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852906ec915cb278a87ff0027a6180b953a8337c
882
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Waleed
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852906ec91 |
feat(splunk): add Splunk Enterprise and Cloud integration (#6743)
Adds a Splunk block with 12 REST operations: run search (oneshot), create/get/cancel search job, get search results, list/get/dispatch saved searches, list/get fired alerts, list indexes, and list apps. Bearer-token or basic auth, with optional /servicesNS namespace scoping.
Every tool was validated against the Splunk REST reference. Results use search/v2/jobs/{sid}/results because the v1 endpoint is deprecated and disabled from Splunk Enterprise 9.0.1. A half-specified namespace fills the missing node with the documented - wildcard rather than nobody/search, which would have hidden user-private objects. Dispatching endpoints fail loudly instead of reporting success with a null sid, and Create Search Job rejects exec_mode=oneshot since that mode returns results rather than a search ID. The results and control endpoints tolerate an empty body. saved/searches sends the f field filter the reference prescribes for it.
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Waleed
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d45dad7e8b |
feat(okta): add System Log, MFA, sessions, apps, roles, and group rules (#6741)
Expands the Okta block from 18 to 44 operations, covering the System Log, MFA factors, sessions, applications, administrator roles, and group rules. Adds shared helpers for the SSWS auth header, Okta error parsing, and the Link-header `after` cursor, and routes every tool through them so there is one auth and error path. All eight list operations now return `nextCursor` and `hasMore`. Makes the block's param transform authoritative over the serialized inputs: the executor merges it on top of them, so a key the transform omits keeps the raw subBlock string. Assigning `undefined` is what actually drops it, which is what keeps a non-numeric `limit` from reaching Okta verbatim and stops a blank field in a partial `update_user` from overwriting the stored value with an empty string. |
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337a53f12c |
feat(cli): Sim CLI with AWS-style profiles and a platform key exchange (#6147)
* improvement(api): pull in the v2 external endpoint surface Cherry-picks improvement/v2-endpoints ( |
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Theodore Li
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6006870f02 |
feat(credentials): add v2 credential lifecycle APIs (#6664)
* feat(credentials): add v2 OAuth connection APIs * fix(credentials): preserve active OAuth connection links * fix(credentials): bind OAuth links to connection intent * feat(credentials): complete v2 credential lifecycle * fix(credentials): make disconnect idempotent * fix(credentials): stabilize oauth draft retries * fix(credentials): bind oauth callbacks to drafts * fix(credentials): fail closed on oauth completion * fix(credentials): bind shopify completion to oauth state * fix(credentials): align custom oauth reconnects * fix(credentials): centralize application authorization * fix(credentials): keep OAuth draft intent immutable * fix(credentials): allow renamed reconnect targets * fix(credentials): close OAuth draft edge cases * fix(credentials): fail closed without breaking auth * fix(credentials): preserve migrated route behavior * feat(credentials): add provider search * fix(credentials): prevent stale secrets and drafts |
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Theodore Li
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ee1fc379a4 |
fix(tables): allow unbounded v1 row queries (#6713)
* fix(tables): allow unbounded v1 row queries * fix(tables): drain under-budget queries fully * fix(tables): bound expanded query metadata * fix(tables): always return query totals |
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Waleed
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3848f97b4c |
fix(grafana): validate against the API docs, add data source querying and contact-point CRUD (#6712)
* fix(azure-data-explorer): correct the tags ingestion-property example
The example rendered as tags="[''daily'']" — doubled single quotes from an
escaping slip, which is not valid Kusto. The reference writes a tags list
as tags='["TagA","TagB"]': single outer quotes with the JSON array's own
double quotes inside.
The clause builder already handled that form; only the example text was
wrong. A template literal avoids the escaping entirely, since the metadata
generator reads the source verbatim and would otherwise carry the
backslashes into the description the model sees.
Adds a test asserting the reference's exact multi-property clause
round-trips, including the comma inside the quoted array.
* fix(grafana): correct response contracts, required alert fields, and outbound request hardening
Validated against Grafana's HTTP API reference and, where the docs
contradict themselves, against the Go wire structs.
Response shapes the tools got wrong:
- update_annotation declared an `id` that was always 0; a patch returns only
a message, so the request's annotation id is echoed and labelled as such
- delete_folder discarded the numeric id Grafana returns and presented an
input-echoed uid as if it came from the API
- delete_dashboard fabricated `id: 0` / `title: ''` via `||` on absent fields
- the contact-point `provenance` description was inverted: "api" means
API-managed, empty means it stayed UI-editable
Requests that could not succeed:
- create_alert_rule left noDataState and execErrState unset and invisible to
the model, but Grafana's validator rejects an empty value outright, so every
model-driven create failed. Both are now sent with Grafana's own defaults,
and skipped for recording rules, which take a different validator
- get_data_source routed a numeric input at /api/datasources/:id, which exists
only behind an off-by-default feature toggle. UID only now
- list_annotations did not trim the dashboard UID, so a padded value matched
nothing
Outbound hardening on the three proxy routes:
- the service-account token was re-sent to redirect targets; the shared fetch
only drops it when asked, so stripAuthOnRedirect is now set
- no timeout was passed, leaving two sequential hops at the 5-minute default
- upstream error bodies were interpolated whole into the tool result, putting
up to 10MB of HTML into logs and traces; now truncated
- UID path segments are URL-encoded so they cannot re-target the request
- update_folder sent both `version` and `overwrite: true`, which Grafana treats
as alternatives, making the freshly fetched version decorative and silently
clobbering a concurrent rename
- replaced the `any` casts with narrowed types
Block surface:
- 25 outputs the tools emit were undeclared and so unreferenceable downstream;
get_data_source had 13 of its 18 unreachable
- `version` was typed string though the dashboard, folder, and data-source
producers all emit a number
- the dashboard title field was shown only for create, so a dashboard could
never be renamed through Update Dashboard
- six list outputs were typed json rather than array
* fix(grafana): let the health check report ill-health, and disambiguate block outputs
The data source health check could only ever report health. Grafana answers an
unhealthy source with HTTP 400 carrying the same {status, message} payload as a
healthy one, and the tool framework converts any non-2xx into an opaque tool
error — so the diagnostic the caller actually wants was unreachable. The check
now goes through an internal route that reads the verdict off either status and
reports it as a successful check, while a failure carrying no verdict (missing
data source, bad token, plugin with no health endpoint) stays a real error. The
plugin's `details` payload is surfaced too.
Also on that route, matching the other three: an outbound timeout, redirect
auth stripping, a truncated upstream error, and a URL-encoded UID.
Block output descriptions: ten keys are emitted by several tools with different
meanings and were described for only one producer — `database` meant both a
data source name and a health status, `annotations` both an annotation list and
an alert rule's summary map. Eleven `json` outputs were opaque although the
tools already document their inner fields. All rewritten to name every producer.
Smaller alignment fixes:
- the same EmbeddedContactPoint.settings field was typed `object` in list and
`json` in create
- list_contact_points mapped non-nullable uid/name/type through `?? null`;
Grafana returns an empty string, which is what create already assumed
- create_alert_rule sent `orgID`, which Grafana overwrites from the
authenticated context, and `Number()` on a non-numeric value put NaN -> null
in the body
- the three update routes declared `output` as required though the auth
short-circuit omits it, and did not declare the `details` they emit on a
validation error
* feat(grafana): complete contact-point CRUD, and add folder move and rule-group read
Four operations the integration was missing, taking it to 29.
update_contact_point / delete_contact_point close a real gap: contact points
could be listed and created but never corrected or removed. Two things worth
recording, because the published docs get both wrong:
- both verbs answer 202 with only a message, not the object. The rendered docs
claim delete returns 204; the current spec and handler both say 202. So the
UID is echoed from the request, the way delete_folder and update_annotation
already do
- update is a full replace with no PATCH counterpart, so name, type, and
settings are all required and the description says so. Omitting
disableResolveMessage resets it
X-Disable-Provenance is exposed on update only. Its polarity is the opposite of
the alert-rule case: omitting it always succeeds, while sending it against an
API-provisioned contact point is rejected — with 403, not the 409 rules use. It
is not exposed on delete at all, because that handler never reads stored
provenance and the endpoint takes no such parameter.
move_folder reuses get_folder's mapping verbatim — same DTO. It always sends
the parentUid key, since Grafana reads an empty value as "move to the root",
which a conditionally-omitted field could not express.
get_alert_rule_group surfaces the group evaluation interval, the one alerting
knob the per-rule operations cannot reach. It reuses the shared mapAlertRule for
the nested rules, and the interval is documented as an integer of seconds.
* feat(grafana): add data source querying, and ground the skill and templates in real tools
query_data_source closes the largest gap in the integration: 29 tools could
read dashboards, folders, and alert configuration, but none could read a metric
value. It posts to /api/ds/query and returns both the raw response and the
frames flattened into rows.
The flattening is derived from the documented layout rather than any data
source's field names: a frame carries schema.fields[] alongside data.values[],
where values[i] is the whole column for fields[i], so zipping them by position
works for Prometheus, SQL, or anything else with a backend.
A failed query is a 400 by Grafana's own status table, so it stays a tool
error — unlike the health check, where the failure status carries the answer.
That also lets four templates and the review-firing-alerts skill stop promising
things the integration could not do. Three templates assumed a metric-query
tool, which now exists. The fourth, and the skill, assumed live alert instance
state, which the provisioning API never returns — they now derive firing rules
from alert-state annotations, which are documented to carry newState and
prevState, and say so explicitly rather than implying a live snapshot.
Deliberately not added: a tool over /api/prometheus/grafana/api/v1/rules for
live instance state. That endpoint appears on no Grafana HTTP API doc page, its
response is only readable from Go internals and test assertions, and the
instance-level state casing differs from the rule level with no documented
contract. Not something to build an output schema on.
* fix(grafana): declare the two block outputs the earlier fixes introduced
Renaming update_annotation's phantom `id` to `annotationId` and adding
`details` to the health check both created outputs the block never declared, so
neither was referenceable downstream. Caught by re-running the output-coverage
check over both integrations; the block now covers all 64 keys the 30 tools emit.
* fix(grafana): make Update Contact Point actually usable from the block
The new replace operation could never succeed. contactPointType and
contactPointSettings were widened to cover it, but contactPointNameNew was
left create-only — and the update maps `name` from that field, so the required
parameter was never supplied.
disableResolveMessage had the same gap, and it matters more than it looks:
the update is a full replace, so a block-driven update was silently clearing
resolve suppression on every contact point it touched. Both fields are now
shown, and required where the API requires them.
Also states a reason on each intentionally-unconstrained response field —
Zod issue objects, alert query stages, notification settings, recording-rule
config, and data-source health detail are all genuinely opaque, but that was
left implicit.
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Waleed
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d5701d5b2b |
fix(icons): align table block icon and 12-unit icon stroke with the emcn family (#6708)
The table/table_v2 blocks and the table trigger used a local lucide-shaped TableIcon (stroke 2.0, full-bleed 24 viewBox, 3x3 grid) while every other table surface used emcn's Table. Consolidate onto the emcn icon and drop the local copy. Nested tool-call rows in Chat applied no color class, so a non-brand block icon inherited body text instead of --text-icon. redo/undo/zoom-in/zoom-out draw 0.85 stroke on a 12-unit viewBox, rendering 0.992px at a 14px box against the family's 0.904px. 0.775 restores parity. |
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mzxchandra
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5a88ce22d1 |
feat(ashby): incremental job sync, custom field writes, and application lifecycle ops (#6703)
* feat(tools): add incremental job sync and draft postings to Ashby reads
list_jobs accepts Ashby's syncToken and returns it as nextSyncCursor, so a
scheduled sync costs O(changed reqs) instead of rescanning every req. Ashby only
returns the token once the last page is drained, which the param description
states.
The output is named as a cursor deliberately. It is an opaque resumption marker,
not a credential, so it belongs with nextCursor - and a field literally named
syncToken matches the /^.*token$/i deny-list in redaction and renders as
[REDACTED], which makes an incremental sync unusable since the operator cannot
read the value the next run needs. The wire name stays syncToken.
list_job_postings gains includeUnpublishedJobPostings, plus the posting status
field - without status a caller cannot tell a returned draft from a published
posting, which makes the flag useless.
Also widens the custom field valueLabel type, which MultiValueSelect returns as
an array, for the write operations that follow.
* fix(tools): render Ashby object-shaped API errors readably
Ashby documents two error shapes and uses both. The `errors` array form carries
`{ message, parameter }` objects, which stringified to '[object Object]' and hid
the real cause - including the 403 a key gets when it lacks a module permission.
Also adds the shared pieces the new write operations need: one definition of the
custom field value shape for the read and write paths to agree on, and a
normalizer for Ashby's case-sensitive objectType enum so a model emitting
'candidate' fails here with the allowed values rather than at the API.
* feat(tools): add Ashby custom field writes, delete, source, and anonymize
customField.setValue/setValues are the only way to annotate a job or req, since
Ashby has no job notes and no job tags. Writing null clears a value, so the
annotation is reversible.
Because null clears, every one of these operations requires explicit intent
before it can destroy data. The block's required markers do not cover the agent
path - a model calls the tool directly, so tools.config.params never runs and
validateRequiredParametersAfterMerge skips a param marked not-required:
- set_custom_field_value rejects an absent or blank fieldValue; an explicit null
still clears
- change_application_source requires unsetSource to clear, and rejects a source
id and an unset request together, since preferring either one silently
discards the other. Ashby has no 'leave unchanged' mode, so setting and
clearing are the only two intents and exactly one must be expressed
- set_custom_field_values rejects an empty array locally rather than relying on
Ashby to reject it
application.delete needs candidatesDelete, a module permission separate from
candidatesWrite. candidate.anonymize strips PII but leaves the record; Ashby
exposes no candidate deletion endpoint.
* test(tools): cover the new Ashby request and response shapes
Includes a gated live harness (ASHBY_LIVE=1) alongside the mocked tests.
vitest.setup.ts stubs global fetch for every file in the app, so the live file
restores the real implementation and asserts the restore worked - without that
guard the whole suite silently passes against a mock.
* feat(blocks): expose the new Ashby operations in the block
fieldValue is polymorphic (boolean, number, string, array, object, null), so it
decodes structured input and otherwise passes text through. The decoding is
deliberately narrow rather than a blanket JSON.parse, which corrupts real text:
1e999 becomes Infinity and serializes back out as null, which CLEARS the field;
a long numeric id loses precision past 2^53; and prose starting with { turns into
an object. Only the literal keywords, {, [ or " prefixes, and exactly
round-tripping numbers decode.
fieldValue carries no wand generationType: json-object forces braces and
json-array forces brackets, and both would wrap a value that must stay bare.
fieldValues, whose contract really is an array, uses json-array.
Setting and clearing an application source are mutually exclusive, so the Source
ID field is conditioned off while the clear switch is on and the params mapping
sends only the intent the switch selects. A value typed before the switch was
flipped cannot reach the tool and surface as an error with no visible cause.
* docs(ashby): document the new operations, permissions, and limitations
Ashby scopes permissions per module and they fail at runtime, not build time, so
the block docs now carry the permission table. Also records the hard API limits
worth designing around: no note or tag on a job, no pagination on
jobPosting.list, and no delete for jobs, candidates, or custom field definitions.
* fix(blocks): stop a stale create-path source id leaking into a source change
The executor merges { ...inputs, ...transformedParams }, so any key the params
mapping leaves unset inherits whatever inputs held. The shared create-path
sourceId subblock reaches inputs even on change_application_source: it is mode
'advanced', and the serializer includes an advanced subblock whenever its value
is non-empty without ever evaluating its condition (serializer/index.ts).
So a source id typed while on Create Application survived into a source change.
With both fields blank it silently attributed a source nobody asked for, and
with the clear switch on it collided with the unset request and failed with no
visible cause, because the field producing it is hidden in that state.
sourceId is now always assigned for this operation rather than conditionally,
so it can never inherit. The regression test asserts the merged result rather
than the mapping alone, since the gap between them is where the bug lived.
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Waleed
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5bb59f08ee |
feat(connectors): add 9 knowledge base connectors (#6699)
* feat(connectors): add 9 knowledge base connectors
Box, Zoho Desk, PagerDuty, Trello, Microsoft Excel, Google Slides, Google
Vault, Mintlify, and SFTP. Selected by intersecting the published connector
catalogs of Glean, Onyx, Dust, Vectara, Writer, Guru, Elastic, Microsoft 365
Copilot, Notion AI, Unstructured, and Airbyte against services that already
ship a Sim block, so OAuth providers, credentials, and icons are reused. Box
was the largest gap, appearing in 7-8 of ~10 catalogs.
Every connector was validated against live provider documentation twice, the
second pass treating the first pass's conclusions as unproven. Notable
correctness work that came out of that:
Listing truncation. The sync engine hard-deletes documents past a cap that is
not flagged with `listingCapped`, and five connectors had a path there — an
empty Mintlify discovery, Zoho Desk's exact-multiple default caps, Trello's
archived lists and 1000-card ceiling, a Google Vault cursor bailout, and a
PagerDuty stalled page. The engine also gained a backstop: an empty or
collapsed listing blocks deletion reconciliation until the same observation
repeats on a consecutive sync, reconstructed from existing sync-log counters
so no migration is needed.
API alignment. `desk.zoho.ca` does not resolve (Canada is
`desk.zohocloud.ca`, and Singapore and UAE were missing); `modifiedTime` is
absent from Zoho's ticket list projection, so every ticket re-embedded on
every sync; Trello's `dateLastActivity` is documented to miss some edits;
PagerDuty's 10,000-record ceiling bounds `offset + limit`, not offset; Excel
indexed dates as raw serial numbers while Google Sheets renders them; Google
Vault truncated at roughly 249 matters.
Security. SFTP followed symlinks in `getDocument` and composed unchecked
server-supplied filenames into paths; it now also supports optional host-key
fingerprint verification, which runs during key exchange before any password
is sent. Trello interpolated user-supplied board ids into URL paths. Google
Vault is narrowed to `ediscovery.readonly`. `getDataverseBaseUrl` accepted
any host while attaching a bearer token, and is pinned to Microsoft's
Dataverse domains — pre-existing shipped code, fixed here.
Also adds `ConnectorAuthConfig.optional` so a public source can be configured
without inventing an API key, and teaches the scope check that a granted
read-write scope satisfies a required `.readonly` sibling.
Microsoft Dataverse was built and then removed: its OAuth cannot complete
consent. Dataverse requires a per-environment resource URI, the provider
declares a static `https://dynamics.microsoft.com/user_impersonation` that is
not an Entra Application ID URI, and the environment URL is only collected
after the credential exists. That predates this change and also affects the
12 shipped Dataverse tools.
* fix(dataverse): strip the bearer token when a request redirects
The host allowlist added alongside the connector work only constrains the
initial destination. `secureFetchWithPinnedIP` follows redirects and keeps the
`Authorization` header unless a tool opts out, so a redirect away from an
allowed Dataverse origin would forward the caller's OAuth token to whatever
host answers. Dataverse redirects in normal operation — file downloads hand
back a signed storage URL, and environment hosts move between regional
origins — so this is reachable without a compromised environment URL.
Sets `stripAuthOnRedirect` on all 18 Dataverse tools, matching the existing
GitHub job-logs and Windchill precedent.
* fix(connectors): address review findings on listing and hashing
- microsoft-excel: `fetchWorksheets` read only the first Graph page and never
followed `@odata.nextLink`. A workbook with more sheets than fit in one page
dropped the remainder from the listing without setting `listingCapped`, so
the sync engine reconciled those documents away as deleted. The walk now
pages, bounded by MAX_WORKSHEETS, and only follows a nextLink that stays on
the Graph origin, since the link is server-supplied and carries the token.
- google-slides: the listing `contentHash` covered only the file id and
modified time, so toggling the speaker-notes option left every stored hash
matching and no presentation was ever re-hydrated with the new scope. The
setting is now part of the hash, in the single shared stub builder so the
list and hydrate paths stay identical.
- mintlify: `pathPrefix` filtered with a bare `startsWith`, so a prefix of
`/guides` also matched a sibling like `/guides-archive`. It now shares the
`/`-boundary rule `withinBasePath` already used, extracted as `isUnderPath`.
* fix(connectors): list newest first in zoho desk, accept a trailing slash prefix
- zoho-desk: `sortBy: 'createdTime'` is ascending — Zoho denotes descending
with a `-` prefix — so the default 500-record caps kept the oldest tickets
and articles and recent ones were never listed. Because the cap sets
listingCapped, that stale tail could not reconcile away either. Now sorts
`-createdTime`. Still ordering on createdTime rather than modifiedTime, so
rows do not reshuffle mid-walk.
- mintlify: `resolvePathPrefix` kept a trailing slash while `isUnderPath`
accepts an exact match or `prefix + '/'`, so `/guides/` matched neither
`/guides` nor `/guides/intro` and the source synced nothing. A regression
from the previous round, which replaced a bare `startsWith`. The prefix is
now normalized before comparison.
* fix(dataverse): strip the bearer token on the upload route's own redirect
`upload_file` posts to an internal route rather than calling Dataverse
directly, so the tool-level `stripAuthOnRedirect` added in
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Waleed
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cf78946529 |
fix(v2): close seven correctness and honesty gaps found sweeping the API (#6702)
* fix(v2): close seven correctness and honesty gaps found sweeping the API A ten-slice sweep of the live v2 surface turned up no regression from the recent cancellation work, but did surface a set of pre-existing defects where an endpoint either lost data, hid a failure, or reported something that was not true. Each is fixed at the layer that owns the behavior. Terminal execution logs. The two force-fail boundaries wrote `status: 'failed'` without `ended_at` or `total_duration_ms`, so a force-failed run dropped out of every duration-filtered log query — the same defect class already closed for cancellation, still open on its sibling. The cancellation payload factory is generalized to take the status; the cancellation call sites are untouched and still emit a byte-identical row. Custom tools. One malformed row failed the whole page, and because the list is keyset-paginated that row made every page containing it permanently unreachable. The projection now validates against the same contract schema the route builder applies, repairing only what can be repaired without inventing information — a stringified schema, and a missing `type` whose contract admits exactly one value — and omitting with a warning what cannot. Both rows observed in production are recovered rather than discarded. Table filters. `eq`/`ne`/`in`/`nin` compiled a wrongly-typed operand into a containment test that silently matched nothing, so a filter written against the value the write path had stored returned an empty page instead of its rows. The operand is now read through the same column-type registry the write used, and rejected only where that registry refuses it. Range operators already behaved this way; `null` and the cleared-cell sentinel still pass through untouched. Error messages. A custom `error` on a string schema also replaced the wrong-type wording, so supplying a number for a name reported that the name was missing. Messages now distinguish an omitted field from a mistyped one, `topK` names its own bounds, the knowledge search refine reports against a field rather than the whole body, and a workspace id is bounded before it reaches a lookup. Archived file metadata. A soft-deleted file was listed but unreadable, leaving no way to check share state before restoring it. The read takes the same `scope` selector the list already exposes; the default is unchanged, and the parameter relaxes only the `deleted_at` predicate, never the authorization. Cancellation reporting. Cancelling an already-terminal run reported a durable write that never happened. The service now distinguishes the no-op and names the state it observed, and both surfaces present one vocabulary instead of the internal route deriving its own. No claim predicate or write changed. Protocol. A 401 carries a challenge naming the header the API actually reads, and a body that failed to parse is reported as an unsupported media type only when the caller positively declared a non-JSON one — after the read has already failed, so nothing that succeeds today can begin to fail. * fix(v2): correct three regressions this branch introduced, and harden its tests Adversarial review of the previous commit found that three of its "behavior preserving" claims were wrong. Each is corrected here at the layer that owns it. Table filters no longer coerce a `date` operand, and no longer throw. `date` is the one column type whose registry `coerce` is not idempotent — it drops sub-second precision — and the leaf that compiles a filter also builds the unique-constraint and upsert-conflict probes, so re-reading an already-coerced operand could stop it matching the row it was written from and admit a duplicate inside the write transaction with no error. Throwing was the second mistake: the v2 predicate grammar type-checks structure but not operand values, so a rejected operand no longer failed at submission but inside the delete, update, dispatch and cancel runners, where a filter that cannot compile means the cells it started can no longer be cancelled. Coercion is now total — it rewrites what the registry accepts and passes everything else through unchanged, exactly as before. Reviving a force-failed run no longer inherits its terminal duration. Writing `ended_at` and `total_duration_ms` on the force-fail boundary was correct in isolation, but a partial resume flips that row back to `pending` and those columns survived. The preserved value is meant to be the pause checkpoint — the run's active time — and it had become wall clock measured at the failed resume, which the checkpoint rule then faithfully carried into the next terminal write. The revival clears them only for a row that was terminal, so an ordinary paused row keeps the checkpoint it is supposed to keep. Cancelling reports the terminal state it actually observed. Reclassification now requires that nothing else went wrong, so a genuine paused-reconciliation failure survives instead of being rewritten as an already-terminal no-op, and the claim's own row count — not a snapshot read before it — decides whether this cancel terminalized the run or lost a race to something else. The status the snapshot needed rides along on the ownership query that already reads the row, rather than the second read that query's own contract warns against. A custom tool that cannot be projected now answers the same way everywhere: the list omits it, and reading or patching it by id reports it as absent rather than as a server fault. Analytics stops reporting a cancellation for a request that cancelled nothing. The tests around all of this were audited by mutating each fix and checking the suite noticed. Where it did not, the assertion is stronger now: the absent content-type branch is genuinely exercised rather than relying on a header the client library supplies, the duration encoder is pinned to the column it must measure from, execution ownership is pinned to both ids it must match, and the archived-file concealment test proves it conceals the archived read specifically. Two tests that asserted a paused branch they could not observe are gone; the rendered-SQL test that can decide it already covers them. * fix(execution): report a workflow-group cancellation as the write it performed Cancelling a workflow-group run whose log had already been cancelled, but whose cell sidecar still needed reconciliation, durably cancelled that sidecar and then reported `already_cancelled` with `durablyRecorded: false` — because the terminal-status shortcut answered from the entry snapshot alone and never asked what this request had written. The analytics event, which now gates on that field, stopped firing for a cancellation that really happened. The outcome a cancel reports is the same question whichever path answers it, so there is now one vocabulary for it rather than one the direct claim tracked and one the group transition did not. Every group result maps to that outcome through a total map, so a new group result cannot compile without deciding what it wrote, and the reclassification leads with whether this request wrote at all. A group transition that reports itself already cancelled is deliberately mapped as unknown rather than as a no-op: it leaves the sidecar alone but still terminalizes a log that was active, and the result does not say which happened. That costs nothing today, because the only snapshot that would reclassify proves the log was already terminal. * fix(execution): have a workflow-group cancellation report the writes it made Three review findings landed on the same reporting logic, each a different face of one cause: the caller could not see what the group transaction had written, so it inferred. It inferred from an entry snapshot, then from the returned kind, and the remaining blind spot was the kind that covers two different transactions — a repair that terminalizes an active log, and a genuine no-op — which left a cancel that wrote nothing still claiming a durable write when it lost a race. The transaction now reports both writes it can make, each read from that statement's own returning row and recorded immediately before the throw that already depended on it, so the report cannot drift from the write. The caller derives its outcome from those rather than from the kind, and the kind is back to naming the situation instead of standing in for the work. The group path can now always answer whether it wrote. The only remaining unknown is the direct claim when its update throws or is never attempted, which genuinely has no row count to report. |
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Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Opus 5
|
237f973a11 |
fix(condition): stop a secret value from breaking or forging a condition (#6705)
Condition expressions pasted every environment variable value into the
expression as source. Block references in the same expression go through a
proper escape and get quoted; env vars went through neither. That left three
defects:
- A bare string placeholder was a SyntaxError. `{{NAME}} === 'alice'` resolved
to `alice === 'alice'`, so the form the Function block docs recommend could
not be used here at all.
