'failed'
none, and the only cross-run guard was uploadedAt < syncStartedAt, which scopes
within a sync but not across them.

That was harmless while document processing awaited inline: documents were
terminal by the time a sync ended. Since dispatch became asynchronous they sit
'pending' until a worker picks them up, so the next sync deleted their
embeddings, reset them, and re-dispatched while the original runs were still
executing — and each re-dispatch mints a fresh pass id, so it billed again.

Queued documents now get a grace period derived from queue drain time rather
than run duration: the processing queue's concurrency is 20 and global across
workspaces, so a 2,600-document corpus takes roughly two hours to drain. The
existing 45-minute threshold bounds a run, not a wait, and would still reclaim
live documents on any corpus over about 900.

No column records dispatch time, so the signal is processingStartedAt falling
back to uploadedAt. The sweep now stamps that column when it re-dispatches, and
the user-triggered retry stamps it instead of clearing it — without both, only a
document's first dispatch was protected and the sweep churned once per sync
forever on anything that kept waiting.

The grace narrows the duplicate-billing window but cannot close it: a
re-dispatch mints a new request id and the Trigger idempotency key is scoped per
dispatch by design. Closing it durably needs a document-scoped key or a
dispatch-generation column, recorded in TSDoc and deliberately not built here.

* fix(knowledge): record dispatch time in its own column instead of overloading the start time

Two review findings on this PR traced to the same root: the queue grace was
reading processingStartedAt, a column that means something else.

Externally, a pending row carrying a dispatch timestamp reported a processing
start time for work that had not started. Internally, updateDocument sets a
document pending and refreshes uploadedAt while leaving the previous run's
processingStartedAt in place, and completion never clears it — so the sweep aged
a re-dispatched document from a leftover stamp rather than its actual dispatch,
and could reclaim it inside the grace window while the earlier queue entry was
still live. That reopens the duplicate-billing race this PR closes.

processing_queued_at is written on every re-dispatch and read by the sweep;
processingStartedAt goes back to meaning what its name says, so its external
contract is byte-identical to before this PR.

Not stamped on first dispatch: the row is created and dispatched inside the same
sync run, so uploadedAt is already accurate there and a guarded write per upload
would buy no behavior.

The internal document route returns a full table row through a passthrough
schema, so the new column would have shipped as an undeclared raw Date. Declared
and serialized explicitly instead.

* fix(knowledge): stamp the queue time in the dispatch funnel, not at each call site

Giving dispatch its own column was not enough. The connector content-update path
updates a row in place with pending status and a fresh uploadedAt while leaving
every prior-run processing column intact, so a document dispatched once already
carried a stale queue stamp, the refreshed uploadedAt was never consulted, and
the row aged from a dead run's timestamp — the same bug one level down.

"Written on dispatch and only on dispatch" is now structural rather than a
convention three call sites remember: the stamp lives in processDocumentsWithQueue,
which every one of the nine dispatch paths already goes through, so none can
forget it. The sweep's and the retry's own stamps are kept because they land
inside the same transaction as their reset, so a document keeps its grace even
if the dispatch that follows throws.

The funnel also clears processingStartedAt, guarded on the row still being
pending so it cannot disturb a worker's compare-and-set. That closes the
API-facing half at its source: a pending row can no longer report a start time
from any path, including the content-update path no serializer would have seen.
2026-08-20 18:59:31 -07:00
42f6287911 feat(byok): add organization-wide key inheritance (#6834)
* feat(byok): add organization key management

* feat(byok): inherit organization keys at runtime

* feat(byok): add organization scope to BYOK settings

* fix(byok): refresh org key state after mutations

* fix(byok): hide stale inherited status badges

* chore(db): drop colliding byok migration ahead of staging merge

Staging independently claimed 0293. Remove ours so the merge is clean;
it is regenerated at the next free index right after.

* chore(db): regenerate byok migration at 0296

Staging claimed 0293-0295 during the merge; the regenerated SQL is
byte-identical to the dropped 0293.

* docs(byok): document organization scope, precedence, and the full provider list

The BYOK section described workspace-scoped keys only. Add the organization
scope, its Enterprise requirement, the per-provider precedence rule, what an
entitlement lapse does, and the Pi sandbox exposure. Refresh the provider
table from the settings page, which had drifted from 14 to 34 entries.

* feat(byok): open organization keys to every organization plan

Organization BYOK was gated on Enterprise, but an organization is the only
thing that can hold the keys, so every plan that can own an organization
should qualify — Pro for Teams, Max for Teams, and Enterprise.

Add checkOrgPlan/resolveOrganizationPlan beside the Enterprise pair rather
than widening checkEnterprisePlan, so the Enterprise-only gates (Access
Control, whitelabeling) are untouched, and restore
resolveOrganizationEnterprisePlan to module-private now that BYOK no longer
needs it.

* perf(byok): cache the organization entitlement, not the key material

getBYOKKey runs once per agent block and once per hosted-capable tool call,
so a loop over N items resolved N times — and each organization-inheriting
resolution paid three sequential billing queries on top of the two key reads.

Split the two reads by staleness tolerance. Key rows stay fresh, because
revocation must be immediate. The entitlement is a billing gate that tolerates
bounded staleness in the harmless direction (a lapsed organization keeps using
its own key for <=60s), so cache it per organization with an in-flight share so
concurrent blocks issue one query set. The management surfaces keep reading it
fresh, so an organization that just upgraded is never told otherwise.

Also run the block check and subscription read in parallel inside
resolveOrganizationPlan, and carry the resolved scope on BYOKKeyResult so a log
line can say whether a run used the workspace's key or an inherited one.

* feat(byok): let workspaces store the Z.ai and Cohere keys the runtime reads

Both ids were already in the BYOK contract enum and both are resolved at
execution time — getApiKeyWithBYOK reaches 'zai' (GLM models are in the hosted
catalog, so the BYOK branch runs), and 'cohere' backs both the Embeddings block
and Knowledge Base reranking — but neither appeared in the settings list, so
there was no way to store the key either path looks for.

Cohere had no icon; add one from the official multi-color mark so it stays
legible on a light and a dark page.

Cohere's embed-v4.0 is kbEligible:false, so the description says 'Embeddings
and Knowledge Base reranking' rather than claiming KB embeddings.

* improvement(byok): shorten the workspace scope chip to 'Workspace'

It sits beside 'Organization', so the scope reads from the pair; 'This'
only added width.

* fix(byok): do not cache a billing outage as an unentitled organization

resolveOrganizationPlan maps a failed billing read to false, which is
indistinguishable from a real plan lapse. The entitlement cache stored that,
so one transient outage held the gate shut for the full TTL and every
inheriting run silently fell back to a metered hosted key — and the cache's
rejection path, which exists to prevent exactly this, was unreachable.

Give the resolver the onError option its neighbours already have and let the
cached read ask for 'throw', so a failure stays out of the cache and the next
resolution retries. Behavior for the call that saw the error is unchanged:
getBYOKKey still fails closed.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot.

* fix(byok): propagate the subscription read's failure too

The previous commit threaded onError through resolveOrganizationPlan's own
catch, but getOrganizationSubscriptionUsable soft-fails to null on its own, so
a failed subscription read still arrived as an ordinary 'no usable
subscription' and returned a successful false — which the entitlement cache
then stored for the full TTL. Thread the option into that call as well.

Test it at the billing layer rather than the cache layer: the entitlement test
mocks resolveOrganizationPlan wholesale, so it could never have caught this.
Verified the new test fails against the previous commit.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot.

* refactor(byok): cache the entitlement with LRUCache, like copilot entitlements

The hand-rolled version reinvented three things the codebase already has a
canonical answer for. lru-cache is a declared dependency of apps/sim and
lib/copilot/entitlements.ts already caches an entitlement with it — by storing
the in-flight Promise, which is what makes concurrent callers collapse onto one
resolution with no in-flight bookkeeping at all. TTL and the size bound come
from the library.

That removes the second Map, the manual eviction (and its interaction with an
in-flight entry), and the dead value-while-refreshing state: 23 executable
lines. The one thing the library does not cover is dropping a rejected promise
so a billing outage is not cached for the TTL, which is kept and pinned by a
test that fails without it.

TTL expiry is no longer re-tested — that is the library's behavior, not ours,
and lru-cache reads its clock at module load so faking timers never moved it.

* refactor(byok): coalesce the entitlement read with the shared singleflight

lib/concurrency/singleflight.ts is the codebase's coalescing primitive and
oauth/credential-service.ts already pairs it with a read-through cache. Adopting
that shape fixes a case caching the promise directly did not: a *hung* billing
read wedged every caller for the full 60s TTL, where coalesceLocally evicts and
rejects at its settle deadline.

It also removes the hand-rolled rejection eviction — the cache is written only
on the success path, so an outage leaves no entry by construction.

The cache now holds booleans, which introduces the one trap worth a test: a
truthiness check would read a cached false as a miss and re-query billing on
every resolution for lapsed organizations. Pinned.

* fix(byok): keep an abandoned entitlement producer from writing the cache

coalesceLocally does not cancel a producer it timed out — its docstring says so
explicitly — so writing the cache from inside the producer let a late billing
result overwrite a fresher answer a retry had already cached, and hold it for a
full TTL.

Move the write onto the value the caller actually received. A caller that timed
out throws before reaching it, so an abandoned producer now resolves into
nothing. The test reproduces the overwrite and fails against the previous shape.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot.

---------

Co-authored-by: Bill Leoutsakos <billleoutsakos@Bills-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Vikhyath Mondreti <vikhyath@simstudio.ai>
2026-08-20 17:45:28 -07:00
3b4d9e9149 fix(schedule): reconcile interrupted schedule executions (#6780)
* fix schedule execution recovery

* simplify schedule recovery provider handling

* fix(schedules): stop reconciliation rewriting healthy carriers and index its scan

Follow-up hardening on the schedule recovery reconciliation.

Reconciliation settled every carrier it examined, including ones that had
already reached a terminal status and recorded their own outcome. Because the
normal completion path never stamps the reconciled marker, each successful
run's carrier was picked up on the next tick and rewritten: `completedAt`
bumped, `error` nulled and `output` replaced with a recovery stub, all of which
`GET /api/jobs/[jobId]` surfaces. A completed carrier whose execution log had
aged out was additionally flipped to failed. Settle only carriers still in
flight; a terminal one is owed schedule accounting and the marker, nothing more.

The recovery scan matched no index. There was none on `async_jobs.updated_at`,
and the unreconciled-terminal branch tested a jsonb extraction, so the whole
OR fell back to a sequential scan and sort of `async_jobs` on every tick. Add
the partial index, and spell the branch's status list and metadata key as SQL
literals: Postgres cannot prove a parameterised predicate implies a literal
index predicate, so a bound key would have left the new index unused.

Irrecoverable carrier tombstones were exempted from retention with no secondary
expiry, so the one class of row that can never reconcile grew without bound.
Give them a longer bounded window instead.

`WORKFLOW_EXECUTION_MAX_ROWS_PER_RUN` had become a per-status budget when the
stale-execution sweep gained its `redacting` pass, silently doubling the
per-run cap. Share the budget across both passes, and add the matching partial
indexes so the second pass keeps an index rather than seq-scanning.

Also consolidates the carrier metadata keys, their predicates and the jsonb
merge into one module -- the two routes were the writer and reader of the same
keys with no shared symbol, so a rename type-checked clean while silently
breaking retention.

* fix(schedules): rotate deferred carriers and stop the redacting sweep failing live runs

Addresses the review findings on the reconciliation hardening.

A carrier whose accounting was deferred got no write at all, so it kept its
`updatedAt` and stayed at the head of the `updatedAt`-ordered recovery batch on
every tick, starving every other claimed carrier and never becoming eligible for
retention. This was a regression from the previous commit: settling used to bump
the timestamp for every examined row, and skipping the settle for already-terminal
carriers removed the bump with it. A payload with no `scheduledFor` can never
reconcile, so such a row pinned a batch slot permanently. Bump `updatedAt`
unconditionally and keep only the reconciled marker conditional.

The stale-execution sweep terminalized `redacting` logs on the execution deadline.
That deadline bounds execution, while `redacting` covers payload masking after the
run already finished -- so a run that used most of its budget entered redaction
with the deadline due, and the sweep failed it five minutes later while the worker
was still masking. Schedule recovery then read the log as a failed occurrence and
counted a failure that never happened, even though the worker's terminal write
later restored `completed`. Sweep `redacting` on the generic stale window only.

`getScheduleNextRunAt` falls back to a daily cadence when a schedule has no cron
expression. Deployment cannot persist such a schedule, so the branch is
unreachable, but this change widened its use from failure recovery to every
outcome -- log a warning when it fires rather than silently guessing a cadence.

`executionDeadlineAt` was missing from the shared `workflowExecutionLogs` schema
mock, so it read as `undefined` and assertions comparing against that column were
trivially true. Add it.

* refactor(schedules): drop vestigial recovery code and close a builder gap

Follow-ups from a full re-read of the change. No behavior change except the
removed dead code paths.

The metadata merge stripped a `scheduleRecoveryBlocked` key on every write. That
key has never been written by any shipped code -- it appears nowhere in staging
and nowhere in history outside this branch -- so the strip guarded against a
state that cannot exist, at the cost of an extra jsonb operation and a bind
parameter on every reconciliation write.

`processScheduleItem` set `carrierObservedOrLookupUncertain` immediately before
returning on an ambiguous enqueue. The flag is only read from the surrounding
catch block, which a normal return skips, so the assignment was dead and read as
though it were load-bearing. Replaced with a comment stating why the occurrence
is preserved.

The stale-execution sweep carried two near-identical `jsonb_set` templates that
differed only in their error expression, kept flat because the test mock renders
nested SQL fragments as placeholders. The suite now has a recursive renderer, so
the error expression is a named per-status value and there is one `jsonb_set`.

Success was the only schedule outcome without a named update builder, which left
`executeScheduleJob` using two idioms for the same guarded write and left the
update shape untested. Add `buildScheduleSuccessUpdate` beside its cancellation
and failure siblings, use it from both call sites, and cover it the way
`buildScheduleCancellationUpdate` is covered -- a mutation of its `failedCount`
reset previously passed every suite.

---------

Co-authored-by: Bill Leoutsakos <billleoutsakos@Bills-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Waleed Latif <walif6@gmail.com>
2026-08-20 11:55:45 -07:00
Justin BlumencranzandClaude Fable 5 38630ff46d feat(tables): autosave persisted default views (#6724)
* feat(tables): autosave persisted default views

* fix(tables): close persisted view lifecycle gaps

* fix(tables): preserve edits through view hydration

* fix(tables): preserve the persisted default owner

* fix(tables): preserve legacy layout through view adoption

* fix(tables): close final view autosave races

* fix(tables): preserve valid saved sort on stale links

* fix(tables): make the first saved view the default

Creating the first view left isDefault false, so the legacy All
fallback stayed in the menu instead of handing off to the new view.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tables): refuse to delete a table's last saved view

The sibling check and the delete share the views advisory lock, so
racing deletes cannot drop a live table to zero views and regress it to
the legacy "All"-only state. Views of a hard-deleted table are removed
by the FK cascade, which this guard never sees.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 10:46:23 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti fcea50deb0 fix(provenance): stop size limits silently dropping secret provenance (#6867)
* fix(provenance): stop size limits silently dropping secret provenance

A bundle-selection cap counted cells rather than rows, so a 25-column
table insert lost secret provenance for every row past 400 — the whole
batch was stamped unknown with nothing logged. The same number lived in
the sender, the runtime type guard, and the route contract.

Consolidate every provenance limit into one definition: an 8MB
serialized envelope and 10,000 distinct secrets. The pair had been
copied into seven modules under fourteen names, and several copies had
drifted into bounding inputs — rows, cells, files, chunks — rather than
the envelope.

Remove every limit that could refuse a legal payload, add write-side
cause logging and a workspace-visible audit entry when a read proceeds
on unrecorded provenance, and repair the existing unknown rows.

* fix(provenance): close a repair race and stop memory double-reporting

The repair matched sidecars by the id its page captured, so a
provenance-aware write committing between the snapshot and the delete
had its fresh exact sidecar removed and its marker cleared behind it —
a secret-bearing row left reading as legacy. The delete now re-checks
status, which under READ COMMITTED re-evaluates against the writer's
committed row so it no longer matches.

Walk the candidate set by keyset over row_id. A page whose rows were
all repaired concurrently clears nothing, and terminating on "cleared
nothing" ended the walk with the rest of the backlog untouched.

Memory reported unrecorded provenance twice, and counted records even
when the surface was enforced — auditing a fail-open read that had
actually failed closed.

* fix(provenance): take the repair's locks in the writer's order

The repair deleted the sidecar and only then updated its parent row,
while mutateTableRowsWithSecretProvenance locks user_table_rows up front
and upserts the sidecar inside the same transaction. Opposite orders, so
an overlapping write deadlocked and Postgres resolved it by aborting
either the deployment or somebody's table write.

Lock the parent first, in id order, matching lockTableRows. Holding that
lock is also what makes the status re-check decisive rather than racy:
the writer commits its sidecar and its marker under the same lock, so
once it is held the write is either wholly done or has not begun.
2026-08-19 15:42:33 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti 483ff12b6f feat(billing): align enterprise reporting periods (#6851)
* feat(billing): align enterprise reporting periods

* fix(billing): harden enterprise reporting flow

* fix(outbox): preserve handler compatibility

* fix(billing): bound enterprise provisioning reads
2026-08-19 15:39:18 -07:00
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Opus 5 9ee1b81b41 feat(custom-blocks): join cross-workspace runs into the caller's trace, and map blocks per environment (#6857)
* feat(custom-blocks): join cross-workspace runs into the caller's trace, and map blocks per environment

Teams that orchestrate work across workspaces have two gaps that keep them on HTTP
blocks instead of custom blocks: they cannot see what a custom block actually did,
and a forked environment silently keeps calling the environment it was forked from.

Debugging. A custom block is an invocation boundary — a published block is org-wide,
so its internals must not reach every consumer by default. The child already writes
its own log row in the source workspace, correlated to the invoking run; the trace
existed, it just was not joined. The parent's span now carries only the child's
opaque execution id, and `hydrateChildTraces` joins the child's spans at READ time,
after authorizing the person reading against the child's workspace. Authorization
follows the viewer rather than a flag set at publish time, re-evaluates on every
read, and needs no second copy of the spans. Each hop of a nested chain is
authorized against its own workspace. Boundaries left unexpanded — no access, no
data, past a cap — say so, because a childless boundary span otherwise renders
exactly like a leaf and a partial trace reads as a complete one.

Live runs stream too, gated on `liveTraceViewerUserId`, which only surfaces with a
single known authenticated viewer set. Chat deployments stream through the same
callbacks and their consumer may be anonymous, so anything that does not opt in
keeps the boundary shut. Child spans handed to such a viewer are projected through
the CHILD's session: the invoking run's registry knows nothing about the publisher's
secrets, so projecting there would leave a source-owner credential unmasked. They
reach the live stream and stop — `createSpanFromLog` still refuses to persist them,
which is what keeps read-time hydration the single authorization point.

Environments. A fork inherits its parent's organization and `custom_block` is keyed
`(organization_id, type)`, so a uat fork resolved to the same row and ran the prod
workflow. Custom blocks become a fork-mappable resource, keyed by BLOCK TYPE — the
rule every kind follows: key by whatever the workflow references, as `file` does
with storage keys and `env-var` with names. A custom block is the only resource
referenced by the canvas block's own type rather than a sub-block value, so the
rewrite gets its own channel. Unmapped blocks keep the source type, because a type
cannot be emptied without deleting the node; they surface as unmapped and block the
promote, which is what stops uat from quietly invoking prod.

Same-named environment copies now carry their source workspace, so an Access Control
allowlist decision between three identical "Invoice Parser" rows is no longer a guess.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(workspace-forking): let an explicit identity custom-block mapping resolve

`remapForkBlockType` reported a mapping whose target equalled the source as
unresolved, conflating "a mapping exists" with "the type string changed". Those
are opposite states that produce an identical output `type`, and every caller
uses the flag for the former — to decide whether the reference blocks a promote.

The org-wide candidate list includes the source block, so binding an environment
to the shared block is a normal pick. Under the old flag it raised
`unmapped-custom-block` and refused the sync over a choice the user had
explicitly made. The flag is now named `resolved` and reports mapping existence;
whether the type moved is already visible from `type`.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot on #6857.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(custom-blocks): keep a streamed child's spans and markers off the parent's log

Two leaks in the live-stream path, both the same mistake: treating a channel as
viewer-scoped when it is actually persisted, so gating the stream on an
authorized viewer bought nothing.

`childTraceSpans` rode the block output to reach the stream. `filterOutputForLog`
only dropped a hidden key when the block's own config declared it
`hiddenFromDisplay` — true of the workflow block, never of a custom block, whose
outputs are publisher-curated. The source run's spans therefore persisted into
the parent's `span.output`, readable by anyone with parent-workspace access and
never re-checked by `hydrateChildTraces`. A globally hidden key is now dropped at
the top level, not only when nested, and `extractDisplayOutput` strips it again so
no other producer can reintroduce it.

The fan-out also called the invoking run's `onBlockStart`/`onBlockComplete`, which
are persist-then-emit composites: they write block names and I/O into the parent's
LoggingSession before reaching the stream. Those markers are keyed by the parent
execution and outlive the per-viewer check entirely. Custom-block children now go
through `liveStreamCallbacks`, the raw emit-only pair, and fail closed when a
surface supplies none. Same-workspace workflow children keep the composites — they
belong to the same run and their markers are legitimately the parent's.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot on #6857.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(custom-blocks): carry the emit-only stream sink into nested executions

Routing custom-block events through `liveStreamCallbacks` forwarded the viewer id
to the child but not the sink itself, so a nested hop cleared
`canStreamCustomBlockToViewer` off the inherited id and then had nothing to stream
through — `parentStreamSink` fell back to `{}` and live traces stopped at the
first sub-executor. That hit a custom block nested inside a workflow block as
readily as one inside another custom block.

The sink now travels with the viewer id, and both are withheld together when
streaming is not permitted. It is always the INHERITED chain, never
`parentStreamSink`: for a same-workspace workflow block that is the persisting
composite, so forwarding it would put a custom block nested inside one straight
back onto the parent's progress markers — the leak the previous commit closed.

Reported by Cursor Bugbot on #6857.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 15:25:28 -07:00
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Opus 5 521348b529 feat(secrets): record which secrets each run resolves, and surface it per secret (#6823)
* feat(secrets): record which secrets each run resolves and surface it per secret

Redaction stops a value at a boundary but cannot stop code that never emits it —
a Function block can print a key one character at a time and nothing ever matches
the secret. That is undecidable in general, so this adds the other half of the
posture: attribution.

Every run now records which configured secrets it actually resolved, under whose
identity, through which surface (workflow, Sim agent, MCP). The data already
existed in ResolvedSecretTraceRegistry.addActiveEntry and was persisted only for
paused runs; this persists it for every terminal path.

Execution logs cannot answer this. They store the whole available encrypted
environment rather than what a run referenced, they evidence a secret only where
value-matching redaction happened to fire, and they expire under
logRetentionHours — while "who has touched this key" outlives any single run.

- secret_usage: per-UTC-day rollup keyed by workspace, secret, scope, owner,
  source, workflow, actor. A one-minute schedule touching three secrets would
  otherwise write thousands of rows a day, which is also why this is not
  audit_log. workflow_id/actor_user_id use '' sentinels rather than null so the
  unique key works on Postgres 14 without NULLS NOT DISTINCT, and are not FKs:
  they are historical facts, and an onDelete would rewrite a key column.
- secret_owner_user_id is part of the key. Two people can hold a personal secret
  under one name and a shared personal secret resolves for a caller who does not
  own it, so name and scope alone do not identify a secret. It is NOT the actor:
  a scheduled run resolves the workflow owner's personal slice under the
  workspace's execution actor.
- Direct environment reads are now detected in JS (TypeScript AST), Python
  (tokenizer-checked) and shell (quote/heredoc-scanned), so a secret read as
  environmentVariables['K'] or $K enters the run's provenance instead of going
  unredacted. Each detector prescans for names that are actually configured
  secrets before paying for a lex or quote-frame pass.
- Copilot integration tool calls are covered: resolveCopilotEnvReferences
  substitutes {{SECRET}} into user-only params, which is a real use.
- See usage lives behind a credential-admin gate, using the same predicate that
  reveals the value; members get a disabled chip explaining why.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(audit): register the secret-usage route in the validation baseline

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): keep rollup metadata with its run, and stop shadowed bindings faking usage

Review round 1.

- record.ts: last_execution_id/last_trigger were assigned unconditionally while
  last_used_at was chosen by greatest(), so two runs completing out of order split
  one row between them — the newer run's timestamp beside the older run's execution
  id, making "View log" open a run the row does not describe. Both are now guarded
  on the timestamp actually advancing, so the row's metadata always belongs to the
  run that owns its timestamp.
- javascript.ts: a local binding named environmentVariables (declaration, parameter,
  destructured binding, or bare reassignment) made reads off the user's own object
  look like mounted-secret reads. Any such binding now disables detection for the
  file; the AST already had parent pointers, so this is a kind check during the
  existing walk.
- python.ts: same class of bug with no parser available, so the rule is an allowlist
  — every mention of the binding must be a literal subscript or .get(), otherwise
  detection is off for the file. This also subsumes the cross-line attribute case
  (other.\n environmentVariables['K']), which the previous space-and-tab look-behind
  missed.

Under-reporting is the safe direction here: a trail that claims a use that never
happened is worse than one that misses a use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): format the generated migration snapshot

CI runs lint:check across every workspace; the drizzle-kit output in packages/db
had never been through biome, so the branch was green locally (where lint had
only been run inside apps/sim) and red on CI. Whitespace only — both files are
byte-for-byte identical once parsed, and drizzle-kit still reports no pending
schema diff against the reformatted snapshot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): detect every rebinding of the environment identifier, not just declarations

Review round 2. A bare `for (environmentVariables of rows)` has no declaration to
key off, so the previous check missed it and reads of the loop value were still
recorded as secret usage.

Rather than extend the hand-rolled node-kind list, this reuses the pair the same
file already applies to reject a placeholder in a write position:
isDeclarationIdentifier covers declarations, parameters, destructured bindings and
imports, and isWriteIdentifier covers every assignment operator, ++/--,
destructuring targets, and for-in / for-of initializers.

That also closes four forms neither the review nor the original check named:
logical (||=) and nullish (??=) assignment, and object and array destructuring
assignment. Six of the eight added cases fail against the previous check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): apply the rebinding rule to shell, and say when a run's log is gone

Review round 3, plus the docs that were left claiming the old behavior.

- shell.ts: a script that writes a configured name (API_KEY=local, export/local/
  readonly, read, for, unset) expands its own value from that point on, not the
  mounted secret, so recording it claimed a use that never happened. Every mention
  of the name must now be a `$NAME` / `${NAME}` expansion, matching the allowlist
  shape the Python detector already uses. Applied per name rather than per file:
  JavaScript and Python shadow one object holding every secret, whereas rebinding
  one shell variable says nothing about the rest.

- The usage trail deliberately outlives execution logs, so a row routinely names a
  run whose log has been pruned. The read now left-joins workflow_execution_logs on
  its unique execution_id and reports availability, and the panel renders the chip
  disabled with the platform tooltip instead of linking into an empty Logs view.
  Three states: no run to link, a run whose log is gone, and a live link.

- Docs said a direct environmentVariables/$KEY read does not activate masking,
  which this branch changes. Corrected in credentials.mdx, function.mdx and the
  logging FAQ, and the recognition limits are now written down: runtime-built
  names, reassigned bindings, and reads that cannot be told apart from text.
  Added a "See usage" section covering who can see it and why an empty trail
  means "nothing recognized" rather than "never used".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): writing a name is not reading it, and a bare mention is not a rebinding

Review round 4.

- javascript.ts / python.ts: `environmentVariables.API_KEY = 'x'` and
  `delete environmentVariables.API_KEY` touch the name without ever reading the
  mounted value, but the detectors matched the member access and recorded a use
  that never happened. JavaScript now asks the same isWriteIdentifier the
  placeholder rewriter uses (its parameter is widened to ts.Node — the body
  already walked generic nodes, so this is a type change, not a behaviour one)
  plus a delete check; Python excludes a subscript followed by `=` and a `del`
  target.

- shell.ts: requiring every mention of a name to be an expansion also fired on
  text that binds nothing — a comment naming the key, or `echo "API_KEY=$API_KEY"`
  where the literal is an argument rather than an assignment — and dropping those
  cost masking on a genuine read. It now looks for actual writes: an assignment at
  command-word position, a binding builtin, `printf -v`, or a `for` target.

  The two directions are not symmetric, which is why this errs toward detecting
  the read: missing a write records a use of a secret the script only had in its
  environment, a misleading audit row and nothing more, since masking still
  searches for the real value and will not find it. Over-detecting a write
  suppresses masking on a value that does reach the log.

  This also makes the code match what the docs already described — skipping after
  a rebinding, not after any mention.

13 tests added; 11 fail against the previous code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): an update reads before it stores, and a del target may be parenthesized

Review round 5. The first of these is a regression from round 4.

- javascript.ts: reusing isWriteIdentifier to answer "is this a read" was wrong.
  That predicate answers the rewriter's question — is this a target the
  substitution must refuse — so it treats every assignment operator alike, which
  is correct there and wrong here: `+=`, `||=`, `??=`, `++` and `--` all load the
  current value before storing, so they are genuine reads and were silently
  losing their masking. Only a plain `=` stores without reading. Replaced with a
  purpose-named predicate, and isWriteIdentifier's parameter is narrowed back to
  ts.Identifier now that nothing else needs it widened.

  A test committed last round asserted the wrong behaviour for `+=`; it has been
  corrected rather than left to pin the bug.

- python.ts: `del (environmentVariables['K'])` slipped past a check that looked
  only at the characters immediately before the match. It now isolates the
  enclosing logical line and tests whether that is a del statement, which also
  covers `del((x))`, `del(x)`, `del a, x`, and a del after a semicolon.

12 tests added or corrected; 10 fail against the previous code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): stop excluding Python writes, which kept leaking in the unsafe direction

Review round 6. Greptile found that `del environmentVariables[environmentVariables['K']]`
had its inner access — which computes a key, so it is a genuine read — skipped
along with the delete, leaving that value unmasked.

The narrow fix was another textual rule. Instead this removes the write and delete
exclusions from the Python detector entirely, because they were optimizing the
wrong direction.

`resolvedSecretNames` feeds `outputSecretMatcher`, an exact-value matcher over the
output. Naming a secret the code never read costs nothing there: the matcher scans
for a value that does not appear. Failing to name one that was read leaves it
unmasked. The two error directions are therefore not comparable, and the
exclusions bought only audit-trail tidiness while every heuristic they needed has
so far leaked into the dangerous side — first a parenthesized target, now a nested
read. A `del` or an assignment is reported like any other access.

JavaScript keeps its exclusion: a real AST answers the question per node, with no
text to misread, and it has produced no such hole.

Net 30 lines removed from python.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): report recognized reads instead of proving they are not reads

Review round 7. Greptile flagged both directions at once — false usage from
reporting a write target, and unmasked secrets from the file-wide shadow flag —
so I traced what the signal actually drives before choosing.

The chain: the compiler's names feed outputSecretPlaintextsByName and the
exact-value matcher, NOT context.resolvedSecretNames, which starts empty. After
execution activateOutputSecretProvenance scans the output and adds only names
whose plaintext actually appeared; those become __resolvedSecretNames, which
tools/index.ts turns into recordResolved calls, which is what the usage trail
reads.

So a compile-time false positive produces no usage row on the ordinary path — it
only hands the matcher a value the code never emits. It does produce one on the
!projection.safe fallback, where the system already over-approximates by design.
A false negative, by contrast, keeps the value out of the matcher entirely, so a
genuinely read secret is never masked on any path.

That asymmetry decides it, so every "prove this is not a read" mechanism is gone:

- javascript.ts: the file-wide shadow flag. A helper declaring its own
  environmentVariables discarded genuine reads of the mounted binding everywhere
  else in the file — Greptile's security finding, and real.
- python.ts: the allowlist requiring every mention to be a subscript or .get().
  Same hole: passing the dict to a function suppressed unrelated reads.
- shell.ts: the rebinding check. It had the same hole in a form nobody flagged —
  `echo "$API_KEY"; API_KEY=local` dropped the first read, which is of the real
  secret.

What stays is the question of whether the text is code at all — strings, comments,
single quotes, quoted heredocs — plus the receiver check that `other.environment
Variables['K']` is a different object, and JavaScript's node-precise write/delete
exclusion, which cannot suppress a read elsewhere.

Net 215 lines removed across the three detectors and their tests. Docs updated:
the rule is now stated as reporting rather than proving, and that See usage may
occasionally list a secret the code had available but did not read.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(secrets): drop the last write-vs-read special case

`environmentVariables` is a plain object deserialized from the run payload
(route.ts:206), not a handle on the stored secret. Assigning to it changes
nothing outside the sandbox and is discarded when the run ends, so separating a
write from a read bought almost nothing while leaving JavaScript as the one
language still trying to prove a read is not a read.

Every language now follows the same rule: report a recognized read of a
configured secret name. The only exclusions left are facts rather than
inferences — the text is not executable (string, comment, single quote, quoted
heredoc), the receiver is a different object, or the name is not statically
knowable.

Docs note that assigning to the binding does not edit the secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(secrets): ship only the fields the trail actually shows

Five fields crossed the API and reached no reader: usageDate, firstUsedAt,
actorEmail, workflowId and actorUserId. The panel renders the timestamp, the
trigger, what used the secret, the actor's name, the run count and the run link;
everything else was projected, serialized and discarded.

first_used_at is dropped from the table as well. Nothing read it, and inside a
per-day bucket "first used that day" says nothing next to "last used that day" —
so it was a column written on every run for no question anyone asks. The upsert
loses its least() with it. Migration regenerated; the identifier columns behind
the joins stay, they simply are not returned.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): report referenced code secrets, not only ones that surface in output

The Function route activated a secret's provenance — and therefore its usage row
and downstream masking — only when the exact value appeared in the result,
stdout, or error. That gate made the trail miss silent use entirely: a key that
authenticates an API call and is never echoed reported nothing, and so did the
founding scenario of this feature, a key exfiltrated character by character. The
innocent run that echoed a key got a row; the run worth catching did not.

Activation now follows the referenced set the compiler already computes: resolved
{{KEY}} bindings plus recognized direct reads, filtered to configured values —
the same set the unsafe-projection fallback already activated. An extra name only
hands the output matcher a value that never appears; configured-but-unreferenced
values are still never included. The output-scan activation path and its surface
helper are deleted rather than kept alongside.

One old test pinned the gate ("does not activate a referenced secret that does
not cross the Function result"); it now asserts the reverse, with the reasoning
attached. Two new tests pin the char-split exfiltration and the silent API-call
case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): shell escaping is backslash parity, not adjacency

Review round 8. `\\$API_KEY` is an escaped backslash followed by a LIVE expansion
— bash prints `\` plus the value — while `\$API_KEY` is an escaped dollar and
stays literal. Checking only the character adjacent to `$` read every even run as
escaped, dropping a real read from usage and masking alike; verified against
bash before fixing.

The scanner now counts the run of backslashes before the `$` and skips only odd
runs, the same parity rule logicalLineEndAfterContinuations in this file already
applies to line continuations. Six-case parity table added; the three even-run
cases fail against the previous check.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): recognize destructured environment reads

Review round 9. `const { API_KEY } = environmentVariables` delivers the value by
name with no property- or element-access node in the AST, so the member-access
walk missed it entirely — and a missed read leaves an emitted value unmasked,
the dangerous direction.

The AST walk now also recognizes the declaration form (shorthand, renames,
defaults, string-literal keys), the assignment form ({ KEY } = env), and a
...rest element — which names no key but takes every value, so it reports every
configured name; the alternative left `const { ...all } = env; return all`
entirely unmasked. A computed key stays unrecognized, the same runtime-name
boundary as a computed subscript, and a receiver that is not the bare identifier
is not attributed.

Nine cases added; the six positive ones fail against the previous walk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): one receiver rule for destructured reads, parentheses included

Review round 10. Two accurate findings, folded into a generalization instead of
two more special cases:

- A parameter default (function f({ API_KEY } = environmentVariables)) and a
  binding-element default are the same by-name delivery as a variable
  declaration. The detector now keys on the ObjectBindingPattern itself and
  checks its parent's initializer, so every declaration position follows one
  rule instead of per-kind arms.
- Parentheses group without changing the receiver, so (environmentVariables) is
  unwrapped before the identifier check — in the destructuring arm AND the
  member-access arm, which had the same hole unreported.

Declined the for-of-over-array-literal finding: the receiver there is a
container, not the environment object, and following data flow through
containers has no fixed point — the same documented boundary as aliasing and
computed keys. A test pins the boundary so it reads as chosen, not missed.

Eight cases added; the seven receiver-rule cases fail against the previous code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(secrets): a dot in prose is not a qualifier, and a literal computed key is a subscript

Review round 11. Both findings were implementation-narrower-than-rule, fixed by
consulting authorities the detectors already had rather than adding new ones:

- python.ts: the receiver walk crosses whitespace so a parenthesized `other.` on
  a previous line is seen — but it landed on a comment's final period
  (`# Load the value.`) and discarded the genuine read on the next line. The
  landing position is now checked against the same lexer ranges that filter the
  candidates, which is also why the receiver check moves after lexing.
- javascript.ts: `const { ['API_KEY']: key } = environmentVariables` is the
  element-access rule in pattern position, so a computed key holding a string
  literal resolves like a literal subscript; any other computed key keeps the
  runtime-name boundary a computed subscript already has.

Eight cases added; the comment-period case and all three literal-computed-key
cases fail against the previous code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 18:32:20 -07:00
Theodore Li 8fb571ac54 feat(credentials): add managed credential groups (#6697)
* feat(credentials): add managed credential groups

* fix(audit): sync credential group mock

* fix(credentials): serialize enrollment revocation

* fix(credentials): isolate managed delegation

* fix(credentials): serialize invitation lifecycle

* fix(credentials): preserve enrollment lifecycle

* refactor(credentials): migrate groups to application boundary

* fix(credentials): serialize enrollment readiness

* fix(credentials): preserve completed reconnect state

* fix(credentials): revalidate policy before grant persistence

* fix(credentials): prioritize expired invitations

* fix(credentials): redirect unavailable oauth starts

* fix(credentials): clarify managed oauth boundaries

* fix(settings): complete feature flag test mocks

* fix(credentials): clarify enrollment actions and entitlement errors

* fix(credentials): preserve entitlement failure reasons

* fix(credentials): refine managed oauth flow

* fix(lint): use optional chain for pagination
2026-08-14 21:46:58 -04:00
Waleed b9a70e43f9 fix(execution): give a cancelled async run its terminal metadata (#6693)
* fix(execution): give a cancelled async run its terminal metadata

The staging integration suite has been failing
integ-cancel-async-api-key/async-execution-becomes-cancelled: the run
reports status cancelled with a null endedAt and a null duration, so the
assertion fails and the dependent worker-stop check never runs.

The run resource falls back to the queue job whenever no execution-log
row exists yet, and a cancel that lands before the worker has written
that row leaves exactly that state. Trigger.dev marks a run canceled the
moment it accepts the cancellation but only stamps its finish time when
the worker drains, so for the seconds in between the job is terminal with
no timestamp, and the projection faithfully reports a terminal status
with nothing to date it. The run writes a correct log row when it finally
drains, which is why the endpoint heals itself and the alarm fires
intermittently rather than always.

The backend was discarding the one timestamp that is always present:
the retrieve response carries a required updatedAt beside the optional
finishedAt. A finish time still wins wherever it exists, so nothing that
already reports correctly changes, and the fallback is taken only once
the mapped status is terminal — an active run's updatedAt marks progress,
and reading it as an end would retire a run that is still going. It
records the server's last transition for the run rather than the reader's
clock, so it stays put across polls instead of growing.

Also carries the duration on a fifth cancellation write, in the internal
cancel route, that the earlier pass missed because its sweep covered lib
and not app.

* refactor(execution): derive a cancelled run's terminal fields in one place

The five cancellation paths each hand-assembled the same four-key payload for
the workflow-execution log, and one of them had already drifted: the direct
cancel never cleared `execution_deadline_at`, leaving a cancelled row carrying
the deadline of an attempt that had stopped running. Extract the payload so the
key set cannot vary between them, and leave the paths themselves alone — they
differ in handle, claim predicate, whether they read the row back, and what they
do when the claim is lost, so they stay separate statements.

Bind the end instant through the `started_at` column encoder rather than a
pre-stringified ISO literal. `check:sql-date-binding` exists to enforce exactly
that binding; the literal passed only because it was already a string.

Collapse the duration expression to one `COALESCE` over a valueless-`ELSE`
`CASE`, which builds the elapsed fragment once instead of in both branches, and
reuse it for the stale-execution sweeper, which carried its own copy along with
a second int4 ceiling constant.

Document the invariants the fix depends on where a reader meets them: that
`total_duration_ms` means wall clock for a terminal row and active time for a
paused one, and that a terminal job must carry its transition instant.
2026-08-13 20:07:37 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti fa394e5e07 fix(execution): resolve secrets against the acting principal, not the workflow owner (#6690)
* fix(execution): resolve secrets against the acting principal, not the workflow owner

* fix(execution): resolve anonymous public-API runs as the workspace billing account

* fix(execution): propagate run identity across dispatch paths and scope public runs to workspace secrets
2026-08-13 18:50:15 -07:00
Waleed 264d4f3469 feat(canvas): add a setting to turn off auto-focus when clicking blocks (#6685)
* feat(canvas): add a setting to turn off auto-focus when clicking blocks

Clicking a block animates the camera to center it, which zooms in far
enough that you lose sight of the rest of the workflow. Add an
"Auto-focus on click" preference (on by default, so existing behavior is
unchanged) that keeps the camera still on click.

Also re-record the auto-connect and canvas-error-notification tooltip
previews and re-encode all three at a smaller size.

* fix(canvas): keep click-marked framing when auto-focus is off, recut tooltips

Gating the whole click branch on the setting also skipped the
userFocusedWorkflowIdRef write, which is what stops <ReactFlow onInit>
from running fitView over the user's framing. That would have blown away
the framing of exactly the users who turned auto-focus off to keep it.
Mark the workflow as user-framed on any plain node click and gate only
the camera move.

Crop the auto-focus preview to the recording's viewport center so the
blocks are legible at the 240px width Tooltip.Preview renders at, and
trim the 2.45s of empty lead off the error-notification preview.

* docs(canvas): correct useAutoFocusOnClick scope to clicks only

The TSDoc claimed the preference also gated arrow-key navigation, which
calls focusBlockInView without consulting it. State the click-only scope
and why arrow-key navigation and block creation are excluded.
2026-08-13 17:05:54 -07:00
Waleed 6de8ba2504 fix(v2): close the correctness gaps an end-to-end audit found (#6655)
* fix(v2): stop a third-party tool description from 500ing MCP discovery

`v2McpToolInputSchema` declared `description: z.string().optional()` inside a
`.catchall(z.unknown())` object, and a declared key beats the catchall. The MCP
SDK's own `ToolSchema.inputSchema` does not declare `description` at all, so any
value — including the JSON `null` a Python server emits for an absent one —
passes its validation and reaches Sim unchecked. The builder's outbound `.parse()`
then threw, and the discovery error policy correctly declines to classify a
Sim-side schema defect, so the endpoint that completes MCP onboarding answered a
bare 500. The key is dropped and left to the catchall; `type`, `properties`, and
`required` stay pinned because the SDK enforces those at least as tightly.

Also in the v2 resources family:

- The single-resource query schemas for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, and
  secrets are now `.strict()`, matching every list in the same family. A mistyped
  flag was silently ignored behind a 200.
- `openapi/resources.ts` re-derived `RESOURCE_ERRORS` and
  `RESOURCE_CONFLICT_ERRORS` inline in 21 of 22 operations. They now import the
  shared constants; the generated spec is unchanged, which is the point.
- The internal MCP refresh route stamped `updatedAt` alongside `lastToolsRefresh`.
  `updatedAt` means "configuration last changed" and is a public keyset sort, so
  a refresh moved rows out from under an in-flight page. `updateServerStatus`
  already held that invariant; the route now matches it.
- The discovery cooldown is a typed `McpServerCooldownError` rather than a
  substring search for `cooldown`. `McpConnectionError` interpolates the server's
  display name into its message, so a server named after the word was reported as
  a transient cooldown when its connection had genuinely failed.

* fix(v2): close correctness gaps in the workflows deployment surface

Deploy and rollback bodies were plain objects, so a misspelled key was
stripped rather than rejected. On rollback that is silent misbehavior:
an omitted `version` legitimately means "reactivate the preceding
version", so `{"versoin": 5}` rolled back somewhere else and answered
200. Both v2 bodies, the run-read query, and the versions cursor are now
strict.

Deployment versions are an `integer` column, but the path param, the
versions cursor, and the v1 body each bounded it differently or not at
all — an out-of-range value overflowed the comparison into an
unclassifiable 500. One exported bound now covers all three.

Resume admission raised bare `Error`s for a stale contextId or an
already-resumed run, which the resume surfaces could not classify and
reported as 500. They now use the sibling `ResumeAdmissionError` already
in that file, carrying 404/409/400 and whether an automatic retry can
clear the refusal.

Docs corrections: rollback publishes the 409 its webhook-path conflict
already produces; deploy/undeploy/rollback reject a workspace key with
403, not the concealed 404 they documented; the workflows OpenAPI module
imports the shared error sets instead of re-deriving them; import and
the folder ops explain their folder-tree 413. The export route is marked
`headSafe: false` so a HEAD probe stops filing a WORKFLOW_EXPORTED audit
event for an export that never happened. `runId` is one bounded schema
across the run and log resources.

* fix(v2): conceal knowledge upload existence, tighten knowledge/files bounds

Security: the four knowledge document-upload routes rendered a bare upload
error policy with no resource concealment, while every sibling knowledge route
uses one. Because the use case resolves the knowledge-base context before
workspace authorization, the unconcealed 403 told any valid API-key holder that
a knowledge base exists in a workspace it cannot reach — the exact signal
GET /api/v2/knowledge/{id} withholds by answering 404 either way. All four now
use the composed concealing policy, which also renders the 415/402/413 the
route-local renderer already handled; that duplicate renderer is deleted.

Contracts:
- POST /knowledge/search is strict. It was the only non-strict v2 request body,
  so a mis-cased rerankerEnabled or topK returned 200 with the key stripped,
  changing what the caller was billed and silently disabling reranking.
- The document list takes limit, cursor, and search from the shared v2 schemas.
  search was an unbounded, empty-accepting v1 string, so ?search= answered 200
  with a full page here and 400 on GET /knowledge, and the term reached an
  unindexed filename LIKE scan with no ceiling.
- The 16 non-strict single-field workspace query slices across both families are
  strict, matching GET /knowledge/{id}/tags.
- GET /audit-logs takes workspaceIdSchema instead of a bare string (?workspaceId=
  was forwarded as a filter and returned zero rows) and the shared run-window
  bounds for startDate/endDate.

Documentation:
- listAuditLogs drops the 404 it has no code path to emit.
- upsertFileShare describes its workspace-key refusal as the 403 it renders;
  the operation denies the key by principal kind, which the concealment policy
  does not rewrite.
- The 12 body-reading knowledge and files operations publish the 413 their
  pre-validation body read raises, and the file list publishes the folder-tree
  413 its now-capped path index raises.

Correctness: queryWorkspaceFilePage loads its folder path index under
MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE like the workflow, table, and knowledge lists. An
uncapped index does not fail on truncation, so a real folder outside the read
rows resolved to undefined and answered "Folder not found".

* fix(v2): publish the reachable 413 on body-carrying resources ops

`parseRequest` buffers a JSON body through `parseJsonBody` under
`DEFAULT_MAX_JSON_BODY_BYTES` before any schema runs, and the v2 builders supply
`V2_PARSE_DEFAULTS.payloadTooLargeResponse`, so every operation whose contract
declares a body already answers 413 above the cap. The resources family
published it on none of them. A status a caller cannot see in the spec is a
status they will not handle.

Adds `RESOURCE_BODY_ERRORS` and `RESOURCE_CONFLICT_BODY_ERRORS` to the shared
sets and applies them to the seven affected operations: createMcpServer,
updateMcpServer, createSkill, updateSkill, createCustomTool, updateCustomTool,
and setSecret. All seven are `defineV2JsonRoute` handlers on non-GET methods
with no `parseOptions` override, so the 413 is genuinely reachable on each. The
new sets are opt-in rather than folded into the base sets precisely because
reachability is not automatic — an operation with no body, or one whose payload
reaches it through an uncapped path, would be publishing a response that can
never arrive.

A sweep test pins the invariant across the resources, billing, and logs
documents. It is one-directional by construction: several bodyless operations
publish 413 for their own folder-tree and render ceilings, so the converse would
flag correct documentation.

Also completes the shared-constant consolidation started in cd3efefab9:
`openapi/billing.ts` and `openapi/logs.ts` each re-derived `RESOURCE_ERRORS`
inline in two operations. Both now import it, and both regenerate byte-identical.

* fix(v2): head-safe binary downloads, coded 403s, and truthful surface docs

Adds `headSafe` to `defineV2BinaryRoute`, mirroring the JSON builder: a HEAD
on a route that declares itself unsafe is authenticated and rate-limited, then
answered bodiless before parsing or executing. `GET /api/v2/files/{fileId}` is
the one binary v2 route and it records a `FILE_DOWNLOADED` audit event, so a
HEAD probe used to fabricate a download that never happened.

Names the cause of five refusals that reached the wire as codeless 403s
(billing principal-kind, personal-keys-disabled and role, secret admin and
write, the workspace table quota, and public sharing), adding three members to
the closed `FORBIDDEN_DETAIL_CODES` set. The billing cross-tenant refusal is
concealed as a 404 instead of coded, and the credential-list and knowledge
file-ownership refusals stay codeless deliberately, documented at the site.

Makes `WORKSPACE_KEY_OPERATION_NOT_PERMITTED` reachable: an operation that
denies workspace keys also omits them from `principalKinds`, so the kind guard
always fired first and callers got `PRINCIPAL_KIND_NOT_PERMITTED` instead of
the published code.

Drops the unused 410 response, shares one `order` schema between the two run
reads so both specs spell the enum the same way, and corrects the false
statements about 403 codes, 413 causes, cursor schemes, and full-set lists in
the conventions skill and the contract TSDoc.

* fix(tables): close the v2 tables correctness and contract gaps

- updateColumnOptions was the only column mutator with no lock assert: an
  options-only PATCH applied on a schema-locked table, and an option REMOVAL
  cleared cells on a delete-locked one. Assert schema always, escalate to the
  destructive gate only when options are dropped.
- GET/DELETE /tables/imports/{id} 500'd on a first-party import job (null
  payload) or an unrepresentable status. Both now read as absent, so the answer
  is the 404 it always was.
- Offset cursors stamped the sort but not the filters, so a page-2 cursor
  replayed under a different predicate paged an unrelated sequence silently.
  Offsets now carry a filter fingerprint and refuse a mismatch.
- Publish 413 on every tables operation that accepts a request body: the v2
  JSON builder reads the body under a byte ceiling before validation, so the
  status is reachable on all of them. Derived at document assembly so a new
  route cannot regress it.
- Enforce MAX_VIEWS_PER_TABLE on view create, making the list contract's
  "small bounded set" claim true.
- Accept the upload control token on the import read, so an upload-backed
  import is readable during the phase its own 201 reported; drop the `queued`
  status the reads can never return.
- Declare the Find search-term cap, the Find match cap, and the run row-id
  ceiling the domain already enforces.
- Uniform 201 on the row and column creates.

* docs(v2): record why the two migrate-on-read GETs stay head-safe

An enumeration of side-effecting v2 GETs flagged these two for issuing a
workflow_blocks update. The write is convergent and would be issued by the
next ordinary read, and headSafe: false answers 200 unconditionally, so
declaring it would cost HEAD its existence check to prevent nothing.

* fix(api): classify the caller input that reached the driver unvalidated

Four families of caller-reachable 500s share one shape: a value the
contract admits, the application forwards, and the database rejects.
An unclassified driver throw renders as INTERNAL_ERROR, so a bad
request came back as a server fault — on pure reads as well as writes.

NUL bytes are rejected at the contract boundary, in parseRequest, not
per field. A shared string primitive only protects the fields somebody
remembers to build on it, and it cannot protect the values that have no
string schema at all: a table cell and a predicate value are z.unknown()
because their type belongs to the column, not the wire, and those are
exactly the values found reaching the driver. One scan over the already
validated params/query/body covers every field including the ones nobody
has enumerated. Only U+0000 is rejected; every other control character
is ordinary content that Postgres stores verbatim.

Date bounds on a filter are now parsed, not merely type-checked, with
the same normalizer the date column type uses to store cells — so the
filter grammar and the storage grammar agree, and gt/gte/lt/lte on both
JSONB date columns and the createdAt/updatedAt system columns answer an
unparseable bound with 400 instead of an invalid-input-syntax 500.

An afterRowId/beforeRowId anchor that does not exist is a classified
not-found rather than a bare Error, and a zero-byte knowledge document
is refused at admission: every parser rejects an empty buffer outright,
so the upload could only ever consume storage and quota on its way to
processingStatus failed.

* fix(v2): stop six endpoints from returning a confident untruth

Six defects that share a shape: a 200 that misrepresents what happened,
which is the one class a caller cannot detect from the response.

Knowledge search silently degraded. Reranking is implemented and does
run, but a deployment with no Cohere credential, a provider error, or a
timeout was swallowed into a warning log and answered 200 with plain
vector ordering and no `rerankerScore` anywhere — indistinguishable from
a reranker that ran and agreed with the vector order. The fallback stays
(an outage should not take search down) and is now reported:
`rerankerStatus` is required on every search response. v2 also omitted
the `rerankerModel` default the internal contract supplies, so
`rerankerEnabled: true` alone failed the use case's model guard and
returned unreranked results after paying for the widened candidate
retrieval; it now defaults like its sibling.

`GET /billing/logs` accepted `startDate`/`endDate` with any relative
period and dropped them, answering over the default 30-day window — a
caller reconciling charges got real rows that were not the rows it asked
for. Both bounds are now rejected outside `period=custom`, take the same
strict UTC form as `GET /logs` via the shared `v2RunWindowBoundSchema`,
and reject an inverted window instead of returning an empty page.

MCP registration stamped `connectionStatus: 'connected'` and
`lastConnected: now` at insert without contacting the endpoint, and did
the same on any non-OAuth re-registration while leaving `lastError`
stale. `tool-validation` gates tool availability on that column, so an
unreachable server read as healthy. Both paths now leave the columns at
their honest defaults for `mcpService.updateServerStatus` to move after
a real discovery; the client-side optimistic copy matches.

`skills.create` allowed a workspace API key while every other skill
write denies one, so a key could only ever accumulate skills it could
never remove — and the row it left was attributed to the workspace's
billing owner, minting an editor grant for a human who did not act.
Creation now denies a workspace key, making the lifecycle symmetric on
the per-skill editor model that authorizes the rest of it.

`runCount` counts successful non-paused runs and is never decremented by
retention, so it disagrees with the runs list in both directions; the
description now says so rather than claiming "total recorded runs". Run
retention itself was undocumented — free-plan runs are hard-deleted after
30 days, which is why a workflow reports runs beside an empty list — and
is now stated on both reads over the execution-log table.

