mirror of
https://github.com/simstudioai/sim.git
synced 2026-09-24 15:45:35 +08:00
3ff91f04392a157bed024a88e2d92001c00ea708
520
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Waleed
|
1c69372cba |
feat(cli): follow a run, wait for one, and tail the log (#6813)
* feat(cli): follow a run, wait for one, and tail the log Three commands the surface was missing, each polling or streaming something the generated command layer cannot express. `workflows run --follow` renders the SSE the execute route already emits, so a multi-minute agent run stops printing nothing until it ends. It rides on the generated `run` leaf rather than a sibling command — same operation, one different response encoding — and delegates to the handler it replaced, so every non-follow invocation still runs the generated path. Answer text, thinking and tool calls go to stderr; only the final envelope reaches stdout, so redirecting still yields the result. Reasoning and tool frames need the `X-Sim-Stream-Protocol` header, which is sent only when asked for, because negotiating also switches answer text to live chunks the server may retract. `workflows runs wait` closes the loop `--async` opens. Terminal is completed, failed or cancelled; `redacting` is not, since a run whose output is still being scrubbed is not yet a run you can read. A time pause keeps polling because the server resumes it, and a human pause stops with the resume command rather than burning the bound and calling it a timeout. Distinct exit codes keep cancelled and paused from reading as failure. The bound is `--wait-timeout` and not `--timeout`, because SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS already bounds one request and two knobs of the same name hide each other. `logs follow` tails runs as they arrive. Dedup keys on run id, not on the timestamp: a schedule fan-out starts many runs in the same millisecond, so a timestamp watermark either drops the siblings or reprints them. JSON output is one object per line, because a follow never closes an array, and the table header is printed once so columns stay aligned across polls. * fix(cli): disclose a truncated burst, and clear a stale retry notice Two review findings in `logs follow`, both verified against the code first. The page budget bounds one poll so an enormous burst cannot stall the follow, but on reaching it the live cursor was discarded: the remainder is older than everything collected and the next poll restarts at the newest page, so those runs were never printed and nothing said so. The budget stays — draining without one trades a bounded poll for unbounded buffering in a process meant to run for hours — but hitting it now warns on stderr, naming the count and pointing at `sim logs list`. That notice is written even off a terminal, because a piped log is where an unexplained hole is hardest to spot. The retry notice was cleared after the empty-rows check, so a poll that recovered but found nothing left "retrying in Ns…" on screen while the follow was already healthy. Clearing now happens as soon as a poll succeeds. The second test needed two failures to be worth anything: the teardown clears the line either way, so what separates fixed from broken is whether a bare erase lands before the second notice or only at the end. The first version passed against the bug. * test(cli): pin that a mixed page is the watermark, not a truncation A page holding a run already printed proves the follow caught up, so the truncation warning must not fire there — that is how every healthy poll terminates, and warning would report a hole on the ordinary path. The straggler sharing that page is still collected, because the filter takes every unprinted row on it rather than only those above the known one. * fix(cli): say when the requested backlog was larger than a page holds The logs API clamps `limit` into 1–1000 rather than rejecting it, so `logs follow -n 5000` came back with 1000 rows, anchored the floor to that partial page, and said nothing. The seed already knew — it computes whether a live cursor remained — but the caller discarded the answer. Guarded on both halves. Fewer rows than asked for is only a shortfall when more were waiting: a workspace holding ten runs answers `-n 50` with ten and nothing is missing, so warning on the row count alone would fire on every small workspace. The cursor is what separates the two. |
||
|
Waleed
|
51f1d45eff |
perf(table): collapse sequential round trips on the table read and write paths (#6808)
* test(table): characterize the single-row route before migrating it
The single-row surface (GET/PATCH/DELETE) had no route-level tests despite
being the hottest table write path. Pin the behavior it emits today so the
migration onto the shared internal route builder is verifiable rather than
hopeful.
Covers status codes, body shapes, ISO-8601 timestamp serialization, the
access level each method demands, collaborator invocation, and the
dual-caller wire keying — session callers pass column ids through untouched
while internal-JWT callers translate names to ids in both directions.
Verified to fail: mutating the wire translator, the deleted count, and the
workspace-ownership guard each turn the corresponding tests red.
* feat(table): model wire keying and actor attribution on row write use cases
The row write use cases assumed every caller speaks column names. That holds
for /api/v2, /api/v1 and the Copilot tools, but not for the first-party grid
or the internal /api/table routes, which address cells by stable storage id.
Feeding id-keyed data through the name remap drops every key it does not
recognise — a storage id names no column name — so the write would store
nothing and still report success.
Make the wire an explicit, required property of the input rather than an
assumption. `dataKeying: 'names' | 'ids'` sits alongside `strictWrite` and is
required for the same reason: a new write surface must state which contract it
publishes. Strictness now means the same thing on either wire — an unknown
column id is refused exactly as an unknown column name already was.
Single-row writes also gain optional actor attribution, so the acting tab can
skip refetching its own write. It is optional and absent by default, so every
existing caller keeps broadcasting to all subscribers as before. Only the
single-row create, update and delete paths accept it; a batch write is not
reconciled locally by the actor and must still refetch.
The attribution pin moves with the behaviour: what selects the actor-scoped
signal is no longer which file calls it but which surface supplies an actor,
so that is now what the test pins.
Verified to fail: ignoring the keying discriminator, and dropping actor
attribution, each turn the corresponding tests red.
* perf(table): remove two round trips from every single-row update
A single-cell PATCH spends far more time in sequential round trips to a remote
Postgres than in the UPDATE it issues. Prepared statements are disabled for
PgBouncer transaction mode, so every await is a full Parse/Bind/Execute.
Two of them were avoidable.
getRowById issued the row lookup and its executions sidecar in series, but the
sidecar is keyed on the row id the caller already supplied, so it never
depended on the lookup. Issuing both together makes it one round trip. A miss
now pays one redundant sidecar read, which is the rare path and costs no extra
wall time.
The uniqueness probe ran whenever the table had any unique column, passing the
fully merged row, so editing an unrelated cell re-probed every unique column —
its own transaction plus one query per column. It is now scoped to the columns
the patch actually writes. A merge cannot newly violate uniqueness on a column
it leaves alone: that value is the one already stored, and it satisfied the
constraint when it was written.
Sized before changing: few tables declare a unique column, but write traffic
concentrates in the ones that do, so this is the larger of the two savings in
practice.
Verified to fail: reverting the probe scoping turns the covering test red.
* perf(table): start the workspace load with the table load when a workspace is asserted
resolveActiveTableContext ran two sequential round trips: load the table,
then load the workspace it turned out to live in. When the caller asserts a
workspace the second input is already in hand, so both can start together.
What makes that safe is unchanged: requireTable still compares the table's
canonical workspaceId against the assertion and reports a mismatch as
not_found. The table outcome is inspected first and unconditionally, so any
path that returns has proven the assertion equal to the canonical id, and a
failing workspace load can never replace the concealing not_found. A final
identity check on the loaded context restates the invariant at the point of
return, so even with the first check removed the function cannot hand back a
foreign workspace. Promise.allSettled keeps the discarded branch from
surfacing as an unhandled rejection.
With no asserted workspace the path stays sequential — the table load is what
reveals which workspace to load, so there is nothing to start early.
One existing assertion changed: it required the workspace load not to have
been issued yet on a mismatched assertion, which is internal sequencing rather
than caller-observable behaviour and is definitionally untrue once the loads
overlap. The observable half is kept, and two timing tests now cover the
sequencing directly.
Verified to fail: removing either mismatch check, reading the workspace
outcome first, and swapping allSettled for bare awaits each turn the
corresponding tests red.
* perf(table): read a table and its latest job in one round trip
getTableById issued the table SELECT and then awaited latestJobForTable, so
every table request paid two sequential round trips. With prepared statements
disabled for PgBouncer transaction mode every await is a full round trip, and
this loader is on essentially every table route.
The job read cannot be skipped: a table's reported rowCount is the stored
count minus the job's pendingDeleteRemaining, so dropping it would overstate
the count during a pending delete and could wrongly reject inserts as over
capacity. An opt-out flag would have made that a caller's trap. Instead the
job is read in the same statement, as a correlated jsonb subquery in the
select list — the select-list form of a LEFT JOIN LATERAL, which is what
drizzle can type here. Output is unchanged for every input.
latestJobForTable is deleted rather than left dangling: getTableById was its
only caller, and keeping it would have carried a third copy of the
exports-excluded / newest-started_at / limit-one rule. mapJobRow is now
exported so the batch path and the lateral share one implementation of the
doomedCount and pendingDeleteRemaining logic. The batch DISTINCT ON path used
by the list endpoint is untouched.
Verified to fail: dropping the export filter, reversing or re-keying the sort,
dropping the limit, dropping the correlation, loosening either doomedCount
condition, and removing the rowCount subtraction each turn tests red. Dropping
the lateral from the projection initially survived, because the shared db mock
returns queued rows regardless of predicate; a projection assertion now
covers it.
* chore(table): drop the unused single-row GET contract
Authored as groundwork for migrating the internal row routes onto the shared
builder, which is not in this change. An exported contract nothing consumes is
dead code, so it lands with the migration that needs it instead.
* fix(table): resolve strict id-keyed columns through getColumnId
assertKnownColumnIds read column.id directly, but a column id is optional —
pre-backfill columns have none and are stored under their name, which is why
getColumnId exists and is what every other consumer of the schema uses. Such columns still
exist, so a strict id-keyed write naming one would have been refused as
unknown.
Latent today: no surface yet combines dataKeying 'ids' with strictWrite. Fixed
before one does.
Verified to fail: reading column.id turns the covering test red.
* refactor(table): apply review findings from the quality pass
Four parallel reviews (reuse, simplification, efficiency, altitude) converged
on the same set. Applied:
Removed actorClientId entirely. It had no supplier anywhere in the repo, so
every call reached signalTableRowsChangedByActor(id, undefined), which is
byte-identical to the broadcast it replaced — three optional fields, three
verbatim doc blocks and a pin test asserting the empty set, all inert. It
belongs with the route migration that supplies an actor. The attribution pin
is restored to its original form.
The uniqueness probe was only half-narrowed: the patched column list was
computed and then discarded, and the probe re-derived every unique column from
the full schema. It now receives only the columns the patch touched, so a
table with several unique columns runs one query instead of all of them.
assertKnownColumnIds hand-rolled an id index and duplicated the sibling
assert's message verbatim. It now reuses buildColumnNameById — which already
keys by getColumnId, so the legacy pre-backfill column case is handled by the
shared helper rather than by a special case here — and both asserts share one
message builder.
The job field list had become two copies, one drizzle-checked and one an
unchecked sql<T> cast that could silently return undefined for a renamed
field. The lateral now derives its jsonb pairs from JOB_PROJECTION, which
satisfies Record<keyof LatestJobRow, Column>. That compile-time guarantee
replaces the runtime drift test it makes redundant.
Also: hoisted the id index out of the batch loop to match the names path,
dropped a never-supplied parameter, narrowed an over-broad parameter type,
removed a dead timer cleanup and its now-unused import, replaced dynamic
re-imports with the static one already present, hoisted a repeated stub, and
documented why filters need no keying counterpart and how laxness differs
between the two wires.
Verified to fail: removing a field from JOB_PROJECTION breaks the build in two
places.
* test(table): share one table-definition fixture factory
buildTable was copy-pasted into 13 route test files under app/api/table, each
a near-identical TableDefinition literal. A required field added to that type
would have failed 13 files individually.
packages/testing already owned createTableColumn and createTableRow but no
definition factory, and — as it turns out — did not export any of them from
the barrel, so they were unreachable from @sim/testing. Adds
createTableDefinition beside them and exports all three.
The fixture type is a structural stand-in rather than TableDefinition itself,
because packages/* must not import from apps/* — the same approach the
existing factories in that file already take.
No assertion changed. Call sites that varied a field pass it as an override;
the four files with several call sites hoist a shared options const and spread
it so each call still gets a fresh object.
* perf(table): project only the job field the row count needs
Both job reads selected the whole payload jsonb, but mapJobRow reads exactly
one number out of it, and only for a running delete. The payload also carries
the delete job's filter and an unbounded excludeRowIds array, and the latest
non-export job is read on essentially every table request — a table that once
ran a large delete would ship that id list on every read, forever.
LatestJobRow.payload becomes doomedCount, extracted in SQL. Both readers share
JOB_PROJECTION so one edit reaches the batch DISTINCT ON and the correlated
subquery alike; the compile-time constraint widens to Column | SQL rather than
being dropped.
Behaviour is identical. `->` keeps the value jsonb, which postgres-js decodes
through its built-in JSON.parse handler, so it arrives as a number with no
boundary coercion. A null payload, a payload without the key, a non-object
payload and an explicit JSON null all collapse to the same `?? 0` the previous
optional chain produced.
Sized honestly before claiming a win: payloads are small in practice today, so
this is defensive rather than impactful — it removes an unbounded growth path,
not a measured cost.
Verified against a real Postgres, not just the mocked driver: the
generated correlated subquery returns doomedCount 12 for a delete job, null
for an import job, and a null row for a table with no job.
Also from the review pass: re-homes the strictWrite explanation onto
rowWriteOptions, where six {@link} references now point; records why
replaceProjectedWireRows carries no keying discriminator; notes the one case
the uniqueness-narrowing invariant does not cover; pins the lax id-wire
passthrough with a test; and renames a parameter that misled once only its
keys were read.
* chore(table): drop two comments the code already says
One restated the identifier below it (checkUniqueConstraintsDb), and one was a
section-divider banner in the factories barrel, which the repo's comment
convention rules out. Everything else that survives is a why the code cannot
express: round-trip rationale, sql.raw input safety, the narrowing invariant
and the one case it does not cover.
* refactor(table): move the internal row routes onto the application boundary (#6809)
* refactor(table): move the single-row route onto the application boundary
The hottest table write path authorized in its own handler and queried the
database from the adapter — the two things a surface adapter must never do. It
now declares itself with defineInternalJsonRoute against the readRow, updateRow
and deleteRow use cases: 127 lines instead of 274, with no db import, no
drizzle import and no checkAccess.
Doing that surfaced why the violation existed. Write-provenance resolution
needs the canonical schema to map a caller's column key to the storage column
it certifies, and the adapter could only do that because it was already loading
the table illegally. The envelope is now split along the real seam: the adapter
reads the header and payload field, which is transport, and the use case
resolves the selections against the canonical table, which is domain.
That split has to preserve a distinction the defaulting logic would erase. An
internal caller that sends no envelope stays deliberately untracked; defaulting
it to an exact-empty stamp would certify "this write introduced no secrets" on
a runtime write that may well have introduced some. Only an interactive caller
certifies exact-empty, over the storage columns its write actually persists.
Two further changes fell out of it:
present() now receives the same { principal, input } pair its sibling hooks
responseHeaders and finalizeResponse already got. This route serves a session
and a workflow execution on one path and owes them different column keyings, so
rendering per caller kind is presentation rather than domain. That was a gap in
the builder, not a special case for this route.
tableRowWireSchema describes what the single-row routes actually return. The
contract claimed a full TableRow, carrying the executions sidecar and Date
objects — true of the list and query routes, and never true here. The hand-
rolled handler was never checked against its own contract, so the drift was
invisible until the builder started validating it.
Wire changes, both deliberate and both narrower than before: a cross-tenant
table now conceals as 404 where the old blanket handler answered 403, while an
in-workspace role denial still answers 403. Nothing in hooks/queries/tables.ts
branches on either.
Verified to fail: forcing one keying, dropping the actor, pre-resolving the
envelope, certifying an untracked internal write, and skipping the bundle
completeness check each turn the covering tests red.
* refactor(table): move the upsert route onto the application boundary
Same shape as the single-row route: declares itself against upsertTableRow,
hands the provenance envelope over unresolved, and derives its column keying
from the principal rather than assuming one.
The keying and presentation helpers the two routes shared are now in row-wire
beside the translators they wrap, so a third route does not restate them.
Two response details changed on purpose. The row now carries `position`, which
the use case always had and this route alone omitted — every other single-row
response already returned it, and the contract now describes one shape instead
of three. The upsert result also carries read-back provenance, which the route
previously assembled for itself.
The surface had no route-level tests; it has six now, covering both caller
keyings, both operations, and the envelope handover.
* refactor(table): move the enrichment-detail route onto the application boundary
The last internal adapter that queried the database for itself. It now runs
through readTableRowEnrichmentDetail, a new use case that shares
tableOperations.readRow — reading a cell's cascade breakdown is a projection of
the same row under the same role, not a second semantic operation.
Its tests move to the same seam and gain one the old suite could not express:
a cross-tenant table now conceals rather than confirming it exists.
* fix(table): mirror the storage rule when keying write provenance
storageKeyByWireKey mapped an unrecognised id-keyed key to null, but
rowDataToStorage persists that key when the caller is not writing strictly. A
cell would have been written with no provenance recorded, under a stamp still
marked complete — the same failure the bundle completeness check exists to
prevent, arriving through the keying map instead of the selection set.