- Ordinary data broke the block. An apostrophe (`O'Brien`) or a newline in a
legitimate value produced unparseable source and failed the run.
- The quoted form was injectable. A value of `x' || true || '` turned
`'{{NAME}}' === 'bob'` into `'x' || true || '' === 'bob'`, forging a true
branch out of a comparison that should be false.
Inline only structurally inert literals — numbers, booleans, and null, with
optional space/tab padding. Every other value keeps its `{{NAME}}` placeholder
and is bound as a string by the execution-boundary compiler, the same one
Function blocks and Custom Tools already use.
Legacy outcomes are preserved. `{{COUNT}} === 3` and `{{ENABLED}} === true`
still compare as literals, and an embedded `"Bearer {{API_KEY}}"` still
compares equal — now via compiled concatenation rather than a pasted value.
Padding is admitted rather than trimmed so the inlined text stays
byte-identical to the stored value, which is what keeps a padded number
correct both bare and quoted.
A resolved secret also no longer travels to the execution boundary inside the
condition source.
The one deliberate behavior change: a value whose text is itself a quoted JS
literal (a secret stored as `'foo'`, a plausible workaround for the bare-string
SyntaxError) now compares as the 5-character string rather than as source.
That form is the injectable one, so it cannot be kept.
Docs: state the placeholder type contract, which was described mechanically but
never in terms of what a reader gets. `{{KEY}}` in Function and Custom Tool code
always evaluates to a string, so a bare `if ({{FLAG}})` is always true and a list
has to be stored as JSON. This is what a customer hit after the resolver lift in
#6247 moved Function blocks off source inlining.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Waleed
|
a7115e87ee |
feat(integrations): add Azure Data Explorer (#6701)
* feat(integrations): add Azure Data Explorer Add a 14-operation Azure Data Explorer (Kusto) integration covering KQL queries, schema and metadata discovery, table management, inline and query-sourced ingestion, ingestion-failure triage, and arbitrary management commands. Authentication uses a Microsoft Entra service principal through an internal proxy route, since the Kusto token audience is per-cluster and cannot be expressed as a static-scope OAuth provider. * fix(azure-data-explorer): only read partial-failure status from the QueryStatus table Scanning every returned table for Severity and StatusDescription columns misread an ordinary query as a failed request whenever the user's own result selected columns of those names — a common shape for a log table. Failure detection now consults only the table the response's table of contents names as QueryStatus, and primary-result selection reuses the same index instead of re-reading it. * fix(azure-data-explorer): keep the Show Operations and Show Table Details cards from painting empty check:canvas-sentences flagged the Show Operations sentence: it anchored `core` on operationId, which is an advanced-mode optional field, so an untouched card resolved to nothing and painted empty. Show Table Details had the same shape in milder form — table is optional there, since omitting it describes every table, leaving a dangling preposition. Both now lead with literal copy and treat their field as an optional refinement. Also simplifies the primary-table condition to a single `!= null` check. * fix(azure-data-explorer): authenticate sovereign clusters against their own Entra authority The cluster allowlist accepted Azure China and US Government hosts, but every token request went to login.microsoftonline.com. Those clouds are isolated instances with their own Entra endpoints, so a sovereign cluster passed URI validation and then could never obtain a token. Each Kusto service domain is now declared alongside the authority that issues tokens for it, so the two cannot drift apart, and the authority is part of the token cache key. * improvement(azure-data-explorer): warn that ingest-from-query matches columns by position Kusto aligns an ingested query result to the target table on column type and order, never on column name, so a query projecting the right columns in the wrong order lands data in the wrong columns without erroring. Surfaces that in the tool description and param the model reads, in the wand prompt that generates the query, in the rollup skill's steps, and in the docs. Also verifies the target schema first rather than after. * chore(azure-data-explorer): drop the unsourced kustomfa host from the cluster allowlist Every other entry traces to a Microsoft reference — the Kusto connection-string doc, the national-cloud endpoint tables, and the Fabric KQL-database REST reference. kustomfa.windows.net does not, and the connection-string doc states the trust boundary as hostnames ending in kusto.windows.net. An allowlist should only hold hosts we can justify, so this drops it and records the sourcing standard for anything added later. * fix(azure-data-explorer): handle commas inside quoted properties and empty extent IDs Two defects in the shared command helpers: buildWithClause split the property list on every comma before validating, so a value that legally contains one — a docstring sentence, or a tags array with more than one entry — was torn in half and rejected. Splitting is now quote-aware, and an unterminated quote is rejected outright rather than swallowing the rest of the clause. transformColumnListResponse dropped empty strings, but `.ingest inline` reports "no data shards were generated" as a single record carrying an empty extent ID. A no-op load therefore looked like a missing column instead of an empty result. Only non-strings are skipped now. |
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Waleed
|
1d342722ad |
feat(rabbitmq): add RabbitMQ integration (#6700)
* feat(rabbitmq): add RabbitMQ integration * fix(rabbitmq): strip auth on redirect, require https, and bound the retrieval response * fix(rabbitmq): reserve message metadata in the retrieval response budget |
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Waleed
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7f64d5e600 | perf(tables): stop a table write refetching every loaded page in the tab that made it (#6698) | ||
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Vikhyath Mondreti
|
fa394e5e07 |
fix(execution): resolve secrets against the acting principal, not the workflow owner (#6690)
* fix(execution): resolve secrets against the acting principal, not the workflow owner * fix(execution): resolve anonymous public-API runs as the workspace billing account * fix(execution): propagate run identity across dispatch paths and scope public runs to workspace secrets |
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Waleed
|
9fc65863cd |
fix(v2): hold create to the rules update enforces, and bind the last two cursors (#6684)
Three defects, one shape: a rule applied to one path and not its sibling. Two were found by probing the live surface after the previous fixes deployed, and the third by reading for the pattern. Creating a workflow group through the public surface validated almost nothing the update path validates. An enrichment group could name an enrichment the registry does not define, or an output the enrichment does not have, or carry no output id at all — each a 201 storing a column no run can ever write, discovered only when the caller later tried to edit the group and got the 400 create should have given. The workflow half was the same: a fabricated block-and-path coordinate was stored on create and refused on update. Create now runs the same two registry helpers and the same workflow-output check the update path uses. The discriminator there is the backing workflow id, not the declared type. The workflow sidebar creates enrichment-template groups labelled `enrichment` while backed by a real workflow and carrying no enrichment id, so keying on the label would have refused the first-party create path outright. A group's producer type could also be relabelled after the fact into a state creation refuses. Nothing rejected it and nothing could repair it, since the update body carries no enrichment id to supply. Relabelling an enrichment group as workflow-backed is the harmful direction: it keeps the enrichment id while moving the group onto the workflow branch with an empty workflow id, so every cell run fails. An update may now only restate the type the group already has. The workflow-version and workspace-member lists were the last two paged reads minting cursors with no route identity, so a token from one parent resumed another at a position that silently skips rows — the defect the previous change closed everywhere else. Both now wrap their domain token with the same scope binding, and the pagination guardrail gained a declaration of every nested list's parent path param, because the old one recorded only query filters and so could not tell an unfiltered list from a forgotten parent. |
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Waleed
|
ab8a64fcae |
fix(v2): close the defects live probing found (#6681)
* fix(v2): close the defects live probing found Staging finally deployed the merged release, so the surface could be exercised for real. Every fix already shipped held up. These are the defects only live traffic surfaced, plus the ones a static sweep had found and left. A cursor named a position in a sequence without naming the sequence. `cursorScopeKey` hashed only the caller's filters, so any two lists filtering on nothing but `workspaceId` produced one fingerprint and accepted each other's tokens: a tables cursor replayed against the knowledge list answered 200 and silently skipped a row. Table rows never reached that check at all, so a cursor from one table paged another. Identity now comes from the route's own contract — method plus resolved path — because a hand-written name is the step an author forgets, and forgetting it is invisible. An unresolved path placeholder throws rather than fingerprinting the template, so a misconfigured route fails on every request instead of an unlucky one. Every token minted before this is refused with an accurate message; they are single-walk and unpersisted. Knowledge search and the document list answered different questions. Search grouped same-tag filters by slot and joined them with OR while the list conjoined every filter, so `gte 9` and `lte 2` on one tag returned nothing from the list and a full billed page from search. Search now conjoins. The OR grouping replaced an explicit `|OR|` mechanism that was deleted outright, was never documented in any contract, and cost the ability to express a range on a single tag; the union it gave is still reachable as separate searches. The search body also accepted an unbounded query that was billed and then silently truncated to the embedding model's window, and ignored the tag-filter cap the list enforces. A body over ten mebibytes was reported as malformed JSON. Next's proxy truncates there, well under this app's fifty-megabyte ceiling, so the parse failed on a body the caller sent whole and the size branch was unreachable. The ceiling is now clamped to what the proxy will pass. Also: a group's output columns accepted a `workflowGroupId` and discarded it; an enrichment group could never gain an output, because a new output coordinate demanded workflow metadata a group with no workflow cannot have; `newOutputColumns` alone reported success and created nothing; a saved view stored layout references to columns that do not exist while refusing the same name in a filter; an MCP server stored `retries: 0` as three and overrode an explicit auth type; a disabled server answered tool discovery with an unclassified fault; rotating a header server's headers left it reading connected; and a run whose workflow was deleted reported the root folder path while also reporting the workflow deleted. Where the honest fix was out of reach, the contract was corrected instead of half-fixing the code: the polled run resource rebuilds `error.code` by matching the persisted message, so it can never report the two codes that need block attribution, and now says so. `OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE` is removed — no path ever emitted it. `triggers` was left alone deliberately. It reads as a closed enum but production holds 43 distinct values, because a webhook run stores its provider id; pinning the enum would refuse legitimate history a log search exists to find. The description now says the vocabulary is open. * fix(v2): clamp explicit body caps to the proxy ceiling too The previous commit clamped the default JSON body cap but left explicit per-route overrides alone, so a route declaring a larger `maxBodyBytes` still fell into the truncation it was meant to report: the four inline workspace-file routes at 70 MB and the deployed-chat route at 220 MB. Next attaches `proxyClientMaxBodySize` to every request and clones the body unconditionally for any non-GET method on a matched path, pushing EOF at ten mebibytes with only a warning, so the handler reads a truncated prefix. Those routes therefore already fail above that size — as a malformed-JSON 400. Clamping the effective limit inside the two body readers makes the same request fail as payload-too-large, quoting the limit actually in force. One existing test asserted the unreachable case, allowing a sixty-mebibyte base64 body; it now asserts what the proxy will forward intact. The inline-file path still advertises fifty mebibytes and cannot exceed the proxy ceiling until that ceiling is raised, which changes buffering for every route and belongs in its own change. * fix(v2): close the two holes the first review round found Both are places where a fix in this branch shut one door and left a smaller one open in the same wall. Letting an enrichment group gain an output meant skipping workflow resolution — but that resolution was the only thing validating a new output, so a PATCH began storing coordinates the runner can never fill. It fills a cell from `result[out.outputId]` and skips an output with no `outputId` at all, while the writer diffs on that same id and the sidebar reads and writes by it; the contract leaves it optional. The regression test added with that fix was itself asserting such a dead coordinate. Create's registry checks are now two shared helpers both paths call, and on update an output is exempt only when an identical binding already existed, so renaming a group whose enrichment has since changed still works while anything added or repointed must name a real output. `mappingUpdates` on an enrichment group now says it is inexpressible rather than resolving an empty workflow id into a missing workflow. The layout-reference check was handed the tolerant column set, so a placeholder minted to keep a dangling filter writable also whitelisted a brand-new layout reference — storing an entry the next read discards, which is the inconsistency the check was added to remove. Layout now resolves against the live columns, which is exactly what pruning keeps, while filters and sorts keep the exemption they need. |
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|
1424809614 |
feat(netsuite): add Oracle NetSuite integration (#6476)
* revise netsuite integration * fix(netsuite): align selector route with snowflake * test(netsuite): remove selector route coverage * test(netsuite): align coverage with snowflake * fix(netsuite): complete integration validation * refactor(netsuite): align integration with codebase patterns * test(netsuite): correct async job citation * fix(netsuite): address final audit findings * fix(netsuite): surface upsert/transform Location, relax task link check Oracle documents the Location response header for create and update, and both tools already require it. Upsert and transform also produce a record but Oracle documents no response headers for either, so they dropped the header entirely and the new record's ID was unreachable. Add a `resource-optional` location mode that captures Location when NetSuite sends it and never fails when it is absent, and wire it to upsert and transform along with their tool and block outputs. Async task discovery rejected the whole response if any task link carried a rel other than `self`, collapsing the picker into a 502. Oracle documents a `self` link per task but never guarantees it is the only one, so skip other relationships and fail only when no self link exists. Also use the shared `truncate` helper in the error sanitizer per the repo convention instead of an inline slice. * fix(netsuite): validate SuiteQL pages against their documented shape The shared collection-page validator required links, items, count, hasMore, offset, and totalResults on every 200, and a missing field turns a successful call into a reported failure. Oracle documents all six for record collections and SuiteAnalytics dataset pages, but its SuiteQL reference lists only links, count, offset, totalResults, and items. A documented SuiteQL response that omits hasMore would therefore have been rejected. Split out a suiteql-page validator that requires the five documented SuiteQL fields and type-checks hasMore only when the account returns it. Record collections and dataset pages keep requiring all six. * chore(netsuite): regenerate tool metadata after rebase on staging The rebase conflicted only in the generated tool-id, tool-metadata, and tool-output artifacts, which NetSuite and the newly landed LogRocket integration both extend. Regenerated from the merged registries: the result is staging's catalog plus the 27 NetSuite tools, with LogRocket's entries intact and no other tool changed. --------- Co-authored-by: Bill Leoutsakos <billleoutsakos@Bills-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: Bill Leoutsakos <billleoutsakos@Mac.localdomain> Co-authored-by: Waleed Latif <walif6@gmail.com> |
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|
Waleed
|
58b5ee9337 |
feat(logrocket): add LogRocket integration (#6678)
* feat(logrocket): add LogRocket integration * improvement(logrocket): fail loudly on a non-numeric identify timestamp and cover releases in the catalog copy * fix(logrocket): require a highlights identity and treat pagination cursors as opaque strings * fix(logrocket): trim request fields so whitespace-only input fails validation * fix(logrocket): declare the release version in the block inputs map |
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Waleed
|
e2b7335644 |
fix(v2): stop telling callers something the server did not do (#6676)
A works-as-advertised sweep of the v2 surface found one defect class in five
places: input is validated for shape, then its meaning is re-derived
independently by each consumer — so a filter compiles differently than it
validated, or a write commits and the response then reports failure.
Knowledge tag filters were validated once and re-parsed three times. The
document list read `Number()`, search read `parseFloat()`; the list matched
booleans case-insensitively, search compared against the literal `'true'`; the
list escaped LIKE metacharacters, search did not; and the date pattern was
tested against the untrimmed string the validator had already trimmed. Two of
those paths dropped the predicate entirely and answered 200 with the whole
knowledge base — on a billed endpoint. Values are now coerced once, where the
resolved field type is known, and both builders consume the result. A builder
that cannot compile an already-validated filter now raises instead of silently
widening the result set.
`PUT /api/v2/secrets/{name}` with `scope: personal` committed the secret and
then answered 500, because a user-global write was reported through a
workspace-scoped mirror lookup, and an org admin's inherited access has no
`permissions` row for the fan-out to find. The personal path no longer decides
success from a per-workspace mirror. The `workspaceId` descriptions said a
personal secret lives in one workspace; it does not, and they now say so.
A custom tool could be stored with a schema the read path cannot serialize —
`POST /workflows/import` and Copilot both wrote through name-only checks — so
one row made the whole workspace list 500, and a title-only PATCH committed,
audited, then reported failure. Every write now passes the same guard the
response schema is derived from.
`POST /api/v2/tables` accepted `workflowGroupId` on an initial column. Nothing
can populate it legitimately, and it made every later column-add and group-add
fail with no way to clear it. The key is refused at the boundary, and
`createTable` now runs the invariant every later mutation already runs, closing
the internal and v1 ingresses too. Those invariants moved to a leaf module:
reaching them through `workflow-columns` pulled the executable tool registry
into the tables page graph, taking it from 1,767 modules to 6,999.
An out-of-range upload part number answered 500 rather than the 400 its
published contract promises, because the throw happened above the route's
try/catch and was not an `HttpError`.
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Waleed
|
8d319a430a |
fix(v2): close the correctness gaps the release audit found (#6671)
An end-to-end audit of the v0.8.1 release surfaced one regression the release itself introduced and a set of filter/cursor gaps that let a caller's spelling change what a query answered. An `enrichment` workflow group stored no `workflowId`. The public contract invites a caller to omit it, the write persisted caller input through an `as WorkflowGroup` cast that hid the omission from the type checker, and the response schema still required it — so the write committed and then the outbound parse threw. Because the list presenter maps every group through that schema, one such row made GET, PATCH and DELETE on that table's groups fail from then on, with no public way to remove it. The cast is gone rather than papered over, so the same class of omission cannot recur silently. Knowledge tag filters accepted any operator string and then ignored an unrecognized one in opposite directions: the document list dropped the predicate and answered with the whole knowledge base, while search fell through to equality and answered a different question. Both now reject at the boundary. `.strict()` is applied on the v2 chain only — v1 has always stripped unrecognized keys, and the `between`-requires-`valueTo` rule already closes the mis-cased `valueTo` trap on both versions. Cursor scopes bound set-valued filters to the caller's ordering: `all`/`any` clause order and `in`/`nin` operand order in the table predicate, and the raw `resourceType` text on audit logs, whose query splits it into an `inArray`. Audit logs is canonicalized on both sides, because canonicalizing the scope alone would have given two genuinely different result sets one fingerprint. Also: the exposed-header list reached only the fallback CORS policy, so all five matched rules — including the wildcard-origin execute route, the only one that emits `X-Run-Id` — could not hand a browser the run id or a 429's `Retry-After`; a bulk row update reported an uncoercible value only when its filter happened to match; the cost and duration windows accepted an inverted pair and answered it with an empty page; and the sortless runs list advised callers to fix a `sortBy` it rejects. |
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Waleed
|
6de8ba2504 |
fix(v2): close the correctness gaps an end-to-end audit found (#6655)
* fix(v2): stop a third-party tool description from 500ing MCP discovery
`v2McpToolInputSchema` declared `description: z.string().optional()` inside a
`.catchall(z.unknown())` object, and a declared key beats the catchall. The MCP
SDK's own `ToolSchema.inputSchema` does not declare `description` at all, so any
value — including the JSON `null` a Python server emits for an absent one —
passes its validation and reaches Sim unchecked. The builder's outbound `.parse()`
then threw, and the discovery error policy correctly declines to classify a
Sim-side schema defect, so the endpoint that completes MCP onboarding answered a
bare 500. The key is dropped and left to the catchall; `type`, `properties`, and
`required` stay pinned because the SDK enforces those at least as tightly.
Also in the v2 resources family:
- The single-resource query schemas for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, and
secrets are now `.strict()`, matching every list in the same family. A mistyped
flag was silently ignored behind a 200.
- `openapi/resources.ts` re-derived `RESOURCE_ERRORS` and
`RESOURCE_CONFLICT_ERRORS` inline in 21 of 22 operations. They now import the
shared constants; the generated spec is unchanged, which is the point.
- The internal MCP refresh route stamped `updatedAt` alongside `lastToolsRefresh`.
`updatedAt` means "configuration last changed" and is a public keyset sort, so
a refresh moved rows out from under an in-flight page. `updateServerStatus`
already held that invariant; the route now matches it.
- The discovery cooldown is a typed `McpServerCooldownError` rather than a
substring search for `cooldown`. `McpConnectionError` interpolates the server's
display name into its message, so a server named after the word was reported as
a transient cooldown when its connection had genuinely failed.
* fix(v2): close correctness gaps in the workflows deployment surface
Deploy and rollback bodies were plain objects, so a misspelled key was
stripped rather than rejected. On rollback that is silent misbehavior:
an omitted `version` legitimately means "reactivate the preceding
version", so `{"versoin": 5}` rolled back somewhere else and answered
200. Both v2 bodies, the run-read query, and the versions cursor are now
strict.
Deployment versions are an `integer` column, but the path param, the
versions cursor, and the v1 body each bounded it differently or not at
all — an out-of-range value overflowed the comparison into an
unclassifiable 500. One exported bound now covers all three.
Resume admission raised bare `Error`s for a stale contextId or an
already-resumed run, which the resume surfaces could not classify and
reported as 500. They now use the sibling `ResumeAdmissionError` already
in that file, carrying 404/409/400 and whether an automatic retry can
clear the refusal.
Docs corrections: rollback publishes the 409 its webhook-path conflict
already produces; deploy/undeploy/rollback reject a workspace key with
403, not the concealed 404 they documented; the workflows OpenAPI module
imports the shared error sets instead of re-deriving them; import and
the folder ops explain their folder-tree 413. The export route is marked
`headSafe: false` so a HEAD probe stops filing a WORKFLOW_EXPORTED audit
event for an export that never happened. `runId` is one bounded schema
across the run and log resources.
* fix(v2): conceal knowledge upload existence, tighten knowledge/files bounds
Security: the four knowledge document-upload routes rendered a bare upload
error policy with no resource concealment, while every sibling knowledge route
uses one. Because the use case resolves the knowledge-base context before
workspace authorization, the unconcealed 403 told any valid API-key holder that
a knowledge base exists in a workspace it cannot reach — the exact signal
GET /api/v2/knowledge/{id} withholds by answering 404 either way. All four now
use the composed concealing policy, which also renders the 415/402/413 the
route-local renderer already handled; that duplicate renderer is deleted.