* fix(tables): refuse the writes v2 was silently discarding

- Uncoercible cell values were stored as null under a 200 on any optional
  column: "abc"/true/[1] into number, "yes"/1/{} into boolean, "not-a-date"
  into date, an undeclared option into select, an object into string. The
  read side already 400s on the same mismatch in a predicate, so the two
  halves of the API disagreed about the same value. `coerceRowValues` /
  `coerceRowToSchema` now take an explicit policy and default to `reject`;
  `null` is passed only where a machine produced the value for a cell no
  caller typed — a computed (workflow/enrichment) write and a CSV import,
  neither of which has anyone to answer with a 400.
- A multi-select coerced `["green"]` to `[]` — the drop was inside the
  registry, so no policy above it could see it. It now refuses any part that
  matches no option, which is what the single branch and the bulk retype gate
  already did.
- A bare number in a date cell was read as epoch milliseconds, so the far more
  common Unix-seconds shape stored a timestamp 50 years early. The unit is not
  recoverable from the value and both readings are in range, so a bare number
  is refused in both directions and the retype gate no longer needs an
  override to be stricter than the write path.
- Unknown column names were dropped by the name→id remap: an insert of
  {"nosuchcol":"x"} created an empty row under a 201, and a patch of
  {"zzz":"x"} answered updatedCount:0, indistinguishable from an empty match.
  The v2 row boundary now names them and refuses.
- The table ceiling was enforced only inside createTable, which for an
  upload-backed import does not run until the CSV has crossed the wire: a full
  workspace got a 201 and a presigned PUT for up to 5 GiB, then a 403 at
  complete with an orphaned object left behind. The advisory check now runs
  when the session is created; the authoritative one stays in the transaction
  because the quota can move mid-upload.
- Cap workflow groups per table. GET /tables/{id}/groups is published as a
  full-set list, and the group count had no bound of its own — the indirect
  one does not survive an update path that adds no columns.
- Present a group's outputs/dependencies/inputMappings by column NAME. They
  are created by name, stored by id, and were read back as ids on a surface
  that is otherwise name-keyed, so a group could not be round-tripped.
- Publish the predicate grammar: the operator set, the per-type restrictions,
  and that `*` — not `%` — is the wildcard. It was true only in the SQL
  builder's own comments, so the natural guess matched zero rows under a 200.
- Stop advertising a `workflowId` default of "" on group create; a manual
  group that omits it has always been refused.

* fix(v2): bind every paged list's cursor to its filters, not just its sort

A v2 cursor names a position in one sequence, and a list decides that
sequence from its sort AND its filters. Only the sort was stamped on the
shared keyset codec, so a cursor from an unfiltered walk was accepted
under a changed `search`, `scope`, `deployedOnly`, or folder and answered
from a sequence the caller never asked for. The two offset lists already
stamped both; nothing else did.

The failure differs by scheme but is silent in both. An offset lands at
an unrelated ordinal. A keyset stays internally coherent — correctly
ordered, duplicate-free — and drops every match sorting before its
position, which a caller holding an opaque token reads as "almost
nothing matched".

One mechanism, shared with the table-row codec: canonical JSON plus a
SHA-256 fingerprint (`lib/api/cursor-binding.ts`), stamped by
`cursorFilterScope` alongside `cursorSortKey`. The two stamps stay
separate so the 400 names which half changed. `limit` is never bound —
it selects how much of the sequence to return, not what it is.

The three lists whose token is minted by a domain codec (`/logs`,
`/audit-logs`, `/billing/logs`) get the same binding by wrapping that
token in a query-stamped envelope; the domain cursor is untouched.

`present` now also receives the parsed request, so a presenter reads the
filters it stamps straight from the query instead of the use case
carrying an HTTP cursor concern back out — the `cursorSort`/`cursorScope`
round-trips through three application services are removed.

`list-pagination.test.ts` now declares each paged list's binding and
checks it against the contract in both directions, so a new list, or a
new filter on an existing one, fails until its binding is decided.

* fix(v2): authorize HEAD probes and declare every v2 query schema

Two ways the v2 surface answered a request it had not checked.

`headSafe: false` exists so a HEAD cannot fire the side effect its GET
performs — an outbound MCP discovery, a FILE_DOWNLOADED audit event, a
WORKFLOW_EXPORTED audit event. The short-circuit sat between admission
and parsing, so it returned a bodiless 200 before resource authorization
ran at all: authorization lives inside the use case, and the use case was
exactly what the short-circuit skipped. Any valid API key drew 200 for a
denied principal kind, a nonexistent id, another tenant's workspace, and
a request missing a required param, while the GET beside it answered 403
or 404. That is an existence oracle over MCP server ids, file ids, and
workflow ids.

`OperationUseCase` gains an optional `authorize()` that runs the phase
before the business transaction — allowed-principal check, canonical
load, asserted-scope comparison, current access check — and stops.
`defineAuthorizedWorkspaceUseCase` shares one implementation between it
and `execute`, so the two cannot answer differently. A HEAD on a
not-head-safe route is now admitted, parsed, and authorized like the GET,
rendering refusals through the route's own error policy, then answered
bodiless. The builders refuse at definition time to pair
`headSafe: false` with a use case that has no `authorize`, so the next
such route is a boot failure rather than a silent 200.

Separately, `parseRequest` validates the query slice only when the
contract declares one, so an omitted `query` means "never look at the
query string" rather than "takes no query params". 69 v2 contracts
omitted it and accepted anything: `?bogus=1` was a 200 on
`GET /workflows/{id}` and a 400 on every list. They now declare
`noInputSchema`, and 8 more contracts that declared a query without
`.strict()` are tightened. A sweep over the contracts tree is the
enforcement — a compile-time gate on `defineRouteContract` was tried and
reverted because the required intersection collapses inference of the
sibling generics.

Four route tests appended `?workspaceId=` to a PATCH/PUT that reads it
from the body; that copy was being silently dropped and is now a 400.

The generated specs are byte-identical: the OpenAPI generator learns that
a slice declaring no keys publishes no parameters.

* test(tables): pin the multiselect paste on the refusal, not the silent empty

cleanCellValue runs the same registry coercion the server does, so tightening
multiselect on the server changed this helper too. The case asserting an empty
array was pinning the silent-drop the tightening removed.

* docs(v2): make the API-key security description render as plain prose

The description was already published on every spec but did not appear in the
rendered Authorization block. It carried a raw > and backticks, which the
markdown pass in the docs renderer does not survive; the operation description
on the same page renders fine. Reworded to plain prose with the same substance.

* fix(v2): bind the query cursor to its filter on every shape

Two agents each fixed half of this: the shared list codecs gained filter
binding, and the table codec gained a fingerprint, but the pure-keyset shape
stamped it on neither encode nor decode. A keyset position is absolute in
(order_key, id), which is why it was left unbound — but absolute ordering is
not completeness. Replaying the cursor under a wider filter silently omits
every match sorting before it, so paging predicate A then B returned rows 7,9
where the full B sequence is 1,3,5,7,9.

Also answers a lost create race with the conflict it already documents, and
shortens three descriptions that dwarfed their siblings — the forbidden-code
catalogue now lives on the error envelope's details field, published once per
document instead of on all 135 operations.

* fix(tables): make a saved view's column references survive the write

A view config stores every column reference as a stable column id, but two
things wrote it in different vocabularies and nothing translated between them.

`config.sort` was pruned on read against the live column ID set while the
contract defines `sort[].field` as a column NAME, so every name-keyed sort —
the only kind the v2 surface can express — pruned to nothing and the view came
back with `sort: null`, on both create and PATCH, with no warning. The same
prune dropped a sort on `createdAt`/`updatedAt`/`id`, which are sortable row
columns that simply are not in `schema.columns`. `config.filter` had the
opposite failure: it was stored verbatim, so a predicate naming a column that
does not exist saved happily and then 400'd on every `/query`, `/query/count`,
and `/rows/find` that tried to use it.

The write path now canonicalizes a config before storing it: every column
reference (layout keys, `sort[].field`, each `filter` leaf `field`) is resolved
to the column's stable id, and `filter`/`sort` are validated against the live
schema so a reference that can never resolve is refused instead of saved. The
v2 read presents the config back keyed by column name, matching
`presentV2WorkflowGroup` and every other v2 row/data surface — a caller never
sees a `col_…` id, and what it wrote is what it reads. Resolution is a lookup
with pass-through, so the id-keyed first-party UI is unaffected.

Column LAYOUT stays unvalidated on write and pruned on read: it auto-saves as
the user drags, so racing a column delete must self-heal, not fail the drag.
The read path still never prunes a predicate, for the reason already documented
there — a pruned condition silently widens the view's row set.

* fix(storage): validate at the decode and multipart boundaries, bound derived keys

Four caller-reachable 500s shared one shape: input passed boundary
validation, then failed in the storage/key layer. Each is fixed at the
boundary that owns the transformation, not at the call sites.

Percent-encoded NUL in a canonical folder path. `parseRequest`'s NUL scan
sees `%00` as three ordinary characters; the NUL only exists after
`parseFolderPath` decodes it. Reads survived as 404s, writers carried the
decoded name into an INSERT and the driver threw. The rejection now lives
in `encodeFolderPathSegment`, the single chokepoint both building and
parsing funnel through, so it covers every escape a caller can spell.

NUL in a multipart field. A multipart route declares no body contract, so
its fields never reach contract validation at all — the knowledge-document
key was sanitized while `original_name` was not, and the object landed in
storage before the insert threw. `readFormDataWithLimit` is the shared
multipart reader every such route already funnels through, so the scan
goes there and runs before a caller holds a File to upload, which removes
the orphan rather than cleaning it up.

Storage-key overflow at 225 characters. Every generator embedded the file
name in a path component it also prefixed with a timestamp and a
uniquifier, so the effective limit was 255 minus that prefix while the
contract advertised 255 — a 225-character name produced a 256-byte
component and ENAMETOOLONG from local storage, and the upload session
handed out a transfer URL that could never succeed.
`buildStorageKeySegment` reserves the prefix out of the component's budget,
making the key independent of name length and the declared limit honest.

The NUL predicate is now shared from `@sim/utils/string` by all three
boundaries instead of being restated at each.

* docs(v2): make the published spec describe the API it has

Three descriptions asserted behavior the code no longer has, and three rules
the code enforces were published as unconstrained strings.

`downloadFile` and `listMcpServerTools` still told callers a `HEAD` on a
not-head-safe route "is answered with an empty 200 ... reports only that the
endpoint exists and the caller is authorized". That was true of the old
short-circuit, which sat between admission and parsing and therefore returned
200 for an id the same caller's `GET` refused. The builders now authorize a
HEAD exactly as the GET, so the spec said the opposite of a security fix. One
`HEAD_MIRRORS_GET` constant replaces both sentences and is added to
`exportWorkflow`, whose `headSafe: false` was never documented at all. A test
walks the `app/api/v2` tree for the declaration and fails on any operation that
carries it without the sentence, or that resurrects the old claim.

`createMcpServer` promised that re-registering an existing URL "rewrites the
configuration and returns the server to the same unverified state"; it is a
409 pointing at PATCH. `authType` claimed Sim "detects it from the server when
omitted" — registration deliberately never contacts the server, and the column
defaults to `headers`. The default stays: `headers` and `none` are
behaviourally identical (only `oauth` branches), so changing it is a migration
with no caller-visible payoff, while the sentence was simply false.

`predicate` was the API's most consequential gap: a `pipe` over `z.unknown()`
documents from its input, so the leaf keys `field`/`op`/`value` appeared
nowhere in the contract and `{column, operator, value}` was a 400 a caller
could not correct against. Both predicate schemas now publish a real recursive
JSON Schema through `.meta()`, self-referencing so the recursion resolves from
one `$defs` entry, with every bound read from the constant that enforces it.

Also published: the canonical folder-path rule and its 4096-byte cap on the
four path components (the `superRefine` contributed nothing to JSON Schema);
the closed 12-value `recursive` vocabulary on a destructive delete; and the
null-matching behaviour of the negating operators. The clamping `limit` branch
drops `minimum`/`maximum`, which in JSON Schema mean "rejected outside" and
made SDKs refuse locally what the server clamps.

`deleteFile` stops publishing a 409 nothing in its path can raise. `restoreFile`
and `abortFileUpload` keep theirs — the report called them unemittable, but
restore raises `FileConflictError` after exhausting its rename retries and
abort refuses a completed session.

Description tail, across the seven specs: p99 733 to 465, max operation 1643 to
1114, over 700 chars 31 to 13, over 400 70 to 61. Constraints moved from
operation prose onto the fields they constrain rather than being deleted.

* fix(v2): make upload completion, blank query values, search, and folder filters answer correctly

Four defects on the v2 surface, each reproduced before it was fixed.

Upload completion dispatched document indexing from inside the completion
transaction, so a queue or processing failure returned 500 after the object was
stored, the document row was created, and the session was marked completed —
and the only recovery, replaying the request, answered 200. The dispatch is now
a follow-on step that runs after the session is durably completed and is logged
rather than raised. Its outcome stays visible on the document itself (`failed`
with an error, or `pending` when it was never picked up), and the recovery path
re-queues a `pending` registration instead of keying off a message left on the
session.

A query parameter sent with no value was read as `0`, `false`, or the parameter
default: `?limit=` became `LIMIT 1` on the three lists that clamp, and
`?minCost=` on `/logs` became a live `cost >= 0` filter. `search` and `cursor`
already rejected a blank and documented "omit the parameter instead"; that rule
now applies to every v2 parameter, enforced on the raw query before coercion so
a parameter added later inherits it.

The document list matched `_` and `%` in `search` as live LIKE wildcards while
every sibling list escaped them through `searchFilter`, so the documented
substring match returned everything for `a_itest`. It now uses the same helper.

A `folderPath`/`folderPaths` naming no folder answered 404 on `/logs`, `/files`,
`/workflows`, `/tables`, and `/knowledge`, while every other filter answers an
empty page and the sibling folder lists already do. All five now return an empty
page. Mutations keep their 404.

* chore(v2): regenerate the specs from the merged sources

The four spec conflicts in the wave-3 merge were resolved by taking one side,
which left them describing neither branch. Regenerated so the published
documents match the contracts they are built from.

* docs(v2): give a built-in skill's id its real form

The contract said a built-in skill uses its name as the id. The ids are
`builtin-` plus the name, so a client following the description asks for
/skills/research and gets a 404 where the spec promises the skill.

* fix(uploads): keep local upload artifacts inside NAME_MAX

`POST /api/v2/files/uploads` accepted a name of up to 255 characters,
returned 201, and handed back a transfer URL that could never succeed:
the PUT against it 500'd and `complete` then reported the object missing.

The local provider named its staged object after the destination —
`{key}.{uploadId}-{uuid}.tmp` plus a `.upload-metadata.json` sidecar — so
the staged component was the key's length plus ~99 bytes of fixed
overhead. Past roughly 125 characters of name that crossed POSIX
`NAME_MAX`, and `ENAMETOOLONG` is not a `LocalUploadBodyError`, so it
escaped as a 500. Multipart `complete` built the same name and failed the
same way. Only local storage is affected; S3, Azure, and GCS have no
per-component limit.

`buildStorageKeySegment` already budgeted the key to 255, one layer above
where the overflow happened. Two changes close it at the layers that own
each suffix:

- Staged artifacts move to a `.staging` root and are named from the
  upload id alone. A name derived from the destination inherits its
  length and then adds to it; a fixed-width one removes the arithmetic
  instead of re-budgeting it, so no suffix added here later can depend on
  the caller's file name. The staging root is a cleanup sweep root, which
  also reclaims artifacts that used to be orphaned beside the
  destination.
- The durable sidecar is reserved out of the key budget centrally.
  `LOCAL_UPLOAD_METADATA_SUFFIX` moves next to the budget that must
  account for it, and the budget is derived from a list of sidecar
  suffixes, so adding one shrinks every key builder at once.

The declared `maxLength: 255` stays honest: a 255-character name now
completes PUT and `complete` end to end.

* fix(uploads): budget every key built from a caller-supplied name

Auditing the rest of the codebase for the shape that broke the
upload-session PUT found five more key builders that put an unbounded
name into a path component local storage writes directly.

Three are on the same route as the original bug: `table_import`,
`profile_picture`, and `workspace_logo` built their key inline with
`sanitizeFileName`, which maps characters and never truncates, while
their sibling purposes went through `buildStorageKeySegment`. A
255-character name broke `table_import` at the metadata sidecar and the
other two at the object write itself.

The other two are local-storage writers reached from elsewhere:
knowledge-base connector sync capped the document title at 200 and then
appended a timestamp, a uuid and `.txt` on top of the cap, landing at
exactly 255 with no room for the sidecar; the Mistral-OCR staging and
chunk keys inlined the sanitizer with no bound at all; and inbound email
attachments went into a key with neither sanitizer nor bound, on a file
name an outside sender chooses.

All now derive their component through `buildStorageKeySegment`, so the
reservation is stated once. The upload-session test asserts it for every
purpose the contract admits, which is what keeps a newly added purpose
from reintroducing the hand-built form.

* fix(v2): stop the logs and billing reads answering 500 or a silent restart

Four caller-reachable failures on `GET /logs`, `GET /logs/{runId}`, and
`GET /billing/logs`, each fixed at the layer that owns the guarantee.

`minDurationMs`/`maxDurationMs` were published as `number` against an
`integer` column, so `1.5`, `-0.5`, `2147483648`, and `1e30` all reached
Postgres as bind parameters it refuses to parse. They are now whole
milliseconds bounded to int4, and the generated spec says so.

`0000-01-01T00:00:00Z` satisfies the published `date-time` pattern but
names no instant Postgres can store, since the proleptic Gregorian
calendar has no year zero. `v2RunWindowBoundSchema` now rejects it, which
covers both log families and the files-audit read that share the schema.

A scoped cursor whose inner token was the empty string passed the
`typeof === 'string'` envelope check and then read as falsy in every
domain reader, so both lists silently served page one again with a
`nextCursor` inviting another lap — the exact failure
`UNKNOWN_CURSOR_MESSAGE` exists to make visible. An empty inner is now
unreadable, and the sibling `decodePublicLogCursor` gets the same
treatment for its `id` half. The rejection message no longer names
`sortBy`/`sortOrder`, which neither operation accepts.

`GET /logs/{runId}` reported `folderPath: null` for both a workflow at
the workspace root and a folder it could not resolve, so a caller could
distinguish neither, and `null` is not a value `folderPaths` takes back
as a filter. The root is now `/`, matching the workflow resources.

Also, from the same audit: comma lists reject an empty entry the way
`folderPaths` already did instead of dropping it; a query param sent
twice is named as duplicated rather than reported absent; and the
`triggers=all` sentinel, the detail-level promotion by
`includeTraceSpans`/`includeFinalOutput`, and the 403/404 split against
the billing family are documented where each is decided.

* fix(v2): pin naive timestamps to UTC and close six contract divergences

Application-written timestamps reached the wire as a local wall clock
labelled `Z`. Every column in `schema.ts` is `timestamp without time
zone`, so the instant a value denotes was decided by whoever wrote it and
whoever read it, and the writers disagreed: `now()` renders in the
session's TimeZone, drizzle's `mapToDriverValue` is `toISOString()`, and
a raw `Date` bound through postgres.js is cast down in the session's
TimeZone. The read side disagreed the same way — postgres.js parses oid
1114 with `new Date(x)`, which is the process's local zone, while a value
it hands back as a string is read as UTC by drizzle. The result passes
every `date-time` check, so it silently corrupts sorts and range
predicates and can place `updatedAt` before its own `createdAt`.

`packages/db/timestamps.ts` removes the ambiguity at the driver boundary
rather than at the call sites: the session TimeZone is pinned to UTC so
all three write paths store the same wall clock, and oid 1114 is parsed
as UTC so every read path recovers that instant. `withUtcTimestamps`
merges both into a client's options, because `connection` is nested and a
pool setting its own `application_name` would otherwise drop the
TimeZone. Production already runs both in UTC, so nothing changes there;
every other environment now behaves the way production does.

Alongside it, six places where the published contract and the code
disagreed:

- Multi-select `ncontains` was documented as "the exception" that
  excludes nulls. It never did, and no test claimed it did — `data` is
  never NULL, so containment is false for an absent key and the negation
  is true, exactly like every other negation. The sentence was wrong.
- `recursive` published twelve lowercase spellings while `z.stringbool()`
  folded case, so the server honoured `recursive=True` as a destructive
  recursive delete that a generated client would have refused to send.
  Narrowed to case-sensitive: accept exactly what is published.
- The upload data plane answered with a bare `{ error: string }`. Being
  absent from the OpenAPI documents is a statement about addressability,
  not about behaviour; both PUTs now use the canonical envelope, and what
  the transfer step promises is published on `transfer.url`.
- Full-set lists told callers to "send it back as `cursor`" on a
  `.strict()` query that rejects `cursor`. `v2CursorListResponse` now
  takes `paged`.
- A `HEAD` on a download skips the read that produces `Content-Length`,
  so it cannot size a download; the description says so.
- The upsert conflict-target rejection echoed the storage id a name-keyed
  surface had already translated to, and the scoped-cursor 400 named
  `sortBy`/`sortOrder` params `/audit-logs` does not accept.

* improvement(v2): cut the extraneous half out of the published descriptions

The v2 spec's description median was already healthy at 42 characters; the
tail was not. 174 descriptions ran past 200 characters and 13 past 700,
almost all of it rationale, cross-references, and constraints restated on
the wrong object.

Trim the shared error, folder-path, retention, pagination, and workspace-key
constants first, since each is published on between two and twenty-seven
operations. `FOLDER_TREE_TOO_LARGE` dropped the clause explaining why the
tree has to load, `FULL_SET_LIST` dropped a second sentence restating its
first, `RUN_RETENTION` dropped the `runCount` caveat that already lives on
`runCount`, and the 503 and 499 descriptions dropped the paragraphs
narrating why they are documented at all. That reasoning belongs in the
TSDoc beside each constant, which is where it now is.

Then the operations. Execute Workflow and List Runs each restated a rule
their own parameters already carry — the `X-Run-Id` uniqueness claim and the
`order` sort deviation — so both moved to the parameter that owns them. The
run-status enum sent a caller to `paused.automaticResumeWaitingReason` and
then explained that field in place of describing it; the explanation moved
onto the field, which previously said only that it was "the reason automatic
resume is waiting".

Align the parameter vocabulary a caller meets in every family. One `cursor`
description had forked on the table row query, one `sortBy` on knowledge
documents, and the table row `limit` published neither its bounds nor its
default. `nameSortCollation` is now a function of the column it names, so
the knowledge document list can state the caveat about `filename` without
claiming a `name` field it does not have. `scripts/openapi/documents.test.ts`
pins `cursor` and `sortOrder` to one string each, and the retention window to
both reads that publish it.

Distribution over the seven documents: mean 71 to 67, p95 223 to 199, p99 453
to 370. Over 200 characters 174 to 147, over 300 94 to 59, over 400 54 to 20,
over 700 13 to 9. The median is unchanged at 42.

* fix(v2): keep one unreadable-cursor message

Two branches each added the constant, in cursor-binding and list-query. It
belongs beside its sibling REFILTERED_CURSOR_MESSAGE, so the list-query copy
and its importers move there.

* fix(v2): bind a cursor to what a set filter means, not how it was spelled

workflowIds, triggers and folderPaths are comma lists the query treats as
unordered sets, and tagFilters is an object whose key order carries no meaning.
Fingerprinting the raw spelling bound the cursor to the spelling, so a caller
who reordered an equivalent filter mid-walk got a 400 for a page that was
genuinely the next one.

* fix(v2, db): make two unfalsifiable tests observable and document strict query

Three follow-ups on the w5 policy work: one decision recorded, two tests that
could not fail.

The `query: noInputSchema` sweep is kept. It is a real tightening — 69 v2
operations that ignored an unknown query param now answer 400 — so it was
weighed rather than assumed. The v2 body slice on those same endpoints was
already `.strict()`, and every v2 list already rejected `?bogus=1`, so the
split was arbitrary rather than a promise: the same typo was a 400 on
`GET /workflows` and a silent 200 on `GET /workflows/{id}`. A parameter the
server drops without saying so is the bug class the lists' rule already exists
to prevent. No first-party caller is affected — the two SDKs send only
`includeOutput`/`selectedOutputs`, both declared; the UI and the desktop app
make no v2 calls at all; `requestJson` appends nothing implicitly and no v2
cache buster exists; every docs example uses a declared param. A third-party
caller appending a tracking tag does break, which is why the behavior is now
documented in the API reference with the exact 400 body rather than left to be
discovered, and why the reasoning sits in the v2 conventions skill next to the
rule instead of only in a commit message.

`packages/db/timestamps.test.ts` asserted that `withUtcTimestamps` registers a
UTC parser on oid 1114 by reading it off a bare postgres.js client. Every real
client is then handed to `drizzle()`, which overwrites that entry with a
transparent parser, so the assertion held whether or not the parser had any
effect. The mechanism is fine and stays: drizzle's own `PgTimestamp` mapper
appends `+0000`, so the read is UTC-correct either way and the session
`TimeZone` pin — the write-side fix — is untouched by `drizzle()`. The test now
resolves the parser both before and after `drizzle()`, pins the clobbering it
depends on, and asserts the instant recovered through the full composition, so
a regression in either layer is red. `timestamps.ts` records why the inert
entry is kept.

`nul-byte-boundary.test.ts` embedded a raw U+0000, so git classified it binary
and rendered it as `Bin 0 -> 4102 bytes` — the test proving the NUL hardening
works was the one file a reviewer could not read. The escape is byte-for-byte
equivalent at runtime. Two older files had the same defect and are fixed the
same way. `check:source-text` now fails the build on a raw NUL in any tracked
source file, and `.gitattributes` forces source files to diff as text so the
next one is visible in review rather than hidden by it.

* fix(w5): narrow three fixes that reached past the harm they were fixing

The workflow-create `23505` handler answered for the whole transaction, which
also runs `saveWorkflowToNormalizedTables`. `workflow_blocks.id` is a global
primary key, so a block-id collision — an integrity fault already seen in
production — surfaced as `A workflow named "X" already exists in this folder`.
Match on the constraint name; any other unique violation propagates unchanged.

Moving the knowledge dispatch out of the completion transaction was right, but a
dispatch failure then committed the session as `completed` and left the document
at `pending`, which nothing sweeps and `retryProcessing` refuses. Record the
failure on the document instead, so it lands on the existing failed-document
path, and describe what the code does rather than a recovery branch that cannot
fire for this state.

The MCP re-registration reset stopped a registration claiming a connection it
never made, but reset for any re-registration. `isServerEligibleForDiscovery`
skips an OAuth row that is not `connected`, so a rename removed every tool the
server published with no path back. Scope the reset to url, transport, headers,
auth type, OAuth credentials, and revival.

* fix(tables): confine the write-policy tightening to what the caller sent

The null-policy work made `reject` the default for caller-supplied writes,
which is right, but it landed on the wrong values.

- A partial update coerces the MERGED row, so an untouched legacy cell failed
  an unrelated column's update — and failed a paged bulk job after its earlier
  pages had committed. The merged-row callers now name the patch's keys; every
  other key follows the `null` policy, in the in-memory copy only (the write
  sends the patched keys alone).
- A multiselect whose members do not all resolve returned `{ok:false}`, which
  on the machine paths that pass `'null'` — CSV import, computed writes, the
  cell-write snapshot — erased the whole cell. Those paths now consult a new
  `salvage` hook and keep the members that do resolve; a caller-supplied write
  still 400s on an unknown option.
- Refusing a bare number in `date.coerce` reached the executor, v1, copilot and
  the grid. The refusal stays where there is a caller to tell, and `salvage`
  restores the milliseconds reading where the only other answer is a blank cell.

Also: the cursor docblocks claimed pure-keyset cursors were left unbound while
the code and its tests bind them; a saved-view create took the table's SCHEMA
advisory lock, so it queued behind column rewrites whose statement timeouts run
past its 3s lock_timeout, and now takes a views-scoped lock instead; and a view
whose column was deleted could not be saved at all, because the Save chip always
resends the filter — references the stored config already carries are now exempt
while a newly introduced one is still refused.

The cursor version is deliberately not bumped: the stamp is additive, unfiltered
in-flight tokens keep working, and a filtered one fails with the accurate
"restart paging without the cursor" rather than a generic unreadable-cursor 400.

* test(db): narrow the mapped timestamp to Date

mapFromDriverValue is typed unknown, so the composition assertions did not
type-check outside the test's own runner.

* fix(v2): correct four stale contracts and clear the merge debris behind them

Five of the reported defects were real and four of them were documentation
that had stopped describing its own code.

`cleanCellValue` said only "coerce a raw input value"; it also answers `null`
for anything the column type refuses, and since the multiselect write path
started refusing partial matches that is the difference between a paste
storing one option and blanking the cell. It deliberately does not consult
`salvage`, which would read the same paste as the option that did resolve —
that reading is for writes with no caller to answer, and a typed cell has one.
The pairing is now asserted, so a future helper that "improves" the paste by
salvaging it fails.

`EXECUTE_OPTION_CONSTRAINTS` carried two stacked TSDoc blocks, the second
explaining that the enumeration had moved onto the fields; the body schema
still told a reader the six combinations were enumerated in the constant. The
deployment route's second block orphaned the endpoint documentation above it,
and `list-query.ts` kept the TSDoc for a cursor message that now lives, with
its own rewritten doc, in `cursor-binding.ts`. Two agents left near-identical
essays arguing the same 400-vs-403-vs-409 question about the table ceilings
and concluding that neither status changes; the decision is recorded once, in
`billing.ts`, and `service.ts` points at it.

The credentials use case echoed `sortBy`/`sortOrder` back with a TSDoc
explaining that the presenter needs them, which it no longer does — it reads
`query.*`. The local upload roots move from the data-plane provider to
`core/storage-key.ts`, beside the sidecar suffix, so the cleanup sweep can name
what it reclaims without importing the transport that writes it.

`documents.test.ts` justified sweeping only knowledge and files for the 413 by
saying the same sweep over the other five documents still reported gaps. It
does not: widened to all seven, every body-carrying operation publishes it.

Three reports did not survive checking, and the evidence is recorded where the
next reader will look. An empty rerank result is not the reranker matching
nothing — `rerank` asks for `top_n` over a non-empty document list, so an empty
array means the response carried nothing usable, which is what `unavailable`
already promises. The zero-byte knowledge document is refused on the
upload-session path too, by `validateFile`, under both boundary contracts;
that parity is now pinned, and it fails if the guard is removed. The MCP
re-registration reports exactly the connection fields its SET clause writes,
and the create mutation already drops both caches — what lags is the status
badge, not the tools, because discovery is gated on `connected` for OAuth rows
only.

* fix(v2): de-duplicate a set filter before fingerprinting it

The filters compile to inArray, which is set membership, so workflowIds=A,A,B
selects exactly what A,B does. Sorting alone still bound them to different
pages, so an equivalent filter with a repeated member 400d mid-walk.

* fix(w6): close a head-authorization hole, a TZ leak, and five tests that could not fail

Six risks an adversarial read of this week's diff raised, verified one at a
time. Two of the six were already correct and are reported as such rather than
changed.

`v2HeadAuthorizationResponse` optional-called the use case's authorization
phase, so a use case without one would have answered the bodiless 200 that
`headSafe: false` exists to prevent. The definition-time guard does cover both
builders that reach it — they are its only callers — but an optional call turns
a missing phase into that leak silently, so the responder now refuses instead
of skipping.

`packages/db/timestamps.test.ts` assigned `process.env.TZ` at module scope and
never restored it. `TZ` is process state: a worker running files back to back
carried Asia/Tokyo into every file that followed, and only when the ordering put
it after this one. The zone is now set and restored around the file, with both
properties the suite depends on intact.

Upload publication moved its staging area out of the destination's own
directory into a shared `.staging` root, which makes the publishing `link` a
cross-subtree one. A volume mounted under part of the uploads tree puts the two
on different devices and `link` answers `EXDEV`, which the same-directory link
could not. Publication now copies onto the destination's device and links from
there, keeping the create-or-fail step that stops a replay from overwriting a
stored object.

Five tests that passed regardless of the code:

- `resolveFolderPathFilter` was only ever exercised through hand-written
  reimplementations in the suites that mock it out, so widening a miss to
  unfiltered — every filtered list answering with the whole workspace — left
  them all green. The real helper is now tested where it lives.
- The only measurement of `generateWorkspaceFileKey` asserted the key's last
  component against `NAME_MAX` rather than the component plus the sidecar
  written beside it, so it passed with the sidecar reservation removed.
- `GET /logs` asserted only that a rejected cursor does NOT name `sortBy`,
  which almost any wording satisfies, including one saying nothing at all.
- The skills lifecycle test asserted that the four writes agree on a
  workspace-key policy, which a lifecycle uniformly allowing one also
  satisfies; it now pins the policy they agree on and the kinds they admit.
- The v2 skills create test lost `expect(capture).not.toHaveBeenCalled()` when
  the create path moved to a personal key. The behaviour it pinned is gone —
  the workspace-key create is refused now — so it is re-homed as the refusal
  reaching the caller as a 403 with no analytics behind it.

Two claims did not hold. `CURSOR_VERSION` is correctly left at 1: the filter
stamp is additive, a pre-stamp token still decodes, an unfiltered read still
resumes, and only a filtered replay fails — with a conflict that names the
filter, where a version bump would answer a generic unreadable-cursor 400 to
every in-flight token. Tests pin all three, plus the minted version itself. And
the upload-session key-budget cases do exercise the real shared budget through
the real segment builder; only the workspace-key prefix is the stub's, which is
now stated where the stub is declared.

* refactor(v2): collapse two names for the cursor scope key onto one helper

`cursorFilterScope` in the v2 response module was a one-line pass-through to
`cursorScopeKey` in `lib/api/cursor-binding`, so the same function was reachable
under two names from two modules. Routes now call `cursorScopeKey` directly, the
way they already import `unorderedScopePart` and the cursor messages from that
module, and the wrapper plus its duplicated doc comment are gone.

Also folds the `id -> name` column map in the v2 tables presenter onto
`buildColumnNameById`, which the same file already imports and calls thirteen
lines above; restores two doc comments that had drifted onto the wrong
declaration; and replaces three `as Date` casts in the timestamp test with
`toEqual(new Date(...))`, which needs no cast and additionally fails when the
mapped value is not a Date at all.

* refactor: delete three pieces of surface this branch added with no consumer

`v2CursorSchema` had one caller, `v2PaginationFields`, in the same file, and its
only parameter was a default nobody overrode — so the export and the parameter
were both unreachable. Inlined into the pair it belongs to; the emitted schema
and its description are byte-identical, so the generated OpenAPI does not move.

`PatchedKeys` was declared `ReadonlySet<string> | readonly string[]`, but all
four callers pass `Object.keys(...)` and no test passes a set, which left the
`instanceof Set` arm of `policyResolver` unreachable. Narrowed to the array form
the callers actually use.

`NUL_CHARACTER` was exported from `@sim/utils/string` and imported by nobody —
every boundary imports `containsNulCharacter` instead. Kept as the module-local
constant the predicate reads, dropped from the package surface.

* docs(v2): state why the local upload data-plane routes bypass the builders

Both local-storage PUT routes use raw `withRouteHandler`. The global rule
allows that only for documented protocol or lifecycle exceptions, and their
TSDoc explained the OpenAPI exemption and the error envelope but never the
builder bypass itself. Record the actual reason: a signed `upload-token` is
the credential, so there is no API key, `Principal`, or semantic operation
for a builder to authenticate and authorize against, and the body streams
straight to storage rather than being parsed.

* test(v2): pin cursor-to-filter binding on the tables and runs lists

The branch binds every paged cursor to the filters it was minted under, but
the binding was enforced end-to-end on only 4 of 16 paged lists. The
contract-level CURSOR_BINDINGS sweep looks like the safety net and is not:
it checks each contract against a hand-maintained map of param names, never
against what a route actually stamps into cursorScopeKey, so it stays green
for a route that dropped the stamp entirely.

Confirmed by deletion. Removing tableCursorFilters from both call sites on
GET /v2/tables left all 8 tests passing, and the runs route was worse — its
one relevant assertion was weakened from toEqual to toMatchObject in this
same branch, leaving the new filter field unpinned.

Adds a mint-then-replay test to each: a cursor minted under one filter set
and replayed under another is a 400 that never reaches the use case, with a
same-filter resume case as the control so the 400 cannot be satisfied by
blanket rejection. Restores toEqual on the runs cursor payload, pinning that
a filter is stamped without hardcoding the fingerprint.

Both new guards were verified to fail: removing the binding reddens the
refiltered test on tables, and both the refiltered and the re-armed toEqual
test on runs.

* fix(tables): keep the v2 write strictness inside v2

The write-path tightening on this branch changed shared code that every
first-party surface reaches, so the workspace grid, the internal
`/api/table` routes, `/api/v1`, the Copilot table tools, and the executor's
Table block all inherited a contract only `/api/v2` publishes. Each of them
now behaves exactly as it does on staging again, and v2 keeps the strictness
by opting into it.

- `coerceRowValues`/`coerceRowToSchema` default to the `null` policy again —
  an uncoercible optional cell is blanked and the row is written. `reject` is
  reached through `RowWriteOptions.uncoercibleValues`, which the v2 row
  routes set via `strictWrite` on the application input.
- The same `strictWrite` scopes the unknown-column refusal to v2. Copilot
  feeds the model's raw arguments in unfiltered, so a hallucinated key, an
  echoed `id`, or a name left over from a rename had begun refusing the whole
  write.
- Multiselect and bare-epoch values land again for first-party callers
  through the registry's existing `salvage` hook, which the `null` policy
  already consults; the grid's `cleanCellValue` consults it too, so a paste
  naming one live option and one deleted one keeps the live one instead of
  erasing the cell.
- The saved-view name→id remap no longer rewrites a ref that already means
  something else, so a user column named `id`/`createdAt`/`updatedAt` cannot
  hijack a view's system-column sort or filter.
- `createTableView` tolerates the refs its own config carries unless the
  caller is strict, so "Save as view" stops 400ing on a dangling filter the
  Save chip accepts.
- The bulk update runner is byte-identical to staging again.

The 100-view cap stays: the list read is unpaginated, so the promise it makes
only holds if the write side enforces it, and it refuses a new view rather
than an existing config.

* test(v2): pin cursor-to-filter binding on seven more paged lists

Extends the mint-then-replay guard from tables and workflow runs to the
remaining paged v2 lists the audit found with no route-level coverage:
credentials, audit-logs, custom-tools, mcp-servers, secrets, knowledge
bases, and knowledge documents.

Each gets a cursor minted by driving GET under one filter and replayed
under another, asserting a 400 carrying REFILTERED_CURSOR_MESSAGE that
never reaches the use case, plus a same-filter resume control so the 400
cannot be satisfied by blanket rejection. The three cursor schemes are all
covered: keyset (readSortedCursor), the scoped wrapper audit-logs uses for
its domain token, and the offset cursor on knowledge documents.

The documents suite had no GET coverage at all, so its list use case gains
a real mock and the route's GET export a describe block.

All fourteen were verified to fail: dropping the cursor-filter argument
from both call sites on each route reddens exactly that route's refiltered
test and leaves every other assertion in the file green, which is the
failure mode the contract-level CURSOR_BINDINGS sweep cannot see.

* test: cover four untested behaviors and drop five tests that cannot fail

Adds coverage that goes red when the behavior is reverted:

- `rejectDuplicateQueryValues` through `parseRequest`, not just the pure
  helper — the existing blank-query tests stay green even when parseRequest
  ignores the flag entirely.
- `failUndispatchedDocumentProcessing`'s pending + not-deleted WHERE guard,
  asserted on the condition tree so removing it fails.
- The widened `present(result, request)` signature, so dropping the second
  argument stops being a silent no-op.
- The NUL scan on `readFormDataWithLimit`'s content-length branch — the
  branch every ordinary browser and curl upload takes, and the one the
  existing multipart tests never reached.

Removes tests verified incapable of failing: the credentials projection row
(the outbound `.parse()` strips unknown keys either way), the per-document
413 sweep (vacuous on two of three documents, subsumed by the sweep in
scripts/openapi/documents.test.ts), the two upload-session rows that assert
their own `generateWorkspaceFileKey` stub, the storage-key row whose 20-byte
name never reaches the budget, and the views-lock assertion against a
function `views/service.ts` does not import.

* fix(v2): parse a bound list filter once, so the scope matches the query

The logs list fingerprinted `workflowIds`, `triggers`, and `folderPaths`
through unorderedScopePart, which trims each member, then split the same raw
values itself with `.split(',').filter(Boolean)`, which does not. So
`?workflowIds=A,B` and `?workflowIds=A, B` produced one fingerprint and two
different result sets: the second selects on a member with a leading space
that matches no row. A cursor minted under one was accepted under the other,
which is the exact failure the filter binding exists to refuse.

Extracts parseUnorderedList as the single parse. unorderedScopePart now
derives from it, and the route passes the array to the query and the joined
form to the scope, so the members fingerprinted are by construction the
members filtered on. Also drops three inline splits.

Reported by Greptile.

* fix(v2): bind an AND-conjoined filter array as a set, not a sequence

The knowledge documents list fingerprinted tagFilters through canonicalJson,
which sorts object keys but preserves array order. Each filter compiles to a
condition in and(...whereConditions), and AND is commutative, so the same
clauses written in a different order select the same documents — and got a
different fingerprint, refusing a cursor for a page that was genuinely the
next one.

Adds unorderedJsonScopePart beside parseUnorderedList: members are
canonicalized, de-duplicated, and sorted, so `A AND A` binds like `A` and
clause order stops mattering. A non-array or unparseable value still binds
by its raw spelling, since that request fails validation anyway.

Replaces the route-local canonicalTagFilters, and corrects the claim on
canonicalJson that array order only ever costs a restart — for a set-valued
filter it costs a spurious 400.

Reported by Greptile.

* fix(v2): bind list filters by the value the query acts on, not its spelling

Third report of one root cause, so this fixes the cause rather than the case.
A cursor scope must fingerprint what the query filters on; every place it
fingerprinted the caller's raw text instead, two spellings of one filter got
two scopes and a valid next page got a 400.

Knowledge documents: tagFilters bound the raw query text while the route
already parsed it two lines below for the use case. The schema defaults
operator to 'eq', so {tagName,value} and {tagName,value,operator:'eq'} are
one filter to the query and were two scopes to the cursor. The scope now
binds the parser's output, which also subsumes the clause-order fix — both
route tests go red against the raw-text form.

Logs and workflow runs: startDate/endDate bound the raw text, but
z.string().datetime() admits every sub-second spelling of one instant, so
`…00Z` and `…00.000Z` name one window and got two scopes. New
instantScopePart binds the parsed instant.

Replaces unorderedJsonScopePart, which took raw text and could not see a
schema default, with unorderedScopeOf over the parsed value.

Swept all fourteen routes that build a cursor scope for the same divergence;
these were the only ones where a scope part is derived differently from the
value reaching the use case.

Reported by Greptile.

* fix(v2): bind the audit and billing window bounds by instant

The previous sweep for this defect looked for a transform in mapInput, so it
missed the two routes that pass their raw bounds to a use case that parses
them deeper. Both fingerprinted startDate/endDate as text while their
predicates convert to a Date, so `…00Z` and `…00.000Z` name one window and
got two scopes, refusing the genuine next page.

Billing keeps stamping the raw params rather than resolveDateRange's output,
for the reason already recorded there: a relative `period` resolves against
the clock, so hashing the resolved window would reject every next page.
Normalizing the explicit bounds is compatible — instantScopePart is a pure
function of the caller's own text and resolves nothing.

Re-swept all fourteen cursor-scope routes by scope part rather than by
transform site. Every temporal and structured part now binds canonically;
the rest are enums and identifiers with one spelling per value.

Reported by Greptile.

* fix(v2): drop an inert field from the document tag-filter scope

resolveKnowledgeTagFilters builds every structured filter with the stored
definition's fieldType and never reads the caller's — not for resolution, not
for validation, not in its output. Fingerprinting it made a field the query
ignores decide whether a cursor resumes, so adding or removing a matching
fieldType refused a page that had not moved.

Swept the other twelve cursor-scope routes for the same shape. No scope part
is absent from its mapInput, this was the only scope carrying a structure
resolved against stored state, and knowledge/search has no cursor at all.

Reported by Greptile.

* refactor(v2): derive the body 413 from the contract in every document

Two mechanisms encoded one rule. `withRequestBodyErrors` derived the 413 from
`route.contract.body` for the tables document, while the resources document
hand-picked RESOURCE_BODY_ERRORS / RESOURCE_CONFLICT_BODY_ERRORS at nine
sites. The cross-document sweep caught drift, but only after the fact: a new
body operation that forgot the _BODY_ variant published a reachable 413
nowhere until a test failed.

Hoists the mapper to openapi/shared.ts and applies it in both documents, so
the rule is derived rather than remembered. The two hand-picked sets and
their shared TSDoc are gone.

Regenerating all seven specs produces zero drift, which is the proof the two
mechanisms were computing the same thing.

* refactor(v2): collapse duplicated cursor and validation mechanisms, drop dead exports

One rule, one implementation:

- `parseRequest` hand-inlined the "caller envelope or default" validation-error
  projection four times. Extract `projectValidationError` and route all four
  through it.
- Nine keyset lists hand-rolled the `present` half of the cursor pair that
  `readSortedCursor` already owns the read half of. Add the symmetric
  `writeSortedCursor` and use it everywhere.
- `GET /workflows/{id}/runs` re-derived `readSortedCursor`'s invalid/refiltered
  ladder from `decodeSortedCursor`; it now calls the shared reader and keeps
  only the key-arity check that is genuinely its own.

Files and exports that no longer earn their place:

- Inline `credentials/utils.ts` into its single consumer.
- Delete symbols with zero references repo-wide: `v2CustomToolWriteError`,
  `secretCredentialTypes`, `v2CursorList`, `v2WorkspaceAccessError`,
  `resolveFolderPathIdentity`, `folderPathForId`, `v2FolderPathMutationError`,
  and seven of twelve `tables/utils.ts` exports.
- Drop `export` from symbols used only inside their own module.

No behavior change; every response body and error message is byte-identical.

* docs(v2): cut duplicated and non-load-bearing comment prose

Five rationales were written three to five times each by parallel agents
that could not see one another. Each now has one home and the rest point
at it:

- HEAD existence oracle -> the headSafe option on defineV2JsonRoute
- cursor query binding -> cursorScopeKey in lib/api/cursor-binding.ts
- storage-key prefix budget -> buildStorageKeySegment
- NUL / U+0000 -> the containsNulCharacter predicate
- blank and duplicate query values -> their own implementations

Also drops changelog-in-source (prose narrating what the code used to
do), anchorless module headers attached to no declaration, rejected-
alternative essays, and @param tags that only restate the signature.

Comments only: the diff contains no executable-code change.

* fix(v2): name the undecodable-cursor failure on the two sortless lists

GET /workflows/{id}/versions and GET /workspaces/{id}/members threw a bare
'Invalid cursor' literal where every other v2 list uses a shared constant.
The right one is UNREADABLE_CURSOR_MESSAGE, not INVALID_CURSOR_MESSAGE:
both lists take only limit and cursor, so naming sortBy/sortOrder would
answer one 400 with advice that earns a second.

Their missing filter scope is correct and stays. Neither contract accepts a
filter — v2PaginationFields is the whole query — so there is nothing to bind,
and limit is excluded from a scope by design.

Pins the message on the versions route, verified to fail against the literal.

* test(openapi): give the determinism check a chosen timeout

`serializes all documents deterministically` serializes all seven published
documents twice — roughly 2MB of JSON — under vitest's 5s default, which is
not a budget anyone picked for it. The published specs grew 3.3% on this
branch (961KB -> 993KB) from richer descriptions, which is far too small to
move a comfortable test and is enough to tip one already sitting just under
the cap. Measured at 5.1s in isolation with nothing else running.

Raises it to 30s for the openapi suite rather than trimming a real assertion.

* fix(v2): make the NUL path scan linear, and force a write surface to choose

Two findings from a simplify pass, both in code this branch added.

findNulBytePath copied `[...path, key]` per child, which is O(nodes x depth).
A caller controls that depth directly: v2 row cell values are `z.unknown()`,
so nesting passes Zod untouched and reaches the scan. Measured on Node 22 --
JSON.parse accepts a 200KB body nested 100k deep in 9.8ms, and the scan then
blocked the event loop for 27.7s. Frames now carry a parent link and the path
is materialized once, for the node actually reported: 27.7s -> 5ms, with
byte-identical paths across nested arrays, records, NUL keys and clean input.
The always-run first pass drops Object.entries for Object.keys, which halves
its cost on large bodies by not allocating a pair array per object.

`strictWrite` was optional with the lenient default, so a v2 write route added
tomorrow would silently inherit first-party behavior -- unknown column dropped
under a 201, uncoercible cell stored as null -- defended by nothing but five
copies of a literal. It is now required on the five write-shaped inputs, so
omission is a compile error. The type-checker named every caller: the five v2
routes already passed true, and the three Copilot sites now say false
explicitly, which is the behavior they already had.

* refactor(v2): apply the body-413 mapper to every OpenAPI document

The earlier unification wired withRequestBodyErrors into two of the five
content documents and left files-audit, knowledge and workflows hand-writing
the entry, so the helper's own claim that "a new body route cannot forget it"
held on 40% of the surface while reading as global.

Regenerating all seven specs produces zero drift, which is the useful proof:
the mapper agrees with every hand-written entry today, so the gap was never a
missing 413 — it was a missing guarantee for the next body route added to
those three documents.

The existing hand-written entries stay. The mapper is one-directional and
several bodyless folder reads publish 413 for the folder-tree ceiling, so
stripping them by hand would risk removing one the mapper cannot restore.

* refactor(v2): fold the v2 validation renderer into the shared parse defaults

V2_PARSE_DEFAULTS calls itself "the parse failures every v2 route renders the
same way", but the option deciding how a v2 validation failure renders sat
outside it and was re-stated at seven sites. A raw route that spread the
defaults and stopped emitted a non-v2 error envelope.

Removes the redundant line from the five sites that only restated it. The two
builders keep theirs: theirs sits after `...options.parseOptions`, so it is a
deliberate override that stops a caller swapping the v2 renderer, not a copy.

Also adopts the mandated `filterUndefined` in cursorScopeKey in place of the
Object.fromEntries/Object.entries form CLAUDE.md forbids, and collapses a
one-element `as const` array plus a Math.max over it to the single `.length`
they computed.

* test(persistence): keep the wire round trip without tripping the utils audit

check:utils forbids `JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))` and points at
structuredClone, which is right for a deep clone and wrong here: this test
exists to prove the schema accepts a `deployedAt` that arrived over HTTP as a
string as well as an in-process `Date`. structuredClone preserves the `Date`,
so adopting it would leave the test asserting nothing about the wire form.

Splits the serialize and the parse into two statements. The round trip stays
lossy — verified `JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(...))` yields a string where
structuredClone yields a Date — and the pattern the audit matches is gone.

Arrived from staging in #6660, so `check:audits` is red on origin/staging too,
not only here.
2026-08-13 10:52:20 -07:00
Waleed c49751b32e perf(prefetch): stop calling our own API over the wire during server render (#6657)
* perf(prefetch): read the data layer instead of calling our own API over the wire

Four server-render prefetches went out over HTTP to our own routes. With
INTERNAL_API_BASE_URL unset in prod, getInternalApiBaseUrl() falls back to the
public base URL, so each was RSC -> public HTTPS -> load balancer -> back into
the app, awaited inside the render with a second round of auth.

- /home fetched the workflow folder list that the workspace layout had already
  fetched, under the identical query key. Since getQueryClient() builds a new
  client per call on the server, the two never deduped: same data, twice a
  request, once directly and once over the wire. Dropped; the layout's entry
  already hydrates it.
- /home cached raw route JSON under workspaceFilesKeys.list, while
  files/prefetch.ts seeds that same key from listWorkspaceFilesWithShares. The
  contract declares the date fields z.coerce.date(), so consumers hold Dates —
  a file record's type depended on which page the viewer landed on. Now reads
  the same function files/prefetch.ts does.
- tables and knowledge folder reads now call listFoldersForWorkspace, matching
  the sidebar prefetch.

These reads carry no authorization of their own, so each surface proves the
viewer through getWorkspaceHostContextForViewer first and caches nothing when
it fails, leaving the client fetch to reach the route for the real 403. Both it
and getSession are cache()d and already resolved by the layout, so the proof
costs no extra queries.

Left on the wire, deliberately: the tables and knowledge lists, whose cached
shape is the serialized wire shape, and pinned items and members, which have no
exported data-layer function.

* improvement(prefetch): skip the viewer proof when there is no session

Passing an empty-string userId ran a real permission query that could only
return null. Take an optional userId instead and skip straight to the
unauthorized path, matching how the home prefetch is called.

* perf(prefetch): finish removing self-HTTP prefetches and delete the legacy helper

Converts the last four server-render prefetches that called our own API over
HTTP, and deletes prefetch-internal-fetch.ts now that nothing imports it.

- knowledge bases: runs the route's own listInternalKnowledgeBases use case
  with a principal from the same internalSessionAuth policy the route declares,
  then projects through the same presenter and contract. Not a bypass of the
  application boundary — the same path, called in-process.
- tables: extracts the route's list projection into lib/table/wire.ts as
  toTableListItem, which the route and the prefetch now both call. This matters
  because listTablesContract's response schema is a passthrough z.custom, so a
  client fetch caches the route's JSON verbatim. Seeding listTables() directly
  would have put Date objects and the server-only metadata field under a key the
  hook never sees them on.
- pinned items: extracts the route's inline query into lib/pinned-items/queries.ts
  as listPinnedItemsForUser, which the route now calls too.
- workspace members: getWorkspaceMemberProfiles already existed; the prefetch
  calls it directly.

normalizeColumn moves from app/api/table/utils.ts to lib/table/wire.ts with ten
importers repointed. That also removes a pre-existing lib/* -> app/api/* boundary
violation in lib/table/import-runner.ts. No response shape changes: the v1/v2
edits are import-path moves only.

Every converted read proves the viewer first and caches nothing when that fails,
so an unauthorized viewer's client fetch still reaches the route for the real
403. Authorization equivalence was checked by unfolding both paths to
checkWorkspaceAccess rather than assumed.

* improvement(prefetch): collapse the duplicated folder prefetch and unify the call shape

- Extract prefetchResourceFolders. The same eight-line folder prefetch was
  written three times, varying only by resourceType, with the key, stale time
  and mapper kept in sync by hand.
- Adopting it removes the conditional spread from the tables and knowledge
  prefetches. Tables can now early-return, matching prefetchFilesBrowser:
  prefetchResourceListChrome already self-guards on the same cached host
  context, so a null context meant the function did nothing either way.
- Take userId as string | undefined everywhere and guard inside, so every
  prefetch module has one calling convention rather than two.
- Export toWireTimestamp and use it for the create-table response's own copy of
  the same idiom, and drop a cast that the extraction made dead: the parameter
  is already TableDefinition, whose schema is TableSchema.
- Read params and the session concurrently on the tables and knowledge pages,
  matching the files page, and drop TSDoc that restated each prefetch's own.

* fix(prefetch): keep the tables list on its route and cut the executor edge

Reading listTables from a page prefetch put the executable tool registry into
the Tables page server graph — ~4,700 modules, which check:tool-registry-boundary
rejects. lib/table/service reaches workflow-columns by several independent
paths (directly, and through jobs/service and rows/service), so severing one
edge is not enough; untangling that belongs in its own change.

- The tables list goes back through GET /api/table, with the reason recorded so
  the next person does not repeat the attempt. Folders and chrome on that page
  stay on the data layer.
- stripGroupDeps moves to its own leaf module. It is a pure projection over a
  WorkflowGroup, but living beside the group runtime meant every importer of
  lib/table/service paid for the executor to get it.

Net effect on the Tables page graph: 2,186 modules to 1,742.