The two wires genuinely differ and the code now says so: the name path drops an
unrecognised key, so it maps to null; the id path stores what it is given, so
every key it sends is a storage key.
Unreachable today, since no delegated surface uses id keying and a session
bundle is refused earlier. Fixed because the function's stated invariant — that
it mirrors how the row data itself is normalized — was not true.
Also corrects the delegated principal fixture in these tests, which used a kind
that is not in the Principal union, so the subject-id branch was never actually
exercised. It is now, and the scope check is asserted to receive the acting
principal's own subject id.
Verified to fail: restoring the schema-based lookup turns the covering test red.
* fix(table): restore executor access to the migrated row routes
The migration swapped checkSessionOrInternalAuth for the delegation policy,
and that broke every Table block call to these endpoints in two ways at once.
The old policy accepted a legacy internal token. The new one requires a
delegation token, which the executor only mints when the tool asks for it —
and none of the four table row tools did, so get/update/delete/upsert row
would each have failed with a 401. The knowledge tools already declare it,
because their routes migrated first.
Even with a valid token the operations denied the caller: readRow, updateRow,
deleteRow and upsertRow ran under a policy whose delegatedServices is
['copilot'], so the executor got a 403. They now use the tool-facing policy
that already existed for the group operations.
Neither was visible to the route tests, which mock the auth policy wholesale —
so the gap is closed at the layer that actually decides: one test pinning that
each tool requests delegation and that its operation admits the executor,
mutation-verified against both failure modes.
Also fixes findings from the review pass: the read surfaces no longer load an
executions sidecar none of them put on the wire (two readers rather than a
flag, so a caller cannot silently read an empty one); the provenance name
index is built once per batch instead of once per row; the uniqueness comment
now names the concurrent-insert race as well as the retro-added constraint;
and the presenter context gets NoInfer plus a note that the v2 builder passes
something different.
* fix(table): keep the lock on a 423 and pin the remaining wire changes
The rows error policy was built on the concealment base rather than the
lock-aware one, so a TableLockedError fell through to the generic handler and
the response lost its `lock` field — the only thing that tells a client which
lock to clear. A row write is exactly as lockable as a group mutation, so it
now shares that base.
Also pins the two wire changes the review found undocumented: a mismatched
workspace assertion answers 404 rather than 400, which is a superset of the
cross-tenant concealment already intended, and an unclassified failure answers
the builder's shared "Internal server error" rather than the old per-route
text. Both are consistent with the ~80 routes already on this builder; they are
asserted so they read as decisions rather than drift.
Verified to fail: reverting the policy base turns the lock test red.
* refactor(table): apply the quality pass
Four parallel reviews (reuse, simplification, efficiency, altitude). The
highest-value finding cut against the branch's own purpose: the rows error
policy sat in the barrel-exported route-policies module, so its import of the
1,200-line row use-case graph was paid by every one of the ~28 table routes
that can never throw a row error — the barrel's import cost went from ~1.1s to
~1.7s. row-route-policies.ts already existed for exactly this and is
deliberately not re-exported; the policy now lives there with its v2 sibling.
The upsert path still loaded an executions sidecar no surface puts on the wire,
and did it inside the write transaction, holding it open for a discarded
result. The read path got that fix earlier; the write path next to it did not.
rowKeyingForPrincipal fell through to name keying for anything that was not a
session. The operation policy admits API-key principals, so the first one to
reach these routes would have had every id-keyed cell dropped and the write
reported as successful. It is now an exhaustive switch over the two kinds the
auth policy yields — which immediately failed three tests using a principal
kind that exists nowhere in the repo, so those fixtures are real now too.
Also: reuses toWireTimestamp and createUnknownTableRowSecretProvenance instead
of re-inlining them; shares one helper for the provenance choice the update and
upsert use cases both make; keeps one canonical actorClientId doc with two
cross-references; merges two maps keyed by the same string into one; stops
round-tripping the principal through the legacy AuthType enum; hoists the
presenter function type out of both conditional branches; drops a subsumed
test; and freezes the shared locks fixture so a mutating test cannot poison its
siblings.
|
||
|
Waleed
|
0e84e92d39 |
fix(cli): bound, trace, and explain the requests the CLI makes (#6798)
* fix(cli): bound, trace, and explain the requests the CLI makes Four transport gaps, all of which failed silently. A request had no timeout, so a connection that was accepted and then never answered hung the terminal indefinitely. `SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` now bounds one, defaulting to 3600s — deliberately above every timeout the server itself applies, since a synchronous workflow run is allowed 3000s on a paid plan and a tighter default would abort real work and report it as a transport failure. `0` removes the bound, for a self-hosted deployment that runs executions without one of its own. The caller's abort signal is composed with the timeout rather than replaced, so neither masks the other. Node ignores HTTP(S)_PROXY unless NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY opts in, and only from v22.21 and v24.5, so on a network that reaches the API only through a proxy every command failed to connect while the variable that would have fixed it was already set. The CLI cannot enable that from inside the process — Node reads it at startup — so it says what to do rather than bundling an HTTP stack for a setting the platform now owns. An API key was sent to any http:// endpoint with no signal. Now a warning, not a refusal: http is the documented way to reach a local dev server, and a deployment terminating TLS at a gateway is real. Loopback stays silent. `SIM_DEBUG=1` traces method, URL, status and duration. Bodies and headers are deliberately absent — the request carries the API key, and `secrets set` carries the secret itself. All four write to stderr, so a piped stdout stays parseable. * fix(cli): make the request bound safe on every runtime it supports Two ways the new timeout could fail before the request was made. `AbortSignal.any` arrived in Node 20.3 and this package supports Node 20, so composing a caller's abort signal with the timeout threw a bare TypeError on the earliest 20.x releases. It is now used when present and composed through an AbortController when not. `AbortSignal.timeout` rejects a fractional millisecond outright, and past 2^31-1 ms it does not fail at all — it clamps to 1ms, so the longest timeout anyone asked for became the shortest. The value is now rounded and refused above what Node can actually wait, pointing at 0 for an unbounded wait. Also unstubs env vars between tests: `stubEnv` is not undone by `unstubAllGlobals`, so a SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS set for one test configured every test after it. * fix(cli): correct the proxy version table, and classify a timeout mid-body `runtimeCanProxy` treated any release between 22 and 24 as capable, so on Node 23 — which reached end of life before the backport — a configured proxy was ignored and the CLI stayed silent about it, which is the exact failure the warning exists to report. The table is now the two lines that shipped the support, and anything after them. `AbortSignal.timeout` keeps firing after `fetch` resolves, so a bound that elapsed while the body was still being read — a large `files get` — escaped the client's own handling and printed a raw TimeoutError stack. The top-level handler now names it, which covers the streaming path as well as the JSON one. A user's own Ctrl-C raises AbortError and is deliberately left alone. * fix(cli): report a timed-out download as a timeout `files get --output-file` streams the body to disk, and `streamToFile` converted anything the stream threw into a write failure. So a request bound elapsing mid-download read as `Could not write <path>: ...`, sending the reader to check permissions and free space for a timeout they can raise, and hiding the one instruction that resolves it. The predicate and that instruction now live beside the timeout that raises them, so the client, the top-level handler and the download path all say the same thing. The wrapping stays where it is: the staged-download cleanup runs off that failure, and rethrowing past it would leak the temporary directory. * fix(cli): keep a sub-millisecond timeout bounded Zero is how this function says "no bound", so rounding a positive SIM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS down to zero inverted the request: anything under 0.0005s asked for the shortest possible timeout and got none at all, leaving a stalled request to hang. Introduced by the rounding that fixed the fractional-millisecond rejection. Floored at 1ms for every positive value; only a literal 0 still disables. |
||
|
Waleed
|
0b4d34137b |
feat(secrets): add optional descriptions to workspace secrets (#6796)
* feat(secrets): add optional descriptions to workspace secrets Workspace secrets already have a backing credential row with a description column, but nothing surfaced it. Teammates had no way to record what a secret is for. - Add a Description field to the secret detail page, matching the integrations credential page, gated on workspace-secret admin - Fold the value and description editors into one Save/Discard pair and one unsaved-changes guard; two guards cannot coexist, since each seeds its own same-URL history entry - Match descriptions in the secrets settings search - Expose description on GET/PUT /api/v2/secrets and in the CLI Descriptions are workspace-only: env_personal credential rows are per-workspace mirrors of one user-global secret, so one saved there would exist in a single workspace, and a personal secret has no teammates to inform. The API rejects a description on personal scope rather than silently dropping it, and omitting it on PUT leaves any existing description untouched so a value rotation cannot erase it. * fix(secrets): address review findings on secret descriptions - Patch the credential detail cache optimistically on update. `onMutate` cancelled the detail query but only patched the lists, so a detail-backed editor stayed dirty after a successful save until the refetch landed — long enough for Discard to restore the pre-save value over the committed one, and for Back to open the unsaved-changes guard. - Memoize `useSecretValue`'s returned callbacks and object, per the hook convention, so the composed form's save/discard stop churning per render. - Reject a description on a personal secret in the domain layer rather than only at the v2 boundary. The internal credential update path accepted one for any type, writing data every reader hides. - Normalize an empty description to null so the API and UI agree. - Correct the secrets documentation, which described a Display Name field the detail view does not have and omitted the scope rule. - Drop the CLI's copy of the 500-character bound; it can't import the contract, so a copy only drifts from the message the API already returns. - Collapse a redundant save guard and align the description write gate with the render gate. Leaves the integrations credential page byte-identical to staging. * fix(secrets): keep the API docs example and CLI column order stable Backward-compatibility fixes for anyone who never sets a description. - Move the blank-to-null normalization out of the contract and into the route. A Zod `.transform()` on any property drops the whole request schema's OpenAPI examples, which had silently removed the Set Secret request example from the published docs. - Append the CLI `description` column instead of inserting it before `updated`. `--output text` is positional, so inserting would shift every field an existing script cuts. - Reject a description on a personal secret with a message that says so, rather than dropping the field and falling through to the generic "no updatable fields" error. |
||
|
Waleed
|
3abac09dc3 |
fix(cli): name SIM_CONFIG_DIR in help, and fix the similarity score width (#6795)
Two loose ends from the command-surface audit. `--help` stated where the profile files live and named only `~/.sim`, so it was wrong for anyone who had set `SIM_CONFIG_DIR` — which every CI job pointing the CLI at a scratch directory has. The variable is documented in the README and the guides; help was the one place that omitted it. `knowledge search` printed the raw similarity double, `0.2818957269585687`: a nineteen-character column whose last dozen digits cannot separate one result from another. A `score` format fixes it to four decimals, the width `cost` already uses, so the column stays put down the page. `json` and `yaml` still carry the full double, which is what a script compares. |
||
|
Waleed
|
fe4480d3f7 |
fix(cli): keep a path prefix in the login URLs (#6793)
* fix(cli): keep a path prefix in the login URLs
`sim login` built both of its URLs with `new URL('/path', endpoint)`. A
leading-slash path is absolute, so it resolves against the endpoint's origin
and drops any path the endpoint carries: a deployment served at
`https://host/sim` sent the browser to `https://host/cli/auth` and polled
`https://host/api/cli/auth/poll`, neither of which exists there.
Every other command builds its URL by concatenation and was unaffected, so
the endpoint looked correct and login alone failed.
Both now go through the client's `buildUrl`, which is exported for it rather
than duplicated — one URL builder for the whole CLI is the point, since two
of them is how the halves drifted apart. Its TSDoc now names the trap.
* test(cli): restore fetch with spyOn so the stub cannot outlive its test
vi.stubGlobal is not undone by restoreAllMocks, so the completed-auth
response would have leaked into whatever ran next. The rest of this file
already spies on globalThis.fetch, which the existing teardown restores.
|
||
|
Waleed
|
5c37778bbd |
fix(cli): identify the CLI to the API and name the remedy on every key refusal (#6792)
Sends a `User-Agent` on both request paths. Without one a CLI request is indistinguishable from any other API traffic, so a bug that reproduces on a single CLI version cannot be found in the server's own logs; the runtime and platform ride along because they are the first things asked about a transport failure only some users hit. The version moves into its own module so the HTTP client can read it. It could not import `program.ts` — program builds the commands, which reach the client — and duplicating the manifest read would let the two disagree. Also recognises `PRINCIPAL_KIND_NOT_PERMITTED`. The same refusal is raised at two layers under two codes, and only the workspace-key one was matched, so the audit-log commands reported "Principal kind workspace_api_key cannot perform operation audit_logs.list" — accurate, written for a server log, and missing the one sentence that tells the reader a personal key resolves it. |
||
|
Waleed
|
60097c89b4 |
fix(cli): default to the host that serves the API (#6791)
`sim.ai` answers /api/** with a 301 to `www.sim.ai`, and the client refuses to follow redirects — a 301 rewrites a POST into a bodyless GET, so following one turns a write into a silent no-op and hands the API key to whatever host Location names. Defaulting to the apex therefore failed every command for anyone who never set an endpoint. Before the refusal shipped it was quieter and worse: reads succeeded while writes did nothing. Also trims the provider catalogue from eleven inferred columns to seven. `docsUrl`, `helpText`, `requiresClientGeneratedCredentialId` and the nested `fields` are what you read once you have chosen a provider, not what you scan to choose one, and they pushed the table well past a terminal. Both ids stay: `credentials connect` names an OAuth provider by `serviceId`, `credentials create` matches a service account on `providerId`. |
||
|
Waleed
|
ae2147645c |
fix(cli): resolve findings from a full command-surface audit (#6788)
* fix(cli): resolve findings from a full command-surface audit Exercised all 147 commands against a live deployment. Fixes the defects that surfaced, plus the docs and generator drift they exposed. Transport - Stop following redirects. A bare domain that 301s to www silently converted POST to GET and dropped the body, so reads worked while every write failed with a misleading validation error and login returned 405. Both the client and the device flow now explain the redirect and name the endpoint to configure, rather than carrying credentials off-origin. - Report a non-JSON response as one instead of printing the HTML page. - Name the personal-API-key remedy on a workspace-key refusal, reading the machine-readable code the API actually sends. - Drop union-branch noise from validation errors that contradicted itself. - Show paging progress on stderr for multi-page fetches. Output - Clamp record values for table only. text is the format built for pipes, and it was truncating signed URLs and tool source mid-value. - Infer timestamp, duration, bytes and boolean formatting for API-owned keys so undeclared commands stop printing raw ISO and float ms. Skips user-defined table cells and leaves json/yaml on the raw payload. - Render a declared-but-absent field as an em dash; billing credits were vanishing silently. Paths, naming and validation - Percent-encode folder paths per segment and decode them for display, so a folder reads and types as the name shown in the app. - Reject a malformed endpoint where it is set and where it resolves, instead of crashing with a URL parse trace. - Request the detail level logs list's own columns need; its workflow column could never populate. - Rename three commands that described themselves wrongly and align two flags with their siblings. Old spellings still work: hidden, warned on stderr, and kept out of help and docs. - Verify whoami against the API, separating a bad key from an unreachable endpoint, and report the workspace by name. - Correct the --yes help text, which advertised skipping a prompt that does not exist. Docs - Teach the docs generator that a flag required by the runtime is required, and that hidden commands are not documented. * fix(cli): clear the paging progress line when a page fails Progress is written without a trailing newline so it can be overwritten in place, and both paging loops cleaned it up only on success. A page that threw part-way through left `fetched 1200…` on the line the error was then printed onto, so the two ran together. * fix(cli): name a working API root when an endpoint redirects The suggested endpoint was the redirect target's origin, which drops a path prefix. A self-hosted deployment reached at https://host/sim was told to set https://www.host — not an API root, so following the advice replaced one broken endpoint with another. Derive it by stripping the request's own path from the target instead, so a prefix survives, and say nothing about --set-endpoint when the target resolves to the endpoint already configured: a trailing-slash or path normalization redirect keeps the origin, and naming the value the caller already has explains nothing. The login poll shared both faults and now shares the helper. |
||
|
Waleed
|
d152fad788 |
chore(deps): bump js-yaml to 4.3.1 in sim-cli and drop the aged-out release-age waivers (#6784)
js-yaml < 4.3.1 has quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj / CVE-2026-59870). sim-cli builds with --packages=bundle, so its dev-scoped js-yaml is bundled into the published CLI. 4.3.1 is already what apps/sim pins, so this collapses sim-cli onto the hoisted copy. The minimumReleaseAge waivers for js-yaml and mermaid were temporary and have both aged past the 7-day window; leaving them behind would disable the supply-chain gate for those packages indefinitely. |
||
|
Waleed
|
746a4496ba |
chore(deps): upgrade next to 16.3.1, its optimizer no longer deletes live code (#6777)
* chore(deps): upgrade next to 16.3.1, its optimizer no longer deletes live code 16.3.0 was reverted in #6242 because its Turbopack optimizer modelled a bare `return <asyncCall>()` tail call inside an async function as returning the promise object, propagated that always-truthy fact through the caller's `await`, and deleted everything after the resulting `if`. That shipped two dead code paths to production: the whole `POST /api/credentials` create path, and the insert inside `upsertAsyncToolCall`. We reported it as vercel/next.js#96595. The fix — "[turbopack] Collapse nested promises in the analyzer" (vercel/next.js#96601) — folds `Promise<Promise<T>>` to `Promise<T>` in the analyzer, and was backported as #96675 and released in 16.3.1. Verified before taking the bump: - The minimal reproduction from the issue no longer reproduces on 16.3.1. All four routes keep their code; on 16.3.0 `/api/broken` lost everything after the `if`. - A production build of `apps/sim` on 16.3.1 still emits the markers whose disappearance was the original signal: `credential_connected` (43 files), `acquireOrganizationUserMutationLocks` (28), and the `upsertAsyncToolCall` insert-path warning (10). The `return await` hardening added to both sites in the revert stays as is, and so does the TypeScript toolchain configuration. 16.3.1 published 2026-08-13, so it is inside the 7-day `minimumReleaseAge` supply-chain window until 2026-08-20 and needs an exclusion to install. The alternative is sitting on 16.2.12, whose successor we already reverted once, so the entries go in dated and come out on the next touch of the file. The mermaid and js-yaml exclusions aged out on 2026-08-11 and 2026-08-07 and are dropped here per that same rule. * fix(deps): keep the musl and win32 SWC binaries in the lockfile The release-age exclusion only listed the four @next/swc platforms that package.json pins, but next declares all eight as its own optionalDependencies, so all eight are normally resolved into bun.lock. A gated optional dependency does not fail the install — bun drops it silently — so the first install stripped both musl variants and both win32 variants from the lockfile. That left the Alpine devcontainer and any Windows machine with no SWC binary to resolve. Adding the remaining four to the exclusion list restores all eight entries at 16.3.1. Worth knowing for the next time this happens: bun.lock is sticky here. Once an optional dependency has been dropped, re-running the install — even with --force, even with the age gate switched off entirely — does not bring it back, because the resolution is not reattempted. The lockfile has to be regenerated from a base that still contains the entries, which is why this restores bun.lock from staging before re-applying the bump. |
||
|
Waleed
|
025ea4d2bd |
fix(docs): serve JSON-LD in the HTML, fix sidebar spacing, and tighten the CLI guides (#6763)
* docs(cli): use -g for the install, and cut the prose that was not pulling weight
`--global` is valid but `-g` is what every comparable CLI documents, and the
long form only came from the package README. Also drops the yarn tab: it read
`yarn global add sim`, which works on Yarn 1 only — Yarn 2 removed global
installs, so that command fails for anyone on a modern Yarn. Adds `npx sim` for
running without installing.