Contracts:
- POST /knowledge/search is strict. It was the only non-strict v2 request body,
so a mis-cased rerankerEnabled or topK returned 200 with the key stripped,
changing what the caller was billed and silently disabling reranking.
- The document list takes limit, cursor, and search from the shared v2 schemas.
search was an unbounded, empty-accepting v1 string, so ?search= answered 200
with a full page here and 400 on GET /knowledge, and the term reached an
unindexed filename LIKE scan with no ceiling.
- The 16 non-strict single-field workspace query slices across both families are
strict, matching GET /knowledge/{id}/tags.
- GET /audit-logs takes workspaceIdSchema instead of a bare string (?workspaceId=
was forwarded as a filter and returned zero rows) and the shared run-window
bounds for startDate/endDate.
Documentation:
- listAuditLogs drops the 404 it has no code path to emit.
- upsertFileShare describes its workspace-key refusal as the 403 it renders;
the operation denies the key by principal kind, which the concealment policy
does not rewrite.
- The 12 body-reading knowledge and files operations publish the 413 their
pre-validation body read raises, and the file list publishes the folder-tree
413 its now-capped path index raises.
Correctness: queryWorkspaceFilePage loads its folder path index under
MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE like the workflow, table, and knowledge lists. An
uncapped index does not fail on truncation, so a real folder outside the read
rows resolved to undefined and answered "Folder not found".
* fix(v2): publish the reachable 413 on body-carrying resources ops
`parseRequest` buffers a JSON body through `parseJsonBody` under
`DEFAULT_MAX_JSON_BODY_BYTES` before any schema runs, and the v2 builders supply
`V2_PARSE_DEFAULTS.payloadTooLargeResponse`, so every operation whose contract
declares a body already answers 413 above the cap. The resources family
published it on none of them. A status a caller cannot see in the spec is a
status they will not handle.
Adds `RESOURCE_BODY_ERRORS` and `RESOURCE_CONFLICT_BODY_ERRORS` to the shared
sets and applies them to the seven affected operations: createMcpServer,
updateMcpServer, createSkill, updateSkill, createCustomTool, updateCustomTool,
and setSecret. All seven are `defineV2JsonRoute` handlers on non-GET methods
with no `parseOptions` override, so the 413 is genuinely reachable on each. The
new sets are opt-in rather than folded into the base sets precisely because
reachability is not automatic — an operation with no body, or one whose payload
reaches it through an uncapped path, would be publishing a response that can
never arrive.
A sweep test pins the invariant across the resources, billing, and logs
documents. It is one-directional by construction: several bodyless operations
publish 413 for their own folder-tree and render ceilings, so the converse would
flag correct documentation.
Also completes the shared-constant consolidation started in
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Waleed
|
29853fbbcf |
improvement(docs): make the API reference read as code and unify its type token (#6653)
* improvement(docs): make the API reference read as code, and unify the type token The API-page font override matched every span/div/p inside the page, which outranks the .font-mono class on specificity, so every parameter name, type, and identifier silently rendered in the body sans face. Exclude .font-mono so code tokens stay monospace. Consolidate the three divergent type-slot treatments — plain scalar, union, and schema reference each carried their own chip definition, differing in size, weight, face, and box height — onto one code token that reuses the docs inline-code recipe and the platform's 20px chip height. Demote the row metadata: 'required' and 'header' were filled pills, 'required' on the error token, making a constraint the loudest element on the page and a page of required parameters read as a page of alarms. Both are now uncontained text, leaving the type token as the only box on the row. Pin the two 'application/json' labels to one treatment; the Request Body and Response headers rendered the same string at different weights and faces. * improvement(docs): mono status-code tabs, and match fumadocs' lucide icons to emcn Status codes in the example panel are numeric literals and render as code everywhere else on the page, including the Response header's own trigger, but fumadocs rendered the strip in the body sans face. Language tabs sit in a separate container and stay sans — those are product names, not code. fumadocs draws a few lucide glyphs on API pages that its client-component overrides do not expose (the heading anchor and the code-block copy button). emcn strokes at 1.55 and lucide at 2, so those icons read heavier than every icon around them; match the weight. * fix(docs): align the auth type chip with every other property row, and wrap example code The auth row collapses its real `<token>` type and renders the chip through ::after, so the span is only a wrapper — but it still matched the type-token rule and kept that rule's border, height, and gap. The border drew a second empty box around the real chip and the gap opened in front of it, because the collapsed text remains an anonymous flex item; together they pushed the chip right by roughly 8px that no other row had. Example-panel code overflowed sideways instead of wrapping: fumadocs sizes the block with `w-max`, so it grew to its longest line inside a 400px scroller and the existing pre-wrap never applied. Cap the width, switch break-all to overflow-wrap anywhere so only unfittable tokens split, and reserve room for the copy button fumadocs floats over the first line. * revert(docs): let example code overflow instead of wrapping Wrapping restarts every continuation line at column zero, and in a JSON body indentation is what carries nesting depth — so a wrapped response misreports its own structure. A hanging indent keeps the depth but needs the shiki lines forced from flex rows to blocks, which breaks the line rhythm. Removes the pre-wrap rules rather than repointing them: fumadocs sizes the block with w-max, so the previous rule never took effect and overflow was already the behaviour on the page. * fix(docs): tighten array type tokens and keep the union separator legible An `array<T>` slot holds its angle brackets as bare text nodes, which become anonymous flex items, so the slot's gap prised `array<` and `>` away from the type they wrap. Drop the gap and let the union separator carry its own margin; this also makes the auth row's gap override redundant. The separator was dimmed twice, by a muted token and again by opacity, which on the dark chip fill left `string | null` reading as `string null`. * fix(docs): restore the hidden API key description, and drop dead API-reference CSS The rule hiding the trailing `In: header` line matched `p:has(> code)`, which is a shape, not a target — every scheme description in our specs cites a status code, so the whole explanation of personal vs workspace-scoped keys was display:none on every API reference page. Match the last child instead, and shorten the description to one line now that it renders. The dropdown trigger's hover rule had been left below a new id-qualified base rule that outranked it, so the trigger could no longer change colour on hover. Removes what does not run: the four `::-webkit-scrollbar` rules (specifying a non-auto scrollbar-width makes Chromium ignore them, and Firefox never had them) and an `order: 2` block whose selectors and declaration the type-token rule above it already carried. Names the two values the API reference repeats — the monospace stack, written out eleven times, and the 12.5px code size, written nine — as --font-mono-stack and --text-code. Also drops four !important declarations that already won on specificity, a --text-muted fallback that can never fire, and a lucide selector subsumed by the one beside it. * refactor(docs): define the API-reference chrome once, and cut the commentary The metadata face — size, leading, weight, mono stack — was written out in seven rules that a comment asked future readers to keep in sync by hand; it is now one rule those seven consume, each adding only its own colour, content, and order. The auth row's chip likewise re-derived all eleven declarations of the type token and now joins that rule, keeping only its label. Comments were running longer than the rules they documented — 88 added comment lines against 73 declarations. Trimmed to the load-bearing facts: cascade traps, browser behaviour, and the bugs a rule prevents. Dropped the block narrating why the wrap rules were reverted, which duplicated its own commit message. Also retires a scrollbar token left unreferenced by the webkit removal, moves the last two fumadocs colours in our own components onto platform tokens, and brings the callout icon to 1.55 so the docs really do have one icon weight. * fix(docs): keep the union separator in the type token's own face The `|` between union members is a classless span, so the page-wide `span:not(.font-mono)` rule assigned it the body sans face while the members beside it stayed mono — one chip rendering in two faces. Applies the inherit reset to every descendant of a type token rather than just its links, so anything fumadocs nests there later is covered too. |
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Waleed
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1fa40b8118 |
feat(v2): complete and align the v2 API surface (#6643)
* fix(v2): close four validation holes in the logs and billing surfaces
Each of these answered a caller-supplied value with a 500 or a silently
wrong result instead of a 400.
- `GET /api/v2/logs` accepted any string as `startDate`/`endDate`. The
route constructs a `Date` from it, so `?startDate=abc` reached the
driver's timestamp mapper as an `Invalid Date` and 500'd. Both bounds
now carry `.datetime()`, matching the sibling run list so one timestamp
works on both collections. This narrows the accepted set: a date without
a time and an offset-bearing timestamp are now rejected, and the field
descriptions say "UTC ISO 8601" rather than overpromising "ISO 8601".
- `v2BillingStatusQuerySchema` was the only non-strict query schema in its
family, so a mis-cased `workspaceID` was stripped and the caller got
account-scope billing in place of the workspace scope it asked for — a
wrong answer about money, served as a 200.
- An unresolvable `cursor` on `/api/v2/billing/logs` applied no cursor
condition and restarted the sequence at page 1 while still reporting
`hasMore`, so a pager holding a cursor across a deploy loops over the
first page and counts the same credits on every lap. It is now a 400.
The message does not reuse `INVALID_CURSOR_MESSAGE`, which names
`sortBy`/`sortOrder` params this collection does not accept.
- The logs `status` field disagrees with the run resources for the same
run: the run projection overlays `paused` from `paused_executions`,
so an ordinary human-in-the-loop pause reads `paused` there and
`pending` here. Reconciling would mean joining `paused_executions` in
this read and silently moving live runs between two buckets of a
shipped field, so the divergence is documented on the contract instead.
* feat(v2): expose the MCP tool plane and page the MCP server list
Registering an MCP server through v2 dead-ended: nothing on the public
surface ever ran tool discovery, so connectionStatus, toolCount, lastError,
and lastToolsRefresh stayed at their registration defaults and there was no
way to read a server's tools without opening the UI.
Adds GET /api/v2/mcp-servers/{id}/tools over a thin use case composed from
the existing mcp_servers.tools.discover operation, resolveServerContext, and
mcpService.discoverServerTools. It is personal-API-key-only — discovery
resolves the acting user's own OAuth credentials, which a workspace key
cannot supply — and the contract says so rather than letting callers meet an
unexplained 403. Discovery failures are classified instead of collapsing
into a 500: an unreachable or cooling-down server is a retryable 503, a
stale OAuth grant is a 401.
Also pages GET /api/v2/mcp-servers. It was the one unbounded list on the v2
surface, classified full-set on a bounded-by-construction rationale that
only holds for folder lists; nothing caps how many servers a workspace
registers.
* feat(v2/tables): strict row bodies, a filtered row count, and round-trippable required columns
Three tables gaps from the v2 capability evaluation.
Strictness. Every v2 tables request body is now `.strict()`. The row family
was the whole hole: `POST /query` sent v1's `filter` key answered 200 with a
fully unfiltered page, because Zod strips unknown keys unless told not to. The
same laxity covered the row create/update/delete/upsert/find bodies, the
run and cancel-runs bodies, the enrichment body, and — outside the row family
but the same class — the column delete, view create/update, and export bodies.
A contract sweep now walks every body-bearing tables contract and fails if one
of them stops rejecting an unrecognized key.
Filtered row count. `POST /api/v2/tables/{tableId}/query/count` answers the
question v1's `includeTotal`/`totalCount` answered and the `{data, nextCursor}`
envelope has nowhere to put: how many rows a predicate matches. It binds the
existing `queryTableRows` use case with `includeTotal: true, limit: 1` — no new
domain logic and the same `tables.rows.query` read policy. The use case types
`totalCount` as nullable because paged callers can decline it; this route always
asks for it, so a null is treated as a broken invariant rather than presented as
a fabricated zero.
Required columns. `required` is accepted on create-table, add-column, and
update-column, matching v1. v2 emitted the flag on every read while stripping it
from every write, so a column could not round-trip. Enforcement was already
complete: turning it on over rows with null, missing, or empty cells is rejected
by the domain.
* test(skills): pin the workspace-API-key split as structural, not accidental
A workspace API key can create a skill it can then never update or delete,
which no sibling resource does — so the asymmetry reads like an oversight
worth widening. It is not. Skill edits are authorized by the per-skill
editor row belonging to the acting user, which is why update/upsert/delete
declare a 'read' floor rather than 'write': workspace role is not the
authority. A workspace key carries no user subject, so allowing one replaces
a 403 with an unclassified PrincipalSubjectUserRequiredError that the v2
surface renders as a caller-reachable 500.
Records the reason on the registry and pins it, so the next reader finds the
argument instead of flipping the flag.
* feat(v2): read deployment state, and undo a file delete
Two v2 reads that existed only as a side effect of a mutation.
`GET /api/v2/workflows/{id}/deployment` publishes the state the deploy,
undeploy, and rollback responses carry, plus `needsRedeployment` — which
those responses structurally cannot carry, because they answer at the
moment the draft and the live version are equal. A caller that lost the
mutation response, or that polls from another process, had no way to ask.
Reuses `readWorkflowDeploymentStatus` behind `workflows.read`, the same
use case the internal status and deploy GETs already adapt.
`DELETE /api/v2/files/{fileId}` was a soft delete with no way to see what
it archived and no way to reverse it. `GET /api/v2/files?scope=archived`
pages the archived set and `deletedAt` on the file resource dates each
one; `POST /api/v2/files/{fileId}/restore` reverses the delete through
the existing `files.restore` operation. Restore is not a pure undo — it
returns the file to the root and renames it on a collision — so the use
case now reads the file back and both the response and the OpenAPI
description say what actually came back rather than what was deleted.
`scope=all` is rejected on the list for the reason the internal contract
already gives: it drops the `deleted_at` predicate and cannot use the
partial index. `scope=archived` combined with `folderPath` 404s when the
containing folder was archived too, which the contract documents.
* fix(v2): keep the unresolvable-cursor rejection a 400 on every surface
The cursor rejection lived in shared billing core but was an OrchestrationError
only, which the session-only GET /api/users/me/usage-logs cannot project: that
route is raw withRouteHandler and readTypedError matches instanceof HttpError,
so any signed-in caller typing ?cursor=x got a 500. UnknownUsageCursorError is
an HttpError carrying the OrchestrationError as its cause, so the v2 route still
renders BAD_REQUEST off the cause chain and the internal route answers 400.
Also closes the other half of the run-list parity: an inverted window on
GET /api/v2/logs is now a 400 instead of a silently empty page.
* fix(v2/tables): sweep union bodies per member and name the shapes on a rows 400
Review follow-ups on the strictness work.
The sweep was vacuous on the one union body it covers. Parsing
`{ notAContractField: true }` against `v2CreateTableRowsBodySchema` and looking
for `unrecognized_keys` anywhere in the issue tree is satisfied by either member
alone, so dropping `.strict()` from the single-row branch shipped green —
reproduced, 36/36 passing with the regression in place. The sweep now flattens a
union body into its members and asserts each one separately; removing `.strict()`
from either branch now fails a case that names it.
`POST /rows` answered an unknown key with `Invalid input`, the exact message the
v2 conventions name as failing the actionable-error rule, because a union
surfaces `invalid_union` first. The union now carries a message naming both
accepted shapes; the per-member failures still ride along in `details`.
Two TSDoc corrections. The `required` docstring claimed the domain rejects
turning the flag on over rows with empty cells — true of the update path, false
of add-column, which applies the flag as given (the same shape `unique` already
had here). And `.strict()` binds the top level only, so the view `config` object
and the shared sort-spec elements still strip unknown keys; both docstrings now
say so instead of implying full coverage.
* fix(v2): classify MCP discovery failures by type, not by substring
The tool-discovery error policy consumed categorizeError's status, whose
fallback is a substring match on the upstream message. Three consequences,
all caller-visible:
- A ZodError from the builder's own response `.parse` contains `invalid_type`,
so a Sim-side response-schema defect answered 400 "Invalid request
parameters" and suppressed the builder's 500 and its unhandled-error log.
- An upstream `Invalid params` or `not found` became the caller's 400/404 on a
request the contract had already validated.
- A stale OAuth grant to the third-party server answered 401, the status this
surface reserves for a missing or invalid Sim API key, so a client would
rotate a credential that was never the problem.
The policy now dispatches on the MCP error families and returns null for
anything else. Reauthorization is a 409 carrying
`details.code: MCP_SERVER_REAUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED`; an unreachable, slow, or
cooling-down server is a 503 with a constant message.
Also: widen the shared server path-param description now that it covers tool
listing, map the list query explicitly so no undeclared `cursor` reaches the
use-case input, and document the endpoint's write side effects.
* merge: bring in the MCP tool plane workstream
* feat(v2): make knowledge tags usable and let documents be updated
v2 accepted tag slots on upload and filtered search by tag display name,
but no response ever returned a tag value and nothing listed the
vocabulary, so a shipped feature dead-ended in the public API. A document
that failed processing could only be deleted and re-uploaded, and
retiring 500 documents cost 500 requests.
- GET /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/tags returns the vocabulary (display name,
slot, field type) as a full-set list.
- Document list and detail responses carry `tags`, keyed by display name
exactly as search keys its result metadata. Writes stay slot-keyed; the
tags endpoint is the mapping and the contract documents the split.
- PATCH /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/documents/{documentId} renames, enables,
disables, retags, or requeues processing. Derived indexing state is not
writable: asserting `processingStatus` on an unindexed document would
corrupt search. A retry may not ride along with field updates.
- PATCH /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/documents bulk-enables or bulk-disables.
Bulk delete is deliberately absent — that operation records no semantic
audit, and a public bulk delete would empty a knowledge base leaving no
DOCUMENT_DELETED entries.
- The document list accepts the same name-based `tagFilters` as search;
the name-to-slot resolver moves out of search into a shared helper, and
the filters are stamped into the offset cursor scope so a replayed
cursor cannot cross a filter change.
- Search accepts `rerankerEnabled`, `rerankerModel`, `rerankerInputCount`
and returns `rerankerScore`; `rerankerApiKey` and `skipUsageBilling`
stay unexposed. Every result now names its `knowledgeBaseId`.
knowledge.tags.list flips from workspaceApiKey 'deny' to 'allow' (and
gains the workspace_api_key principal kind) so it matches the sibling
reads knowledge.documents.list / read / search. The vocabulary is
required input for two operations a workspace key can already perform.
Every tag write stays human-delegated.
* fix(v2): name every 403 cause, unfork boolean params, close nested strictness holes
Four cross-cutting consistency gaps on the v2 public surface.
**403s now carry a machine-readable cause.** The conventions skill mandated
`error.details.code` on 403 and nothing emitted one, so a client had to
string-match prose to tell "raise this member's role" from "this workspace
refuses personal keys" from "buy an enterprise plan" — four different
remedies behind one status, and every message reword a silent break. The
vocabulary is a closed set, `FORBIDDEN_DETAIL_CODES`, with a `Record` of
descriptions beside it that the generated OpenAPI 403 description is built
from, so a code cannot reach the wire unpublished. Refusals throw
`ForbiddenOperationError` in the domain and `v2CaughtOrchestrationError` —
the function every v2 error policy falls through to — attaches the code, so a
route cannot forget it. The audit-log resolver distinguished four causes and
collapsed them into one; it now names each.
Cross-tenant refusals deliberately get no code: they are concealed as 404 and
naming their cause would hand back the existence signal the concealment
withholds.
**Two boolean query params rejoin the majority.** `?includeDeparted` and
`?includeOutput` were `'true'`/`'false'` string enums inherited from the
internal shapes they reused, while four sibling params were real booleans.
Both move to `booleanQueryFlagSchema`, which still coerces both strings — a
strict widening, so an existing caller is unaffected, and the spec stops
telling callers to send a string.
**Two nested strictness holes close.** `.strict()` binds the top level only,
so `sort: [{ field, direction, nulls: 'last' }]` was answered 200 with the
null-ordering request dropped, and an unknown key inside a saved view's
`config` was accepted and discarded — the headline `filter` bug one level
down. `sortSpecSchema`'s element and both view-config schemas are now strict.
Safe on the read side because `normalizeStoredViewConfig` projects the
schemaless stored blob onto the declared keys first, so a legacy row cannot
turn into a 500.
The two sort dialects stay as they are. `/logs` and `/workflows/{id}/runs`
have one sortable column, so there is no `sortBy` to pair with; renaming
`order` breaks every caller and an alias is a second spelling of one thing
with undefined precedence. Both contracts and the skill now state the rule.
* style: format the files the workspace-scoped lint gate does not reach
`turbo run lint:check` runs `biome check .` per workspace, so `scripts/` at the
repo root is outside the graph and four changed files were unformatted — one of
them a merge artifact from reconciling the route baseline across branches.
* fix(v2): collapse the four knowledge document projections onto one null-tolerant summary
Extracts toV2DocumentSummary in app/api/v2/knowledge/utils.ts and composes the
list, upload-acknowledgement and detail presenters from it. toV2TaggedDocument
serialized uploadedAt with a bare .toISOString(), so a document with no upload
timestamp threw where every sibling returned null and the contract declares the
field nullable.
Also consolidates the two Zod strictness walkers onto one shared introspection
helper that unwraps wrappers and expands unions, closing the hole where a
union-shaped schema answered null and was skipped by the pagination sweep.
* fix(v2): stop HEAD driving MCP discovery, and unbreak the updatedAt keyset page
B1: Next aliases HEAD onto GET, which RFC 9110 permits only because GET is safe.
The MCP tool-discovery GET is not: it opens a live connection to the registered
endpoint and writes the outcome onto the server row. The v2 JSON builder gains a
headSafe option, default true, and the discovery route declares itself unsafe —
a HEAD is authenticated and rate-limited, then answered bodiless.
B2: a discovery status write stamped updatedAt, which this branch added as a
keyset sort, so any concurrent discovery duplicated and skipped servers across a
caller's pages. Discovery liveness already has lastConnected, lastToolsRefresh,
lastError and statusConfig.
B4: a public refresh now skips the positive cache but keeps the failure cooldown,
so it cannot be used to drive a connection attempt per request at a failing
endpoint. An explicit user action on their own server keeps the full bypass.
B6: the consecutive-failure counter is incremented SQL-side rather than read,
incremented and written back, and the success branch carries the same workspace,
liveness and staleness guard the failure branch already had.
* fix(v2): bound the bulk update echo, close the search leak, and make the docs true
B3: a selectAll bulk document update echoed every changed identifier, which the
request does not bound — a 100k-document knowledge base produced a multi-megabyte
array, materialized and then element-wise validated. The use case now reports
whether the selection was unbounded and the presenter omits the echo.
A1: the knowledge search presenter spread the whole use-case result, which also
carries userId, workspaceId, a cost breakdown and a live secret-trace registry.
Only Zod's default key-stripping kept them off the wire. Projected explicitly.
P1-a: GET /knowledge/{id}/tags advertised all 17 slots while the document PATCH
accepted only the seven text ones. The writer already coerces every slot type,
so the PATCH now takes all 17 in their declared types, with a 400 where a
malformed value used to silently clear the tag.
P1-b: both new PATCHes deny workspace API keys and now say so.
P1-c: the two table query reads declare maxBodyBytes and now document the 413.
P1-d: getWorkflowDeploymentV2 loses its legacy suffix.
C3: deletes two orchestration error mappers with no callers that mapped
'forbidden' with no details.
D2: a stored null in table_views.config survived the pick and failed the
response schema.
Also folds the six 'bounded set' paraphrases onto one FULL_SET_LIST constant,
shares the run-window date bound between the logs and runs lists so their
documented parity is enforced rather than asserted, adds the missing barrel
export for FORBIDDEN_DETAIL_CODE_DESCRIPTIONS, and strictens two response
schemas whose peers were already strict.
Migrates 40 v2 route tests onto the shared @sim/testing harness: 26 asserted a
rateLimitSubjectIds shape v2 auth never returns, 26 asserted the wrong
refillRate, 33 could not exercise their 401 path at all, and 6 hard-wired the
rollout gate to null.
* fix(mcp): bound the connect handshake, and stop the 403 description over-claiming
B5: the connect clamp was getMaxExecutionTimeout(), the workflow ceiling of
seven days, so the real bound became the server row's own timeout — which the
registration contract permits up to 300s — times the connect retries. A slow
server could hold a Node request for roughly twenty minutes. Connecting is not a
workflow run, so the handshake now shares the one-minute ceiling tools/list
already applies to itself.
C2: the generated 403 description asserted that error.details.code names the
cause on every 403. Nine domain refusals still throw a bare forbidden
OrchestrationError and reach the wire codeless, so the wording now says 'where
the cause is one a caller can act on'. Reparenting those throws is left as a
deliberate change: one of them is a cross-tenant refusal that belongs in the
codeless class and would change its status.
* chore: reconcile the route ratchet with staging
* style: sort imports and format the three files biome flagged
* fix(openapi): import the forbidden-code constants from their module, not the application barrel
The barrel also re-exports the authorized use-case layer, which loads
@sim/db at import time. That pulled a database connection into the
OpenAPI spec check, so check:audits failed wherever DATABASE_URL is
absent, including CI.