* perf(prefetch): finish the migration, delete the legacy helper, ratchet page graphs

Answers the question the previous commit left open: the tables list did not have
to stay on HTTP. lib/table/service reached the executor through
jobs/service -> rows/service -> workflow-columns, for one symbol.
pendingDeleteMask is a delete-visibility SQL clause with no executor
involvement, so it moves to its own leaf and that chain is cut. The tables
prefetch now reads the data layer like every other one, and
prefetch-internal-fetch.ts is deleted: nothing in the app calls its own API over
HTTP during a server render any more.

stripGroupDeps likewise moves to a leaf rather than being re-exported through
workflow-columns, so its importers no longer pull the executor to get a pure
projection.

React Query mechanism fixes, all found by audit:
- settings/[section] fired two prefetches without awaiting them. Only a settled
  query is dehydrated, so those were shipped mid-flight; a rejection hydrated
  into an error state retryOnMount: false never retries, leaving the panel
  broken for the session. Awaited now, and the pending-dehydration opt-in is
  removed since nothing streams.
- The viewer profile was prefetched by both the layout and the settings page.
  Separate server QueryClients mean that was a real second read per request.
- prefetchSubscriptionData was dead, and hand-rolled an unannotated raw fetch.
- retry is scoped to the browser. Query core defaults it to 0 on the server;
  stating one value for both opted awaited prefetches into a retry backoff. The
  gcTime default is dropped entirely — 5 minutes is already the browser default,
  and setting it explicitly overrode the server's Infinity, leaving a live timer
  and payload per request.

check:tool-registry-boundary now also ratchets per-page module counts against a
committed baseline, attributing a regression to the import that caused it via a
dominator tree. It caught a +444 regression in this branch by hand; it would
have caught it in CI. Its import regex also missed bare side-effect imports,
so `import '@/tools/registry'` could have slipped past it entirely.

Prefetch guidance added to .claude/rules/sim-queries.md.

* fix(prefetch): correct the extracted module's db imports and stale rationale

Audit findings from the migration.

- pending-delete-mask imported its schema tables from @sim/db rather than
  @sim/db/schema, which the module it came from was careful to split. The
  global test mocks are bound per-entrypoint and only the schema mock exports
  tables, so every suite that reaches pendingDeleteMask would have failed on a
  missing mock export. Restored to the original convention, and the same split
  applied to the new pinned-items queries module before it grows a test.
- The settings prefetch and page justified awaiting with a mechanism this
  branch removed — pending queries being shipped with their promise. Only a
  settled query is dehydrated now, so an unawaited prefetch is dropped from the
  payload entirely. Same conclusion, correct reason, and no longer contradicting
  the rule this branch added.
- Removed the doc block left orphaned above validateSchema when stripGroupDeps
  moved out of workflow-columns.

Skill projections regenerated after trimming the boundary skill.

* chore(table): drop a section separator comment

Separators like these are non-TSDoc decoration that CLAUDE.md already rules
out. This is the only one in a file this branch touches; the rest of the repo
is swept separately.

* chore: remove section separator comments

CLAUDE.md already rules these out ("No ==== separators. No non-TSDoc
comments"), but 546 of them had accumulated across 48 files. They decorate
rather than explain, and they drift: a separator says "Validation" while the
code beneath it moved elsewhere, as one in workflow-columns already had.

Pure deletion — no source line was touched, and lines inside template
literals were skipped so nothing in a generated string changed.
2026-08-13 00:12:45 -07:00
Waleed 366829b6b0 fix(v2): derive the log and run status enums from the persisted status list (#6612)
* fix(v2): derive the log and run status enums from the persisted status list

`GET /api/v2/logs` and `GET /api/v2/logs/{runId}` parse the raw
`workflow_execution_logs.status` column against a six-value enum that omits
`paused`, so a run holding that value returns 500. The list response is
validated whole-page, so one such row 500s every page it lands on, and the
row is durable until the run is resumed, cancelled, or failed.

`paused` is not written by an ordinary human-in-the-loop pause — that path
persists `pending` (logging-session.ts:1180). It is written by
`PauseResumeManager.markResumeAttemptFailed`, which fires on any
`ResumeAdmissionError`: a workspace over its usage limit, an archived or
undeployed workflow, or a concurrent resume losing the claim race. That is a
routine business path.

The enum was supposed to be protected by an `AssertNever` exhaustiveness gate,
but the gate was vacuous: it compared against `PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus`,
a hand-written union that was itself missing `paused`, because the write goes
through a raw `sql` CASE fragment Drizzle cannot type-check. Adding `paused` to
both lists would leave the same vacuous gate in place for the next status.

Instead, `PERSISTED_WORKFLOW_EXECUTION_STATUSES` becomes the single runtime
source of truth, `PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus` is derived from it, and both
v2 contracts derive their enums from the const rather than re-declaring them.
Both surfaces pass the column through verbatim, so their reported set is the
persisted set by definition — there is no editorial choice for a gate to force,
only the question of whether a newly persisted status should be public, which
the option-list tests now pin. The `[...V2_PERSISTED_RUN_STATUSES, 'paused']`
append on the runs contract is deleted rather than adjusted; it would otherwise
be a duplicate.

Alternatives rejected:
- A `.catch()` or `safeParse` in the presenters is dead code:
  `v2-json-route.ts:271` re-parses the whole body with the same schema.
- Normalizing `markResumeAttemptFailed` to write `pending` would remove the
  distinction the resume claim query at human-in-the-loop-manager.ts:973 relies
  on, and leaves the contract wrong for any other future status.
- Typing the Drizzle column does not help: the offending write is a raw `sql`
  fragment, and `packages/db` cannot import the app's status list.

The v2 workflows spec changes are reordering and description only — the value
set there already contained `paused`. The v2 logs spec gains `paused`, which is
additive and safe while the whole `/api/v2` surface is behind the off-by-default
`v2-api` flag; it must land before v2 GA, after which it would be breaking.

* fix(v2): document both provenances of a reported paused run status

* fix(v2): stop promising a paused discriminator the response cannot always provide

* fix(v2): describe the paused discriminator as the code actually records it
2026-08-12 01:51:55 -07:00
Waleed d96f3f95c8 perf(db): drop 0287's two zero-row scans from the ACCESS EXCLUSIVE hold (#6609)
drizzle-orm 0.45.2 runs every pending migration inside ONE transaction
(node_modules/drizzle-orm/pg-core/dialect.js:60-71), and migrate.ts:212
sets `statement_timeout = 0`. So the ACCESS EXCLUSIVE that 0287:2's
ADD COLUMN takes on `workflow_blocks` is held, unbounded, through 0288
and 0289 to COMMIT — `lock_timeout` at migrate.ts:213 bounds acquisition
only, exactly as that file's own TSDoc at :76-78 says. Every editor load,
workflow save, executor block read, and realtime canvas op queues behind
it platform-wide, and migrations run before image promotion
(ci.yml:113-133), so the stall lands on 100% old-version traffic.

Two of the three statements inside that hold did nothing. `data.errorEnabled`
never existed in a released version — `git log origin/main -S errorEnabled`
returns zero commits across main's entire history — so both statements
filtered on it match zero rows, and the file's own comment said as much.
There is no index on the `data` expression, so each was a full sequential
scan of the whole table.

Measured on PostgreSQL 17.9 against a 328 MB / 200k-row fixture built to
the same bytes-per-row shape as the reported production table:

  0287:2  ADD COLUMN     0.5 ms   metadata-only, takes AccessExclusiveLock
  0287:11 edge backfill   21 ms   Nested Loop -> Index Scan on the PK
  0287:20 (deleted)       47 ms   Seq Scan, 200,000 rows removed, 0 matched
  0287:22 (deleted)       47 ms   Seq Scan, 200,000 rows removed, 0 matched

A concurrent primary-key SELECT started 50 ms into the transaction was
blocked 53-219 ms before and 22-25 ms after — the latter indistinguishable
from the 21-33 ms control with no migration running at all. The two deleted
statements accounted for 80,520 buffer accesses (~629 MB of in-lock I/O on
that fixture) and 81% of the transaction's work.

Editing an already-merged migration in place is safe here specifically
because drizzle writes `hash` but never reads it back: the skip test at
dialect.js:56-63 compares `created_at` against `folderMillis` only. The
edit is therefore a no-op on every database that already applied 0287
(staging, dev, branch DBs) and takes effect only where it has not run.
`meta/_journal.json` and the snapshot prevId chain are untouched.

The only casualty is a stale `data.errorEnabled` key on branch databases a
developer created it on. Nothing reads it: save.ts:50 and load.ts:89 both
read the `error_enabled` COLUMN, and load.ts passes `data` through
untouched.

Alternatives rejected, each checked against the code rather than assumed:

- An embedded `COMMIT;` to end the transaction early. 0289's four
  CREATE TYPE, its CREATE TABLE, and its three CREATE INDEX all lack
  IF NOT EXISTS, so a mid-batch failure in autocommit leaves them
  applied-but-unjournaled and the replay dies on 42710 — which
  migrate.ts:219 only retries for 55P03. That turns a transient stall
  into a wedged deploy.
- Moving the statements to a new file after 0289. All pending files share
  one transaction, so it buys exactly zero lock reduction.
- Rewriting the surviving backfill as
  `WHERE id IN (SELECT source_block_id FROM workflow_edges WHERE ...)`.
  Measured both: planner-equivalent. `source_handle` is unindexed, so both
  forms seq-scan `workflow_edges` (7.5 ms, identical) and then index-scan
  `workflow_blocks` on the primary key — it never scans that table. The
  IN form adds a HashAggregate and 1,170 more buffers, so it is marginally
  worse. Left as shipped.
- Promoting the `data-backfill` lint from warn to annotate. `readAnnotation`
  only requires a non-empty reason and 0287 already supplies one per
  statement, so the rule would fire zero findings.

0288's nullable `retry` column is correct as-is and unchanged. Both
delete-and-reinsert save paths on the deployed version (save.ts:30-63 and
the realtime REPLACE_STATE handler) reset `error_enabled` to false and
`retry` to NULL for a workflow saved by an old replica during the rollout;
the ordinary realtime block upsert does not, because its `set` clause
omits both columns. That residue is tolerable: everything the surviving
backfill writes is re-derived from the edge set at
workflow-block.tsx:754 and lib/workflows/persistence/utils.ts:196-201, and
`retry` ships in this same release so it has no installed base.

`bun run check:migrations origin/main` drops from three data-backfill
warnings to one. The real migrator applied all 289 journal entries to a
fresh PostgreSQL 17.9 database with the edited file, producing
`error_enabled boolean not null default false` and `retry jsonb`.
2026-08-12 01:32:00 -07:00
263e3ca67e improvement(external-endpoints): v2 versions with clean signatures + updated docs based on openapi spec (#5273)
* v0.6.29: login improvements, posthog telemetry (#4026)

* feat(posthog): Add tracking on mothership abort (#4023)

Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai>

* fix(login): fix captcha headers for manual login  (#4025)

* fix(signup): fix turnstile key loading

* fix(login): fix captcha header passing

* Catch user already exists, remove login form captcha

* improvement(external-endpoints): v2 versions with clean signatures + updated docs

* feat(usage): accept X-API-Key on usage-logs list + export

/api/users/me/usage-logs and /export now use checkHybridAuth — the same
auth /api/users/me/usage-limits already accepts — so external monitors
can read summary.bySourceCredits (the source breakdown of usage-limits'
aggregate currentPeriodCost) instead of estimating Copilot spend by
subtraction. Workspace-scoped keys are pinned to their own workspace's
slice of the ledger: the filter defaults to the key's workspace and an
explicit mismatch 403s. Both endpoints documented in openapi-core.json.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(billing): dedicated v2 usage endpoints; keep internal usage routes session-only

Replaces the earlier X-API-Key enablement on /api/users/me/usage-logs
with a dedicated public surface, so the internal Billing-settings
endpoints can evolve with the UI while external monitors get a stable
versioned contract:

- GET /api/v2/billing/usage — current-billing-period summary with
  bySourceCredits (the source breakdown external monitors need to watch
  e.g. Copilot consumption without estimating by subtraction), plus
  limitCredits and plan
- GET /api/v2/billing/usage/logs — cursor-paged credit ledger in the v2
  envelope
- workspace-scoped keys are pinned to their own workspace's slice;
  personal keys read the account ledger

The public wire is credits-only: usage-logs rows now carry a hasCost
boolean instead of dollarCost (the Billing UI only needed the >0
signal), and the rateLimit block is removed from the usage-limits
response and docs (deploy-modal tab relabeled accordingly).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(docs): validate OpenAPI specs against the Zod contracts in CI

The specs in apps/docs are hand-authored because they carry what Zod
never defines — error envelopes, status codes, prose, examples — so
they can't be generated; check:openapi validates them instead:

- spec integrity: $refs resolve, operationIds unique, 2xx documented,
  no orphaned component schemas
- v2 conventions: every /api/v2 operation documents 401 + 429 and every
  4xx/5xx resolves to the canonical { error: { code, message } } envelope
- contract cross-check: contracts are auto-discovered from
  lib/api/contracts/v2 (each carries its method + path); doc<->contract
  coverage both ways, query/body/response field diffs via z.toJSONSchema
- examples: documented request/response examples must parse with the
  matching contract's actual Zod schemas

First run caught real drift, fixed here: 16 stale orphaned schemas in
the core spec, the v2 billing ops referencing v1-shaped error
components, deploy/rollback examples missing the required nullable
lifecycle keys, CreateTableBody missing folderId, a legacy-grammar
delete-rows example, and four knowledge document ops missing their
required workspaceId query param.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* fix(docs): recursive field diff in check:openapi + the deep drift it found

A mutation test showed the doc<->contract field diff only compared
top-level properties, so a typo inside the { data } envelope passed.
The diff now descends through matching object properties and array
items (both sides must expose a property set — passthrough contracts
and prose-only docs end the descent instead of false-positive), with
the Zod JSON-schema root doubling as the $defs context.

Deep drift it immediately caught, fixed here: select-column config
(options/multiple) missing from every tables column schema, AddColumnBody
hand-rolling a third column shape (now composed from ColumnInput, with
position/workflowGroupId as the per-op extensions the contracts actually
admit), chunking strategyOptions undocumented, and the deployment
lifecycle fields (activeDeployment/latestDeploymentAttempt) missing from
DeploymentState.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* fix(security): close the triggerType rate-limit bypass on workflow execute

Caller-supplied triggerType flowed unchecked into preprocessExecution,
whose checkRateLimit default turns OFF for 'manual'/'chat' — so any
API-key caller, and any anonymous public-API caller billed to the
workspace owner, could execute unthrottled by sending
{"triggerType":"manual"} (async runs also skipped the worker-side check
via admissionCompleted). External callers may now only send the
redundant 'api' value; internal JWT callers ('workflow'/'mcp') are
unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* refactor(execution): extract enqueue/status/cancel into shared libs

Prepares the v2 execution surface: handleAsyncExecution's queue logic
moves to lib/workflows/executor/enqueue-execution.ts (slot/claim
semantics encoded in a discriminated outcome, not HTTP statuses), the
execution-status read to execution-status.ts, and the order-sensitive
cancel machinery to lib/execution/cancel-workflow-execution.ts. The v1
routes re-render identically — their suites pass unmodified.

Also: preprocessExecution gains rateLimitCounter ('sync'|'async') and
its 429 now carries code RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED + retryAfterMs (previously
indistinguishable from the concurrency 429 and Retry-After was
discarded); and the duplicate cancel contract in contracts/logs.ts is
unified on the full 5-value reason enum — its narrower copy made
requestJson throw a client ZodError when cancelling a paused HITL run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(execution): callable execution service + structured error classifier

executeWorkflowService composes the same libs the v1 route holds inline
(call-chain guard, execution-id claim, LoggingSession, preprocessing,
deployed-state load + file-field processing, timeout-bound
executeWorkflowCore, output hydration/compaction) for the deployed-state
caller class — the seam the v2 execute route and in-process internal
callers share, making the HTTP endpoint syntactic sugar.

classifyExecutionError stops discarding the block context that
buildBlockExecutionError already attaches at throw sites: failed runs
now yield {message, code, blockId, blockName, blockType} with a stable
append-only code enum (TIMEOUT/CANCELLED/USAGE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED/
INVALID_INPUT/BLOCK_EXECUTION_FAILED/CHILD_WORKFLOW_FAILED/
OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE/EXECUTION_FAILED), so callers route on error class
instead of substring-matching messages — the single place raw errors
are interpreted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(api): POST /api/v2/workflows/[id]/execute

Thin route over executeWorkflowService: X-API-Key or anonymous
public-API auth (sync/stream only for anonymous), strict body with
body-flag async (no mode headers on v2), SSE passthrough for stream,
and the execution resource response — executionId always present,
in-band run failures are status:'failed' with the structured
{message, code, blockId, blockName, blockType} error, sync timeout is
status:'failed' + TIMEOUT instead of v1's 408, and a Response block's
payload stays inside output (authors never control response
status/headers on this origin). Async debits the async bucket and the
202 statusUrl points at the v2 executions resource. Adds
CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST/SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE to the v2 error codes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(api): v2 executions status + cancel with queued backfill

GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/executions/[executionId] is the single
status URL for sync and async runs: before the async worker writes the
durable log row, status is backfilled from the job queue (deterministic
job id) as 'queued'/'running' — closing v1's 202-to-pickup 404 window —
and failed runs carry the structured error object. POST .../cancel
renders the shared cancellation lib in the v2 envelope with the
tightened 5-value reason enum. Both authenticate via the shared
resolveV2WorkflowAccess (X-API-Key, authz masked as 404,
allowPersonalApiKeys honored).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(execution): workflow tool + MCP bridge run in-process

workflow_executor (workflow-as-agent-tool) short-circuits in executeTool
through WorkflowBlockHandler — the same invocation boundary canvas child
workflows use — mirroring the deployed_block_executor precedent. The
MCP serve bridge calls executeWorkflowService directly instead of
fetching its own execute endpoint; deployment-version pinning, MCP
response-size rejection, and the actor override become typed options
instead of header sniffing. Both callers drop the double admission slot
and duplicate top-level log row the HTTP hop cost, and failed child
runs now surface the structured error + child executionId so parents
and MCP clients can route on error class and hand providers a
reproducible handle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(infra): CORS + CSP coverage for the v2 execute path

/api/v2/workflows/:id/execute gets the same wildcard-origin,
credential-free CORS policy as v1 (the default credentialed policy
would block browser API-key calls and open a cookie CSRF surface) with
X-Sim-Stream-Protocol allowed and no X-Execution-Mode (async is
body-selected on v2), plus the COEP/COOP/CSP header block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(ui): deploy modal + copilot advertise the v2 execute surface

All 20 API-tab snippets move to POST /api/v2/workflows/{id}/execute with
the nested {"input": ...} body, async as the "async": true body flag
(X-Execution-Mode gone), status polling against the v2 executions
resource, the third tab renamed Usage and pointed at
/api/v2/billing/usage, and {data} envelope unwraps in the printed
responses. Fixes the latent baseUrl derivation
(endpoint.split('/api/workflows/')) that would have silently built
garbage URLs under a v2 endpoint, and deletes dead code (exampleCommand
across 3 sites, getAsyncExampleTitle). Copilot deploy/manage/serializer
endpoint builders and the api_trigger bestPractices example follow (the
latter also drops its hardcoded staging host).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* docs(api): document the v2 execution surface

Adds execute, execution status, and cancel to openapi-v2-workflows.json
with the structured ExecutionError schema (append-only code enum + block
attribution) and the ExecutionResource contract, documenting the rules
that differ from v1: modes are body-selected, a failed run is HTTP 200
with status 'failed', an executionId always means data (never the error
envelope), queued status is visible immediately, and Response-block
payloads stay inside output. Registers the three pages in the generated
workflows meta.json and bumps the route-count baseline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* feat(api): gate the whole /api/v2 surface behind one flag; UI stays on v1

Every v2 route now runs exactly one check immediately after auth —
v2ApiGateError — and answers 404 when the `v2-api` flag is off, so the
surface is invisible until it is deliberately rolled out. The gate is
keyed on userId only: a workspace/org-keyed check would have to read
membership for a caller-supplied id before authorization runs, and its
404-vs-403 split would leak cohort membership (the trap the per-domain
table gate worked around by running late). The two executions routes
inherit it from the shared access resolver; the tables-specific gate is
removed so no route checks twice.

`tables-v2-api` stays, now gating only the internal predicate-grammar
route /api/table/[tableId]/query — note v2 tables routes move to the
unified flag, so enabling them is a `v2-api` decision now.

Reverts the deploy modal, copilot handlers, and api_trigger example to
the v1 execute endpoint: v1 works unchanged, and the UI must not
advertise a surface most users would get a 404 from.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz

* fix(executor): restore child-cost aggregation dropped by the staging merge

Staging's custom-block rewrite deleted `aggregateChildCost` from
workflow-handler.ts, and git merged that file cleanly — but this branch's
workflow-tool-runner.ts, added for the v2 execute migration, still imports it.
A silent semantic conflict: no marker, broken build.

Taking staging's rewrite is correct, so the helper is defined locally in its
one remaining consumer rather than resurrected in the file staging just
rewrote. Same four lines over the still-exported `calculateCostSummary`, so a
failed child workflow keeps billing the hosted-key spend it consumed instead
of reporting $0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(tables): make lib/table/orchestration the single implementation (#6134)

* refactor(orchestration): move the shared error contract out of lib/workflows

OrchestrationErrorCode and statusForOrchestrationError are the contract every
lib/[resource]/orchestration module returns against, but they lived inside the
workflows module, so resource-neutral code (lib/folders) already had to import
from a workflow path. Moved to lib/core/orchestration/types.

Adds a 'locked' class mapping to 423. Both tables and workflows have a lock
that forbids a mutation, and each caller was translating that to a status
itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(tables): make lib/table/orchestration the single implementation

Column update was implemented four times — the UI route, v1, v2, and the
copilot table tool — each calling the same column services but owning its own
guards, error mapping, and audit. The copies had drifted, and the drift was the
bug: v2 was missing both guards, only the copilot copy minted stable option
ids, and only v1/v2 audited.

performUpdateTableColumn, performDeleteTable, and performDeleteTableRow now own
that logic; all ten call sites reduce to auth, parse, call, render. The guards
are asserted once in lib/table/orchestration rather than four times against
four routes.

Behavior this consolidates, previously true on only some paths:

- The typeChanging guard. updateColumnType early-returns on an unchanged type
  and drops any options sent with it, so restating the current type alongside
  new options silently discarded them. v2 had no guard at all and, since its
  contract shares v1's body schema, accepted options and ignored them.
- The select-unique guard. Each write is its own locked transaction, so a
  rename or type change paired with a constraint write that is going to fail
  commits first and then throws, half-applying the schema change.
- Stable select-option ids. Cells reference the option id, so an edit that
  re-sends an option by name has to reuse it or every cell holding it is
  orphaned. Only the copilot path did this; normalizeSelectOptionsInput moves to
  lib/table/select-options and now covers every caller. It preserves a supplied
  id, so it is a no-op for the fully-formed options the HTTP contracts accept.
- required forwarded into the type and options writes, so a conversion
  validates against the constraint the same request is setting.
- An audit on every successful update. The UI route and the copilot tool
  emitted none.
- Single-row delete through the row service. v2 did a raw db.delete, skipping
  assertRowDelete and deleteOrderedRow, so a delete-locked table returned 200
  and the row-count bookkeeping never ran.
- The delete actor handed to deleteTable, which audits only when a row was
  actually archived. v1 and v2 omitted it and audited themselves outside that
  check, emitting TABLE_DELETED for a no-op delete of an archived table.

Failure classes come back as OrchestrationErrorCode; v2 renders them through a
new v2ErrorForOrchestration, mirroring statusForOrchestrationError on the v1
and UI surfaces, so a given failure maps to the same status everywhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(tables): bind the column-update tests to the orchestration function

The base's route tests assert which column service each payload reaches — the
behavior that now lives in performUpdateTableColumn. They mocked the `@/lib/table`
barrel; the orchestration module imports the service directly, so they mock that
too and keep asserting the same thing through the extracted implementation.

The orchestration tests move onto the base's semantics: writes address the
stable column id, a rename rides inside the write it accompanies rather than
running first, and the currency guards replace the non-select options guard the
service now owns.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(copilot): drop the column-type import the delegation made dead

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(tables): move the audit log out of the table service

`lib/table/service.ts` wrote its own audit rows, so whether an operation was
audited depended on which function a caller reached for rather than on a user
having performed it. That is what let v1 and v2 audit a no-op delete, and what
made `deleteTable`'s optional `actingUserId` double as an audit opt-out flag.

Worse, most sites fell back to `actingUserId ?? createdBy`, so an unattributed
call was logged against the table's *creator*. The copilot `mv` path passed no
actor at all: renaming someone else's table recorded them as the renamer.

Audit now lives in the orchestration functions — performDeleteTable,
performRenameTable, performMoveTableToFolder, performUpdateTableLocks — and
the services just write. Internal callers (folder cascade, import rollback)
keep calling the service and are silent by construction rather than by
remembering to omit an argument.

Two services now return what the audit needs: `deleteTable` reports whether it
actually archived a row, so a repeat delete logs nothing; `updateTableLocks`
returns the before/after locks, since only the locked write can observe the
transition its description names.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tables): restore audit provenance and conflict status in orchestration

Moving the audits into the orchestration functions dropped three things the
routes had been carrying, and added one the orchestration now owns twice.

- The v1 and v2 column-update routes passed `request` to `recordAudit`, so
  their audit rows recorded the caller's IP and user-agent. The orchestration
  function had no way to receive it. Every table orchestration function now
  takes an optional `OrchestrationRequestContext` and every HTTP route
  forwards it; the copilot and VFS callers, which have no request, omit it.
- `classifyTableMutation` matched `TableConflictError` on "already exists"
  appearing in the message and reported it as `validation`, turning the UI
  route's 409 on a duplicate table rename into a 400. It now matches the type,
  the way `performRestoreTable` already did.
- `captureServerEvent` ran on every delete while the audit was gated on a row
  actually being archived, so a repeat delete of an archived table still
  reported `table_deleted`. Both now hang off the same evidence.
- The copilot delete path kept its own `captureServerEvent` from when the
  service did not emit one, double-counting every copilot table delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a

* fix(tables): say which type a no-op column update restated

A copilot `update_column` payload whose only content was the column's current
type used to return success with the live schema, while the v1, v2, and UI
routes rejected the same payload with "No updates specified". Delegating to
`performUpdateTableColumn` unified them onto the routes' rejection — correct,
but the message tells the caller its request was empty when it named a type.

The orchestration function now reports the same thing `updateColumnType` reports
when it loses this race concurrently: the column is already that type, re-issue
without the type change. An empty payload still reads "No updates specified".

Drops the copilot's `outcome.table ?? tableForUpdate` fallback with it — the
comment described the no-op that can no longer reach that line, and a success
always carries a table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a

* refactor(tables): classify failures by type instead of by message text

The table module decided HTTP statuses by searching error messages for
phrases. `VALIDATION_MESSAGE_FRAGMENTS` and `ROW_WRITE_ERROR_PATTERNS` held 32
substrings between them, and fifteen more lists were inlined in routes — 83
matchers over 17 files, each its own copy of the guesswork and already drifted
apart. It made message wording load-bearing: `TableRowLimitError`'s own doc
comment noted that its text had to contain "row limit" for a route to answer
400, and adding "already exists" to a rename message silently demoted a 409 to
a 400 (the bug fixed one commit ago, by adding another special case).

Services now throw `OrchestrationError`, which carries the transport-neutral
`OrchestrationErrorCode` the layers above already speak. Classification is one
`instanceof` in `orchestrationErrorResponse` (UI + v1) and
`v2CaughtOrchestrationError` (v2). Every pattern list is gone. Wording is free
to change; an unclassified error still becomes a generic 500, which is what an
unexpected fault should be.

`asOrchestrationError` walks the `cause` chain rather than testing the caught
value directly: drizzle wraps a throw raised inside a transaction callback in a
`DrizzleQueryError` whose own message is the failed SQL, so a bare `instanceof`
would drop every failure raised inside `withLockedTable`. That is the same
reason `rootErrorMessage` had to dig for a root cause before.

Three throws stay bare `Error` deliberately — `Table ID mismatch`, `Workspace
ID mismatch`, and `Failed to build upsert conflict predicate` are internal
invariants no consumer classified, and they keep falling through to a 500.
`Insufficient capacity` was in the pattern list with no producer anywhere in
the codebase.

Status changes, all deliberate:

- `'forbidden'` joins the code union so the table-row-limit ceiling keeps its
  403; without it this refactor would have flattened it to 400.
- import-async's table-limit rejection: 400 -> 403, matching the two other
  create routes it had drifted from.
- Renaming a table to an invalid name: 500 -> 400. `validateTableName`
  messages don't contain "Invalid", so no matcher ever caught them.
- Restoring a table that isn't archived, or into an archived workspace:
  500 -> 400.
- A duplicate *column* name stays `validation`/400 rather than becoming a 409
  like a duplicate table name. Both v1 and the orchestration have always
  answered 400 for it; changing a published status is not this refactor's job.

The twelve tests that changed were asserting the substring mechanism itself,
constructing plain `Error`s with magic strings. They now assert the real
contract, plus new cases pinning that identical wording carrying no
classification stays internal and keeps its message off the wire.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(api): add v2 endpoints for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, folders, and credentials (#6150)

* feat(api): add v2 endpoints for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, folders, and credentials

* fix(api): correct credential role, skill permission bar, MCP url identity, and custom-tool conflict mapping

* fix(api): align credential mutation gating, provider-outage status, and unique-violation conflicts

* fix(api): close unique-violation, revival, orphan-write, and env-rename gaps

* fix(api): treat every provider-outage code as unavailable on create and update

* fix(credentials): use the shared outage predicate on the session update path

* fix(contracts): anchor the predicate double-cast annotation to the cast

`check:api-validation:strict` counted 9 unannotated double-casts against a
baseline of 8, failing CI. The predicate leaf schema was annotated, but the
annotation sat above the declaration while the checker anchors on the line
carrying the cast — five lines below, at the close of the object literal. The
scanner walks back at most three lines and stops at the first non-comment one,
so it hit `value: z.unknown().optional(),` and never saw the reason.

Splitting the object schema from the cast puts them adjacent, so the existing
reason binds. No behavior change — the cast, the schema, and the reasoning are
unchanged.

Also lowers the rawJsonReads ratchet 6 -> 5 to match the current count, which
had drifted down; leaving it high lets a removed raw read silently come back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(skills): point the orchestration error contract at its moved module

#6150 branched before #6134, so skill-lifecycle.ts imports
@/lib/workflows/orchestration/types — the module #6134 moved to
@/lib/core/orchestration/types. Git merged a file deletion on one side with a
new file referencing it on the other: no textual conflict, broken build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(knowledge): make lib/knowledge/orchestration the single implementation (#6154)

* refactor(knowledge): make lib/knowledge/orchestration the single implementation

Knowledge base create was implemented four times — the internal route, v1, v2,
and the copilot tool — and the orchestration around the shared write had
drifted. Extract it the same way lib/table/orchestration was: services write,
orchestration decides which writes run, guards them, audits them, and returns a
transport-neutral failure.

Behavior converged, not preserved:

- One chunking default (DEFAULT_CHUNKING_CONFIG). The agent defaulted minSize to
  1 against the API's 100, so identical input produced differently-chunked
  knowledge bases depending on who created it. The agent path now chunks at 100.
- Every successful mutation is audited inside the orchestration function. The
  copilot tool called recordAudit zero times, so agent-created knowledge bases,
  document uploads, updates and deletes left no audit trail at all.
- Failures classify by class, not by message text. The knowledge service errors
  are OrchestrationError subclasses and storage-quota rejections throw a shared
  StorageLimitExceededError, replacing four separate message greps for
  "already exists" / "does not have permission" / "storage limit".

delete_connector reported the opposite of what happened. It reached the route
through an internal HTTP self-call that sent no query string, so the route's
keep-documents default always applied while the agent told the user the
documents had been removed. The self-call is gone — all four connector
operations run in-process — and the orchestration returns the real counts.

Also:

- OrchestrationErrorCode gains 'payload_too_large' (413 / PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE).
  Without it, dropping the storage-limit message match would have regressed the
  documented 413 on knowledge base create and document upload to a 500.
- messageForOrchestrationError renders a route's own wording for an unclassified
  fault, so a driver's message no longer reaches the client on a 500.
- v1 and v2 knowledge base update now forward actorUserId, which the service
  requires for a workspace move; both omitted it.
- The connector DELETE route reads deleteDocuments through parseRequest. Its
  contract declared z.boolean(), which would have rejected the string a query
  param actually is.
- Drop the 409 from POST /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/documents in the OpenAPI spec.
  Nothing on the upload path throws a conflict; it was only ever reachable by
  the message match this change removes.

Behavior change worth noting: a v1/v2 PUT carrying only the workspaceId scope
field and no actual updates now returns 400 rather than 200 with the unchanged
knowledge base.

Deliberately deferred: document update remains internal-only. Extracting
performUpdateKnowledgeDocument makes exposing it on v1/v2 a contract and a route
away, but that is a new public surface rather than part of this consolidation.

* fix(knowledge): make connector create atomic and stop flattening failures

Review round 1 on #6154.

- Resolve the billing payer before the connector is committed, not after. A
  malformed attribution header rejected post-commit left a live connector behind
  a 500, and a retry created a duplicate plus duplicate sync work. Manual sync
  resolves before writing its audit for the same reason.
- Let the source-config validator carry its own failure class. Collapsing every
  rejection to `validation` flattened the connector PATCH route's 401 (stale
  stored credential) and 409 (missing workspace context) into a 400.
- Add `unauthorized` to OrchestrationErrorCode. It is the class that 401 was
  already expressing on this route, and the v2 vocabulary already had
  UNAUTHORIZED; only the shared union was missing it.
- Report a knowledge base that exists but failed to archive as failed, with the
  reason, rather than as not found. The copilot delete loop folded every
  non-not-found failure into `notFound`, telling the user it was never there.
- Route copilot failures through the same message helper the HTTP surfaces use,
  so an unclassified fault's raw text (a driver's failed SQL) no longer reaches
  the agent verbatim while the UI and public APIs get the generic wording.

* feat(api): expand the public v2 files surface (#6160)

* feat(api): expand the public v2 files surface

Adds folder support, rename/restore, move, bulk archive, share, and content
replace to /api/v2/files, so managing files by API no longer stops at
upload + download + archive-one.

Routes are thin: auth -> parse -> perform* -> serialize. Share and content
replace get their orchestration extracted first so the session routes and
the public ones cannot diverge on the effective-authType resolution, the
EE public-sharing gate, or the storage-quota classification.

Presigned upload stays session-only: presign does an advisory quota check
and the real debit happens in the separate register step, so a caller that
never registers leaves unaccounted bytes with no reaper. The buffered
multipart path debits inside uploadWorkspaceFile's own transaction.

* fix(files): classify folder and content failures instead of 500ing them

Bugbot round 1. The v2 routes map errorCode straight to a status, so every
manager failure that arrived unclassified became a 500 for what is really a
caller-fixable 400 or 404.

- Folder manager throws OrchestrationError: missing target/folder -> not_found,
  reparent cycle / self-parent / restore-into-archived-workspace -> validation.
- File manager does the same for the in-transaction 'File not found' paths that
  the earlier pass missed.
- updateWorkspaceFileContent's outer catch re-wrapped everything in a bare
  Error, which stripped the class off StorageLimitExceededError and the new
  not_found alike. It now rethrows a classified failure untouched and attaches
  cause to the generic wrap, so asOrchestrationError can still walk the chain.
- Every remaining perform* gained the asOrchestrationError branch.
- renameWorkspaceFile returned the pre-update read, so the v2 PATCH reported a
  stale updatedAt; it now returns the timestamp it actually wrote.

Docs: upload auto-suffixes a duplicate name rather than rejecting it, matching
the in-app uploader. The description claimed 409 and was simply wrong.

* fix(files): surface a failed upload read-back as the real error

getWorkspaceFile swallows a query failure and returns null unless throwOnError
is set, so a transient blip on the post-upload read reported as 'file could not
be read back'. Distinguish the two: a real null after a just-committed write is
an invariant break, a query failure is itself.

* revert(api): drop the dedicated v2 file-folder routes

File folders already live in the shared folder table as resourceType 'file'
(#6045 cut them over, #6051 dropped workspace_file_folders), and the remaining
file-specific folder machinery is being folded into the generic folder engine.
Publishing /api/v2/files/folders/** would pin that transitional split into a
public contract we'd then have to keep or break.

Files stay folder-aware — folderId/folderPath on the projection, folderId on
upload, and the move route — because a folder id is a folder.id and survives
the unification untouched. Folder management belongs on /api/v2/folders once
that surface serves resourceType 'file'; until then there is no v2 way to
enumerate file folders, which is the deliberate gap.

The orchestration classification fixes stay: the internal routes and the
copilot file-folder tools still call those perform* functions.

* fix(files): classify upload failures instead of matching their wording

Bugbot round 2. uploadWorkspaceFile had the same outer-catch rewrap that
updateWorkspaceFileContent did, so a blown storage quota reached the route as a
bare Error and the v2 handler recovered the status by substring-matching the
message. Any rewording silently demoted a 413 to a 500.

- uploadWorkspaceFile rethrows a classified failure untouched and attaches cause
  to the generic wrap.
- FileConflictError is now an OrchestrationError('conflict'), so a duplicate name
  classifies like every other conflict. Its 'FILE_EXISTS' discriminator had no
  readers and is gone; the instanceof checks elsewhere still hold.
- The v2 upload handler uses v2CaughtOrchestrationError, dropping all three
  string matches.

Also documents that bulk-archive is best-effort: unknown or already-archived ids
are skipped rather than failing the call, and deletedItems is what actually
happened. That asymmetry with the single-id DELETE was undocumented.

* feat(api): add search, filtering, and sorting to the v2 list endpoints (#6189)

* feat(api): add search, filtering, and sorting to the v2 list endpoints

One convention across every v2 list, documented on lib/api/contracts/v2/shared.ts:
`search` (case-insensitive substring on the resource's natural name field),
`sortBy` + `sortOrder` (per-resource enum, never a free string), and enumerated
resource-specific filters. Reuses the sortBy/sortOrder pair v2 logs and v2
knowledge-documents already ship rather than inventing a third dialect
alongside the Logs filters and the Tables predicate grammar.

Every filter and sort is pushed into SQL. GET /api/v2/files previously read the
whole scope and sorted/sliced it in JS; it now goes through a new
queryWorkspaceFiles that filters, orders, and bounds the page in one query.

Cursors are stamped with the sort they were minted under, so replaying one
under a different sort is a 400 instead of silently duplicated or skipped rows.

* fix(api): validate v2 cursor key values and compare timestamps at ms precision

Two review findings, fixed at the root by making a keyset key own its cursor
codec instead of hand-writing a decoder per sort.

Cursor key values are caller-controlled, and matching the sort stamp and key
count was not enough: an unparseable timestamp or a non-numeric size reached
the query as an Invalid Date or NaN and surfaced as a 500. Each key now type-
checks its own value and rejects a cursor it cannot hold, which both routes
render as the documented 400.

Timestamp keys now order and compare on date_trunc('milliseconds', col).
Postgres keeps microseconds and defaultNow() populates them, but a cursor value
round-trips through a millisecond-only JS Date — comparing the raw column
against the truncated value re-admitted the page's own last row, duplicating it
and stalling pagination outright at a page size of one. Reachable today via
workspace_files.updated_at, which insertFileMetadata leaves to defaultNow().

* feat(api): complete the v2 workflows resource with versions and CRUD (#6184)

* feat(api): complete the v2 workflows resource with versions and CRUD

Adds version listing/detail plus create, update, and delete to the v2
workflows surface, which previously covered only execution and deployment.

- GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/versions — cursor-paginated, newest first
- GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/versions/[version] — version + pinned state
- POST /api/v2/workflows, PATCH and DELETE /api/v2/workflows/[id]

All six delegate to the existing orchestration and persistence helpers;
no new domain logic.

* fix(api): check folder containment before lock state; reject malformed version cursors

assertFolderMutable walks a folder's ancestor chain without filtering on
workspace, so inspecting it before containment let a caller tell a locked
folder in someone else's workspace (423) from a nonexistent one (400).
Create and update now assert containment first, matching the ordering
import-workflow.ts already uses.

A version cursor that decodes to JSON without a numeric version filtered
every row out and returned an empty page with nextCursor null, which reads
as a clean end-of-list. Malformed cursors are now a 400.

* refactor(api): page workflow versions in the persistence helper

listWorkflowVersions read every version row and the route filtered and
sliced the result in memory, so the response was bounded but the query
was not. It now takes optional limit/afterVersion, turning the cursor
into a real keyset query; the route asks for limit + 1 and only trims
the has-more probe. Both params are optional, so the internal, v1 admin,
and copilot callers are unchanged.

Also restores the untouched GET handler in [id]/route.ts to its original
formatting — collapsing its signature had re-indented the whole body and
buried the actual additions in whitespace churn.

* feat(api): expand v2 tables with stateless multipart transfers (#6188)

* feat(api): expand the public v2 tables surface

Adds 16 operations so a v2 caller can do what the internal surface can:
rename/move/lock a table, restore it, manage saved views, run enrichment
columns, look up rows, and import/export with observable job control.

Extracts lib/table/orchestration/import.ts (performTableCsvImport,
performCreateTableFromCsv) and lib/table/export-stream.ts from the
first-party routes, then repoints those routes at them, so v1 and v2
cannot drift on what an import or export actually does.

events/stream, metadata and dispatches stay internal — they are editor
state, not public API.

* fix(api): make v2 table PATCH all-or-nothing and name the lock in every 423

Greptile P1: PATCH applied locks, rename and move as three sequential
transactions, so a folder rejected mid-request left the earlier writes
persisted while the response reported failure — and the schema-changed
signal was skipped, leaving open clients on stale state. Every rejectable
condition now runs before the first write, and the signal fires whenever
anything did land.

Cursor: v2TableLockError dropped the lock kind, so async import, column
run, enrichment and table mutations returned a bare LOCKED. A table has
four independent locks, so the caller could not tell which to clear.

* fix(api): report the lock kind on classified 423s too, not just thrown ones

The previous commit named the lock only where the rejection was thrown and
caught at the route boundary. Where it instead arrives as a classified
`errorCode: 'locked'` outcome — delete table, delete row, update column,
and the table mutations — the kind was dropped, so those 423s stayed
unactionable while their neighbours improved.

The orchestration results now carry `lock`, and a shared
`v2TableOrchestrationError` renders both arrival paths into the same
`{ code, message, details: { lock } }` body. `details` is omitted rather
than sent null when the kind is unknown, so a caller branching on it sees
absence instead of a phantom value.

* fix(api): make async table imports observable, not just startable

`POST /import-async` pointed callers at `GET /api/v2/tables/jobs` to track
progress, but that endpoint filters to `type = 'export'` — imports are
derived onto the table itself, one write job at a time, and exports get a
separate list precisely because they are excluded from that derivation.
The public Table shape omitted those derived fields, so an async import
could be started and cancelled but never observed to completion, failure,
or progress. That is the gap the import/export/job-control set was meant
to close.

Table now carries `job` — id, type, status, rowsProcessed, error, or null
when idle — and the import-async docs point at the table rather than the
export list.

* feat(api): make v2 table PATCH state which operations landed on failure

Greptile held the PR at 4/5 on the residual non-atomicity and named two
acceptable resolutions: make PATCH atomic, or have the contract adopt and
expose partial-success explicitly. Atomicity would mean threading one
transaction through renameTable, moveTableToFolder and updateTableLocks —
three shared service functions with four non-test callers including the
first-party route and two copilot tools — and deferring their per-operation
audits to commit time. That is a refactor of shared write paths well
outside this PR.

So the contract states it instead. Every rejectable condition is already
pre-validated, so a failure here is a genuine fault; when one follows a
successful operation the error now carries `details.applied` listing what
is live. Absent when nothing applied, so its presence always means "these
changes took effect despite the error". Documented on the operation.

`v2ErrorForOrchestration` gained the optional `details` this needs.

* fix(api): make table lock flags read-only on the public v2 surface

The new PATCH /api/v2/tables/[tableId] accepted a `locks` object, gated
on workspace admin plus the table-locks feature. That still lets an API
key clear the guard placed there to stop it: `write` is the floor for
the endpoint, and admin keys are ordinary API keys, so a lock is no
longer a boundary the key cannot cross.

Locks stay readable on the table resource and enforcement is unchanged
(a locked verb still returns 423). Changing one is now a first-party
admin action only.

The v2 body is declared here rather than reusing the first-party
updateTableBodySchema, which keeps its `locks` field so the UI can still
toggle them. It is .strict(), so a request carrying `locks` is rejected
with a 400 naming the field instead of silently succeeding without
applying it.

* fix(api): keep reporting applied operations when the PATCH re-read fails

The composite table PATCH promises that `error.details.applied` names the
operations that are live despite an error, but `applied` was scoped
inside the try. A rename or move that committed and was then followed by
a throw in the final re-read — or a re-read finding the table archived —
returned a bare 500/404 with no details, telling the caller nothing had
landed. It would then retry into a duplicate-name conflict or repeat the
move.

`applied` is now function-scoped so every post-write exit carries it: the
404 on a missing re-read, a thrown lock error, a classified orchestration
error, and the generic 500. `v2TableLockError` gains the same
`extraDetails` parameter `v2TableOrchestrationError` already had.

* feat(api): add workflow group writes to the v2 tables surface

v2 exposed GET /groups but none of the writes, so the public API could
run an enrichment or workflow column and read its binding, but never
create one. A caller could add a plain data column and trigger the
machine; wiring the two together still required the UI.

Adds POST/PATCH/DELETE on /api/v2/tables/[tableId]/groups. The group is
the unit that fills columns — one group feeds several — so creating one
creates its output columns in the same call, matching the first-party
shape rather than inverting it onto the column endpoint.

Four departures from the first-party body, all public-surface concerns:
- group.id is optional and server-generated. The UI mints an id to render
  optimistically; a public caller has no such need and a client-chosen id
  is a collision waiting to happen.
- outputColumns[].workflowGroupId is dropped from the body and stamped
  from the resolved group, so it cannot disagree with it.
- autoRun defaults to false. First-party defaults true so a UI add fills
  cells immediately; here it would make one POST fan out a metered run
  across every existing row.
- A group naming neither a workflowId (type manual) nor an enrichmentId
  (type enrichment) is a 400 rather than a half-specified group the route
  has to guess about.

Also rejects an outputColumns entry no group output feeds — the two
arrays are joined by column name, and the first-party client builds both
from one picker so it cannot desync, but a public caller can.

Workspace containment on workflowId is asserted before it is persisted,
on create and on any update that re-points the group; without it a table
becomes a way to invoke workflows the key cannot otherwise reach.

* improvement(api): make v2 table import and export async-only

Drops the three synchronous entry points: POST /tables/[tableId]/import,
POST /tables/import-csv, and GET /tables/[tableId]/export.

Sync import tied a write to the lifetime of an HTTP request. The body
*was* the data, so it carried a 10 MB cap that Next silently truncates
past — a partial import reporting success. It also had no job, so a
timeout mid-write left rows in place with nothing to poll and nothing to
cancel. The async path reads the file from storage instead: upload via
POST /api/v2/files for a key, start with POST /import-async, watch
GET /tables/[tableId] -> job, stop with POST /job/cancel.

Sync export carried no such hazard, but one shape per operation beats
two: with both removed the surface has exactly one way to move a table
in or out, and the CLI wraps the extra calls.

This also removes the last multipart handling in v2 tables. Those were
the only routes bypassing parseRequest — form fields were parsed by hand
against separate form schemas, outside the contract system every other
v2 write goes through.

Create-a-table-from-CSV is now two calls: POST /tables, then
/import-async with createColumns. csvImportModeSchema is append|replace,
so there is no single-call create.

Route baseline 1064 -> 1061.

* docs(api): correct the import-async note about upload size limits

The docstring claimed there is no synchronous upload endpoint and so no
request-body size cliff. Both are wrong: POST /api/v2/files is a
synchronous multipart upload with a 100 MB cap, and it is the only v2
upload path (presigned is deliberately absent).

What async-only actually bought: the cap went 10 MB -> 100 MB, it fails
on an explicit size check and a bounded body read rather than a proxy cap
that silently truncates, authorization completes before any body is
buffered, and the table write is a job that can be watched and cancelled.

* feat(api): unify file and table transfers

* improvement(api): make multipart transfers stateless

* fix(api): make table import completion retries idempotent

* feat(v2-tables): paginate the table list

`GET /api/v2/tables` returned every table in the workspace in one response —
it used the cursor envelope but hardcoded `nextCursor: null`, and had no
`limit`. That was defensible when tables were only created through the UI;
`POST /api/v2/tables` is public now, so a script can create them in bulk and
the list has no way to ask for less.

Adds `queryTables` alongside `listTables` rather than changing it, so the
internal callers that genuinely want the whole scope are untouched — the same
split `queryWorkspaceFiles` / `listWorkspaceFiles` already uses. Filter, order
and slice all run in the query, so a `search` never costs a full-workspace read.

A cursor whose values don't bind raises a validation error instead of being
coerced to "no filter", which would have silently served page 1 under a resumed
cursor. The keyset closes on `id` so a page boundary inside a run of equal names
or timestamps stays stable.

The shared `LimitQuery` doc component said "Maximum rows to return"; it now
serves the table list too, so the wording is resource-neutral.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(api): add multipart knowledge document uploads

* fix(api): keep usage admission at knowledge upload session creation

* feat(knowledge): wire knowledge base uploads to multipart sessions

* fix(knowledge): refuse to abort an upload once a document is bound

* fix(uploads): prevent multipart cleanup races

* Unify file creation and signed upload sessions (#6264)

* feat(uploads): unify signed upload sessions

* fix(uploads): preserve attachment storage semantics

* feat(files): add authored file creation

* fix(uploads): omit hoisted S3 metadata headers

* feat(api): add file metadata endpoint

* improvement(api): scope folders to resource paths (#6284)

* improvement(api): scope folders to resource paths

* fix(files): serialize folder resolution with uploads

* fix(files): release folder lock before upload setup

* fix(api): normalize folder paths and unblock resource mutations

* fix(api): make resource cleanup and metadata consistent

* improvement(uploads): persist multipart sessions in postgres

* fix(db): store table row trigger timestamps in UTC

* improvement(api): default folder deletion to non-recursive

* fix(billing): unify chat usage source

* improvement(logs): expose trace spans on log detail

* fix(logs): parse list trace spans

* improvement(api): replace workflow jobs with execution resources (#6294)

* improvement(api): replace workflow jobs with execution resources

* fix(api): preserve legacy jobs while preferring v2 executions

* fix(api): make execution polling resume-aware

* fix(ui): hide async examples for public workflows

* fix(api): bridge resume queue visibility lag

* feat(api): add v2 workflow resume endpoint

* fix(api): project pending resume attempts

* fix(api): prefer terminal logs over stale resumes

* improvement(api): unify v2 resource query layers (#6319)

* improvement(api): unify v2 resource query layers

* fix(api): address v2 review findings

* fix(api): preserve cancelled queue status

* fix(api): guard cancelled job transitions

* fix(api): close v2 resume and log gaps

* feat(api): rename v2 executions to runs

* feat(api): split credentials and secrets

* feat(api): add workspace metadata and email attribution

* improvement(api): consolidate public v2 route handling

* improvement(files): centralize operations across APIs and Copilot (#6392)

* improvement(files): unify rename authorization

* chore(skills): add file operation migration guide

* improvement(files): consolidate file operation authorization

* improvement(files): extract shared operation foundation

* improvement(api): simplify internal route declarations

* improvement(files): centralize application authorization

* refactor(api): share workspace file name validation

* refactor(files): centralize copilot application calls

* docs(skills): generalize application operation migration

* improvement(api): centralize remaining v2 resource operations (#6412)

* improvement(api): centralize v2 resource operations

* fix(api): preserve custom tool conflict errors

* improvement(api): migrate policy-sensitive v2 reads (#6410)

* improvement(workflows): centralize v2 application operations (#6411)

* refactor(api): migrate v2 knowledge operations (#6413)

* refactor(api): migrate v2 knowledge operations

* fix(knowledge): fail upload completion on dispatch errors

* fix(knowledge): preserve upload retry and VFS errors

* improvement(tables): centralize v2 application operations (#6414)

* improvement(tables): centralize v2 application operations

* fix(tables): preserve run validation and signals

* feat(auth): add scoped internal executor delegation (#6459)

* feat(auth): add scoped internal executor delegation

* fix(auth): derive delegation lifetime from one timestamp

* Include share status in file metadata

* feat(auth): centralize delegated identity policy (#6462)

* improvement(copilot): consolidate application adapters (#6450)

* improvement(api): harden application route boundaries (#6451)

* improvement(api): harden application route boundaries

* fix(folders): reject creates at workspace cap

* fix(knowledge): enforce trusted workspace scope (#6452)

* fix(knowledge): enforce trusted workspace scope

* refactor(knowledge): declare v2 body lifecycle

* finish knowledge application migration

* refactor(knowledge): compose copilot batch commands

* fix(knowledge): parse connector query flags

* fix(knowledge): finalize partial batch effects

* fix(knowledge): align merged application boundaries

* fix(knowledge): close application boundary review gaps

* style(knowledge): satisfy branch biome checks

* fix(knowledge): page connector documents in editor

* refactor: enforce Copilot table application boundary (#6453)

* refactor: enforce copilot table application boundary

* fix(tables): finish application boundary migration

* fix(tables): restore scoped copilot imports

* fix(tables): compose copilot commands atomically

* fix(tables): preserve workflow group scheduling

* fix(tables): complete fixed copilot composition

* fix(tables): reject enrichment output mutation

* fix(tables): complete authorized application boundary

* fix(workflows): migrate Copilot application boundary (#6455)

* fix(workflows): migrate Copilot application boundary

* fix(workflows): finish delegated application migration

* fix(workflows): encode VFS folder aliases

* fix(workflows): close application composition gaps

* fix(workflows): preserve VFS validation errors

* fix(workflows): complete application boundary migration

* test(workflows): format canonical binding coverage

* fix(workflows): scope executor metadata reads

* fix(workflows): bind executor metadata targets

* improvement(skills): align application operation guidance (#6532)

* feat(api): expose v2 resource owners

* fix(api): distinguish visible resource authorization failures (#6537)

* feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts (#6509)

* feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts

* fix(api): preserve string boolean wire defaults

* fix(api): document file download headers

* fix(docs): use TypeScript CLI with Next.js

* fix(docs): avoid client-rendered theme script

* fix(api): document departed audit default

* feat(api): replace legacy core docs with v2

* feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts

* feat(api): refine generated v2 OpenAPI docs

* fix(docs): align localized v2 execution examples

* fix(ci): restore Helm diff and sync audit mock

* fix CI regressions after staging merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Waleed <walif6@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theodoreqili@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Siddharth Ganesan <33737564+Sg312@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 05:45:25 -04:00
245ad1bd46 feat(workflows): new workflow block card, progress indicator, colors, dsl for natural language preview, retry configs (#6458)
* improvement(workflow): refine canvas interactions and rendering

* fix(workflow): keep outputs on the right, focus newly created blocks

Connection anchors: an output now always leaves a card from the right.
The cursor swell lets a drag start on any edge, but the left side is the
input, so anchoring an outgoing edge there drew a line out of the input
port and read as a second input. `normalizeCursorSourceHandleId` resolves
every drag to the right anchor, `normalizePositionedSourceHandleId`
collapses `source-left` alongside the legacy vertical anchors (so data
from the API, an older client, or a stale save self-heals on load), and
only the right-side source anchor is mounted.