The guides had accumulated design rationale that belongs in code comments rather
than user docs — why the filter grammar is JSON, why the config section naming
is asymmetric, why an unexpected error keeps its stack trace. Surveying how gh,
Vercel, Turborepo, Deno, Bun and Supabase write theirs, none carry that kind of
justification, and callouts are reserved for content whose absence produces a
wrong result rather than for general asides.
So: 1016 lines to 763, and 12 callouts to 3. The three that remain are the
pairing-code check, that `sim logout` does not revoke the key, and the
`--limit 100` default on `batch-delete`/`batch-update`, which silently truncates
a larger match. Troubleshooting drops the entries whose error message already
contained its own fix and keeps the seven whose cause is not obvious.
* fix(docs): render JSON-LD as native script tags so it reaches the HTML
All four structured-data blocks — WebSite, TechArticle, BreadcrumbList,
SoftwareApplication — were rendered with `next/script`, which never emitted a
script tag. Measured on a production build, `/api-reference/getting-started`
contained zero `<script type="application/ld+json">` elements; the payload
existed only in the `__next_s` client-injection queue and the RSC flight data,
so anything reading the served HTML saw no structured data at all. React was
also logging "Encountered a script tag while rendering React component" on every
page.
`next/script` is for loading and executing JavaScript. JSON-LD is data, and
Next's own guidance is a native `<script>` in the component. `serializeJsonLd`
already escapes the `<` character to its unicode form, which is the
sanitization that guidance calls for, so only the element changes.
Same build, after: three valid tags per page with `WebSite` in `<head>`, and the
injection queue gone entirely.
* fix(docs): scope the flush-separator rule to a container's first separator
`[data-separator]:not([data-separator] ~ [data-separator])` was meant to keep the
first sidebar group flush against the top padding, but `~` only reaches siblings,
so it also matched the first separator inside every expanded folder. Under
Self-Hosting, "Install" lost its top margin and crowded the "Architecture" link
above it — 25px of gap where "Configure" and "Operate" below it had 40px.
`:first-child` expresses the intent directly. Only the four sidebar roots open
with a separator; every nested folder starts with a page, so the intended case
still goes flush and nothing else changes.
* fix(docs): move the flush-separator rule onto the separator component
Keeps the styling with the component that owns it, per the repo standard, and
lets the global rule be deleted outright rather than corrected — `global.css`
now only loses a rule in this PR. Tailwind's `first:` variant compiles to the
same `:first-child` selector, so behavior is unchanged: the build emits
`.first\:mt-0:first-child{margin-top:0}` and the prerendered HTML carries the
class on the separator.
|
||
|
Waleed
|
fed891f69d |
docs(cli): add a CLI docs section generated from the command tree (#6762)
* docs(cli): add a CLI section, generated from the command tree
The `sim` CLI shipped with no coverage in the docs site. Adds a fourth
top-level tab for it, and moves Academy last.
The command reference is generated. `sim` exposes 147 leaf commands across
33 groups, most of them derived at runtime from the v2 route contracts, so a
hand-written reference would be wrong the week after it was written. The
generator walks the command tree `buildProgram()` hands to commander — the
same tree the terminal parses — rather than re-deriving it from the contract,
which would be a second implementation free to describe commands nobody can
invoke. `check:cli-docs` is a zero-arg `check:*` script, so the existing audit
runner picks it up and stale pages fail CI.
Generating against the real tree surfaced a collision it had been hiding:
`bulkUpdateKnowledgeDocuments` and `updateKnowledgeDocument` both derived to
`sim knowledge documents update`. Commander resolves a duplicate to the first
match, so the bulk form shadowed the single-document one and its flags were
unreachable while still appearing in `--help`. The bulk form is now
`batch-update`, matching how `tables rows batch-delete`/`batch-update` already
handle the same REST overload, and the generator fails on any duplicate path
so the next one cannot land silently.
Five hand-written guides cover install, auth, configuration, output formats,
and scripting. Also corrects two commands in the package README that do not
exist as documented (`tables columns <tableId>`, and `--sort score:desc`,
which is JSON).
* docs(cli): document every flag from the contracts, add troubleshooting and a single-page reference
The command reference was structurally complete but said almost nothing: 223 of
377 flags rendered as "Set sort by" because the CLI only ever read flag help
from its own contract overrides, and fell back to restating the flag name.
The prose already existed. The v2 route contracts carry 931 `.describe()` calls
and the OpenAPI specs publish all of them — 327 parameters and 282 body
properties, 100% coverage — but the generated operation table dropped every one,
carrying only a per-operation summary. It now carries the field descriptions,
the path-parameter descriptions, and positional help, so `--help` and the docs
explain a flag the same way the API reference does. Placeholder descriptions are
now zero, and 147/147 commands, 377/377 flags and 130/130 arguments are
documented.
`check:cli-docs` fails on a request field with no `.describe()` rather than
letting it render as documentation that says nothing.
Also in this pass:
- Commands are root-level sidebar entries under a Commands heading rather than
a folder, and headings are the command's description, so the table of
contents distinguishes entries at the first word instead of repeating
"sim knowledge documents …" fourteen times. A guard fails the build if two
descriptions on a page collide, since they would share an anchor.
- A single-page `Complete reference` carrying all 147 commands, for in-page
search and for agents fetching `/cli/reference.mdx`. It keys on exact command
paths because descriptions are only unique within a group.
- A troubleshooting page, with every message copied from the source.
- Table columns are sized by a local component; the flag column was starved
while descriptions kept most of the row empty.
- The prerelease install channels are dropped from the docs and the package
README, which is what npm renders.
* fix(docs): match the CLI tab by path segment, and escape backslashes before pipes
`pathname.includes('/cli')` also matches `/integrations/clickup` and
`/integrations/clickhouse`, so both existing integration pages lit the CLI tab
and unlit Documentation. Matching is now per path segment. Anchoring to the
start would not work either — a non-default locale prefixes the path, as in
`/ja/cli` — so the segment is matched wherever it sits.
Table cells now double a backslash before escaping pipes. A value ending in one
turned `a\` + `|` into `a\\|`, which the table parser reads as an escaped
backslash followed by an unescaped pipe, splitting the cell early. Nothing in
the command surface contains a backslash today, so this was latent rather than
visible.
The reference page's global options table is two-column and was being wrapped in
`CommandTable`, which sizes the second column for the `Required` cell of the
three-column tables and crushed the description into 5.5rem. It now matches the
overview page, which leaves that table unsized.
|
||
|
Waleed
|
4f722c6439 |
fix(deploy): resolve the error-output flag from edges on both sides of change detection (#6754)
* fix(deploy): resolve the error-output flag from edges on both sides of change detection A block can hold `errorEnabled: false` while an error edge still leaves it. `setBlockErrorEnabled` does not remove existing error edges, both block renderers draw the port on `errorEnabled || hasErrorConnection`, and the executor never reads the flag at all — the edge alone decides routing. So the two spellings are one state, and nothing about the block has functionally changed. Only the deployed side reconciled them. `materializeDeploymentState` backfills `errorEnabled: true` for any block with an error edge, while the live normalized tables are read verbatim. Change detection compared the raw flag, saw `true` against `false` for a block that had not changed, and no redeploy could clear it: deploying snapshots the live `false`, which the next read backfills straight back to `true`. The deploy button sat on "Update" permanently, and the server path (`checkNeedsRedeployment`, which reads the raw jsonb and skips the backfill) disagreed with it. Lift the rule into `@sim/workflow-types` as `collectErrorSourceBlockIds` / `resolveEffectiveErrorEnabled` so the backfill and the comparison share one definition, and apply it to both sides of the diff. Compared outside the structural gate, since the flag can match while the edges disagree. * chore(deploy): use TSDoc for the error-output comparison comments |
||
|
Theodore Li
|
623c30f05c |
fix(credentials): restore reliable OAuth connections (#6753)
* fix(credentials): restore reliable OAuth connections * fix(credentials): cover OAuth handoff edge cases * fix(credentials): preserve reauthorization outcomes |
||
|
Waleed
|
4fc0fb4bad |
refactor(resources): converge Files onto the shared drag hook and batch bulk authorization (#6748)
* refactor(resources): converge Files onto the shared drag hook and batch bulk authorization Files kept a 280-line copy of the foldered-list drag logic because it also accepts OS file drops. The copies had already drifted, so the external drop becomes an option on the shared hook and the copy goes away. - Add `externalDrop` to `useFolderRowDragDrop`: folder rows highlight and spring open for an OS file drag exactly as for a move, while the body and breadcrumb decline so the page-level upload overlay owns those regions - Collapse the three drop-active booleans into one `ActiveDropTarget` union, so exactly one affordance is armed by construction rather than by hand-clearing - Keep drop-target writes identity-stable so `dragover` does not re-render the list on every event - Give each list its own drag MIME again, restoring the cross-surface isolation `drag-payload.ts` documents - Let a folder spring open more than once per drag, so a drag can walk back out through the breadcrumb and descend again; the guard against re-entering the folder already on screen moves to `useSpringNavigation`, the only layer that can state it - Resolve each bulk item against the workspace context the batch already holds, and memoize the effective-permission lookup for the batch, replacing two invariant queries per item - Fill the drop target at `--surface-active`: `--surface-4` is the button-base token and is lighter than hover in light mode, so the strongest row state read the faintest * fix(resources): dismiss the upload overlay on a folder drop and re-check permission per item The drag hook stops propagation on a drop it handles, so the page-level handler that cleared the upload overlay never ran and the chrome stayed up over the finished upload. Both consuming paths now share one dismissal. Drop the batch permission memo: each item in a bulk move or delete commits independently, so reusing one allow verdict let a revocation part-way through a batch go unseen by the remaining items. The workspace context is still resolved once per batch, which was the larger saving. |
||
|
Waleed
|
0cd87bad2f |
feat(resources): multiselect on tables and knowledge, spring-loaded folders (#6721)
* feat(resources): multiselect on tables and knowledge, spring-loaded folders Tables and Knowledge lists get the checkbox multiselect Files already had — selection, shift-click ranges, select-all, and a shared bulk action bar for move and delete. Dragging a resource onto a folder row and resting there now opens that folder, so nested filing is one gesture (macOS Finder spring-loading). Works on Files, Tables, and Knowledge. Selection, the action bar, the drag payload, the drag ghost, and drag teardown are extracted to shared modules; Files migrates onto them rather than keeping its own copies. Bulk move and delete land as single authorized operations that take folders and resources together, so a mixed selection commits once instead of fanning out. Fixes two latent UI bugs: the drop-target outline referenced --accent, an HSL-channel token only valid via hsl(), so it silently rendered as currentColor; and rows painted hover and selected with the same surface token, making the two states indistinguishable. * chore(audits): re-record route ratchet after merging staging * fix(bulk): reject a move target inside the moving subtree and report contained folders deterministically * improvement(resources): neutral drop affordance, longer spring delay, and a body drop target * fix(resources): drop into the open folder on Files, return on an unused spring-open, and guard bulk caps * fix(drag): end a drag on pointer resume instead of an idle timer * feat(resources): drag onto breadcrumbs to move back up, and round the drop ring * fix(resources): tint the list region on drop instead of ringing it * refactor(folders): share the spring-navigation lifecycle so Files returns too * fix(breadcrumbs): accept a drag on the open-folder crumb too * fix(files): keep the view in a spring-opened folder when an OS upload lands there |
||
|
|
337a53f12c |
feat(cli): Sim CLI with AWS-style profiles and a platform key exchange (#6147)
* improvement(api): pull in the v2 external endpoint surface Cherry-picks improvement/v2-endpoints ( |
||
|
Theodore Li
|
b198080356 |
feat(credential-groups): complete managed account enrollment (#6729)
* fix(credential-groups): show reconnect after authorization * feat(slack): include managed user auth in custom bots * feat(credential-groups): add enrollment completion page * fix(credential-groups): align settings order and block color * fix(credential-groups): delete credentials on access revoke * fix(credential-groups): use person icon for enrollments * fix(credential-groups): keep enrollment submit visible * fix(credential-groups): make enrollment connections optional * fix(credential-groups): simplify people actions * fix(credential-groups): preserve pagination after deletion * fix(credential-groups): delete removed enrollments * fix(credential-groups): hydrate canvas labels |
||
|
Theodore Li
|
8fb571ac54 |
feat(credentials): add managed credential groups (#6697)
* feat(credentials): add managed credential groups * fix(audit): sync credential group mock * fix(credentials): serialize enrollment revocation * fix(credentials): isolate managed delegation * fix(credentials): serialize invitation lifecycle * fix(credentials): preserve enrollment lifecycle * refactor(credentials): migrate groups to application boundary * fix(credentials): serialize enrollment readiness * fix(credentials): preserve completed reconnect state * fix(credentials): revalidate policy before grant persistence * fix(credentials): prioritize expired invitations * fix(credentials): redirect unavailable oauth starts * fix(credentials): clarify managed oauth boundaries * fix(settings): complete feature flag test mocks * fix(credentials): clarify enrollment actions and entitlement errors * fix(credentials): preserve entitlement failure reasons * fix(credentials): refine managed oauth flow * fix(lint): use optional chain for pagination |
||
|
Waleed
|
2223b63851 |
chore(utils): consolidate record guards and remove dead code (#6715)