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2805a8def9 |
feat(windchill): add document integration (#6577)
* feat(windchill): add document integration * fix(windchill): align tool contracts and docs * fix(windchill): use official integration icon * fix(windchill): correct response and paging semantics * fix(windchill): align execution and API contracts * refactor(windchill): inline route authentication * fix(windchill): correct OData query encoding, content download, and cleared-field handling Validated the integration end to end against PTC Windchill REST Services 2.7 documentation and fixed every divergence found. Protocol correctness: - Encode OData query spaces as %20 rather than the form-encoded `+` that URLSearchParams emits. Every multi-token $filter and $orderby reached Windchill as a literal `+` and could not match. - Download content through the documented typed navigation `<content>/PTC.ApplicationData/Content/URL`, which returns a signed vault URL, instead of a `$value` segment that WRS does not implement. The resolved URL is pinned to the configured HTTPS origin. - Terminate every Stage 2 CacheDescriptor_array entry with `;` to match the documented grammar. - Raise the $top bound to Windchill's documented 2000 maximum, keeping 200 as the default page size. Cleared-field handling: - The executor merges raw block inputs before the block's param transform, so omitting a key could not clear it. A cleared numeric or boolean field reached the URL builder as '' and threw, and cleared optional strings failed contract validation. Coercions now emit an explicit undefined, and the internal-route body strips blanks centrally. Robustness and contracts: - Bound the document-structure walk to the depth actually requested. - Loosen response schemas that re-applied request-side bounds to provider-returned values, which turned committed mutations into opaque parse failures. - Return contract-shaped bodies for oversized, malformed, and unhandled request failures. - Normalize downloaded content types and drop charset parameters. Presentation and docs: - Square the icon to a centred tile on white. - Replace WT.Document and PATCH-compatible jargon with plain language. - Fix canvas sentence noun stutters on the bulk operations. - Correct the revision skill's unverified working-copy claim to read the OID back rather than assume it, and add retirement and stale-checkout skills. - Add a manual intro section to the integration docs page. * fix(windchill): align tool copy with the docs page and rebase the route baseline Tool descriptions feed both the integration catalog and the generated docs page, so the plain-language pass had to reach them too: drop WT.Document and PATCH-compatible from the operation copy, and correct the $top bound the descriptions still advertised as 200. Correct the docs intro's attachment wording, gloss OData on first use, and attribute the bulk-atomicity claim to PTC's documented behavior. Raise the API route-count baseline, which staging advanced while this branch was behind. * feat(windchill): add update common properties Name, Number, and Organization are rejected by the PATCH-based update operation, and the rejection message told users to reach for Windchill's UpdateCommonProperties action that the integration did not expose. Add it. PTC documents UpdateCommonProperties as a bound DocMgmt action taking an Updates wrapper, available when hasCommonProperties is set on the Documents entity, and refused while the document is checked out. The subblock and param descriptions carry that constraint, and the rejection message now names the operation that does the job. * test(windchill): assert block and tool params stay aligned for every operation Validating the new operation surfaced that nothing enforced the block-to-tool alignment the review process had been checking by hand. Assert it for all 27 operations instead: every required tool param has a required, non-advanced input under that operation's condition, and no operation shows an input its tool cannot accept. Both fail on a deliberately broken condition or a dropped required flag. --------- Co-authored-by: Bill Leoutsakos <billleoutsakos@Bills-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: Waleed Latif <walif6@gmail.com> |
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Waleed
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81108d5a4e |
fix(v2): serve HEAD, advertise PATCH, and document the reachable 403 (#6623)
* fix(v2): serve HEAD, advertise PATCH, and document the reachable 403 Three HTTP-semantics defects on the v2 surface, all found by probing the published contract rather than the happy path. **HEAD answered 500 on every v2 endpoint.** Next implements a missing `HEAD` export by aliasing it onto `GET` and dropping the body when it sends, so a route's `GET` legitimately runs with `request.method === 'HEAD'`. The builders' method guard compared that against the contract's declared method and threw, so `HEAD /api/v2/workflows` and every sibling replied 500 — which is what health checkers, uptime monitors, link checkers, and some CDNs send, all of them reading the API as hard-down. RFC 9110 §9.3.2 makes HEAD identical to GET but for the body, which is exactly what running the GET path produces. Fixed once in `methodMatchesContract`, shared by all five route builders; every other mismatch stays a hard error so a handler exported under the wrong verb still fails loudly. **CORS advertised `GET,POST,OPTIONS,PUT,DELETE`** while the v2 spec has 17 `PATCH` operations, so a browser preflight for any of them was rejected. It also advertised `PUT`, which two operations use — the shape of a hand-maintained list outgrown by its surface. The list stays hand-written because middleware cannot import the contract tree without pulling Zod into the edge bundle, but it is now pinned by a test that sweeps the real contracts and fails on any method it omits. **Six operations omitted a 403 their siblings documented** — three knowledge reads and three file-upload operations. Traced from the code rather than the spec: `requirePermission` throws `NoWorkspaceAccessError` for no access at all (concealed as 404) but `InsufficientWorkspacePermissionsError` for access below `minimumRole` (a real 403), and `PersonalApiKeysDisabledError` reaches every operation a personal API key can call. So 403 was reachable on all six and the omission was an accident of hand-assembled error lists, not a policy. They now use the shared `RESOURCE_ERRORS` / `RESOURCE_CONFLICT_ERRORS` sets, and two operations spelling those same sets by hand were normalized onto them. All 128 documented operations now declare 403. The rules for HEAD, for the 403/404 split, and for using the shared error sets are recorded in `.agents/skills/v2-api-conventions/SKILL.md`. * test(proxy): update the CORS policy assertion to the served method list `proxy.test.ts` pinned the previous hand-written method string, so widening `resolveApiCorsPolicy` to advertise PATCH and HEAD left it asserting a list the middleware no longer returns. The literal is kept rather than imported from `proxy.ts` so the test still pins the exact wire value independently of the implementation. * refactor(v2): retire the error sets that could omit Forbidden The three knowledge reads and three upload operations lost their `403` by assembling `[...VALIDATED_ERRORS, ...]` by hand, and `VALIDATED_ERRORS` / `STANDARD_ERRORS` were the only exported sets that omit `Forbidden`. Migrating the last consumers to the shared `RESOURCE_*` sets left both unreferenced, so deleting them turns the fix from a one-time cleanup into an invariant: there is no longer a building block from which a workspace-scoped operation can assemble an error list without `Forbidden`. Regenerating the specs produces no diff, so the migration is output-neutral. Also folds `method-match.test.ts` into `definition.test.ts` to match the repo's `feature.ts` -> `feature.test.ts` convention, types `contractMethod` as `HttpMethod` so a contract declaring `HEAD` is unrepresentable, and drops the duplicated Next-aliasing rationale so `methodMatchesContract`'s TSDoc is its single home. * fix(cors): expose the API response headers a browser client needs Without `Access-Control-Expose-Headers` a browser can read only the six CORS-safelisted response headers, so the rate-limit budget, the `Retry-After` a 429 or 503 asks the caller to observe, and the request/run correlation ids were all on the wire but invisible to `fetch()`. Server-to-server callers were unaffected, which is why it went unnoticed. Exposed on the default `/api` policy only. The per-route `CORS_RULES` entries are wildcard-origin public endpoints and opt in individually if they ever need it, so this does not widen what an anonymous cross-origin caller can read from them. |
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Waleed
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6541a22aa6 |
fix(v2): tell a caller when to come back on every failure meant to be retried (#6625)
* fix(v2): tell a caller when to come back on every failure meant to be retried Three related gaps in retry signalling, found auditing the v2 surface against RFC 9110/6585 and against how Stripe, GitHub and Google's AIPs handle the same problems. **No 503 carried `Retry-After`.** Every one of them — the three route builders' `unhandledErrorResponse`, the execute and resume routes, and `serviceFailureResponse` — funnels through `v2Error`, so the default lands there, keyed on the response *status*: `Retry-After` is defined against the status, and the status is the only half of the code/status pair a client sees. A caller that supplies its own value still wins. RFC 9110 §15.6.4 makes this a `MAY` rather than a `SHOULD`, so it is a deliberate improvement, not a conformance fix: without it a client's only defensible policy on a 503 is an immediate retry, and Sim raises 503 exactly when a dependency is too degraded to absorb one. **A 429 that already knew its wait threw it away.** The admission descriptors declare `retryAfterSeconds` per denial, but mapping a descriptor onto a preprocess error copied only `statusCode`, `code` and `retryable`. A concurrency denial therefore reached the client as a bare 429 with no `Retry-After` despite the policy layer having named the wait five seconds earlier. The value now travels `descriptor.retryAfterSeconds` → `PreprocessExecutionError.retryAfterMs` → `ExecuteWorkflowServiceFailure.retryAfterMs` → `serviceFailureResponse`, so the transport reads a number the policy owns instead of re-guessing one. The 503 default is now only the floor for paths with no policy signal. **One failure must not advise a retry at all.** `ASYNC_ENQUEUE_AMBIGUOUS` is a 503 whose enqueue may have succeeded — it deliberately retains its execution-ID claim because a job may already exist. Telling that caller to come back in five seconds invites a client with no `X-Run-Id` to start, and bill, a second run of the same workflow. It opts out via `omitRetryAfter` and returns the run id so the caller reconciles instead. `ADMISSION_RETRY_AFTER_SECONDS` is reused rather than restated, so the execute route's capacity 429 and every other surface's 503 cannot drift apart. Also records the audit in `.agents/skills/v2-api-conventions/SKILL.md`: the retry rule, the cursor-tampering invariants, and reasoned rejections of RFC 9457 problem+json, the `RateLimit-*` draft fields, renaming `X-RateLimit-*` under RFC 6648, 422-for-semantic-validation, `Location` on 201, ETag/`If-Match`, and `merge-patch+json` — each with the spec text and the industry evidence, so they are not re-litigated. `Deprecation`/`Sunset` on v1 is left open pending a retirement date, which is a product decision. * docs(v2): name the one 503 that omits Retry-After in the shared contract The shared ServiceUnavailable description claimed every 503 carries the header, which the ASYNC_ENQUEUE_AMBIGUOUS response deliberately does not. It now says the header is normally present and names that exception, so the published contract matches the runtime behaviour for all 128 operations. |
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Waleed
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9dfd9db3b0 |
feat(xai): wire reasoning effort through the Grok adapter (#6627)
* feat(xai): wire reasoning effort through the Grok adapter The catalog never declared reasoningEffort for xAI and the adapter never sent reasoning_effort, so the flag was dead for every Grok model. Values are per-model and verified against the live API rather than the docs, which are wrong in three places: grok-4.5 does accept xhigh, grok-4.3 supports the parameter at all (undocumented) including none, and grok-4.20-0309-reasoning rejects it outright despite being a reasoning model. Also corrects grok-4.5's missing cachedInput and drops an inline comment the new provider TSDoc now covers. * test(xai): type the provider test helper instead of casting to any * fix(agent): correct reasoning-effort copy that still claimed GPT-5 only |
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Theodore Li
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afa02939bb | fix(docs): include API key header in generated code samples (#6630) | ||
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Waleed
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5cf60f6a41 |
fix(v2): give every collection one pagination contract and close four envelope holes (#6620)
* fix(v2): give every collection one pagination contract and close four envelope holes
A fractional `limit` reached Postgres as `LIMIT 2.5` and answered 500 on both
`GET /workflows` and `GET /audit-logs`: each list re-declared the param inline,
and these two copies lost their `.int()`. The same divergence left `limit`
validated five different ways and five collections emitting `nextCursor` while
accepting no `limit` at all, or accepting one and silently discarding it.
Adds `v2PaginationFields()` in `contracts/v2/shared.ts` — a bounded integer
`limit` and an opaque `cursor` — and adopts it across all 17 paged lists, so the
family cannot drift again. `/files`, `/logs` and `/tables` keep the truncate-and-
clamp leniency they published, now as an explicit named mode rather than three
hand-rolled copies.
Gives `/skills`, `/custom-tools`, `/secrets`, `/credentials` and `/knowledge`
real pagination using the existing cursor codecs: a keyset for the four whose
page comes from one ordered SQL read, and the offset cursor for `/skills`, whose
merge of the static builtin registry into DB rows cannot be expressed as a SQL
keyset. Each keyset sort now ends in a unique `id`; knowledge tie-broke on
`createdAt`, which cannot separate rows sharing a millisecond.
Two correctness fixes pagination forced: the secrets visibility filter moved from
a post-query JS pass into SQL, because trimming rows after the page is cut
returns fewer than `limit` while `nextCursor` claims more; and the skills list
stopped selecting the 50k-char `content` column only to discard it.
Also restores the canonical error envelope where it had holes: a malformed JSON
body returned a bare `{"error":string}` because the envelope was a per-route
opt-in only 8 of 77 routes remembered, and an unknown `/api/v2` path returned an
HTML 404. Both are now defaults — `V2_PARSE_DEFAULTS` on the builders and the two
raw routes, and a catch-all whose body is byte-identical to the rollout gate's so
an unknown path stays indistinguishable from an ungated one.
Consolidates the keyset paging block (`resumeKeyset`/`keysetPage` in
`list-query.ts`) that had been open-coded in six modules, and folds the bespoke
`InvalidWorkflowListCursorError` into the `OrchestrationError` every other list
already used.
Prevention: the contract sweep in `list-pagination.test.ts` now also asserts that
every paged list rejects a fractional `limit`, that every list query is
`.strict()`, and that the three clamping lists still truncate. The fractional-
limit assertion is what caught `/audit-logs`. Documented in
`.agents/skills/v2-api-conventions/SKILL.md`.
405 responses still carry no `Allow` header — Next.js generates those before any
handler runs. Recorded as a known gap.
* fix(v2): bind the offset cursor to the query state it counts positions in
An offset names a position in one exact sequence. `GET /skills` accepted a bare
`{offset}` cursor and applied it to whatever sequence the next request asked
for, so following `nextCursor` with a different `search`, `sortBy` or
`sortOrder` silently skipped rows, repeated them, or landed past the end and
returned an empty page while the cursor implied more.
Fixed in the codec rather than the route so the sibling could not keep the gap:
`decodeOffsetCursor` now takes a scope stamp and rejects a cursor minted under a
different one, which is what `decodeSortedCursor` has always done for keysets.
`offsetCursorScope()` builds the stamp from every param that filters or orders
the sequence; `limit` is excluded because it selects how much of the sequence to
return, not what the sequence is, so paging with a different page size still
works.
`GET /knowledge/{id}/documents` had the identical latent gap and gets the same
treatment — the compiler surfaced it as soon as the signature changed.
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Waleed
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366829b6b0 |
fix(v2): derive the log and run status enums from the persisted status list (#6612)
* fix(v2): derive the log and run status enums from the persisted status list
`GET /api/v2/logs` and `GET /api/v2/logs/{runId}` parse the raw
`workflow_execution_logs.status` column against a six-value enum that omits
`paused`, so a run holding that value returns 500. The list response is
validated whole-page, so one such row 500s every page it lands on, and the
row is durable until the run is resumed, cancelled, or failed.
`paused` is not written by an ordinary human-in-the-loop pause — that path
persists `pending` (logging-session.ts:1180). It is written by
`PauseResumeManager.markResumeAttemptFailed`, which fires on any
`ResumeAdmissionError`: a workspace over its usage limit, an archived or
undeployed workflow, or a concurrent resume losing the claim race. That is a
routine business path.
The enum was supposed to be protected by an `AssertNever` exhaustiveness gate,
but the gate was vacuous: it compared against `PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus`,
a hand-written union that was itself missing `paused`, because the write goes
through a raw `sql` CASE fragment Drizzle cannot type-check. Adding `paused` to
both lists would leave the same vacuous gate in place for the next status.
Instead, `PERSISTED_WORKFLOW_EXECUTION_STATUSES` becomes the single runtime
source of truth, `PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus` is derived from it, and both
v2 contracts derive their enums from the const rather than re-declaring them.
Both surfaces pass the column through verbatim, so their reported set is the
persisted set by definition — there is no editorial choice for a gate to force,
only the question of whether a newly persisted status should be public, which
the option-list tests now pin. The `[...V2_PERSISTED_RUN_STATUSES, 'paused']`
append on the runs contract is deleted rather than adjusted; it would otherwise
be a duplicate.
Alternatives rejected:
- A `.catch()` or `safeParse` in the presenters is dead code:
`v2-json-route.ts:271` re-parses the whole body with the same schema.
- Normalizing `markResumeAttemptFailed` to write `pending` would remove the
distinction the resume claim query at human-in-the-loop-manager.ts:973 relies
on, and leaves the contract wrong for any other future status.
- Typing the Drizzle column does not help: the offending write is a raw `sql`
fragment, and `packages/db` cannot import the app's status list.
The v2 workflows spec changes are reordering and description only — the value
set there already contained `paused`. The v2 logs spec gains `paused`, which is
additive and safe while the whole `/api/v2` surface is behind the off-by-default
`v2-api` flag; it must land before v2 GA, after which it would be breaking.
* fix(v2): document both provenances of a reported paused run status
* fix(v2): stop promising a paused discriminator the response cannot always provide
* fix(v2): describe the paused discriminator as the code actually records it
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Waleed
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47f143016e |
fix(docs): restore api-reference URL continuity and fix translated SDK bodies (#6617)
Two docs-only defects introduced by #5273 (`263e3ca67e`), which re-founded the public API reference on the v2 surface. 1. Ten translated SDK snippets produce a deterministic 400. The streaming example in the five translated `api-reference/typescript.mdx` and `python.mdx` pages was repointed from `/api/workflows/{id}/execute` to `/api/v2/workflows/{id}/execute` and nothing else was changed — fr/ja/zh typescript.mdx are literally one-line diffs. `message` stayed at the body root. That was correct against v1, whose route treats the whole non-control body as workflow input, but `v2ExecuteWorkflowBodySchema` ends in `.strict()` and the route parses before executing, so every copied snippet returns `400 Unrecognized key: "message"`. The same commit fixed the English bodies to `input: { … }`, so this is an oversight, not a decision. The ten fences now match `en/api-reference/typescript.mdx:959` and `python.mdx:681`. Not relaxing `.strict()`: it is deliberate house style across the v2 contract and is what makes a typo'd option fail loudly instead of silently. 2. Thirty-two published operation pages 404 with no redirect. Replacing the single v1 `openapi.json` with seven v2-only specs changes page identity, because fumadocs derives every generated page as `slugify(tag)/operationId` from the specs at build time. Re-deriving both sets gives 52 old slugs and 128 new ones: 32 disappear and 20 keep their URL while silently retargeting v1 -> v2 (`knowledge-bases/updateKnowledgeBase` also flips PUT -> PATCH). All 52 are in the live sitemap — parsing `<loc>` from docs.sim.ai/sitemap.xml gives 458 URLs of which 56 are `/api-reference/`: the four static pages plus all 52 generated ones by name, including every one of the 32 that die. They are 200 today under an allow-all robots.txt. The spec swap itself is deliberate and CI-enforced (`check-openapi-specs.ts` requires every published operation under `/api/v2/`), so restoring the v1 operations is not an option. The missing piece is the redirect map, in a file that already carried 56 such rules from earlier doc moves. `permanent: true` (308) is used only for a true 1:1 successor — same operation, renamed. A 308 is cached indefinitely and effectively unrecallable, so anything that collapses two pages onto one, changes the identifier model, or lands on a merely adjacent operation is `permanent: false` (307). That splits 21/11. Four destinations differ from the mapping proposed in review, each on evidence from the specs rather than from the operation names: - `workflows/getJobStatus` is not destination-less. The v2 queued-execution receipt (`QueuedWorkflowRun`) returns `statusUrl` `/api/v2/workflows/{id}/runs/{runId}`, so `workflow-runs/getWorkflowRunV2` is the successor poll target — far better than a generic landing page. - The three HITL read operations go to `getWorkflowRunV2`, not to the resume page: `WorkflowRunStatus` carries a `paused` object with `contextId`, `pausedAt`, and `pauseKind`. Pointing a GET doc at a POST doc would be wrong. - `human-in-the-loop/listPausedExecutions` goes to `listWorkflowRunsV2`, whose `status` filter includes `paused`. - `tables/batchUpdateRows` is 307, not 308. v2 `updateTableRows` is "Update Rows by Filter" — the successor of v1 `updateRows` (PUT, predicate-based), which keeps its 308. v2 has no by-id batch update at all, so batchUpdateRows lands on a genuinely different operation. 3. A guard, so the map cannot rot silently. `scripts/openapi/docs-redirects.test.ts` recomputes the generated slug set the way fumadocs does and asserts no `/api-reference/` source shadows a live page and every destination resolves. Nothing else in the repo reads docs URLs, so a future spec regeneration would otherwise break the map with no signal. It needs no wiring: `check-openapi.ts` already runs this vitest config. The redirect array moves to `apps/docs/lib/redirects.ts` because the guard cannot import `next.config.ts` — `createMDX()` runs the fumadocs-mdx generator at import time, which made vitest emit an unhandled build error and warn about false positives. The 56 pre-existing rules are byte-identical to before, verified programmatically; `next.config.ts` keeps the same public shape and Next's own `checkCustomRoutes` accepts all 88 rules. Open question for the owner, larger than the redirects: all 82 `/api/v1` route files survive on staging, so a live public API now ships with zero reference docs, while the documented `/api/v2` surface returns 404 for any caller outside the off-by-default `v2-api` flag cohort. Is that the intended end state or transitional? |
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Waleed
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34d65df7d6 |
fix(sdk): make the 0.2.0 SDK release safe to publish (#6616)
The v2 SDK migration (#5273, #6564) shipped five breaking changes in both
SDKs but got the release mechanics wrong in three separate ways, and left
one of the two rewrites unable to complete a single successful call.
Versions. packages/ts-sdk/package.json read 0.1.3 -- a patch digit added
inside an unrelated compatibility commit, never deliberated. npm expands
^0.1.2 to >=0.1.2 <0.2.0, so every existing consumer would have picked the
break up on a lockfile refresh: AsyncExecutionResult.jobId renamed to
runId, executionId dropped from that interface, a failed sync run now
throwing instead of resolving {success:false}, the request body reshaped,
and the endpoint moved to /api/v2 with no fallback. 0.2.0 excludes every
existing range, so the upgrade becomes opt-in. packages/python-sdk carries
the identical break and was never bumped at all, so its publish job would
have skipped green at the "version already exists" gate and left the repo
and PyPI silently divergent; it moves 0.1.2 -> 0.2.0 in lockstep, along
with the __version__ string in simstudio/__init__.py, which tracks
pyproject and would otherwise have started lying. setup.py is left at
0.1.1: it is unchanged from main and demonstrably unread (0.1.2 published
from pyproject while setup.py already said 0.1.1). It wants deleting, in
its own commit.
A 404 fallback was considered and rejected. The legacy 202 body's statusUrl
points at /api/jobs/{jobId}, so mapping jobId onto runId would hand the
caller an id that getWorkflowRun cannot resolve against that same old
server -- a successful execute followed by an inexplicable failure on the
next call is a worse contract than a clean 404. Both READMEs instead state
the minimum server version and name the endpoint to check for.
Cancelled runs. packages/python-sdk computed success as status != 'failed',
so a run cancelled out of band reported success=True. The TypeScript SDK
uses a closed whitelist and reports False, and before the migration both
SDKs read the server's own value, which was False -- so this was a Python
regression, not merely an inconsistency. Fixed by mirroring the whitelist.
The v2 contract enumerates exactly completed|failed|paused|cancelled, so
narrowing the blacklist to a whitelist cannot drop a live value, and a
status added later now defaults to "not successful" rather than silently
reporting True. WorkflowExecutionResult gains a status field because
Python, unlike TypeScript, does not throw on 'failed' -- so success=False
alone is ambiguous there in a way it is not in the TypeScript SDK, which
is why status is not added to both.
Rate-limit header. Found while auditing the two SDKs for further
divergence, and the reason the Python bump could not have shipped as it
stood: every authenticated v2 response now carries X-RateLimit-Reset as an
ISO 8601 timestamp (recorded by v2RateLimits.publicApi, stamped by
withRouteHandler). The Python SDK parsed it with int(), raising a bare
ValueError that no handler in execute_workflow catches -- so every
successful v2 execution raised instead of returning. None of the legacy
endpoints the SDK previously called record a rate-limit snapshot, which is
why the latent int() survived until the v2 move. The TypeScript SDK
already branches on the format; _parse_reset_header mirrors it, including
degrading an unrecognised value to 0, because a quota hint must not take
down the call it rode in on.
Timing metadata. The v2 rewrite stopped forwarding startedAt/endedAt, which
main passed through and the TypeScript SDK still reports; restored under
the same startTime/endTime keys the TypeScript SDK uses.