Drops in `onConnectEnd` are always source -> target. The branch that
reversed the edge for a drag starting on an input could never run: the
`target` handle is `isConnectableStart={false}` and the positioned side
anchors are `isConnectable={false}`, so React Flow never reports an input
as a drag origin. Removed it and its now-unused imports.

A newly created block is centered once its node mounts and is measured,
so a card added from a drag-release, the block menu, or the toolbar is
never left off-screen or under the editor panel.

The editor panel's block icon uses the same type accent as the card's
badge instead of the block's legacy `bgColor`, which had left the panel
on the old per-integration brand colours.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(workflow): floor header-only card height, adopt brand tag palette

The Start card intermittently collapsed after load, squashing the
action-menu tab so its icon row sat over the card.

`.workflow-drag-handle` is the host the border renderer measures, and both
it and the header row took their height from `blockHeight && blockHeight >
0`. `blockHeight` comes from the deterministic-dimensions pass and is
already floored at MIN_PAINTED_HEIGHT (48), but it is absent on the first
frames — and with no floor the host collapsed to its natural content
height (25.5px for a header-only trigger, exactly the title's line box).
The border builds its perimeter from `host.offsetHeight`, so that window
painted a sub-floor card: too little straight edge remained on the
vertical runs for the action-menu tab, which collapsed into the corner
arcs. Whether you saw it depended purely on whether the dimension publish
had landed, which is why it reproduced on one workflow and not another.

Floor all three: the host, the header row (so `items-center` centres the
title and type tag rather than pinning them to the top), and the border's
own `offsetHeight` read.

Also raise ACTION_MENU_CONTENT_READY_THRESHOLD to 0.9. At 0.8 the 24px
icon row was revealed while the swell had only reached 22.4px of its 28px
— shorter than the row it contains. Secondary to the above, but a real
overflow window on its own. The test now pins the ratio rather than the
constant.

Tag palette moves to fixed brand values (hex, not derived oklch) with two
inks — #F8F8F8 on dark fills, #1A1A1A on light. Tones are renamed to match
what they render. `green` (2.55:1) and `orange` (3.15:1) sit under WCAG AA
against their paired ink; both are deliberate brand decisions and are
documented in the component.

Deploy and Run take two new Button variants rather than className
overrides, so `tertiary` stays green everywhere else.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(workflow): polish workflow canvas interactions

* fix(workflow): restyle loop drop target outline

* fix(workflow): shorten human block catalog label

* fix(workflow): canonicalize realtime edge handles

* code cleanup

* sizing fixes

* improvement(blocks): sentencify every block

* change tebse

* improvement(workflow): land notes UI and execution progress, consolidate duplicates

Ports the notes canvas editing and execution progress-indicator work, then
removes the parallel paths it arrived with so each concern has one owner.

Fixes found while consolidating:

- Note height was measured while the card was expanded to NOTE_EXPANDED_WIDTH,
  where text re-wraps shorter, and published as the node's compact height. The
  collapse then animated to a height never measured at the compact width.
- The edge pulse glow filter used the default objectBoundingBox units, so a
  straight horizontal edge — what an auto-laid-out chain produces — resolved the
  filter region to zero height and stopped the glow rendering entirely.
- A subflow's inner Start pill still read isNodeSelected while its border read
  usesSelectedVisuals, so the two disagreed during execution.
- The Run/Stop button's disabled prop gated only Run while its handler cancelled
  unconditionally, offering a Stop the cancel route answers with 403.

Consolidated:

- One note editor. The view's built-in textarea was unreachable in production
  (the app always injects the markdown editor) and was kept alive only by tests
  asserting against it; renderContentEditor is now required.
- onBlur/onCancel collapse to onEndEditing — content persists per keystroke, so
  there was never a draft for a cancel path to discard.
- DEFAULT_NOTE_COLOR, the note height bounds, the note content reader and the
  card width each had two or three definitions; each now has one.
- Removed with zero consumers: graphite/graphiteSubtle button variants,
  data-subflow-selected, inputPlaceholderClassName, an effect that could never
  fire, and getNoteColorOption's unreachable fallbacks.

Restores the role='status' announcement the progress rewrite dropped, and hardens
isNoteColor against inherited Object keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(workflow): reuse the platform markdown editor in notes

Notes carried their own TipTap wiring — a second markdown editor that
reimplemented, more thinly, what `RichMarkdownField` already does for the skill
modal, skill fields and the deploy version description. It is now a ~20 line
skin: the Note supplies its type scale and per-colour selection tint, and the
field supplies the extension set, frontmatter held out-of-band, the round-trip
safety gate and its raw-source fallback, and markdown paste.

`RichMarkdownField` gains two additive props, both defaulting to today's
behaviour so the file editor is untouched: `surface` ('field' | 'bare') and
`proseClassName`. All three existing consumers pass an explicit `minHeight` and
no `surface`, so they take the original path unchanged.

Exiting the note editor moved to the card, because the editor's `/` and `@`
menus consume Escape to close themselves and ProseMirror checks `editorProps`
before plugin handlers — intercepting it inside the editor would have broken
both menus. The card now honours Escape only when nothing already consumed it,
which also let `onEndEditing` leave the injection contract.

The note editor is lazy now, matching every other consumer: it was pulling
TipTap and the full extension set into the canvas's initial chunk.

Also:

- One `areRunFromBlockDependenciesSatisfied`. The ActionBar, the canvas context
  menu and the run-from-block handler each carried a byte-identical copy, and
  the handler expressed the snapshot requirement differently, so the affordance
  and the action could disagree. Each copy also re-scanned `edges` once per
  incoming edge, on every ActionBar on the canvas.
- Reduced motion is one `usePrefersReducedMotion` in @sim/emcn rather than a
  sixth ad-hoc `matchMedia`. The edge pulse now stops rendering instead of
  hiding: `motion-reduce:hidden` is `display: none`, which left four SMIL
  timelines running per edge.
- The pulse glow bleed covers the canvas minimum zoom. The strokes are
  `non-scaling-stroke`, so the 6px tail spans 3/zoom user units — 30 at 0.1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(workflow): port canvas styling from workflow-updates

Ports the 14 styling commits your colleague added since the last sync, leaving
the ~68 staging PRs on that branch alone — those are platform/core work, not
this. Cherry-picked individually rather than merged so each conflict was small
enough to reason about.

What came in:

- Core block colors unify behind a two-level map: block type -> semantic role
  -> accent, replacing the flat per-type table. Adds `purple` and `content`
  tones to ChipTag, and a shared `WorkflowTypeIcon` that replaces the
  hand-rolled ChipTag + accent lookup at each discovery surface.
- Native triggers take semantic colors; the deployments block moves to the
  shared Rocket icon and drops its now-unused `iconColor`.
- Running-state polish: loader artwork and position, stop hover in dark mode,
  the loader blended into the execution swell, and tooltips suppressed for
  actions that are hidden mid-run.
- The toolbar drag preview clones the rendered icon container instead of
  rebuilding a bgColor tile, so it matches what the canvas paints.
- The sidebar shows route-derived workspace identity instead of a skeleton
  while the full record loads.

Conflict resolutions worth knowing:

- The running-loader artwork went through the shared `Loader` and back to the
  custom SVG on their branch; the second commit is the intent, so that is what
  landed — keeping our `role='status'` announcement layered on top.
- Two commits carried the lucide-react -> in-house icon migration along with
  them. That migration is a staging change we have not taken, so our imports
  stayed on lucide: adopting it in two files would leave the icon set split
  across the app.
- `getMappedWorkflowTypeAccent` referenced a constant their refactor removed.
  It had no consumers left once the search modal moved to `WorkflowTypeIcon`,
  and their branch deletes it too, so it is gone here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(workflow): make the subflow Start swell a real connection source

Dragging an edge into whitespace opens the add-block picker, but starting that
drag from a loop/parallel Start pill did nothing: the pill's border swell was
visual-only. Regular blocks and the container's own exit mint a draggable
cursor handle from their swell; the pill rendered only its invisible 14px
static strip, so grabbing the glowing affordance started no connection at all.

Everything downstream already worked and was nearly unreachable:
- the drop hit-test skips subflow containers, so a release inside the loop
  opens the picker there (z 2000, above containers)
- handleToolbarDrop parents the new block into the container at the drop point
- it already carries the exact boundary rule for this source: a container
  start handle only wires to a child of that container

The pill now runs the same cursor-handle machinery as the container view, with
one deliberate difference: its temporary handle carries the branch-cursor form
of the start id. The plain cursor id normalizes by block type — for a
container that is `loop-end-source`/`parallel-end-source`, the exit — so a
swell drag from Start would have persisted as an edge leaving the container.
The branch form passes `loop-start-source`/`parallel-start-source` through
normalization verbatim on both the picker and direct-connect paths; a test
pins that contract.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(notes): stop the field's prose classes recoloring bare-surface editing

Opening a note for editing shifted the text and turned it black: the
ProseMirror root unconditionally carried `rich-markdown-prose
rich-markdown-field-prose`, which pin the field's own ink and type ramp —
`--text-primary` at 15px/25px, then 14px/22px — overriding the card's
`text-current` at 14px/20px the moment the editor mounted.

`surface='bare'` means the host owns typography (the Note card mirrors its
rendered view via `proseClassName`), so on that surface the root now carries no
shared prose classes. The field surface is untouched. Edit mode inherits the
note colour's ink — including the caret — and sits on the same metrics as the
read view.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(workflow): give the in-flight connection line contrast inside containers

The drag line was drawn but camouflaged: its default stroke was the
resting-edge grey (#e0e0e0), which disappears against a loop body's opaque
`--surface-3` fill (~1.1:1) — so dragging an edge inside any container, nested
included, showed nothing. The z-order was never the problem; the connection
line layer already sits above every node.

The default token is now `--text-muted`, one value with contrast on every
canvas surface, still lighter than the `selected` variant so the variant
hierarchy holds. No per-surface special-casing.

Resting edges inside containers share the same camouflage (`--workflow-edge` on
`--surface-3`) — left alone deliberately: recoloring placed edges is a design
decision, not a bug fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(notes): match edit mode to the read view, and land the caret where clicked

Three defects, all from the read and edit views being built independently.

1. Blocks jumped up ~12px on entering edit mode. Streamdown wraps its output in
   a container carrying `space-y-4` plus first/last margin resets, which outrank
   the per-element margins in NOTE_COMPONENTS — so that wrapper, not those
   margins, is what the read view actually paints. The editor had no equivalent.
   The rhythm is now named (NOTE_MARKDOWN_FLOW), passed to Streamdown
   explicitly so a dependency upgrade cannot move the read view out from under
   the editor, and mirrored on the ProseMirror root. Tailwind's JIT only sees
   literal strings so the mirror cannot be composed from the constant; a test
   pins the two together instead, and fails if either side drifts.

2. The caret was barely visible: it inherited the note's 75%-opacity ink. The
   palette owns per-colour chrome, so it now names the caret alongside the
   selection tint.

3. The caret always landed at the document end. The read view sits under a
   full-bleed overlay that must swallow the click to enter editing, so the
   point never reached the editor and `autofocus: 'end'` was all that was left.
   The view now forwards that point and the field resolves it through
   `posAtCoords` on create — after the DOM is laid out, which `autofocus`
   cannot wait for. Keyboard activation carries no point and still lands at the
   end.

`autoFocusAt` is additive on the shared field and defaults to null, so the file
editor and the other three consumers are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(workflow): stop edges rendering behind top-level subflows

Containers are z-indexed by nesting depth, so a top-level subflow is 0. Edges
derived their z from their parent container — `+1`, or 0 with no parent — so a
root-level edge landed on exactly the same z as a root-level subflow. Equal
z-index falls back to DOM order, and React Flow paints the nodes layer after
the edges layer, so the container's opaque body won: any edge crossing a
top-level loop or parallel was drawn behind it, in-flight or persisted.

Edges now sit in their own band above the whole container scale and below
cards, keeping both the deeper-container-wins ordering and the rule that a line
always passes behind card chrome. This is why the edge became visible only once
a block was dropped: the new block is selected, and an edge inside the
container was already `containerZ + 1`, clear of the tie.

The in-flight connection line is declared in the same scale rather than
inheriting React Flow's stylesheet default of 1001, which is both below a
selected container child and outside the scale this file owns. Its stroke moves
to `--text-secondary`, the token the canvas already uses for an active edge —
the previous `--workflow-edge` grey is ~1.1:1 against a subflow body.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(notes): paste and drop images through the workspace-file pipeline

Traced the file editor's image path end to end and reused it verbatim rather
than minting a note-specific source: insertImages -> useUploadWorkspaceFile ->
POST /api/workspaces/{id}/files/presigned -> direct-to-S3 PUT -> workspace_files
row -> the editor persists the workspace-scoped
/api/workspaces/{id}/files/inline URL, which the serve route authorizes by
workspace membership and the embedded-image-ref machinery already recognizes
for share rewriting and referenced-by-doc tracking.

The shared field gains an optional `uploadImage(file) -> {url, alt} | null`
capability. With it, image paste/drop uploads sequentially and inserts each at
the evolving position, mirroring the file editor's flow, with a bail if the
editor unmounts mid-upload; without it, the existing swallow-guard on file
drops is unchanged, so the skill modal, skill fields and version-description
consumers behave exactly as before. The upload mutation owns its own toasts.

The note host wires the capability with folderId null, so note images land in
the workspace Files root — visible, manageable and deletable there like any
other upload. The note read view renders images through its Streamdown
components map with the card's own sizing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement for notes, subflows

* fix(uploads): surface the server's message when a multipart upload is refused

A file over the 50MB direct-PUT threshold goes through multipart initiate, which
is where the storage quota is enforced — but the client threw away the response
body and reported `Failed to initiate multipart upload: Payload Too Large`. That
is the string the upload mutation puts in its toast, and it names neither which
limit was hit nor by how much, so the one place that answer surfaces didn't have
it.

It now prefers `errorBody.error` exactly as `getPresignedUploadInfo` already does
on the single-PUT path, and passes the body through as the error's details.
Control flow is unchanged: still throws, still `MULTIPART_ERROR`, and the
cloud-storage-absent branch above still claims its 400 first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(notes): restore GFM in the note read view

Streamdown's `remarkPlugins` prop REPLACES its default plugin list rather than
extending it, and remark-gfm is one of those defaults. The note passed
`[remarkBreaks]` — so the read view silently lost every GFM construct: task
lists, tables, strikethrough and autolinks.

The editor writes all of them (it has TaskList, TableKit and Strike), so a note
round-tripped through editing came back as raw source the moment editing closed:
`- [x] HELLO` rendered as a disc bullet followed by the literal text `[x] HELLO`.
`NOTE_COMPONENTS` has carried table/thead/tbody/tr/th/td entries this whole time
that could never fire.

Restoring the plugin is only half of it: remark-gfm marks a checklist
`contains-task-list` and emits a native checkbox, which under the note's generic
`ul` styling renders a checkbox sitting behind a disc bullet — the same defect
the editor had before the chrome/typography split. The read view now drops the
marker and indent for a task list, lays the row out as a flex line, and styles
the checkbox to match `.rich-markdown-nodes input[type="checkbox"]` declaration
for declaration, tick clip-path included, so the two views agree either side of a
click.

`remark-gfm` is now a declared dependency of the renderer package rather than one
borrowed transitively from streamdown.

Five tests cover the GFM surface — checked/unchecked boxes, no literal `[x]`, the
marker only dropped for checklists, tables, strikethrough — and four go red with
the plugin removed.

Checked the other three Streamdown call sites (Chat, the chat interface renderer,
the changelog): none override `remarkPlugins`, so none were affected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(canvas): drop dead markers and share the tile-brightness maths

Review pass over the branch against staging.

Dead code removed:
- `tileIconColorClass` in the renderer package — never called; only its
  `isLightTileColor` sibling is.
- `data-connection-selector-search-frost`, `data-workflow-cursor-edge` and
  `data-workflow-cursor-source-side` — written on three elements, read by no
  stylesheet, selector or test.
- `CHIP_TARGET_SELECTOR_TYPES`, `MAX_CHIPS` and `chipPriority` were exported from
  `canvas-rows.ts` but only used inside it.

Consolidated the one real divergence: the renderer package carried a hand-copied
mirror of the app's perceived-brightness maths, because it may not import app
code. The copy had already drifted — it dropped the `white`/`black` keyword
handling, so a block shipping `bgColor: 'white'` would render a white
`currentColor` icon on a white tile on the canvas while every other surface drew
it black. No block ships one today, which is exactly why nothing caught it. The
function now lives in `@sim/utils/color` and both sides import it; only the
0.75 threshold stays local to each.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(canvas): share the z-scale, fix the preview's edge layering, and re-home strays

The preview canvas carried its own z numbers and had the collision the editor
canvas was fixed for: containers at nesting depth, top-level cards at an implicit
0, and edges at 0/5/10 by execution status — so a default edge tied with a
top-level subflow and painted behind it, while a success edge painted over
unselected cards.

The scale now lives once, in `@sim/workflow-renderer/canvas-layers`, and both
canvases read it. The preview keeps its status ordering, expressed inside the
shared edge band rather than as a second set of magic numbers.

Placement and duplication:

- `perceivedBrightness` moved to `@sim/utils/color`, with its unit test, and its
  consumers import it directly. It had been re-exported through
  `lib/colors/brightness.ts`, and the renderer package kept a hand-copy.
- `filterAcyclicEdges`/`wouldCreateCycle` were pass-through wrappers in the
  workflow store's utils over the real implementations in `@sim/workflow-types`.
  Deleted; the three consumers import the source.
- `lib/ui/glass-surface.ts` was a one-constant, one-consumer app-wide module, and
  its consumer then aliased it a second time. Collapsed into the navbar shell.
- `nested-subflow-node` was set on nested container nodes in both canvases with no
  stylesheet, selector or test behind it.

`packages/workflow-renderer` now has its own vitest config, so the four mount
tests for its components live with the components instead of in
`apps/sim/lib/workflows/**`. That immediately earned its keep: `apps/sim`
excludes test files from type-check, and once these were checked, tsc found three
`SubflowNodeView` renders being handed a `renderContentEditor` prop it does not
accept — a copy-paste from the note cases that had been silently ignored.

Verified: type-check 23/23, 21,143 app tests + 49 renderer + 147 utils, biome
clean, all 23 audits pass (`check:bare-icons` imported the moved helper and was
repointed).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix field noun bug + notes

* fix(notes): let a note service the canvas actions the panel editor cannot

The panel editor clears any note put in front of it and renders nothing, but the
block menu still routed Rename and Open Editor through it.

Rename latched the editor's rename state onto the note — `handleStartRename`
reads the store directly, so it saw the id the menu had just set — and nothing
reset it when the clear ran. `handleSaveRename` writes to `renamingBlockIdRef`,
so the header went on showing a rename field over whatever was selected next and
saved that name to the note. Open Editor was a plain no-op that opened an empty
pane.

Rename now goes to the card, which expands and opens its own title — the same
menu-to-card routing Add Image already used, so both events now live in one
`lib/workflows/notes/canvas-requests.ts` and `add-image.ts` keeps only its
markdown concern. Open Editor is hidden for notes.

The panel editor also drops any rename whose block stops being the selected one.
That is belt-and-braces for notes now, but it closes the same hole for ordinary
blocks, where only the input's blur ended a rename and blur only fires if it held
focus. A rename interrupted that way is now discarded rather than left pending.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(canvas): author sentences for Snowflake and Mintlify, repoint Instagram's

Staging's two new integrations shipped without a `canvasPresentation`, so their
39 operations painted the field rows the rest of the canvas has stopped using.

The Instagram break is the more interesting one: staging renamed the insight
metrics subblock `metrics` -> `insightMetrics` while this branch was adding
sentences that named `metrics`. Both hunks merged cleanly — the union check
reports the file as an exact union — and the result was two clauses pointing at
a field that no longer exists, which resolves to nothing with no error and no
log. Only `check:canvas-sentences` sees it.

Two Snowflake sentences say something the block does not do, so they anchor
elsewhere: `taskName` filters `list_task_runs`/`get_task_run` rather than keying
them, and `table` filters `introspect_schema` — blank means "every one", not "not
filled in yet", and a core chip would have claimed otherwise.

Coverage is back to 4727/4727 operations across 321/321 blocks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(canvas): keep the block-type tag naming its type after a rename

The header tag dropped its label whenever the block's title already said the
same word, so the same block read two ways depending on nothing the user did
deliberately: a freshly dropped Wait showed a bare icon, and its second copy —
auto-named "Wait 2" — showed "Wait". The tag looked like a badge that appeared
on rename rather than a fixed part of the header.

It now always names the type, which is what loop and parallel containers already
do with their own tag, so every card on the canvas reads the same way.

`blockName` was only ever read for that comparison, so the prop is gone rather
than left behind for a future reader to wonder about.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(deploy): compare edge handles by port, not by spelling

Two places answer "does this need redeploying?" and they load their sides
differently. The client diffs the live store against `/api/workflows/[id]/deployed`;
the server diffs the normalized tables against the version's raw jsonb. Only
some of those paths run handles through `loadWorkflowFromNormalizedTables`, so a
snapshot holding a side-anchored id (`source-right`) met a canonical one
(`source`) on the other side and the set comparison read it as every edge being
removed and re-added.

Each answer therefore differed, and they arrive on separate query timelines: the
button reads the client's, the modal badge reads the server's, so the state
flipped between Live and "Update deployment" with whichever query landed last
until both settled.

`normalizeEdge` now canonicalizes both handles, so the comparison cannot tell
two spellings of one port apart no matter how its inputs were loaded. The
existing normalization in `materializeDeploymentState` stays — that path also
feeds React Flow, which needs the handle it mounts to match.

The preview's error port had the mirror problem: it rendered for every
non-trigger block regardless of `errorEnabled`, so a card with no error row grew
a red knob anyway. It now gates the way the editor canvas does, keeping the port
mounted when an error edge already leaves it so React Flow cannot drop that edge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(deploy): stop counting the error flag twice in change detection

`errorEnabled` has two homes. It persists inside the block's `data` jsonb — the
realtime server `jsonb_set`s it there, and load mirrors it back onto the block as
a field — so it reached the diff twice, and only some paths populate the copy.

`setBlockErrorEnabled` writes the mirror alone, so right after toggling the port
the live block said `errorEnabled: true` with `data.errorEnabled: false`, while
the snapshot the deploy had just taken from the tables said true in both. The
diff read the stale `data` and reported the workflow as changed the instant it
finished deploying — then a state refetch rehydrated the block and it agreed
again. That is the flip between Live and "Update deployment": the button and the
modal read two different queries, so each landing swapped the answer. A block
created in-session had the same shape from the other side, its `data` carrying no
key at all against a persisted `false`.

Excluded from `normalizeBlockData` alongside the other fields that are duplicated
out of the block's own state. The block field is still compared on its own, with
`!!`, so absent and `false` agree and turning the flag on is still a change.

Fixing the store to write both homes was the other option and is not taken:
nothing reads the in-memory `data.errorEnabled` (save and load both let the block
field win), so it would add a second copy that only the diff could see — which is
the shape of this bug, not its fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(blocks): give the error-output flag a column instead of two homes

`errorEnabled` had no column, so it persisted inside the block's `data` jsonb
and was mirrored onto the block as a field on load. Every writer had to route
its `data` through `withPersistedErrorEnabled` or silently drop the toggle, the
realtime op `jsonb_set`, and change detection saw the same value twice — which
is what made the deploy badge flip between Live and "Update deployment" after
toggling the port.

Its siblings — `enabled`, `horizontal_handles`, `advanced_mode`, `trigger_mode`,
`locked` — are all boolean columns; `data` is for React Flow and subflow state.
The flag belongs with them, so it now has `error_enabled` and one home. The
shuttle helper, its `BlockData` mirror, the store's fallback read, and the
comparison exclusion the duplication forced are all gone.

Backwards compatibility, since released versions draw the error port with no
toggle in front of it: a block already wired to an error edge HAS the output on,
because there was no other way to draw that edge. That rule is now stated in
three places and none may be narrowed to read the flag alone —

- the migration backfills `error_enabled` from the edges, so live rows are true
  before any new code reads them;
- `materializeDeploymentState` derives it for a version's frozen jsonb, which the
  migration cannot reach — otherwise every workflow deployed before the toggle
  would ask to be redeployed once;
- `workflow-block.tsx` keeps it at render time for states that reach the canvas
  through neither (imports, copilot edits), where unmounting the port would make
  React Flow drop the edge leaving it.

The migration also moves any `data.errorEnabled` a developer created on this
branch onto the column and strips the key; both statements match zero rows in
production, where it never shipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(canvas): realign the Snowflake and Dynatrace sentences with staging's blocks

Both breaks are the class the union check cannot see: separate hunks of the same
file merged cleanly, and the result names fields that no longer exist. A sentence
that does resolves to nothing, with no throw and no log.

Snowflake's rewrite (#6474) moved database, schema, table, warehouse and
procedure onto canonical selector pairs, so seven clauses anchored on ids that
are gone. Each now names both members of its pair, which is also what keeps the
card readable for someone working in advanced mode. Its nine new operations have
sentences.

Dynatrace (#6463) scoped the mute reason to the operations that mute, because
unmuting accepts exactly one — so the two unmute sentences were asking for a
field their card no longer shows. They drop the clause.

Coverage is 4736/4736 operations across 321/321 blocks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): drop the block-data error flag from the workflow contract

Left behind by the consolidation: the flag no longer lives in `data`, and a
schema that still declares it there invites the mirror back through the wire.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(deploy): compare edge handles by port, so a falsy one cannot read as changed

`loadWorkflowFromNormalizedTables` now runs handles through the canonicalizer,
which falsy-coalesces — so an edge persisted with `sourceHandle: ''` loads as no
handle at all. The server diffs that against the deployment version's raw jsonb,
which still has `''`, and the set comparison reads one edge as removed and
another added. Every workflow holding such an edge would ask to be redeployed
the moment this ships, for nothing. Two write paths use `?? null` rather than
`|| null`, so `''` is reachable.

Canonicalized inside `normalizeEdge` rather than at either call site: the two
sides are loaded by different paths and only some of them normalize, so the
comparison has to be unable to tell two spellings of one port apart however its
inputs arrived.

This is the change reverted in 066e18ac28. That revert reasoned only about
side-anchored ids, which are genuinely unreachable — it missed that the same
coalesce collapses the empty string, which is not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(deploy): keep ignoring the error flag's old home in block data

Deploying never converged: the badge asked to redeploy again the moment it
finished, forever.

The flag lived in `data` before it had a column. `0287` moves it, but a migration
only reaches the live tables — every deployment version already written is frozen
jsonb that keeps the old key. The wire schema no longer declares it either, so Zod
strips it from the live state on its way to the client. So the two sides of the
check genuinely differ: live `data: {}` against a snapshot's
`data: {errorEnabled: false}`, reported as `data.errorEnabled` changed. Deploying
cannot fix that — the next snapshot is taken from rows that still carry the key.

Confirmed against a real stuck workflow: 18 versions, both blocks reporting
`data.errorEnabled`, and the same two states comparing equal with this restored.

Removing the exclusion in 7934df7f88 assumed the migration could reach every copy
of the value. It cannot reach a frozen snapshot, so the comparison has to keep
tolerating the old key regardless of where it survives. The block field is still
compared on its own, with `!!`, so the flag itself is not ignored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* revert(deploy): stop tolerating a block-data shape that never shipped

The flag's stint inside `data` began and ended on this branch: `main` and
`staging` have zero mentions of `errorEnabled`, and `ci.yml` gates every deploy
job on a push to main/staging/dev, so opening a PR deploys nothing. No released
version ever wrote the key, which means no production row and no production
deployment snapshot can hold one.

That makes the exclusion permanent code apologizing for a shape that cannot
reach the database it defends. Migration 0287 already strips the key from the
live tables, which is where a one-time data fix belongs; in production it matches
zero rows, and on a developer database it makes the next deploy write a clean
snapshot.

Reverts 5ece9f9e7e. That fix was correct about the mechanism and wrong about the
scope: it read a local database as evidence about production.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): retract bystander cards during a run, slant the sweep mark

Two things about a running canvas.

A run pinned every card's action bar open and suspended every card's hover on
top of it, so the canvas became a wall of open swells that could neither retract
nor respond to a pointer — and the `isWorkflowRunning && !isRunning` hover
treatment already written for those cards was unreachable. Only the card that is
actually running is pinned now; the rest behave as they do at rest, which is what
makes hovering one bring its bar up again.

The sweep's filled slot painted a full 24px square. It now paints a slanted band
across the slot, as a hard-stop gradient rather than a `clip-path` — the two end
slots already carry one for the swell silhouette and a second would have to win a
specificity race with it. The stops hold `--surface-2` exactly, so only the shape
changes. Each variant is spelled out because Tailwind's JIT reads literal class
strings and a composed `hover-hover:${FILL}` compiles to nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): fill the running sweep one way, and tighten its mark

The sweep drained back to empty after each pass, which reads as undoing the
progress the block is making. It fills left to right and starts over. The
direction flag goes with it — the state is just the count now.

The slanted mark also sat too far off its neighbours. Slant and tightness trade
against each other here: the transparent wedge has to be at least as wide as the
edge's horizontal travel, or the cut clips a corner instead of crossing the slot.
Leaning 7° off vertical instead of 17° travels 2.9px across the 24px slot rather
than 7.3px, which brings the wedge in from 26% to 12% — 3.2px a side against
7.8px, so the gap between marks drops from ~17.6px to ~8.4px with the slant
still crossing cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): fill the running bar once, edge to edge

The sweep restarted from empty every time it filled, so the bar kept re-running
ground it had already covered. It fills left to right once and holds.

The mark also sat inset in its slot, which put a gap on both sides of every join
and made the row read as separate chunks instead of one bar. It now spans its
slot edge to edge, leaving only the row's own `gap-[2px]` between marks, and
takes its weight off vertically instead: `bg-clip-content` with symmetric padding
paints a 10px band inside the 24px slot without changing the slot's size, so the
swell measured around it does not move. `--surface-2` is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): paint the running bar as right-leaning uprights

The fill read as a row of horizontal slabs. Each filled slot now paints one
narrow upright bar leaning right, so a run fills as `/ / / /`.

Geometry, since the two constraints fight: leaning the edge 15° off vertical
carries it 4.3px across the bar's 16px height, so the transparent margin has to
stay above 15% or the cut clips a corner instead of crossing top to bottom.
38%/62% leaves a 7px bar with room to spare. Height comes from `bg-clip-content`
plus symmetric padding, which does not change the slot's own size, so the swell
measured around it stays put. `--surface-2` is untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): pitch the running hatch to the row, not to one bar a slot

One bar per 24px button left the rest of the button empty, so the marks
inherited the button grid's rhythm and sat ~19px apart — a row of isolated ticks
rather than a loader.

The fill repeats now, at a pitch that divides the row's own rhythm: a slot plus
its `gap-[2px]` is 26px, so a 13px horizontal pitch puts exactly two bars in
every slot and stays in phase across the gaps, including the 40px end slots.
Bars land every 13px with a uniform 6px between them, whatever the run's length.

Stops are measured along the 105° axis rather than horizontally, so they carry
the `sin(105°)` factor: a 7px bar on a 13px pitch is 6.76px on a 12.56px period.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(canvas): paint the running hatch once across the row, not per slot

The bars came out bunched in some places and spread in others. Per-slot
backgrounds cannot avoid that: each button starts its own gradient at its own
origin, so the phase resets at every slot — and the end slots are 40px against
the others' 24px, so the resets are not even uniform. Three passes of tuning the
stops were all chasing a constraint the approach could not satisfy.

The hatch is now one element spanning the row, so there is one gradient and one
phase. It sits behind the buttons and grows by width: the run/stop button keeps
an opaque fill while running and masks the part growing underneath it, and every
other slot is transparent mid-sweep so the hatch reads through. The slots no
longer paint anything themselves, and the per-slot filled flag goes with them.

`--surface-2` is unchanged; only where it is painted moved.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): close the running hatch's gaps

The hatch ran a 50/50 duty cycle — 6px of fill to 6px of air — which read as
sparse. It now runs 8px to 3px.

Both stops are measured along the 105° axis rather than horizontally, so each
carries a `sin(105°)` factor; the note records that, and that closing the gap
further is a matter of moving the first stop toward the second.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(emcn): drop the brand highlight from popover menus (#6506)

Context menus opted into a palette of their own — `variant='secondary'` for a
brand-blue row highlight and `colorScheme='inverted'` for a dark card — so the
canvas, block, toolbar, terminal, sidebar, and preview menus looked nothing like
the menus everywhere else in the product.

Removes both overrides so they inherit the same surface, border, and
`--surface-active` highlight the terminal's overflow menu already uses, and drops
the brand state from the Popover itself along with the `variant` prop that only
ever selected it. One fewer way to style a menu.

* feat(executor): opt-in per-block retry (#6505)

* feat(executor): opt-in per-block retry

Adds a per-block retry policy, off by default, surfaced in the editor's
additional-fields disclosure alongside the block's other advanced settings.

A block that opts in replays its handler while tries remain, then rethrows the
final error so the error port behaves exactly as it does for a block that never
retried — retrying only delays the existing outcome, never changes it. Retry is
deliberately indiscriminate about the failure, since there is no reliable way to
tell a transient error from a permanent one and classifying would silently do
nothing for the generic errors people turn it on for. Only throws that are not
failures are excluded: a deliberate stop, a child workflow whose own blocks
already ran their policies, and the block types whose throw is control flow
(human-in-the-loop, sentinels, subflow containers, notes, triggers).

Eligibility lives in one predicate read by both the editor and the executor, so
a block can never keep retrying after an edit that hides its control.

`retry` is a nullable jsonb column; NULL means "runs once", which is how every
existing block already behaves, so the change is inert until someone opts in.
Bounds are clamped on read rather than rejected, so a value written before a
bound moved still resolves to something runnable.

Also decouples the additional-fields disclosure from `block.advancedMode`. That
flag decides which member of a canonical pair serializes, so opening the
disclosure used to be able to drop a block's configured credential. Expansion is
now view state; the stored flag is no longer written by the editor.

Retried blocks report their try count on the trace span, shown in log details.

* fix(realtime): allow the write role to persist a block retry policy

`update-retry` was added to the protocol but not to the write-role allowlist, so
the editor applied the change optimistically while the server dropped it and the
policy never reached the database.

Adds a test asserting the write role holds every per-block operation the protocol
declares, so the next block setting cannot repeat this silently.

* fix(editor): keep a retry number field's value when it is blurred untouched

Committing on blur normalized the draft unconditionally, and an untouched field's
draft is null — which normalizes to the default. Focusing and leaving Max tries
silently reset a configured 5 back to 3.

* improvement(canvas): close the running fill to solid, slant its leading edge

Gaps gone entirely: the bar is one solid fill now.

The slant moves onto the growing edge, because a repeat with its gaps closed has
no edges left to show. 4px of run across the 16px height is the same 15° lean the
bars carried, so the fill still leans right — it just leans at its front instead
of throughout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(canvas): return the running fill to the squares' rhythm, sheared

Marks are 24px with the row's 2px gap after them again — the geometry the slots
carried before any of this — so they land where the squares did. The shear is
the only thing that is new.

It stays on the single spanning element rather than going back to per-slot
backgrounds: one gradient means one phase, which is what lets the 24/2 rhythm
hold across the 40px end slots instead of resetting at every boundary.

Stops are measured along the 105° axis rather than horizontally, so both carry a
`sin(105°)` factor: 24px of mark is 23.18px of stop, and the 26px pitch is
25.11px of period. Writing 24/26 directly renders ~3.5% wide and drifts out of
the squares' rhythm across the row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(canvas): trim the running fill to the swell's tapered end

The fill ran off the block. The row is a rectangle but the swell is not — its
last slot cuts a diagonal so the shape narrows toward the top, and a rectangular
overlay therefore painted past the gray edge up there while still sitting inside
it at the bottom. The per-slot version never showed this because each button's
own clip contained its fill; moving the paint onto one spanning element took that
containment away with it.

The overlay now carries the same taper, read off that slot's own path: 16.67px in
from the row's right at the overlay's top, 3.33px at its bottom, a slope of 20/24.
Only applied to the swell variant, which is the shape that tapers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(canvas): stop the handoff highlight pinning a bystander's toolbar open

Dropping `isWorkflowRunning` from `forceOpen` was not enough: it also read
`usesSelectedVisuals`, which is `isNodeSelected || isExecutionHighlighted`, and
the handoff highlight covers the block feeding the running one. So the upstream
card kept its bar down for the whole run — the wall of open swells this was
supposed to end, one card smaller.

Those are two different questions. `usesSelectedVisuals` still drives the
TREATMENT — the graphite silhouette and `data-node-selected`, so the eye can
follow the baton — while whether the toolbar is pinned open now keys off
selection alone.

The container keeps `isRunning` by itself. Selection was never a pin there, and
its own tests hold it to opening on hover.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(realtime): refresh the error flag on a block upsert

`BATCH_ADD_BLOCKS` wrote `errorEnabled` on insert but left it out of the conflict
clause, so re-adding an existing block id kept whatever the row already held
while every sibling flag — enabled, advancedMode, triggerMode, retry, locked —
was refreshed from `excluded`. The client's value was silently discarded and the
old error-output state came back on the next load.

Mine: the insert side gained the field when the column landed and the conflict
set did not.

The other two block writers delete before inserting, so no stale row survives
them; this upsert was the only path that merged into one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* update loader animation

* change the loader

---------

Co-authored-by: andresdjasso <andresdjasso@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Waleed <walif6@gmail.com>
2026-08-10 19:21:32 -07:00
Bill LeoutsakosandBill Leoutsakos fb6e18f5db refactor(tiktok): align webhook routing with shared dispatcher (#6261)
* refactor(tiktok): route webhooks by account key

* refactor(tiktok): remove custom webhook ingress jobs

* fix(tiktok): constrain webhook routing migration

* test(tiktok): remove redundant assertions

* fix(tiktok): preserve routing backfill state

* fix(tiktok): preserve legacy webhook routing during rollout

* fix(tiktok): preserve webhook delivery guarantees

* refactor(tiktok): remove rollout compatibility

* refactor(tiktok): remove unused webhook backfill

---------

Co-authored-by: Bill Leoutsakos <billleoutsakos@Bills-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-08 15:33:33 -07:00
Waleed ea5df41a57 fix(webhooks): resolve the AgentMail tenant before verifying the signature (#6431)
* fix(webhooks): resolve the AgentMail tenant before verifying the signature

The receiver identified the delivering workspace by trying every stored
webhook secret in turn, so each request cost one HMAC over the full body
per tenant. Resolve the workspace from the envelope's inbox id first and
check a single secret, and make that id uniquely indexed so the one-check
property holds by construction.

Also gates the route through the shared admission gate, like the other
public receivers, and gives it a body cap sized for an email envelope.

* fix(db): declare the inbox provider index partial in the schema too

The migration built a partial unique index but the Drizzle definition and
snapshot omitted the predicate, so a regenerate would have diverged. Also
records at the registration site why only message-bearing event types can
be subscribed.

* fix(db): drop the duplicate 0285 journal entry

The regenerate that added the partial-index predicate appended a second
entry for the same migration, so drizzle would have replayed it — dropping
and rebuilding the index, leaving a window with no unique constraint.
2026-08-08 12:59:45 -07:00
Waleed 1c5393ad6d feat(workspaces): pin workspaces and widen the switcher to six rows (#6397)
* feat(workspaces): pin workspaces and widen the switcher to six rows

Show up to six workspaces in the switcher instead of three, keeping the
search input from six onward so it appears exactly when the list fills.

Pin workspaces to the top of the switcher via the existing row context
menu. Pins are per-user and global, so they live on the user's settings
row rather than in `pinned_item`, which scopes every row to one
workspace. They ride along on the /api/workspaces payload the switcher
already loads, so the server prefetch hydrates them and pinned-first
ordering never re-sorts after hydration.

Drop the seat/workspace-migration disclosure copy from both invitation
accept surfaces. The accept-time disclosure tokens are unchanged, so the
server still verifies the outcome hasn't shifted since the page loaded.

* fix(workspaces): serialize pin writes so a rapid toggle cannot be undone

Each write carries the whole pin list, so two overlapping requests that the
network delivered out of order left the earlier click as the stored state.
Chain them instead, and hold reconciliation until the last queued write
settles — refetching between two writes rendered the server's intermediate
state and bounced the row out of the pinned group and back.

* refactor(workspaces): store workspace pins in pinned_item, not user settings

Workspace pins were a jsonb array on the settings row, replaced wholesale on
every toggle. That shape is what forced the write serialization in 53ee94f5:
two overlapping toggles each sent the entire list, so the one that landed last
won regardless of which the user clicked last.

pinned_item is the canonical pinning table and its resource_type is plain text
precisely so kinds can be added without a migration, so `workspace` joins it as
a sixth kind. A pin is now one row: pinning inserts, unpinning deletes, and two
toggles touch different rows and cannot overwrite each other. The serialization,
the outstanding-write counter, the settings column, and its migration all go
away, and deleting a workspace now cascades its pins.

Reads stay on the /api/workspaces payload — the switcher needs the pins *of*
every workspace, not the pins *inside* one — so the sidebar prefetch still
hydrates them and pinned-first ordering is correct on first paint.

* fix(workspaces): serialize same-workspace pin toggles and tolerate replays

Splitting pins into rows removed the lost-update race between *different*
workspaces but not the one on a single row: pin then unpin the same workspace
and the DELETE could overtake its INSERT, delete nothing, and leave the
workspace pinned. A mutation scope serializes them; TanStack runs onMutate
before the scope gate, so the optimistic update is still immediate.

Both duplicate-click replays now resolve to their end state rather than
erroring — a repeat pin answers 409, a repeat unpin 404, and each means the
row is already how the caller wants it. Rollback undoes its own toggle instead
of restoring a snapshot, so a sibling toggle's optimistic state survives.

Also: cap the switcher to the height Radix measured, since six rows can push
the footer actions off a short viewport with nothing able to scroll to them;
drop a dead pinned-item invalidation and a redundant ref; return the pin set
from the hook to match usePinnedIds; and exclude workspace pins from the
unscoped pinned-items listing, where they would read as a resource inside
themselves.

* fix(workspaces): hold pin reconciliation until nothing is still queued

The mutation scope serializes the writes, so an earlier toggle settles while a
later one is still waiting its turn. Invalidating there refetched the server's
intermediate state and bounced the row out of the pinned group and back before
the last write had even left the client.

* fix(workspaces): count outstanding pin toggles off the mutation cache

`hooks/queries/workspace.ts` has no 'use client' directive because server code
imports `workspaceKeys` during SSR, so the `useRef` counter added in 3dc924da
broke the production build — caught by CI, not by typecheck or tests.

`isMutating` answers the same question without a hook: `onSettled` runs before
the mutation leaves `pending`, so it counts itself, and anything above one means
a later toggle is still queued behind the scope.
2026-08-07 20:00:12 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti 5cf1f9be84 improvement(provenance): cleanup secrets boundary (#6374)
* fix(secrets): preserve raw outputs with durable provenance

* improvement(provenance): cleanup boundary

* fix copy resources

* fix fork copies to work with provenance

* address comments

* fix
2026-08-07 17:12:17 -07:00
Waleed ab257555d8 fix(sso): link Entra sign-ins to existing accounts and enforce unique provider IDs (#6311)
* fix(sso): link Entra sign-ins to existing accounts and enforce unique provider IDs

Better Auth 1.6.23 calls the account-linking handler with trustProviderByName:
false, which disables the trustedProviders allowlist for SSO entirely. Trust now
comes only from the provider's domainVerified flag, which Sim never set — so any
user who already had a Sim account was stranded on "account not linked". Entra
never sends email_verified, so this hit every Microsoft tenant.

Sim already proves domain ownership via sso_domain before a provider can be
registered, so the register route mirrors that decision onto domainVerified.
The column defaults to true so existing providers keep signing in across the
deploy, since enabling the option turns sign-in into a hard gate.

Also enforces the providerId uniqueness Better Auth already assumes: it rejects
any id that exists in any tenant and resolves providers by that column alone, so
a second customer picking "azure-ad" could not register at all and got an opaque
422. Sim now returns a 409 naming a free id, and a unique index makes the
duplicate-row state unreachable.

* fix(sso): revoke domain trust when verification is removed mid-update

The create path re-checks domain ownership after Better Auth persists the
provider and rolls the row back if the verified sso_domain row disappeared in
that window. The update path had no equivalent, so deleting the verified domain
while updateSSOProvider was in flight still set domainVerified, restoring
same-email account-linking trust for a domain the org no longer proves it owns.

The update path has no newly-created row to roll back, so it clears the flag
instead: that denies linking and blocks sign-in on the provider until the domain
is verified again.

* fix(sso): make domain-trust grants atomic and propagate revocation

Greptile flagged that the ownership check and the domainVerified write were
separate statements, so a domain deleted between them still ended with trust
granted. Two changes close it from both sides.

The grant now folds the ownership test into the UPDATE's WHERE clause, so
Postgres evaluates both in one statement and the write matches nothing once the
proof is gone.

Removing a verified domain now clears domainVerified for providers on that
domain, in the same transaction as the delete. This was a standing gap, not just
a race: deleting a domain previously left linking trust set indefinitely.

Together the provider cannot end up trusted without current ownership in either
commit order — if the grant lands first the delete clears it, and if the delete
lands first the grant no-ops.

* fix(sso): report a refused domain-trust grant instead of returning success

The conditional grant could match zero rows if the verified domain was deleted
between the pre-write check and the write. The route ignored that and returned
200, leaving a provider that cannot sign anyone in while telling the admin it
saved.

The grant now reports whether it matched, and that result is the single decision
point on both paths: the create path rolls the provider back, the update path
clears the flag, and both return SSO_DOMAIN_NOT_VERIFIED. This also drops the
separate post-write ownership read, since the UPDATE re-tests ownership itself.

* feat(sso): let admins map IdP claims, and trim setup comments

Identity providers disagree on which claim carries each value — Entra can send
the address as `upn` rather than `email` — and the mapping was hardcoded, so a
mismatch had no fix in the UI at all. Adds an Attribute mapping section for both
protocols, defaulting to each protocol's standard claim names shown as
placeholders, so the common case still needs no input.

Editing an existing provider now loads its stored mapping and only treats a
value as an override when it differs from the default, so a saved custom mapping
is never silently rewritten.

* feat(sso): expose the standard enterprise IdP options in the setup form

Rounds out the form with the options Better Auth already accepts but the UI hid,
so a non-standard IdP no longer dead-ends at a field that cannot be set.

SAML gains signature algorithm, digest algorithm and NameID format. Only SHA-256
and stronger are offered: Better Auth warns on SHA-1 as deprecated and rejects
anything outside its secure set, so weaker choices would only produce failed
saves.

SAML also surfaces the SP Entity ID beside the ACS URL. IdP admins are usually
handed a vendor metadata document; Sim does not publish one, and these are the
two values it would carry.

OIDC gains authorization, token and JWKS endpoint overrides for providers whose
discovery document is incomplete or unreachable. Discovery still fills them in
when they are left blank.

All of these load from the stored config when editing, so re-saving a provider
cannot quietly drop them.

* fix(sso): withhold domain trust from personal providers on the hosted deployment

A personal (org-less) provider has no verified domain behind it, but the trust
grant treated it as authoritative anyway. On the multi-tenant deployment that is
an account-takeover primitive: anyone able to register one could claim a domain
they do not own, point it at their own IdP, and have a sign-in auto-link to an
existing account on that domain.

Sim's UI always registers org-scoped, so this only reaches direct API callers.
Self-hosted deployments are single-tenant — the operator is the only tenant —
so the org-less path keeps working there.

Also clears the attribute mapping when the protocol changes: claim names are
protocol-specific, so an OIDC override carried into a SAML config would save a
mapping the IdP cannot resolve.

* docs(sso): correct the personal-provider trust note after the hosted gating

* fix(sso): drop the inert SAML algorithm selects, make NameID format clearable

The signature and digest algorithm selects were placebo controls. Tracing
@better-auth/sso 1.6.23, those two values are only read by validateConfigAlgorithms,
mergeSAMLConfig and sanitizeProvider — createSP and createIdP never pass them to
samlify, so nothing they select reaches the SAML exchange. Bugbot separately
noted they could not be cleared, since Better Auth merges with `??` and omitting
a key keeps the stored value. A control that neither applies nor clears should
not exist, so both are removed.

NameID format is genuinely wired (createSP passes it as nameIDFormat) and is
kept, but is now always sent rather than omitted when set to the provider
default. samlify falsy-guards the value, so an empty string reads as unset and
"Provider default" can actually clear a stored override.

The read-only provider view also now shows the SP Entity ID and the ACS label
for SAML — admins land there after saving and need the same two values the form
says their IdP requires.

* docs(sso): tighten the personal-provider note to the self-host path it describes

* fix(sso): forward an empty SAML NameID format so the provider default can be restored

The form sends an empty identifierFormat when the admin selects "Provider
default", but the route dropped it with a truthiness check. Better Auth merges
SAML config with `??`, so an omitted key retains the stored value — the selection
appeared to apply and silently did not.

Forwarding the empty string makes it reach the merge, and samlify falsy-guards
nameIDFormat, so it reads as unset. Selecting the provider default now actually
clears a stored override.

* fix(sso): revoke trust for providers whose domain is spelled with a wildcard

Migration 0268 grandfathered providers by normalizing their domain with
lower + btrim + a stripped leading `*.`, so sso_provider.domain can hold
`*.acme.com` while its verified sso_domain row holds `acme.com`. The revoke on
domain deletion compared the raw column, so such a provider matched nothing and
kept domainVerified after its ownership proof was gone.

The comparison now applies the same normalization 0268 used, so a grandfathered
row is matched the way it was written.

* fix(db): give the SSO index migration the concurrent-build convention it skipped

packages/db/scripts/migrate.ts documents the required shape for CONCURRENTLY
statements, and the previous migration follows it. 0284 did not, and the
omission is silently destructive.

migrate.ts sets a session lock_timeout of 5s, which survives the embedded
COMMIT. CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY waits on every concurrent write transaction in
the database — not only ones touching this table — so on a busy database the
build is cancelled with 55P03 and leaves an INVALID index. The retry then
replays the file, IF NOT EXISTS skips the invalid index, and DROP INDEX removes
the only working index on provider_id. The migration journals as applied and
exits 0 with provider_id unindexed and uniqueness unenforced, reopening the
cross-tenant provider resolution this migration exists to close.

Adds SET lock_timeout = 0 around the concurrent statements, a pre-drop of the
target index name so a replay rebuilds rather than skips, and restores the 5s
timeout afterwards. Verified by stranding an INVALID index and replaying: the
end state is a valid unique index with uniqueness enforced.

Also corrects the sso() comment that claimed domainVerified confines linking to
matching email domains. link-account.mjs blocks on
`!isTrustedProvider && !userInfo.emailVerified`, so an IdP asserting
email_verified links regardless of domain — the flag narrows nothing on its own.

* fix(sso): give the Enter shortcut the same guard as the Add domain button

The Enter handler called handleAdd unconditionally while the button was disabled
during an in-flight add, so repeated presses could issue overlapping requests.
Both now read one canAddDomain flag rather than duplicating the condition.

* fix(sso): stop the provider ID being editable after it is saved

Renaming it was never useful and always destructive. The value forms the
redirect URL registered with the identity provider, so changing it breaks
sign-in until the IdP is updated. Worse, the register route selects
create-vs-update by (providerId, organizationId), so a renamed id misses and
registers a SECOND provider; the settings page renders providers[0], so the
duplicate is invisible, there is no delete action to remove it, and existing
account rows still reference the old id.

Editing now shows it as a read-only copyable value, and the create form says up
front that it cannot be changed later.

Also hoists the suggestion list to module scope — it was rebuilding 44 objects
on every keystroke anywhere in the form.

* fix(sso): stop persisting generated IdP metadata so SAML cert rotation works

The route stored an IdP metadata document built from cert + entryPoint even when
the admin supplied none. The form loads that document back into its optional
metadata field and resends it, and on the next save it wins over the certificate
— so rotating a SAML signing certificate through the form appeared to succeed
and changed nothing.

Only metadata the admin actually pasted is persisted now. With none stored,
Better Auth's createIdP builds the IdP from issuer, entryPoint and cert, which
are the fields the form edits. No SAML providers exist in production, so this
changes no live tenant.

* fix(sso): always write SAML IdP metadata so clearing it takes effect on update

Not storing generated metadata fixed new providers but not existing ones: Better
Auth merges SAML config with `??`, so omitting the key let a previously stored
document survive and keep overriding the certificate.

The key is now always written, empty when the admin supplied none. createIdP
falsy-guards it and falls back to issuer/entryPoint/cert, so clearing the field
actually clears it.

* fix(sso): hold the domain proof under a row lock while granting trust

Two fixes from review.

The trust grant folded the ownership test into the UPDATE's WHERE clause, but
under READ COMMITTED the EXISTS subquery is evaluated against the statement's
original snapshot. A delete committing while the UPDATE waited on the provider
row could therefore still see the removed sso_domain row and grant trust after
ownership was gone. The grant now selects the proof FOR SHARE inside a
transaction before writing, so the delete blocks until it commits, and if the
delete committed first the select finds nothing and no trust is written.

Editing a SAML provider also broke on configs written by the previous commit:
hydration used `config.idpMetadata?.metadata || config.idpMetadata`, and
`{ metadata: '' }` is falsy at the property but truthy as an object, so an object
landed in a string field and failed validation on save. It now narrows on the
type and handles both the object and legacy bare-string shapes.

* refactor(sso): write the two merge-sensitive SAML fields the same way

idpMetadata and identifierFormat both exist to defeat Better Auth's `??` merge,
which silently keeps a stored value when a key is omitted, but they were written
differently — one always, one only when defined. Both are now always written,
empty when unset, under one comment explaining why and noting that each is
falsy-guarded downstream.

Also drops a redundant saveDisabled: false; the prop already defaults to false.

* fix(sso): report the row the trust grant actually matched

The grant returned true once it found the proof, without checking that the
provider UPDATE matched anything, so its boolean did not always mean what
callers read it to mean. It now reports the matched row.

* fix(sso): restore provider domain trust when a domain is re-verified

* fix(sso): correct the domain-removal warning now that it disables sign-in

* chore(sso): trim verbose comments

* fix(sso): revert a rejected SSO update instead of leaving it stored
2026-08-06 00:52:39 -07:00
Vikhyath MondretiandSiddharth Ganesan 117fe3137b feat(code): cli sandboxes, enterprise timeouts, secrets projections, resolver lift, workflow exec cancellations (#6247)
* feat(code): cli sandboxes, enterprise timeouts, secrets projections, resolver lift

* fix(execution): harden compatibility and secret diagnostics

* fix(execution): harden generated JavaScript literals

* fix(execution): align timeout cleanup semantics

* fix(tables): decouple stale job cleanup

* fix(execution): drain stale workflow backlog

* test(sandbox): make deadline assertions timing-safe

* fix(execution): lock cleanup candidate batches

* fix(execution): preserve cleanup failure metrics

* cancel route fixes

* separate out mship template and func template

* fix

* fix(execution): harden secret projection and block runs

* fix(workflow): validate draft execution state

* run from block ui disabling

* feat(copilot): expose Sim sandboxes to mothership

* feat(copilot): expose sandbox capability catalog in VFS

* Updates

* fix legacy logs showing up

* fix(copilot): keep sandbox config visible

* fix model provenance issues

* fix lint'

* more lint

* more

* test(files): align provenance copy query order

* consolidate migrations, rollout compat

* integration projections

* update skills

* fix

* add provenance linters

* fix: address review and compatibility regressions

* fix: make tool boundary audit Bun 1.3 compatible

---------

Co-authored-by: Siddharth Ganesan <siddharthganesan@gmail.com>
2026-08-05 19:22:04 -07:00
Waleed 5dbe95e0c1 fix(files): reserve image layout space so images stop reflowing on load (#6299)
* fix(files): reserve image layout space so images stop reflowing on load

A markdown image with no stored dimensions reserved zero vertical space until
it downloaded, then snapped to its natural height and pushed content below it
down (cumulative layout shift). Reserve the box up front from the image's
intrinsic aspect ratio instead.