* refactor: consolidate local isRecord guards onto shared isRecordLike Nineteen files had re-declared a local `isRecord` guard rather than using the shared one from `@sim/utils/object`, drift that reappeared after #5061 first consolidated them. Two more imported the shared guard under an `isRecordLike as isRecord` alias. The copies were not interchangeable. Nine matched `isRecordLike` exactly. The rest omitted the array exclusion (`typeof x === 'object' && x !== null`, or `Boolean(x) && typeof x === 'object'`), so arrays passed the guard. Each of those call sites was reviewed individually: in every case the guard is followed by string/number field checks that an array fails anyway, so the outcome is unchanged. The one exception is `isOptionsTagData`, where `Object.values` on an array of option items really did make an array-form `<options>` tag render. It now accepts arrays explicitly rather than by accident. `executor/handlers/pi/search/extension-source.ts` keeps its own copy: it is source text written into an E2B/Daytona sandbox at runtime and cannot import. * refactor: replace inline record guards with isRecordLike 103 inline `typeof x === 'object' && x !== null && !Array.isArray(x)` guards (and the `x &&` / `Boolean(x)` spellings of the same conjunction) now call the shared guard. Inside a conjunction that already asserts `typeof x === 'object'`, `x &&` and `x !== null` are interchangeable, so all three orderings are the same predicate at runtime. Only exactly-equivalent conjunctions were converted. Matching required the three clauses to be one adjacent conjunction over the same operand, so a nearby but unrelated clause cannot be absorbed — generic-handler.ts, where the array case is handled inside the block rather than excluded by the guard, is correctly left alone. Two sites were reverted after type-check rejected them: instagram/server-utils.ts and workflows/[id]/log/route.ts both cast straight to a specific interface, which is legal from `object` but not from `Record<string, unknown>`. Their narrowing is genuinely not identical, so they keep the inline form rather than acquiring a double cast. Left as-is: `packages/ts-sdk` (published with no runtime dependencies) and the two sandbox sources written into E2B/Daytona as text, which cannot import. * refactor: consolidate duplicate record coercion helpers onto @sim/utils A second sweep found 28 more local record helpers hiding under names the previous `isRecord` grep never matched — `asRecord`, `toRecord`, `toRecordOrNull`, `asObject`, `isJsonObject`. rabbitmq defined the same `asRecord` twice within one service; dynatrace had three variants in one file. Fourteen of them were re-deriving the same two shapes, so those shapes now live in `@sim/utils/object` beside the guards they wrap: toRecord(value) // isRecordLike(value) ? value : {} toRecordOrNull(value) // isRecordLike(value) ? value : null Both preserve identity on a hit, so no call site starts copying. Eighteen local definitions are gone. `tools/instantly/utils.ts` keeps its exported `asRecord` because its return type is the local `JsonRecord` alias, but its body now delegates. `app/api/mcp/serve/[serverId]/route.ts` had an `isJsonObject` with zero call sites — deleted outright. Six helpers were deliberately left alone because they are NOT equivalent: `pagerduty`/`zendesk`/`gitlab` do `(value as Record) || {}`, which type-checks nothing at all, and `copilot/resources/extraction.ts`, `edit-workflow/validation.ts`, `pi/core/events.ts` omit the array exclusion. Those sit on webhook ingress and copilot paths where tightening is a behavior change, not a cleanup; they are audited separately. Two guards were removed rather than substituted, each proven dominated by an earlier check: the bedrock streaming `toolUse.input` guard was unreachable (`parseToolInput` already throws on non-objects before the loop builds `assembledToolUses`), and four `driver.ts` re-narrows follow an `if (!isRecordLike(x) || ...) throw` that dominates the later use. * fix(webhooks): guard non-string GitLab ref, and consolidate the last record helpers Two audits covered the six helpers held back from the previous commit for not being equivalent to isRecordLike. Five are now migrated; one is deliberately not. `gitlab.ts` carried a real crash path, independent of the guard work: const ref = (b.ref as string) || '' const branch = ref.replace('refs/heads/', '') The cast is unchecked and `|| ''` only catches falsy values, so a truthy non-string body field — `{"ref": 12345}` — reaches `.replace` and throws `TypeError: ref.replace is not a function` inside `formatInput`. That runs in the background worker after the webhook is already 200-ACKed, and GitLab does not auto-retry, so the delivery is lost silently. Now checks `typeof`. `pagerduty`/`zendesk`/`gitlab` each defined `asRecord` as `(value as Record<string, unknown>) || {}`, which type-checks nothing — a string or array passed through and was then spread into the workflow trigger payload (`gitlab.ts:114`) as character- or index-keyed garbage. All three now use the shared `toRecord`. These sit behind `verifyProviderAuth`, so reaching them requires the shared secret; this is robustness, not authorization. `copilot/resources/extraction.ts` and `pi/core/events.ts` were array-permissive but provably inert — extraction.ts has no key enumeration or spread anywhere, and events.ts only diverges by returning `null` instead of `{type:'other'}` for an array, which every consumer already no-ops on. Pinned with a test. `edit-workflow/validation.ts` is left permissive ON PURPOSE. Its `Object.entries` walk mirrors the unguarded walk in `operations.ts:86,191`, so an array-shaped `nestedNodes` from the model is currently visited by both. Tightening only the validation side would stop `collectHostedApiKeyInput` from stripping platform-managed API keys while the apply side still creates those child blocks. Both paths have to change together, with tests, in their own PR. * refactor: delete 31 unreachable module-local functions Removes 815 lines of provably dead code: module-local (non-exported) declarations whose identifier appears exactly once in their own file — the declaration itself. A non-exported symbol cannot be reached by an import, a barrel, a dynamic import, or a framework convention, so "unreferenced in its own file" is a complete proof of deadness rather than a heuristic. Notable removals include whole abandoned code paths: `findWebhookAndWorkflow` (78 lines), `calculateBillingProjection` and `initializeUserUsageLimit` (80 lines), `removeCredits` + `deductFromCredits` (54), `sendBatchSMS`, `executeToolBatch`, and four unused `async-runs/repository.ts` queries. Spans come from the TypeScript AST, not a regex. A regex cannot find a declaration's extent — a first-brace scan cuts inside a return-type annotation such as `Promise<{ canCreate: boolean }>` and silently corrupts the file. The AST pass also re-derives deadness from identifier nodes, which caught two wealthbox helpers that a regex export-check had wrongly reported as local. Note the runtime TypeScript API here is `@typescript/typescript6`; the bare `typescript` specifier resolves to the native compiler, which exposes no `createSourceFile`. * refactor: delete 434 stranded exported symbols Removes ~5,930 lines of unreachable code across 166 files: exported symbols that no other file in the repo mentions and that are unused inside their own file. Whole abandoned surfaces go with them — unused React Query hooks (useOrganizations, useOrganizationMembers, useUpgradeSubscription, ...), unused admin route contracts, dead executor constants and reference builders, and the landing-page StageWorkflow/LandingPreviewMount components. Three files left with no remaining code were removed outright. Candidates came from an AST pass; each was then verified individually against an UNFILTERED repo-wide search plus the reachability paths a name search misses: string-keyed tool/block registries, dynamic imports, `export *` barrels, and the docs generator's source-text parsing of tool files. 29 candidates were verified LIVE and kept. Those exposed a flaw in the candidate generator: it indexed only .ts/.tsx, while apps/docs/content/**/*.mdx imports React components directly — ActionImage appears in ~190 MDX pages and ActionVideo in ~115, and both scanned as dead. `app/global-error.tsx` was likewise kept, since Next.js reaches it by filename and its default export can never have a name reference. All 434 deleted names were afterwards cross-checked against every .mdx/.md/.json/.yaml in the repo: no hits. Verified with turbo type-check (23 workspaces), the full apps/sim suite (25,219 tests), all 26 audits, and a production `next build` — the last of these being what actually exercises route- and component-level reachability. |
||
|
Waleed
|
d5701d5b2b |
fix(icons): align table block icon and 12-unit icon stroke with the emcn family (#6708)
The table/table_v2 blocks and the table trigger used a local lucide-shaped TableIcon (stroke 2.0, full-bleed 24 viewBox, 3x3 grid) while every other table surface used emcn's Table. Consolidate onto the emcn icon and drop the local copy. Nested tool-call rows in Chat applied no color class, so a non-brand block icon inherited body text instead of --text-icon. redo/undo/zoom-in/zoom-out draw 0.85 stroke on a 12-unit viewBox, rendering 0.992px at a 14px box against the family's 0.904px. 0.775 restores parity. |
||
|
Waleed
|
9664e7ec17 |
Revert "fix(integrations): read every service mark from one registry (#6682)" (#6707)
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Waleed
|
b7a5f22abd |
fix(integrations): read every service mark from one registry (#6682)
* fix(integrations): read every service mark from one registry A service looked like itself on the canvas and like nothing in particular everywhere it was connected. `OAUTH_PROVIDERS` registers 93 icons and no colour at all, so the surfaces built on it — the connect dialog above all — drew a flat grey mark for a block whose config already carries its brand icon and `bgColor`. Bridges the two: `resolveIntegrationBlockTypeForOAuth` maps any OAuth id (a service id, a provider id, an extra authorization server) to the catalog block behind it, so a credential surface holding only an OAuth identity can still reach the registry. The connect dialog now wears the block's tile, and `ChipModalHeader` takes a rendered mark so a tile can carry its own chrome instead of being tinted with the header's grey. Folds in the copies that had grown around the gap: `IntegrationTile` resolved its fill from the registry but took its icon from whatever the caller passed — one tile, two sources — and now defaults to the registry, with an override kept for the family service-account marks that genuinely are not the block's. The letter fallback it grew alongside was reading the catalog's `bgColor` while the tile beside it read the registry's; both are the tile now. Two `getProviderIcon` implementations for the same job (one tinted, one not) become one `ProviderIcon`, the connector tile duplicated verbatim across two knowledge-base surfaces becomes one `ConnectorTile`, and the permission rows that hardcoded `text-white` — which renders white-on-white on a pale brand tile — go through `BlockTile`. Public pages keep their generated catalog: importing the registry there would ship 282 block configs to a marketing page, and `integrations.json` is generated from the same `bgColor`, so the two cannot drift. * fix(blocks): drop the dead copies of a block's colour Sweeping the surfaces above turned up colour data nothing reads and colour data two surfaces disagreed on. Dead: `BLOCK_COLORS.DEFAULT/LOOP/PARALLEL` in the tag dropdown (only `VARIABLE` was ever referenced), `BlockIconInfo.color` on table columns — whose consumer documents that it deliberately ignores the colour, so the `#2F55FF` behind it could never render — and the `bgColor` threaded into the add-resource dropdown, whose row renders a bare tinted icon. Disagreeing: the Variables tile is `#2F8BFF` in the tag dropdown and `#8B5CF6` in the preview panel, for the same "V" on the same concept. Both now read `VARIABLE_TILE_COLOR`, and the preview panel's two hand-rolled squares become `BlockTile` like every other tile. Four spellings of the neutral fallback (`#6B7280`, `#6b7280`, `#666666`, and a `cancelled` status that happened to equal it) now point at `DEFAULT_BLOCK_TILE_COLOR`. The terminal and logs resolvers stay. They look like duplicates of `accent.ts` but carry behaviour it does not have — status fills for synthesized error/validation/cancelled rows, near-black contrast correction, MCP tool-id parsing, and a model-provider branch — so folding them in is a behavioural change, not a deletion. * chore(copilot): delete the mention machinery nothing calls The workflow panel's copilot tab renders `MothershipChat`, and that component brings its own input — so `panel/components/copilot` no longer holds a component at all, only the hook library the old input used. Five of those hooks have no caller anywhere: `useMentionData`, `useMentionKeyboard`, `useCaretViewport`, `useMentionInsertHandlers`, `useTextareaAutoResize`. They are not all of it. `home/components/user-input` still imports `useFileAttachments`, `useMentionMenu`, `useMentionTokens`, `useContextManagement`, and `useIntegrationAutoMention` from this directory, so it survives as a shared hook library rather than dead weight — which is why this removes the uncalled five rather than the folder. What they alone reached goes with them: `getFolderData` / `getFolderLoading` / `getFolderEnsureLoaded` and the `FOLDER_CONFIGS` table describing every mention folder, `buildMentionHighlightNodes`, the `MentionFolderNav` type, and the slash-command tables. Of the 266-line constants file only `SCROLL_TOLERANCE` had a live reader left. * fix(integrations): never answer with a sibling's tile Two integrations can share one OAuth id: Google Slides is authenticated by Drive's `google-drive` service and Jira Service Management by Jira's `jira`. Indexing first-write-wins made those ids resolve to whichever sorted first, so the dialog connecting Slides could wear Drive's brand. An id claimed by more than one block type now resolves to neither, and the caller keeps the service-specific mark it already had. A wrong brand is worse than no tile. |
||
|
Waleed
|
af076a7a34 |
fix(logger, blocks): log nested errors and stop spurious model-selection warnings (#6706)
* fix(logger, blocks): log nested errors and stop spurious model-selection warnings
Two production defects found in the prod logs, neither release-related.
logger: mergeArgs copied object arguments verbatim, so an Error held under a
key stayed an Error instance and JSON.stringify rendered it {} — message and
stack are non-enumerable on Error.prototype. 399 call sites use the
logger.x('msg', { error }) shape and every one logged error: {}, which is why
BlockOutputs failures (10k/week) were undiagnosable. The colorized path had
the same hole via formatObject.
blocks: router, evaluator and agent resolved config.tool through
getBaseModelProviders(), which deliberately excludes gateway providers
(OpenRouter, vLLM, LiteLLM, Ollama, ...). A valid openrouter/* model therefore
threw "Invalid model selected", as did a model still holding an unresolved
<variable.x> at serialization time — ~140 warnings/day. The value is cosmetic
(every handler re-derives the provider from the resolved model), so the throw
bought nothing.
- unwrap keyed Errors on both the structured and colorized log paths
- keep `error` a plain message string so log queries can group on it
- resolve serialized provider ids through getProviderFromModel, the same
resolver the executor uses, via one shared helper for all four call sites
- drop the unreachable `if (!model)` checks behind `params.model || default`
* fix(blocks): move the fallback rationale into TSDoc
The repo forbids non-TSDoc comments; the explanation for why recovery returns
a constant instead of resolving again belongs on the declaration anyway.