Tests: cancelled/failed/paused status coverage, the ISO reset header, and
the restored metadata keys, each verified red against the unfixed line
first. The TypeScript suite gains matching cancelled/paused and ISO-reset
pins -- they pass against today's source by design, and were confirmed to
fail against a deliberately degraded copy so they are not toothless.
Deliberately not included: a CI guard failing a PR that changes SDK source
without a version bump. It would have caught this twice over, but it is a
new script and workflow rather than a fix to the defect at hand.
Review revision. bun.lock recorded packages/ts-sdk at 0.1.3 and was left
stale by the first pass, so the repo asserted two versions for the same
workspace package -- in a change whose whole thesis is that the version
strings had diverged. It does not break CI (bun 1.3.14 accepts the
mismatch under --frozen-lockfile, confirmed here), but
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Waleed
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892401a8d0 |
fix(uploads): sign Azure upload URLs create-only (#6607)
getBlobPresignedUploadUrl signed its SAS with BlobSASPermissions.parse('w').
Per Azure's service-SAS reference, `w` is "create or write content" and permits
overwriting an existing blob; `c` is "write a new blob" and does not. main
signed `c` before this signer moved out of core/storage-service.ts, so Azure
deployments lost create-only enforcement in the move.
The `If-None-Match: '*'` the signer returns cannot carry the guarantee on its
own: an Azure service-SAS string-to-sign covers the resource, times,
permissions and the five rsc* response-header overrides, never request headers,
so a client is free to drop it. The header is signed on the other two providers
-- inside the PutObjectCommand on S3, and as x-goog-if-generation-match in
signed extensionHeaders on GCS -- which is why only Azure regressed.
Without this, a signed upload URL stayed a plain overwrite grant on the final
key for its full hour. A caller could replace the object after complete had
already verified size and content type, written the workspace file row and
metered storage from that verified HEAD, leaving durable metadata and billing
describing content that no longer exists.
The multipart block-staging signer keeps `w`: block staging is overwrite-shaped
and matches main.
The existing test asserted parse('w'), so it locked the defect in; it now
asserts create-only, and its name states the guarantee so a future flip reads
as deleting a security property rather than adjusting a value.
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||
|
Theodore Li
|
23318a13a0 |
fix(security): redact workflow snapshot secrets (#6581)
* fix(security): redact opaque workflow snapshot inputs * fix(security): document fail-closed tool redaction * fix(security): redact malformed tool params * fix(security): redact nested credential references * fix(security): isolate opaque tool schemas |
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Justin Blumencranz
|
a72457b9f5 | fix(docs): preserve items response fields (#6587) | ||
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Waleed
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7c05e36049 |
fix(api): close five defects found auditing the v2 migration against main (#6575)
* fix(tables): stop a column retype from nulling empty-string cells A type conversion rewrote every cell holding '' to null. Main only nulled a blank the target type could not read; '' is a real stored value that both string and json columns accept, so string->json and json->string silently destroyed those cells. Worse on a required target: countEmptyCells matches only a missing key, SQL NULL, or '[]', so '' passes the required guard and the rewrite then wrote null behind a constraint that had just succeeded. The per-cell decision is now the pure retypeCellRewrite, restoring main's rule: null a blank only when the target cannot read it, otherwise coerce. * fix(execution): release the concurrency slot when a group cancel is refused The stop-the-work effects (durable Redis abort record, queue-job cancel, in-process abort) all fire before the workflow-group sidecar is consulted, and none can be undone. When the sidecar refuses the claim we throw a conflict, which skipped releaseExecutionSlot and stranded the plan concurrency reservation until it expired. Every conflict return is a terminal-or-absent state - a missing log row, a log already completed or errored, or a terminal cell - so a refusal never means the run is still executing. The slot is released before the throw, keeping the exact success && !isPausedCancellationPath predicate rather than a blanket finally that would free reservations for live runs. * fix(uploads): recover an ambiguous PUT instead of discarding the object Main recovered an upload whose bytes committed but whose response was lost, via a verify endpoint. The session client retries the PUT instead, but every provider now signs a create-only precondition, so the retry returns 409/412, is classified non-retryable, and the session aborts - deleting the object that had already landed. A transient blip on the final ack cost the whole upload. A conflict on a retry attempt is now treated as our own earlier PUT having committed, and completion proceeds. That is safe because completeUploadSession independently verifies the object through assertObjectIdentity, which rejects on uploadId mismatch before anything durable is registered. A first-attempt conflict still fails loudly. * fix(folders): enforce the workspace folder ceiling on the create path Readers bound the active path index at MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE and throw once a workspace exceeds it, but POST /api/folders reached createFolder, which has no maxFolderRows field and never counts. A workspace could therefore be driven past the ceiling, after which the 27 capped read sites failed on a state the product had allowed. createFolder now asserts room inside its transaction, right after the mutation lock, so the count cannot be raced. The refusal is a typed conflict rendering 409 with an actionable message rather than a 500. The check counts rows directly instead of loading the path index, so an already-over-cap workspace gets a clean refusal rather than a read error, and no reader gained a cap. folderMutationStatus also gained the payload_too_large mapping it was missing, which had been rendering a delete-cascade cap breach as an unexplained 500. * fix(skills): route internal skill writes through the shared use cases The internal route made the workspace authorization decision itself, never consulting the skills operation policy, never loading canonical workspace context, and recording an audit entry with no operation id or actor projection. v2 and Copilot already went through the use cases; only this surface did not. GET/POST/DELETE now authenticate, parse, call the shared use case, and present. Request and response shapes are unchanged. Two behavior changes fall out: a write against a deleted workspace is now refused with 404 rather than accepted, and permission-denial text matches the rest of the platform. Legacy internal-JWT auth is dropped because no principal kind expresses that caller and nothing calls it: the whole repo references /api/skills only in two comments, no tool declares an internalRoute to it, and the executor reads skills through a direct listSkills call rather than over HTTP. * fix(folders): enforce the workspace ceiling on the remaining create paths Folder duplication, admin workspace import, and workspace forking all inserted folders without consulting the ceiling that 27 read sites enforce, so any of them could leave a workspace whose reads then fail. Each now asserts room for the rows it is about to add rather than one at a time: duplication measures the whole subtree up front, forking counts its bulk insert, and import counts per segment because that is genuinely one row. assertFolderCollectionHasRoom gained an additionalRows notion for the bulk case, and short-circuits when nothing is being added so an over-cap workspace still reads and still syncs. Duplication deliberately does not take the folder mutation lock. Holding it across the copy would block folder creation workspace-wide for an unbounded time - there is no cap on workflows per subtree and duplicateWorkflow runs sequentially - and narrowing it is impossible because an advisory transaction lock cannot be released early; splitting the transaction would leave a half-copied tree on failure. A rare few-row overshoot near the ceiling is the better trade, and it matches what forking already does. A test asserts the lock is absent so re-adding it is a visible decision. Admin import gained the transaction and lock it never had. Its folder-full refusal escapes the per-workflow result list, because a full tree is a property of the workspace and would otherwise be buried as N failures behind a 200. The fork and promote routes had no catch at all, and withRouteHandler only classifies HttpError, so a refusal rendered as an opaque 500 - twice over, since drizzle wraps the throw. Both now project a classified conflict as 409 and rethrow anything unclassified. * fix(uploads): bound the signed PUT lifetime and advertise its real expiry A single-PUT transfer was signed for the whole 24h upload-session TTL, because expiresAt was reused as both the session lifetime and the signing lifetime. Multipart part URLs in the same file kept 1h, and the pre-migration presigned route signed every PUT for 1h, so the widening was unintended rather than a policy change. No provider clamps below 24h. The PUT presign is now clamped at the provider boundary by a shared UPLOAD_URL_TTL_MS, which the part-URL path also uses so the two cannot drift. An expired PUT URL is deliberately not recoverable: unlike multipart, which re-signs per part call because its progress is durable, a PUT is not resumable, so an expired URL and an interrupted PUT have identical recovery. Nothing leaks, since every provider signs a create-only precondition. Clamping alone would have made the contract lie: the URL would die an hour before the session's advertised expiresAt, with nothing telling an integrator why the 403 happened. The PUT transfer now carries its own expiresAt, mirroring the multipart part-URL field. It is provider-dependent on purpose - cloud transfers report the clamped signature expiry, while the local data plane has no signature and admits against the session, so reporting an hour there would have been a new inaccuracy in the other direction. * chore: delete the dead presigned-upload and skill-adapter paths The presigned upload routes and the internal skills adapters were both replaced during the v2 migration, leaving their implementations behind with no callers. Removed generatePresignedUploadUrl and verifyPresignedUploadReceipt with their three provider helpers, QUOTA_EXEMPT_STORAGE_CONTEXTS and the types it orphaned, and the performCreateSkill/performUpdateSkill/performDeleteSkill adapters with recordSkillEvent and statusForSkillOrchestrationError. Each was verified unreachable across apps, packages, scripts and ee, including barrel re-exports and string access, not just direct imports. recordSkillEvent needed the closest look, since deleting an audit writer can silently drop coverage. The use cases declare the same action, resource, and description, and the framework adds the operation and actor the old helper lacked; recordAudit back-fills actorName and actorEmail from the user table when both are omitted, so the one field the helper passed is not lost. The self-hosting architecture doc described a directUploadSupported flag on an endpoint that no longer exists, and now describes the upload-session flow that replaced it. * refactor(folders): keep the cheap resource facts out of the schema graph Reading a folder resource type's label or its lock support meant importing folderResourceConfig, which imports the db schema for every table it serves and from there reaches lib/table/service, the executor, and the tool registry. That mattered as soon as lib/folders/queries needed a label: queries is reached from workspace-file-manager, which is reached from the files and chat pages, so one import edge put roughly 4,700 modules into those page graphs and broke the tool-registry boundary audit. Labels and lock support now live in a leaf module that imports only a type, and config composes them so there is still one source of truth. The three folder routes that pulled the whole config in for a single boolean read the leaf instead. * fix(skills): apply an upsert batch in one transaction The internal skills route looped the batch, calling an independently committing use case per item. A rejection on a later item left the earlier ones written and audited while the request reported failure - the compound-mutation rule in CLAUDE.md exists for exactly this. No new transaction plumbing was needed: upsertSkills already wraps its whole item loop in one db.transaction, so the partial commit came from calling it N times rather than once. upsertSkillBatch now validates and per-skill authorizes every item before issuing a single write, and createSkill and updateSkill became thin wrappers over it so v2 and Copilot keep one authority for the rules. The compound operation declares the read floor that skills.update already used, and the use case additionally authorizes skills.create when any item lacks an id, still ahead of every write. A read-only member who is a skill editor keeps their edit, and creates are not authorized more loosely than before. Audit projects one entry per committed skill, and analytics moved after the commit so nothing is reported for a rolled-back item. Note metadata.operation for these writes is now skills.upsert rather than skills.create/update; the action field still carries the distinction. * fix(security): close two disclosure gaps and finish the slot-leak fix The payer-pool gate only covered the workspace branch. A personal API key that omits workspaceId takes the account branch, where getHighestPrioritySubscription resolves an organization subscription from any member row regardless of role - so a plain member read the organization-wide credit and storage pool by dropping one query parameter. The account branch is now gated by the same authority, and the storage pool is not queried when it may not be disclosed. Forcing that branch self-scoped instead would have downgraded plan, period, and status, which is what a member needs to see whether the org is blocked. GET /api/v1/logs/executions/[executionId] emitted the workflow snapshot raw, carrying password sub-block values and oauth-input credential ids. It now shares the sanitizer the v2 read already used, extracted so there is one implementation rather than two. Env-var references are still preserved. cancelWorkflowGroupExecution itself was unguarded, so an unexpected throw from its transaction escaped ahead of every release site - the same reservation leak this branch set out to close, still open on the adjacent path. It now releases through the shared predicate and rethrows, because a failed transition means the cell state is unknown and a success-shaped answer would be a lie. The comment claiming the abort record cannot be taken back was false and now states the real reason: a refusal is always a terminal-or-absent state. * fix(v2-api): cover every persisted run status and every capped body The workflow-runs endpoints carried the same omission the logs contract had: the execution logger persists redacting, the run schemas did not list it, and because validation is whole-response one such row returned 500 for an entire page. Both schemas now derive from PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus behind the same AssertNever gate, so a future status is a type error rather than a production 500. The single-run read keeps its extra queued value, which only it can observe. That schema was also serving as the run-list status filter. Widening it would have accepted a filter value the application input cannot express, so the reported set and the accepted filter are now separate schemas. Routes declaring maxBodyBytes without payloadTooLargeResponse fell back to a bare string with no error code and no private cache header. Rather than patch the four, the default moved into the builders - all three had the hole - which covers 58 body-bearing handlers, and a route override still wins. The five per-route overrides that merely restated the default are gone. Also documents the 413 on the one knowledge route that has a real body cap, adds the rollout gate's 404 to the last v2 operation missing it, and rewords the nextCursor description, which read as though every list were a full-set list. * fix(api): make the shared traits and lifetimes single-sourced The folder resource-traits leaf composed labels into config but restated lock support independently, so the routes reading the trait and the orchestration reading the config could disagree about which resources lock. Config now composes both, and supportsLocking is required rather than optional so a new resource type cannot silently omit it. The upload commit claimed the PUT clamp and the multipart part URLs shared a constant and could not drift. That was true only of the advertised expiry - the three provider signers each hardcoded an hour, so changing the constant would have moved what we advertise while leaving what we sign, recreating exactly the mismatch the clamp removed. Each provider now receives the lifetime in its own unit from the one constant. Table restore hand-rolled its status map and returned the driver message verbatim at 500, leaking the failed statement and its bound parameters - the same defect this branch closed at nine other sites. It and import-csv now use the shared projection; import-csv's result type also had to carry the lock the classifier already set, so a 423 can name it. Deletes v2RowWriteError, which had no callers and would have rendered a locked table as 400 by discarding the 423 it was handed. |
||
|
Theodore Li
|
9f3c20290b | fix(tables): cap row pages and use native cursors (#6582) | ||
|
Siddharth Ganesan
|
7f39678264 |
improvement(desktop, executions): fix desktop update script and throw error when thinking enabled on stream false (#6578)
* Fix update check * fix include tool calls error * fix comments |
||
|
Theodore Li
|
092311ea68 |
fix(api): restore migrated endpoint and SDK compatibility (#6564)
* fix(api): restore migrated endpoint compatibility * fix(api): close remaining migration regressions * fix(files): validate ensured folder paths * fix(files): project folder path validation * fix(files): align archive regression fixture * fix(tables): avoid partial bulk update failures * fix(auth): project legacy knowledge audits |
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|
Waleed
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9b9f4ee596 |
fix(v2-api): close three secret disclosures, make the surface consistent, and align docs with signatures (#6560)
* fix(v2-api): close two secret disclosures and align docs with signatures
Two P0 disclosures, five correctness bugs, and the standardization and
guard work that came out of auditing them.
**Secret disclosure — workflow version state.** `GET /api/v2/workflows/{id}/
versions/{version}` served the deployed graph unsanitized, so a read-role
workspace API key received plaintext block-password values and OAuth
credential ids. The sibling export route has always sanitized. Every other v2
response is protected structurally because the builder re-parses it, but this
field is `z.custom<WorkflowState>()` — a predicate that validates nothing —
which is why it survived earlier audits. Sanitization now lives in the use
case, secure by default, with a named `includeCredentialValues` opt-in that
only the session-authed deploy-preview route sets.
**Secret disclosure — MCP headers.** The internal list and update routes
returned custom `Authorization` headers verbatim to any read-role member;
headers are stored unencrypted. Values are now gated on write permission and
projected through one shared helper. The settings UI genuinely prefills from
them, so blanking outright would wipe headers on unrelated edits — write-only
headers plus encryption at rest are the follow-up.
Correctness:
- v2 execute ignored `X-Sim-Via`, resetting the call chain on every hop and
defeating the recursion guard. Wired on both the keyed and anonymous paths.
- v2 knowledge search accepted `searchMode` and dropped it, silently serving
vector-only results for a hybrid request, and allowed 50MB bodies where
internal caps at 2MiB.
- v2 run cancel never released the plan concurrency slot and half-cancelled
group runs; a group conflict now returns 409 instead of reporting success.
- v2 table row writes stamped no secret provenance, so the next internal read
reported the whole page incomplete. `secretProvenance` is now required on
the primitives, making the next omission a compile error.
- Folder conflicts and malformed paths returned 500; they are 409/404/400 now.
`FolderPathError` splits from `FolderHierarchyError` so a corrupt stored
tree stays a 500 and stays in 5xx alerting.
Standardization and documentation:
- `PUT /files/{id}/share` -> PATCH. The resource is not round-trippable
(`hasPassword`, never the password), so merge-on-omission is the only
implementable semantics.
- ~40 spec truthfulness fixes: a 410 the API cannot emit, eight 423s with no
lock guard, ~30 reachable-but-undocumented 404/400/413s, and six inverted
field claims. Eleven operations that always reject a workspace key now say
so — four of them answer 404, so a workspace key was told the resource did
not exist.
- `NAME_PATTERN` lost its `/i` through `z.toJSONSchema`, publishing 15
patterns that reject names the runtime accepts. Every generated client
rejected any capitalized table or column name, and two of the spec's own
examples failed the spec's own schema.
Guards, so these classes cannot recur:
- `check:route-verbs` (new) cross-checks all 212 builder routes' exported verb
and path against their contract. The builders only compare at runtime, so a
half-done rename previously passed CI and 500'd in production.
- Example validation now runs against the published JSON Schema with formats
on, covering 225 nodes instead of 100 — this is what caught the regex bug.
- The list-pagination sweep is union-aware and fails loudly on a schema it
cannot introspect, rather than counting it compliant.
* refactor(v2-api)!: flatten the single-resource response envelope
BREAKING: 31 endpoints that returned `{ data: { <resource>: T } }` now return
`{ data: T }`.
This corrects drift, not a design decision. PR #5273 added skills, custom
tools, MCP servers, secrets, and knowledge nested while adding workflows,
files, and logs flat — and in the same commit wrote the `v2/shared.ts`
docblock declaring `single resource: { data: T }` is the standard. The nested
half appears to have been modelled on the v2 tables surface (#6067), which
landed twelve days earlier. Lists were already `{ data: T[], nextCursor }`, so
flat single-resource is what actually matches them; nesting made every client
destructure a layer that carries nothing.
Doing it now because the cost only grows: `v2-api` is still dark-launched, so
today this breaks no one. After GA it needs a deprecation window.
Payloads that carry real information were deliberately left alone — this was a
classification exercise, not a mechanical sweep. Unchanged: delete
acknowledgements (`{ id, deleted }`, `{ path, deleted, deletedItems }`), the
knowledge search envelope (which echoes query, knowledgeBaseIds, topK and
totalResults alongside hits), upload payloads carrying signed tokens and
transfer instructions, bulk-operation counts, `{ row, operation }` upserts,
named acknowledgement scalars (`{ dispatchId }`, `{ cancelled }`), and
`{ columns: [...] }` — a collection, where a bare `{ data: T[] }` would be
indistinguishable from the list envelope but without `nextCursor`.
Also flattened the two file-share responses, which were not in the original
survey: leaving them would have put one resource in two shapes on one path.
`GET /files/{id}/share` now returns `{ "data": null }` when a file has never
been shared.
No consumer is affected. Both SDKs touch exactly two v2 endpoints — execute
and run status — and both were already flat. No docs MDX, client hook, or
internal caller reads a changed response; Copilot table tools call the
application use cases directly rather than the HTTP surface.
The shared `v2FolderSchema` is untouched: every folder flatten was achievable
at the response site, which is itself evidence flat was the intended shape.
* fix(v2-api): close a third secret disclosure and make concealment coherent
**Secret disclosure — run snapshot.** `GET /api/v2/logs/{runId}` returned
`workflowState` straight from `workflowExecutionSnapshots.stateData`, which is
the workflow graph: `blocks[].subBlocks[].value` holds `password: true` field
values and `oauth-input` credential ids. Nothing on that path sanitized it, and
the field was typed `z.unknown()`, so the builder's response parse stripped
nothing. A read-role workspace API key could read plaintext credentials.
This is the third instance of one pattern, and the pattern is the finding: the
builder protects every response by re-parsing it, so the only fields that can
leak are the ones typed `z.unknown()` or `z.custom()`. Both prior disclosures
sat behind exactly such a field. The snapshot is now sanitized in the use case
and the field is typed object-or-null. An inventory of every remaining
`z.unknown()` in the v2 contracts is in the PR description; two carry data with
no projection behind them and are named there as follow-ups.
**Concealment was bypassable.** `createV2ResourceConcealmentPolicy` rewrites
resource-authorization failures to 404 so a caller cannot probe for existence.
Workflows and files applied it on every verb; tables and knowledge applied it
only on reads. A caller could therefore probe with PATCH, read the 403, and
learn the resource exists — the read-side concealment bought nothing. Nine
mutation sites now conceal, plus the three table-column verbs, which were
inconsistent with their own sibling sub-resources.
`lib/logs/api/route-policies.ts` was a second, divergent implementation that
sniffed `response.status === 403` and so also swallowed workspace-policy
denials the canonical helper deliberately preserves. It now uses the helper. A
third such sniff survives in the upload-control helper and is noted as a
follow-up.
Also:
- `DELETE /tables/{tableId}/rows/{rowId}` returned the bulk `{deletedCount,
deletedRowIds}` shape while nine sibling single-resource deletes return
`{id, deleted}`. It now matches them.
- Nine operations can 404 on an unknown folder path and did not document it;
`createWorkflow` could 413 on an oversized folder tree and did not; getting a
run can 409 when trace data was truncated and did not.
- `queryTableRows` documented a 413 it cannot emit and `resumeWorkflowRun` a
423 with no lock guard anywhere in its path — the same un-producible-status
class already cleared for 410 elsewhere.
- Execute's 409 description covered only the run-id case after the
recursion-guard fix added a second cause, and named a code the route does not
emit: the wire carries `error.code: CONFLICT` with the specific cause in
`error.details.code`. `x-sim-via` is now a declared request header.
- Deploy and rollback published examples that were impossible: `isDeployed:
true` beside `activeDeployment: null`, where the route computes the former
from the latter.
- `afterRowId`/`beforeRowId` were published on row insert and silently dropped
by the route, so a positional insert became a tail append.
- A generated document whose script fails permanently answered "still being
generated, try again" forever; the underlying cause is now preserved.
* docs(v2-api): correct eleven false or misleading spec claims
Structural parity between contracts and specs is CI-enforced; semantic truth is
not. These are claims the spec made that the code does not honour.
Outright false:
- `DELETE /files/{fileId}` said it deletes "the stored bytes". It archives:
the row is retained with a deletion timestamp and the bytes are never
removed. Restore exists, but only on the internal API, so the description now
says so rather than implying v2 offers it.
- Execute documented `409 EXECUTION_ID_CONFLICT` in three places. The wire
carries `error.code: CONFLICT` with `error.details.code: RUN_ID_CONFLICT`;
only v1 ever emitted the documented string.
- The files spec claimed every endpoint uses the canonical envelopes while
`GET /files/{fileId}` returns octet-stream.
- The shared timestamp rule justified itself with a rendering claim that is
false — 29 bare-form sites publish `format: date-time` identically. The real
difference is runtime validation, so the rule now says that. It was softened
rather than enforced: responses are re-parsed, so adding `.datetime()` to a
field whose producer can emit a non-ISO string turns a working read into a
500, and that could not be proven for all 29 without a much larger audit.
Misleading:
- The billing ledger silently defaults to a 30-day window, so a client
paginating to `nextCursor: null` believes it has the whole ledger.
- Deleting a connector-backed knowledge document does not delete its chunks —
the row survives as excluded and the embeddings remain.
- `listTables` said "all tables"; it is keyset-paged with a default limit.
- `GET /files/{id}/share` omitted the `data: null` never-shared case its own
schema and example already declare.
- The share PATCH matrix omitted two hard 400s, so following it literally
against a never-shared file fails.
- Five knowledge operations render a canonical folder path back and can 413 on
an oversized tree without carrying the sentence that says so.
Also: the upload-control helper was a third implementation of concealment by
sniffing `response.status === 403`, which masks workspace-policy denials the
canonical helper deliberately preserves. It now uses the shared policy, so
those denials keep their 403. And the shared docblock's search-field
enumeration was presented as exhaustive while omitting two lists, and its
error-envelope claim omitted the two upload data-plane routes that emit a bare
`{error: string}` — both now carry the carve-out the CI allowlist already had.
* test(v2-api): align upload concealment test with cross-tenant-only semantics
#6557 narrowed `createV2ResourceConcealmentPolicy` to conceal only the three
cross-tenant authorization classes, deliberately letting a same-workspace
policy denial keep its 403 so the caller learns why. My test predated that and
asserted a workspace-key denial was concealed as 404.