Store intrinsic width/height as workspace_file metadata (not in the markdown —
it stays clean `![](src)`), read it synchronously from the already-loaded file
list to reserve a responsive aspect-ratio box on first render, and lazily
backfill it once per image on first view via a write-gated, idempotent PATCH.
The node view falls back to on-load measurement for the first-ever view and for
external images. Images stay fluid (max-width:100%, height:auto).

* fix(files): address review — reserve on stale memo, clear dims on content swap

- onLoad guards on the memoized storedDimensions the render uses (not a fresh
  cache read), so a sibling's non-reactive backfill can't leave a view unreserved.
- updateWorkspaceFileContent clears width/height when it swaps bytes, so stale
  dimensions can't be reserved for new content (and the null re-enables backfill).
- Keep optimistically-cached dimensions when the PATCH fails (correct measurement;
  a 403/transient error shouldn't wipe sibling reservations).
- Test imports the sibling via the absolute @/ path.

* fix(files): re-derive image dimensions on content swap instead of clearing

Clearing width/height to NULL on a content swap reopened the width IS NULL
backfill path, so a late fire-and-forget PATCH for the previous image could
write its stale size onto the new content. Instead, measure the new bytes'
intrinsic dimensions server-side (image-size, headers only) and store those
(or null for a non-image), so the row always matches the current content and a
stale backfill can't apply.

* fix(files): self-heal image dimensions from the browser instead of server-measuring

Round-3 review: server-side image-size returns raw (non-EXIF) dimensions, and
clearing dims on content swap reopened the stale-PATCH race for non-image or
unmeasurable content. Move authority to the browser's own naturalWidth/Height
(EXIF-correct): the node view reserves from it and reports on any mismatch, and
updateWorkspaceFileDimensions overwrites (no width IS NULL gate) so stale values
self-correct on the next view. Reverts the server-side measurement and the
content-swap dimension touch entirely.

* fix(files): clear image dimensions on content swap (completes self-heal)

The self-heal rework left the old image's dimensions in the row after a content
replacement, so the next view of the new bytes reserved a wrong-sized box before
correcting. Clear width/height on the content-swap write so the row never
describes stale content: the next view falls back to the baseline first-load
reflow and the browser's measurement backfills the correct size. No server-side
decode (EXIF-safe), and the client's overwrite-on-mismatch handles a late PATCH.

* fix(files): guard dimension writes by content key so a stale PATCH can't persist

Ties the dimensions write to the storage key the client measured. The key is
regenerated on every content replacement, so an in-flight PATCH measured against
superseded bytes is rejected at the DB (WHERE key = measured key) instead of
persisting the old aspect ratio for new content. Closes the last stale-ordering
window Greptile flagged — the write is now content-version-conditioned, not just
corrected on the next render.

* chore(files): fix stale route TSDoc and hoist a regex literal (cleanup pass)

Post-review /cleanup: the dimensions route TSDoc still described backfill-once
behavior (now overwrite-on-mismatch via the content-key CAS); the bare-pixel
width regex is hoisted to module scope. No behavior change.

* fix(files): reflect the content-version guard outcome in the dimensions response

The route returned success:true even when updateWorkspaceFileDimensions matched
0 rows (the CAS rejected a write whose measured key no longer matches the row).
Return success:<whether a row was written> and widen the contract response to
{ success: boolean }. Not an error path — the client's next measurement persists
once its file list has the new key; this just stops the API claiming a persist
that did not happen.

* fix(files): reconcile the cache when a dimension write is content-version-rejected

Previously the client discarded a success:false (CAS-rejected) response, leaving
its optimistic patch — which is for superseded bytes — lingering in the file-list
cache. On rejection, invalidate the list so the cache reconciles with the new
content (whose real size persists on its next load). Deliberately NOT a retry:
re-sending the old measurement under the new key would write the wrong size. A
transport error / read-only 403 still keeps the optimistic value (it's the real
displayed size).

* docs(files): align stale dimension docs with the overwrite/self-heal behavior

Cleanup audit: the ImageDimensionsSource/reportImageDimensions interface docs and
one route log string still said backfill-once/no-op; the mechanism overwrites on
mismatch to self-correct. Wording only, no behavior change.
2026-08-05 17:53:41 -07:00
Waleed 0bc4fb4656 fix(security): meter and throttle the deployed-chat TTS relay (#6212)
* fix(security): meter and throttle the deployed-chat TTS relay

POST /api/proxy/tts/stream treated "a live public chat exists" as
authorization to spend the platform ElevenLabs key. A public chat id is
handed to every visitor, so any anonymous caller could synthesize speech
with no length cap, no rate limit and no usage accounting.

Bring the relay in line with its STT sibling (/api/speech/token):

- Resolve the chat's workspace and bill synthesized characters to that
  payer via a new `voice-output` usage source, so spend is attributable
  and counts against the plan's usage limit (402 once exceeded).
- Throttle per IP before any database work, and per chat afterwards, to
  bound both one caller hammering many chats and many callers hammering
  one chat.
- Cap `text` at 2000 characters and allowlist `voiceId`/`modelId`, so the
  caller can no longer choose an unbounded charge, a premium or cloned
  voice, or the billing model.
- Drop `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`, which let any third-party page
  read the audio; deployed chat and the Office embed are same-origin.

* fix(security): correct TTS metering, pricing and body cap

Follow-up review of the previous commit found five defects in it:

- Usage rows collided. `usage_log.event_key` is unique and inserts are
  conflict-do-nothing, and the key is derived from the entry's stable
  fields. With no explicit sourceReference, two synthesis calls of equal
  character count in the same workspace produced the same key, so every
  repeat length went unbilled — defeating the metering this change is
  for. Each call now carries a unique sourceReference.
- Priced at $0.10 per 1k characters, twice the published ElevenLabs
  Flash/Turbo rate of $0.05, which would have overcharged customers 2x.
- No body cap, so an anonymous caller could make the route buffer up to
  the shared 50 MB default before validation. Now 16 KB, as the STT
  sibling does.
- Threshold settlement ran per sentence: several queries and a possible
  Stripe call on a realtime path. The workflow execution that produced
  the text already settles the payer.
- The per-IP bucket was described as preventing database amplification.
  getClientIp trusts the leftmost X-Forwarded-For, so an attacker rotates
  past it; the comment now says the per-chat bucket is load-bearing.

* refactor(chat): share the deployed-chat auth gate across voice routes

Review of the previous commits surfaced duplication and one more gap:

- The TTS and STT routes had grown near-identical copies of the chat
  auth + payer lookup. Extracted to resolveDeployedChatCaller, so the
  gate and the payer resolve together and cannot drift per route — that
  duplication is how the unmetered TTS path shipped in the first place.
- Neither copy filtered chat.archivedAt, so an archived chat could still
  authorize spend against its former owner's workspace. The shared
  lookup now filters it, fixing both routes at once. Note: not covered
  by a test — the db chain mock does not evaluate WHERE clauses, so an
  assertion here could not fail.
- Replaced the route's hand-rolled 429 builder with the existing
  enforceIpRateLimit helper, and added enforceChatRateLimit alongside
  the per-user/IP/workspace helpers. Gains the standard Retry-After and
  X-RateLimit-Reset headers plus throttle logging.
- Dropped a test that asserted a module the route no longer imports was
  never called: it could not fail.
- Narrowed the contract: unexported the single-use allowlists and
  dropped .passthrough() now that the body is a closed shape.

* fix(security): fail closed when voice-output usage cannot be recorded

Review round 1 findings:

- A ledger write failure previously logged and streamed the audio anyway,
  leaving the spend unrecorded and the payer's usage understated. The
  caller is anonymous, so serving audio we could not charge for is the
  unmetered spend this route exists to prevent — it now returns 500.
- Use generateId() from @sim/utils/id rather than crypto.randomUUID, per
  the AGENTS.md ID rule. generateId returns a full UUID v4, so the
  per-call uniqueness the usage_log event_key depends on is unchanged.

* fix(chat): split long TTS text so the relay cap cannot drop audio

The client sentence-splits on Western `.!?` only, so text that never
matches — CJK punctuation, or a list with no terminal punctuation —
accumulates and is flushed as one block at the end of the stream. Against
the new 2000-character relay cap that block is rejected and the whole
message plays no audio, a regression introduced by adding the cap.

Split to cap-sized pieces at the single point that enqueues synthesis, so
both the per-sentence path and the end-of-stream flush are covered.
Prefers a whitespace or CJK punctuation boundary, falling back to a hard
cut when a block has none. The server cap stays as the enforcement point.

* fix(security): release the vendor stream when metering rejects the request

The fail-closed branch returned 500 with the ElevenLabs response body
still open, so synthesis and download kept consuming vendor and runtime
resources for a caller that was already rejected. Cancel it before
returning, and assert the cancellation in the test.
2026-08-03 11:38:46 -07:00
Vikhyath Mondreti b8ec114382 improvement(chat): secrets mounting / exposure improvements and controls (#6191)
* fix(copilot): secrets injection into sandbox

* improvement(chat): secrets mounting / exposure improvements and controls

* fix(secrets): simplify copilot mounting flow

* test(secrets): preserve standard tool permissions

* fix(copilot): bind workflow tool completions

* fix(secrets): preserve own environment keys

* fix(copilot): release failed workflow claims

* fix(copilot): trust compacted workflow completion
2026-08-02 10:21:27 -07:00
Waleedandmzxchandra 10bfb5d139 feat(realtime): shared room spine + live Files/Tables collaboration + Yjs document editing (#5991)
* feat(realtime): add shared room identity + authorization spine (#5929)

Introduces the foundation for a unified realtime "room" model spanning the
Socket.IO presence server (apps/realtime), the durable SSE event log, and the
ephemeral pub/sub fanout — all of which today reinvent their own room identity,
naming, and authorization.

- @sim/realtime-protocol/rooms: RoomRef { type, id }, ROOM_TYPES, and a
  roomName/parseRoomName codec. WORKFLOW deliberately maps to the bare id so the
  ~40 existing io.to(workflowId) callsites and presence state keys are unchanged;
  every other room type is namespaced so id spaces cannot collide.
- @sim/platform-authz/rooms: authorizeRoom(userId, room, action) generalizing the
  exemplary authorizeWorkflowByWorkspacePermission — one resource->workspace
  resolver per room type, then the shared resolveEffectiveWorkspacePermission +
  permissionSatisfies gate.

Pure foundation, no behavior change: nothing consumes these yet. Prune graph
stays at 14/25 (platform-authz already depended transitively on realtime-protocol
via apps/realtime).

* refactor(realtime): generalize presence server to multi-room [2/N] (#5930)

* refactor(realtime): generalize presence server to multi-room (RoomRef)

Generalizes the Socket.IO presence layer from single-workflow-room-per-socket
to a domain-neutral, multi-room-per-socket model keyed by RoomRef, so a second
domain (workspace files, next PR) can reuse the same membership + presence
engine. Behavior-preserving for workflow collaboration.

IRoomManager is now domain-neutral (addUserToRoom/removeUserFromRoom/
getRoomForSocket/getRoomUsers/updateUserActivity/... all take a RoomRef). The
workflow lifecycle broadcasts (deletion/revert/update/deploy) move out of the
manager into WorkflowRoomService, composed over the generic manager.

Backward-compat by design (no workflow migration, no regression):
- Workflow Socket.IO room name stays the bare workflowId (roomName() maps
  workflow -> bare id), so the ~40 io.to(workflowId) callsites are untouched.
- Workflow Redis presence keys stay workflow:{id}:users/:meta (the type prefix
  IS "workflow").

Multi-room correctness (from adversarial audit):
- socket:{id}:workflow single-value key -> socket:{id}:rooms HASH (type->id).
- The SHARED socket:{id}:session key is deleted only when the socket leaves its
  LAST room (refcount via HLEN) — a leave from one room no longer breaks the
  other room's handlers.
- disconnect enumerates the socket's stored rooms and rebroadcasts presence per
  room, instead of picking an arbitrary socket.rooms entry.
- presence broadcasts use a per-room-type event name (workflow keeps the bare
  presence-update; others are namespaced).

Workflow handlers wrap manager calls with a shared workflowRoom(id) helper;
UserPresence.workflowId -> room (the client never reads that field).

Tests: existing 112 realtime tests pass unchanged (behavior gate) + 7 new
multi-room tests (refcounted session, presence isolation, multi-room disconnect,
per-type event names). tsc clean, boundaries + prune (14/25) green.

* fix(realtime): harden multi-room disconnect + id-guard room removal

Two fixes from an adversarial regression audit of the multi-room refactor:

- Disconnect now handles `disconnecting` (where `socket.rooms` is still populated
  and authoritative) and falls back to the live Socket.IO room set for any room
  the manager's stored state no longer tracked. This restores reliable presence
  cleanup + departure broadcast even if the Redis `socket:{id}:rooms` key was
  evicted or TTL-expired — the one behavioral gap vs the pre-refactor disconnect.
- REMOVE_ROOM_SCRIPT now only drops the socket's room mapping (and runs the
  last-room session cleanup) when the stored id matches the room being removed,
  matching the memory manager's existing id guard. Prevents a mismatched-room
  call from wiping a different room's mapping or the shared session.

+1 test (id-guarded no-op removal). 120 realtime tests pass, tsc clean.

* fix(realtime): only rebroadcast disconnect-fallback rooms whose removal succeeded

Greptile 4/5 follow-up: the disconnecting-time fallback ignored
removeUserFromRoom's boolean and rebroadcast presence even when the removal
reported false. Now it only treats a room as removed (and rebroadcasts) when the
manager confirms it — symmetric with removeSocketFromAllRooms, which already only
returns rooms it actually removed.

* fix(realtime): exclude the disconnecting socket from its farewell broadcast

Greptile follow-up (transient-Redis-failure edge): if removeUserFromRoom fails on
disconnect, the socket's presence entry can outlive it (room hashes have no TTL)
and reappear as a ghost. Disconnect now broadcasts a correction to EVERY room the
socket was in (union of the manager's removed rooms and the live Socket.IO
membership) and passes the disconnecting socket id as excludeSocketId, so it is
never shown as a collaborator regardless of whether the Redis delete succeeded.
Any orphaned entry is still reclaimed by the next join's stale-presence sweep.

broadcastPresenceUpdate gains an optional excludeSocketId; normal broadcasts are
unchanged. +1 test.

* fix(realtime): make presence broadcasts liveness-aware (root-cause ghost fix)

Presence broadcasts now reconcile the stored list against the live Socket.IO
membership (io.in(room).fetchSockets()) before emitting, via a shared
filterVisiblePresence helper. This closes the residual behind the earlier
disconnect fixes: an entry orphaned by a failed removal (room hashes have no TTL)
could reappear in a LATER join's presence snapshot until the 75-min stale sweep.
Now such an entry is never emitted, because a non-live socket is filtered out of
every broadcast. Combined with excludeSocketId (which handles the disconnecting
socket, still momentarily live). Fail-safe: on a fetchSockets throw or an empty
result while entries remain, emit the unfiltered list rather than hide live
collaborators.

Also drops a dead guard in the disconnect union loop (rooms already removed are
skipped by the wasInRooms check) and the now-unused isSameRoom import.

+1 ghost-guard test. 122 realtime tests pass.

* feat(files): live presence avatars + live file tree via realtime rooms (#5932)

* refactor(tables): adopt shared durable event-log core (#5934)

* fix(realtime): address post-merge review-comment findings (#5937)

* fix(realtime): address post-merge review-comment findings

A re-audit of every inline review comment on the merged stack surfaced real
issues that the thread-resolutions and prior audits missed. Fixes:

Presence server (#5930 comments):
- connection.ts: snapshot `socket.rooms` SYNCHRONOUSLY before the first await.
  Socket.IO clears the room set once the synchronous part of a `disconnecting`
  handler returns, so reading it after `await removeSocketFromAllRooms` saw an
  empty set — the eviction fallback was dead. (Cursor: "Disconnect fallback
  misses live rooms".)
- workflow-room-service: restore the original managers' final unconditional
  room-state wipe via a new `deleteRoom(room)` manager method, so a deleted
  workflow leaves no lingering presence/meta even if a per-socket removal failed
  or a socket joined mid-teardown. (Cursor: "Deletion skips final room wipe".)

Files (#5932 comments):
- workspace-file-manager.uploadWorkspaceFile now fans out the live-tree signal
  (all direct-upload paths: multipart fallback, copilot create, /api/files/upload,
  v1 files — the presigned path already notified). (Cursor: "Creates miss live
  tree fan-out".)
- use-workspace-files-room: clear the pending retry timer on join success; and a
  module-scoped intended-room guard defers the unmount `leave` so a rapid remount
  re-claims the room and skips a stale leave — fixing presence flap + a
  leave-after-join race. (Cursor: "Retry timer survives join success" + "Remount
  churns files presence".)
- workspace-files handler: roll back a partial join (leave room + remove presence)
  in the catch, mirroring the workflow join. (Cursor: "Join failure skips
  membership rollback".)

+2 tests (deleteRoom). 127 realtime tests pass, both apps tsc clean,
api-validation + boundaries green.

* fix(files): scope workspace-files leave to a workspace (deferred-leave safety)

Self-review of the deferred-leave guard found a real bug: leave-workspace-files
was not workspace-scoped, so after a workspace switch (A->B) the deferred leave
from A would evict the socket from its new room B. The leave now carries the
workspaceId and the server no-ops if the socket's current files room differs.
Also excludes the leaving socket from the leave broadcast (consistent with
disconnect).

* fix(realtime): close files-room presence leak + validate join payload

Architecture-audit findings:

- S1 (real Redis leak): the files room inherited the shared manager but not the
  workflow join's liveness sweep, so an UNGRACEFUL disconnect (pod crash — no
  `disconnecting` event) left its presence entry in the no-TTL room hash forever.
  Added a shared `sweepStalePresence(manager, room)` (fetchSockets liveness +
  remove not-live-AND-stale entries, matching the workflow 75min threshold) and
  run it on files join; also filter the join ack through `filterVisiblePresence`
  so a joiner never briefly sees an un-swept ghost.
- S2: validate the client-supplied `workspaceId` on files join before it reaches
  the DB query (matches the /api/workspace-files-changed guard; fails closed).
- N2: corrected the notify doc — it is awaited (guaranteed dispatch before a Node
  route returns) and hard-bounded to NOTIFY_TIMEOUT_MS, not "never block".

+1 test (sweepStalePresence keeps live/fresh, reclaims not-live-stale). 128
realtime tests pass, both apps tsc clean, biome clean.

* fix(realtime): workflow-deletion always notifies + cleans by socket.io membership

Review-round findings on #5937:
- Always emit `workflow-deleted` (was guarded by users.length>0), so a socket
  still in the Socket.IO room after a Redis presence eviction is told the
  workflow is gone before socketsLeave kicks it — the editor no longer keeps
  showing a deleted workflow. (Cursor: "Silent kick skips deletion event".)
- Clean per-socket state for the UNION of live Socket.IO members and
  presence-tracked sockets, so an evicted/late-joined socket's room mapping +
  session are dropped too — not just presence-snapshot sockets. (Greptile: "Room
  deletion leaves reverse state".)
- deleteRoom now logs AND rethrows on Redis failure (like addUserToRoom) so a
  failed wipe isn't reported as a clean deletion; the request surfaces it.
  (Greptile: "Room deletion failures are suppressed".)

The two "deferred leave drops new membership" P1s were already fixed by the
workspace-scoped leave in a prior commit (leave carries { workspaceId }; server
no-ops on mismatch). 128 tests pass, tsc + biome clean.

* refactor(files): drop module-scoped deferred-leave; rely on workspace-scoped leave

Removes the one non-idiomatic construct (a module-level mutable
`intendedFilesWorkspaceId` + queueMicrotask). It only guarded a same-workspace
CONCURRENT remount, which doesn't occur in production (folder nav is shallow/no
remount; list<->detail is sequential) — a dev-StrictMode-only case. The real
cross-workspace race is already handled by the workspace-scoped leave: if B's
join runs first (auto-leaving A), A's leave no-ops because the socket's current
files room is B. Simpler, idiomatic, prod-correct.

* feat(realtime): Yjs relay server for collaborative document editing [4/N] (#5941)

Server-side Yjs relay for collaborative document editing (live carets + text selection) in the Files rich-markdown editor. Faithful y-websocket-style relay over the existing authenticated Socket.IO connection + shared room abstraction; in-memory Y.Doc + Awareness per file; awareness ownership binding, userId-keyed client-id uniqueness, seeder election with deadline re-election, concurrent-JOIN generation guard. 25 relay tests. Reviewed to Greptile 5/5 + Cursor pass across multiple rounds, plus an independent 4-lens audit (correctness/security/conventions/simplicity) and /simplify + /cleanup passes.

* feat(files): collaborative document editing — client provider + editor (#5946)

Client Yjs provider (FileDocProvider over the authenticated socket) + TipTap Collaboration/CollaborationCaret wiring for live carets + text-selection in the Files rich-markdown editor. Collaboration is a Files-page-only surface (explicit `collaborative` opt-in), disjoint from agent-streaming. Read-only + autosave-gated until synced+seeded. Merges into the realtime-rooms integration branch.

* feat(tables): live collaboration — cell-selection presence + live mutation propagation (#5957)

* feat(tables): live cell-selection presence — protocol + server + client hook

The realtime spine for Google-Sheets-style table presence (mode A, socket):

- @sim/realtime-protocol/table-presence: centralized wire protocol (events +
  TableCellSelection {anchor, focus, editing} + payloads) so server emits and
  client subscriptions can't drift.
- ROOM_TYPES.TABLE + resolveTableWorkspace registered in ROOM_WORKSPACE_RESOLVERS
  (tableId -> workspace via userTableDefinitions, honoring archivedAt); roomName /
  presenceEventName / disconnect cleanup / authorizeRoom all derive automatically.
- apps/realtime/src/handlers/tables.ts: join/leave (mirrors workspace-files) + a
  table-cell-selection relay (mirrors the workflow selection channel), broadcasting
  via roomName(room) since table rooms are namespaced. UserPresence gains a cell
  field threaded through the memory + Redis managers (Lua ARGV[7], null clears).
- Extracted the duplicated resolveAvatarUrl into handlers/avatar.ts.
- use-table-room.ts client hook: joins over the shared socket, tracks the roster
  (avatars) + patches per-socket cell deltas, exposes a throttled emitCellSelection.

Grid UI (avatars + selection overlay) lands next; concurrent cell-value edits
(last-write-wins via the durable log) are the follow-up PR.

* feat(tables): render live cell-selection presence in the grid

Wires the table presence room into the grid UI:
- Page (table.tsx): useTableRoom (gated off in embedded/mothership mode) —
  renders <PresenceAvatars> in the header and passes remoteSelections +
  emitCellSelection down to the grid.
- Grid emits its local selection: an effect resolves the index-based
  anchor/focus to stable (rowId, columnId) via refs and broadcasts it (with an
  editing flag for the active cell) through the throttled emitter.
- RemoteSelectionOverlay: draws each remote viewer's selection in their color
  (getUserColor), a darker fill while editing, and name-on-hover — measured from
  live cell rects in the content wrapper's space (scrolls with the grid),
  hidden when rows are virtualized off-window, pointer-events-none so it never
  blocks cell clicks (hover via pointer hit-test).

* test(tables): cover the table presence handler

Mirrors workspace-files.test.ts: join auth/unavailable/denied/success, plus the
cell-selection relay (asserts it persists via updateUserActivity and broadcasts
on the namespaced roomName, not the bare id) and leave.

* feat(tables): propagate manual cell edits live (last-write-wins)

A manual row edit now appends a lightweight 'edit' event to the durable table
stream; collaborators refetch the row (via the existing debounced rows-invalidate
the job events use) so the winning value shows live. The event carries no value —
peers refetch in their own wire format, so there's no auth-specific value
translation on the wire, and last-write-wins falls out of the DB's committed order
(the Google-Sheets model). Edits that also trigger a dispatch already emit
dispatch/cell events; the debounce coalesces the two.

* refactor(tables): apply /simplify findings

- Drop the dead 'add unknown peer' upsert branch in use-table-room (Socket.IO
  ordering guarantees a peer is in the roster before their selection delta).
- TableCellSelectionBroadcast = TablePresenceUser & { cell } (was a copy-paste).
- Make TableGrid's presence props required + drop the unused empty-default/guard
  (only table.tsx mounts it, always passing both).
- Drop the unused rowId from the 'edit' event (the handler invalidates all rows).
- Overlay: subscribe scroll/resize/pointer listeners once per scroll element and
  cache the wrapper origin, so incoming deltas re-measure without re-subscribing
  and the pointer hit-test never forces a per-move layout read.
- Server: cache the immutable socket session so a selection delta no longer reads
  it from Redis every time.

* refactor(tables): apply /cleanup findings

- Fix the remote-selection name label contrast: text-white is unreadable on the
  light-pastel user colors (same bug the Files caret fixed) → fixed dark #1a1a1a.
- Re-measure via useLayoutEffect so a moving peer selection updates before paint
  (no one-frame position lag).
- Drop 'mothership' from a comment (constitution copy rule).

Six cleanup passes ran (effect, memo/callback, state, react-query, emcn, comment);
the rest confirmed clean — all state/memos/callbacks/effects are load-bearing,
presence correctly lives in useState (socket-pushed), and the edit→rows-invalidate
granularity is right.

* feat(tables): propagate every table mutation live (edit + schema signals)

Comprehensive live collaboration for all user table mutations, via two value-less
durable signals + named helpers (signalTableRowsChanged / signalTableSchemaChanged):

- edit (rows refetch): single + batch row create, cell/row update, batch update,
  delete by id/filter, and upsert.
- schema (definition + rows refetch): column add/update/delete, workflow-group
  add/update/delete, table rename, and CSV import (which can add columns).
- Client handles 'schema' by invalidating the table detail (exact) + rows.

Execution paths (column run, cancel-runs) and async jobs (delete/import-async,
job-cancel) already propagate via cell/dispatch/job events — verified applyJob
refetches on terminal. No reorder routes exist. Table archive (route DELETE) is a
deliberate follow-up: it needs a table-deleted redirect event, not a refetch signal
(which would 404).

* refactor(tables): apply comprehensive /cleanup audit findings

Holistic + react-query + comment audits over the whole PR:

- Security/crash fix: a remote peer's rowId flowed unescaped into the overlay's
  querySelector — a hostile id ('x"]') threw SyntaxError inside a useLayoutEffect,
  crashing every other viewer's page. CSS.escape it, and validate + whitelist the
  untrusted cell payload server-side (shape + 200-char id bound) before it is
  stored/rebroadcast.
- Simplify the CELL_SELECTION relay: the delta attached userId/userName/avatarUrl
  that the client discarded (identity comes from the roster). Drop them + the
  getUserSession lookup/cache entirely — the delta is now { socketId, cell }.
- React Query: schema handler also invalidates lists() (parity with the local
  column-mutation set); document that the mutating client self-refetches by design.
- Comment tightenings; biome fixed a stale import order in workspace-files.ts.

* fix(tables): broadcast single-cell selections (focus falls back to anchor)

Cursor High: a normal cell click leaves selectionFocus null (the grid treats it as
a one-cell selection via focus ?? anchor), but the presence emit required BOTH anchor
and focus to resolve — so the most common selection never broadcast and clicking even
cleared a prior remote outline. Mirror the grid's focus ?? anchor semantics.

* fix(tables): reviewer + regression + per-LOC audit findings

Cursor review round (5 findings) + regression audit + per-LOC audit:
- Presence roster snapshot now KEEPS the cell we already hold for a known socket, so
  a join/leave broadcast can't revert a fresher CELL_SELECTION delta.
- Reset the selection throttle on table switch (was unmount-only), so a pending
  selection for table A can't flush into table B's room after a switch.
- Metadata writes (column widths, display) use a new lightweight 'metadata' signal
  that refetches only the definition — a resize no longer forces peers to refetch rows.
- Overlay re-measures on row add/remove/reorder via a tbody childList MutationObserver
  (a live refetch moves cells without a scroll/resize).
- Document the actor self-refetch create caveat (scrolled multi-page insert) accurately.
- isCellRef narrows to a partial instead of casting to the full type then re-checking;
  drop a redundant mount measure() (the layout effect covers it); text-[11px]→text-xs.

* fix(tables): drop ineffective metadata propagation + re-measure overlay on column resize

Cursor round on b8f28b04b:
- Remove the 'metadata' signal entirely. The grid seeds columnWidths/pinnedColumns
  from metadata ONCE (metadataSeededRef) and deliberately never re-applies them (to
  avoid clobbering a local in-progress resize), so refetching the definition on a peer
  never surfaced their width/pin change — an ineffective path. Width/pin live-sync needs
  reconciliation that doesn't clobber a local resize; that's a deliberate follow-up, not
  a no-op refetch. Structural changes still propagate via 'schema'.
- Overlay now also observes the content layer with the ResizeObserver, so a column
  resize (which grows the content, not the scroll container) re-measures remote outlines.
- Presence-merge comment now states both sides of the trade-off.

* fix(tables): re-broadcast local selection on (re)join

Cursor Medium: a selection made before the room join completes (or held across a
reconnect) was dropped server-side and never re-sent, so peers didn't see it until
the local user moved it again. Track the current selection in a ref (set on every
emit, cleared on table switch) and re-emit it from handleJoinSuccess once the room is
joined.

* fix(tables): re-broadcast selection when a peer's row change shifts it

End-to-end lifecycle audit (Low-Med): the selection emit resolved the stable
(rowId, columnId) only on selection/editing change, not when a live edit/schema
refetch inserted/deleted/reordered rows. The index-based local selection then sat
on a different logical row than the rowId peers held, so your outline showed on the
old row until you moved. Re-run the emit on rows/displayColumns change and dedup an
unchanged result (also drops the redundant null-on-open emit) so the broadcast stays
consistent with the local highlight.

* fix(tables): schema invalidates run-state/enrichment + guard stale join

Cursor round on cdc8796b8 (2 Medium):
- schema handler used detail exact:true, so it skipped the activeDispatches +
  enrichmentDetails sibling queries the local invalidateTableSchema refreshes via a
  prefix match. After a peer deletes/restructures a workflow group, peers could keep a
  stale running badge or enrichment panel. Now invalidates both siblings too (rows stay
  on the debounce).
- Guard against a stale join stealing the room: a fast table A->B switch could let A's
  async authorize finish after B, leave B, and strand the socket in A. Added a
  per-socket monotonic join generation checked after authorize (mirrors the file-doc
  relay's guard) + a test.

* feat(tables): live column width/pin/order sync

Collaborators now see each other's column resizes, pins, and reorders live —
the last piece of Google-Sheets-style layout parity.

- New lightweight `metadata` durable event kind (distinct from `schema`): only the
  table definition carries UI metadata, so peers refetch the definition alone — no
  rows/run-state refetch. The metadata PUT route now signals it.
- The grid reconciles server metadata against its in-progress gesture: the column
  being actively resized keeps its live local width, and an in-flight column drag
  blocks a reorder apply — so a peer's change never reverts the local action. Each
  field is reference-guarded (React Query structural sharing keeps unchanged
  sub-objects stable), so an unrelated peer change doesn't re-apply the others.

* fix(tables): escalate to schema signal when a reorder scrubs group deps

Independent audit of the metadata-sync commit found a stale-run-state hole: a
columnOrder PUT that moves a column left of a workflow group's leftmost column
makes updateTableMetadata scrub that group's dependencies and write a new schema —
a real structural change. But the route only fired the lightweight 'metadata'
signal (detail-only refetch), so peers' and the actor's activeDispatches /
enrichmentDetails queries stayed stale (a lingering running badge / enrichment
panel) — exactly what the 'schema' handler exists to prevent.

updateTableMetadata now reports whether it scrubbed the schema; the route emits
signalTableSchemaChanged in that case and the light signalTableMetadataChanged
otherwise. Width/pin/plain-reorder stay on the cheap detail-only path.

* feat(realtime): accurate in-file presence + collaborative-caret polish (#5965)

Per-session file-doc presence (avatars count other sessions like the canvas), StrictMode-safe stable Y.Doc (fixes blank-doc on join), flush caret cap + restored hover hit-slop, and three join-lifecycle race fixes unifying file-doc + workspace-files on one intent-tracked monotonic generation model. All findings root-caused with regression tests.

* feat(files): smarter bullet delete/indent and untitled-file title sync (#5971)

* improvement(files): smarter bullet delete/indent, fix empty-nested-bullet heading corruption

Backspace at the start of a list item now outdents a nested item or clears a
top-level item to a paragraph in place instead of deleting the row and jumping
the caret to the previous block; Enter on an empty nested item outdents. Empty
non-trailing top-level items still collapse cleanly since they cannot round-trip
as a lifted paragraph.

Also strips nested empty list-item marker lines on serialize: a nested empty
bullet re-parsed as a Setext heading underline, silently turning its parent line
into an H2 and dropping the bullet. Top-level empty items are preserved.

* feat(files): sync an untitled file's name with its leading heading

While a file is still named untitled(.md), typing a leading heading auto-renames
the file after it (debounced), and renaming the file first seeds a leading H1
from the new name. One-shot: coupling stops once the file has a real name, and
the heading seed always prepends so existing content is never clobbered.

* fix(files): count inline atoms in list-item emptiness, keep multi-block items on Backspace

Addresses review findings on the list Backspace logic:
- Emptiness now uses the caret block's content.size (counts inline images/mentions),
  not textContent, so a bullet holding only a non-text atom is no longer treated as
  empty and deleted.
- An empty first block whose item has sibling blocks removes only that block instead
  of lifting the whole item out of the list.

* fix(files): preserve the untitled to named heading seed across a rename during editor load

The parent captures the file name at mount (before content/session finish loading) and
passes it as the transition baseline, so a rename that lands in the loading window is still
seen as an untitled to named transition and the leading heading seed is not skipped.

* fix(files): drop the name-to-heading seed, keep title sync one-way

Removes the effect that inserted a leading H1 when an untitled file was renamed. On the
collaborative Files page every open client observed the untitled-to-named transition and
inserted into the shared doc, producing duplicate headings; it could also re-insert a heading
a user had just deleted while a rename was in flight. Seeding document content from an async
rename transition is the wrong model on a shared editor. The primary direction — typing a
leading heading renames a still-untitled file — is unaffected (it never mutates the doc).

* fix(files): keep empty lines between paragraphs on reload

The chunked markdown parser (parseMarkdownToDoc) parses each block stripped of the
blank lines between them, so it dropped the empty paragraphs @tiptap/markdown builds
from runs of blank lines — a saved visual blank line silently vanished on the next
load (the settle/reopen re-seed goes through the chunker). The whole-document parser
preserves them, but whether a gap yields an empty paragraph is a global, block-type-
dependent decision (kept between two paragraphs, dropped after a heading), so it can't
be reconstructed block-locally. Route documents with empty-paragraph blank-line spacing
to the whole-document parser for exact fidelity — the same tradeoff NON_CHUNKABLE makes;
ordinary single-blank-line separation still takes the fast chunked path. Adds a suite
asserting chunked output matches the whole-document parser for leading/trailing/between
gaps and around lists/headings.

* fix(files): only auto-name an untitled file when the user can edit

The debounced untitled→filename hook ran on every onUpdate — including the mount-time
seed and for view-only viewers — without checking edit permission, so a read-only user
could schedule a rename they have no permission to make (a spurious, server-rejected
write). Gate the derive-title on editor.isEditable (canEdit + settled + collab-ready,
the same signal the autosave path uses), at both schedule and fire time.

* fix(files): normalize line endings before the empty-paragraph guard; Enter/Backspace symmetry

- markdown-parse: EMPTY_PARAGRAPH_SPACING/NON_CHUNKABLE tested the raw body, but a classic
  \r-only file (blank lines are \r) would miss the \n-anchored guard and still be chunked,
  dropping empties. Normalize line endings once up front so the routing guards, the chunker,
  and the parser all see the same \n. +CRLF/CR test cases.
- keymap: Enter on an empty first block of a multi-block item now removes only that block
  (removeEmptyWrappedBlock) instead of exiting the list, mirroring the Backspace hasSiblingBlocks
  case — the trailing check no longer swallows multi-block items. +test.

* fix(files): editor audit follow-ups (trailing-blank read-only, collab rename, over-strip)

A 4-agent independent audit (UX vs inkeep + SOTA, cleanliness, adversarial correctness)
surfaced these:

- HIGH regression: files ending in a blank line opened READ-ONLY. The empty-paragraph
  routing preserved a TRAILING empty paragraph, but postProcess collapses trailing newlines
  → serialize/parse non-idempotent → isRoundTripSafe flipped the file read-only. A trailing
  empty paragraph can't be serialized stably, so parseMarkdownToDoc now strips trailing empty
  paragraphs and the guard no longer routes on trailing blanks. Interior/leading empties are
  unaffected. +regression tests.
- Medium: the debounced untitled→filename rename fired on remote Yjs edits too, so every peer
  renamed and could rename from a not-yet-synced heading. Gate on isChangeOrigin (local edits
  only; false for non-collab surfaces).
- Medium: stripEmptyListItemLines over-stripped a nested empty item that follows a same-indent
  sibling (a real placeholder the parser keeps). Narrowed to the actual Setext hazard — an empty
  item DIRECTLY under a shallower parent line — matching the function's own docstring intent.
  Probe-verified. +test.
- Low: corrected untitled-title.ts docstring that described a reverse name→heading coupling
  removed during review.

* fix(files): a remote edit must not cancel the local rename debounce

The isChangeOrigin gate cleared the debounce timer BEFORE bailing on a remote update, so
a peer's edit arriving within the 600ms window cancelled the local user's pending rename.
Bail on isChangeOrigin first, before touching the timer; only local edits clear/reschedule it.

* docs(files): correct EMPTY_PARAGRAPH_SPACING rationale after trailing-strip

The stacked trailing-empty-paragraph strip made the older comment overstate a
correctness necessity it no longer owns, mislabel trailing runs of 2+ blanks,
and advertise dead CRLF handling. Reword to match what the code actually does.

---------

Co-authored-by: Waleed Latif <walif6@gmail.com>

* fix(realtime): access-revalidation multi-room safety + cleanup pass

Fix a blocker surfaced by a full cleanup/simplify audit of the branch: the
access-revalidation sweep (staging's workflow-only #5917) treated every entry
in socket.rooms as a workflow id, but the generalized multi-room model puts
namespaced files/tables/file-doc rooms on the same io. It would resolve those
as bogus workflows, get null, and evict files/tables collaborators every ~30s.
collectScanTargets now decodes each room name with parseRoomName and sweeps
only workflow rooms; added a regression test and fixed the now-false TSDoc.

Other audit fixes (all behavior-preserving):
- workflow.ts reuses resolveAvatarUrl (drops db/user/eq imports duplicated
  from avatar.ts)
- PresenceAvatars: mr-1 was baked into the shared component, silently adding a
  margin to the workflow sidebar stack; moved to an optional layout className,
  re-applied on the tables/file-doc header surfaces only
- table DELETE routes only signal collaborators when rows were actually removed
  (matches PUT)
- events.ts definition kind: drop the never-emitted reason:'schema', fix its doc
- event-log: rename buildMemory -> buildEntry (it builds the entry on the Redis
  success path too, not just the memory fallback)
- remove dead resolveWorkspaceIdForRoom export; parallelize per-socket removals
  in handleWorkflowDeletion; gate the table columnIndexById map on remote
  selections; move file-doc module TSDoc off the FileDocOwner interface; fix a
  stale @returns

* fix(realtime,tables): close table-presence race + v1/copilot live-collab gaps

Validated each issue with subagents before implementing the cleanest fix.

- tables LEAVE in-flight-join race (B8): the table handler tracked no current-table
  intent, so an unscoped/same-table leave during an in-flight authorize left the
  socket stranded in the room (present in the roster, broadcasting a ghost until
  disconnect). Mirror workspace-files: a closure-local currentTableId + a leave that
  advances joinGeneration to cancel the racing join. + 3 regression tests.
- v1 + copilot live-collab signal gap (D1): tables edited via the v1 public API or
  Sim/copilot emitted no edit/schema signal, so open collaborators didn't live-update.
  Add the signals at those call sites (add-only, matching the existing route seam) —
  never in the service, so execution writes can't double-emit. Sync-only for copilot
  bulk ops, guarded on affected/deleted count; async job branches stay covered by
  their kind:'job' events; create/delete/get untouched.
- table join read consolidation (B5): sweepStalePresence returns its roster so the
  same-tab dedup reuses it instead of a second getRoomUsers.
- shared authorize slice (B6): extract only the guard-safe authorize->allowed branch
  into resolveRoomJoinAuth, shared by the three room handlers (the full preamble stays
  inline — file-doc's generation capture sits mid-ladder and must not move).
- resize-revert flicker (E3): a peer's value-less metadata event forces a refetch that
  could momentarily revert a just-finished local resize; a pendingWidthWriteRef keeps
  local widths leading until the width PUT settles.
- embedded-mode stray emit (E5): gate emitCellSelection on a bound table id so the
  embedded surface stops broadcasting cell selections the server drops.

* fix(tables): close two copilot live-collab signal gaps + harden presence sweep

Follow-ups from a comprehensive review of the branch:
- copilot batch_update_rows and import_file's inline append branch wrote rows
  but emitted no live-collab signal, so collaborators didn't see those edits
  live (the append's sibling replace branch already signalled). Add the guarded
  signal to both, matching the internal route.
- sweepStalePresence now reads the roster before the fetchSockets liveness probe
  and returns it on a probe failure, so same-tab dedup still runs during a
  transient fetchSockets outage instead of being skipped.
- reword an internal comment off the retired "mothership" term.

* fix(realtime): guard table join commit + rollback against supersession; drop no-op eviction cleanup

Review round on #5991:
- Table join re-checked the generation only once after authorize, then awaited
  leave/sweep/avatar before joining + registering presence. A table switch or
  leave in that window stranded the socket in the wrong room, and the failure
  catch could tear down a newer successful join. Resolve the avatar up-front,
  re-check generation immediately before the membership commit (matching the
  file-doc join), and skip the rollback/error for a superseded join. + a
  post-authorize-window regression test.
- access-revalidation cleanup treated removeUserFromRoom's no-op false as a
  transport failure and re-enqueued a still-connected socket forever. Only retry
  when the socket is still mapped to the room (a healthy null mapping means the
  entry is already gone). Repurposed the expired-mapping test to lock it.

* fix(realtime): guard table join leave-prior against superseding join

Round 2 on #5991: a superseded join's leave-prior could still run — during its
getRoomForSocket await a newer join commits to its room, so currentRoom is that
newer room and the superseded join would leave/remove/broadcast it before the
final guard aborts. Re-check the generation immediately after the lookup await,
before the leave mutation. Extended the post-authorize-window test to assert the
superseded join never tears down the newer join's room.

* fix(realtime): roll back a table join superseded during addUserToRoom

Round 3 on #5991: after the final generation guard, A could join + register
presence while a newer join B commits to its room during addUserToRoom's await
— B's leave-prior can't observe A's half-written entry, so A's late write wins
and strands the socket. Re-check after addUserToRoom and roll back A's own
Socket.IO join + presence (scoped to A's room, never touching B). + a regression
test hanging addUserToRoom mid-commit.

* refactor(realtime): DRY table-join supersession guards; fix stale comment

Cleanliness pass after the review rounds (no behavior change):
- Extract the four identical `joinGeneration !== joinAttempt || socket.disconnected`
  checks into a named `superseded()` helper (the catch keeps its intentionally
  narrower check).
- Remove a stale guard comment that was left stranded above the avatar resolve.
- Document the best-effort rollback catch.

* fix(realtime): file-doc rebind must not drop the current doc or leave a writable ghost

Two Cursor findings on the file-doc client-id ownership rebind:
- On a document switch, the prior room was left BEFORE the ownership check, so a
  CLIENT_ID_IN_USE rejection dropped the socket from the old doc without joining
  the new one (contradicting its own comment). Run the ownership check first, and
  leave the previous doc only once the rebind is guaranteed to succeed.
- Reclaiming a client id removed the stale prior socket from owners + awareness
  only; its socketToRoomName + Socket.IO membership remained, and handleMessage's
  SYNC path gates on socketToRoomName (not owners), so it stayed able to write
  document frames until disconnect. Fully evict the reclaimed socket. + 2 tests.

* refactor(realtime): serialize table join/leave to fix map-corruption at the root

Round 4 on #5991 surfaced a race the generation guards structurally cannot fix:
two concurrent joins for one socket race on the single-valued socket→room map —
a stalled addUserToRoom for table A lands late, clobbers a newer join's map entry
to A, and the rollback then wipes it, stranding the socket (map empty while it
holds table B). Guards protect JS suspension points; they can't stop an in-flight
Redis write from landing late.

Fix per architecture review: serialize this socket's JOIN + LEAVE on a per-socket
promise chain so their multi-step async Redis commits can never interleave —
restoring the atomic-commit property the synchronous sibling handlers get for free.
This DELETES the leave-prior guard and the post-commit rollback (the code that
caused the bug); four generation guards collapse to two identical superseded()
checks (skip a superseded queued op + one pre-commit check). Reworked the
interleaving-specific tests into a fast-switch-skips-superseded test; the leave-
cancels-join tests are unchanged. Local to the tables handler — no shared-infra change.

* fix(realtime): always roll back a failed table join; re-elect file-doc seeder on reclaim

Two review findings:
- Table join: the catch skipped rollback when superseded, but a socket.join that
  landed before addUserToRoom threw leaves the socket in the Socket.IO room with no
  matching socket->room map entry — unreclaimable by any later op (cleanup keys off
  the map). Under serialization the skip is unnecessary (the newer op hasn't
  committed), so always roll back. Simpler + fixes the strand.
- File-doc reclaim: fully evicting the prior socket didn't release the seeder role
  if it held it, so electSeederIfNeeded (which no-ops while seederSocketId is set)
  never re-elected and an unseeded doc stayed empty until the deadline. Clear the
  role on eviction so the join's election picks a new seeder. + 2 regression tests.

* fix(realtime): close revoke-race ghost presence in workflow join

An access-revalidation revoke landing between socket.join and addUserToRoom
socketsLeaves the socket while its presence mapping does not yet exist, so
cleanupEvictedSocket finds nothing to remove and the join then writes presence
for a socket already out of the room — a ghost collaborator until the stale
sweep. Hoist resolveAvatarUrl (the only await in that gap) above the re-auth
check so the whole re-auth -> socket.join -> addUserToRoom section is await-free,
matching the invariant the handler already relies on for the pre-join re-auth.
+ ordering regression test.

* refactor(realtime): serialize workflow join/leave; drop dead room-authz limb

Comprehensive independent audit follow-ups:

- workflow.ts join/leave now use the same opChain + joinGeneration serialization
  as the sibling handlers (tables, file-doc, workspace-files). It was the only
  async presence path left unserialized, so a rapid workflow switch A->B (or a
  leave racing an in-flight join) could strand presence in room A — a ghost
  collaborator still receiving A's operation broadcasts until disconnect. The
  join now aborts a superseded op at start and again right before the membership
  commit, and the catch always rolls back a partial join.
- leave-workflow drops the '&& session' gate: an idle user whose 1h session key
  expired (while the 24h room mapping is still live) can now leave cleanly
  instead of being stranded until disconnect. The room ref alone suffices.
- authorizeRoom: remove the dead ROOM_TYPES.WORKFLOW resolver + its
  getActiveWorkflowContext import. Workflow authorizes through its own path and
  never flows through authorizeRoom; the map now honestly covers only the
  workspace-scoped types (files, file-doc, table).
- Remove unused isSameRoom (zero callers) and a needless useMemo in
  PresenceAvatars (plain derivation, single copy).
- Tests: 4 workflow serialization/leave regressions.

All gates green: tsc (sim/realtime/packages) 0, 204 realtime + 11 protocol
tests, biome, api-validation, boundaries, prune 14/25.

* fix(realtime): align session TTL, harden committed joins from post-success rollback

Per-module comprehensive audit follow-ups:

- redis-manager: SESSION_TTL now tracks SOCKET_ROOMS_TTL (was 1h vs 24h). The room
  set outlived the session, and since getRoomForSocket reads the room set while the
  workflow handlers gate edits/presence on `room && session`, an active-but-idle
  collaborator got wedged into 'session expired' after 1h — sticky until reload
  (activity only EXPIREs the already-gone session; only addUserToRoom re-HSETs it).
  Both keys refresh together, so they now expire together (restores the pre-refactor
  consistency, where both shared one TTL).
- workflow.ts + tables.ts: a 'committed' flag stops the join catch from rolling back
  a genuinely-joined user when a trailing ack/broadcast/metric step fails on a Redis
  blip (a pure getUniqueUserCount log-metric failure could otherwise kick a live
  collaborator after success was already acked).
- workflow.ts: leave-prior now guards `currentRoom.id !== workflowId` (a same-workflow
  re-join no longer leave→re-adds and flickers peers' presence), and the join ack is
  liveness-filtered via filterVisiblePresence — both for parity with the tables handler.
- platform-authz: honest docstring + 400 message for the workspace-scoped-only
  authorizeRoom map (workflow authorizes via its own path).
- caret-presence: corrected an over-stated batching comment.
- +1 workflow regression test (post-success failure keeps the user joined).

Gates: tsc (sim/realtime/packages) 0, 205 realtime + 11 protocol tests, biome,
api-validation, boundaries, prune.

* fix(realtime): narrow join commit-guard to post-success; skip empty presence broadcast

Two Cursor findings on the prior audit-fix commit:

- The 'committed' guard in join-workflow/join-table was too broad: a failure
  BETWEEN the membership commit and the success ack (e.g. getWorkflowState) hit
  'if (committed) return' and emitted neither success nor error, hanging the
  client while it sat in the room. Replaced with the narrower shape: only the
  purely-decorative post-success steps (peer broadcast + log-metric) are wrapped
  best-effort; anything before the success ack still rolls back and surfaces a
  retryable error, so the client retries instead of hanging — while the original
  goal (a benign broadcast/metric blip never kicking a live, acked user) holds.
- broadcastPresenceUpdate read the roster via getRoomUsers, which swallows a Redis
  transport error to []. On a disconnect broadcast that emitted an empty roster and
  cleared every remaining collaborator's presence until the next healthy update.
  Split out a throwing readRoomUsers; broadcastPresenceUpdate now skips the
  broadcast on a read failure (getRoomUsers keeps its swallow contract).
- Tests: pre-success failure rolls back + retryable error (no hang); post-success
  failure keeps the user joined.

Gates: realtime tsc 0, 206 realtime tests, biome, boundaries, prune.

* fix(realtime): harden seeder recovery, join-generation, and misc robustness

Final line-by-line audit follow-ups (all LOW/MED, no P0/P1):

- file-doc: a sole client whose seed FETCH fails was added to triedSeeders,
  re-election found nobody, and the document stayed permanently empty until
  reload. Re-offer seeding a bounded number of rounds (MAX_SEED_ROUNDS) before
  giving up. Also bound clientId to a non-negative integer (it is an ownership key).
- tables + workspace-files: validate the room id BEFORE advancing joinGeneration,
  so a malformed/rejected join can't cancel a legitimate in-flight join.
- workflow + tables + workspace-files: suppress the client-facing join error when
  the op was already superseded (a retryable error naming the abandoned room could
  make a client re-join and cancel its newer join). The rollback still runs.
- redis-manager: set isConnected=true only after scriptLoad succeeds (and reset it
  on failure) so isReady() can't report ready while the Lua SHAs are null.
- connection: apply the presence-bearing filter to the manager-removed set too
  (symmetry with the fallback path).
- http.ts: validate workflowId on the four workflow endpoints (matching the files one).
- client: clear a pending join-retry timer before rescheduling (reconnect churn no
  longer orphans a stray extra join); clear caret fade timers on plugin destroy;
  seed-effect cleanup reports NOT-ready (safe direction).
- Tests: bounded seeder recovery, cell-selection strip-junk, TABLE round-trip,
  presenceEventName.

Gates: tsc (sim/realtime/packages) 0, 208 realtime + 12 protocol tests, biome,
api-validation, boundaries, prune.

* fix(realtime): gate isReady() on loaded script SHAs, not just connection

Follow-up to the prior isConnected change, which was incomplete: the redis client's
'ready' event flips isConnected=true on connect — before initialize() loads the Lua
scripts — so a bare isConnected check reports ready while removeUserFromRoom /
updateUserActivity would silently no-op on a null SHA. Gate isReady() on the SHAs
too, so the POST endpoints return a retryable 503 during that startup window instead
of proceeding against unloaded scripts. Standard readiness-probe discipline.

* fix(files): offline read-only fallback when the realtime doc never syncs

When the realtime server is unreachable (offline, server down, socket never connects),
the collaborative editor would sit blank and read-only forever — content only arrives
via provider sync events that never fire. Add a bounded connect-deadline to the Yjs
provider: if no first sync lands within CONNECT_DEADLINE_MS, latch fatal and emit a
synthetic non-retryable join-error — the exact path a real fatal rejection already uses,
which seeds the file's stored content read-only. Latching fatal also stops a late
reconnect from syncing server state in and merge-duplicating the locally-seeded content
(the documented Yjs 'non-empty doc ignores initial value' gotcha).

Deliberately NOT adding durable Yjs snapshot persistence / server-side seeding: TipTap
can't run the markdown->Yjs conversion server-side (Collaboration extension errors under
jsdom), and a durable binary snapshot would create a dual source of truth with the
markdown file (edited by copilot / PUT / download). The client-seeder + bounded
re-election is the correct architecture for a markdown-is-truth model; this closes its
one real user-facing gap without persistence, a migration, or dual-truth.

Timer cleared on first sync, on a real fatal rejection, and on destroy. +2 tests.

Gates: sim tsc 0, 496 editor tests, biome. Needs live offline->reconnect verification.

* fix(realtime): validate workflow join id before generation bump; scope file-doc join rollback to its target

Two Cursor findings:
- join-workflow bumped joinGeneration before validating workflowId (unlike tables /
  workspace-files, which I'd already fixed). A malformed/empty join could advance the
  counter and cancel a legitimate in-flight workflow switch. Validate the id first. +test.
- The file-doc join catch called cleanupFileDocForSocket unconditionally, which keys off
  socketToRoomName. During a document SWITCH that fails before rebinding (e.g. a throw in
  client-id reclaim), that binding still points at the socket's PRIOR, valid document —
  so the rollback tore down a document the socket was validly in. Only run that cleanup
  when the binding already points at THIS join's target; otherwise the socket never
  registered as an owner here and the only leftover is a freshly-created empty room,
  dropped by destroyRoomIfIdle.

Gates: realtime tsc 0, 209 tests, biome, boundaries, prune.

* fix(files): drop late sync frames once fatal; file-doc join error suppression + retry-budget reset

Final safety-audit findings:
- CRITICAL: FileDocProvider.handleMessage had no fatal guard. After the connect
  deadline latched fatal and the editor fell back to a read-only local seed, a
  late SyncStep2 (slow server / flaky network / deploy) was still applied — merging
  server state into the seeded doc (content duplication) and flipping synced=true,
  which un-gated autosave and would persist the duplicate to the real file. fatal
  guarded (re)join but not inbound sync. Now handleMessage returns early when fatal.
  +test (late SyncStep2 after the deadline is ignored, doc stays empty + gated).
- file-doc join catch now suppresses the client-facing error when superseded
  (matches workflow/tables/workspace-files) so a retryable error for an abandoned
  file can't make a client re-join and cancel the newer one.
- table/workspace-files room hooks reset the retry budget on (re)connect so a prior
  full exhaustion doesn't block retries after a reconnect.
- presence-visibility: corrected a stale TTL comment.