|
||
|
Waleed
|
b9a70e43f9 |
fix(execution): give a cancelled async run its terminal metadata (#6693)
* fix(execution): give a cancelled async run its terminal metadata The staging integration suite has been failing integ-cancel-async-api-key/async-execution-becomes-cancelled: the run reports status cancelled with a null endedAt and a null duration, so the assertion fails and the dependent worker-stop check never runs. The run resource falls back to the queue job whenever no execution-log row exists yet, and a cancel that lands before the worker has written that row leaves exactly that state. Trigger.dev marks a run canceled the moment it accepts the cancellation but only stamps its finish time when the worker drains, so for the seconds in between the job is terminal with no timestamp, and the projection faithfully reports a terminal status with nothing to date it. The run writes a correct log row when it finally drains, which is why the endpoint heals itself and the alarm fires intermittently rather than always. The backend was discarding the one timestamp that is always present: the retrieve response carries a required updatedAt beside the optional finishedAt. A finish time still wins wherever it exists, so nothing that already reports correctly changes, and the fallback is taken only once the mapped status is terminal — an active run's updatedAt marks progress, and reading it as an end would retire a run that is still going. It records the server's last transition for the run rather than the reader's clock, so it stays put across polls instead of growing. Also carries the duration on a fifth cancellation write, in the internal cancel route, that the earlier pass missed because its sweep covered lib and not app. * refactor(execution): derive a cancelled run's terminal fields in one place The five cancellation paths each hand-assembled the same four-key payload for the workflow-execution log, and one of them had already drifted: the direct cancel never cleared `execution_deadline_at`, leaving a cancelled row carrying the deadline of an attempt that had stopped running. Extract the payload so the key set cannot vary between them, and leave the paths themselves alone — they differ in handle, claim predicate, whether they read the row back, and what they do when the claim is lost, so they stay separate statements. Bind the end instant through the `started_at` column encoder rather than a pre-stringified ISO literal. `check:sql-date-binding` exists to enforce exactly that binding; the literal passed only because it was already a string. Collapse the duration expression to one `COALESCE` over a valueless-`ELSE` `CASE`, which builds the elapsed fragment once instead of in both branches, and reuse it for the stale-execution sweeper, which carried its own copy along with a second int4 ceiling constant. Document the invariants the fix depends on where a reader meets them: that `total_duration_ms` means wall clock for a terminal row and active time for a paused one, and that a terminal job must carry its transition instant. |
||
|
Waleed
|
9aa36a424f |
fix(icons): match folder icon optical size to sibling resource icons (#6692)
The folder icon read visibly smaller than the table/database icons beside it in resource rows despite an identical size-[14px] class, because the class sets the SVG box and not the artwork inside it. The folder outline only spanned 15 units of the shared -1 -2 24 24 box against 17.5-18 for its siblings. Scale the outline to a 17-unit extent on the same .25 grid and quarter circle corner radii, keeping the body path byte-identical across Folder, FolderOpen and FolderCode so the sidebar expand/collapse toggle does not shift. FolderCode's brackets move with the body they are centred on. |
||
|
Vikhyath Mondreti
|
fa394e5e07 |
fix(execution): resolve secrets against the acting principal, not the workflow owner (#6690)
* fix(execution): resolve secrets against the acting principal, not the workflow owner * fix(execution): resolve anonymous public-API runs as the workspace billing account * fix(execution): propagate run identity across dispatch paths and scope public runs to workspace secrets |
||
|
Waleed
|
b9b9c9c9a9 |
fix(canvas): stop phantom ports and a latched-open action bar (#6688)
* fix(canvas): stop phantom ports and a latched-open action bar Ports surface on hover from a swell painted on the card border, and that swell was raised with no regard for whether a handle exists behind it. A Response block mounts no source handle, so hovering its edge raised a knob no edge could ever leave from. A trigger mounts no target handle, yet still swelled under a connection dragged from another card, offering a drop it cannot accept. Gate each direction on the handle that backs it, and limit a trigger's own swell to its source edge the way the subflow start node already does. The action bar latched open for the same interaction. Leaving the card arms a retract and installs a pointermove listener to track the pointer across the gap up to the bar; re-entering the bar's band called openHover(), which cancelled the retract AND removed that listener. No further pointerleave can arrive once the pointer is off the node, so nothing was left to close the bar. Keep the listener installed and re-arm the retract when the pointer moves back out. Also clear the magnetized port when the pointer leaves the tracking band onto the action bar: only the in-band path recomputed it, so the last knob stayed pinned at hover amplitude with the pointer nowhere near it. * fix(canvas): scope the receive gate, cover both swell directions Gating the foreign-drag listener also ran the shared pointer-tracking reset, which belongs to the card's own hover. A trigger sets canReceiveConnection false while canStartConnection stays true, so the reset undid the layout effect's :hover bootstrap and left a card that mounted under the pointer with no source swell until the pointer left and came back. Skip the listener instead; the effect's own cleanup already covers a true-to-false flip. Drop the trigger-only cursorSwellSides restriction. A swell on a trigger's input edge resolves to a source handle, so an edge genuinely can be made there — it was a behavior change beyond the bug, not a phantom. Cover both directions of the swell gate, and use the shared sleep helper in the action-bar test. Hoist the constant connection sides out of the render body so they stop riding the borderPorts dep array. |
||
|
Waleed
|
264d4f3469 |
feat(canvas): add a setting to turn off auto-focus when clicking blocks (#6685)
* feat(canvas): add a setting to turn off auto-focus when clicking blocks Clicking a block animates the camera to center it, which zooms in far enough that you lose sight of the rest of the workflow. Add an "Auto-focus on click" preference (on by default, so existing behavior is unchanged) that keeps the camera still on click. Also re-record the auto-connect and canvas-error-notification tooltip previews and re-encode all three at a smaller size. * fix(canvas): keep click-marked framing when auto-focus is off, recut tooltips Gating the whole click branch on the setting also skipped the userFocusedWorkflowIdRef write, which is what stops <ReactFlow onInit> from running fitView over the user's framing. That would have blown away the framing of exactly the users who turned auto-focus off to keep it. Mark the workflow as user-framed on any plain node click and gate only the camera move. Crop the auto-focus preview to the recording's viewport center so the blocks are legible at the 240px width Tooltip.Preview renders at, and trim the 2.45s of empty lead off the error-notification preview. * docs(canvas): correct useAutoFocusOnClick scope to clicks only The TSDoc claimed the preference also gated arrow-key navigation, which calls focusBlockInView without consulting it. State the click-only scope and why arrow-key navigation and block creation are excluded. |
||
|
Waleed
|
85c8451a86 |
fix(blocks): give the detail headers the same tile as everything else (#6672)
The tile consolidation left the large detail headers on their own treatment, so a block wore one colour on the canvas and another in the header naming it: the preview panel behind the deploy modal and the logs trace detail both painted straight from the catalog `bgColor`, showing Start's catalog blue over a neutral card, and hardcoded `#2FB3FF`/`#FEE12B` for the two subflows. Adds the 18px header slot to `BlockTile` and points all three headers at it — preview panel, trace detail, and the editor header, which had been carrying its own inline copy of the accent rule. `WorkflowTypeIcon` takes an icon class so the accent chip can draw the larger glyph the header uses. |
||
|
Waleed
|
6de8ba2504 |
fix(v2): close the correctness gaps an end-to-end audit found (#6655)
* fix(v2): stop a third-party tool description from 500ing MCP discovery
`v2McpToolInputSchema` declared `description: z.string().optional()` inside a
`.catchall(z.unknown())` object, and a declared key beats the catchall. The MCP
SDK's own `ToolSchema.inputSchema` does not declare `description` at all, so any
value — including the JSON `null` a Python server emits for an absent one —
passes its validation and reaches Sim unchecked. The builder's outbound `.parse()`
then threw, and the discovery error policy correctly declines to classify a
Sim-side schema defect, so the endpoint that completes MCP onboarding answered a
bare 500. The key is dropped and left to the catchall; `type`, `properties`, and
`required` stay pinned because the SDK enforces those at least as tightly.
Also in the v2 resources family:
- The single-resource query schemas for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, and
secrets are now `.strict()`, matching every list in the same family. A mistyped
flag was silently ignored behind a 200.
- `openapi/resources.ts` re-derived `RESOURCE_ERRORS` and
`RESOURCE_CONFLICT_ERRORS` inline in 21 of 22 operations. They now import the
shared constants; the generated spec is unchanged, which is the point.
- The internal MCP refresh route stamped `updatedAt` alongside `lastToolsRefresh`.
`updatedAt` means "configuration last changed" and is a public keyset sort, so
a refresh moved rows out from under an in-flight page. `updateServerStatus`
already held that invariant; the route now matches it.
- The discovery cooldown is a typed `McpServerCooldownError` rather than a
substring search for `cooldown`. `McpConnectionError` interpolates the server's
display name into its message, so a server named after the word was reported as
a transient cooldown when its connection had genuinely failed.
* fix(v2): close correctness gaps in the workflows deployment surface
Deploy and rollback bodies were plain objects, so a misspelled key was
stripped rather than rejected. On rollback that is silent misbehavior:
an omitted `version` legitimately means "reactivate the preceding
version", so `{"versoin": 5}` rolled back somewhere else and answered
200. Both v2 bodies, the run-read query, and the versions cursor are now
strict.
Deployment versions are an `integer` column, but the path param, the
versions cursor, and the v1 body each bounded it differently or not at
all — an out-of-range value overflowed the comparison into an
unclassifiable 500. One exported bound now covers all three.
Resume admission raised bare `Error`s for a stale contextId or an
already-resumed run, which the resume surfaces could not classify and
reported as 500. They now use the sibling `ResumeAdmissionError` already
in that file, carrying 404/409/400 and whether an automatic retry can
clear the refusal.
Docs corrections: rollback publishes the 409 its webhook-path conflict
already produces; deploy/undeploy/rollback reject a workspace key with
403, not the concealed 404 they documented; the workflows OpenAPI module
imports the shared error sets instead of re-deriving them; import and
the folder ops explain their folder-tree 413. The export route is marked
`headSafe: false` so a HEAD probe stops filing a WORKFLOW_EXPORTED audit
event for an export that never happened. `runId` is one bounded schema
across the run and log resources.
* fix(v2): conceal knowledge upload existence, tighten knowledge/files bounds
Security: the four knowledge document-upload routes rendered a bare upload
error policy with no resource concealment, while every sibling knowledge route
uses one. Because the use case resolves the knowledge-base context before
workspace authorization, the unconcealed 403 told any valid API-key holder that
a knowledge base exists in a workspace it cannot reach — the exact signal
GET /api/v2/knowledge/{id} withholds by answering 404 either way. All four now
use the composed concealing policy, which also renders the 415/402/413 the
route-local renderer already handled; that duplicate renderer is deleted.
Contracts:
- POST /knowledge/search is strict. It was the only non-strict v2 request body,
so a mis-cased rerankerEnabled or topK returned 200 with the key stripped,
changing what the caller was billed and silently disabling reranking.
- The document list takes limit, cursor, and search from the shared v2 schemas.
search was an unbounded, empty-accepting v1 string, so ?search= answered 200
with a full page here and 400 on GET /knowledge, and the term reached an
unindexed filename LIKE scan with no ceiling.
- The 16 non-strict single-field workspace query slices across both families are
strict, matching GET /knowledge/{id}/tags.
- GET /audit-logs takes workspaceIdSchema instead of a bare string (?workspaceId=
was forwarded as a filter and returned zero rows) and the shared run-window
bounds for startDate/endDate.
Documentation:
- listAuditLogs drops the 404 it has no code path to emit.
- upsertFileShare describes its workspace-key refusal as the 403 it renders;
the operation denies the key by principal kind, which the concealment policy
does not rewrite.
- The 12 body-reading knowledge and files operations publish the 413 their
pre-validation body read raises, and the file list publishes the folder-tree
413 its now-capped path index raises.
Correctness: queryWorkspaceFilePage loads its folder path index under
MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE like the workflow, table, and knowledge lists. An
uncapped index does not fail on truncation, so a real folder outside the read
rows resolved to undefined and answered "Folder not found".
* fix(v2): publish the reachable 413 on body-carrying resources ops
`parseRequest` buffers a JSON body through `parseJsonBody` under
`DEFAULT_MAX_JSON_BODY_BYTES` before any schema runs, and the v2 builders supply
`V2_PARSE_DEFAULTS.payloadTooLargeResponse`, so every operation whose contract
declares a body already answers 413 above the cap. The resources family
published it on none of them. A status a caller cannot see in the spec is a
status they will not handle.
Adds `RESOURCE_BODY_ERRORS` and `RESOURCE_CONFLICT_BODY_ERRORS` to the shared
sets and applies them to the seven affected operations: createMcpServer,
updateMcpServer, createSkill, updateSkill, createCustomTool, updateCustomTool,
and setSecret. All seven are `defineV2JsonRoute` handlers on non-GET methods
with no `parseOptions` override, so the 413 is genuinely reachable on each. The
new sets are opt-in rather than folded into the base sets precisely because
reachability is not automatic — an operation with no body, or one whose payload
reaches it through an uncapped path, would be publishing a response that can
never arrive.
A sweep test pins the invariant across the resources, billing, and logs
documents. It is one-directional by construction: several bodyless operations
publish 413 for their own folder-tree and render ceilings, so the converse would
flag correct documentation.
Also completes the shared-constant consolidation started in
|
||
|
Waleed
|
c49751b32e |
perf(prefetch): stop calling our own API over the wire during server render (#6657)
* perf(prefetch): read the data layer instead of calling our own API over the wire
Four server-render prefetches went out over HTTP to our own routes. With
INTERNAL_API_BASE_URL unset in prod, getInternalApiBaseUrl() falls back to the
public base URL, so each was RSC -> public HTTPS -> load balancer -> back into
the app, awaited inside the render with a second round of auth.
- /home fetched the workflow folder list that the workspace layout had already
fetched, under the identical query key. Since getQueryClient() builds a new
client per call on the server, the two never deduped: same data, twice a
request, once directly and once over the wire. Dropped; the layout's entry
already hydrates it.
- /home cached raw route JSON under workspaceFilesKeys.list, while
files/prefetch.ts seeds that same key from listWorkspaceFilesWithShares. The
contract declares the date fields z.coerce.date(), so consumers hold Dates —
a file record's type depended on which page the viewer landed on. Now reads
the same function files/prefetch.ts does.
- tables and knowledge folder reads now call listFoldersForWorkspace, matching
the sidebar prefetch.
These reads carry no authorization of their own, so each surface proves the
viewer through getWorkspaceHostContextForViewer first and caches nothing when
it fails, leaving the client fetch to reach the route for the real 403. Both it
and getSession are cache()d and already resolved by the layout, so the proof
costs no extra queries.
Left on the wire, deliberately: the tables and knowledge lists, whose cached
shape is the serialized wire shape, and pinned items and members, which have no
exported data-layer function.
* improvement(prefetch): skip the viewer proof when there is no session
Passing an empty-string userId ran a real permission query that could only
return null. Take an optional userId instead and skip straight to the
unauthorized path, matching how the home prefetch is called.
* perf(prefetch): finish removing self-HTTP prefetches and delete the legacy helper
Converts the last four server-render prefetches that called our own API over
HTTP, and deletes prefetch-internal-fetch.ts now that nothing imports it.
- knowledge bases: runs the route's own listInternalKnowledgeBases use case
with a principal from the same internalSessionAuth policy the route declares,
then projects through the same presenter and contract. Not a bypass of the
application boundary — the same path, called in-process.
- tables: extracts the route's list projection into lib/table/wire.ts as
toTableListItem, which the route and the prefetch now both call. This matters
because listTablesContract's response schema is a passthrough z.custom, so a
client fetch caches the route's JSON verbatim. Seeding listTables() directly
would have put Date objects and the server-only metadata field under a key the
hook never sees them on.
- pinned items: extracts the route's inline query into lib/pinned-items/queries.ts
as listPinnedItemsForUser, which the route now calls too.
- workspace members: getWorkspaceMemberProfiles already existed; the prefetch
calls it directly.
normalizeColumn moves from app/api/table/utils.ts to lib/table/wire.ts with ten
importers repointed. That also removes a pre-existing lib/* -> app/api/* boundary
violation in lib/table/import-runner.ts. No response shape changes: the v1/v2
edits are import-path moves only.
Every converted read proves the viewer first and caches nothing when that fails,
so an unauthorized viewer's client fetch still reaches the route for the real
403. Authorization equivalence was checked by unfolding both paths to
checkWorkspaceAccess rather than assumed.
* improvement(prefetch): collapse the duplicated folder prefetch and unify the call shape
- Extract prefetchResourceFolders. The same eight-line folder prefetch was
written three times, varying only by resourceType, with the key, stale time
and mapper kept in sync by hand.
- Adopting it removes the conditional spread from the tables and knowledge
prefetches. Tables can now early-return, matching prefetchFilesBrowser:
prefetchResourceListChrome already self-guards on the same cached host
context, so a null context meant the function did nothing either way.
- Take userId as string | undefined everywhere and guard inside, so every
prefetch module has one calling convention rather than two.
- Export toWireTimestamp and use it for the create-table response's own copy of
the same idiom, and drop a cast that the extraction made dead: the parameter
is already TableDefinition, whose schema is TableSchema.
- Read params and the session concurrently on the tables and knowledge pages,
matching the files page, and drop TSDoc that restated each prefetch's own.
* fix(prefetch): keep the tables list on its route and cut the executor edge
Reading listTables from a page prefetch put the executable tool registry into
the Tables page server graph — ~4,700 modules, which check:tool-registry-boundary
rejects. lib/table/service reaches workflow-columns by several independent
paths (directly, and through jobs/service and rows/service), so severing one
edge is not enough; untangling that belongs in its own change.
- The tables list goes back through GET /api/table, with the reason recorded so
the next person does not repeat the attempt. Folders and chrome on that page
stay on the data layer.
- stripGroupDeps moves to its own leaf module. It is a pure projection over a
WorkflowGroup, but living beside the group runtime meant every importer of
lib/table/service paid for the executor to get it.
Net effect on the Tables page graph: 2,186 modules to 1,742.
* perf(prefetch): finish the migration, delete the legacy helper, ratchet page graphs
Answers the question the previous commit left open: the tables list did not have
to stay on HTTP. lib/table/service reached the executor through
jobs/service -> rows/service -> workflow-columns, for one symbol.
pendingDeleteMask is a delete-visibility SQL clause with no executor
involvement, so it moves to its own leaf and that chain is cut. The tables
prefetch now reads the data layer like every other one, and
prefetch-internal-fetch.ts is deleted: nothing in the app calls its own API over
HTTP during a server render any more.
stripGroupDeps likewise moves to a leaf rather than being re-exported through
workflow-columns, so its importers no longer pull the executor to get a pure
projection.
React Query mechanism fixes, all found by audit:
- settings/[section] fired two prefetches without awaiting them. Only a settled
query is dehydrated, so those were shipped mid-flight; a rejection hydrated
into an error state retryOnMount: false never retries, leaving the panel
broken for the session. Awaited now, and the pending-dehydration opt-in is
removed since nothing streams.
- The viewer profile was prefetched by both the layout and the settings page.
Separate server QueryClients mean that was a real second read per request.
- prefetchSubscriptionData was dead, and hand-rolled an unannotated raw fetch.
- retry is scoped to the browser. Query core defaults it to 0 on the server;
stating one value for both opted awaited prefetches into a retry backoff. The
gcTime default is dropped entirely — 5 minutes is already the browser default,
and setting it explicitly overrode the server's Infinity, leaving a live timer
and payload per request.
check:tool-registry-boundary now also ratchets per-page module counts against a
committed baseline, attributing a regression to the import that caused it via a
dominator tree. It caught a +444 regression in this branch by hand; it would
have caught it in CI. Its import regex also missed bare side-effect imports,
so `import '@/tools/registry'` could have slipped past it entirely.
Prefetch guidance added to .claude/rules/sim-queries.md.
* fix(prefetch): correct the extracted module's db imports and stale rationale
Audit findings from the migration.
- pending-delete-mask imported its schema tables from @sim/db rather than
@sim/db/schema, which the module it came from was careful to split. The
global test mocks are bound per-entrypoint and only the schema mock exports
tables, so every suite that reaches pendingDeleteMask would have failed on a
missing mock export. Restored to the original convention, and the same split
applied to the new pinned-items queries module before it grows a test.
- The settings prefetch and page justified awaiting with a mechanism this
branch removed — pending queries being shipped with their promise. Only a
settled query is dehydrated now, so an unawaited prefetch is dropped from the
payload entirely. Same conclusion, correct reason, and no longer contradicting
the rule this branch added.