Split into two cases that pin the distinction rather than paper over it: a
cross-tenant reach conceals, a workspace-key policy denial does not.
* fix(v2-api): accept the redacting log status and envelope the knowledge-search 413
The v2 log presenters parsed status against a five-value enum, but the
execution logger persists a sixth, redacting, while a finished run's output
is scrubbed. Any such row failed the response parse; on the list route one
row 500'd the whole page. The enum is now derived from
PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus with a compile-time exhaustiveness
assertion, so a future status is a type error rather than a production 500.
POST /api/v2/knowledge/search declared maxBodyBytes without
payloadTooLargeResponse, so its 413 returned a bare string instead of the v2
error envelope. It now matches the sibling deploy/rollback routes.
* fix(uploads): restore archive extraction folder parity
Archive extraction into workspace files/ was rewritten onto the authorized
application-operation boundary, and three behavioral regressions came with
that move. Together they broke every archive containing a subdirectory, and
100% of copilot extract() calls (materialize-file always passes
rootFolderSegments: [baseName], and its catch only handles ArchiveError).
1. Non-canonical folder path. The extractor joined the folder segments with
"/" and passed the result as `path` to createWorkspaceFileFolderOperation.
That path reaches requireNonRootFolderPath -> parseFolderPath, which
requires a leading "/" and byte-for-byte canonical per-segment encoding,
so "bundle/data" threw FolderPathError before anything was written — and
a folder name containing a space or a reserved character would still have
thrown after merely prefixing a slash.
2. exactName: true. createWorkspaceFileFromBuffer was told to demand the
exact leaf name, which sets maxAttempts = 1 and raises FileConflictError
when the name already exists. The extractor's rollback then deleted every
file written so far, so one colliding name destroyed the whole
extraction. Reachable today for flat archives through the unzip action of
POST /api/tools/file/manage. Restored to auto-suffixing via
allocateUniqueWorkspaceFileName.
3. Wrong folder primitive. createWorkspaceFileFolderAtPath creates exactly
one leaf, conflicts on an existing path, and requires the parent to exist
already. The extractor never creates intermediates and caches by full
path, so the first nested entry asked for a folder whose parent was never
created. The correct semantics are ensureWorkspaceFileFolderPath: walk
every segment, reuse what exists, create only what is missing.
Rather than bypass the operation boundary by calling the manager primitive
directly, this adds ensureWorkspaceFileFolderPathOperation — an authorized
application use case under files.folders.create that expresses "ensure this
whole chain exists" — and routes the extractor through it with raw decoded
segments, so no path string is built and no encoding can be malformed.
archive.test.ts previously mocked the folder operation and asserted the
broken shape (path: 'bundle'), which is why this shipped. The suite now
fakes the workspace-file store in memory while enforcing the real rules:
folder paths run through the production parseFolderPath family, the
create-one-leaf operation conflicts and requires a parent, and exactName
governs conflict vs auto-suffix. Nested, reuse, encoded-name, and collision
cases are covered and each fails against the pre-fix code.
* chore(files): tidy archive extraction cleanup
* fix(uploads): roll back folders archive extraction created
Extraction now materializes folders before uploading files, but the failure
path only deleted the extracted files — every folder the call created was left
behind. That is not cosmetic: `materialize_file` guards re-extraction by looking
up the root folder path and refusing when it has any child, so a half-extracted
nested archive turned every retry into "already extracted — delete that folder
first" until a human cleaned up the tree by hand.
The rollback must delete only folders this call actually inserted, never one it
reused: extracting into an existing path is normal (a sibling entry, an earlier
successful extraction), and deleting a pre-existing folder would destroy
unrelated user data. `ensureWorkspaceFileFolderPath` already distinguishes the
two while walking the segment chain, so it (and its application operation) now
reports `createdFolderIds` alongside the leaf id. The extractor accumulates
those ids in creation order and, on failure, deletes them in reverse — parents
are recorded before their children, so reverse order is deepest-first and a
parent is never removed out from under a child. Folder cleanup is best-effort
like the existing file cleanup, so a cleanup failure never masks the original
error.
* fix(billing): withhold the payer credit pool from v2 status readers
`GET /api/v2/billing/status` resolved the workspace's payer and projected
that payer's pooled allowances — credits used, credit limit, credits
remaining, and the payer entity's storage usage and quota — to any caller
holding only `read` on the workspace, including a personal API key. The
payer pool is shared across every workspace that payer funds, and the
platform already treats it as privileged: the workspace credit-availability
surface computes `canViewPayerPool` from `canManageWorkspaceBilling` and
substitutes member-scoped or null figures for everyone else. The new
versioned endpoint had no equivalent gate.
`credits` and `storage` are now projected only to a caller who may manage
the resolved payer's billing: the billed account holder of a personally
hosted workspace, an admin of the hosting organization, or a workspace API
key, which only a workspace admin can provision. The endpoint stays at
`read` so a plain member keeps the plan, period, and standing the workspace
UI already shows them, and an exceeded pooled limit still reports as
`limit_exceeded` without disclosing the numbers behind it. Both fields are
nullable on the wire and in the regenerated OpenAPI spec.
The decision lives in the application use case, resolved from canonical
workspace state, not in the route: billing authority is payer identity and
organization role, which the workspace permission ladder cannot express —
a plain workspace `admin` is deliberately not enough.
* chore(api): remove the unused public API route builder and dead endpoint labels
`withPublicApiRouteHandler` and 27 `ApiEndpoint` union members landed together
in #5273, but the v2 surface shipped on `defineV2JsonRoute` + `v2RateLimits`
instead. The builder had no production caller — only its own test — and the v2
rate limiter never reads an `ApiEndpoint` label, so those members were never
emitted to telemetry by symbol or by string literal.
Remaining members are exactly the labels a v1 route passes to `checkRateLimit`
or `authenticateRequest`. Drops the now-unreachable `hasZodUsage` branch from
the API validation audit; no ratchet metric moves (route total stays 1093).
* fix(billing): deny the payer pool to actor-less workspace API keys
The first pass gated `credits` and `storage` on billing authority for
personal API keys but let a `workspace_api_key` principal through
unconditionally, which left the excluded role a way back in. Any workspace
`admin` may mint a workspace API key, and a workspace `admin` is
deliberately not a billing manager, so an admin who reads `null` as
themselves could mint a key and read the full pool with it. On an
organization-hosted workspace that pool is the organization's, spanning
workspaces the admin has no standing in.
Billing authority is payer identity or an organization admin role — a
property of a person. A workspace API key is deliberately actor-less, so it
can never satisfy it and now reads both fields as `null`. Attributing the
key to its creator was rejected: it would launder the same workspace-admin
role, it breaks when the creator's authority is revoked while the key lives
on, and substituting a key's owner for the acting principal is what the
application operation boundary forbids. The reasoning sits in TSDoc at the
decision point.
The key keeps the plan, period, and standing it needs to monitor a
workspace, including `limit_exceeded` and `billing_blocked`. No in-repo
caller reads `credits` or `storage` from this endpoint. The payer storage
pool is now read only once disclosure is authorized, so a caller who may
not see it no longer triggers the query at all.
* fix(folders): bound the workflow folderId-branch path index reads
`createWorkflow` and `updateWorkflow` each resolve a folder two ways inside one
function. The folderPath branch goes through `resolveWorkflowFolderPath`, which
loads the path index with `maxRows: MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE`; the folderId
branch loaded it with no bound at all, issuing a `SELECT` over every active
folder row in the workspace. In `updateWorkflow` the unbounded read and the
bounded fallback sit thirty lines apart in the same function.
Passes the cap at both sites, matching the read sites that already opt in.
Exceeding it throws `FolderCollectionLimitExceededError` rather than truncating,
because a partial path index resolves real folder paths to `undefined` and
re-roots resources at the workspace root.
`maxRows` deliberately stays opt-in rather than becoming the default. Folder
creation does not refuse at the same ceiling on every path — `POST /api/folders`
goes through the `createFolder` name/parentId variant, which passes no
`maxFolderRows`, so the count guard in `executeCreateFolderAtPath` never runs
and a workspace can already hold more than `MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE` folders.
Defaulting the bound would make every path-index consumer throw for a state the
product allows to exist. Reconciling reader and writer is a separate change with
a user-facing limit, not a chore.
* chore(billing): tidy payer-pool concealment cleanup
* fix(api): reject an undecodable offset cursor on v2 table rows
GET /api/v2/tables/{tableId}/rows coerced an undecodable pagination cursor to
offset 0 and re-served page one. A client paging forward reads that as a fresh
first page and can loop over it forever. Every sibling v2 cursor list — logs,
files, workflows, workflow runs, workflow versions, workspace members, tables,
knowledge documents — already rejects with a validation error instead.
Extracts the offset-cursor decode both offset-paginated v2 routes had inlined
into `decodeOffsetCursor`, next to the existing `decodeSortedCursor`, so the
reject-don't-restart rule has one home.
* fix(api): restore v1 table error-response parity and stop internal message leak
The v1 table routes were rewritten to consume `lib/table/orchestration`
results, and two response behaviors drifted from what the live API returned.
Information disclosure: an unclassified failure's `outcome.error` carries
whatever text the fault happened to have. Drizzle wraps a throw raised inside
a transaction in an error whose own message is the failed statement and its
bound parameters, so `DELETE /api/v1/tables/{tableId}` and
`DELETE /api/v1/tables/{tableId}/rows/{rowId}` returned that verbatim in the
500 body to any API-key holder. Previously these returned a fixed generic
string.
Lost `lock` field: the 423 body used to be `{ error, lock }`. The delete,
row-delete, and column-update routes (v1 and internal) dropped the lock kind
the orchestration result already computes, leaving clients unable to tell
which lock to clear.
Both are fixed at one altitude: `orchestrationOutcomeErrorResponse` in
`app/api/table/utils.ts` is now the only way a table route projects an
orchestration failure onto the wire. It renders the route's fallback for an
unclassified failure and the real message for a classified one (validation,
not-found, conflict, locked keep their specific text), and carries `lock` on a
423. A future route cannot reintroduce either bug by hand-spelling the body.
Duplicate table names on `POST /api/v1/tables` keep answering 409 rather than
reverting to the previous 400. 409 is the correct semantic, and every other v1
duplicate-name surface (knowledge, files, workflow import) already answers 409;
the tables 400 was the outlier. v1 tables appears in no published OpenAPI
document and no in-repo client branches on the status, so the compatibility
cost is limited to a caller matching 400 specifically for a name collision.
* fix(skills): only reject a built-in name collision on an actual rename
The built-in-name guard ran on every update that carried a `name`, without
comparing it to the skill's current persisted name. Skills created before the
guard existed can legitimately carry a built-in's name (they simply shadowed
the built-in at read time), and the skill modal always submits the full object
including the unchanged name — so every save of such a skill returned 400 with
"The skill name ... is reserved by a built-in skill", with no way to fix it
short of renaming.
Move the guard in `updateSkill` to after the canonical row is loaded and run it
only when the submitted name differs from the current one. Creating a skill
with a built-in name, and renaming an existing skill into one, are still
rejected. The check stays in the shared orchestration primitive because that is
the only layer both the internal `/api/skills` adapter (via `performUpdateSkill`)
and `updateSkillUseCase` (v2 + Copilot) pass through, and it is where the
current name is in hand.
* chore(tables): tidy v1 error projection cleanup
* chore(skills): tidy collision guard cleanup
|
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|
Waleed
|
be5db68644 |
fix(agiloft): repoint the block at the alrest surface and fix EWLogin (#6562)
* fix(agiloft): make the block work, and align it with the REST documentation
The native Agiloft block could not authenticate against any instance. A
customer reported it; production traces for their workspace confirm every
failure mode verbatim. Fixing that exposed a second, larger problem, and a
per-endpoint audit against the full published documentation found the rest.
Authentication
- EWLogin sent only $KB/$login/$password as query parameters. A live instance
answers `400 EWWrongDataException ... One has to specify $table, $KB, $lang
parameters`. $table is required even though only $KB/$login/$password/$lang
are documented. Parameters now travel in a form-encoded body, which the docs
permit and which keeps the password out of URLs and access logs.
- The authentication scheme is read from the login response and trimmed;
Agiloft returns it as "Bearer " with a trailing space.
- EWLogout was missing $lang.
Surfaces
- Record create, read, update, search and saved-search now use the endpoints
that accept the token EWLogin issues; the legacy operations authenticate from
inline credentials, which is what that surface expects. Nothing sends both
forms at once — the documented 400 for doing so is what the original report
had run into.
- EWSelect passes credentials in a POST body, one of the five operations
documented to support it.
- Attachment retrieval uses the documented EWRetrieve endpoint, with
filePosition rather than position, and no longer needs a login/logout pair.
Defects found in the audit
- remove_attachment reported zero on every call: its body is the EWREST
assignment form but the route ran JSON.parse then Number(), yielding NaN.
- The EWREST parser could not read EWActionButton's documented response, which
puts both assignments on one line.
- EWLock treated any 200 as success, including the documented
{error, error_description} envelope, and invented an 'UNKNOWN' status.
- EWTable discarded the linked-field details, required flag and text field type
it had asked for, making includeLinkedInfo inert.
- select_records had no result ceiling at all; both it and search now cap and
report a truncated flag rather than reporting a capped length as a total.
- Optional string inputs rejected null, so a blank Page field failed validation
before any request was made.
- Upsert treated the documented 202 async acknowledgement as a missing-ID
failure, and returned no callback ID for the caller to poll.
- Every response contract required an output that the 401 and 500 paths never
return.
Coverage added
- Table and field discovery (EWTable), upsert (EWUpsert), async status
(EWAsyncStatus), natural language search (EWNLPSearch), action buttons
(EWActionButton), the REPLACE_WITH_ANOTHER delete rule with its substitute
records, $async on upsert, and <fieldName>$overwrite on attach.
- Reads with a named field list go through the search projection; an unfiltered
contract record runs to roughly 184KB and swamps downstream agent context.
- Errors are readable: Agiloft wraps failures in HTML around a typed exception
and an internal task id, and the JSON endpoints now request real status codes
rather than a 200 the caller has to interpret.
Not implemented: $searchSQL and $operationHints=NOLOCK are EWRead/EWUpdate
parameters and those operations do not run on that surface here; EWQuestion,
EWHotlinks, EWOData, EWBroadcast and webhook registration have no documentation
beyond their names.
Verified against the published documentation, not against a live instance.
* fix(agiloft): give natural language search a sentence that paints
check:canvas-sentences failed: the nlp_search card resolved to nothing on an
untouched canvas, so it painted empty. Its only basic-mode field was the
long-input query, and the field list is advanced, so every segment dropped.
The sentence now leads with the knowledge base, matching the shape List Tables
already uses — both operations are knowledge-base scoped rather than
table-scoped, so it also reads more accurately.
* fix(agiloft): stop retrying refusals, and expose the outputs the new operations return
Five findings from review that had gone unanswered.
An Agiloft refusal was surfacing as HTTP 500. readAlrestJson throws when the
envelope reports success:false, the route catch mapped that to 500, and the
tool runner retries 500s — so a create the server had already rejected could be
retried and duplicate the record. Refusals now return a settled failure with the
message intact; genuine faults still 500.
list_tables could not run in its primary mode. EWTable is knowledge-base scoped,
but some instances reject EWLogin without a $table, so whole-knowledge-base
discovery failed at login with nothing to fall back to. It now says what the
caller can do about it rather than surfacing the raw login error.
Upsert corrupted structured values. Every field went through String(), so a
multi-value field collapsed into one joined string instead of the documented
repeated key/value pairs, and an object silently wrote "[object Object]" into
the record. Arrays now encode as repeated pairs and objects are refused, since
Agiloft documents no encoding for them.
Two outputs were invisible in the editor. `records` was conditioned on
search_records alone, so natural language search results could not be chained,
and `callbackId` on run_action_button alone, so a queued upsert's callback could
not be wired into Async Status even though both values exist at runtime.
|
||
|
Theodore Li
|
6d3e484fb3 |
fix(api): align v2 permissions and resource behavior (#6557)
* fix(api): align v2 permissions and resource behavior * fix(api): refine resource authorization boundaries * fix(tables): restore large durable imports * fix(files): classify missing archive targets |
||
|
Waleed
|
81e04a8e41 |
fix(agiloft): align the integration with the documented ewws REST interface (#6556)
* fix(agiloft): align the integration with the documented ewws REST interface
The CRUD tools targeted /ewws/REST/{kb}/{table}/{id} with JSON bodies and
guessed at the response by probing `data.result ?? data` and `id ?? ID`.
Agiloft documents that path as a URL convention only -- no method table, no
example call, and no response shape -- and no known client uses it. The EW*
operation family is specified end to end, including exact response bodies, so
every operation now goes through it and parses the documented
`EWREST_key='value';` assignment format.
- EWCreate/EWRead/EWUpdate/EWDelete/EWSearch/EWSelect/EWGetChoiceLineId are
form-encoded and parsed via a shared EWREST parser; the /.json suffix is kept
only on EWAttachInfo, the one operation with a published JSON sample
- EWDelete now sends the deleteRule the docs require, defaulting to
ERROR_IF_DEPENDANTS so a delete fails rather than cascading
- EWRemoveAttachment uses GET; it does not accept DELETE
- EWSearch accepts the documented `search` saved-search label, so saved
searches are reachable for the first time
- Search query help taught AND/OR; Agiloft uses && and ||
- Add run_action_button (POST /ewws/async/EWActionButton) for approvals and
send-for-signature steps
- Drop saved_search: EWSavedSearch has no doc page, so neither its URL nor its
response could be verified and it could only ever return an empty list
- Add force on unlock, filter read fields locally since $fields is
undocumented, correct lock status to LOCKED/NO_LOCK, and stop reporting a
fabricated page size of 25
* fix(agiloft): fail loudly on non-EWREST bodies and keep the retired tool resolvable
- EWSearch and EWSelect report an empty result set as `EWREST_id_length = '0';`,
so a body with no assignments at all is a refusal Agiloft returned with HTTP
200, not an empty result. Both routes now surface it as an error instead of a
successful empty list.
- Re-register agiloft_saved_search as a retired tool. Removing it outright left
workflows saved with operation='saved_search' deriving a tool id the registry
no longer provided, which throws "Tool not found" at execution. It now fails
through directExecution with a message pointing at the Search Records
operation's Saved Search field, without issuing an undocumented request. It
stays out of the operation dropdown so it cannot be chosen for new blocks.
- Guard EWCreate and EWUpdate against oversized record data. Those operations
carry field values in the query string, so a large payload hits the request
line limit; the tool now explains that rather than surfacing an opaque 414.