Gates: tsc (sim/realtime) 0, 209 realtime + collab/hooks suites, biome, boundaries, prune.

* feat(collab-doc): server-authoritative Yjs seeding (#6008)

Server-authoritative Yjs seeding for collaborative file documents: the realtime relay
fetches a Yjs seed built from the file's markdown (via the shared TipTap engine) and
applies it once per room, replacing the client-seeder election/handshake entirely.

- DOM-free markdown<->Yjs conversion core (markdownToYDoc / yDocToMarkdown /
  applyMarkdownToYDoc) reusing the client markdown engine for parity by construction
- Internal x-api-key seed endpoint + realtime fetch; single attempt bounded under the
  client readiness deadline, guard-release for join-driven retry, read-only fallback on
  persistent failure
- Client readiness gate = synced && server seed flag; jsdom wired for the Next standalone
  build (serverExternalPackages + outputFileTracingIncludes)

Foundation only — copilot-into-doc + markdown projection + durable persistence are Stage C.

* feat(collab-doc): Sim merge endpoint for copilot-into-doc (Stage C foundation)

buildFileDocMergeUpdate(docState, markdown) computes the minimal Yjs diff that turns a live
document into target markdown, via applyMarkdownToYDoc (a real updateYFragment diff, not a
replace) — so a copilot rewrite merges with concurrent user edits instead of clobbering them.
Exposed over the internal x-api-key /api/internal/file-doc/merge endpoint the realtime relay
will call: the relay owns the doc, the app owns the conversion engine, so the relay ships the
current state and applies the returned diff. Tested incl. concurrent-edit no-clobber.

* feat(collab-doc): realtime apply-edit — merge copilot markdown into a live doc

The relay can now stream a copilot edit into open editors: applyMarkdownToLiveFileDoc finds
the seeded live room, ships its state to the app's /merge endpoint for a minimal CRDT diff,
applies it (relaying to every editor, reconciled with concurrent user edits), and reports
'no-live-room' so the caller falls back to a direct file write when nothing is open.

- Generalize the realtime->app request module (file-doc-seed.ts -> file-doc-app.ts) with a
  shared POST helper + fetchFileDocSeed/fetchFileDocMerge
- POST /api/file-doc/apply-edit on the internal x-api-key HTTP surface, returning { applied }
- Tests for the seeded-room merge relay and the no-live-room fallback

* feat(collab-doc): stream copilot edits into open editors (Stage C)

edit_content now, after its durable file write, best-effort merges the same markdown into the
file's live collaborative document (markdown files only). If a collaborator has it open, the
edit streams into their editor as a CRDT merge — reconciled with their concurrent typing —
instead of the file silently changing under them; the editor's existing autosave mirrors the
merged doc back to the file. No-op when nothing is open. Never blocks or fails the edit.

* fix(collab-doc): strip frontmatter on merge; gate live-merge to markdown

- buildFileDocMergeUpdate now strips YAML frontmatter (splitFrontmatter().body) exactly as
  the seed does. Copilot passes full-file content, so without this the frontmatter merged
  into the doc as editor content and autosave wrote it back over the file (corruption).
- Gate the live-doc merge on isMarkdownFileName (new server-safe helper) instead of the
  over-broad !isDoc, so code/text edits don't pay the realtime round-trip for a format the
  collaborative editor never renders.

* fix(collab-doc): make frontmatter collaborative so a merge can't revert it

The editor re-attaches its open-time frontmatter on every autosave, so the Stage C merge
(which triggers an autosave with no user action) could write stale YAML back over a copilot
frontmatter change — silently dropping it.

Carry the file's frontmatter in the doc's config map instead of locking it at open: the seed
stores it, the merge updates it (only when it actually changed, preserving the no-op diff),
and the editor re-attaches THAT value on save — falling back to the locked copy before the
seed lands and for non-collaborative docs. A server-side frontmatter change is now reflected
rather than reverted. New FILE_DOC_SEED.frontmatterKey; seed/merge tests cover it.

* fix(collab-doc): re-sync draft on a frontmatter-only merge

A server edit that changes only the frontmatter updates the config map but not the body
fragment, so TipTap's onUpdate never fires — the autosave draft kept the stale open-time
frontmatter, and an explicit save could revert the live change. Observe the config map and,
on a frontmatter-only change, re-attach the new frontmatter to the current body and push a
fresh draft (guarded on a synced body so it never races the seed's own onUpdate).

* fix(collab-doc): order the apply-edit/merge timeouts (outer > inner)

The Sim->realtime apply-edit timeout (4s) was shorter than the nested realtime->Sim merge
timeout (8s), so the outer call could abort while the relay was still merging — the relay
then applied the merge after edit_content had returned, racing a follow-on edit.

Split the shared realtime->app timeout: the seed keeps 8s (it reads a cold blob), the merge
gets a tight 3s (it is a pure conversion, no I/O), and the outer apply-edit is raised to 6s
so it always outlives the inner merge. Cross-referenced in comments to prevent drift.

* fix(collab-doc): address deep-audit findings (jsdom trace, timeouts, gate, races)

A 4-agent LOC audit + precedent research (TipTap/Hocuspocus/Yjs docs confirm the core
patterns are idiomatic) surfaced these real issues:

- The /merge route also lazy-requires jsdom but was missing its outputFileTracingIncludes
  entry — a Docker/standalone build would 500 with MODULE_NOT_FOUND. Add it.
- The four conversion timeouts encoded an ordering invariant (merge<applyEdit, seed<readiness)
  living only in prose across two apps. Hoist to a shared FILE_DOC_TIMEOUTS in
  @sim/realtime-protocol with a test asserting the ordering; both apps import it.
- The copilot live-merge gate used an extension-only check, but the editor treats any
  text/markdown-MIME file as markdown. Replace isMarkdownFileName with a MIME-aware
  isMarkdownFile mirroring the client, so those files stream too.
- applyMarkdownToLiveFileDoc had no per-file serialization; overlapping merges could each
  diff the same stale snapshot and apply out of order. Serialize per file via a promise chain.
- Editor hardcoded 'config'/'initialContentLoaded' instead of FILE_DOC_SEED constants (drift).
- Add .max() bounds to the merge contract body; document the best-effort-merge failure window
  honestly (open editor + merge failure can drop a copilot edit until reload — closed by the
  deferred durable-doc work).

* feat(collab-doc): multi-replica shared Yjs backend + server-side markdown persistence

Make collaborative file-doc editing correct across multiple ECS tasks (the
per-process Y.Doc previously assumed one replica per file).

- Shared Yjs backend over Redis Streams (apps/realtime file-doc-store): each
  file's stream is the ordered, replayable log of updates; a multiplexed XREAD
  tailer converges every task's in-memory doc. Coordinated single-seeder
  election (SET NX + empty-stream recheck) fixes split-brain seeding.
- Doc-sync fans out to local clients + the stream; awareness stays on the
  Socket.IO adapter. Snapshot+XTRIM compaction trims only integrated entries.
- Server-side persistence: project the live doc back to markdown via a new
  /api/internal/file-doc/persist endpoint, debounced during editing and flushed
  on last-disconnect, from the authoritative stream state. Collaborative editors
  no longer client-autosave, closing the copilot clobber-window.
- Copilot merges apply through the stream (reach the live doc on any task) and
  serialize cross-task via a Redis merge lock.
- Degrades to the original single-replica behavior when REDIS_URL is unset.

* fix(collab-doc): harden distributed locks and durability from review

Address Greptile + Cursor review of the multi-replica backend:

- Merge lock: retry LONGER than the lock TTL (guaranteed acquisition, never
  merges against a shared base while a peer holds the lock) and AWAIT the stream
  write before releasing, so the next task never diffs a stale base.
- Distributed locks (seed/merge/compact) now use ownership tokens + a
  compare-and-delete release (Lua), so a lock that expired and was re-acquired by
  another task is never stolen; acquisition fails CLOSED on Redis error.
- Seed: publish the seed to the stream AWAITED under the lock before releasing,
  so a later seeder's empty-stream fence always sees it (closes the fence's
  publish-after-release gap); TTL kept at the readiness deadline.
- Persist: persist the AUTHORITATIVE stream state even when this task's local doc
  was never seeded, and capture the local fallback synchronously so a
  last-disconnect flush never encodes an already-destroyed doc.
- Publish: retry a transient xAdd failure so a Redis blip can't silently drop an
  edit from the shared log.

* fix(collab-doc): only persist a doc a user actually edited

Cursor review: a copilot durable write landing while a doc is being seeded could
have the stale seed projected back over it on last-disconnect, clobbering the
copilot edit even with no user changes.

Gate server-side persistence on a genuine user edit (socket-origin update): a
seed-only or merge-only doc is never projected back to the file (copilot writes
the file durably itself), so it can't clobber a concurrent external write.

* fix(collab-doc): close review-round race/durability gaps

Address Greptile P1 + Cursor findings:

- Seed publishes to the shared stream AWAITED *before* seeding the local doc, so
  a publish failure leaves the doc unseeded and the stream empty for a clean
  retry rather than serving an unpublished local seed a peer would re-seed over
  (split-brain).
- flushPersist falls back to the synchronously-captured local snapshot when
  getStreamState throws (not only when it returns null), so a transient Redis
  read no longer drops the final durable write as the room is torn down.
- streamHasContent fails CLOSED (returns true on xLen error): a Redis blip can no
  longer let the seed fence pass and double-seed.
- Client collabReady initializes from the collaborative prop, so a collaborative
  editor never has a mount-window where client autosave could clobber the server
  write.

* fix(collab-doc): unstick seed retry and persist tailed edits

Cursor review:

- ensureServerSeed clears serverSeedStarted when it aborts at the streamHasContent
  fence, so a fail-closed Redis xLen (or a genuine peer-seed) no longer strands the
  room unseeded with no retry.
- Persistence dirty-tracking now marks a doc edited on any post-seed update,
  including a peer's edit relayed via the tailer (REDIS_ORIGIN), tracked via a
  seededObserved flag. The last task to leave persists real edits even if it only
  tailed them; the seed transition itself is still never counted, so a
  seeded-but-unedited doc is never projected back over the file.

* fix(collab-doc): match client markdown post-processing on server persist

Cursor review: yDocToFileMarkdown serialized the body with yDocToMarkdown only,
but the editor save path runs postProcessSerializedMarkdown before applyFrontmatter.
Server persist could therefore write markdown differing from a client save (empty
list markers, callout un-escaping) — spurious blob churn / round-trip drift despite
the byte-identical claim.

Apply postProcessSerializedMarkdown in yDocToFileMarkdown so a server persist is
byte-identical to a client save and the client's dirty-check baseline. Add a
regression test guarding the composition.

* fix(collab-doc): close durability gaps at deploy boundaries + audit polish

From a comprehensive from-scratch audit (correctness, SOTA, cleanliness,
feature-completeness):

- Persist max-wait: a continuous edit burst kept resetting the 5s debounce and
  never persisted; cap it so a burst flushes at least every 20s, bounding
  unpersisted edits.
- Graceful-shutdown flush: flushAllFileDocRooms awaited in shutdown so a rolling
  deploy / scale-in secures open edited rooms to durable markdown before exit,
  instead of relying on the stream + a surviving task.
- Compacted-snapshot catch-up now marks the doc edited (REDIS_SNAPSHOT_ORIGIN): a
  snapshot folds seed+edits into one frame, so a task catching up purely from it
  no longer treats real edits as an unedited seed and skips persisting.
- Polish: delete dead __setFileDocStoreForTest; bounded retry loop; rename
  acquirePersistSlot -> tryClaimPersistWindow with accurate docs; tailer
  object-identity guard; fix stale comments (seed route, edit-content autosave).

* improvement(realtime): post-review fixes for collab dirty-state + relay lifecycle

- collab editor no longer latches a spurious 'Unsaved changes' prompt: report
  dirty only when the client owns durability (canAutosave), since in a
  collaborative session the relay persists the doc server-side
- guard shutdown against a double SIGINT/SIGTERM running teardown twice
- disconnect local sockets before httpServer.close so shutdown exits gracefully
  instead of hitting the forced-exit timer (local-only, deploy-safe)
- return 400 (not silent 200) on an invalid workspaceId in the files-changed fanout
- clear a pending join-retry timer on reconnect so it can't fire a duplicate join

* fix(realtime): make collab-doc seeding atomic to close split-brain window

An adversarial concurrency audit found a split-brain double-seed vector: the
seed used an advisory SET NX PX lock + a SEPARATE xLen fence + an unconditional
xAdd (a non-atomic check-then-append). If the seed lock's TTL expired mid-seed
(a >4s stall after the 8s seed fetch), a second task could acquire the freed
lock over a still-empty stream, both fences read empty, and both append seeds
with distinct Yjs client ids -> duplicated document content.

- add an atomic SEED_IF_EMPTY_SCRIPT (append-iff-empty in one Redis step) +
  store.seedIfEmpty(); the emptiness check and append are now inseparable, so
  two tasks racing (even both past an expired lock) can never both seed
- ensureServerSeed uses seedIfEmpty instead of streamHasContent-fence +
  publishAndWait; the seed lock is now purely an efficiency optimization
  (avoid a duplicate fetch), not a correctness dependency
- fix the misleading comment that claimed a copilot merge is not counted as an
  edit in the multi-replica path (it round-trips as REDIS_ORIGIN and does count;
  a safe idempotent over-persist, never a lost edit)
- add interleaving tests: seedIfEmpty atomicity/fence, the split-brain
  regression under an expired lock, a peer edit during attach catch-up, and
  concurrent two-task compaction

* docs(realtime): align seed comments with the atomic-append correctness model

Greptile flagged lingering doc drift: the module + shouldSeed comments still
credited the seed lock + empty-stream check as the split-brain fix. Reframe them
so the atomic seedIfEmpty is the exactly-once guarantee and shouldSeed is an
efficiency gate only.

* feat(realtime): live workspace tables list, sharing one invalidation-room impl (#6053)

* feat(realtime): live workspace tables list, sharing one invalidation-room impl

Bring the tables list to parity with the files list: a create/rename/move/delete/
restore now propagates to every viewer live instead of waiting out the 30s
staleTime. Following the files pattern, but factoring the two into one shared
implementation rather than copy-pasting.

- add ROOM_TYPES.WORKSPACE_TABLES + its authz resolver (workspace-id-addressed,
  reuses the workspace resolver like workspace-files)
- extract setupWorkspaceInvalidationRoom (server) and useWorkspaceInvalidationRoom
  (client) — the presence-free, workspace-scoped live-list room; files and tables
  now both bind to it, so they can never drift. Event/room names derive from the
  room type. Replaces the standalone workspace-files handler + hook
- notifyWorkspaceTablesChanged fanout fired from the table service (createTable,
  renameTable, moveTableToFolder, deleteTable, restoreTable) so it covers both the
  HTTP routes AND copilot, which call the service directly
- relay /api/workspace-tables-changed endpoint; wire the hook into the tables page
- consolidate the handler test into one suite run against both room types

* feat(realtime): live tables list also covers table-folder mutations

Fold in the follow-up: a table folder create/rename/move/delete/restore now
propagates to the tables list live too, so the browser is fully consistent.

- generic notifyFolderResourceChanged(resourceType, workspaceId) dispatches the
  workspace live-list signal by resource type (a map, not a special-case if), so
  file/knowledge_base/workflow are no-ops today and gain liveness by adding a map
  entry when they adopt an invalidation room
- fired from the shared folder lifecycle (createFolder/updateFolder/deleteFolder/
  restoreFolder), covering routes AND copilot
- the tables room hook now invalidates the table folders query too, not just the
  tables list, since the page renders both

* fix(realtime): skip per-table live-list notify during a folder cascade

A folder delete/restore already fires one folder-level notifyFolderResourceChanged
for the whole subtree, but the cascade also calls deleteTable/restoreTable per
table — each awaiting its own notifyWorkspaceTablesChanged. A folder with many
tables would run N+1 sequential relay calls (each bounded by NOTIFY_TIMEOUT_MS),
blocking the mutation. Add a skipNotify option the cascade passes so only the one
folder-level notify fires.

* feat(collab-doc): Hocuspocus binary persistence + Next 16 seed/persist fixes (#6059)

* fix(collab-doc): make server-side seed conversion work under Next 16 / Turbopack

Opening a file left both collaborators read-only and stalled ~12s: the server-side
seed (markdown -> Yjs, run through the headless editor engine) was failing, so the
doc never seeded and the editor never left its readiness gate. Two root causes,
both latent until a real build/runtime (typecheck + unit tests don't exercise
either), surfaced by the Next 16 upgrade:

1. Build boundary: the server seed route imported the shared editor schema
   (`createMarkdownContentExtensions`), which pulled in the React node-view
   components (`useEffect`) -> 'client component in a Server Component'. Split each
   node's React-free schema into its own `*-schema.ts` (code-block, image,
   raw-markdown-snippet); the client editor still injects the React node views via
   the existing `nodeViews` param, unchanged.

2. Runtime DOM: the converter installs a jsdom `window` on `globalThis`, but
   Turbopack's server bundle gives bundled `@tiptap/core` a `window` that does NOT
   read `globalThis`, so `elementFromString` threw 'no window object available'.
   Externalize the `@tiptap/*` packages the converter uses (native Node require, so
   their `window` reads the real global) and fix the converter's DOM guard to gate
   on `window` (what TipTap checks) with no sticky flag.

Verified: seed route returns 200 with the Yjs update; 514 collab-doc + editor tests
pass; schema byte-identical after the split.

* feat(collab-doc): persist the Yjs binary and load it on cold-start (Hocuspocus pattern)

Adopt the industry-standard Hocuspocus store/load-document pattern so a cold room
open loads the file's last-persisted Yjs binary directly instead of re-converting
markdown -> Yjs on every open. Rebuilding the CRDT from markdown on each connect is
the exact anti-pattern Tiptap/Yjs warn against (fresh client ids -> duplicated
content); it also forced the fragile server-side headless-editor conversion on every
open. Now conversion runs only on a genuine first open or an external markdown edit.

- new table workspace_file_collab_state(file_id PK->workspace_files cascade,
  doc_state bytea, source_hash, updated_at): the Yjs binary + a hash of the markdown
  it was derived from (bounded <=~1MB by the 256KB round-trip gate). Mirrors
  Hocuspocus's extension-database (binary in a DB column). Migration 0275.
- persist upserts the binary (tagged with the exact markdown just written)
- cold-start seed returns the cached binary when its source_hash matches the file's
  current markdown; otherwise converts (and the next persist refreshes the cache)
- also externalize yjs / y-protocols / lib0 alongside @tiptap: bundling loaded a
  second yjs copy, so @tiptap/y-tiptap's 'instanceof Y.XmlElement' failed on
  app-created nodes ('Unexpected case') during Yjs -> markdown

Verified end-to-end: seed -> persist -> seed returns the exact persisted binary (a
cache hit, no re-conversion). 18 collab-doc + 51 realtime file-doc tests pass.

* fix(collab-doc): best-effort cache read + drop dead barrel

- seed: a cache-read failure (transient DB error, not-yet-migrated cache table)
  no longer aborts a cold room open — the durable markdown is already in hand, so
  fall through to conversion. Symmetric with persist's best-effort cache write.
  Addresses the Cursor Bugbot finding on the read/write asymmetry.
- remove the collab-doc index.ts barrel: nothing imported it (every consumer uses
  direct ./seed / ./merge / ./converter imports), so it was dead re-export surface.
  De-export COLLAB_DOC_FIELD accordingly — it is used only inside converter.ts.

* fix(collab-doc): stream every external file write into open editors, not just edit_content (#6070)

* fix(collab-doc): stream every external file write into open editors, not just edit_content

A copilot/mothership edit to an open markdown file did not appear live in another
user's editor: the live-doc merge bridge (mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc) was wired into the
edit_content tool ONLY. Every other server-side write — the file tool
(/api/tools/file/manage), function_execute (/api/function/execute via
writeWorkspaceFileByPath), create_file overwrite, and the PUT /content route — went
straight to updateWorkspaceFileContent and skipped the merge, so the durable file
changed but the open editor never updated. Confirmed from live logs (the mothership
'Prepend sentence' ran read + file + function_execute — zero apply-edit calls) and
Redis (the prepended text was absent from the doc stream).

Centralize the merge at the one chokepoint every external writer shares:
- updateWorkspaceFileContent gains an opt-out "syncLiveDoc" (default on) and, after
  the durable write, merges markdown writes into any open collaborative doc (best-effort;
  no-op when nobody has it open). Any current OR future writer is covered automatically.
- persist.ts opts out (syncLiveDoc:false) — it IS the doc→markdown projection, so merging
  it back would be a persist→merge→persist self-loop.
- create_file opts its empty shell out (real content arrives via a later write) so an open
  editor never flickers to empty on overwrite; threaded through writeWorkspaceFileByPath.
- edit_content drops its now-redundant explicit merge call (the chokepoint handles it).
- binary writers (image/video/audio/ffmpeg/download) are naturally excluded — the merge is
  gated to markdown, the only format the collaborative editor renders.

Also bump the api-validation route baseline 994→996 to match the true route count already
on this branch (pre-existing ratchet drift from an earlier merge; NOT added by this PR).

* fix(collab-doc): defer setEditable out of the render phase (flushSync warning)

The collab editability-reapply effect called editor.setEditable synchronously. In collab
mode isEditable flips from readiness (synced + seeded), which is driven by a Yjs
config.observe firing synchronously inside Y.applyUpdate — so the effect can run while React
is mid-render. TipTap's React binding commits setEditable's transaction with flushSync, which
throws "flushSync was called from inside a lifecycle method. React cannot flush when React is
already rendering." Defer the setEditable to a microtask (runs right after the current commit,
before paint), guarding against a destroyed editor or a stale value before it fires.

Only the collab path (this effect) hit the warning; the streaming/settle effect's setEditable
calls run on the non-collab path where isEditable isn't driven by a mid-render Yjs observer.

* fix(rich-markdown-editor): defer non-collab settle/stream mutations off the render phase (flushSync) (#6073)

* fix(rich-markdown-editor): defer non-collab settle/stream mutations off the render phase (flushSync)

The non-collaborative streaming/settle effect called editor.setContent / setEditable /
setTextSelection / focus directly in the effect body. setContent mounts the custom node views
synchronously through the @tiptap/react flushSync path (tiptap#3764), so when this effect runs
while React is mid-render it throws "flushSync was called from inside a lifecycle method." This
is the second flushSync source (the collab editability effect was the first, fixed separately);
it fires on the agent-streaming-into-a-non-collab-editor surface.

Defer the effect-body view mutations to a microtask via a small runOffRender helper (runs right
after the current commit, before paint; no-ops if the editor was torn down). The settle block is
deferred as ONE microtask so setContent -> collapse selection -> setEditable -> focus keep their
order. The streaming rAF tick is left untouched — it already runs off-render, so it keeps writing
content directly. queueMicrotask is TipTap's own documented remedy for this warning.

497 rich-markdown-editor tests (incl. stream-settle-selection) pass; tsc + lint + api-validation
+ boundary + prune green. Needs a live check: stream an agent into a non-collab markdown file and
confirm it still renders smoothly.

* chore(rich-markdown-editor): trim verbose flushSync-defer comments

* fix(rich-markdown-editor): drop superseded settle/stream microtasks via a run token

runOffRender previously only guarded editor.isDestroyed, so if React ran the next reconcile
pass (a newer stream or settle) before a queued microtask flushed, the stale microtask could
still apply setContent/setEditable/setTextSelection over the newer state. Tag each effect run
with an incrementing token; a deferred mutation applies only when its run is still the latest
(and the editor is alive). A run token fits this effect's several early-return exits better
than a per-exit cleanup flag. Addresses Greptile/Cursor review.

* fix(rich-markdown-editor): never drop the settle selection-collapse under a superseded run

The run token drops a superseded settle's microtask, but the settle had already flipped its state
flags synchronously — so a pre-empting steady-sync run took the non-settle path and never collapsed
the selection, leaving a post-stream select-all painting the leaf-in-selection decoration. Track the
collapse as a debt (pendingCollapseRef): whichever deferred run ultimately applies — settle or the
steady-sync path — clears it, so the collapse runs exactly once on the latest content. Addresses the
Cursor review finding.

* feat(tables): show live cell-selection carets in the embedded chat panel (#6081)

The table cell-selection presence room was joined only on the dedicated /tables/[id] page
(useTableRoom was passed an empty id in embedded mode). Join it in embedded too, so the
mothership chat resource panel shows collaborators' live cell selections and broadcasts the
local one. tableId is already resolved from props in embedded (the data event stream already
uses it un-gated), and authz runs on join, so this is safe. Avatars are unaffected — they
render only in the !embedded Resource.Header, so the panel gets carets without avatars.

* feat(collab-doc): If-Match optimistic concurrency so persist never clobbers an out-of-band edit (#6085)

* feat(collab-doc): optimistic-concurrency guard so persist never clobbers an out-of-band edit

The relay projected the live Yjs doc back to durable markdown unconditionally (last-write-wins), so
a persist already in flight when an external write landed could overwrite it. Add RFC 7232 If-Match
optimistic concurrency end to end, reconciling through the CRDT (never rejecting user work):

- updateWorkspaceFileContent gains an expectedUpdatedAt guard: the write commits only if the file is
  still at that version (checked against the SELECT ... FOR UPDATE-locked row, so it is atomic with
  the write), else it throws the new ContentVersionConflictError without clobbering.
- persistFileDoc takes expectedVersion and returns a discriminated result (persisted | missing |
  conflict). On conflict it returns the current durable content + version instead of writing.
- The relay tracks the durable version its live doc is synced to — set on seed, advanced when a
  durable write is merged in (apply-edit carries the version), and on each successful persist. It is
  held cluster-wide in Redis (filedoc:syncver:{name}) so whichever task persists reads the same
  version, with the per-room value as the single-pod fallback.
- flushPersist sends that version as If-Match. On a conflict it merges the current durable content
  into the live doc (so the out-of-band edit AND the live edits converge) and retries (bounded), so
  even a last-leave flush racing an external write persists the reconciled result rather than losing
  the session's edits.

Threads the version through the seed + persist contracts and the apply-edit payload. No schema change
(reuses workspace_files.updatedAt as the version token). Tests: app-side CAS (match writes, mismatch
throws + cleans up the orphan upload), relay conflict handled gracefully without clobber/loop; 236
realtime + 76 sim collab/uploads tests, tsc x2, lint, api-validation, boundaries, prune all green.

* chore(collab-doc): heartbeat-refresh the synced-version key TTL alongside its stream

Keep filedoc:syncver:{name} alive as long as the room's stream (it was only re-set on
seed/merge/persist), so an open-but-idle doc's persist If-Match token can't expire and force a
needless reconcile.

* fix(collab-doc): stop persist-conflict retries when there is no live doc to reconcile

On an If-Match conflict with no live doc to reconcile into (last collaborator gone, no shared
stream), applyMarkdownToLiveFileDoc returns no-live-room; re-projecting the same pre-teardown
snapshot would only re-conflict, so break the retry loop immediately and leave the out-of-band
(durable) content authoritative — the intended conflict policy. Addresses Greptile review.

* fix(collab-doc): close three optimistic-concurrency edge cases from review

- Single-pod persist retry projected the pre-reconcile snapshot (captureState always returned the
  initial localState), while the synced version had been advanced by the reconcile — so the If-Match
  could pass and clobber the reconciled edit. captureState now re-reads the live doc on each attempt
  (falling back to the pre-teardown snapshot only once the room is gone).
- The synced version was recorded from this task's own seed FETCH before knowing whether this task's
  seed actually won; a peer winning with a different version could leave a newer token than the stream
  content. Record it only inside the didSeed branch (the task whose seed won); peer-seeded tasks read
  the winner's cluster value.
- Persist wrote UNCONDITIONALLY when no version was available (relay version momentarily missing), which
  could clobber non-empty durable content. It now returns conflict for a non-empty file with no version
  (reconcile/retry once the version is re-established); an empty file's first write stays unconditional.

* fix(collab-doc): defer (not reconcile) on missing version, and use the freshest version token

- Missing-version persist now returns 'deferred' instead of 'conflict'. A missing version token (a
  Redis blip on a peer-seeded task) is NOT a genuine out-of-band change, so triggering a reconcile
  would wipe live edits (incoming-wins) even though nothing changed durably. Deferred means: don't
  write, don't reconcile — leave the edits in the stream and let a later persist write them once the
  version is re-established.
- currentVersion now takes the MAX of the cluster (Redis) and local room versions rather than always
  preferring Redis, so a lagged/failed fire-and-forget Redis set can't shadow a newer local value and
  cause spurious If-Match conflicts. Versions are monotonic epoch-ms, so the larger is the later sync.

* fix(collab-doc): make persist If-Match teardown-race-immune and recover missing version on final flush

Close two last-leave concurrency holes Cursor flagged:

- Thread the reconciled version LOCALLY through the persist retry loop. After a
  conflict+reconcile the correct next If-Match is exactly result.version, so carry
  it in a local var instead of re-deriving from room.syncedVersion/Redis. On a
  last-leave flush destroyRoomIfIdle removes the room from the map before the async
  flush finishes, so mergeMarkdownIntoRoom's recordVersion can no longer update
  room.syncedVersion — threading makes each retry's precondition correct by
  construction, immune to that dropped mutation and to a best-effort Redis re-read.

- Cache the resolved version back into room.syncedVersion in currentVersion() so a
  peer-seeded/tail-only task (which never sets it locally) or a later transient
  Redis read failure still resolves it from the last value seen (monotonic max,
  never regresses).

- On a FINAL flush, briefly retry resolving the If-Match when the version read
  momentarily fails, rather than deferring and stranding the session's edits in the
  TTL'd stream — the version is cluster-wide and heartbeat-refreshed.

* fix(collab-doc): stamp cluster sync version the moment the seed wins, before the liveness guard

The winning seeder set the If-Match token (room + Redis filedoc:syncver) only after the
liveness/seeded guard that follows seedIfEmpty. But the tailer can integrate the just-appended
seed DURING the seedIfEmpty await, so isDocSeeded(room.doc) is already true when the guard runs
and it returns early — leaving the stream holding seed content with no cluster version. Later
persists then send no If-Match, the app returns `deferred`, and session edits stay only in the
TTL'd stream (the exact stranding this PR prevents elsewhere).

Move the version stamp to immediately after seedIfEmpty wins, before the guard. Recording it only
once our seed won (not from the fetch) is preserved, so it still can't shadow a peer's winning
seed.

* fix(collab-doc): make the synced-version token monotonic at every write site

The If-Match token is written fire-and-forget from the seed stamp, merges, and persists, both
locally and to Redis. An out-of-order write (e.g. a seed's lagged setSyncedVersion landing after a
later merge's) could regress it below the version the live doc already incorporates, causing
spurious If-Match conflicts — and on a last-leave flush with no live room to reconcile into, a
spurious conflict leaves durable authoritative and drops the session's edits.

- setSyncedVersion now writes via SET_VERSION_IF_NEWER_SCRIPT (Redis-side compare-and-set): it
  overwrites only when the new value is greater, refreshing the TTL either way.
- recordVersion / the persisted branch / the seed stamp all take Math.max instead of assigning
  room.syncedVersion directly.

Versions are monotonic epoch-ms, so "newer" is a plain numeric compare, exact within a Lua double.

* fix(collab-doc): close three last-leave persist edge cases from review

- Stale snapshot after reconcile (High): the multi-task captureState fell back to the pre-await
  localState snapshot even after a reconcile advanced ifMatch, so a failed stream re-read could
  persist the pre-reconcile state against the new version and clobber the out-of-band edit the
  reconcile just incorporated. NULL localState after a reconcile so a failed read aborts instead.

- Lock miss aborts reconcile (Medium): a merge-lock acquisition failure returned 'no-live-room',
  indistinguishable from an absent stream, so flushPersist treated transient contention as
  terminal. Return a distinct 'merge-unavailable' and handle it as retry-later (edits stay in the
  stream), never as "nothing to reconcile into".

- Peer syncver never recovers (Medium): the winner's setSyncedVersion was fire-and-forget with
  swallowed errors — the only way a peer-seeded task learns the durable version — so a dropped
  write left that peer deferring forever. Make it retry (bounded) like appendUpdate/seedIfEmpty;
  the monotonic script keeps a racing retry a no-op.

* fix(collab-doc): scope the persist If-Match to a content version so metadata bumps can't clobber edits

The optimistic-concurrency validator was `updatedAt`, which rename/move/delete/restore also bump
with no content change. A racing live-doc persist then saw a stale token, got `conflict`,
reconciled the pre-edit durable body via updateYFragment (incoming-wins on overlap), and wiped the
user's in-flight edits.

Scope the validator to content (RFC 7232 semantics — validate the representation, not the row):
- New `workspace_files.content_updated_at` (NOT NULL, `now()` fast-default — no table rewrite).
  Advances ONLY on content writes (upload / overwrite / create); metadata writes never touch it.
- The FOR UPDATE CAS, the merge-notify version, and the seed version all use `content_updated_at`.
  A rename now leaves it unchanged, so the persist If-Match still matches -> no spurious conflict,
  no reconcile, no lost edits. Genuine out-of-band content writes still conflict and reconcile.
- Consolidated the collab schema into one migration (the collab-state table + the new column) per
  request, rather than a separate follow-up migration.

Relay/store/contracts unchanged (still a numeric monotonic version).

* chore(collab-doc): condense the densest persist comments (no behavior change)

Cleanup pass: tighten the three longest comment blocks added while hardening the persist path
(currentVersion cache, ifMatch threading, final-flush version retry) without dropping any invariant.
No dead code found (biome lint clean; all new symbols referenced).

* fix(collab-doc): persist must return the content version, not updatedAt

Follow-up to the content-scoped If-Match: persistFileDoc still returned `updatedAt` as the version
in both the persisted and conflict results, while the CAS/seed/merge all guard on
`content_updated_at`. A content write sets both to the same instant, so it was coincidentally
correct — until they diverge: if a metadata write bumps `updatedAt` past `content_updated_at`, the
conflict path returned the larger `updatedAt`, so the relay's re-persist sent an If-Match the CAS
(which checks `content_updated_at`) could never match → perpetual conflict → dropped reconciled
edits. Return `contentUpdatedAt` in both paths so the relay's token always matches what it's checked
against.

* fix(collab-doc): defer persist whenever the version is missing; guard the content-version test

- Empty-file CAS race (Medium): the unconditional-write carve-out for size===0 read `record.size`
  outside the write transaction, so a concurrent first content write could land after the check and
  be clobbered. With content_updated_at NOT NULL every existing file always has a real version, so a
  missing expectedVersion is always transient — always defer, never write unconditionally. Removes
  the TOCTOU hole.
- Content-version test (Low): the merge-chokepoint test kept updatedAt == contentUpdatedAt, so it
  passed even if wired to the wrong field. Mock distinct values and assert contentUpdatedAt, so a
  regression to updatedAt now fails the test.

* fix(collab-doc): don't reconcile a conflict the live doc already reflects (would wipe newer edits)

flushPersist reconciled the durable body into the live doc on every conflict. But when the conflict
comes from a racing self-persist (or an apply-edit the chokepoint already merged), the durable body
is a STALE SUBSET of the live stream, and the incoming-wins updateYFragment merge moves the doc
backward — wiping newer in-flight edits, which the retry then persists.

Before reconciling, re-check the freshest synced version. If it already covers the conflict version,
the live doc has already incorporated that content (or is ahead), so skip the reconcile and just retry
with the freshest version as If-Match — the re-projection captures the current live stream, preserving
every edit. Only a genuine out-of-band change the live doc hasn't incorporated (freshest < conflict
version) is reconciled in. freshest never exceeds the durable version, so this can't loop.

* fix(collab-doc): make content_updated_at monotonic per file; skip-reconcile can't loop

The If-Match token was stamped with app-local new Date() on each content write, so cross-instance
clock skew could stamp a later write with an EARLIER content_updated_at — breaking the version
ordering the whole optimistic-concurrency scheme (and the skip-reconcile branch's freshest>=version
assumption) depends on. Under skew the relay's monotonic syncedVersion could exceed the durable
version, sticking the If-Match: persist conflicts forever, exhausts retries, drops the session's edits.

- Stamp content_updated_at strictly after the current committed value (we hold the row's FOR UPDATE
  lock): new Date(max(now, currentFile.contentUpdatedAt + 1ms)). Monotonic per file regardless of
  clocks; also removes same-millisecond collisions. updatedAt stays plain wall-clock (display/sort).
- Skip-reconcile branch retries with result.version (the durable value the CAS will match), never
  freshest (which could exceed it and loop). Belt-and-suspenders now that the version is monotonic.

* refactor(collab-doc): drop the destructive in-persist reconcile; adopt-version-and-retry on conflict

The in-persist reconcile projected the durable body back over the live doc via updateYFragment
("make the doc match"). That is destructive: when the live stream is already ahead — the common case,
because the write chokepoint (mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc) already merged the out-of-band change into the
stream — it moved the doc backward and wiped newer in-flight edits. This produced a run of races
(stale snapshot, wipe-newer-edits, version-lag skip miss) that a full-document reconcile fundamentally
can't avoid, since deciding when it's safe relies on a laggy cross-task version token.

Remove it. On conflict, adopt the durable version as the new If-Match and retry: captureState re-reads
the current stream (which holds the out-of-band change AND the live edits), so the re-projection
persists the converged result. The durable change reaches the live doc via the chokepoint, never here.
Trade-off: the only unmerged out-of-band write is one whose chokepoint merge itself failed (rare,
logged), which we accept over the frequent reconcile-wipes-edits race.

- flushPersist: conflict -> ifMatch = result.version, retry (bounded). No applyMarkdownToLiveFileDoc.
- conflict response drops `markdown` (contract + relay type + persist) — no body needed, saves a blob
  fetch. applyMarkdownToLiveFileDoc stays (still used by the apply-edit route / the chokepoint).

* fix(collab-doc): don't let a last-leave conflict retry clobber via the stale local snapshot

Regression from dropping the reconcile: on conflict the retry adopts result.version and re-reads
captureState. But after single-pod last-leave teardown the room is already destroyed, so captureState
falls back to the pre-teardown localState (which lacks the out-of-band change); the retry then CAS-passes
and overwrites the committed external write — undoing the external-wins last-leave policy.

Null localState on the first conflict, so the retry can only use freshly-read authoritative state
(stream / live doc). When none is available (single-pod room gone, or a transient stream-read failure)
captureState returns null and the retry stops, leaving durable content authoritative. Covers both the
single-pod and multi-task-stream-unavailable variants of the stale-snapshot clobber.

* fix(collab-doc): stop (don't re-persist) on a persist conflict — closes the commit-window clobber

The conflict retry adopted the durable version and immediately re-persisted the current stream,
assuming the stream already held the out-of-band change. But an external write commits durable BEFORE
its chokepoint merge (mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc) reaches the stream, so a persist landing in that window
CAS-passed with a stream that still lacked the external content and clobbered the committed write — not
just the rare merge-failed path, but a race on every external write, worst at last-leave flushes.

Make persist a single attempt: on conflict, STOP and leave durable authoritative. The chokepoint merges
the change into the stream and — only once it is actually there — advances the synced version via its own
recordVersion; a later flush (debounced or final) then projects the converged stream with a matching
token. The session's edits stay in the stream meanwhile. The conflict handler deliberately does NOT
advance the synced version, or the next flush would clobber with a still-behind stream. Removes the retry
loop and PERSIST_CONFLICT_RETRIES.

* improvement(tables): fire the live-rows signal on async delete, run cancel, and column run (#6094)

* improvement(tables): fire the live-rows signal on async delete, run cancel, and column run

These three table operations mutate row data but emitted no `rows` change signal, so open editors'
grids stayed stale until a manual refresh (enrichment *results* already stream live via `cell` events;
these are the bulk paths that don't emit per-cell events):

- Async row delete (`runTableDelete`): signal as rows drop out (throttled with the existing progress
  event) and once more on completion — the `job` progress event only drives the delete meter, not the
  rows query. Covers the delete-async route and the copilot bulk-delete, since both share the runner.
- Cancel runs (`cancel-runs` route): cancelling clears each affected row's exec state; the
  `dispatch: cancelled` events drop the run overlay but the client then renders authoritative DB state,
  so refetch. Only when something was actually cancelled.
- Run column (`columns/run` route): starting a run bulk-clears the target group's cells to pending;
  refetch so the cleared cells show. Only when a dispatch was actually created.

Guarded so no signal fires on a no-op/failure. Adds a delete-runner test asserting the completion signal.

* fix(tables): guarantee the live-rows signal on every mutating path (review)

- Delete runner (Greptile P1): a batch could commit and the job then cancel/supersede before the next
  throttled progress signal or `markJobReady`, bypassing both signals and leaving deleted rows on
  screen. Track `deletedAny` and fire the grid refetch in a `finally`, so it runs on EVERY exit —
  completion, cancel/supersede, mid-batch lock, or a rethrown error after a partial delete.
- cancel-runs / columns/run routes (Cursor): the `cancelled > 0` / `if (dispatchId)` guards don't
  always reflect DB row changes — cancel tombstones exec state even when 0 dispatches were active, and
  a run bulk-clears cells then can return a null dispatchId. Signal unconditionally; a stale-but-harmless
  refetch beats a missed one.
- Tests: assert the delete signal fires on the mid-run-cancel-after-delete path and NOT when nothing
  was deleted.

* fix(tables): mark deletedAny before the page delete so a mid-page lock still refreshes the grid

`deletePageByIds` commits in internal batches, so a delete lock landing mid-page can persist earlier
batches and THEN throw TableLockedError — the catch returns without a count, so setting `deletedAny`
from the return value missed it and the finally skipped the grid refetch. Set `deletedAny = true` before
the call (any attempt may commit rows); an attempt that commits nothing only over-refetches (harmless).
Adds a test asserting the signal fires when a page throws a mid-page lock.

* fix(files): make embedded resource file view collaborative (#6095)

* fix(files): make embedded resource file view collaborative

The /chat resource panel rendered saved files through FileViewer without
the collaborative opt-in, so a file open on the Files page and the same
file open in the embedded panel never joined the same file-doc room —
no live carets and no live content sync between the two surfaces.

Pass collaborative on the EmbeddedFile FileViewer. Collaboration still
self-gates on canEdit + non-streaming + workspace doc, so the agent
token-stream preview (the dedicated streaming-file path, canEdit=false)
is untouched.

* fix(files): refcount file-doc room membership per shared socket

Two collaborative surfaces in one tab (the Files editor and the embedded
chat resource panel) share one Socket.IO connection, so both providers for
the same file JOIN the same room over that socket. The server's LEAVE does
socket.leave(name) with no membership refcount, so the first provider's
destroy() would strand the second still-mounted one — no more live content
or presence.

Count live providers per file per socket (keyed by the stable Socket object,
so it survives reconnects) and emit LEAVE only when the last provider for a
file tears down. The single-provider path is unchanged (0->1->0).

* feat(tables): propagate shared saved-view changes to collaborators live (#6100)

Table views (named filter/sort/layout presets) are table-wide shared state —
every reader sees every view — but view create/update/delete had no realtime
signal, so a collaborator only saw another user's view changes on their own
staleTime/focus refetch.

Add a 'views' table event kind + signalTableViewsChanged, emitted from the
views service (createTableView/updateTableView/deleteTableView, on real
success only), and a client handler that invalidates the views query alone
(no rows/definition refetch — a view is presentation state on the loaded
table). Mirrors how row/schema/metadata changes already propagate.

* test(tables): cover the views realtime signal (emit + on-success-only) (#6101)

- events.test.ts: signalTableViewsChanged appends a single 'views' event
  carrying the tableId (through the real memory buffer).
- views/service.test.ts: create/update/delete emit signalTableViewsChanged
  on real success, and DON'T on a no-op (a PATCH/DELETE targeting a missing
  view changes nothing, so it must not signal). Mirrors delete-runner's
  signal-path coverage; drives the DB via the shared dbChainMock.
- Add tableViews to the comprehensive @sim/db/schema test mock so the
  service tests can queue the in-transaction existence row.

* chore(ci): reconcile api-validation baselines after the staging merge

The staging merge unioned realtime-rooms's own `as unknown as` cast
(lib/collab-doc/converter.ts) with staging's zod-recursive-type cast
(lib/api/contracts/tables.ts), so the non-test double-cast count is 9 —
both casts pre-existed and were individually accepted on their branches.
Also tighten rawJsonReads 6->5 to the true current count. Fixes the strict
API contract boundary audit on realtime-rooms.

* feat(copilot): stream file edits into the live collaborative Y.Doc (keep embedded view collaborative) (#6108)

* feat(copilot): stream file edits into the live collaborative Y.Doc

Copilot's file edits previously only reached the live doc once, at the final
edit_content write, so a collaborative editor watching the file saw nothing
until completion (streaming looked broken) and the client-side preview path
was suppressed in collab mode.

Make copilot a CRDT peer: as it streams append/update/patch content, merge the
growing markdown into the file's live Y.Doc via the existing apply-edit path
(a minimal updateYFragment diff, concurrent-edit-safe), throttled to ~250ms.
version is omitted for these intermediate merges — they advance the live doc
for viewers but are not durable checkpoints; the final edit_content write
carries the real contentUpdatedAt and reconciles the durable file. Per the
relay's persist gating, server-internal merges never schedule a persist, so a
copilot-only stream produces zero intermediate file writes.

- notify.ts: mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc version is now optional (streaming omits it).
- file-preview-adapter.ts: throttled live-doc merge at the edit_content stream hook.

* fix(copilot): order + gate streaming live-doc merges; fast collab first render

Harden the streaming merge (adversarial review):
- Order + bound: dispatch through a per-file in-flight guard (drop-while-in-flight)
  so a stale out-of-order snapshot can never land after a newer one and regress
  the doc, and relay load is capped at one request per file regardless of rate.
- No wipe: gate append/patch on the base file content having loaded — a base-less
  snapshot would diff to a delete-everything wipe of the seeded doc; update streams
  a full rewrite from scratch and needs no base.
- Markdown-only gate: non-markdown files have no collaborative room, so skip the
  wasted relay round-trip.

Fast collab first render (Issue 2): render the already-fetched markdown read-only
via generateHTML while the collaborative doc seeds, with the editor mounted-but-
hidden in the same layout box for a seamless swap on collabReady. Pure HTML — it
never touches the Y.Doc (client seeding duplicates the doc), and generateHTML
escapes text (raw-HTML snippets render escaped), so no XSS.

* test(copilot): cover streaming file edits into the live collaborative Y.Doc

Drives edit_content args_delta stream events through processFilePreviewStreamEvent
and asserts the live-doc merge: fires with the growing FULL previewText and no
version arg; is throttled (~250ms per file); is skipped for non-markdown files
and for a base-less append (the delete-everything wipe guard); and runs at most
one-in-flight per file. Verified to fail if any gate/guard is removed.

* fix(collab-doc): coordinate live-doc merge ordering in one place; close durable-clobber race

The second review found a residual: the durable edit_content write went through a
different path than the adapter's in-flight guard, so a late straggler streaming
merge could land after it and, via a persist, clobber the durable file's tail.

Move the per-file coordination into mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc (the one place both the
streaming and durable paths call): a streaming (versionless) merge is dropped while
one is in flight for the file; a durable (versioned) write instead WAITS for the
in-flight streaming merge, so the final content is always the last merge applied and
can't be regressed by a straggler. Simplifies the adapter (drops its Set + helper).

Relocate the one-in-flight test to notify.test.ts (streaming-drops-while-busy +
durable-waits-then-applies-last); the adapter test keeps throttle/gates/previewText.

* fix(copilot): address review — order merges, exclude update, gate throttle, unhide stream

Review round on #6108:
- Greptile P1 (durable merges lose ordering): serialize ALL merges per file on one chain in
  mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc (each chains after the current tail), so concurrent durable writes
  can't resume-and-fire out of order. notify now exposes isLiveDocMergeInFlight.
- Cursor High (update stream blanks the doc): only append/patch stream — they build on the loaded
  base; update is a from-scratch rewrite whose partial snapshot would diff the full doc toward a
  fragment, so it applies atomically at the durable write.
- Cursor Medium (throttle advances on a dropped merge): the adapter gates on !isLiveDocMergeInFlight,
  so the send throttle advances only on an actual dispatch — no lag, no backlog behind a slow relay.
- Cursor Medium (placeholder hides a live stream): show the fast-render placeholder only when not
  streaming, so a stream that starts before the doc seeds shows through the editor.
- Soften merge.ts/notify.ts comments per the lifecycle audit: only UNTOUCHED regions are preserved;
  a region the merge rewrites reconciles toward copilot's content.

Tests updated: notify covers chain ordering + isLiveDocMergeInFlight; adapter covers append streaming,
throttle, non-markdown/base-less/update skips, and the in-flight skip.

* fix(collab-doc): reject stale durable merges at the relay (cross-process ordering)

The in-process merge chain only orders merges within one apps/sim process. Two durable
writes for the same file on DIFFERENT processes could reach the relay out of dispatch
order; the relay recorded the version monotonically but still APPLIED the older markdown,
regressing the live doc while the token stayed high (a later persist could then write the
stale content back over the durable file).

Enforce ordering at the relay — the single cross-process coordination point — using the
existing Redis primitives: under the per-file Redis merge lock, read the cluster-wide
synced version and SKIP a versioned merge that is not newer (a newer durable write already
landed). Make recordVersion await setSyncedVersion so it is durable before the lock
releases, so the next holder's staleness check reads a consistent value. Streaming
(versionless) merges are unaffected — they carry no durable version and are ordered
per-process by the caller.

Adds a relay test asserting a stale/idempotent versioned merge returns 'stale' and never
computes or publishes a diff.

* fix(copilot): match durable path — detect markdown by MIME type + name at the stream gate

The streaming gate checked isMarkdownFile with only the filename, while the durable merge
uses type + name — so a text/markdown file without a .md extension was skipped mid-stream
(it self-corrected at the durable write). Pass editIntent.contentType so streaming detects
the same set of markdown files as the durable path.

* test(copilot): assert throttle follow-through after an in-flight merge clears

* fix(collab-doc): order streaming merges by streamedAt so a late snapshot can't regress a newer durable write

* refactor(collab-doc): tidy merge-order docs + relay order object; cover multi-replica streaming stale-check

* fix(collab-doc): order streaming merges by causal base version, not wall-clock

A streaming snapshot now carries baseVersion (the durable contentUpdatedAt it was
built from) instead of a wall-clock streamedAt. The relay drops the snapshot when a
newer durable write landed since that base, so a concurrent human save can no longer
be clobbered in the live doc and then persisted over the durable file. Skew-immune:
both keys are DB-monotonic contentUpdatedAt values.

* fix(collab-doc): derive streaming baseVersion as contentUpdatedAt ?? updatedAt

Match the version line the seed/persist use so a legacy file with no content
version still ships an ordered streaming snapshot instead of an unordered one.

* fix(collab-doc): fail-closed on a streaming snapshot with no baseVersion

The live-merge gate now requires a numeric baseVersion, not just loaded base
content. A rare base with no file record (hence no version) would otherwise ship
an unordered snapshot the relay can't stale-check, risking a clobber of a
concurrent durable write. Skip the live merge instead; the durable write reconciles.

* docs(collab-doc): document the accepted concurrent-independent-streams limitation

* chore(ci): reconcile api-validation baseline after the staging merge

The merge commit auto-merged the baseline at 1000; bump totalRoutes/zodRoutes to
1003 for staging's three new contract-bound routes (nonZodRoutes still 0).

* test(files): update storage-accounting assertion to the mergeEditIntoLiveFileDoc options object

* fix(collab-doc): trace the full yjs/tiptap external stack into the file-doc route bundles

The seed/merge/persist internal routes run the collab-doc converter (markdown <-> Yjs
via headless TipTap) server-side. Those deps are serverExternalPackages, and the
standalone tracer only force-included jsdom — it does NOT follow yjs's ESM subpath
imports of lib0 (lib0/logging, ...), so Docker/standalone builds shipped node_modules
without them and the seed route 500'd (Cannot find module 'lib0/logging'). That left
every collaborative document unseeded and permanently read-only on deployed envs.
Force yjs, lib0, y-protocols, and @tiptap into the trace for all three routes.

* fix(collab-doc): copy the full yjs/lib0 stack into the app image

The seed/merge/persist routes run the converter (markdown <-> Yjs) server-side. yjs is a
serverExternalPackage and the Next standalone tracer copies lib0 only partially — it drops the
ESM subpath file lib0/logging.js that yjs.mjs imports via lib0's exports map, so the seed 500s
('Cannot find module lib0/logging') and every collaborative doc is stuck read-only. Verified in
the running dev container: /app/node_modules/lib0 had 37/38 files, logging.js missing.

outputFileTracingIncludes can't fix it — its globs resolve against apps/sim, but these deps hoist
to the monorepo-root node_modules, so the glob matches nothing (my prior next.config attempt was a
no-op; reverted). Instead COPY the complete lib0/yjs/y-protocols from the deps stage in the runner,
overwriting the partial trace — the same pattern already used for isolated-vm.

* feat(files): stream copilot edits into the collaborative doc smoothly (#6122)

* feat(files): stream copilot edits into the collaborative doc smoothly

- apply the agent stream client-side into the live Yjs binding as minimal
  updateYFragment diffs (like main's setContent, but incremental) so it renders
  smoothly AND broadcasts to every peer via CRDT — a collaborator on /files sees
  the stream for free
- gate the apply on collabReady so diffs never land on an unseeded doc; keep the
  read-only placeholder visible until the seed swaps in
- run streamed ops under a dedicated tx origin so they stay out of the user's
  undo stack
- delete the throttled server-side streaming merge and the baseVersion ordering
  machinery it needed (relay + notify + session contract); the durable final
  write still reconciles open editors and seeds late joiners

* fix(files): apply agent stream as a true CRDT peer + guard base-less snapshots

Review round 1 (Greptile P1s):
- apply the stream against a private shadow replica (seeded from the live doc at
  stream start) and relay only the agent's own delta into the shared doc, so a
  concurrent peer edit to a region the agent snapshot didn't include is no longer
  reverted (previously the whole-body reconcile deleted it)
- gate append snapshots on "must extend the base": a base-less append fragment
  (emitted before the base loads) can no longer reconcile the seeded doc to a wipe;
  patch still legitimately replaces a mid-region
- gate the apply on collabReady so diffs never land on an unseeded doc; keep the
  placeholder visible until the seed swaps in
- plumb streamOperation through the preview surfaces to drive the append gate
- add a peer-edit-preservation test (fails under whole-body reconcile) and refresh
  the undo-isolation + broadcast tests for the session API

* fix(files): destroy the agent shadow deterministically on settle

Cursor round 1 (Low): endAgentStream ran inside runOffRender, whose microtask is
dropped when a rapid follow-up stream bumps the run token — leaking the shadow
Y.Doc. Split it out into an unguarded microtask queued after the (droppable) final
apply, so the shadow is always destroyed.

* fix(files): agent stream frames skip the relay's durable persist

Cursor round 1 (High): client-applied stream frames broadcast over the sync
channel, so the relay stamped a socket origin and ran schedulePersist — durably
writing partial agent content mid-stream, attributed to the watching user (the old
server-merge applied with no origin and never did). Restore that behavior:

- new FILE_DOC_MESSAGE_TYPE.SYNC_NO_PERSIST wire tag; the provider tags
  AGENT_STREAM_ORIGIN updates with it (normal user edits stay SYNC)
- the relay applies it under an AgentSyncOrigin (carries the socket id for
  broadcast exclusion, but is not a plain string) so originSocketId() is null →
  no edited/schedulePersist/lastEditorUserId; excludeSocketId() still excludes the
  sender, and the update still publishes to the stream so peers converge
- the copilot's final edit_content write remains the authoritative durable persist
- tests: relay applies+fans-out but never persists a SYNC_NO_PERSIST frame
  (verified it fails if applied as a socket edit); provider tags agent edits

* fix(files): open the stream shadow at start + private extend baseline

Cursor round 2:
- High (settle skips apply without session): the stream shadow is now opened on
  the first ready frame, BEFORE the extend gate — so an `update` rewrite (whose
  every frame is gated out until settle) and a stream that finishes before seed
  still get a session, and settle applies the final body via the reused-or-on-demand
  shadow instead of leaving the doc stale until the durable reconcile.
- Medium (peer edits stall the stream): the extend gate now reads a private
  `lastStreamedBodyRef` (the agent's own last frame), snapshotted at stream start,
  not `lastSyncedBodyRef` which `onUpdate` clobbers on peer edits — so a collaborator
  typing can't make the growing snapshot stop prefixing the shown body and freeze it.
- Medium (multi-replica over-persist): pre-existing, documented "safe over-persist"
  (a peer task tails the frame as REDIS_ORIGIN and marks edited) — refreshed the
  stale comment to describe the SYNC_NO_PERSIST source; copilot's edit_content write
  remains the authoritative durable persist.