- Removed the doc block left orphaned above validateSchema when stripGroupDeps
moved out of workflow-columns.
Skill projections regenerated after trimming the boundary skill.
* chore(table): drop a section separator comment
Separators like these are non-TSDoc decoration that CLAUDE.md already rules
out. This is the only one in a file this branch touches; the rest of the repo
is swept separately.
* chore: remove section separator comments
CLAUDE.md already rules these out ("No ==== separators. No non-TSDoc
comments"), but 546 of them had accumulated across 48 files. They decorate
rather than explain, and they drift: a separator says "Validation" while the
code beneath it moved elsewhere, as one in workflow-columns already had.
Pure deletion — no source line was touched, and lines inside template
literals were skipped so nothing in a generated string changed.
|
||
|
Vikhyath MondretiandClaude Opus 5
|
e8d278b6e4 |
fix(files): stop the collaborative editor rewriting and reflowing a document on open (#6652)
* fix(files): stop the collaborative editor rewriting and reflowing a document on open Opening a file rewrote it. Binding an editor to a seeded document emits a Yjs update of its own — ProseMirror appends an empty paragraph to any doc that does not end in one — which the relay saw as a real edit and persisted. Every open therefore uploaded the file under a FRESH storage key and deleted the old one, 404ing the page's own in-flight content read, bumping "Last Updated" just from viewing, and churning a blob per open. Worse, a trailing blank line cannot serialize, so the file never recorded that paragraph and nothing reconciled the two: each client that seeded without seeing another's contribution stacked one more. A real document reached 18 against the placeholder's 1 — measured as the pane growing several hundred pixels the instant the live editor took over. - Seed and merge through the editor's own normal form (`editorNormalForm`), so binding is a no-op and `canonicalizeYDoc` collapses an accumulated run back to one. Placed at the collab boundary, not in `parseMarkdownToDoc`: only the CRDT has to agree with the editor — every other consumer of the parse renders through a real editor that normalizes itself. - Skip a persist whose projection already matches the durable bytes. Byte length is the free reject, so the compare read only happens when a no-op write is actually on the table. - Revoke collaborative readiness on a fatal join. The sticky `syncedOnce` latch outlived the document: after a readiness timeout the provider drops `synced` so the gate closes, but the latch re-opened it on the offline fallback's seed flag — handing back an EDITABLE editor on a document the provider had abandoned, with client autosave gated off because collaboration is nominally on. Keystrokes went nowhere and vanished on reload, with no error shown. - Recover from a superseded storage key instead of stranding the reader: a 404 re-resolves the file record, so the read re-keys onto the current object. And do not focus-refetch durable bytes while the relay owns durability. - Prefetch the workspace file list in the layout, where the sidebar already reads it. `HydrationBoundary` defers an already-seen query to an effect that SSR never runs, so a page-level prefetch of that key could not reach the server render — the file route rendered a spinner and disagreed with the client about the header's markup (a hydration mismatch). - Load the document font with `display: block`. A swap repaints prose in metric-adjusted Arial first, so paragraphs re-wrap when the real face lands. Also: a detail-route `loading.tsx` (the segment was inheriting the list chrome), `normalize.ts` renamed to `field.ts` now that it holds only the field constant, and the duplicate `COLLAB_DOC_FIELD` in the streaming path folded into it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(files): serve a whole document on join, and stop persistence deadlocking Opening a file right after an edit replayed it — the block you had just moved moved again, in front of you. A room rebuilds itself from the file's Redis stream one entry at a time, into the same Y.Doc that fans every update out to its room, and the join attached the socket before that finished and before the server seed. So a client was never sent the document; it was sent the document's history, and it watched that replay. The new join-readiness test reproduces it exactly — ['AAA', 'BBBAAA'] where one state was due — and fails without the fix. Underneath it, persistence had deadlocked. The If-Match token is a REMEMBERED timestamp: held in the room, which dies with it, and in a cluster key written fire-and-forget. A relay that exits in the moments after a successful write comes back holding a version older than the file's, every persist then fails the CAS, and because a conflict neither writes nor advances the token, that document can never be persisted again. Measured on a live file: token 1786594348911 against a content version of 1786594418409, with 103 unpersisted entries still in the stream. The durable markdown froze there — and the editor's placeholder is built from it, so every reload painted the pre-edit document and the live one corrected it on screen. - Assemble a room before attaching a client to it. The join awaits the stream catch-up and the seed, so the first sync IS the finished document, in one message. The seed is memoized on the room, so concurrent joins wait for the same one instead of the second being served an empty doc; a task that loses the seed lock PULLS the winner's seed from the stream rather than waiting for the tailer to push it, which is what left a freshly uploaded file read-only until its readiness deadline lapsed. - Drop the client-side quiet-frame gate that was standing in for this. It was unsound in both directions: it delayed a document that was already correct, and it opened mid-flight anyway whenever updates arrived more than a frame apart, which is what a cross-region Redis and a long room history produce. - Await the cluster version write after a successful persist. It is the only record that survives a teardown, and one round trip after a blob write is not a cost worth a wedged document. - On a version conflict, ask the CONTENT, not the clock. If the file still holds the bytes this document last projected — the tag written with every persist — then nothing out-of-band exists to protect, so re-sync the token and write. Any other bytes and the conflict stands exactly as before. - Actually run the stale-storage-key recovery. It was requested from inside the failing read's own queryFn, where react-query drops it, so nothing re-resolved the record and the reader sat on a dead key showing "Failed to load file content" until something unrelated refetched. It now runs off that cycle and cancels a read already in flight, which could only hand back the dead key. While the record is re-resolving the surface reports loading, not failure. - One document per file, for its whole life. A document rebuilt from markdown is a DIFFERENT document to Yjs — its items carry new client ids — so a client still holding the old one merges the file into itself, twice, on both sides. The seed now stores what it builds (until that row existed, a file opened but never edited was rebuilt on every open) and resumes it with a CRDT diff when the markdown moved on out-of-band. A document also carries an identity the join ack names, so a tab that outlived its room is refused rather than merged. - Let a browser keep an embedded image. The inline route sent no-cache with no validator, so every open re-downloaded the whole image — measured at ~1 MB per open of a real document, with the image area blank until it landed. A `key` names one storage object and a content write never rewrites one, so those bytes are immutable; a `fileId` names the file, whose bytes move, so that form still revalidates. * fix(files): name every collaborative document, and only cache what the URL names Two findings from review, both real. A document stored before identities existed is returned by the seed's fast path on every open, and that path never named one — so those files could never acquire an identity, and the join-ack guard could never fire for them. That is the population most likely to have a tab that outlived its room, which is the case the guard exists for. The fast path now names an unnamed document and stores it, once: minting without storing would name it differently on every open and the guard would start refusing clients that hold the very same document. The inline route marked a response immutable whenever the caller passed a key, but a key is resolved to a FILE and the file's current key is what gets streamed. A content write landing between those two reads would serve the new bytes under a URL naming the old object — and cached for a year, that is wrong forever. The flag is now what it always meant: the URL names the exact object that was streamed. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Waleed
|
e56b28857c |
fix(workflow): draw a highlighted edge over the ordinary ones (#6642)
* fix(workflow): draw a highlighted edge over the ordinary ones An edge's z came from the nesting depth of the container it belongs to, and a highlighted edge kept that depth like any other. A line one level deeper therefore sat above it and painted straight through the highlight, cutting it in half wherever the two crossed. Give a highlighted edge — selected, or connected to the selected card — the top tier of the edge band instead. Depth only ever ordered edges against each other, and once the user has picked one out, being drawn whole matters more than which container it came from. The tier stays inside the band, below the cards, deliberately: highlighted edges were elevated over the cards once before and drew across the chrome of their own endpoints. A line belongs behind cards, knobs and the action-bar swell whether or not it is highlighted, so ordinary edges give up the top of the band rather than the band being widened into the cards. * fix(workflow): elevate the connection preview edge with the rest It renders highlighted — its data carries `isConnectedToSelection` — but it was the one call site left taking a depth tier, so the line being drawn could be crossed by an ordinary edge in a deeper container. Highlighted now means elevated with no exception. Also drop the export on the highlighted tier: nothing outside the module reads it, and the band's tiers are an implementation detail of `getEdgeZIndex`. * fix(workflow): give the edge highlight one definition The z-index elevation I added checked canvas selection only, while the edge darkens for panel focus too — a block open in the editor lights its edges, and those stayed depth-tiered, so an ordinary edge could still cut through the highlight. The bug I set out to fix, on the path I had not covered. The condition already existed in two places and the second one carries a comment saying it must mirror the first exactly, because a knob checking fewer conditions than the line leaves a dark line running into a light knob. Adding the z would have made a third copy, and the finding here is what the third copy gets you. One predicate now, in `edge-highlight`, used by the line, the knobs, and the z. The canvas subscribes to the panel store rather than reading `getState()`, since the z has to be recomputed when the open block changes. |
||
|
Waleed
|
128054ea51 |
fix(workflow): stop subflows resizing themselves after every load (#6639)
* fix(workflow): stop subflows resizing themselves after every load
A container sized itself from its children, and when a child had not yet
reported a height it used `estimateBlockDimensions` in its place — a guess of
`ceil(subBlockCount / 2)` rows, which read a 39-field Gmail card as 276px tall
against the 112px it draws. The container painted that number, the real height
arrived a frame later, and it visibly resized between the two. Nothing is
persisted, so it happened on every refresh.
A card's height depends on what it actually renders — which rows survive its
conditions, whether it draws a summary sentence, and for a reactive field even
a credential it has to fetch — so the card is the only thing that can know it.
Size only from heights the children have themselves reported, and hold the
container at its current size until they have. `getBlockDimensions` keeps the
estimate for the callers that only need a rough box (clamping a drag, placing a
paste) and is now that same lookup plus the fallback.
Also stop `calculateContainerDimensions` counting the container's chrome twice.
Child coordinates are relative to the container's own origin and are already
held clear of the header by `clampPositionToContainer`, so a child's far edge is
the distance to cover and only the trailing padding is owed on top. Adding the
header and leading padding again left every container 66px taller and 16px
wider than its contents.
* fix(workflow): gate container sizing on this session's reported layout
Two holes in the measurement gate, both from reading the wrong field.
`height` is a persisted column and `data.width` / `data.height` persist a
container's last size, so a block that has not reported yet can still carry last
session's numbers — reachable through paste, import, and checkpoint restore. The
gate treated those as reported and sized from them.
Nested containers had it worse: an inner container with an unreported descendant
handed back its 500x300 default as though it were measured, so the outer
container sized to that and resized again once the descendant filled in — the
same two-step this change exists to remove.
`layout` is in-memory only and written by exactly the two places that know: a
card through `updateBlockLayoutMetrics`, a container through
`updateNodeDimensions`. Reading it means "reported during this session" and
nothing else, and an inner container that is still waiting reports null, so the
outer one waits with it.
`getBlockDimensions` keeps the persisted height and the estimate as fallbacks —
its callers only need a rough box, where a stale height still beats a guess.
* Revert "fix(workflow): gate container sizing on this session's reported layout"
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Waleed
|
7022e2ef4f |
fix(workflow): stop the coloured knob leaving a barb at each shoulder tip (#6632)
The connection knob is a recolour of one stretch of the card outline, so its path has to be the outline's own path. Two things pulled it off: Its span was cut at the exact point the bulge falls under the visibility threshold, which is not one of the points the silhouette sampled — so the knob sat on a grid of its own. And a span clamped its first and last control points to the bare perimeter tangent, where the silhouette derives every control point from the samples either side of it, so those two segments bowed differently from the curve they were painted over. The knob was left still flat where the silhouette had already begun its descent, and the uncovered sliver of dark stroke read as a small spur poking off the shoulder. It is clearest on the Error output's outer shoulder, against the card's bottom-right corner. Measure the span against the interval the silhouette resamples the bulge over rather than in whole pixels, and sample a step wide on each side before trimming back, so every emitted segment has the neighbours the silhouette had. The knob's commands now come out identical to the silhouette's, which the tests pin — including for merged intervals and odd tab lengths, where measuring in whole pixels would still have landed half a step off. The painted footprint is unchanged. |
||
|
Waleed
|
366829b6b0 |
fix(v2): derive the log and run status enums from the persisted status list (#6612)
* fix(v2): derive the log and run status enums from the persisted status list
`GET /api/v2/logs` and `GET /api/v2/logs/{runId}` parse the raw
`workflow_execution_logs.status` column against a six-value enum that omits
`paused`, so a run holding that value returns 500. The list response is
validated whole-page, so one such row 500s every page it lands on, and the
row is durable until the run is resumed, cancelled, or failed.
`paused` is not written by an ordinary human-in-the-loop pause — that path
persists `pending` (logging-session.ts:1180). It is written by
`PauseResumeManager.markResumeAttemptFailed`, which fires on any
`ResumeAdmissionError`: a workspace over its usage limit, an archived or
undeployed workflow, or a concurrent resume losing the claim race. That is a
routine business path.
The enum was supposed to be protected by an `AssertNever` exhaustiveness gate,
but the gate was vacuous: it compared against `PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus`,
a hand-written union that was itself missing `paused`, because the write goes
through a raw `sql` CASE fragment Drizzle cannot type-check. Adding `paused` to
both lists would leave the same vacuous gate in place for the next status.
Instead, `PERSISTED_WORKFLOW_EXECUTION_STATUSES` becomes the single runtime
source of truth, `PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus` is derived from it, and both
v2 contracts derive their enums from the const rather than re-declaring them.
Both surfaces pass the column through verbatim, so their reported set is the
persisted set by definition — there is no editorial choice for a gate to force,
only the question of whether a newly persisted status should be public, which
the option-list tests now pin. The `[...V2_PERSISTED_RUN_STATUSES, 'paused']`
append on the runs contract is deleted rather than adjusted; it would otherwise
be a duplicate.
Alternatives rejected:
- A `.catch()` or `safeParse` in the presenters is dead code:
`v2-json-route.ts:271` re-parses the whole body with the same schema.
- Normalizing `markResumeAttemptFailed` to write `pending` would remove the
distinction the resume claim query at human-in-the-loop-manager.ts:973 relies
on, and leaves the contract wrong for any other future status.
- Typing the Drizzle column does not help: the offending write is a raw `sql`
fragment, and `packages/db` cannot import the app's status list.
The v2 workflows spec changes are reordering and description only — the value
set there already contained `paused`. The v2 logs spec gains `paused`, which is
additive and safe while the whole `/api/v2` surface is behind the off-by-default
`v2-api` flag; it must land before v2 GA, after which it would be breaking.
* fix(v2): document both provenances of a reported paused run status
* fix(v2): stop promising a paused discriminator the response cannot always provide
* fix(v2): describe the paused discriminator as the code actually records it
|
||
|
Waleed
|
34d65df7d6 |
fix(sdk): make the 0.2.0 SDK release safe to publish (#6616)
The v2 SDK migration (#5273, #6564) shipped five breaking changes in both
SDKs but got the release mechanics wrong in three separate ways, and left
one of the two rewrites unable to complete a single successful call.
Versions. packages/ts-sdk/package.json read 0.1.3 -- a patch digit added
inside an unrelated compatibility commit, never deliberated. npm expands
^0.1.2 to >=0.1.2 <0.2.0, so every existing consumer would have picked the
break up on a lockfile refresh: AsyncExecutionResult.jobId renamed to
runId, executionId dropped from that interface, a failed sync run now
throwing instead of resolving {success:false}, the request body reshaped,
and the endpoint moved to /api/v2 with no fallback. 0.2.0 excludes every
existing range, so the upgrade becomes opt-in. packages/python-sdk carries
the identical break and was never bumped at all, so its publish job would
have skipped green at the "version already exists" gate and left the repo
and PyPI silently divergent; it moves 0.1.2 -> 0.2.0 in lockstep, along
with the __version__ string in simstudio/__init__.py, which tracks
pyproject and would otherwise have started lying. setup.py is left at
0.1.1: it is unchanged from main and demonstrably unread (0.1.2 published
from pyproject while setup.py already said 0.1.1). It wants deleting, in
its own commit.
A 404 fallback was considered and rejected. The legacy 202 body's statusUrl
points at /api/jobs/{jobId}, so mapping jobId onto runId would hand the
caller an id that getWorkflowRun cannot resolve against that same old
server -- a successful execute followed by an inexplicable failure on the
next call is a worse contract than a clean 404. Both READMEs instead state
the minimum server version and name the endpoint to check for.
Cancelled runs. packages/python-sdk computed success as status != 'failed',
so a run cancelled out of band reported success=True. The TypeScript SDK
uses a closed whitelist and reports False, and before the migration both
SDKs read the server's own value, which was False -- so this was a Python
regression, not merely an inconsistency. Fixed by mirroring the whitelist.