|
||
|
Waleed
|
c365b14f73 |
feat(calendly): extend tools with booking, availability, no-shows, and routing forms (#6545)
* feat(calendly): extend tools with booking, availability, no-shows, and routing forms Adds 12 tools verified against the Calendly OpenAPI spec: get_user, get_event_invitee, create_event_invitee, list_event_type_available_times, list_user_busy_times, list_user_availability_schedules, create_scheduling_link, create/delete_invitee_no_show, list_organization_memberships, list_routing_forms, and list_routing_form_submissions. Also fixes issues found while validating the existing tools: - list_webhooks dropped the scope query param the API requires, so every call with scope unset returned 400 - list_event_types could only send active=true, making inactive event types unlistable - user and organization filters now accept a bare UUID or a full URI consistently across every operation - json array params (eventGuests, events) are normalized whether they arrive as an array or a JSON string * improvement(calendly): type the block/tool alignment test instead of using any * fix(calendly): normalize webhook organization and user identifiers |
||
|
Waleed
|
6fdb1459c4 |
fix(v2-api): standardization (#6542)
* fix(v2-api): stop leaking resolved secrets in logs and serving doc source Two regressions shipped with the v2 API (#5273) where v2 diverged from the v1 path it replaced, plus the hardening that fell out of auditing them. **v2 logs bypassed secret redaction.** `getPublicLog` and `listPublicLogs` called raw `materializeExecutionData`, while every other reader — v1 list and detail, CSV export, `fetch-log-detail`, both data-drain sources — calls `materializeExecutionDataForDisplay`, which applies the resolved-secret provenance projection. Both v2 routes then serialize `traceSpans` and `finalOutput` straight onto the wire, so unredacted secrets could reach the public API. Swapped to the display projection and threaded the principal's subject user into the read context. **v2 file download served generation source.** `GET /api/v2/files/{fileId}` streamed `file.key` raw. AI-generated docs store their generation source as the primary file, so a raw download yields source text under a `.pdf` name — a file the recipient cannot open. Generated docs now resolve to their compiled artifact; ordinary uploads still stream and are never materialized, gated on the recorded generation-source type rather than the extension. The resolve is capped at MAX_RENDERED_DOCUMENT_BYTES, and a still-compiling artifact returns a retryable 409 rather than a 500. Also in this change: - Reconcile the two v2 verbs that used PUT for PATCH semantics: `PUT /v2/knowledge/{id}` and `PUT /v2/tables/{tableId}/rows` are both all-optional partial updates. Breaking for API-key clients, but the surface is dark-launched behind the `v2-api` gate and no in-repo caller issues PUT. - Close the OpenAPI coverage blind spot that hid two routes: contract discovery was a non-recursive read of the flat `contracts/v2/` directory, so a contract in a subdirectory — or beside its non-v2 siblings, which is where the uploads contracts live — escaped the gate. The sweep is now recursive over the whole contracts tree, and the two upload data-plane routes are named in an explicit allowlist with reasons and staleness guards. - Extract `needsRenderedArtifact` so the "recorded type is authoritative, extension is fallback" rule has one home instead of being duplicated. - Extract `DocCompileUserError` into a leaf module so recognizing it no longer drags `app/api/**` and `next/server` into application modules. - Correct the stale pagination docstring in `contracts/v2/shared.ts` and pin the paged/full-set split in a test so it cannot drift again. * fix(v2-api): absolute imports for the extracted doc-compile error Review follow-up. - Use the `@/lib/...` alias for `doc-compile-error` in the three modules that imported it relatively. The repo requires absolute imports, and having all four consumers share one specifier also removes any chance of two module instances resolving apart and breaking `instanceof`. - Memoize the v2 list-pagination sweep. It re-imported the whole contracts tree once per test and timed out against the default 10s limit under load; it now sweeps once and declares an explicit timeout. Its failure message also still pointed at an enumeration in `v2/shared.ts` that this branch replaced with a pointer to the test itself. * fix(v2-api): correct three inaccurate claims found in verification None of these change behavior; each is a comment or test-config assertion that was not true as written. - The artifact resolver's TSDoc implied the byte cap prevents an oversized artifact being materialized. It does not: the artifact-store fetch is not streaming-bounded, so the bytes are resident before the ceiling rejects them. Say what it actually guarantees. - `v2/shared.ts` pointed at per-contract documentation for the two lists that still filter in memory. Neither contract documents it, so name the two lists and what they do inline instead of pointing at a page that does not exist. - The knowledge update contract said "every field of the body is optional"; `workspaceId` is required. Narrow the claim to mutable fields. - Scope the pagination sweep's extended timeout to the one test that pays for it, so a genuine hang in the other two surfaces in 10s rather than 60s. |
||
|
|
263e3ca67e |
improvement(external-endpoints): v2 versions with clean signatures + updated docs based on openapi spec (#5273)
* v0.6.29: login improvements, posthog telemetry (#4026) * feat(posthog): Add tracking on mothership abort (#4023) Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai> * fix(login): fix captcha headers for manual login (#4025) * fix(signup): fix turnstile key loading * fix(login): fix captcha header passing * Catch user already exists, remove login form captcha * improvement(external-endpoints): v2 versions with clean signatures + updated docs * feat(usage): accept X-API-Key on usage-logs list + export /api/users/me/usage-logs and /export now use checkHybridAuth — the same auth /api/users/me/usage-limits already accepts — so external monitors can read summary.bySourceCredits (the source breakdown of usage-limits' aggregate currentPeriodCost) instead of estimating Copilot spend by subtraction. Workspace-scoped keys are pinned to their own workspace's slice of the ledger: the filter defaults to the key's workspace and an explicit mismatch 403s. Both endpoints documented in openapi-core.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(billing): dedicated v2 usage endpoints; keep internal usage routes session-only Replaces the earlier X-API-Key enablement on /api/users/me/usage-logs with a dedicated public surface, so the internal Billing-settings endpoints can evolve with the UI while external monitors get a stable versioned contract: - GET /api/v2/billing/usage — current-billing-period summary with bySourceCredits (the source breakdown external monitors need to watch e.g. Copilot consumption without estimating by subtraction), plus limitCredits and plan - GET /api/v2/billing/usage/logs — cursor-paged credit ledger in the v2 envelope - workspace-scoped keys are pinned to their own workspace's slice; personal keys read the account ledger The public wire is credits-only: usage-logs rows now carry a hasCost boolean instead of dollarCost (the Billing UI only needed the >0 signal), and the rateLimit block is removed from the usage-limits response and docs (deploy-modal tab relabeled accordingly). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(docs): validate OpenAPI specs against the Zod contracts in CI The specs in apps/docs are hand-authored because they carry what Zod never defines — error envelopes, status codes, prose, examples — so they can't be generated; check:openapi validates them instead: - spec integrity: $refs resolve, operationIds unique, 2xx documented, no orphaned component schemas - v2 conventions: every /api/v2 operation documents 401 + 429 and every 4xx/5xx resolves to the canonical { error: { code, message } } envelope - contract cross-check: contracts are auto-discovered from lib/api/contracts/v2 (each carries its method + path); doc<->contract coverage both ways, query/body/response field diffs via z.toJSONSchema - examples: documented request/response examples must parse with the matching contract's actual Zod schemas First run caught real drift, fixed here: 16 stale orphaned schemas in the core spec, the v2 billing ops referencing v1-shaped error components, deploy/rollback examples missing the required nullable lifecycle keys, CreateTableBody missing folderId, a legacy-grammar delete-rows example, and four knowledge document ops missing their required workspaceId query param. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(docs): recursive field diff in check:openapi + the deep drift it found A mutation test showed the doc<->contract field diff only compared top-level properties, so a typo inside the { data } envelope passed. The diff now descends through matching object properties and array items (both sides must expose a property set — passthrough contracts and prose-only docs end the descent instead of false-positive), with the Zod JSON-schema root doubling as the $defs context. Deep drift it immediately caught, fixed here: select-column config (options/multiple) missing from every tables column schema, AddColumnBody hand-rolling a third column shape (now composed from ColumnInput, with position/workflowGroupId as the per-op extensions the contracts actually admit), chunking strategyOptions undocumented, and the deployment lifecycle fields (activeDeployment/latestDeploymentAttempt) missing from DeploymentState. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(security): close the triggerType rate-limit bypass on workflow execute Caller-supplied triggerType flowed unchecked into preprocessExecution, whose checkRateLimit default turns OFF for 'manual'/'chat' — so any API-key caller, and any anonymous public-API caller billed to the workspace owner, could execute unthrottled by sending {"triggerType":"manual"} (async runs also skipped the worker-side check via admissionCompleted). External callers may now only send the redundant 'api' value; internal JWT callers ('workflow'/'mcp') are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * refactor(execution): extract enqueue/status/cancel into shared libs Prepares the v2 execution surface: handleAsyncExecution's queue logic moves to lib/workflows/executor/enqueue-execution.ts (slot/claim semantics encoded in a discriminated outcome, not HTTP statuses), the execution-status read to execution-status.ts, and the order-sensitive cancel machinery to lib/execution/cancel-workflow-execution.ts. The v1 routes re-render identically — their suites pass unmodified. Also: preprocessExecution gains rateLimitCounter ('sync'|'async') and its 429 now carries code RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED + retryAfterMs (previously indistinguishable from the concurrency 429 and Retry-After was discarded); and the duplicate cancel contract in contracts/logs.ts is unified on the full 5-value reason enum — its narrower copy made requestJson throw a client ZodError when cancelling a paused HITL run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(execution): callable execution service + structured error classifier executeWorkflowService composes the same libs the v1 route holds inline (call-chain guard, execution-id claim, LoggingSession, preprocessing, deployed-state load + file-field processing, timeout-bound executeWorkflowCore, output hydration/compaction) for the deployed-state caller class — the seam the v2 execute route and in-process internal callers share, making the HTTP endpoint syntactic sugar. classifyExecutionError stops discarding the block context that buildBlockExecutionError already attaches at throw sites: failed runs now yield {message, code, blockId, blockName, blockType} with a stable append-only code enum (TIMEOUT/CANCELLED/USAGE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED/ INVALID_INPUT/BLOCK_EXECUTION_FAILED/CHILD_WORKFLOW_FAILED/ OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE/EXECUTION_FAILED), so callers route on error class instead of substring-matching messages — the single place raw errors are interpreted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(api): POST /api/v2/workflows/[id]/execute Thin route over executeWorkflowService: X-API-Key or anonymous public-API auth (sync/stream only for anonymous), strict body with body-flag async (no mode headers on v2), SSE passthrough for stream, and the execution resource response — executionId always present, in-band run failures are status:'failed' with the structured {message, code, blockId, blockName, blockType} error, sync timeout is status:'failed' + TIMEOUT instead of v1's 408, and a Response block's payload stays inside output (authors never control response status/headers on this origin). Async debits the async bucket and the 202 statusUrl points at the v2 executions resource. Adds CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST/SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE to the v2 error codes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(api): v2 executions status + cancel with queued backfill GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/executions/[executionId] is the single status URL for sync and async runs: before the async worker writes the durable log row, status is backfilled from the job queue (deterministic job id) as 'queued'/'running' — closing v1's 202-to-pickup 404 window — and failed runs carry the structured error object. POST .../cancel renders the shared cancellation lib in the v2 envelope with the tightened 5-value reason enum. Both authenticate via the shared resolveV2WorkflowAccess (X-API-Key, authz masked as 404, allowPersonalApiKeys honored). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(execution): workflow tool + MCP bridge run in-process workflow_executor (workflow-as-agent-tool) short-circuits in executeTool through WorkflowBlockHandler — the same invocation boundary canvas child workflows use — mirroring the deployed_block_executor precedent. The MCP serve bridge calls executeWorkflowService directly instead of fetching its own execute endpoint; deployment-version pinning, MCP response-size rejection, and the actor override become typed options instead of header sniffing. Both callers drop the double admission slot and duplicate top-level log row the HTTP hop cost, and failed child runs now surface the structured error + child executionId so parents and MCP clients can route on error class and hand providers a reproducible handle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(infra): CORS + CSP coverage for the v2 execute path /api/v2/workflows/:id/execute gets the same wildcard-origin, credential-free CORS policy as v1 (the default credentialed policy would block browser API-key calls and open a cookie CSRF surface) with X-Sim-Stream-Protocol allowed and no X-Execution-Mode (async is body-selected on v2), plus the COEP/COOP/CSP header block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(ui): deploy modal + copilot advertise the v2 execute surface All 20 API-tab snippets move to POST /api/v2/workflows/{id}/execute with the nested {"input": ...} body, async as the "async": true body flag (X-Execution-Mode gone), status polling against the v2 executions resource, the third tab renamed Usage and pointed at /api/v2/billing/usage, and {data} envelope unwraps in the printed responses. Fixes the latent baseUrl derivation (endpoint.split('/api/workflows/')) that would have silently built garbage URLs under a v2 endpoint, and deletes dead code (exampleCommand across 3 sites, getAsyncExampleTitle). Copilot deploy/manage/serializer endpoint builders and the api_trigger bestPractices example follow (the latter also drops its hardcoded staging host). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * docs(api): document the v2 execution surface Adds execute, execution status, and cancel to openapi-v2-workflows.json with the structured ExecutionError schema (append-only code enum + block attribution) and the ExecutionResource contract, documenting the rules that differ from v1: modes are body-selected, a failed run is HTTP 200 with status 'failed', an executionId always means data (never the error envelope), queued status is visible immediately, and Response-block payloads stay inside output. Registers the three pages in the generated workflows meta.json and bumps the route-count baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(api): gate the whole /api/v2 surface behind one flag; UI stays on v1 Every v2 route now runs exactly one check immediately after auth — v2ApiGateError — and answers 404 when the `v2-api` flag is off, so the surface is invisible until it is deliberately rolled out. The gate is keyed on userId only: a workspace/org-keyed check would have to read membership for a caller-supplied id before authorization runs, and its 404-vs-403 split would leak cohort membership (the trap the per-domain table gate worked around by running late). The two executions routes inherit it from the shared access resolver; the tables-specific gate is removed so no route checks twice. `tables-v2-api` stays, now gating only the internal predicate-grammar route /api/table/[tableId]/query — note v2 tables routes move to the unified flag, so enabling them is a `v2-api` decision now. Reverts the deploy modal, copilot handlers, and api_trigger example to the v1 execute endpoint: v1 works unchanged, and the UI must not advertise a surface most users would get a 404 from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(executor): restore child-cost aggregation dropped by the staging merge Staging's custom-block rewrite deleted `aggregateChildCost` from workflow-handler.ts, and git merged that file cleanly — but this branch's workflow-tool-runner.ts, added for the v2 execute migration, still imports it. A silent semantic conflict: no marker, broken build. Taking staging's rewrite is correct, so the helper is defined locally in its one remaining consumer rather than resurrected in the file staging just rewrote. Same four lines over the still-exported `calculateCostSummary`, so a failed child workflow keeps billing the hosted-key spend it consumed instead of reporting $0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(tables): make lib/table/orchestration the single implementation (#6134) * refactor(orchestration): move the shared error contract out of lib/workflows OrchestrationErrorCode and statusForOrchestrationError are the contract every lib/[resource]/orchestration module returns against, but they lived inside the workflows module, so resource-neutral code (lib/folders) already had to import from a workflow path. Moved to lib/core/orchestration/types. Adds a 'locked' class mapping to 423. Both tables and workflows have a lock that forbids a mutation, and each caller was translating that to a status itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(tables): make lib/table/orchestration the single implementation Column update was implemented four times — the UI route, v1, v2, and the copilot table tool — each calling the same column services but owning its own guards, error mapping, and audit. The copies had drifted, and the drift was the bug: v2 was missing both guards, only the copilot copy minted stable option ids, and only v1/v2 audited. performUpdateTableColumn, performDeleteTable, and performDeleteTableRow now own that logic; all ten call sites reduce to auth, parse, call, render. The guards are asserted once in lib/table/orchestration rather than four times against four routes. Behavior this consolidates, previously true on only some paths: - The typeChanging guard. updateColumnType early-returns on an unchanged type and drops any options sent with it, so restating the current type alongside new options silently discarded them. v2 had no guard at all and, since its contract shares v1's body schema, accepted options and ignored them. - The select-unique guard. Each write is its own locked transaction, so a rename or type change paired with a constraint write that is going to fail commits first and then throws, half-applying the schema change. - Stable select-option ids. Cells reference the option id, so an edit that re-sends an option by name has to reuse it or every cell holding it is orphaned. Only the copilot path did this; normalizeSelectOptionsInput moves to lib/table/select-options and now covers every caller. It preserves a supplied id, so it is a no-op for the fully-formed options the HTTP contracts accept. - required forwarded into the type and options writes, so a conversion validates against the constraint the same request is setting. - An audit on every successful update. The UI route and the copilot tool emitted none. - Single-row delete through the row service. v2 did a raw db.delete, skipping assertRowDelete and deleteOrderedRow, so a delete-locked table returned 200 and the row-count bookkeeping never ran. - The delete actor handed to deleteTable, which audits only when a row was actually archived. v1 and v2 omitted it and audited themselves outside that check, emitting TABLE_DELETED for a no-op delete of an archived table. Failure classes come back as OrchestrationErrorCode; v2 renders them through a new v2ErrorForOrchestration, mirroring statusForOrchestrationError on the v1 and UI surfaces, so a given failure maps to the same status everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(tables): bind the column-update tests to the orchestration function The base's route tests assert which column service each payload reaches — the behavior that now lives in performUpdateTableColumn. They mocked the `@/lib/table` barrel; the orchestration module imports the service directly, so they mock that too and keep asserting the same thing through the extracted implementation. The orchestration tests move onto the base's semantics: writes address the stable column id, a rename rides inside the write it accompanies rather than running first, and the currency guards replace the non-select options guard the service now owns. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(copilot): drop the column-type import the delegation made dead Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(tables): move the audit log out of the table service `lib/table/service.ts` wrote its own audit rows, so whether an operation was audited depended on which function a caller reached for rather than on a user having performed it. That is what let v1 and v2 audit a no-op delete, and what made `deleteTable`'s optional `actingUserId` double as an audit opt-out flag. Worse, most sites fell back to `actingUserId ?? createdBy`, so an unattributed call was logged against the table's *creator*. The copilot `mv` path passed no actor at all: renaming someone else's table recorded them as the renamer. Audit now lives in the orchestration functions — performDeleteTable, performRenameTable, performMoveTableToFolder, performUpdateTableLocks — and the services just write. Internal callers (folder cascade, import rollback) keep calling the service and are silent by construction rather than by remembering to omit an argument. Two services now return what the audit needs: `deleteTable` reports whether it actually archived a row, so a repeat delete logs nothing; `updateTableLocks` returns the before/after locks, since only the locked write can observe the transition its description names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tables): restore audit provenance and conflict status in orchestration Moving the audits into the orchestration functions dropped three things the routes had been carrying, and added one the orchestration now owns twice. - The v1 and v2 column-update routes passed `request` to `recordAudit`, so their audit rows recorded the caller's IP and user-agent. The orchestration function had no way to receive it. Every table orchestration function now takes an optional `OrchestrationRequestContext` and every HTTP route forwards it; the copilot and VFS callers, which have no request, omit it. - `classifyTableMutation` matched `TableConflictError` on "already exists" appearing in the message and reported it as `validation`, turning the UI route's 409 on a duplicate table rename into a 400. It now matches the type, the way `performRestoreTable` already did. - `captureServerEvent` ran on every delete while the audit was gated on a row actually being archived, so a repeat delete of an archived table still reported `table_deleted`. Both now hang off the same evidence. - The copilot delete path kept its own `captureServerEvent` from when the service did not emit one, double-counting every copilot table delete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a * fix(tables): say which type a no-op column update restated A copilot `update_column` payload whose only content was the column's current type used to return success with the live schema, while the v1, v2, and UI routes rejected the same payload with "No updates specified". Delegating to `performUpdateTableColumn` unified them onto the routes' rejection — correct, but the message tells the caller its request was empty when it named a type. The orchestration function now reports the same thing `updateColumnType` reports when it loses this race concurrently: the column is already that type, re-issue without the type change. An empty payload still reads "No updates specified". Drops the copilot's `outcome.table ?? tableForUpdate` fallback with it — the comment described the no-op that can no longer reach that line, and a success always carries a table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a * refactor(tables): classify failures by type instead of by message text The table module decided HTTP statuses by searching error messages for phrases. `VALIDATION_MESSAGE_FRAGMENTS` and `ROW_WRITE_ERROR_PATTERNS` held 32 substrings between them, and fifteen more lists were inlined in routes — 83 matchers over 17 files, each its own copy of the guesswork and already drifted apart. It made message wording load-bearing: `TableRowLimitError`'s own doc comment noted that its text had to contain "row limit" for a route to answer 400, and adding "already exists" to a rename message silently demoted a 409 to a 400 (the bug fixed one commit ago, by adding another special case). Services now throw `OrchestrationError`, which carries the transport-neutral `OrchestrationErrorCode` the layers above already speak. Classification is one `instanceof` in `orchestrationErrorResponse` (UI + v1) and `v2CaughtOrchestrationError` (v2). Every pattern list is gone. Wording is free to change; an unclassified error still becomes a generic 500, which is what an unexpected fault should be. `asOrchestrationError` walks the `cause` chain rather than testing the caught value directly: drizzle wraps a throw raised inside a transaction callback in a `DrizzleQueryError` whose own message is the failed SQL, so a bare `instanceof` would drop every failure raised inside `withLockedTable`. That is the same reason `rootErrorMessage` had to dig for a root cause before. Three throws stay bare `Error` deliberately — `Table ID mismatch`, `Workspace ID mismatch`, and `Failed to build upsert conflict predicate` are internal invariants no consumer classified, and they keep falling through to a 500. `Insufficient capacity` was in the pattern list with no producer anywhere in the codebase. Status changes, all deliberate: - `'forbidden'` joins the code union so the table-row-limit ceiling keeps its 403; without it this refactor would have flattened it to 400. - import-async's table-limit rejection: 400 -> 403, matching the two other create routes it had drifted from. - Renaming a table to an invalid name: 500 -> 400. `validateTableName` messages don't contain "Invalid", so no matcher ever caught them. - Restoring a table that isn't archived, or into an archived workspace: 500 -> 400. - A duplicate *column* name stays `validation`/400 rather than becoming a 409 like a duplicate table name. Both v1 and the orchestration have always answered 400 for it; changing a published status is not this refactor's job. The twelve tests that changed were asserting the substring mechanism itself, constructing plain `Error`s with magic strings. They now assert the real contract, plus new cases pinning that identical wording carrying no classification stays internal and keeps its message off the wire. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): add v2 endpoints for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, folders, and credentials (#6150) * feat(api): add v2 endpoints for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, folders, and credentials * fix(api): correct credential role, skill permission bar, MCP url identity, and custom-tool conflict mapping * fix(api): align credential mutation gating, provider-outage status, and unique-violation conflicts * fix(api): close unique-violation, revival, orphan-write, and env-rename gaps * fix(api): treat every provider-outage code as unavailable on create and update * fix(credentials): use the shared outage predicate on the session update path * fix(contracts): anchor the predicate double-cast annotation to the cast `check:api-validation:strict` counted 9 unannotated double-casts against a baseline of 8, failing CI. The predicate leaf schema was annotated, but the annotation sat above the declaration while the checker anchors on the line carrying the cast — five lines below, at the close of the object literal. The scanner walks back at most three lines and stops at the first non-comment one, so it hit `value: z.unknown().optional(),` and never saw the reason. Splitting the object schema from the cast puts them adjacent, so the existing reason binds. No behavior change — the cast, the schema, and the reasoning are unchanged. Also lowers the rawJsonReads ratchet 6 -> 5 to match the current count, which had drifted down; leaving it high lets a removed raw read silently come back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(skills): point the orchestration error contract at its moved module #6150 branched before #6134, so skill-lifecycle.ts imports @/lib/workflows/orchestration/types — the module #6134 moved to @/lib/core/orchestration/types. Git merged a file deletion on one side with a new file referencing it on the other: no textual conflict, broken build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(knowledge): make lib/knowledge/orchestration the single implementation (#6154) * refactor(knowledge): make lib/knowledge/orchestration the single implementation Knowledge base create was implemented four times — the internal route, v1, v2, and the copilot tool — and the orchestration around the shared write had drifted. Extract it the same way lib/table/orchestration was: services write, orchestration decides which writes run, guards them, audits them, and returns a transport-neutral failure. Behavior converged, not preserved: - One chunking default (DEFAULT_CHUNKING_CONFIG). The agent defaulted minSize to 1 against the API's 100, so identical input produced differently-chunked knowledge bases depending on who created it. The agent path now chunks at 100. - Every successful mutation is audited inside the orchestration function. The copilot tool called recordAudit zero times, so agent-created knowledge bases, document uploads, updates and deletes left no audit trail at all. - Failures classify by class, not by message text. The knowledge service errors are OrchestrationError subclasses and storage-quota rejections throw a shared StorageLimitExceededError, replacing four separate message greps for "already exists" / "does not have permission" / "storage limit". delete_connector reported the opposite of what happened. It reached the route through an internal HTTP self-call that sent no query string, so the route's keep-documents default always applied while the agent told the user the documents had been removed. The self-call is gone — all four connector operations run in-process — and the orchestration returns the real counts. Also: - OrchestrationErrorCode gains 'payload_too_large' (413 / PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE). Without it, dropping the storage-limit message match would have regressed the documented 413 on knowledge base create and document upload to a 500. - messageForOrchestrationError renders a route's own wording for an unclassified fault, so a driver's message no longer reaches the client on a 500. - v1 and v2 knowledge base update now forward actorUserId, which the service requires for a workspace move; both omitted it. - The connector DELETE route reads deleteDocuments through parseRequest. Its contract declared z.boolean(), which would have rejected the string a query param actually is. - Drop the 409 from POST /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/documents in the OpenAPI spec. Nothing on the upload path throws a conflict; it was only ever reachable by the message match this change removes. Behavior change worth noting: a v1/v2 PUT carrying only the workspaceId scope field and no actual updates now returns 400 rather than 200 with the unchanged knowledge base. Deliberately deferred: document update remains internal-only. Extracting performUpdateKnowledgeDocument makes exposing it on v1/v2 a contract and a route away, but that is a new public surface rather than part of this consolidation. * fix(knowledge): make connector create atomic and stop flattening failures Review round 1 on #6154. - Resolve the billing payer before the connector is committed, not after. A malformed attribution header rejected post-commit left a live connector behind a 500, and a retry created a duplicate plus duplicate sync work. Manual sync resolves before writing its audit for the same reason. - Let the source-config validator carry its own failure class. Collapsing every rejection to `validation` flattened the connector PATCH route's 401 (stale stored credential) and 409 (missing workspace context) into a 400. - Add `unauthorized` to OrchestrationErrorCode. It is the class that 401 was already expressing on this route, and the v2 vocabulary already had UNAUTHORIZED; only the shared union was missing it. - Report a knowledge base that exists but failed to archive as failed, with the reason, rather than as not found. The copilot delete loop folded every non-not-found failure into `notFound`, telling the user it was never there. - Route copilot failures through the same message helper the HTTP surfaces use, so an unclassified fault's raw text (a driver's failed SQL) no longer reaches the agent verbatim while the UI and public APIs get the generic wording. * feat(api): expand the public v2 files surface (#6160) * feat(api): expand the public v2 files surface Adds folder support, rename/restore, move, bulk archive, share, and