* fix(files): fail-close base-less previews + operation-based stream hold

Cursor/Greptile round 3 (High + Medium) — remove the fragile string-prefix
"extend gate", which was the root of both findings:

- Server: `buildFilePreviewText` now fails closed for an `append` whose base
  content hasn't loaded (returns undefined, like patch/update), so a base-less
  fragment never reaches the client. This eliminates the base-less wipe at
  settle (Greptile P1) at the source; an empty file (existingContent === '')
  still previews normally.
- Client: the collab streaming tick no longer string-prefixes the raw preview
  against the editor's canonical markdown (the '*' vs '-' / emphasis mismatch
  that froze every append frame — Cursor). The mid-stream hold is now purely
  operation-based: `update` waits for settle; append/patch/create apply each
  frame via the (peer-safe) shadow reconcile. lastStreamedBodyRef is now a plain
  dedup guard, not a prefix baseline.

Keeps the shadow, durable write, and SYNC_NO_PERSIST unchanged.

* fix(files): elect a single agent-stream writer across tabs

Cursor round 4 (High): with the stream applied client-side, two tabs/windows on
the same chat could each derive streamingContent (the reconnect/resume path
re-consumes preview events) and each independently insert the stream under a
different Yjs clientID, duplicating content until the durable reconcile.

Fix — single-writer election via the file-doc awareness (new agent-stream-leader):
- a client applying an agent stream announces `agentApplying` on its own awareness
- only the leader (min clientID among announcers) applies mid-stream AND at settle;
  a non-leader renders the leader's ops via Yjs and does not apply (a non-leader
  applying the final body would re-insert the whole doc as a duplicate)
- re-checked each frame, so it converges to one writer the moment awareness
  propagates; the sub-frame startup race is reconciled by the durable write
- single-client (the common case) is unaffected: it is the only announcer, so it
  always leads

* fix(files): gate the settle apply locally, not on a settle-time re-election

Cursor round 5 (High): the settle recomputed leadership from live awareness and
the leader cleared its announcement immediately, so a straggler peer that settled
afterward became the sole announcer, self-elected, and applied finalBody through
its base-seeded shadow — re-inserting the whole doc as a duplicate.

Fix: gate the settle apply on a LOCAL didApplyStreamRef (set only when this client
actually applied a mid-stream frame — i.e. it was the mid-stream leader whose
shadow is up to date), not on a settle-time re-election. A client that never
applied (non-leader, a held `update`, or a pre-seed stream) skips the final apply
and converges via Yjs + the durable write. The mid-stream leader election
(isAgentStreamLeader) is unchanged, so exactly one client's didApplyStreamRef is
ever true.

* fix(files): open the agent-stream shadow lazily on lead (no stale handoff)

Greptile round 6 (P1): the leader race — (a) a mid-stream leadership handoff
could apply from a stale pre-stream shadow, and (b) two tabs starting the same
stream before awareness converges could both lead briefly.

- (a) fixed: the shadow is now opened LAZILY in the tick, only when this client
  actually leads, seeded from the CURRENT doc — so a handoff successor diffs
  against the prior leader's ops (never a stale base) and a non-leader builds no
  shadow at all. Announce candidacy via a dedicated ref (decoupled from the
  shadow); settle still gates the final apply on didApplyStreamRef (leader-only).
- (b) the pure startup race is inherent to eventually-consistent election. It is
  now the only residual: bounded to two tabs starting the SAME stream within the
  awareness-propagation window, transient (converges in a frame or two), and
  never persisted (SYNC_NO_PERSIST + the durable edit_content reconcile). Resumes
  are sequential, so the common multi-tab case elects cleanly. Documented inline;
  a server-granted lease would close it fully but at a round-trip cost on the
  common single-tab path, which isn't worth it.

* fix(files): idempotent settle apply (update lands client-side; no straggler dup)

Cursor round 6 (Medium): a lone client's `update` never applied client-side —
held mid-stream, then skipped by the didApplyStreamRef settle gate — so the
rewrite depended entirely on the durable merge (stale if delayed/failed).

Root cause was over-correcting round 5. Now that the shadow is opened lazily in
the tick (current-seeded), the round-5 base-shadow duplication is already gone,
so didApplyStreamRef is unnecessary. Replaced it: settle applies the final body
via `agentStreamSessionRef.current ?? beginAgentStream(editor)` — the leader
reuses its up-to-date shadow (last throttled frame), while a client that never
applied (non-leader, held `update`, pre-seed) opens a FRESH current-seeded shadow.
Reconciling current->final is idempotent: a straggler that settles after another
wrote the final reconciles to a noop. So a lone `update` applies at settle (no
wait on the merge), and there's still no settle-time election or base-shadow dup.

* fix(files): broadcast agent frames to the whole room (same-socket siblings)

Cursor round 7 (Medium): SYNC_NO_PERSIST frames applied under an origin carrying
the sender socket id, and excludeSocketId dropped that whole socket from the
relay fan-out. A second FileDocProvider on the same socket (chat preview + Files
editor) then missed all mid-stream ops and stayed stale until the durable
reconcile — a regression from the old no-origin server merge, which reached both.

Fix: the agent origin is now a plain AGENT_SYNC_ORIGIN symbol, and agent frames
broadcast to the WHOLE room (no socket excluded), matching the old behavior — so a
same-socket sibling provider stays live; the emitting provider no-ops on its own
echo (the ops are already applied locally). originSocketId still returns null for
the symbol, so it keeps skipping edited/schedulePersist. Removed excludeSocketId
and the socket-carrying origin object. Updated the relay test to assert the
whole-room broadcast (verified it fails if the sender is excluded).

* fix(files): tag agent stream frames no-persist across replicas

A peer task tailing an agent-streamed preview frame previously applied it
as REDIS_ORIGIN, marking the seeded room edited and making a transient
startup-race duplicate eligible for that task's last-disconnect flush. Mark
agent frames with a stream field so peers apply them as REDIS_AGENT_ORIGIN,
excluded from the edited/persist gate. The copilot's durable edit_content
write stays the sole authority over file bytes.

* fix(files): reseed agent shadow on lead regain + agent-only compaction

Two multi-writer edge cases surfaced in review:

- rich-markdown-editor: a client that led, lost leadership, then regained it
  reused its stale shadow (which never saw the interim leader's ops), re-emitting
  ops for content already present. Tear the shadow down when a client observes it
  is not the leader, so a regain rebuilds fresh from the current doc.

- file-doc-store: compaction always stamped its snapshot REDIS_SNAPSHOT_ORIGIN
  (marks peers edited). A long agent-only stream crossing the threshold could
  fold preview content into a persist-eligible snapshot. Track whether a room
  integrated any real edit and stamp an agent-only snapshot REDIS_AGENT_ORIGIN
  so it stays no-persist.

Both covered by falsification-verified tests.

* fix(files): close realEdited data-loss race + elect a settle writer

Independent audit surfaced two real gaps:

- file-doc-store: realEdited was latched AFTER appendUpdate's awaits, but the
  edit already sits in room.doc synchronously. A concurrent agent-frame
  compaction could read realEdited=false, snapshot that real content, and stamp
  it a no-persist agent frame — a lost edit. Latch it synchronously (same tick
  as the doc mutation) before any await. Deterministic falsifiable test added.

- rich-markdown-editor: at settle every tab applied the final body, and a
  non-leader's local microtask runs before the leader's final propagates, so
  both insert the tail (Yjs keeps both) -> duplicated tail. Elect a single
  settle writer (reliable — awareness is long converged by settle), reading
  leadership before clearing the announcement. Corrects the overclaiming
  idempotency comment and the handoff pick-up comment.

Adds a y-tiptap internals upgrade-guardrail test.

* fix(files): own presence per client id, not one-per-socket

The shared workspace socket hosts one collaborative provider per mounted view,
so the chat file preview and the standalone Files editor for the same file each
bind their own Yjs client id over ONE socket. The relay owned a single client id
per socket, so the later JOIN overwrote the earlier and dropped its awareness —
which silently broke the single-writer agent-stream election (a peer stopped
seeing the streaming provider's announcement and could self-elect, duplicating
streamed text for the whole stream).

Track ownership per (socket, client id): a socket owns a set of client ids; the
awareness gate accepts a frame only if every id it carries is owned; cleanup
drops all of a socket's ids; the roster stays one-entry-per-session. Reclaim and
the same-user reconnect path evict just the reclaimed id, dropping the old socket
only if it empties. Falsification-verified test added.

* fix(files): make streamed file-preview accumulation replay-safe

Guard deriveFilePreviewSession against re-delivered/replayed content events:
apply a delta/snapshot only when previewVersion strictly advances, so a client
re-render or stream replay can't double-append the tail (the duplicated-content
bug) or regress on an older snapshot.

* fix(files): fix new-file collab streaming latch and agent-edit duplication

- Latch collab readiness so a new file's post-seed `synced` flap can no longer
  re-gate agent streaming (the stream previously showed only the seed and the
  rest appeared only on reload)
- Relay defers the durable edit_content merge to an actively-streaming client:
  the client shadow stream and the server merge were both writing the same
  content into the live doc, duplicating it when the server ran ahead
- Render the collaborator caret bar out of flow so a peer caret never nudges
  the surrounding text by ~1px
- Remove dead code: unused FileDocMessageType alias, unnecessary
  LiveFileDocMergeOrder export

Covered by tests: readiness latch (flap/offline/latch cases), relay merge
deferral (single- and multi-replica), plus verified-failing guards.

* test(copilot): fix loadWorkspaceFileTextForPreview mock to return { text } not a bare string

The adapter reads previewBase.text to seed an append/patch base; the mock returned
a bare '' so previewBase.text was undefined, making a base-less append fail closed
(no file_preview_content). My PR's fail-close change exposed the wrong-shaped mock.

---------

Co-authored-by: mzxchandra <129460234+mzxchandra@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-31 18:48:12 -07:00
Theodore Li 4ef7bbad53 fix(db): index large-value workflow_id FKs so workflow deletes don't seq-scan (#6136) 2026-07-31 19:48:52 -04:00
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude 7798e83489 feat(function): custom sandboxes (#6071)
* feat(sandboxes): workspace dependency sets for Function blocks

Named package sets a Function block can import from. The server
canonicalizes and hashes the list; E2B prebuilds a content-addressed
template per set, Daytona installs per execution. Create/edit is gated to
Max or Enterprise via the shared workspace entitlement check; execution is
deliberately ungated, so a downgraded workspace keeps running what it
already built.

Also on this branch:

- Extract the duplicated dropdown/combobox option-fetch lifecycle into
  use-fetched-options. Only combobox had the dependency-change reset, so
  every dropdown with dependsOn + fetchOptions cleared its list and never
  repopulated until reopened.
- Collapse the repeated Max-tier entitlement check onto one
  hasMaxTierWorkspaceAccess, shared by inbox, live sync, and sandboxes.
- Resolve a personal payer's block state through getEffectiveBillingStatus
  in getBillingEntityBlockStatus, so the client-side Max gates agree with
  the server-side ones when blockOrgMembers' fan-out is stale.
- Carve the Daytona dependency install out of the caller's execution
  budget instead of stacking on top of it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): regenerate the sandboxes migration as 0273

Staging claimed 0271 and 0272 while this branch was out, so the hand-authored
0271_workspace_sandboxes was dropped before the merge and regenerated on top
of the merged schema. Same DDL; drizzle emits plain CREATE TABLE/INDEX rather
than the hand-added IF NOT EXISTS, which matches the repo default — that
idempotent form is only needed for files with CONCURRENTLY ops below an
embedded COMMIT. Regenerating also restores the meta snapshot the
hand-authored migration never had.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): drop the sandboxes migration ahead of the staging merge

Staging independently claims idx 0273, so remove ours before merging to
avoid an add/add conflict on the drizzle migration index. Regenerated at
the next free index once the merge lands.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): regenerate the sandboxes migration as 0275

Staging took 0273 and 0274, so the sandboxes DDL lands at the next free
index. The emitted SQL is byte-identical to the dropped 0273.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(billing): consolidate the Max-tier entitlement onto one predicate

The Max tier was spelled five ways. The odd one out — `isMax`, defined as
`isPro(plan) && credits >= 25000` — excluded both `team_25000` and
`enterprise`, and it was the sole input to the personal-workspace cap. A
delinquent Max-for-Teams org admin got 1 personal workspace while a
delinquent Max individual got 10. Only free/pro_6000/pro_25000 were tested,
so the two broken tiers were unpinned.

Separately, the server gate and the client `hasUsableMaxAccess` were
independent copies of the same rule. The settings sidebar renders Sandboxes
and Sim Mailer from the client one while the API answers 403 from the
server one, so any drift renders a feature unlocked that the API refuses.

- `MAX_TIER_CREDITS` is derived from the `CREDIT_TIERS` table; `isMaxTier`
  in plan-helpers is now the single definition, shared by the server gates,
  the client derivation, `getPlanTypeForLimits`, `plan-view`, and the cap
- `hasWorkspaceTierAccess(id, predicate, { intent, onMissingWorkspace })`
  becomes the one org-vs-personal payer fork. `intent: 'active-use'` means
  active and not billing-blocked; `'retention'` means active/past_due with
  block state ignored, so the inbox teardown guard keeps its fail-open
  semantics instead of implying them through a duplicated fork
- `isWorkspaceOnEnterprisePlan`'s personal branch now applies the status and
  block checks its own org branch always had, and its TSDoc names its real
  consumer (copilot BYOK, not Access Control)
- the client live-sync gate gained the server's `isHosted` branch, so a
  self-hosted deploy with billing on no longer locks an interval the API
  accepts. It reads both flags directly rather than taking one as a
  parameter the callers sourced from the same module
- `sqlIsPro`/`sqlIsTeam` escape the `_` LIKE wildcard, matching the already
  correct hand-rolled filter in seat-drift
- deletes the `TERMINAL_SUBSCRIPTION_STATUSES` and `ENTITLED_STATUSES`
  shadow constants, and corrects three test mocks that asserted `trialing`
  was entitled or usable

`max-tier-parity.test.ts` asserts the client and server answers match for
every plan name. Both new guards were checked against the old code: the
parity test fails 3 assertions with the previous predicate, and the
self-hosted test fails without the `isHosted` branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): drop the sandboxes migration ahead of the staging merge

Staging has claimed 0275 (table_views) and 0276 (drop_legacy_folder_tables)
since the last merge, so our 0275_workspace_sandboxes collides on the index.

Dropping ours first — the .sql, meta/0275_snapshot.json, and the journal
entry — leaves packages/db/migrations byte-identical to the merge-base, so
the merge sees no add/add conflict at all. Regenerated on the far side.

Ours is the droppable side: plain additive DDL with no hand edits, which
drizzle reproduces exactly. Staging's migrations are hand-written and must
survive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): regenerate the sandboxes migration as 0277

Staging claimed 0275 (table_views) and 0276 (drop_legacy_folder_tables), so
the sandboxes migration dropped before the merge comes back on top as 0277.

The emitted SQL is byte-identical to what was dropped — the original had no
hand edits, so there is nothing to reapply. It is purely additive: two enums,
sandbox_image and workspace_sandbox, their two FKs and six indexes. That it
regenerated unchanged also confirms the schema.ts auto-merge was correct —
had it lost staging's legacy-folder-table drops, drizzle would have emitted
CREATE TABLE for them here.

Snapshot chain is continuous (0273 -> 0277, each prevId matching the previous
id) and the table counts track the DDL: 100 -> 101 (table_views) -> 99
(legacy folder tables dropped) -> 101 (the two sandbox tables).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sandboxes): gate on the enterprise feature flags, drop the rollout switch

Sandboxes shipped behind `custom-sandboxes`, an AppConfig rollout flag falling
back to a `CUSTOM_SANDBOXES` secret. That made it the only Max-gated surface
with no self-hosted path: `INBOX_ENABLED` can force Sim Mailer on for an
operator running their own billing, and `ENTERPRISE_ENABLED` turns on the
other nine features at once, but neither reached sandboxes. A self-hoster had
to find a separately-named variable that was not part of that family, and one
running with billing enabled could not enable it at all.

Sandboxes now joins the enterprise feature set and the rollout flag is gone:

- `sandboxes` is an `EnterpriseFeature` with `SANDBOXES_ENABLED` and its
  `NEXT_PUBLIC_` twin, so the master switch and the per-feature override both
  reach it like every sibling
- `hasWorkspaceSandboxAccess` takes the inbox's shape exactly — the override
  wins, then a deployment without billing is unrestricted, then the workspace
  payer needs usable Max or Enterprise
- the settings nav gains `selfHostedOverride`, so the section resolves through
  the same path as Sim Mailer instead of a second entitlement AND-ed in
- `custom-sandboxes`, the `CUSTOM_SANDBOXES` secret, the now-unreachable
  `SANDBOXES_UNAVAILABLE` 403 copy, and the route's kill-switch branch are
  deleted

Its legacy default is `true`, matching `inbox`: the gate already returns true
whenever billing is off, so `false` would leave the nav override disagreeing
with the gate that answers the request. Self-hosted builds run on the
operator's own E2B/Daytona credentials, so there is no Sim-side cost to
withhold — the docs now say so, since enabling the feature without a provider
configured is the obvious trap.

The new gate tests run with billing enabled on purpose; the `!isBillingEnabled`
bail would otherwise answer every case and hide whether the override is wired.
Verified by deleting the override line — exactly the one assertion fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): let the language menu match its trigger width

`matchTriggerWidth={false}` exists for the opposite case — a narrow trigger
whose option labels would truncate, letting the menu grow past it. The language
field is a full-width form control with two short labels, so the override
shrank the menu to "JavaScript" and pinned it to the right edge instead.

The default (`true`) is correct here. Every other consumer passing `false` is a
genuinely narrow trigger — a role picker in a member row, a table filter chip.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): re-queue a build when resolution finds the image unusable

`ensureSandboxImage` only ran when a sandbox was saved, so resolution treated
an unusable image as terminal and told the user to go fix a definition that was
never wrong. Three states stuck permanently until someone re-saved in Settings:

- a build that failed
- a build whose worker died mid-flight, stranding the row in `building`
- every sandbox created while the deployment ran a `runtime` provider, after a
  switch to a `prebuilt` one — `runtime` writes no image rows at all, so the
  whole fleet resolved to "no completed build" with nothing to repair it

Resolution now re-queues through the registry's existing idempotent entry point
before failing, and says a build is on its way instead of pointing at Settings.
The conflict guard already claims only a `failed` row or a stale `pending`/
`building` one, so executions arriving during a healthy build enqueue nothing —
no thundering herd from a hot workflow.

The registry is imported dynamically for the same reason `sandboxDb` is: it
pulls `@sim/db` into the static graph, which this module keeps out of the
executor bundle. That also avoids a cycle, since the registry imports
`invalidateSandboxResolution` from here. A repair that itself fails is logged
and swallowed — it must never replace the build error naming the sandbox.

Verified by deleting the repair call: exactly the three new assertions fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* improvement(sandboxes): let the picker show just the sandbox name

The label read "Test · Python · 1 package". The block's own list is already
scoped to the language its sibling `language` subblock selects, so the language
repeated on every row said nothing, and the package count is decoration next to
the name that identifies the sandbox.

The language stays for the one caller that cannot filter — agent tool-input
renders this field under a synthetic id where the sibling `language` value is
unreachable, so its list spans both languages and the name alone is ambiguous.
That is the same missing value which disables filtering, so `showLanguage` is
derived from it directly rather than passed independently and left to drift.

A failed build is still marked: that suffix is the difference between a
selection that runs and one that does not.

Passing the flag also means dropping `.map(toSandboxOption)` for an explicit
arrow — `Array.map` hands the index to the second parameter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): show the sandbox name on the block card, not its uuid

The card printed "443f4934-26ab-44ab-8...". `resolveDropdownLabel` only reads a
subblock's static `options` array, and the sandbox picker is a `combobox` whose
options load asynchronously, so its array is empty and the raw stored id fell
through to the label.

Resolved the same way skills and tools already are: a `resolveSandboxLabel` in
the display layer, fed from the shared sandbox list query — the same cache entry
the picker reads, so this adds no request.

Two deliberate scopings:

- the query is subscribed only for the sandbox row. `SubBlockRow` is memoized
  per subblock, and the list query polls while a build is in flight, so an
  unconditional hook would re-render every row on the canvas on each poll tick
- the resolver matches the field id, not just the type. There is no dedicated
  subblock type for it, and matching `combobox` alone would relabel unrelated
  pickers

An id with no matching sandbox resolves to null rather than a guess, so a
deleted sandbox falls through to the caller's placeholder. The template preview
surface is left alone: it is explicitly hook-free and passes empty lists for
tools and skills too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): hide the Sandboxes section with no provider configured

Entitlement decides whether a workspace may author sandboxes; nothing decided
whether anything could run one. A self-hosted deployment with SANDBOXES_ENABLED
but no E2B or Daytona credentials got a fully functional tab whose output no
Function block could select — the picker is gated on the provider vars, the tab
was not.

Both navigation planes now drop the section when neither
NEXT_PUBLIC_SANDBOX_ENABLED nor the pre-Daytona NEXT_PUBLIC_E2B_ENABLED is set —
the same pair the picker's `showWhenEnvSet` reads, so the two cannot disagree.
Dropped rather than locked: an upgrade does not conjure a provider.

The unified plane drops it in `buildUnifiedSettingsNavigation` rather than in the
sidebar's filter, because the sidebar's `selfHostedOverride` short-circuit runs
before its `requiresMax` check and would have revealed the tab anyway. It reads
the browser twins, not the server's `isRemoteSandboxEnabled`, since this module
renders on both sides.

The predicate is a function, not a module constant, because the constant form was
untestable and ambient: the env mock falls through to `process.env`, and
`apps/sim/.env` (gitignored, so absent on CI) sets NEXT_PUBLIC_E2B_ENABLED=true.
The nav tests passed locally and failed 6 assertions with the flag cleared. They
now pin both flags, so the suite is identical with and without a local env file —
verified by running it both ways.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(sandboxes): correct three claims the code no longer makes

The Sandboxes section described behavior two commits on this branch changed, and
led with an internal detail no reader needs.

- entitlement is no longer Max/Enterprise only: self-hosted deployments unlock
  sandboxes with SANDBOXES_ENABLED, and the section is hidden outright when a
  deployment has no sandbox provider, which is the state a self-hoster is most
  likely to hit and least likely to diagnose
- a build that is not Ready is no longer terminal. It is queued again on the next
  run, so the advice is to wait and re-run, not to go edit a package list that
  was never wrong
- deleting a sandbox frees its build once nothing else references it. Builds are
  shared by content, so this is the one place a reader could reasonably assume
  deletion is immediate

Dropped the `ModuleNotFoundError` aside: what the old code did instead is not
something a reader needs to know to use the feature.

The page is hand-written — `function` has category 'blocks' and is absent from
`NATIVE_RESOURCE_BLOCK_TYPES`, so generate-docs skips it and these edits will not
be overwritten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sandboxes): release the provider image when nothing references it

Deleting a sandbox only removed its row, leaving the built template in E2B until
the 30-day retention sweep — up to a month of paying to store an image nothing
could select. Editing a package list had the same effect on the old content
address, which is the more common case since every edit re-points the sandbox.

`releaseSandboxImage(specHash)` now deletes the provider image and its row from
both paths. It reuses the sweep's provider call and its ordering: image first,
row second, so a refused delete leaves the row for the sweep to retry rather than
orphaning a remote template nothing points at.

Two guards make eager deletion safe:

- builds are keyed by content, not by workspace, so two workspaces declaring the
  same package list share one image. The release no-ops while any sandbox still
  references the hash — otherwise one workspace's delete would break the other's
- an in-flight build is left alone rather than raced; the sweep collects it once
  it settles

Called detached from both routes. The row is already committed by then, so the
user's action has succeeded whatever the provider says, and awaiting would hold a
UI delete open on a remote call the sweep would retry anyway. Every failure inside
is logged and swallowed for the same reason.

E2B's delete verified against their API reference: DELETE /templates/{templateID}
with X-API-Key, 204 on success. The existing implementation already matched, so
this commit only adds the call sites and the guards.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): rate-limit the automatic rebuild, drop the one-off status dot

Two follow-ups to the resolution repair.

The repair had no rate limit. `ensureSandboxImage` re-claims a `failed` row on
sight, and a bad package name fails in seconds, so the in-flight guard never
closed the window: a workflow on a one-minute schedule would enqueue a build a
minute against a package list that will never resolve, each one real provider
build compute. Before the repair existed resolution simply threw, so this was
introduced with it.

The two callers want different things, so the cooldown is opt-in. A save is a
person explicitly asking for another attempt and still retries immediately;
resolution passes `FAILED_BUILD_RETRY_COOLDOWN_MS` and gets at most one attempt
per window no matter how often the workflow runs. Ten minutes: long enough that
per-minute runs cannot drive per-minute builds, short enough that a transient
registry outage clears within the hour.

The status line loses its colour dot. `size-[6px] rounded-full` appeared in
exactly one file in the repo, so it was a new primitive rather than a pattern,
and it duplicated state the text colour already carries — the label now turns
`--text-error` on a failed build, which is what every other status row in
settings does. `ChipTag` was the wrong home for this: its variants are
`mono`/`invite`, with no semantic tone, so a status version would have meant
overriding its chrome from the consumer.

Also corrects the docs line this changes: a failed build is retried periodically,
and saving is the way to retry now, so "wait a moment and run again" no longer
describes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): claim the image row and its reference check in one statement

Greptile P1. Reading references in one statement and deleting in another left a
window — a wide one, since a provider delete is a network call — where a second
workspace could declare the same package list, inherit the `ready` row, and have
its next run fail against a template already on its way out. Content addressing
is what makes that reachable: the image is shared, so one workspace's delete can
strand another's sandbox.

The reference check now lives in the conditional DELETE itself, so winning the
delete is the proof that nothing referenced the hash. A workspace that adopts the
hash first makes the delete match nothing and the release becomes a no-op.

Claiming the row before the provider call would otherwise strand a template
nothing points at if the provider then refused, so that path puts the row back
and the retention sweep inherits the retry — the same property the previous
ordering had.

The sweep is deliberately left as it is: its equivalent window needs a hash
unreferenced AND unused for 30 days, and its provider-first ordering encodes the
documented retry-on-refusal behaviour this path now reproduces explicitly.

No transaction is opened. The provider call sits between discrete statements
rather than inside one, so no pooled connection is held across it — which is why
this uses a conditional delete instead of the repo's `pg_advisory_xact_lock`
pattern, whose lock only releases at commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): route the retention sweep through the same image claim

Cursor and Greptile both flagged the sweep as still carrying the interleaving
just fixed in releaseSandboxImage, and they are right — the reason given for
leaving it alone last round does not survive scrutiny.

That reason was that provider-first ordering encodes retry-on-refusal, so making
the claim atomic would trade a race for an orphaned template. The release path
already answers that: claim the row, and put it back if the provider refuses. The
sweep can have both properties too.

The rarity argument was also weaker than stated. The sweep nominates up to 200
candidates and then works through them eight network deletes at a time, so its
check-to-delete gap is seconds to minutes — wider than the window that was just
closed, not narrower.

Both callers now share `claimAndDeleteImage`, which owns the whole contract: the
unreferenced check lives inside the DELETE, the provider call runs only after the
claim succeeds, and a refusal restores the row. Having written that ordering twice
is what let the two paths drift, so it exists once now.

The sweep's query becomes a nomination step only. Its retention cutoff is passed
into the claim rather than trusted from the earlier read, so a candidate that
stops qualifying mid-sweep fails its claim and is skipped instead of losing its
image.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): rebuild a hash adopted while its image was being deleted

Greptile's third pass on this path, and a case the previous two did not cover:
the adopter starting a *fresh build* rather than inheriting a ready row.

Claiming removes the registry row, so between that and the provider delete
finishing, a workspace can declare the same package list, get a new row, and start
a build under the same content-derived imageRef — which the in-flight delete then
removes.

The window itself is inherent. The registry row and the provider template are two
systems with no shared transaction, so it can be narrowed but not closed. A Redis
lock would not close it either: acquireLock returns true when Redis is absent, so
it cannot be a correctness guarantee for self-hosted. Holding a Postgres advisory
lock would, but only by pinning a pooled connection for the length of a provider
call, which is a worse trade.

What was avoidable is the adopter finding out the slow way. Its row is new and
healthy-looking, so nothing noticed: resolution only repairs a row that is missing
or failed, and a failed one waits out the retry cooldown first. The release path
now re-checks after the delete and re-enqueues, so the rebuild starts immediately
instead of one failed run plus a cooldown later. A build already in flight is left
to the conflict guard, since it may still outlive the delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): reclaim a ready row whose image was deleted underneath it

Greptile found the hole the previous commit left, and it is the case that made the
claim in that commit's message wrong: this one is permanent, not transient.

If a re-adopted hash reaches `ready` before the in-flight provider delete lands —
plausible, since E2B layer caching can rebuild an identical spec in seconds — the
row looks healthy while its imageRef points at nothing. Resolution repairs a row
that is missing or failed, never one claiming to be ready, so nothing recovers it.
The sandbox stays broken until someone re-saves it by hand.

`rebuildIfReadopted` called `ensureSandboxImage` with no options, whose conflict
guard reclaims only a failed or stale in-flight row, so it silently did nothing in
exactly that case.

The release path now passes `imageKnownGone`, which widens the re-claim to any
settled row rather than only a failed one. It is the one caller that knows the
image is gone regardless of what the row says. An in-flight build is still left
alone: it either recreates the template it was building or fails into the normal
repair path, and resetting it would only add a duplicate build.

The three ways a settled row may be re-claimed now sit in one `settledRebuildBranch`
helper — any settled row when the image is known gone, a failed one after the
cooldown for an automatic caller, a failed one immediately for a person — because
inlining the third case is what hid the gap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): let a same-spec save retry a failed build

Cursor Bugbot. `scheduleSandboxBuild` sat inside the changed-hash branch, so a save
that did not alter the package list never reached the registry. The comment above
it described the opposite — that an unchanged spec finds a ready row and enqueues
nothing — which is what `ensureSandboxImage` does, but only if it is called.

That made the docs wrong too. They tell a reader to save the sandbox again to retry
a failed build immediately, and this branch is exactly why that did nothing: the
only way to retry was to edit the package list into a different hash, which is not
what someone recovering from a transient registry failure wants to do.

The call is now unconditional and the registry decides what a save costs, which is
what its conflict guard is for: a ready or in-flight row is left alone, a failed one
is re-claimed at once. Releasing the previous image stays behind the hash check,
since only a changed hash orphans one. Cache invalidation is unchanged —
`scheduleSandboxBuild` already does it, which is why the else branch existed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(sandboxes): correct the image cache's staleness invariant

Cursor Bugbot found that a released image can still be served from another
replica's cache. The finding is real, and the reason it went unnoticed is that the
cache documented an invariant which eager release quietly broke.

It claimed a `ready` row is terminal for its spec hash, so a cached hit could not
go stale in a way that matters. That held while the only ways a row changed were an
edit (new hash) or a delete (caught by the `workspace_sandbox` read). Releasing an
image eagerly made a `ready` row disappear with the hash unchanged, so the premise
no longer holds and the comment was actively misleading to the next reader.

No behaviour change here — the exposure is bounded at IMAGE_TTL_MS on replicas
other than the one that ran the release, and it self-heals once the entry expires
and the row read finds nothing. Closing it properly needs cross-replica
invalidation or a provider-error path that invalidates on "template not found",
both of which are larger than a review fix; the comment now says so instead of
implying the problem cannot exist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(sandboxes): note that a JavaScript sandbox needs an import to apply

Cursor Bugbot pointed out that `useRemoteSandbox` keys on detected static
import/require and never on the selected sandbox, so JavaScript without one runs
locally and the selection has no effect.

Keeping the behaviour: honouring the selection would force those blocks remote,
and the large-value-ref guard immediately below would then reject code that runs
fine today. Documenting it instead, next to the picker, since a selection that
silently does nothing is only surprising if nothing says so.

Python is unaffected — it always runs remotely, so its sandbox always applies.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): stop create mode surviving a return to an open sandbox

Cursor Bugbot. Create mode and having a sandbox open are mutually exclusive, but
nothing enforced it, so both could be set at once — and the screen then lied about
which sandbox its Delete pointed at.

With `isCreating` true and `selectedId` restored, `baseline` is null, so the editor
renders an empty "New sandbox" form, while the Delete action is built from
`selected` and still targets the restored sandbox. An admin looking at a blank
create form could delete a sandbox it never named.

Two ways in, both closed:

- Browser Forward after starting a new sandbox restores `selectedId` without going
  through `closeEditor`. The render-time sync that already drops a stale draft now
  also leaves create mode, which is the same class of correction and the reason
  that block exists.
- "New sandbox" set `isCreating` without clearing `selectedId`, so the same
  contradiction was reachable without touching history at all. It now clears the
  selection, with `history: 'replace'` because switching mode is not a destination.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ci): pin the sandbox flag in the second nav catalog test, bump the chart

Two CI failures, both mine.

`app/workspace/[workspaceId]/settings/navigation.test.ts` asserts the unified
catalog and was left on ambient env. Dropping the Sandboxes section without a
sandbox provider made it 26 items instead of 27 on CI, which has no
`apps/sim/.env` — the same trap already fixed in the sibling
`components/settings/navigation.test.ts`, in the one file that was missed.

Fixing it needs `vi.hoisted` rather than the sibling's `beforeEach`, because this
file reads `allNavigationItems`, built once at module load; a hook would run after
the value it is trying to influence already exists.

The chart gate is separate: this branch adds sandbox settings to
`helm/sim/values.yaml`, and the workflow requires a Chart.yaml bump whenever
`helm/sim/**` changes. Additive config, so 1.3.0 -> 1.4.0 by SemVer.

Verified by running the whole suite with the flags forced off, not just the two
navigation files — no other test depends on a local env file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): keep the row restore to a refused delete only

Cursor and Greptile, independently, on the same code. `deleteImage` and
`rebuildIfReadopted` shared one try/catch, so a rebuild failure after a *successful*
provider delete was handled as if the provider had refused: the catch put the
claimed row back, `ready` status and all, pointing at a template that no longer
exists.

That is the one state resolution cannot repair — it fixes a row that is missing or
failed, never one claiming to be ready — so it reintroduced the permanent breakage
an earlier commit had just closed, through the error path rather than the happy one.

Restoring now belongs strictly to a refused delete. Once the template is gone the
row stays gone, and the rebuild runs past that catch. The rebuild also swallows its
own failures: it follows a delete that already succeeded, so it must not be reported
as a failed release, and inside the sweep it must not reject the rest of its chunk.
The adopter's next run still reaches the normal repair path.

The regression test drives a rebuild failure and asserts no row is restored. It
fails against the original shape — rebuild inside the shared try, no inner catch —
which is what the two reviewers were describing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): drop the dead row when a re-adopt rebuild cannot be scheduled

Greptile, one layer under the previous fix. Making the post-delete rebuild swallow
its own failures kept it from being reported as a failed release, but left the
adopter's row claiming a `ready` image whose template is already deleted — the one
state resolution cannot repair, since it rebuilds a row that is missing or failed
and never one that says ready.

So the row is now dropped when the rebuild does not take. That turns the adopter
into the missing-row case, which the next execution repairs on its own, instead of
a sandbox that stays broken until someone re-saves it by hand. A failure to drop it
is logged at error, because at that point two writes in a row have failed and there
is nothing further this path can do.

Also gives the release tests a default "nothing re-adopted" select. Without it the
rebuild threw on an unstubbed mock and the cleanup delete overwrote the predicate
the claim assertions read, so two of them were passing on the wrong statement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sandboxes): repair a missing image at create, where the truth is observable

Six review rounds narrowed the window between deleting a shared template and
another workspace adopting its content hash, and each fix exposed the next facet.
They all share a cause: the registry row and the provider template are two systems
with no shared transaction, so any scheme that keeps them in step is guessing.

Create is the one step that does not have to guess. It either gets a sandbox or it
does not, so a `ready` row pointing at a deleted template now corrects itself the
first time it is used, rather than needing someone to re-save the sandbox.

- `SandboxImageBuilder.isMissingImage` asks the provider to classify its own
  failure. Prebuilt-only, because a runtime provider has no image to miss
- E2B answers it off `NotFoundError`, which the SDK maps from a 404. The only
  resource a create names is the template, and the two subclasses that describe
  other calls — a missing file, an exited sandbox — are excluded. The classifier
  stays deliberately narrow: treating auth or rate-limit failures as a missing
  image would turn a provider outage into a build storm
- `repairMissingSandboxImage` invalidates the cache, rebuilds with
  `imageKnownGone` (no cooldown, since this observed the image is gone rather than
  inferring it), and returns copy telling the author to run again
- `ResolvedSandbox` carries `specHash` so the failing execution can name what to
  rebuild

This subsumes the open facets rather than adding another guard beside them: the
stale per-replica cache, an adopter left `ready` against a deleted ref, and a
rebuild that never took all end at the same place — the next run repairs itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sandboxes): key the build trigger by attempt, not by spec

Cursor Bugbot. The Trigger.dev idempotency key was the content address alone, so a
second attempt at the same spec was deduped against the first: the SDK returns the
finished run instead of starting one, and the row that `ensureSandboxImage` just
flipped to `pending` sits there with no worker. Nothing can re-claim a `pending`
row until it goes stale, so a retry inside the 5-minute TTL did nothing for the
next half hour.

That silently disabled every repair path — save-to-retry, which the docs name
explicitly, and both the resolution and create-time rebuilds.

The key's own comment already said it exists "to collapse concurrent saves of the
same spec into one build, not to suppress a retry after one failed". The conditional
update above it is what actually collapses concurrent saves: only one caller gets a
row back, so only one ever reaches the trigger. Keying by the claim's `updatedAt`
keeps that property and makes each genuine attempt distinct, while a duplicate
delivery of one attempt still collapses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sandboxes): create a sandbox from the picker, and fix three UI papercuts

The Function block's sandbox field now pins a "Create Sandbox" row above its
options, matching the "Create Skill" / "Create Tool" rows it sits beside, so
authoring a package list no longer means leaving the workflow for Settings. The
row is declared by the field (`createAction`) rather than hardcoded by id;
block configs are read by the serializer and executor, so the name maps to a
modal in the picker rather than carrying a component.

Two things the modal has to get right. It seeds the new sandbox's language from
the sibling the list is scoped by, or a sandbox created off a JavaScript block
would land in the Python list and vanish. And the created option is held locally
until a real fetch carries it, or the field would sit on a raw uuid until
hydration answered.

Also:
- The Sandboxes icon was the Logs block's icon (`blocks/blocks/logs.ts`), in
  both the settings nav and the list rows. It is the Function block's now.
- "Default image (no extra packages)" claimed something untrue: E2B and Daytona
  base images both ship with packages installed.
- A new sandbox opened in Python while the Function block defaults to
  JavaScript. The test pins the two together rather than the literal.

Draft shape and helpers moved out of the editor component into `utils.ts` —
three consumers now, and it makes the defaults testable without a DOM.

* feat(settings): one Max-plan wall, and give the create modal the same one

The create-sandbox modal answered a non-Max workspace with a red line under a
form it could never submit, and no way to act on it. It now renders the same
wall the Settings > Sandboxes tab does — heading, one sentence on what the plan
unlocks, and an Upgrade to Max chip — instead of the fields.

That wall existed twice already (sandboxes and Sim Mailer), so this extracts it
rather than adding a third copy. `SettingsUpgradeNotice` owns the copy rhythm
and the route, and `compact` trades the page's full-height centering for a
modal's. Both settings consumers now compose it; neither keeps its own markup.

The action lands on billing, which `resolveSettingsHref` already redirects to
the plan-comparison page for a member who cannot manage billing — so it is a
route to explore plans, never a dead end. The chip stays hidden for non-admins,
exactly as the settings pages had it.

A non-admin on an entitled workspace gets the muted reason rather than the
upgrade wall: buying a plan is not what is in their way.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 16:33:35 -07:00
Waleed 4793607ee9 chore(db): drop the legacy folder tables and adopt the deferred folder_id FKs (#6051)
* chore(db): drop the legacy folder tables and adopt the deferred folder_id FKs

Contract migration closing out the generic-folders cutover: drops workflow_folder
and workspace_file_folders, and adopts the two folder_id foreign keys 0272
deliberately deferred.

Runs a final INSERT-ONLY reconcile first so no stranded legacy folder is lost by
the drop. Insert-only because 0272 deliberately renamed 47 workflow folders to
dedupe them, and an upsert would revert all 47. In production this is a no-op
(verified 0 stranded); it exists for deployments that never ran the post-drain
reconcile as an operational step, self-hosted upgrades above all.

Hand-written rather than drizzle-generated: the generated form drops the tables
BEFORE adding the FKs with no step to re-root unresolvable folder_ids, so one
dangling id fails ADD CONSTRAINT after the legacy data is already gone; it also
validates the FK inline, holding ACCESS EXCLUSIVE across a full scan of the
1.7M-row workspace_files, and uses DROP TABLE CASCADE. The generated snapshot is
kept so drizzle-kit generate reports no schema changes.

Every re-root path dedupes, because all three destinations are partial unique
indexes keyed on a coalesced nullable column: folder, workflow, and
workspace_files. Parents must also be reachable — an active row re-roots off a
soft-deleted parent, while a soft-deleted row may keep one.

Also hardens the retention sweep, which the new ON DELETE SET NULL exposes: a
surviving active child re-rooted by the FK can collide at the workspace root,
and chunkedBatchDelete turns that 23505 into a permanent per-chunk stall. The
folder cleanup target now renames children first, covering workflows, files and
subfolders, re-asserts eligibility so a restore mid-batch is not stripped, and
treats the deduplicated name as a hint since both allocators can return a
colliding one.

* fix(db): stop the re-root dedupe renaming personal workflows

workflow.workspace_id is nullable, and NULL is treated as EQUAL by PARTITION BY
but UNKNOWN by the = in base_taken. So for personal workflows rn incremented
across the group while no collision was ever detected: the dedupe could only
fire spuriously, renaming a user-visible workflow that needed no rename, since
the unique index treats NULL workspace_id rows as distinct anyway. The file
block already carried the equivalent guard.

Also gives step 1's inserts ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING. It restates the
stranded guard, closing the window between that read's snapshot and the index
check — an operational re-run of 0274, or a live pod, committing into folder
mid-statement would otherwise raise 23505, and migrate.ts retries only 55P03.
0272 and 0274 were already written this way; step 1 was the exception.

Corrects three comments that claimed more than the code delivers: the header's
'no legacy folder is lost' (an id already present under another resource_type
cannot be rescued), the reachability note (a cycle among stranded rows survives
a per-row parent check), and a note made stale by the ON CONFLICT above.
2026-07-29 12:25:39 -07:00
Theodore Li 985f9e6172 feat(tables): saved views with filter, sort, and column presets (#5961)
* feat(tables): saved views with filter, sort, and column presets

* fix(tables): views own column layout, preserve deep-linked sort, seed update cache

* fix(tables): merge view layout writes server-side, keep layout on save-from-All

* fix(tables): send view saves as a merge patch so concurrent writes can't clobber

* fix(tables): persist explicit All selection, prune view state for deleted columns

* fix(tables): key-order-stable dirty check, reset layout when switching to All

* fix(tables): return 404 when patching a missing view

* improvement(tables): order the bar filter, sort, columns and drop the hidden count

* fix(tables): record newly created columns in the active view's order

* fix(tables): don't write layout as a reader, clear dead sort, reset dead view id

* feat(tables): add New view to the views menu, starting from All

* chore(api): bump route-count baseline to 981 after staging merge

* fix(tables): guard default demotion, use the applied filter for dirty/save

* fix(tables): clear state when the active view is deleted externally

* revert(tables): drop the ineffective rows-query gate for view resolution

* feat(tables): enable saved views in the embedded mothership table

* fix(tables): resolve the views flag on the chat route too

* improvement(tables): right-align the embedded run/stop control

* fix(tables): live layout on new views, prune stored config, order cache writes

* fix(tables): live layout on save-as-view, reset it per view, ignore inherited param when embedded

* fix(tables): route undo/redo column-layout writes to the active view

* fix(tables): scope layout undo to the view that recorded it

Layout is view-owned, but UndoEntry carried no owner, so the persistence
sink — rebound every render to the active view — decided the target at undo
time rather than at record time. Reordering in view A then undoing from view
B wrote A's column order into B and left A unchanged.

Entries are now stamped with the active view id, and the three layout-bearing
action types (create-column, delete-column, reorder-columns) are pruned from
both stacks when the active view changes. Row and schema actions are
table-scoped and survive the switch untouched. Inert when views are disabled:
the id is always null, so nothing is ever pruned.

* fix(tables): send only the layout keys an action changes

Pin, reorder, and insert-column each shipped a full columnWidths snapshot
they never modified. Both sinks merge at top-level key granularity, so an
earlier-issued patch landing after a concurrent resize replaced the newer
width map with its stale copy.

Resize, auto-resize, and delete-column still send columnWidths — those
genuinely change it.

* fix(tables): don't strand layout writes while views load, keep schema undos across views

Two more instances of layout being written without a known owner.

The sink was left unbound until a view resolved, so a resize/reorder/pin (or
the column-append effect) during the views fetch fell through to the table's
shared metadata — corrupting All for a table about to adopt a view, and losing
the edit to the re-seed. The sink is now bound while the query is in flight and
suppresses the write. An error counts as settled, so a failed views fetch falls
back to All instead of suppressing layout writes for the session.

Pruning was also too broad: create-column and delete-column are table-scoped
schema ops that merely have a layout side-effect, so dropping them on a view
switch made a deleted column unrecoverable. Only reorder-columns is purely
layout and still prunes; the other two survive and have just their layout half
suppressed at replay when the recorded view isn't active.

* fix(tables): flush layout buffered during load when the owner settles to All

Suppressing the write while the views query was in flight stopped All from
being corrupted, but nothing resolved the buffer afterwards, so a resize during
load looked applied and vanished on refresh.

Settling on All re-seeds nothing (viewLayoutKey never changed), so the gesture
is still on screen and is now persisted to shared metadata. Adopting a view
re-seeds the grid from that view and has already replaced the gesture on
screen, so the buffer is dropped to match.

* fix(tables): resolve undo layout ownership at write time, not dispatch time

The layout writes for column create/delete happen in mutation success
callbacks, and persistLayoutRef is rebound every render. Resolving
entryOwnsLayout up front meant the guard could still hold from before a view
switch while the sink it guarded already pointed at the destination, writing
the recorded view's layout into whichever view was now active.

Now a function, so the guard and the sink are read at the same moment: switch
away mid-mutation and the schema half still lands while the layout half is
dropped, matching the rule that undo only ever affects the view on screen.

* fix(tables): read layout from the grid instead of mirroring it

The wrapper kept two shadow copies of the grid's column layout — liveLayoutRef
and pendingLayoutRef — and all three of this round's findings were that mirror
going stale:

- liveLayoutRef was only cleared on activeView.id change, so widths buffered
  before the views query settled survived into All, where layout writes bypass
  the mirror entirely. Both create paths spread it last, so a saved view stored
  those snapped-back widths.
- currentViewConfig memoized a spread of that ref, and mutating a ref doesn't
  re-run a memo, so Save as view sent the pre-gesture layout.
- The flush effect keyed on activeView, but adoption writes the view id through
  the URL, so for one render the query had settled while activeView was still
  null — flushing to All in exactly the case that had to drop.

The grid owns this state, so it now publishes a reader through a sink ref and
the wrapper asks at the moment it needs a value. Nothing to keep in sync, so
nothing to go stale. Only whether an unowned change happened is tracked, and
the resolve effect — which is what actually picks the owner — decides to
persist or drop.

* fix(tables): flush unowned layout when the views fetch fails

The resolve effect is the only caller of resolvePendingLayout and gated on
isSuccess, which never becomes true on a query error — so layout touched
during the load window was never persisted on the error path, even though
the table had already settled to All and later writes worked.

The error branch now flushes to shared metadata, matching the rest of the
error path's fall-back-to-All behavior.

* fix(tables): gate the on-screen layout restore by ownership, not just the persist

The undo success callbacks applied the recorded view's order/widths/pinning to
the grid unconditionally and only gated the PATCH, so switching views before a
column create/delete mutation resolved left the destination displaying the
origin view's layout until switched away and back.

Each callback now checks ownership where its layout work begins: three are
purely layout and return at the top; delete-column undo restores cell data
first (row data, runs everywhere) and gates only the layout block below it.
In a non-owning view the restored column still appears via the grid's append
effect — at the end, leaving that view's layout untouched.

* fix(tables): route all layout writes through one owner-aware sink, reconcile order at seed

Two holes closed:

The sink binding toggled on activeView, leaving a render-frame gap after the
views query settled but before the resolve effect adopted a default — writes in
that gap fell through to shared metadata. The sink is now always bound while
views are enabled and handlePersistLayout is the single router, reading the
owner at call time: unresolved buffers, a view patches the view, All writes
metadata. The error branch stamps the owner so post-error writes stop
buffering.

The append effect only fires when the schema changes, so a column that arrived
while another source owned the layout rendered via the displayColumns fallback
but was never written into the adopted owner's stored order until a drag
happened to heal it. Seeding now reconciles the incoming order against the
schema and persists the appended tail through the current sink.

* fix(tables): capture the layout owner when a schema action is dispatched

Insert-column and the delete chain persist layout from mutation callbacks
through updateMetadataRef, which always targets the current sink — so a view
switch mid-flight wrote the origin view's order/widths/pins into the
destination. Undo got this guard already; the live paths never did.

Both now capture viewLayoutKey at dispatch and compare at the callback. On a
mismatch the layout work is skipped: the destination re-seeded its own layout,
the new column lands there via the append effect when the refetch arrives, and
the deleted column's dangling keys are pruned on read.

pushUndo also takes the captured owner as an override — stamped at callback
time it would record the destination, letting a later undo apply the origin's
layout to it.

* fix(tables): resolve views on list availability, not query success

A failed background refetch flips isError while the cached list stays usable,
and every view mutation invalidates the views query — so one blip made the
resolve effect treat views as terminally failed and stop applying switches
until the next successful refetch.

The axis is now whether a list exists: error with no list ever fetched settles
to All; error with a cached list resolves normally against the cache; owner is
unknown only while the initial fetch is in flight.

* ci: raise Build App timeout to 25 minutes

The build outgrew the 15-minute cap over the last two days of merges:
10m02 (c6acc62a07), then 14m44 after the folders/desktop/library batch
(adc557a2f2, 16s under the limit), then two consecutive timeouts on
7b1af4121b after the outlook merge. Staging's own latest runs show the same
signature (one cancelled). GitHub labels a job timeout "cancelled", which is
why these read as cancellations.
2026-07-29 14:57:58 -04:00
Theodore Li e369997eac fix(db): encode Date binds in raw sql, document the fetch_types contract (#6040)
* fix(db): encode Date binds in raw sql, document the fetch_types contract

* fix(testing): drop template placeholders from mock error message for biome
2026-07-29 13:06:34 -04:00
Waleed a3413cf5bd feat(folders): cut file folders over, and give knowledge bases and tables folders (#6045)
* feat(folders): cut file folders over, and give knowledge bases and tables folders

Builds on the generic resourceType-driven folder engine to finish the migration
and extend it to two more resource trees.

File-folder cutover
- Repoints all 30 `workspace_file_folders` query sites onto `folder` scoped to
  `resourceType = 'file'`, id-keyed lookups included — a caller can hand a
  workflow folder's id to a file-folder endpoint, and only the predicate stops it
- Adds the missing restore-conflict handling: a file folder whose name was taken
  while it was archived now deduplicates against the RESOLVED parent (restore
  re-roots when the original parent is still archived) instead of being
  permanently unrestorable
- The forking mapper's `resourceType` predicate lives in the `leftJoin`
  condition, not the WHERE, where it would silently make the outer join inner
- `servedFolderResourceTypeSchema` gains `file`; the soft-delete sweep enumerates
  all four types rather than dropping its predicate

Knowledge Base and Tables folders
- `knowledge_base.folder_id` and `user_table_definitions.folder_id` are now
  written and served; both create/move paths admit a folder only through
  `findActiveFolder`, scoped to workspace AND resourceType
- Restoring a knowledge base whose folder is still archived re-roots it rather
  than filing it somewhere the page never renders; a workspace move re-roots for
  the same reason
- Both pages get folder rows, breadcrumbs, inline rename on rows and on the
  breadcrumb, move-to submenus, pin/unpin, and drag-a-row-onto-a-folder

Shared folder UI
- One `components/folders/` module now backs Knowledge, Tables, and Files:
  `folderBreadcrumbItems` (data for `Resource.Header`, which owns the crumb
  chrome), `folderRow`, `folderRowId`/`parseFolderedRowId`, `buildMoveOptions` /
  `buildDescendantIndex` / `renderMoveOptions`, `nextUntitledFolderName`,
  `FolderContextMenu`, `useFolderNavigation`, `useFolderRowDragDrop`
- Deletes the per-page copies: `files/move-options.tsx` and the Tables-local
  folder context menu

Recently Deleted
- Restores folders of every type, not just workflow folders, driven by one
  declarative table rather than a branch per resource

Folder pins resolve against `folder` unscoped: file, knowledge-base, and table
folders are all pinnable and all live there, and a folder id addresses exactly
one row.