The v2 contract enumerates exactly completed|failed|paused|cancelled, so
narrowing the blacklist to a whitelist cannot drop a live value, and a
status added later now defaults to "not successful" rather than silently
reporting True. WorkflowExecutionResult gains a status field because
Python, unlike TypeScript, does not throw on 'failed' -- so success=False
alone is ambiguous there in a way it is not in the TypeScript SDK, which
is why status is not added to both.
Rate-limit header. Found while auditing the two SDKs for further
divergence, and the reason the Python bump could not have shipped as it
stood: every authenticated v2 response now carries X-RateLimit-Reset as an
ISO 8601 timestamp (recorded by v2RateLimits.publicApi, stamped by
withRouteHandler). The Python SDK parsed it with int(), raising a bare
ValueError that no handler in execute_workflow catches -- so every
successful v2 execution raised instead of returning. None of the legacy
endpoints the SDK previously called record a rate-limit snapshot, which is
why the latent int() survived until the v2 move. The TypeScript SDK
already branches on the format; _parse_reset_header mirrors it, including
degrading an unrecognised value to 0, because a quota hint must not take
down the call it rode in on.
Timing metadata. The v2 rewrite stopped forwarding startedAt/endedAt, which
main passed through and the TypeScript SDK still reports; restored under
the same startTime/endTime keys the TypeScript SDK uses.
Tests: cancelled/failed/paused status coverage, the ISO reset header, and
the restored metadata keys, each verified red against the unfixed line
first. The TypeScript suite gains matching cancelled/paused and ISO-reset
pins -- they pass against today's source by design, and were confirmed to
fail against a deliberately degraded copy so they are not toothless.
Deliberately not included: a CI guard failing a PR that changes SDK source
without a version bump. It would have caught this twice over, but it is a
new script and workflow rather than a fix to the defect at hand.
Review revision. bun.lock recorded packages/ts-sdk at 0.1.3 and was left
stale by the first pass, so the repo asserted two versions for the same
workspace package -- in a change whose whole thesis is that the version
strings had diverged. It does not break CI (bun 1.3.14 accepts the
mismatch under --frozen-lockfile, confirmed here), but
|
||
|
Waleed
|
8f85ded35f |
fix(workflows): pin a stored block retry policy when loading it (#6614)
`workflow_blocks.retry` is a jsonb column written verbatim. Three of its writers never validate what they store: the realtime batch-add and replace-state ops take untyped block records, and the admin/superuser import routes persist externally-authored workflow JSON. `load.ts` then asserted the blob was already a `BlockRetryConfig` and handed it straight to the HTTP boundary, where `workflowBlockStateSchema` bounds `maxTries` to 2..5 and `waitBetweenTriesMs` to 0..5000. That schema is shared between the PUT `/state` body, where the bound is right, and the GET `/api/workflows/[id]` and `/state` responses, where it is fatal. The response `.parse` in the shared route builder throws a ZodError, which is not an `OrchestrationError`, so the error policy declines it and it falls through to a 500. One out-of-range or partial stored value therefore made a workflow permanently unopenable, with no in-product repair — every UI write path reads the workflow first. The feature already declares clamp-on-read as its contract: the commit that added it says bounds are clamped on read rather than rejected, the TSDoc on `resolveBlockRetryConfig` says the same, and `block-retry.test.ts` asserts it. Execution has always honoured that. Only the read boundary disagreed, so that is what this fixes: the loader now constructs a real `BlockRetryConfig` from the blob through `normalizeBlockRetryTries` / `normalizeBlockRetryWaitMs`, filling defaults for missing fields and carrying `enabled` across unchanged. `loadWorkflowFromNormalizedTablesRaw` is the single read choke point for both apps — `@sim/workflow-persistence` for the Next app and the realtime server's full-state emit — so one edit repairs every reader, including rows that are already out of range, and the row self-heals on the next save. It matches `clampParallelBatchSize` a few lines below, which already pins a stored subflow value on the same path. Alternatives rejected: - Validating on write. It leaves every existing bad row fatal forever, and it would have to be repeated across three realtime ops plus roughly a dozen `saveWorkflowToNormalizedTables` callers, none of which share a validation seam. - Bounding `BlockRetrySchema` in `@sim/realtime-protocol`. Its own TSDoc is correct that batch-add and replace-state bypass it, so this closes one writer and leaves the 500. - Relaxing the response contract. It stops the 500 but leaves the editor rendering a number execution will never run. A test now pins the write bound so that shortcut fails loudly. - `resolveBlockRetryConfig`. It returns null for a disabled policy, which would erase the numbers a builder configured every time state is read. Tests: six cases in `packages/workflow-persistence/src/load.test.ts` (four red before this change) covering out-of-range enabled, out-of-range disabled with `enabled` preserved, missing fields, a non-boolean flag, an untouched in-range policy, and NULL meaning "runs once"; plus a contract test that the write bound still rejects out-of-range input. |
||
|
Waleed
|
d96f3f95c8 |
perf(db): drop 0287's two zero-row scans from the ACCESS EXCLUSIVE hold (#6609)
drizzle-orm 0.45.2 runs every pending migration inside ONE transaction (node_modules/drizzle-orm/pg-core/dialect.js:60-71), and migrate.ts:212 sets `statement_timeout = 0`. So the ACCESS EXCLUSIVE that 0287:2's ADD COLUMN takes on `workflow_blocks` is held, unbounded, through 0288 and 0289 to COMMIT — `lock_timeout` at migrate.ts:213 bounds acquisition only, exactly as that file's own TSDoc at :76-78 says. Every editor load, workflow save, executor block read, and realtime canvas op queues behind it platform-wide, and migrations run before image promotion (ci.yml:113-133), so the stall lands on 100% old-version traffic. Two of the three statements inside that hold did nothing. `data.errorEnabled` never existed in a released version — `git log origin/main -S errorEnabled` returns zero commits across main's entire history — so both statements filtered on it match zero rows, and the file's own comment said as much. There is no index on the `data` expression, so each was a full sequential scan of the whole table. Measured on PostgreSQL 17.9 against a 328 MB / 200k-row fixture built to the same bytes-per-row shape as the reported production table: 0287:2 ADD COLUMN 0.5 ms metadata-only, takes AccessExclusiveLock 0287:11 edge backfill 21 ms Nested Loop -> Index Scan on the PK 0287:20 (deleted) 47 ms Seq Scan, 200,000 rows removed, 0 matched 0287:22 (deleted) 47 ms Seq Scan, 200,000 rows removed, 0 matched A concurrent primary-key SELECT started 50 ms into the transaction was blocked 53-219 ms before and 22-25 ms after — the latter indistinguishable from the 21-33 ms control with no migration running at all. The two deleted statements accounted for 80,520 buffer accesses (~629 MB of in-lock I/O on that fixture) and 81% of the transaction's work. Editing an already-merged migration in place is safe here specifically because drizzle writes `hash` but never reads it back: the skip test at dialect.js:56-63 compares `created_at` against `folderMillis` only. The edit is therefore a no-op on every database that already applied 0287 (staging, dev, branch DBs) and takes effect only where it has not run. `meta/_journal.json` and the snapshot prevId chain are untouched. The only casualty is a stale `data.errorEnabled` key on branch databases a developer created it on. Nothing reads it: save.ts:50 and load.ts:89 both read the `error_enabled` COLUMN, and load.ts passes `data` through untouched. Alternatives rejected, each checked against the code rather than assumed: - An embedded `COMMIT;` to end the transaction early. 0289's four CREATE TYPE, its CREATE TABLE, and its three CREATE INDEX all lack IF NOT EXISTS, so a mid-batch failure in autocommit leaves them applied-but-unjournaled and the replay dies on 42710 — which migrate.ts:219 only retries for 55P03. That turns a transient stall into a wedged deploy. - Moving the statements to a new file after 0289. All pending files share one transaction, so it buys exactly zero lock reduction. - Rewriting the surviving backfill as `WHERE id IN (SELECT source_block_id FROM workflow_edges WHERE ...)`. Measured both: planner-equivalent. `source_handle` is unindexed, so both forms seq-scan `workflow_edges` (7.5 ms, identical) and then index-scan `workflow_blocks` on the primary key — it never scans that table. The IN form adds a HashAggregate and 1,170 more buffers, so it is marginally worse. Left as shipped. - Promoting the `data-backfill` lint from warn to annotate. `readAnnotation` only requires a non-empty reason and 0287 already supplies one per statement, so the rule would fire zero findings. 0288's nullable `retry` column is correct as-is and unchanged. Both delete-and-reinsert save paths on the deployed version (save.ts:30-63 and the realtime REPLACE_STATE handler) reset `error_enabled` to false and `retry` to NULL for a workflow saved by an old replica during the rollout; the ordinary realtime block upsert does not, because its `set` clause omits both columns. That residue is tolerable: everything the surviving backfill writes is re-derived from the edge set at workflow-block.tsx:754 and lib/workflows/persistence/utils.ts:196-201, and `retry` ships in this same release so it has no installed base. `bun run check:migrations origin/main` drops from three data-backfill warnings to one. The real migrator applied all 289 journal entries to a fresh PostgreSQL 17.9 database with the edited file, producing `error_enabled boolean not null default false` and `retry jsonb`. |
||
|
Waleed
|
068422b3ff |
refactor(audit): derive updatedFields through one shared helper (#6604)
* refactor(audit): derive updatedFields through one shared helper Six copies of Object.keys(updateData).filter(k => k !== 'updatedAt') across four files decided, independently, which columns an audit row reports. The exclusion set is an audit convention, not a local detail, so it moves to @sim/audit as auditUpdatedFields and the exclusion becomes a single edit. The admin organizations route evaluated the expression twice in one handler and filed it under the metadata key `fields` while every other site uses `updatedFields`, so any consumer filtering on updatedFields silently missed org updates. It now computes once and uses the shared key; nothing reads metadata.fields. auditMock carries the real implementation rather than a stub, since callers under test derive their audit metadata through it. The two suites that hand-roll an @sim/audit factory source it from there. * test(audit): pin the testing mock's copy of auditUpdatedFields @sim/audit devDepends on @sim/testing, so the mock cannot import the real helper without closing a package cycle. Assert parity from the audit side instead, where the dependency already runs the safe direction, so a change to the exclusion convention cannot leave mocked callers validating behavior the deployed helper no longer has. |
||
|
Siddharth Ganesan
|
380aca2b61 |
fix(desktop): fix background tab spawning (#6590)
* Update tab spawning * update import |
||
|
Waleed
|
7c05e36049 |
fix(api): close five defects found auditing the v2 migration against main (#6575)
* fix(tables): stop a column retype from nulling empty-string cells A type conversion rewrote every cell holding '' to null. Main only nulled a blank the target type could not read; '' is a real stored value that both string and json columns accept, so string->json and json->string silently destroyed those cells. Worse on a required target: countEmptyCells matches only a missing key, SQL NULL, or '[]', so '' passes the required guard and the rewrite then wrote null behind a constraint that had just succeeded. The per-cell decision is now the pure retypeCellRewrite, restoring main's rule: null a blank only when the target cannot read it, otherwise coerce. * fix(execution): release the concurrency slot when a group cancel is refused The stop-the-work effects (durable Redis abort record, queue-job cancel, in-process abort) all fire before the workflow-group sidecar is consulted, and none can be undone. When the sidecar refuses the claim we throw a conflict, which skipped releaseExecutionSlot and stranded the plan concurrency reservation until it expired. Every conflict return is a terminal-or-absent state - a missing log row, a log already completed or errored, or a terminal cell - so a refusal never means the run is still executing. The slot is released before the throw, keeping the exact success && !isPausedCancellationPath predicate rather than a blanket finally that would free reservations for live runs. * fix(uploads): recover an ambiguous PUT instead of discarding the object Main recovered an upload whose bytes committed but whose response was lost, via a verify endpoint. The session client retries the PUT instead, but every provider now signs a create-only precondition, so the retry returns 409/412, is classified non-retryable, and the session aborts - deleting the object that had already landed. A transient blip on the final ack cost the whole upload. A conflict on a retry attempt is now treated as our own earlier PUT having committed, and completion proceeds. That is safe because completeUploadSession independently verifies the object through assertObjectIdentity, which rejects on uploadId mismatch before anything durable is registered. A first-attempt conflict still fails loudly. * fix(folders): enforce the workspace folder ceiling on the create path Readers bound the active path index at MAX_FOLDERS_PER_WORKSPACE and throw once a workspace exceeds it, but POST /api/folders reached createFolder, which has no maxFolderRows field and never counts. A workspace could therefore be driven past the ceiling, after which the 27 capped read sites failed on a state the product had allowed. createFolder now asserts room inside its transaction, right after the mutation lock, so the count cannot be raced. The refusal is a typed conflict rendering 409 with an actionable message rather than a 500. The check counts rows directly instead of loading the path index, so an already-over-cap workspace gets a clean refusal rather than a read error, and no reader gained a cap. folderMutationStatus also gained the payload_too_large mapping it was missing, which had been rendering a delete-cascade cap breach as an unexplained 500. * fix(skills): route internal skill writes through the shared use cases The internal route made the workspace authorization decision itself, never consulting the skills operation policy, never loading canonical workspace context, and recording an audit entry with no operation id or actor projection. v2 and Copilot already went through the use cases; only this surface did not. GET/POST/DELETE now authenticate, parse, call the shared use case, and present. Request and response shapes are unchanged. Two behavior changes fall out: a write against a deleted workspace is now refused with 404 rather than accepted, and permission-denial text matches the rest of the platform. Legacy internal-JWT auth is dropped because no principal kind expresses that caller and nothing calls it: the whole repo references /api/skills only in two comments, no tool declares an internalRoute to it, and the executor reads skills through a direct listSkills call rather than over HTTP. * fix(folders): enforce the workspace ceiling on the remaining create paths Folder duplication, admin workspace import, and workspace forking all inserted folders without consulting the ceiling that 27 read sites enforce, so any of them could leave a workspace whose reads then fail. Each now asserts room for the rows it is about to add rather than one at a time: duplication measures the whole subtree up front, forking counts its bulk insert, and import counts per segment because that is genuinely one row. assertFolderCollectionHasRoom gained an additionalRows notion for the bulk case, and short-circuits when nothing is being added so an over-cap workspace still reads and still syncs. Duplication deliberately does not take the folder mutation lock. Holding it across the copy would block folder creation workspace-wide for an unbounded time - there is no cap on workflows per subtree and duplicateWorkflow runs sequentially - and narrowing it is impossible because an advisory transaction lock cannot be released early; splitting the transaction would leave a half-copied tree on failure. A rare few-row overshoot near the ceiling is the better trade, and it matches what forking already does. A test asserts the lock is absent so re-adding it is a visible decision. Admin import gained the transaction and lock it never had. Its folder-full refusal escapes the per-workflow result list, because a full tree is a property of the workspace and would otherwise be buried as N failures behind a 200. The fork and promote routes had no catch at all, and withRouteHandler only classifies HttpError, so a refusal rendered as an opaque 500 - twice over, since drizzle wraps the throw. Both now project a classified conflict as 409 and rethrow anything unclassified. * fix(uploads): bound the signed PUT lifetime and advertise its real expiry A single-PUT transfer was signed for the whole 24h upload-session TTL, because expiresAt was reused as both the session lifetime and the signing lifetime. Multipart part URLs in the same file kept 1h, and the pre-migration presigned route signed every PUT for 1h, so the widening was unintended rather than a policy change. No provider clamps below 24h. The PUT presign is now clamped at the provider boundary by a shared UPLOAD_URL_TTL_MS, which the part-URL path also uses so the two cannot drift. An expired PUT URL is deliberately not recoverable: unlike multipart, which re-signs per part call because its progress is durable, a PUT is not resumable, so an expired URL and an interrupted PUT have identical recovery. Nothing leaks, since every provider signs a create-only precondition. Clamping alone would have made the contract lie: the URL would die an hour before the session's advertised expiresAt, with nothing telling an integrator why the 403 happened. The PUT transfer now carries its own expiresAt, mirroring the multipart part-URL field. It is provider-dependent on purpose - cloud transfers report the clamped signature expiry, while the local data plane has no signature and admits against the session, so reporting an hour there would have been a new inaccuracy in the other direction. * chore: delete the dead presigned-upload and skill-adapter paths The presigned upload routes and the internal skills adapters were both replaced during the v2 migration, leaving their implementations behind with no callers. Removed generatePresignedUploadUrl and verifyPresignedUploadReceipt with their three provider helpers, QUOTA_EXEMPT_STORAGE_CONTEXTS and the types it orphaned, and the performCreateSkill/performUpdateSkill/performDeleteSkill adapters with recordSkillEvent and statusForSkillOrchestrationError. Each was verified unreachable across apps, packages, scripts and ee, including barrel re-exports and string access, not just direct imports. recordSkillEvent needed the closest look, since deleting an audit writer can silently drop coverage. The use cases declare the same action, resource, and description, and the framework adds the operation and actor the old helper lacked; recordAudit back-fills actorName and actorEmail from the user table when both are omitted, so the one field the helper passed is not lost. The self-hosting architecture doc described a directUploadSupported flag on an endpoint that no longer exists, and now describes the upload-session flow that replaced it. * refactor(folders): keep the cheap resource facts out of the schema graph Reading a folder resource type's label or its lock support meant importing folderResourceConfig, which imports the db schema for every table it serves and from there reaches lib/table/service, the executor, and the tool registry. That mattered as soon as lib/folders/queries needed a label: queries is reached from workspace-file-manager, which is reached from the files and chat pages, so one import edge put roughly 4,700 modules into those page graphs and broke the tool-registry boundary audit. Labels