content replace to /api/v2/files, so managing files by API no longer stops at upload + download + archive-one. Routes are thin: auth -> parse -> perform* -> serialize. Share and content replace get their orchestration extracted first so the session routes and the public ones cannot diverge on the effective-authType resolution, the EE public-sharing gate, or the storage-quota classification. Presigned upload stays session-only: presign does an advisory quota check and the real debit happens in the separate register step, so a caller that never registers leaves unaccounted bytes with no reaper. The buffered multipart path debits inside uploadWorkspaceFile's own transaction. * fix(files): classify folder and content failures instead of 500ing them Bugbot round 1. The v2 routes map errorCode straight to a status, so every manager failure that arrived unclassified became a 500 for what is really a caller-fixable 400 or 404. - Folder manager throws OrchestrationError: missing target/folder -> not_found, reparent cycle / self-parent / restore-into-archived-workspace -> validation. - File manager does the same for the in-transaction 'File not found' paths that the earlier pass missed. - updateWorkspaceFileContent's outer catch re-wrapped everything in a bare Error, which stripped the class off StorageLimitExceededError and the new not_found alike. It now rethrows a classified failure untouched and attaches cause to the generic wrap, so asOrchestrationError can still walk the chain. - Every remaining perform* gained the asOrchestrationError branch. - renameWorkspaceFile returned the pre-update read, so the v2 PATCH reported a stale updatedAt; it now returns the timestamp it actually wrote. Docs: upload auto-suffixes a duplicate name rather than rejecting it, matching the in-app uploader. The description claimed 409 and was simply wrong. * fix(files): surface a failed upload read-back as the real error getWorkspaceFile swallows a query failure and returns null unless throwOnError is set, so a transient blip on the post-upload read reported as 'file could not be read back'. Distinguish the two: a real null after a just-committed write is an invariant break, a query failure is itself. * revert(api): drop the dedicated v2 file-folder routes File folders already live in the shared folder table as resourceType 'file' (#6045 cut them over, #6051 dropped workspace_file_folders), and the remaining file-specific folder machinery is being folded into the generic folder engine. Publishing /api/v2/files/folders/** would pin that transitional split into a public contract we'd then have to keep or break. Files stay folder-aware — folderId/folderPath on the projection, folderId on upload, and the move route — because a folder id is a folder.id and survives the unification untouched. Folder management belongs on /api/v2/folders once that surface serves resourceType 'file'; until then there is no v2 way to enumerate file folders, which is the deliberate gap. The orchestration classification fixes stay: the internal routes and the copilot file-folder tools still call those perform* functions. * fix(files): classify upload failures instead of matching their wording Bugbot round 2. uploadWorkspaceFile had the same outer-catch rewrap that updateWorkspaceFileContent did, so a blown storage quota reached the route as a bare Error and the v2 handler recovered the status by substring-matching the message. Any rewording silently demoted a 413 to a 500. - uploadWorkspaceFile rethrows a classified failure untouched and attaches cause to the generic wrap. - FileConflictError is now an OrchestrationError('conflict'), so a duplicate name classifies like every other conflict. Its 'FILE_EXISTS' discriminator had no readers and is gone; the instanceof checks elsewhere still hold. - The v2 upload handler uses v2CaughtOrchestrationError, dropping all three string matches. Also documents that bulk-archive is best-effort: unknown or already-archived ids are skipped rather than failing the call, and deletedItems is what actually happened. That asymmetry with the single-id DELETE was undocumented. * feat(api): add search, filtering, and sorting to the v2 list endpoints (#6189) * feat(api): add search, filtering, and sorting to the v2 list endpoints One convention across every v2 list, documented on lib/api/contracts/v2/shared.ts: `search` (case-insensitive substring on the resource's natural name field), `sortBy` + `sortOrder` (per-resource enum, never a free string), and enumerated resource-specific filters. Reuses the sortBy/sortOrder pair v2 logs and v2 knowledge-documents already ship rather than inventing a third dialect alongside the Logs filters and the Tables predicate grammar. Every filter and sort is pushed into SQL. GET /api/v2/files previously read the whole scope and sorted/sliced it in JS; it now goes through a new queryWorkspaceFiles that filters, orders, and bounds the page in one query. Cursors are stamped with the sort they were minted under, so replaying one under a different sort is a 400 instead of silently duplicated or skipped rows. * fix(api): validate v2 cursor key values and compare timestamps at ms precision Two review findings, fixed at the root by making a keyset key own its cursor codec instead of hand-writing a decoder per sort. Cursor key values are caller-controlled, and matching the sort stamp and key count was not enough: an unparseable timestamp or a non-numeric size reached the query as an Invalid Date or NaN and surfaced as a 500. Each key now type- checks its own value and rejects a cursor it cannot hold, which both routes render as the documented 400. Timestamp keys now order and compare on date_trunc('milliseconds', col). Postgres keeps microseconds and defaultNow() populates them, but a cursor value round-trips through a millisecond-only JS Date — comparing the raw column against the truncated value re-admitted the page's own last row, duplicating it and stalling pagination outright at a page size of one. Reachable today via workspace_files.updated_at, which insertFileMetadata leaves to defaultNow(). * feat(api): complete the v2 workflows resource with versions and CRUD (#6184) * feat(api): complete the v2 workflows resource with versions and CRUD Adds version listing/detail plus create, update, and delete to the v2 workflows surface, which previously covered only execution and deployment. - GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/versions — cursor-paginated, newest first - GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/versions/[version] — version + pinned state - POST /api/v2/workflows, PATCH and DELETE /api/v2/workflows/[id] All six delegate to the existing orchestration and persistence helpers; no new domain logic. * fix(api): check folder containment before lock state; reject malformed version cursors assertFolderMutable walks a folder's ancestor chain without filtering on workspace, so inspecting it before containment let a caller tell a locked folder in someone else's workspace (423) from a nonexistent one (400). Create and update now assert containment first, matching the ordering import-workflow.ts already uses. A version cursor that decodes to JSON without a numeric version filtered every row out and returned an empty page with nextCursor null, which reads as a clean end-of-list. Malformed cursors are now a 400. * refactor(api): page workflow versions in the persistence helper listWorkflowVersions read every version row and the route filtered and sliced the result in memory, so the response was bounded but the query was not. It now takes optional limit/afterVersion, turning the cursor into a real keyset query; the route asks for limit + 1 and only trims the has-more probe. Both params are optional, so the internal, v1 admin, and copilot callers are unchanged. Also restores the untouched GET handler in [id]/route.ts to its original formatting — collapsing its signature had re-indented the whole body and buried the actual additions in whitespace churn. * feat(api): expand v2 tables with stateless multipart transfers (#6188) * feat(api): expand the public v2 tables surface Adds 16 operations so a v2 caller can do what the internal surface can: rename/move/lock a table, restore it, manage saved views, run enrichment columns, look up rows, and import/export with observable job control. Extracts lib/table/orchestration/import.ts (performTableCsvImport, performCreateTableFromCsv) and lib/table/export-stream.ts from the first-party routes, then repoints those routes at them, so v1 and v2 cannot drift on what an import or export actually does. events/stream, metadata and dispatches stay internal — they are editor state, not public API. * fix(api): make v2 table PATCH all-or-nothing and name the lock in every 423 Greptile P1: PATCH applied locks, rename and move as three sequential transactions, so a folder rejected mid-request left the earlier writes persisted while the response reported failure — and the schema-changed signal was skipped, leaving open clients on stale state. Every rejectable condition now runs before the first write, and the signal fires whenever anything did land. Cursor: v2TableLockError dropped the lock kind, so async import, column run, enrichment and table mutations returned a bare LOCKED. A table has four independent locks, so the caller could not tell which to clear. * fix(api): report the lock kind on classified 423s too, not just thrown ones The previous commit named the lock only where the rejection was thrown and caught at the route boundary. Where it instead arrives as a classified `errorCode: 'locked'` outcome — delete table, delete row, update column, and the table mutations — the kind was dropped, so those 423s stayed unactionable while their neighbours improved. The orchestration results now carry `lock`, and a shared `v2TableOrchestrationError` renders both arrival paths into the same `{ code, message, details: { lock } }` body. `details` is omitted rather than sent null when the kind is unknown, so a caller branching on it sees absence instead of a phantom value. * fix(api): make async table imports observable, not just startable `POST /import-async` pointed callers at `GET /api/v2/tables/jobs` to track progress, but that endpoint filters to `type = 'export'` — imports are derived onto the table itself, one write job at a time, and exports get a separate list precisely because they are excluded from that derivation. The public Table shape omitted those derived fields, so an async import could be started and cancelled but never observed to completion, failure, or progress. That is the gap the import/export/job-control set was meant to close. Table now carries `job` — id, type, status, rowsProcessed, error, or null when idle — and the import-async docs point at the table rather than the export list. * feat(api): make v2 table PATCH state which operations landed on failure Greptile held the PR at 4/5 on the residual non-atomicity and named two acceptable resolutions: make PATCH atomic, or have the contract adopt and expose partial-success explicitly. Atomicity would mean threading one transaction through renameTable, moveTableToFolder and updateTableLocks — three shared service functions with four non-test callers including the first-party route and two copilot tools — and deferring their per-operation audits to commit time. That is a refactor of shared write paths well outside this PR. So the contract states it instead. Every rejectable condition is already pre-validated, so a failure here is a genuine fault; when one follows a successful operation the error now carries `details.applied` listing what is live. Absent when nothing applied, so its presence always means "these changes took effect despite the error". Documented on the operation. `v2ErrorForOrchestration` gained the optional `details` this needs. * fix(api): make table lock flags read-only on the public v2 surface The new PATCH /api/v2/tables/[tableId] accepted a `locks` object, gated on workspace admin plus the table-locks feature. That still lets an API key clear the guard placed there to stop it: `write` is the floor for the endpoint, and admin keys are ordinary API keys, so a lock is no longer a boundary the key cannot cross. Locks stay readable on the table resource and enforcement is unchanged (a locked verb still returns 423). Changing one is now a first-party admin action only. The v2 body is declared here rather than reusing the first-party updateTableBodySchema, which keeps its `locks` field so the UI can still toggle them. It is .strict(), so a request carrying `locks` is rejected with a 400 naming the field instead of silently succeeding without applying it. * fix(api): keep reporting applied operations when the PATCH re-read fails The composite table PATCH promises that `error.details.applied` names the operations that are live despite an error, but `applied` was scoped inside the try. A rename or move that committed and was then followed by a throw in the final re-read — or a re-read finding the table archived — returned a bare 500/404 with no details, telling the caller nothing had landed. It would then retry into a duplicate-name conflict or repeat the move. `applied` is now function-scoped so every post-write exit carries it: the 404 on a missing re-read, a thrown lock error, a classified orchestration error, and the generic 500. `v2TableLockError` gains the same `extraDetails` parameter `v2TableOrchestrationError` already had. * feat(api): add workflow group writes to the v2 tables surface v2 exposed GET /groups but none of the writes, so the public API could run an enrichment or workflow column and read its binding, but never create one. A caller could add a plain data column and trigger the machine; wiring the two together still required the UI. Adds POST/PATCH/DELETE on /api/v2/tables/[tableId]/groups. The group is the unit that fills columns — one group feeds several — so creating one creates its output columns in the same call, matching the first-party shape rather than inverting it onto the column endpoint. Four departures from the first-party body, all public-surface concerns: - group.id is optional and server-generated. The UI mints an id to render optimistically; a public caller has no such need and a client-chosen id is a collision waiting to happen. - outputColumns[].workflowGroupId is dropped from the body and stamped from the resolved group, so it cannot disagree with it. - autoRun defaults to false. First-party defaults true so a UI add fills cells immediately; here it would make one POST fan out a metered run across every existing row. - A group naming neither a workflowId (type manual) nor an enrichmentId (type enrichment) is a 400 rather than a half-specified group the route has to guess about. Also rejects an outputColumns entry no group output feeds — the two arrays are joined by column name, and the first-party client builds both from one picker so it cannot desync, but a public caller can. Workspace containment on workflowId is asserted before it is persisted, on create and on any update that re-points the group; without it a table becomes a way to invoke workflows the key cannot otherwise reach. * improvement(api): make v2 table import and export async-only Drops the three synchronous entry points: POST /tables/[tableId]/import, POST /tables/import-csv, and GET /tables/[tableId]/export. Sync import tied a write to the lifetime of an HTTP request. The body *was* the data, so it carried a 10 MB cap that Next silently truncates past — a partial import reporting success. It also had no job, so a timeout mid-write left rows in place with nothing to poll and nothing to cancel. The async path reads the file from storage instead: upload via POST /api/v2/files for a key, start with POST /import-async, watch GET /tables/[tableId] -> job, stop with POST /job/cancel. Sync export carried no such hazard, but one shape per operation beats two: with both removed the surface has exactly one way to move a table in or out, and the CLI wraps the extra calls. This also removes the last multipart handling in v2 tables. Those were the only routes bypassing parseRequest — form fields were parsed by hand against separate form schemas, outside the contract system every other v2 write goes through. Create-a-table-from-CSV is now two calls: POST /tables, then /import-async with createColumns. csvImportModeSchema is append|replace, so there is no single-call create. Route baseline 1064 -> 1061. * docs(api): correct the import-async note about upload size limits The docstring claimed there is no synchronous upload endpoint and so no request-body size cliff. Both are wrong: POST /api/v2/files is a synchronous multipart upload with a 100 MB cap, and it is the only v2 upload path (presigned is deliberately absent). What async-only actually bought: the cap went 10 MB -> 100 MB, it fails on an explicit size check and a bounded body read rather than a proxy cap that silently truncates, authorization completes before any body is buffered, and the table write is a job that can be watched and cancelled. * feat(api): unify file and table transfers * improvement(api): make multipart transfers stateless * fix(api): make table import completion retries idempotent * feat(v2-tables): paginate the table list `GET /api/v2/tables` returned every table in the workspace in one response — it used the cursor envelope but hardcoded `nextCursor: null`, and had no `limit`. That was defensible when tables were only created through the UI; `POST /api/v2/tables` is public now, so a script can create them in bulk and the list has no way to ask for less. Adds `queryTables` alongside `listTables` rather than changing it, so the internal callers that genuinely want the whole scope are untouched — the same split `queryWorkspaceFiles` / `listWorkspaceFiles` already uses. Filter, order and slice all run in the query, so a `search` never costs a full-workspace read. A cursor whose values don't bind raises a validation error instead of being coerced to "no filter", which would have silently served page 1 under a resumed cursor. The keyset closes on `id` so a page boundary inside a run of equal names or timestamps stays stable. The shared `LimitQuery` doc component said "Maximum rows to return"; it now serves the table list too, so the wording is resource-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): add multipart knowledge document uploads * fix(api): keep usage admission at knowledge upload session creation * feat(knowledge): wire knowledge base uploads to multipart sessions * fix(knowledge): refuse to abort an upload once a document is bound * fix(uploads): prevent multipart cleanup races * Unify file creation and signed upload sessions (#6264) * feat(uploads): unify signed upload sessions * fix(uploads): preserve attachment storage semantics * feat(files): add authored file creation * fix(uploads): omit hoisted S3 metadata headers * feat(api): add file metadata endpoint * improvement(api): scope folders to resource paths (#6284) * improvement(api): scope folders to resource paths * fix(files): serialize folder resolution with uploads * fix(files): release folder lock before upload setup * fix(api): normalize folder paths and unblock resource mutations * fix(api): make resource cleanup and metadata consistent * improvement(uploads): persist multipart sessions in postgres * fix(db): store table row trigger timestamps in UTC * improvement(api): default folder deletion to non-recursive * fix(billing): unify chat usage source * improvement(logs): expose trace spans on log detail * fix(logs): parse list trace spans * improvement(api): replace workflow jobs with execution resources (#6294) * improvement(api): replace workflow jobs with execution resources * fix(api): preserve legacy jobs while preferring v2 executions * fix(api): make execution polling resume-aware * fix(ui): hide async examples for public workflows * fix(api): bridge resume queue visibility lag * feat(api): add v2 workflow resume endpoint * fix(api): project pending resume attempts * fix(api): prefer terminal logs over stale resumes * improvement(api): unify v2 resource query layers (#6319) * improvement(api): unify v2 resource query layers * fix(api): address v2 review findings * fix(api): preserve cancelled queue status * fix(api): guard cancelled job transitions * fix(api): close v2 resume and log gaps * feat(api): rename v2 executions to runs * feat(api): split credentials and secrets * feat(api): add workspace metadata and email attribution * improvement(api): consolidate public v2 route handling * improvement(files): centralize operations across APIs and Copilot (#6392) * improvement(files): unify rename authorization * chore(skills): add file operation migration guide * improvement(files): consolidate file operation authorization * improvement(files): extract shared operation foundation * improvement(api): simplify internal route declarations * improvement(files): centralize application authorization * refactor(api): share workspace file name validation * refactor(files): centralize copilot application calls * docs(skills): generalize application operation migration * improvement(api): centralize remaining v2 resource operations (#6412) * improvement(api): centralize v2 resource operations * fix(api): preserve custom tool conflict errors * improvement(api): migrate policy-sensitive v2 reads (#6410) * improvement(workflows): centralize v2 application operations (#6411) * refactor(api): migrate v2 knowledge operations (#6413) * refactor(api): migrate v2 knowledge operations * fix(knowledge): fail upload completion on dispatch errors * fix(knowledge): preserve upload retry and VFS errors * improvement(tables): centralize v2 application operations (#6414) * improvement(tables): centralize v2 application operations * fix(tables): preserve run validation and signals * feat(auth): add scoped internal executor delegation (#6459) * feat(auth): add scoped internal executor delegation * fix(auth): derive delegation lifetime from one timestamp * Include share status in file metadata * feat(auth): centralize delegated identity policy (#6462) * improvement(copilot): consolidate application adapters (#6450) * improvement(api): harden application route boundaries (#6451) * improvement(api): harden application route boundaries * fix(folders): reject creates at workspace cap * fix(knowledge): enforce trusted workspace scope (#6452) * fix(knowledge): enforce trusted workspace scope * refactor(knowledge): declare v2 body lifecycle * finish knowledge application migration * refactor(knowledge): compose copilot batch commands * fix(knowledge): parse connector query flags * fix(knowledge): finalize partial batch effects * fix(knowledge): align merged application boundaries * fix(knowledge): close application boundary review gaps * style(knowledge): satisfy branch biome checks * fix(knowledge): page connector documents in editor * refactor: enforce Copilot table application boundary (#6453) * refactor: enforce copilot table application boundary * fix(tables): finish application boundary migration * fix(tables): restore scoped copilot imports * fix(tables): compose copilot commands atomically * fix(tables): preserve workflow group scheduling * fix(tables): complete fixed copilot composition * fix(tables): reject enrichment output mutation * fix(tables): complete authorized application boundary * fix(workflows): migrate Copilot application boundary (#6455) * fix(workflows): migrate Copilot application boundary * fix(workflows): finish delegated application migration * fix(workflows): encode VFS folder aliases * fix(workflows): close application composition gaps * fix(workflows): preserve VFS validation errors * fix(workflows): complete application boundary migration * test(workflows): format canonical binding coverage * fix(workflows): scope executor metadata reads * fix(workflows): bind executor metadata targets * improvement(skills): align application operation guidance (#6532) * feat(api): expose v2 resource owners * fix(api): distinguish visible resource authorization failures (#6537) * feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts (#6509) * feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts * fix(api): preserve string boolean wire defaults * fix(api): document file download headers * fix(docs): use TypeScript CLI with Next.js * fix(docs): avoid client-rendered theme script * fix(api): document departed audit default * feat(api): replace legacy core docs with v2 * feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts * feat(api): refine generated v2 OpenAPI docs * fix(docs): align localized v2 execution examples * fix(ci): restore Helm diff and sync audit mock * fix CI regressions after staging merge --------- Co-authored-by: Waleed <walif6@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theodoreqili@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Siddharth Ganesan <33737564+Sg312@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Waleed
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2f43148d60 |
improvement(ui): align terminal with the workflow design system, fix row hover states (#6534)
* improvement(ui): align terminal with the workflow design system, fix row hover states Terminal: - derive log-row block tiles the way the canvas does (role accent for core blocks and subflows, provider colour only for role-less integrations) - compose rows from chipGeometryClass, chipContentLabelClass and disclosureChevronClass instead of re-deriving the pill - align the output tree's greys with the log rows; share ROW_STYLES.nested and BADGE_STYLE instead of duplicating the literals - neutralise value-type badges so red is the only colour in the tree - unify the row/separator gutter; normalise icon sizes to size-[14px] - drop dead flattenEntryTree and the RunningBadge re-exports Hover model (chipVariants, PopoverItem, Combobox, docs sidebar, terminal): - hover paints --surface-hover, one step below the --surface-active a selected row keeps, so a hovered row no longer impersonates the selected one - an active row holds its surface through hover instead of brightening Deploy modal: - move the footer actions onto the Chip family, primary action as Chip variant='primary' to match every other modal footer * improvement(emcn): extract the row-state surface pair, simplify the terminal rows Review follow-ups from /simplify and /cleanup: - add chipHoverSurfaceClass / chipActiveSurfaceClass to chip-chrome as the one home for the two-surface row model, and route chipVariants, PopoverItem, Combobox, the docs sidebar, the landing preview and queued messages through them instead of restating the literals - terminal ROW_STYLES now renders chipVariants rather than re-deriving its output, and the four rows share content/label/status classes resolved once - structured-output composes chipGeometryClass with an h-auto override rather than restating four of its literals - getEntryAccentType collapses to one expression, dropping the SYNTHETIC_BLOCK types coupling - collapse the chip compound variants to two array-matched entries - deploy modal: hoist the shared loader adornment, size it with chipContentIconClass so it matches every other chip icon - landing preview drops its --c-active/--c-hover inline aliases for the tokens - trim the rationale to one canonical copy with cross-references, and convert the block comments on declarations to TSDoc * improvement(workflow): align canvas controls with the canvas surface and icon scale - floating controls sit on --surface-2, the surface the block cards use, rather than --surface-1 (the sidebar/panel surface) - undo/redo/fit glyphs drop 16px -> the platform's 14px default, and the mode dropdown's own 12px icons come up to match; the control had three icon sizes - inactive buttons hover to --surface-hover instead of --surface-5, which was the active mode button's resting fill, so hovering one looked selected - inner radius goes concentric with the 4px padding (rounded-sm inside rounded-lg) * improvement(workflow): give the canvas-mode chevron the same treatment as its siblings It was the only control in the cluster with no hover fill and a different rest colour (--text-muted against the others' --text-secondary), so it read fainter and behaved differently under the pointer. It is also a disclosure chevron, so it now uses disclosureChevronClass instead of a hand-rolled duration-100 copy, and a real 20px box instead of the !p-1.5 override plus -m-1 hit-area hack. * test(terminal): lock the log-row accent rule against the block toolbar getEntryAccentType encodes a cross-surface rule — a block must be accented the same way in the terminal as in the block toolbar — and nothing enforced it. The table covers every branch: core blocks mapped and unmapped, role-bearing and role-less integrations and triggers, the config-less subflows, and the synthesized error/validation/cancelled rows that must keep their status fill. Verified failing: reverting the guard to an unconditional return reds two of the four cases. * fix(workflow): make notifications track panel and terminal resize live The toast stack insets by --panel-width / --terminal-height, but a resize drag writes those to the resized subtree only (.panel-container / .terminal-container) rather than to :root, because a custom-property write on :root recalculates the whole document (~150x slower). The stack is portalled to <body>, so it shares no ancestor with either and kept reading the stale :root value — it held its pre-drag position and jumped once the drag committed, while the canvas controls, which are laid out inside the shrinking canvas, tracked the drag in realtime. useDragResize now accepts several target subtrees and writes each one, so the scoped recalc is preserved and every consumer follows the drag frame by frame. The stack is found through a new data-toast-viewport attribute. Also drops the canvas controls from bottom-4 to bottom-2: the toast clears the terminal by 8px (it anchors from the viewport, and the terminal is inset by CONTENT_WINDOW_GAP), where the controls measure from the canvas floor and so sat at twice the gap. * improvement(workflow): inset the canvas controls 8px off both edges The toast stack clears the terminal and the panel by 8px — it anchors from the viewport at --terminal-height/--panel-width + 16px, and both are themselves inset by CONTENT_WINDOW_GAP (8px). The controls measure from the canvas floor and wall instead, so their 16px read as twice the gap on both axes. * improvement(workflow): lift the canvas controls and toasts to a 12px clearance 8px sat them too close to the terminal. 12 is on the same 4px grid as the surrounding spacing, where 10 would have been the only off-grid value in the area. Both surfaces clear the terminal and the panel by the same amount, so they read as one row; the toast's literals move into named insets rather than staying bare numbers in a style object. * refactor(hooks): split the drag's resize target from its other var consumers getTarget briefly accepted a list, which made the first entry both the resized element and the drag's liveness reference. A toast auto-dismisses after 5s, so had one ever led that list, its mid-drag unmount would have read as the drag target detaching and skipped the final recompute on release. The co-consumers now come through getExtraTargets, which is written but never consulted for liveness, and can come and go freely. * fix(emcn): stop the combobox cursor diverging from what Enter commits The option rows painted --surface-active from CSS :hover as well as from isHighlighted. CSS :hover tracks the pointer continuously while highlightedIndex only advances on mouseenter, so once the list scrolled under a stationary pointer the row that looked selected was not the one Enter would commit — Enter reads filteredOptions[highlightedIndex]. isHighlighted is now the single source of truth for the cursor, so paint and commit cannot disagree. The row under a stationary pointer may lag a scroll until the mouse moves, but it lags in agreement with what Enter will do, which is the invariant worth keeping. Disabled options also stop painting on hover, matching the mouseenter guard that already refused to highlight them. The 'All' row keeps its own hover: it clears the highlight rather than taking it, so it has no isHighlighted paint to fall back on. * fix(toast): derive the workflow inset from the shell's actual padding WORKFLOW_INSET_PX baked in the 8px the workspace shell normally insets the panel and terminal by, so the stack's 20px resolved to a 12px clearance — matching the canvas controls. But the shell drops to p-0 on the desktop title-bar shell with a collapsed sidebar, and there the stack would have sat 20px out while the controls, laid out inside the shell, stayed at 12. The stack now adds --workspace-content-gap (published on :root, zeroed by the same condition that zeroes the padding) to a flat 12, so the two surfaces hold the same clearance in both configurations. Before this PR they matched in the p-0 case at 16px each, so this closes a divergence the PR would otherwise have introduced. |
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Waleed
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a64ce49af9 |
feat(incidentio): add on-call, alert, catalog, and team tools (#6529)
* feat(incidentio): add on-call, alert, catalog, and team tools
Adds 19 tools to the incident.io block, taking it from 46 to 65
operations. Every endpoint, param, and response field is taken from the
official OpenAPI spec at api.incident.io/v1/openapiV3.json.
Who is on call had no reachable answer before: the data lives in
ScheduleV2.current_shifts, and both schedules_list and schedules_show
returned it but never declared it. The new incidentio_on_call_now tool
flattens current and upcoming shifts to one row per person, and the two
existing schedule tools now declare the fields they were already
returning.
Also fixes two pre-existing wiring bugs: the block declared an output
named schedule_override while the tool emits override, and the on-call
handoff skill described a lookup the integration could not perform.
* fix(incidentio): stop the alert filter sentinel reaching the API
The has_notes and include_maintenance_window dropdowns default to the
string "any", meaning "do not filter". The params transform skipped the
key in that case, but the executor merges its output over the raw inputs
(`{ ...inputs, ...transformedParams }`), so the sentinel survived and the
tool sent has_notes[is]=any, which incident.io rejects.
The transform now always assigns the key, mapping "any" to undefined so
it overwrites the sentinel instead of leaving it in place. The tool also
only serializes these filters when it actually has a boolean.
Adds tests covering the sentinel, both real boolean values, and the
documented bracket-operator filter syntax.
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Theodore Li
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5478a690cc | improvement(setup): complete knowledge and update flows (#6521) |