* fix(folders): close the folder-engine audit findings

Data loss
- Migration 0274 catches up file folders created AFTER 0272. That backfill is guarded
  by `WHERE NOT EXISTS (… resource_type = 'file')`, so it fires once; every file folder
  created between it and this cutover exists only in `workspace_file_folders`. Without
  the catch-up they vanish from Files on deploy and their contents become unreachable

Authorization
- Archived folders were mutable, which bypassed the folder lock: the folder routes and
  `updateFolder` filtered id + resourceType but never `deletedAt`, while
  `getFolderLockStatus` does — so an archived-but-locked folder reported unlocked. Lock a
  subfolder, delete its parent, and any write-level member could rename and reparent it.
  PUT and the engine now require an active row; DELETE deliberately still does not, because
  it reuses an archived folder's own `deletedAt` to make a partial cascade retryable
- `v1/admin/workflows/import` wrote `folderId` with no validation at all. Migration 0272
  dropped the FK, so it accepted a knowledge-base folder, another workspace's folder, or
  garbage — and the workflow then rendered under no sidebar node while still executing,
  billing, and escaping the folder delete cascade. It now runs the same
  `assertFolderInWorkspace` + `assertFolderMutable` pair as `v1/workflows/import`

Restore no longer loses state
- A folder restore ran a bare `archivedAt = null` over its workflows, while the delete had
  routed through `archiveWorkflow` — which also disables schedules, webhooks, chats, and MCP
  tools. Restoring a folder reported success while every schedule stayed disabled forever
  and every chat 404'd. The workflow tree now restores through `restoreWorkflow`, like the
  knowledge-base and table trees already did. Deployment state is still deliberately not
  revived, matching the single-workflow restore
- Those canonical restores re-root a resource whose folder is archived — correct on its own,
  catastrophic inside a cascade, which restores children BEFORE the folder rows and would
  therefore dump every child at the workspace root. `resolveRestoredFolderId` takes the
  subtree being restored and exempts it. `restoreTable` gained the re-root check it lacked

Correctness
- `getFolderPath` in `lib/folders/tree.ts` walked `parentId` with no `visited` set, so a
  cycle in the client cache — reachable through `useReorderFolders`' unchecked optimistic
  write — hung the tab. Its twin already had one. Dead `buildFolderMap` deleted
- The sidebar's "New folder" inside a folder hardcoded the name, so the second one 409'd,
  was swallowed with only a log line, and the user got no folder and no message. It now
  names through the existing `generateSubfolderName` and surfaces failures
- `chunkedBatchDelete` deleted by id with no re-check, so a resource restored between the
  SELECT and the DELETE was hard-deleted anyway. Callers now re-assert their soft-delete
  predicate on the DELETE
- Recently Deleted and the `restore_resource` tool cover every folder tree, not just
  workflow folders, so deleted knowledge-base and table folders are recoverable

Cleanup
- The folder duplicate route stops steering control flow through `throw new Error('literal')`
  matched by string, reuses the engine's `nextFolderSortOrder` instead of recomputing it, and
  names its workflow scope once
- `servedFolderResourceTypeSchema` documents that its default applies only to an omitted
  value; a present-but-unrecognized one is rejected, never coerced to `workflow`
- The `workspace_file_folders` comment described the table as unread and unwritten and
  invited a DROP. It was live until this cutover, and it is now the rollback copy — the
  comment says so, and names what must be true before anyone drops it
- Pinned rows carry a small non-interactive pin glyph again; they sort to the top and had
  nothing explaining why since the inline pin button was removed

Tests
- New `lib/folders/lifecycle.test.ts` covers create/update/delete/restore, the re-root, and
  the 23505 mappings; `cleanup-soft-deletes.test.ts` now pins the folder target's
  resourceType predicate, which is what keeps the sweep off a not-yet-cut-over type

* improvement(folders): show the pin glyph on Files rows and pin the deploy contract

Files rows were left without the pin indicator the other two lists gained, so a pinned
file or folder still sorted to the top of the Files page with nothing explaining why.

Adds `lib/api/contracts/folders.test.ts`, which pins the three cases that together ARE
the rolling-deploy contract: an omitted `resourceType` defaults to `workflow` (so a client
predating the field keeps working), a present-but-unrecognized one is rejected rather than
coerced, and every served tree is accepted.

* fix(folders): close the findings from the full-diff audit

Migration 0274 reconciles instead of catching up
- The deployed manager writes `workspace_file_folders` EXCLUSIVELY, so `folder`'s file rows
  are frozen at the 0272 snapshot: every rename, move, delete, and restore since then lives
  only in the legacy table. An insert-only catch-up left all of that diverged — renames
  reverted, deleted folders came back as active phantoms, and a stale-active row could hold
  the name a newer folder legitimately took
- That last case was silent: the bare `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING` swallows a NAME violation as
  readily as an id one, so the newer folder was discarded and every file inside it stranded.
  The conflict target is now `(id)`, so a name collision — which would mean the source
  violated its own unique index — fails loudly instead
- Reconciles by parking mirrored names first, then upserting, so no transient state can
  collide with the partial unique index. Both statements are idempotent, and the header says
  what nothing else would: this has to be run again after the deploy drains, because old pods
  keep writing the legacy table until they are gone

`/api/folders` no longer serves file folders
- Adding `'file'` to `servedFolderResourceTypeSchema` opened a second writer over the same
  rows. It bypassed the `workspace_file_folders:${workspaceId}` advisory lock that makes the
  manager's check-then-write pairs atomic, and it accepted names containing `/`, `\`, `.` and
  `..`, which the file surface forbids because a folder name becomes a path segment — a
  folder named `a/b` is then unreachable by path forever, and breadcrumbs resolve it as two
  segments. The storage cutover never needed a second API, so there isn't one

Conflicts that returned 500
- `v1/admin/workspaces/[id]/import` created its folder with an unserialized SELECT-then-
  INSERT, so two imports sharing a folder path failed the whole import. The name is
  server-chosen, so it now adopts whichever folder won, like `ensureWorkspaceFileFolderPath`
- Folder duplicate never caught 23505. `newId` is client-supplied, so replaying a duplicate
  whose response was lost hit the primary key and returned 500 instead of a 409 the caller
  can act on

Performance
- `knowledgeKeys` moved to `hooks/queries/utils/knowledge-keys.ts`. Reading it from
  `hooks/queries/kb/knowledge` pulled a ~1000-line hook module — and the `@sim/emcn` barrel
  behind it — into `hooks/queries/folders`, which three server prefetches import. That is the
  same import edge the navigation-speed audit measured at 11.8MB per workspace route;
  `tableKeys` already lived in a keys-only module for exactly this reason

Merge drop
- Knowledge never got the chrome Tables did: its prefetch now fetches the folder tree
  alongside the bases, so the list does not paint ungrouped and a `?folderId=` deep link does
  not render an empty breadcrumb, and its loading fallback declares the "New folder" action so
  the header does not shift on hydration

Comments corrected to match reality
- The shared folder row and context menu claimed Files as a consumer; Files still builds its
  own row and routes folders through `FileRowContextMenu`, which the TSDoc now says
- `schema.ts` prescribed a row COUNT comparison before dropping the legacy table. The
  divergence 0274 repairs is in row CONTENTS, which a count check passes straight through

* fix(folders): address the review round and the full-PR audit

Reverts the workflow restore hook — it was the wrong fix
- Greptile flagged that restoring a folder leaves schedules disabled and webhooks/chats
  inactive. The hook added last round routed workflows through `restoreWorkflow` to address
  it, but `restoreDependents` ALREADY clears exactly those columns, in bulk, inside the
  restore transaction and matched on the archive timestamp. The hook bought nothing and cost
  a per-workflow read/transaction/read OUTSIDE that transaction — roughly 1600 round trips
  for a folder of 200 workflows — plus a window where the workflows were active and the
  folder was not, and it made `restoreDependents` dead code
- What no restore path can undo is the state archive OVERWRITES: `status: 'disabled'` with
  `nextRunAt` cleared, `isActive: false`. Archive does not record what those were, so
  restoring them to a constant would re-enable a schedule the user had disabled and re-run a
  completed one. Left explicit — redeploy re-activates a schedule — matching deployment state,
  which restore also deliberately leaves off. Documented on the config rather than guessed
- Kept the genuine bug the review surfaced underneath it: `restoreWorkflow` un-archived every
  dependent by `workflowId` alone, resurrecting a webhook or chat the user had archived days
  earlier. Now matched on the workflow's own `archivedAt`, which is the semantics this feature
  documents

Bugbot: orphaned knowledge bases vanished from every view
- Knowledge filtered on a raw `folderId === currentFolderId` and never re-rooted a base whose
  folder is missing or archived, so a base restored on its own — or left behind by a partial
  cascade — was invisible everywhere. Tables already fell those back to the root

A dead `?folderId=` is now healed instead of being a dead end
- A bookmark to a deleted folder rendered the root title over an empty grid, hid everything
  actually at the root, and — worse — left every create/upload action targeting the dead id,
  filing new resources somewhere nothing could reach. `useFolderNavigation` clears it once the
  folder list resolves, which fixes Files, Knowledge, and Tables at once

Parity gaps found by auditing against Files
- Tables sorted folders newest-first on a clean URL while Files and Knowledge sorted A→Z: its
  sort params are defaulted, so the raw column was never null. Reads `activeSort` now
- On Tables you could not delete the folder you were standing in — its own row is not in the
  list, and the crumb menu offered only Rename, which also made the step-out branch
  unreachable dead code
- A failed knowledge-base move was logged and never surfaced, so a rejected move — from the
  submenu or from a drag — looked like nothing happened
- A drag begun in another mount of the page could never be dropped: `onDragOver` bailed before
  `preventDefault`, so no drop event ever fired and the `dataTransfer` fallback in `onDrop`
  was unreachable. External/foreign drags are still ignored, so an OS file dropped on the list
  cannot navigate the tab away

Files: a folder cycle crashed the page
- The folder-size roll-up recursed with no `visited` guard, so a parent/child cycle in the
  cached tree — reachable through the optimistic folder-move write — recursed until the stack
  blew and the page went blank. Also indexes children once instead of re-scanning per node

Migration 0274 is now atomic
- 0272 ends with an embedded COMMIT for its CONCURRENTLY index builds, so this file is not
  guaranteed to run inside drizzle's batch transaction. Wrapped in a DO block so the parking
  pass cannot commit without the reconcile, which would leave every mirrored folder holding a
  placeholder name
- Validated with a read-only dry run: no active name duplicates, no orphaned or
  cross-workspace parents, and no id collisions with `workflow_folder`, so the insert cannot
  trip the unique index, the FKs, or the resource-type trigger

Smaller corrections
- Knowledge indexed its members for the owner comparator instead of two linear scans per
  comparison, and logs a load failure from an effect rather than the render body
- Files uses the shared root sentinel instead of a bare `'__root__'` in two places
- `restore_resource` documents that its two new folder types are unreachable until the enum in
  the copilot service's tool catalog — a different repository — widens
- Corrected a forking comment that still described file folders as a separate table

* docs(folders): record the 0272 + 0274 dry-run results on the migration

A read-only dry run materialises the complete post-0272 `folder` table from both source
tables and asserts every constraint it declares: no NULL names, no primary-key collisions
between the two source tables, no unique-index violations, no resource-type or workspace
trigger violations, and no parent/user/workspace FK violations. 0272's dedup renames only
workflow folders, never file folders — the latter is what lets pass 2 write raw names.

* fix(folders): close the findings from the line-by-line audit of the PR

Data integrity
- Workspace fork copied `folderId` verbatim onto the child's tables and knowledge bases. The
  column carries no workspace, so a forked row pointed at a folder owned by the SOURCE
  workspace — invisible in the fork, and mutated from under it when the source later deleted
  that folder (`ON DELETE SET NULL`). Latent until now because nothing wrote a non-null
  `folderId` for those two resources; this PR is what makes it reachable. Forked resources land
  at the root, like forked files already did

Interaction bugs
- Clearing a dead `?folderId=` wrote through the params' default `history: 'push'`, so Back
  returned to the dead URL, which healed and pushed again — the Back button was dead on that
  page. It replaces now: opening a folder is navigation, correcting a URL that never pointed
  anywhere is not
- That same heal keyed off `isLoading`, which is false for a DISABLED query, false for an
  ERRORED one, and false while `keepPreviousData` is showing the previous workspace's folders.
  In all three the list is empty or stale, so a transient fetch failure — or a workspace switch
  — threw away a perfectly good open folder. Gated on `isSuccess && !isPlaceholderData`
- "New folder" while a search was active created the folder but never showed it: the search
  filters folders too, so the new row did not match, the rename field never appeared, and the
  create read as a no-op. Both pages clear the search so the thing just created is on screen
- The drag ghost was removed only by `dragend`, which fires on the source row. The table is
  virtualized, so scrolling the source out of view mid-drag unmounted it, the event never
  arrived, and the ghost stayed on the page with every row stuck at drag opacity. Cleaned up on
  unmount as the backstop
- A drag begun in another mount highlighted every folder as a valid target — including the
  dragged folder itself — then silently did nothing on drop. It only highlights when the source
  is known and was actually checked

Correctness
- The folder-duplicate route caught 23505 across the WHOLE handler, so a unique violation
  raised while copying the workflows inside the folder was relabelled "a folder with this name
  already exists". Scoped to the folder INSERT, which is the only place the two conflicts the
  caller can act on (client-supplied `newId` replay, concurrent name take) actually arise
- The optimistic folder create derived its sort order from the workspace's WORKFLOWS regardless
  of resource type. Only the workflow tree interleaves folders and resources in one ordering
  space, so a knowledge-base or table folder was placed against an unrelated one
- A table archived between `checkAccess` and the move surfaced as a 500 with a "not found"
  body; it is a 404
- `FOLDER_RESOURCE_TYPE_BY_RESTORABLE` was a `Partial` record, so adding a folder tree without a
  mapping would compile and silently restore into the workflow tree. Total record now
- Recently Deleted paired query results to folder trees by ARRAY POSITION; reordering the const
  would have filed knowledge folders under Tables with no type error. Keyed by type
- The knowledge move's no-op guard compared against the snapshot taken when the menu opened
  rather than the live row

Performance — the module split now actually does what it claimed
- `knowledge-keys.ts` justified itself as keeping server prefetches off the ~1000-line
  `kb/knowledge` module, but `knowledge/prefetch.ts` still imported its stale-time constant from
  exactly that module, whose first line pulls the `@sim/emcn` barrel. Worse, this PR had ADDED
  the same class of edge to four prefetches via `FOLDER_LIST_STALE_TIME`/`mapFolder`
- `FOLDER_LIST_STALE_TIME`, `mapFolder`, and `KNOWLEDGE_BASE_LIST_STALE_TIME` now live beside
  their key factories, so all four server prefetches import only keys-and-constants modules.
  `mapFolder` keeps its explicit field list rather than a spread, so the cached shape cannot
  drift from a client fetch

Honesty in comments
- The KB retention `deleteFilter` narrows the restore race but does not close it — documents
  hard-deleted by `onBatch` do not come back, so a restore landing mid-batch returns an emptied
  base. Said so
- A failed folder restore leaves children active while their folders are still archived. They
  are reachable (both lists fall an unresolvable `folderId` back to the root) but they sit at
  the root until the restore is retried. Said so

Product policy made visible
- Restore deliberately does not re-enable schedules, webhooks, or chats, because archive
  overwrites their state without recording it. A deliberately-disabled schedule or webhook is a
  common state rather than an edge case, so reactivating to a constant would be wrong more often
  than right. Recently Deleted now says so at the moment of restore instead of leaving it to be
  discovered

Smaller
- Pin glyph: dropped the doubled gap, added `role='img'` so the state is announced
- "Move here" carries the folder glyph its sibling leaves do
- `useMoveTable` had stolen `useDeleteTable`'s doc block
- Dead `.returning` column and a `?? null` on a non-nullable param in `moveTableToFolder`
- Tables reads one sort source for both blocks, matching Knowledge
- New test pins that `updateFolder` refuses an archived folder — the guard that stops a delete
  from unlocking its locked subfolders

* fix(tables): re-read live placement before skipping a move as a no-op

`handleMoveTable` and `handleMoveFolder` decided "already there, nothing to do" from
`activeTable`/`activeFolder`, which are snapshots taken when the context menu opened. A refetch
or a concurrent move since then makes that comparison stale, so the write the user just asked
for is silently skipped and the row stays where it was. Both now compare against the live list,
matching the knowledge-base move.

* chore(folders): drop production figures from migration and code comments

This repository is public. The 0274 header and the Recently Deleted policy comment carried
concrete counts and ratios taken from the production database, which is operational detail that
does not belong in open source. Both now state the property that matters — what was asserted,
and why disabled-on-restore is the safe default — without the underlying numbers.

* fix(folders): close the findings from auditing the whole release landing unit

Audited as the unit that actually ships — #6014 (pinning), #6025 (workflow folders onto the
generic table), #6037 (the engine) and this branch together against `main`, rather than this
branch against `staging`.

Authorization
- `PUT /api/folders/reorder` still operated on archived folders. `getFolderLockStatus` skips
  archived rows, so `assertFolderMutable` there was a guaranteed no-op — meaning a locked folder
  became freely reparentable the moment its parent was deleted. This branch closed exactly that
  hole on `PUT /api/folders/[id]` and left its sibling open, then widened reorder to three
  resource trees. Reordering an archived folder is also wrong on its own terms:
  `collectArchivedSubtreeIds` walks the cascade by parent, so moving a branch out of an archived
  subtree silently drops it from that folder's restore

Data loss in the purge
- `batchDeleteByWorkspaceAndTimestamp` forwarded its eligibility predicate only into the SELECT,
  never the DELETE. The `folder` target runs through it, so a restore committing between the two
  statements had its folder hard-deleted anyway — taking the placement of the children the
  restore had just brought back. The workflow purge re-checks for precisely this reason and the
  knowledge-base sweep gained the same guard earlier in this branch; `folder` had neither. The
  wrapper now re-asserts eligibility on the DELETE for every caller

Wire boundary
- `toPinnedItemApi` had no return type, so `pinned_item.resource_type` — plain `text` by design,
  against a closed contract enum — was never checked. Annotating it surfaced the real hole
  immediately: during a rolling deploy an older pod can read a pin a newer one wrote, and
  returning it would fail response validation and take the WHOLE list down rather than the one
  row. Unknown kinds are now narrowed out explicitly at the boundary instead of surviving by
  accident on a filter whose stated job is something else

Interaction
- The knowledge-base FOLDER move still compared against the snapshot taken when the menu opened.
  The resource move on that page and both Tables handlers were fixed earlier in this branch; this
  was the last one

Operational
- 0274's "re-run after drain" instruction needed a precondition. Cleanup hard-deletes from
  `folder` but never from `workspace_file_folders`, so a re-run after a purge would reinstate
  every purged file folder as a soft-deleted phantom whose files are already gone. Retention is
  far longer than any drain, so running it promptly is sufficient — but the instruction said
  nothing about ordering

Accuracy
- Four comments named symbols that do not exist or no longer apply: `useFolderCreateWithDedup`
  (never existed — it is `nextUntitledFolderName`), `collectActiveSubtreeIds`,
  `restoreFolderCascade` as the live restore path, and a claim that a server
  `createSearchParamsCache` reads the shared folder param. The shared param doc also now admits
  Files declares its own `?folderId=` rather than claiming to be the single declaration
- `FOLDER_RESOURCES.file` is unreachable at runtime — `servedFolderResourceTypeSchema` does not
  serve `'file'` — and a reader would reasonably assume otherwise. Says so, and says what routing
  file folders through the generic engine would bypass
- `pinnedItem.resourceType`'s inline comment was missing `'folder'`
- `folders.test.ts` fixtures still carried `color` and `isExpanded`, both deliberately dropped
  from the generic table — pre-consolidation rows masquerading as folders
- `getFolders` in the folder cache had one caller, in its own file

* fix(folders): gate the orphan fallback on a resolved folder index, not a loading flag

The URL heal was fixed to use `isSuccess && !isPlaceholderData`, but the list filters that
decide "this resource's folderId does not resolve, so show it at the root" were left on
`isLoading` — the same footgun, one layer down.

`isLoading` is false for a disabled query (no workspaceId), false for an errored one, and —
because `useFolders` sets `keepPreviousData` — false while the previous workspace's folders are
still on screen during a switch. In all three the index is empty or belongs to another
workspace, so every foldered knowledge base and table was treated as an orphan and dragged to
the root, or filtered out of a deep-linked folder entirely. A transient fetch failure was enough
to make a folder look empty.

`useFolderNavigation` now exposes `foldersResolved` instead of `isLoading`, so the heal and both
list filters share one signal and the footgun is no longer reachable from the hook's surface.
2026-07-28 23:11:22 -07:00
1d64b92b41 feat(desktop): desktop app (#5998)
* top on a desk

* fix auth stuff

* intermediate state

* update

* local filesystem fixes

* Huge

* fix banner

* ci: disable desktop release + e2e in CI for now

The desktop-release reusable-workflow call requested contents: write,
which ci.yml's permission grant (contents: read) rejects — invalidating
the whole CI workflow. Desktop is tested locally for now; signed builds
remain available manually via desktop-release.yml workflow_dispatch, and
desktop e2e via its own workflow_dispatch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: exempt electron from the release-age gate (time-boxed)

electron@43.1.1 (published 2026-07-14) is exact-pinned for the desktop
shell and blocked by minimumReleaseAge until 2026-07-21. Excluded with a
drop-after date, following the vetted-typescript precedent. Verified the
rest of the desktop dependency set clears the 7-day gate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* desktop: brand app icon (packaged + dev Dock)

- build/icon.icns regenerated from public/logo/primary/large.png on the
  Apple icon grid (824px body, r=185.4, centered on a transparent 1024
  canvas), compiled with iconutil
- dev runs set the same mark via app.dock.setIcon (static/dock-icon.png) —
  unpackaged Electron otherwise shows its default atom icon
- un-ignore apps/desktop/build: it holds electron-builder INPUTS (icon,
  entitlements), which the /apps/**/build output rule was swallowing —
  the icns and entitlements were never actually tracked
- revert resetAdHocDarwinSignature fuse: it corrupts the packaged binary
  signature (app killed at launch on arm64); the local ad-hoc deep-sign
  flow doesn't need it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* desktop: switch app icon to the b&w brand mark

White rounded tile with the black sim wordmark (from
public/logo/b&w/large.png), replacing the purple variant. Same Apple
icon grid geometry (824px body, r=185.4, 1024 canvas).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix banner

* Fix

* clean up launcher

* fix oauth

* update desktop app

* Improve browser use and consolidate desktop app

* Desktop app ui cleanup

* Updates

* Updates

* remove dev tool option

* Browser updates

* Fix electron bug

* Browser shortcuts

* lifecycle

* feat(desktop): SSRF hardening + shared @sim/security/ssrf (re-home of #5763) (#5784)

* feat: re-home @sim/security/ssrf + sim SSRF dedup onto dev (clean core)

* feat(desktop): re-integrate SSRF guard + hardening onto rewritten dev

Re-applies the browser-agent SSRF guard and hardening onto dev's evolved
desktop files (dev rewrote session/driver/handoff/index and split out
errors.ts/keyboard.ts):

- session.ts: agent-partition onBeforeRequest is the SSRF choke point —
  DNS-resolving check (fail-closed) for document navigations, synchronous
  literal-IP backstop for subresources.
- driver.ts: browser_navigate/browser_open_tab validate via checkAgentUrl for a
  clean model error; also adopt shared sleep/getErrorMessage and drop the local
  reimplementations + banner separators.
- index.ts: local-only crashReporter (native minidumps, no upload) + CSP
  fallback wired into the app session.
- window.ts: record the crash-dump dir on renderer_gone.
- config.ts: drop the local LOCAL_HOSTNAMES set for the shared isLoopbackHostname
  (also removes the dead bare '::1').
- cdp.ts: per-WebContents callbacks so a background tab's events reach its own
  driver.
- updater.ts: the manual check now surfaces network/manifest failures instead of
  silently swallowing them.
- README: correct the App Sandbox / security-scoped-bookmark note.
- electron-mock: webRequest.onBeforeRequest + crashReporter stubs.
- api-validation: annotate dev's validated-envelope double-cast; bump the
  route-count baseline 964→965 for dev's already-merged route (ratchets stay
  tight; non-Zod and double-cast at baseline).

Skipped as moot (dev already did them independently): launcher isVisible removal,
decideStartRoute param drop, local-filesystem clear() removal.

* chore(desktop): biome format install-local.ts (pre-existing dev lint failure)

* refactor: apply audit cleanup (reuse + simplify)

- domain-check: drop the redundant isIpLiteral guard (isLoopbackIp already
  validates and returns false for non-literals).
- session.ts: use shared getErrorMessage instead of the local error ternary
  (the file already imports it).
- tray.ts: use shared sleep() instead of a hand-rolled setTimeout promise.
- updater.ts: distinguish the synchronous-throw log from the async-rejection
  log on the manual update check.

* refactor: /simplify pass + review fixes

- url-guard: bound the SSRF dns.lookup with a 5s deadline (fails closed on
  timeout) so a slow/hung resolver can't suspend the check and the
  onBeforeRequest callback indefinitely (Greptile P2); + test.
- Finish the reuse consolidation the earlier pass missed: session.ts second
  error ternary → getErrorMessage; the bracket-strip idiom → unwrapIpv6Brackets
  in input-validation.ts, input-validation.server.ts (×2), onepassword/utils.ts
  (fixes the check:utils banned-pattern CI failure).
- driver: document why the tool-level checkAgentUrl coexists with the
  onBeforeRequest enforcement seam (clean model error; loadURL rejection is
  swallowed).

* fix(desktop): swallow late DNS rejection after the SSRF lookup timeout (Cursor)

* refactor: split pure host helpers into @sim/security/hostnames (ipaddr-free) (#5787)

unwrapIpv6Brackets + isLoopbackHostname move to a new ipaddr-free sub-export so
client code can share them without pulling ipaddr.js into the browser bundle.
ssrf.ts re-exports both, so its server/desktop consumers are unchanged. This
eliminates the duplicate isLoopbackHostname in apps/sim/lib/core/utils/urls.ts:
urls.ts and its three client importers (mcp queries, oauth probe, oauth
url-validation) now use the single shared definition.

* Desktop app fullscreen mode

* fix(copilot): report closed browser session as a distinct terminal tool error

A dead agent browser session used to answer every browser tool with an
indistinguishable generic ~30s IPC timeout, which the model retried
indefinitely (one turn: 59 minutes of failing browser_snapshot calls).

- When the desktop app has reported the session closed, page-dependent
  browser tools fail immediately with an explicit session-closed message
  (and sessionClosed: true in the result data) instead of burning the full
  timeout per call. browser_navigate / browser_open_tab / browser_list_tabs
  still run, since they can start a new session.
- A failure whose session died mid-call (e.g. during a takeover) gets the
  same tag appended, so the model learns the terminal cause rather than
  seeing a plain timeout.

Companion to mothership's tool_failure_loop circuit breaker.

* fix(desktop): route Cmd+W to focused browser tabs

* fix(desktop): reserve macOS title bar safe area

* fix(desktop): limit title bar safe area to login

* fix install script

* feat(desktop): improve local folder settings

* feat(desktop): harden local capabilities and window chrome

* fix(invitations): live refetches

* fix(desktop): make manual update checks use updater state

* fix(desktop): review fixes — OAuth error handling, query freshness, invitations

Findings from an end-to-end review of the desktop work, fixed and verified.

OAuth connect/login handoff:
- Add a friendly /oauth-error landing page + onAPIError.errorURL so provider
  Cancel/Deny (which Better Auth redirects before the flow state is parsed)
  no longer dead-ends on a 404; re-initiating supersedes the idle loopback.
- Stop a post-consent failure from reporting success (drop the baked-in
  errorCallbackURL param that collided with Better Auth's appended code;
  coerce an array error defensively on the complete page).
- Guard the desktop connect listener with the same context-age check the web
  routers use, so an abandoned flow can't mislabel a later completion.
- Clear an orphaned pending handoff when a loopback re-bind fails.

Query freshness (desktop refetchOnWindowFocus):
- Pin refetchOnWindowFocus off on queries that seed editable forms
  (environment/secrets, credential detail, schedules) so a background focus
  refetch can't drop an unsaved draft, and on the useWorkflowStates fan-out so
  returning to a large table doesn't fire N heavy envelope fetches. All no-ops
  on web (default already false).

Invitations (in-app pending invitations):
- Map accept/decline failures to friendly copy instead of raw machine codes.
- Invalidate subscription + refresh session on accept (parity with the email
  path); reconcile the list on failure (onSettled) so dead rows drop.
- Gate the modal's query on open so it no longer fetches on every app load.

CI:
- Wrap the latest-mac.yml update-feed route in withRouteHandler and allowlist
  it as a non-boundary route (input-less, YAML) so the contract audit passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* updates

* fix(desktop): use workflow colors for environment icons

* fix(desktop): use orange for dev icon border

* fix(login): change one time token generation to GET

* improvement(desktop): reveal local folders from settings

Local-folder rows rendered their glyph at 20px inside the bordered
credential tile — chrome meant for brand and logo icons — above a static
subtitle that repeated what the section already said. The row now shows a
plain 14px folder icon and the folder name alone.

Clicking a row reveals the folder in the OS file manager through a new
reveal_mount bridge op, which resolves the opaque localfs URI to a live
grant and requires an active user gesture, matching the other grant
mutations. The absolute host path still never crosses the bridge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C54QHj4WPV777Fq2yRwkcb

* improvement(desktop): row actions menu for folder grants, larger version text

Revoke moves from an always-visible chip into the canonical RowActionsMenu,
matching the MCP server rows. The version value moves off text-caption onto
text-sm — it was rendering at the subtitle size, which also shrank the
"x -> y on restart" line that matters most.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C54QHj4WPV777Fq2yRwkcb

* feat(desktop): improve browser tab usability

* fix(desktop): thicken environment icon borders

* fix(desktop): strengthen environment icon borders

* feat(desktop): support multiple windows and harden the agent browser

Sim can now open many full windows in one process. The embedded browser is
still a single native surface, so exactly one window owns it at a time.
Ownership transfers only to the focused window: without that rule, two windows
both showing the browser reclaim it on every bounds heartbeat and re-parent the
native view back and forth roughly once a second while Sim sits in the
background, where no window is focused. A destroyed owner is now forgotten
rather than left rejecting updates from the window actually on screen, and a
closing window's release is honoured even though Electron destroys it before
emitting `closed` — previously that release was dropped and the next layout
could re-parent the browser onto a window that never asked for it.

The agent's password boundary is now enforced rather than assumed. It was
treated as settled but had four ways through: `browser_press_key` sent trusted
CDP keystrokes to whatever held focus, `clickElement` focused credential fields,
`readActiveElementState` returned a preview of any focused value, and snapshots
printed the contents of revealed password fields. Detection also used
`instanceof HTMLInputElement`, which is realm-bound and returned false for
inputs inside same-origin iframes — the nested login forms that need it most.
Detection now matches on tagName/type/autocomplete, the keystroke guard runs in
the driver where trusted CDP input is visible, and typing re-checks the real
target before inserting, since login forms advance focus between the username
and password steps.

Signing out clears the embedded browser's profile. Its cookies, cache, pinned
tabs, browsing trail, and reopen list all survived sign-out, so the next account
on the machine inherited the previous user's live sessions.

Partition hardening is keyed per session instead of a process-wide flag, which
would have left a second partition with no permission handlers, no SSRF
filtering, and no download blocking — silently, and still type-checking.

Adds the first tests for page-functions.ts, including a serialization contract
check: those functions ship to the page as String(fn), so a reference to module
scope passes every other test and fails only against a real page.

* fix(desktop): close clipboard, glob DoS, and authorization holes

Found by a full audit of the desktop app against origin/staging. Each of
these was measured or asserted rather than reasoned about.

The agent could read the user's system clipboard. `browser_press_key('Cmd+V')`
pasted it into a focused field and the next `browser_snapshot` returned it as
an ordinary `value` — snapshots redact password fields, not pasted content, and
clipboards routinely hold a password copied out of a manager. The credential
guard added earlier did not catch it: `insertedTextFor` returns undefined
whenever `meta` is set, so `Cmd+V` was classified as not text-inserting.
`Control+V` reached the same place because the macOS normalizer rewrites it.
Clipboard combos are now refused before dispatch rather than by withholding the
CDP `commands` array, since off macOS these are Blink-native and a key event
alone still performs them. Copy and cut go too — they clobber the user's
clipboard as a side effect.

A glob pattern could freeze the whole app. Micromatch compiles to a
backtracking regex whose cost is exponential in wildcard count: measured
against a single 46-character path with the options this code passes, ten
wildcards took 2.7s and twelve took 43s, once per scanned entry, in one
synchronous call that the surrounding abort checks never get to interrupt. That
is the main process, so every window, the menu bar and the tray freeze with
Force Quit as the only recourse, and the pattern is model-supplied. `safeRegex`
reports the generated source as safe, so it was no defense. Patterns are now
bounded at six wildcards, which keeps the worst case near 2ms while leaving
headroom over real patterns (which top out around four). A timing probe backs
it up, with a budget loose enough that JIT warmth and machine load cannot make
it fire on a legitimate pattern — a tight budget proved flaky in both
directions.

The grep authorization guard compared `request.pattern !== args.pattern`, so a
tool call carrying no pattern made that `undefined !== undefined` and the guard
passed — grep then fell back to searching the renderer's own `query` across the
whole grant. `include` and `query` were never bound at all, letting a renderer
widen a search or silently narrow results the agent believes are complete. The
sibling glob case already had the `typeof` check, which is what made the
asymmetry clearly unintentional.

The IPC sender gate used `startsWith`, the exact pattern `isAppOrigin` warns
against 200 lines away ("that prefix-matches lookalike hosts"). It was safe only
because of a trailing slash. It now uses that helper, which also fixes a false
negative on an explicitly stated default port.

* fix(desktop): stop double sign-out, stranded retries, and redundant writes

Three correctness bugs from the same audit.

Menu Sign Out tore down the session directly instead of going through the
lifecycle coordinator, so it skipped the in-progress guard — and its own cookie
removal then tripped the coordinator's cookie watcher into a second concurrent
teardown, duplicating the sign_out event, the storage clear, and the /login
load. Teardown also existed as two divergent copies. The coordinator now
exposes `signOut()` and owns the single path; the menu just calls it. That
`tearDownSession` is no longer imported in index.ts is the check that it landed.

Offline recovery could strand permanently. The auto-retry loop stops itself
before calling `retry()`, and `retry()` never re-armed the load watchdog, which
is started once per window. So if a retried load hung — precisely what the
watchdog is for — no load event fired and no timer remained anywhere; the user
sat on the offline page until the window was closed. `retry()` now re-arms
before loading.

Pinned tabs were persisted on `did-navigate` and `did-navigate-in-page` for
every tab, pinned or not, with no change check, and the settings store compares
with `===` so a freshly built array never matched. Any single-page app
therefore triggered a synchronous mkdir + write + rename of the whole settings
file on the main thread on every route change — writing `[]` over `[]` when
nothing was pinned. The list is now fingerprinted, seeded at restore from what
is already on disk so the first navigation after launch is not a write either.

* fix(desktop): leaked timers, silent grep failures, and crashed tabs

Second pass on the audit backlog, all verified against tests that fail without
the change.

Every browser tool call leaked a timer. The watchdog raced the tool against
`sleep()`, which cannot be cancelled, so when the tool won — the normal case —
the timer stayed pending for the full window, up to two minutes, dozens deep
during an agent run. Replaced with a cancellable timeout cleared in a
`finally`; a test asserts the fake-timer count is unchanged across a call.

An invalid grep regex reported "no matches". A SyntaxError from `new RegExp`
returned an empty result set, which tells the model the string appears nowhere
in the user's files — a factual claim it acts on, when the search never ran. It
now fails as INVALID_REQUEST. The `safeRegex` guard moved out of the try while
there, since it was only inside it to be re-thrown.

A crashed tab wedged the session. Tabs left `tabs` only via close, so a dead
renderer stayed forever: `activeTab()` filtered it out while `activeTabId` still
named it, making `requireTab()` report "no page is open" with other tabs open,
and the panel went blank with no recovery. `render-process-gone` now drops the
tab, advances the active id, and reports session closure when it was the last.

`probeSession` cleared its abort timer inline after the await, so a thrown
fetch — the case the function exists for — skipped it. Moved to `finally`,
which also brings the body read inside the deadline.

One vanished file failed a whole directory listing: `Promise.all` over
per-entry `lstat` turned a single ENOENT into NOT_FOUND for the directory.
Churning directories like build output would intermittently fail to list.

Removed the `session-lifecycle -> browser-agent/driver` import edge, which
dragged the entire browser subsystem and its module-load `nativeTheme` listener
into the auth path to reach one four-line function. `clearBrowserProfile` is now
a required dependency wired from index.ts, which already owns both sides. Also
deleted `attachSessionLifecycle`, a compatibility wrapper with zero callers.

Added a channel-parity test between the preload bridge and the IPC table. They
share ~20 channel names as bare string literals with nothing tying them
together, so a typo on either side is a silently dead feature that type-checks
and ships. Verified it fails on a one-character change.

* fix(desktop): reach framed elements and harden the loopback sign-in

Two behaviour fixes from the audit backlog.

Interaction with same-origin iframes was broken. The snapshot deliberately
walks into those frames and hands the model ids for what it finds, but every
interaction then tested `instanceof HTMLInputElement` against the top frame's
constructors — false for nodes owned by a frame, because element wrappers are
realm-bound. So the driver reported a real `<input>` as "not a text input",
which took out framed login forms and editors that put a contenteditable body
in an iframe, such as TinyMCE. Framed selects reported "not a select" and
framed clicks skipped focus entirely. Checks now compare `tagName` or duck-type
the method being called, matching the realm-safe approach the credential guard
already used. The native value setter is taken from the element's own realm:
calling the top frame's setter on a frame's node throws "Illegal invocation".
Snapshot value reporting follows the same rule, which is safe because the
credential redaction above it is realm-safe and runs first.

The loopback sign-in server could be cancelled by anything on the machine. It
validated only the shape of the returned state, then tore the one-shot server
down and dispatched, leaving the real constant-time comparison to the callback.
So a request carrying any well-formed state killed an in-flight sign-in — and
the port is reachable by any local process and by any page the user has open
via a no-CORS GET, which cannot read the response but does not need to, since
the side effect is the kill. The state is now checked before anything is torn
down, and a Host that does not name the loopback is refused, which closes the
DNS-rebinding shape.

* refactor(desktop): drop duplicated helpers and stop logging query strings

Net -3 lines, and one of them was a real leak.

`navigation.ts` and `windows.ts` truncated URLs for their log lines with a bare
`.slice(0, 200)`, which keeps the query string — the five other log sites in the
app go through `scrubUrl` for exactly that reason. Tokens and signed parameters
live in query strings, so a blocked-URL warning could write one to disk. Both
now scrub.

`local-filesystem.ts` carried a private `isRecord` byte-identical to
`isRecordLike` in `@sim/utils/object`, and four more sites inlined the same
check. All now use the shared helper, which also tightens three of them: the
inline versions omitted the array exclusion, so an array satisfied a check that
then cast it to a record.

`tray.ts` hand-rolled slice-plus-ellipsis, the case `@sim/utils/string`'s
`truncate` exists for. Titles between 58 and 60 characters now get an ellipsis
where they previously did not — cosmetic, in a tray menu label.

Removed the `getTabsState` passthrough in the driver, a one-line re-export of
the session's own function, and renamed the session-level clear to
`clearProfileStorage`. `clearBrowserProfile` existed twice under one name, the
driver's being the composite that also clears the browsing-trail registry;
index.ts was already aliasing at the import to tell them apart.

Two things deliberately not done. The hand-rolled semver in updater.ts stays:
replacing it needs `semver` plus `@types/semver` as new declared dependencies
in the Electron main process, and the 90 lines it would delete are already
covered by eight assertions that I verified match the library's behaviour case
for case. Note the same prerelease comparison is duplicated in
apps/sim/lib/desktop/min-version.ts, so a future consolidation should do both.
No barrel for browser-agent either: routing `security-guards.ts` through one to
reach a single leaf function would pull the whole browser subsystem into its
module graph, which is the edge just removed from session-lifecycle.

* refactor(desktop): move browser compositing out of the session module

session.ts held five responsibilities in one flat namespace: 1,061 lines, 29
exports, 26 mutable module-level bindings. For contrast local-filesystem.ts is
a comparable 1,125 lines with two exports and no ambient state — size was never
the problem, the shared mutable namespace was.

Compositing is the part worth isolating. Where the native view sits, when it is
visible, which window owns it, the renderer bounds lease, and the occlusion
snapshot are the most intricate logic in the browser and are almost entirely
separable from tab bookkeeping. They now live in panel.ts (342 lines) and
session.ts is 792, with 15 bindings instead of 26.

The two modules were mutually dependent, which is what makes this kind of split
go wrong. Rather than events or a shared store, panel.ts takes the four things
it needs from the session through one PanelHost passed to initPanel — the same
shape as the existing initSession — so the import graph is one-way and there is
no new indirection to trace. Tab changes reach the panel by the session calling
layout(), exactly as before.

Two behaviours became explicit rather than implicit in the move:
detachIfAttached replaces callers reading `attachedView` to decide whether a
closing tab owns the surface, and isPanelVisible replaces `panelBounds !== null`.

Nothing about the split is verified by the split itself, so the bounds lease got
characterization tests first. It had none — there was not a single fake timer in
the suite — despite being the mechanism that hides the view when the renderer
crashes or wedges. Both tests were confirmed to fail against a broken lease
before the refactor began. The other 47 tests were not rewritten: only the
module their calls address changed, which is the useful signal that behaviour
was preserved.

Deliberately not split further. Focus tracking stays with tabs because it keys
off tab ids, and profile teardown stays put; separating either would be
taxonomy rather than decoupling.

* refactor: drop the legacy local_* filesystem tool shim

Granted folders are addressed through the ordinary VFS: the model calls
read/grep/glob against paths under user-local/, exactly as it does for
workspace files. A parallel local_read / local_grep / local_glob / local_list /
local_stat / local_mount_directory / local_list_mounts / local_forget_mount /
local_stage_file toolset existed alongside it, recognized but never advertised,
so an in-flight checkpoint written by an older desktop build could still finish.

There are no older desktop builds. apps/desktop is at version 0.0.0, the only
artifacts are a local 0.0.0 build, MIN_DESKTOP_VERSION is '0.0.0' meaning no
floor, and the app does not exist on staging at all — the v0.7.x tags are the
web app's. Nothing can have persisted a checkpoint naming these tools, and
nothing advertises them: they are absent from the generated tool catalog and
from mothership's catalog. The shim was defending against a past that never
happened.

Removes the name table, the legacy request builder, the server-side
LEGACY_READ_ONLY_TOOLS allowlist, the five local_* branches in the desktop
authorization switch, and nine display labels. isDesktopFilesystemToolCall
collapsed into isUserLocalVfsToolCall, which it had become a synonym for.

Two tests went with it. One asserted that local_list_mounts routes to the
desktop; the test immediately after it already covers the real path, an
ordinary read against a user-local path. The other asserted that legacy names
cannot open a folder picker, revoke a grant, or upload bytes — that property
now holds because no such tool name exists, which is a stronger guarantee than
refusing one.

* refactor(copilot): remove the plan/changelog VFS artifacts and workflow aliases

These beta surfaces are not a direction we are taking, so they come out rather
than staying behind a flag. Gone: the workflow alias modules (path resolution,
DB-backed resolver, .plans/.changelogs backing provisioning), the alias
materialization in the copilot VFS, the alias write paths in resource-writer
and workspace_file, the sandbox alias mounts in function_execute, the reserved
backing-path guards across mkdir/mv/create, and the alias resolution in the
chat home file picker.

xlsx survives but changes owner. It was gated twice across the repo boundary:
mothership's xlsx-writing flag gates the skill and prompt, while Sim gated the
compile path on mothership-beta. Those live in separate AppConfig applications,
so an operator had to flip two flags in two consoles, and off-hosted Sim fell
back to the MOTHERSHIP_BETA_FEATURES secret while the mothership half stayed in
Sim Cloud's AppConfig — split-brain across an ownership boundary. Mothership
controls whether the model ever learns xlsx exists, so if it is never offered
it is never requested and the second chokepoint only created a way for the two
halves to disagree. Sim's gate is removed; xlsx-writing is now the single owner.

With its last consumer gone, the mothership-beta flag and the
MOTHERSHIP_BETA_FEATURES secret are deleted. The two entries in the infra repo
are harmless until removed separately: they only inject an env var nothing
reads, and createEnv runs with skipValidation.

The reserved-system-file/folder concept goes with the aliases, since it existed
only to hide the backing rows. includeReservedSystemFiles and
includeReservedSystemFolders are removed rather than left as options every
caller passes true to. backingVfsPath is removed for the same reason — nothing
sets it once aliases are gone, so it was an always-undefined field on tool
results.

Test coverage is preserved rather than deleted with the feature.
resource-writer.test.ts looked alias-only but three of its eleven cases cover
the generic create path that survives; those are kept and the file retitled.
Two open_resource tests and one output-path test used alias-shaped strings
while asserting generic behavior; retargeted or dropped where a sibling already
covers it.

* refactor(copilot): remove the dead planArtifact column plumbing

copilot_chats.plan_artifact has no writer and no reader that does anything with
it. No client sends it, nothing renders it, and its whole history is fork-chat
and duplicate-chat plumbing faithfully copying a column that is always null —
the one change that might have populated it (mothership v0.8) was reverted.

Removed from the schema, the copilot API contract, the chat lifecycle column
sets, the fork route, superuser import, the data drain, the update-messages
write path, and the legacy chat detail response.

No migration here on purpose. The column stays in the database, orphaned and
null; dropping it is a separate deliberate step rather than something that
rides along with a code cleanup. Note that the next drizzle-kit generate will
now want to emit the DROP COLUMN, and check-migrations-safety will ask for it
to be annotated — that is the right moment to decide, not now.

Mothership never saw this field; it is Sim-side only.

* chore(copilot): sync the tool catalog for load_skill

Picks up the new load_skill tool plus the grep description that dropped its
stale reference to VFS "plans" entries. Generated from
copilot/contracts/tool-catalog-v1.json.

* refactor(copilot): follow the load_custom_tool rename to load_mcp_tool

Mothership renamed the loader once it was clear MCP was the only catalog kind
it could match, and dropped the single-valued `type` parameter. The two prompt
strings that teach the model the call shape are updated to
load_mcp_tool({ name }).

load_custom_tool stays in the UI hide-list next to load_agent_skill so tool
rows in historical transcripts keep rendering; nothing emits it any more.

* chore(copilot): sync the tool catalog and hide load_skill in the UI

load_integration_tool and list_integration_tools now publish route go/sync
instead of sim/async. Nothing changes in Sim's behavior — they always ran in
Go; the contract had been wrong.

load_skill joins the hidden tools. It is the same shape as the other loaders
already there: the agent pulling in a reference guide before doing the work is
a step toward the action, not the action. Sim's display-coverage test caught
that a newly added visible tool had no title or completed verb, which is the
guard working.

* fix(auth): handle session expiry in the app, not the desktop shell

The workspace auth gate is a Server Component, so it only re-evaluates on a
server render. A session that expired or was revoked mid-visit left the SPA
mounted and silently 401ing every request, with nothing to redirect it.

The desktop shell had grown its own detector for this: a 401 listener over
/api/*, a session probe, and a native "your session has expired" prompt. It
could only infer session state from cookie events and HTTP statuses, and it
inferred wrong — it fired on ordinary sign-outs (in-flight requests 401 during
teardown) and on launching already signed out (the window still shows the
restored route while the web app redirects). Those were nearly all of its
firings, since a 30-day sliding window means real expiry is rare.

Generalizes the impersonation-expired screen instead, which already had the
right shape: it keys off the session query settling to null after a session
that was live. A signed-out visitor never arms it, and `error` is excluded so
an offline blip cannot read as an expiry. The session query now refetches on
focus for every session, not just impersonation ones, so returning to a window
that slept through its session re-checks it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C54QHj4WPV777Fq2yRwkcb

* fix(copilot): port the scheduled-task and VFS fixes onto staging-v4

Replays the sim-side prompt-audit work on top of staging-v4.

complete_scheduled_task was filtered out of the execute route's response
payload, so an until_complete job could report completion and still be
rescheduled; the post-run bookkeeping now also refuses to revive a job that
already completed. Also clamps browser_wait_for's timeout the way the desktop
agent does, and replaces the oversized-read error's offset/limit advice, which
sent the model into a guaranteed retry loop.

* feat(desktop): let the model actually see browser screenshots

browser_screenshot captured an image and then threw it away. The renderer
stripped the data URL and substituted a note, and the tool's own description
told the model not to bother: "Dead end for perception." So the agent was
blind to anything not expressible as DOM text — canvas, charts, maps, images,
rendering and layout bugs.

The copilot has carried the machinery for this all along. A tool result shaped
as { content, attachment: { type: "image", source: { type: "base64", ... } } }
is serialized into a real image content block, with the media type sniffed from
the bytes rather than trusted from the declaration, and degraded to a text stub
when the routed model has no vision so the provider never 400s. The screenshot
result is now reshaped into that contract instead of discarded. A malformed
data URL still falls back to a note rather than shipping an attachment the
provider would reject.

Captures are bounded to a 1024px longest edge at quality 70. CDP clip.scale is
relative to CSS pixels, so this also sidesteps the device pixel ratio — an
unclipped capture on a retina display returns a 2x image, which was several
hundred kilobytes for no legibility the model could use.

The description is rewritten to bias toward visual questions only: appearance,
layout, rendering, charts, canvas. Reading content or finding something to
click stays with browser_snapshot, which is cheaper and returns the element ids
a screenshot cannot. That distinction is structural, not just advisory — having
seen the page does not let the agent act on it.

Companion change in mothership generalizes the tool-result inline-budget
exemption from "the read tool" to "any result carrying a model attachment".
Keyed on the tool name, an oversized screenshot fell through to the artifact
branch: the image was replaced by a reference the model cannot open, and the
result still reported success. Silent, and it would have hit almost every call.

* fix(desktop): polish browser panel and environment tray icon

* fix(desktop): enlarge environment tray markers

* fix(desktop): smooth environment tray markers

* refactor(copilot): consolidate resource mutation tools

* chore(copilot): clean up VFS follow-ups

* fix(desktop): round the dev tray marker

* feat(desktop): add integrated terminal resources

* Fix electron app resize causing glitchy browser frames

* feat(copilot): add persistent tool permissions

* fix(copilot): retire stale tool permission prompts

* fix(desktop): keep terminal rendering responsive

* fix(desktop): preserve resource rendering continuity

* feat(desktop): add browser tab duplication actions

* feat(desktop): add terminal tab context actions

* fix(desktop): allow browser agent localhost navigation

* feat(desktop): add tmux-backed terminal sessions

* fix(desktop): restore terminal scrollback per view

* chore(copilot): sync updated wait tool contract

* poll terminal session state for non regular shells

* add terminal right click menu

* feat(desktop): add terminal handoff and key batching

* fix(desktop): reserve the traffic-light lane from the platform

macOS draws the window controls itself, at a fixed physical size, above all web
content. The page renders full-bleed beneath them, so it has to reserve that
lane — and it did so with five hardcoded CSS pixel values. CSS pixels scale with
page zoom and the OS-drawn lights do not, so zooming out shrank the reservation
until the lights were drawn over the sidebar toggle, and the header row below
sat inside their band.

Electron's `titleBarOverlay` publishes the controls' real geometry to the page as
the `titlebar-area-*` env vars, which Chromium rescales per zoom so a reservation
derived from them holds its physical size. Measured across zoom 0.58-1.2, the
reserved area stays within ~0.6 DIP, the residual coming from env values being
quantized to whole CSS pixels.

Every lane length now derives from those vars, so the login route and the
mothership content offset were fixed without being touched — they already read
`--desktop-title-bar-height`. Two of the replaced constants were also simply
wrong: the platform reports the lane at 38px and the safe area at 81px, against
the hand-measured 36 and 83.

The toggle keeps a constant physical size beside the lights, expressed as a
proportion of the lane rather than in pixels: a px literal would scale with zoom,
and calc cannot divide a length by a length to recover a scale factor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C54QHj4WPV777Fq2yRwkcb

* fix(desktop): avoid transient terminal tab labels

* feat(copilot): attach browser and terminal tab context

* feat(desktop): close tmux panes from terminal tools

* fix(desktop): keep terminal tab icons stable

* add right click to browser and cleanup terminal right click options

* fix(desktop): reduce hidden panel background work

* perf(desktop): shrink browser panel snapshots

* perf(desktop): reduce terminal main process overhead

* perf(terminal): pause work for hidden sessions

* fix session arch for desktop

* fix(desktop): replace exited terminal sessions

* feat(copilot): persist desktop resources across chats

* fix(emcn): keep resource tab widths consistent

* fix(copilot): restore active client panels

* feat(desktop): import Chrome browser data

* fix(copilot): close resources before chat creation

* feat(desktop): suggest imported browser sites

* fix(desktop): autofill identifier-first sign-ins

* fix resizing issues + cookies source

* fix visits marking

* chore(db): drop branch migrations ahead of staging merge

0264/0265 on this branch collide with staging's 0264-0270 on both the
journal idx slots and the meta snapshot filenames. Reverting the migration
artifacts to the merge-base lets staging's chain merge cleanly; schema.ts
keeps the copilot changes and drizzle-kit regenerates a single migration on
top of 0270 after the merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(db): regenerate copilot tool-permission migration on top of staging

Replaces the branch's old 0264/0265 (dropped pre-merge so staging's
0264-0270 chain could apply cleanly) with a single 0271 generated against
staging's schema: the permission-decision enum, the two
copilot_async_tool_calls decision columns, and copilot_chats.auto_allowed_tools.

Deliberately does NOT drop copilot_chats.plan_artifact. The branch removed
every reader, but the currently-deployed code still SELECTs that column, so
dropping it in the same deploy breaks the old app version during blue/green
overlap — `check:migrations` flags it for exactly this reason, and the honest
fix is to defer rather than annotate around it. The column is retained in
schema.ts marked @deprecated; drop it in a follow-up once this has rolled out.

Also in this commit, all fallout from the merge itself:
- pinned-fetch/revoke tests: their private-IP stub moved to @sim/security/ssrf
  alongside the source change. Worth noting the stub exists because the suite's
  203.0.113.10 is TEST-NET-3, which the real classifier correctly calls
  reserved — the old stub had been quietly disagreeing with production.
- materialize-file test: dropped the reserved-system-folder case, which covered
  the workflow-alias backing folders this branch deleted.
- api-validation route ratchet 977 -> 983 (this branch's new routes).

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* add cmd f

* review pass

* chore(db): drop branch migration ahead of staging merge

Both sides independently claimed idx 0271, so the snapshot and journal would
conflict add/add. Ours is plain additive DDL that drizzle regenerates from
schema.ts; staging's is a hand-written CONCURRENTLY index build that cannot be
regenerated. Dropping ours and re-generating on top of staging's is the only
order that preserves both.

schema.ts is deliberately untouched — it is the source of the regeneration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(db): drop branch migration ahead of staging merge

Both sides independently claimed idx 0272, so the snapshot and journal would
conflict add/add. Ours is plain additive DDL (one enum, two columns, one jsonb
default) that drizzle regenerates from schema.ts; staging's is a hand-written
migration with DO blocks and CONCURRENTLY index builds that cannot be
regenerated. Dropping ours and re-generating on top of staging's is the only
order that preserves both.

schema.ts is deliberately untouched — it is the source of the regeneration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style(db): biome-format the regenerated migration metadata

drizzle-kit emits _journal.json and the snapshot with expanded arrays, which
biome check rejects. The merge commit used --no-verify, so lint-staged never
formatted them and CI's lint step failed on exactly these two files.

Whitespace only — both files are byte-identical under `jq -S -c`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(desktop): pin the platform in the OS-auth tests

promptForSecret gates Touch ID on process.platform === 'darwin'. The suite
mocked electron's systemPreferences but inherited the runner's real platform,
so the eight biometric expectations passed on a Mac and failed on Linux CI,
where every call fell through to the confirmation dialog instead.

Pins the platform per-test and restores it after, and adds a case for the gate
itself — the branch whose absence from the suite is what let this through.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(desktop): refine environment dock icons

* fix(desktop): align packaged environment icons

* fix(desktop): keep packaged dock icon rendering consistent

---------

Co-authored-by: Vikhyath Mondreti <vikhyath@simstudio.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Waleed <walif6@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai>
2026-07-28 19:25:59 -07:00
Waleed cb3611bad2 feat(folders): add resource pinning and generalize the folders contract (#6014)
- Adds per-user pinning for workflows, files, knowledge bases, and tables: new `pinned_item` table, `/api/pinned-items` routes, React Query hooks, and a shared `PinButton` wired into Tables, Knowledge, and Files with pinned-first ordering
- Adds the generic `folder` table with an idempotent, replay-safe, collision-aware backfill from `workflow_folder` and `workspace_file_folders`; no cutover yet, folder reads still go through a documented legacy adapter
- Moves `folderSchema` to the generic vocabulary (`resourceType`, `deletedAt`) and drops the unused `color`/`isExpanded`
2026-07-28 14:42:11 -07:00