and lock support now live in a leaf module that imports only a type, and config composes them so there is still one source of truth. The three folder routes that pulled the whole config in for a single boolean read the leaf instead. * fix(skills): apply an upsert batch in one transaction The internal skills route looped the batch, calling an independently committing use case per item. A rejection on a later item left the earlier ones written and audited while the request reported failure - the compound-mutation rule in CLAUDE.md exists for exactly this. No new transaction plumbing was needed: upsertSkills already wraps its whole item loop in one db.transaction, so the partial commit came from calling it N times rather than once. upsertSkillBatch now validates and per-skill authorizes every item before issuing a single write, and createSkill and updateSkill became thin wrappers over it so v2 and Copilot keep one authority for the rules. The compound operation declares the read floor that skills.update already used, and the use case additionally authorizes skills.create when any item lacks an id, still ahead of every write. A read-only member who is a skill editor keeps their edit, and creates are not authorized more loosely than before. Audit projects one entry per committed skill, and analytics moved after the commit so nothing is reported for a rolled-back item. Note metadata.operation for these writes is now skills.upsert rather than skills.create/update; the action field still carries the distinction. * fix(security): close two disclosure gaps and finish the slot-leak fix The payer-pool gate only covered the workspace branch. A personal API key that omits workspaceId takes the account branch, where getHighestPrioritySubscription resolves an organization subscription from any member row regardless of role - so a plain member read the organization-wide credit and storage pool by dropping one query parameter. The account branch is now gated by the same authority, and the storage pool is not queried when it may not be disclosed. Forcing that branch self-scoped instead would have downgraded plan, period, and status, which is what a member needs to see whether the org is blocked. GET /api/v1/logs/executions/[executionId] emitted the workflow snapshot raw, carrying password sub-block values and oauth-input credential ids. It now shares the sanitizer the v2 read already used, extracted so there is one implementation rather than two. Env-var references are still preserved. cancelWorkflowGroupExecution itself was unguarded, so an unexpected throw from its transaction escaped ahead of every release site - the same reservation leak this branch set out to close, still open on the adjacent path. It now releases through the shared predicate and rethrows, because a failed transition means the cell state is unknown and a success-shaped answer would be a lie. The comment claiming the abort record cannot be taken back was false and now states the real reason: a refusal is always a terminal-or-absent state. * fix(v2-api): cover every persisted run status and every capped body The workflow-runs endpoints carried the same omission the logs contract had: the execution logger persists redacting, the run schemas did not list it, and because validation is whole-response one such row returned 500 for an entire page. Both schemas now derive from PersistedWorkflowExecutionStatus behind the same AssertNever gate, so a future status is a type error rather than a production 500. The single-run read keeps its extra queued value, which only it can observe. That schema was also serving as the run-list status filter. Widening it would have accepted a filter value the application input cannot express, so the reported set and the accepted filter are now separate schemas. Routes declaring maxBodyBytes without payloadTooLargeResponse fell back to a bare string with no error code and no private cache header. Rather than patch the four, the default moved into the builders - all three had the hole - which covers 58 body-bearing handlers, and a route override still wins. The five per-route overrides that merely restated the default are gone. Also documents the 413 on the one knowledge route that has a real body cap, adds the rollout gate's 404 to the last v2 operation missing it, and rewords the nextCursor description, which read as though every list were a full-set list. * fix(api): make the shared traits and lifetimes single-sourced The folder resource-traits leaf composed labels into config but restated lock support independently, so the routes reading the trait and the orchestration reading the config could disagree about which resources lock. Config now composes both, and supportsLocking is required rather than optional so a new resource type cannot silently omit it. The upload commit claimed the PUT clamp and the multipart part URLs shared a constant and could not drift. That was true only of the advertised expiry - the three provider signers each hardcoded an hour, so changing the constant would have moved what we advertise while leaving what we sign, recreating exactly the mismatch the clamp removed. Each provider now receives the lifetime in its own unit from the one constant. Table restore hand-rolled its status map and returned the driver message verbatim at 500, leaking the failed statement and its bound parameters - the same defect this branch closed at nine other sites. It and import-csv now use the shared projection; import-csv's result type also had to carry the lock the classifier already set, so a 423 can name it. Deletes v2RowWriteError, which had no callers and would have rendered a locked table as 400 by discarding the 423 it was handed. |
||
|
Siddharth Ganesan
|
2a5e29ad3f |
improvement(updates): validate update path and fix native mac help (#6580)
* Desktop update check * Update script |
||
|
Siddharth Ganesan
|
e7590c828c | improvement(desktop): help menu | ||
|
Theodore Li
|
092311ea68 |
fix(api): restore migrated endpoint and SDK compatibility (#6564)
* fix(api): restore migrated endpoint compatibility * fix(api): close remaining migration regressions * fix(files): validate ensured folder paths * fix(files): project folder path validation * fix(files): align archive regression fixture * fix(tables): avoid partial bulk update failures * fix(auth): project legacy knowledge audits |
||
|
Siddharth Ganesan
|
cb2809001e |
fix(mship, desktop): fix bugs (#6572)
* fix bugs * fix tests * fix(tests): stabilize archive and client boundary coverage |
||
|
Siddharth Ganesan
|
1dd85eb688 |
improvement(desktop): add apple signing, fix some bugs (#6519)
* feat(desktop): sync updater and shell refinements * style(desktop): refine macOS installer layout * chore(desktop): trigger updated prerelease * Unify resource panel collapse controls * Desktop improvemetns * Update * browser updates * fix(desktop): harden browser and terminal tab activity |
||
|
|
263e3ca67e |
improvement(external-endpoints): v2 versions with clean signatures + updated docs based on openapi spec (#5273)
* v0.6.29: login improvements, posthog telemetry (#4026) * feat(posthog): Add tracking on mothership abort (#4023) Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai> * fix(login): fix captcha headers for manual login (#4025) * fix(signup): fix turnstile key loading * fix(login): fix captcha header passing * Catch user already exists, remove login form captcha * improvement(external-endpoints): v2 versions with clean signatures + updated docs * feat(usage): accept X-API-Key on usage-logs list + export /api/users/me/usage-logs and /export now use checkHybridAuth — the same auth /api/users/me/usage-limits already accepts — so external monitors can read summary.bySourceCredits (the source breakdown of usage-limits' aggregate currentPeriodCost) instead of estimating Copilot spend by subtraction. Workspace-scoped keys are pinned to their own workspace's slice of the ledger: the filter defaults to the key's workspace and an explicit mismatch 403s. Both endpoints documented in openapi-core.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(billing): dedicated v2 usage endpoints; keep internal usage routes session-only Replaces the earlier X-API-Key enablement on /api/users/me/usage-logs with a dedicated public surface, so the internal Billing-settings endpoints can evolve with the UI while external monitors get a stable versioned contract: - GET /api/v2/billing/usage — current-billing-period summary with bySourceCredits (the source breakdown external monitors need to watch e.g. Copilot consumption without estimating by subtraction), plus limitCredits and plan - GET /api/v2/billing/usage/logs — cursor-paged credit ledger in the v2 envelope - workspace-scoped keys are pinned to their own workspace's slice; personal keys read the account ledger The public wire is credits-only: usage-logs rows now carry a hasCost boolean instead of dollarCost (the Billing UI only needed the >0 signal), and the rateLimit block is removed from the usage-limits response and docs (deploy-modal tab relabeled accordingly). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(docs): validate OpenAPI specs against the Zod contracts in CI The specs in apps/docs are hand-authored because they carry what Zod never defines — error envelopes, status codes, prose, examples — so they can't be generated; check:openapi validates them instead: - spec integrity: $refs resolve, operationIds unique, 2xx documented, no orphaned component schemas - v2 conventions: every /api/v2 operation documents 401 + 429 and every 4xx/5xx resolves to the canonical { error: { code, message } } envelope - contract cross-check: contracts are auto-discovered from lib/api/contracts/v2 (each carries its method + path); doc<->contract coverage both ways, query/body/response field diffs via z.toJSONSchema - examples: documented request/response examples must parse with the matching contract's actual Zod schemas First run caught real drift, fixed here: 16 stale orphaned schemas in the core spec, the v2 billing ops referencing v1-shaped error components, deploy/rollback examples missing the required nullable lifecycle keys, CreateTableBody missing folderId, a legacy-grammar delete-rows example, and four knowledge document ops missing their required workspaceId query param. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(docs): recursive field diff in check:openapi + the deep drift it found A mutation test showed the doc<->contract field diff only compared top-level properties, so a typo inside the { data } envelope passed. The diff now descends through matching object properties and array items (both sides must expose a property set — passthrough contracts and prose-only docs end the descent instead of false-positive), with the Zod JSON-schema root doubling as the $defs context. Deep drift it immediately caught, fixed here: select-column config (options/multiple) missing from every tables column schema, AddColumnBody hand-rolling a third column shape (now composed from ColumnInput, with position/workflowGroupId as the per-op extensions the contracts actually admit), chunking strategyOptions undocumented, and the deployment lifecycle fields (activeDeployment/latestDeploymentAttempt) missing from DeploymentState. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(security): close the triggerType rate-limit bypass on workflow execute Caller-supplied triggerType flowed unchecked into preprocessExecution, whose checkRateLimit default turns OFF for 'manual'/'chat' — so any API-key caller, and any anonymous public-API caller billed to the workspace owner, could execute unthrottled by sending {"triggerType":"manual"} (async runs also skipped the worker-side check via admissionCompleted). External callers may now only send the redundant 'api' value; internal JWT callers ('workflow'/'mcp') are unaffected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * refactor(execution): extract enqueue/status/cancel into shared libs Prepares the v2 execution surface: handleAsyncExecution's queue logic moves to lib/workflows/executor/enqueue-execution.ts (slot/claim semantics encoded in a discriminated outcome, not HTTP statuses), the execution-status read to execution-status.ts, and the order-sensitive cancel machinery to lib/execution/cancel-workflow-execution.ts. The v1 routes re-render identically — their suites pass unmodified. Also: preprocessExecution gains rateLimitCounter ('sync'|'async') and its 429 now carries code RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED + retryAfterMs (previously indistinguishable from the concurrency 429 and Retry-After was discarded); and the duplicate cancel contract in contracts/logs.ts is unified on the full 5-value reason enum — its narrower copy made requestJson throw a client ZodError when cancelling a paused HITL run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(execution): callable execution service + structured error classifier executeWorkflowService composes the same libs the v1 route holds inline (call-chain guard, execution-id claim, LoggingSession, preprocessing, deployed-state load + file-field processing, timeout-bound executeWorkflowCore, output hydration/compaction) for the deployed-state caller class — the seam the v2 execute route and in-process internal callers share, making the HTTP endpoint syntactic sugar. classifyExecutionError stops discarding the block context that buildBlockExecutionError already attaches at throw sites: failed runs now yield {message, code, blockId, blockName, blockType} with a stable append-only code enum (TIMEOUT/CANCELLED/USAGE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED/ INVALID_INPUT/BLOCK_EXECUTION_FAILED/CHILD_WORKFLOW_FAILED/ OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE/EXECUTION_FAILED), so callers route on error class instead of substring-matching messages — the single place raw errors are interpreted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(api): POST /api/v2/workflows/[id]/execute Thin route over executeWorkflowService: X-API-Key or anonymous public-API auth (sync/stream only for anonymous), strict body with body-flag async (no mode headers on v2), SSE passthrough for stream, and the execution resource response — executionId always present, in-band run failures are status:'failed' with the structured {message, code, blockId, blockName, blockType} error, sync timeout is status:'failed' + TIMEOUT instead of v1's 408, and a Response block's payload stays inside output (authors never control response status/headers on this origin). Async debits the async bucket and the 202 statusUrl points at the v2 executions resource. Adds CLIENT_CLOSED_REQUEST/SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE to the v2 error codes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(api): v2 executions status + cancel with queued backfill GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/executions/[executionId] is the single status URL for sync and async runs: before the async worker writes the durable log row, status is backfilled from the job queue (deterministic job id) as 'queued'/'running' — closing v1's 202-to-pickup 404 window — and failed runs carry the structured error object. POST .../cancel renders the shared cancellation lib in the v2 envelope with the tightened 5-value reason enum. Both authenticate via the shared resolveV2WorkflowAccess (X-API-Key, authz masked as 404, allowPersonalApiKeys honored). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(execution): workflow tool + MCP bridge run in-process workflow_executor (workflow-as-agent-tool) short-circuits in executeTool through WorkflowBlockHandler — the same invocation boundary canvas child workflows use — mirroring the deployed_block_executor precedent. The MCP serve bridge calls executeWorkflowService directly instead of fetching its own execute endpoint; deployment-version pinning, MCP response-size rejection, and the actor override become typed options instead of header sniffing. Both callers drop the double admission slot and duplicate top-level log row the HTTP hop cost, and failed child runs now surface the structured error + child executionId so parents and MCP clients can route on error class and hand providers a reproducible handle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(infra): CORS + CSP coverage for the v2 execute path /api/v2/workflows/:id/execute gets the same wildcard-origin, credential-free CORS policy as v1 (the default credentialed policy would block browser API-key calls and open a cookie CSRF surface) with X-Sim-Stream-Protocol allowed and no X-Execution-Mode (async is body-selected on v2), plus the COEP/COOP/CSP header block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(ui): deploy modal + copilot advertise the v2 execute surface All 20 API-tab snippets move to POST /api/v2/workflows/{id}/execute with the nested {"input": ...} body, async as the "async": true body flag (X-Execution-Mode gone), status polling against the v2 executions resource, the third tab renamed Usage and pointed at /api/v2/billing/usage, and {data} envelope unwraps in the printed responses. Fixes the latent baseUrl derivation (endpoint.split('/api/workflows/')) that would have silently built garbage URLs under a v2 endpoint, and deletes dead code (exampleCommand across 3 sites, getAsyncExampleTitle). Copilot deploy/manage/serializer endpoint builders and the api_trigger bestPractices example follow (the latter also drops its hardcoded staging host). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * docs(api): document the v2 execution surface Adds execute, execution status, and cancel to openapi-v2-workflows.json with the structured ExecutionError schema (append-only code enum + block attribution) and the ExecutionResource contract, documenting the rules that differ from v1: modes are body-selected, a failed run is HTTP 200 with status 'failed', an executionId always means data (never the error envelope), queued status is visible immediately, and Response-block payloads stay inside output. Registers the three pages in the generated workflows meta.json and bumps the route-count baseline. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * feat(api): gate the whole /api/v2 surface behind one flag; UI stays on v1 Every v2 route now runs exactly one check immediately after auth — v2ApiGateError — and answers 404 when the `v2-api` flag is off, so the surface is invisible until it is deliberately rolled out. The gate is keyed on userId only: a workspace/org-keyed check would have to read membership for a caller-supplied id before authorization runs, and its 404-vs-403 split would leak cohort membership (the trap the per-domain table gate worked around by running late). The two executions routes inherit it from the shared access resolver; the tables-specific gate is removed so no route checks twice. `tables-v2-api` stays, now gating only the internal predicate-grammar route /api/table/[tableId]/query — note v2 tables routes move to the unified flag, so enabling them is a `v2-api` decision now. Reverts the deploy modal, copilot handlers, and api_trigger example to the v1 execute endpoint: v1 works unchanged, and the UI must not advertise a surface most users would get a 404 from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CiHhAk2R1NryaS3R8n2yFz * fix(executor): restore child-cost aggregation dropped by the staging merge Staging's custom-block rewrite deleted `aggregateChildCost` from workflow-handler.ts, and git merged that file cleanly — but this branch's workflow-tool-runner.ts, added for the v2 execute migration, still imports it. A silent semantic conflict: no marker, broken build. Taking staging's rewrite is correct, so the helper is defined locally in its one remaining consumer rather than resurrected in the file staging just rewrote. Same four lines over the still-exported `calculateCostSummary`, so a failed child workflow keeps billing the hosted-key spend it consumed instead of reporting $0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(tables): make lib/table/orchestration the single implementation (#6134) * refactor(orchestration): move the shared error contract out of lib/workflows OrchestrationErrorCode and statusForOrchestrationError are the contract every lib/[resource]/orchestration module returns against, but they lived inside the workflows module, so resource-neutral code (lib/folders) already had to import from a workflow path. Moved to lib/core/orchestration/types. Adds a 'locked' class mapping to 423. Both tables and workflows have a lock that forbids a mutation, and each caller was translating that to a status itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(tables): make lib/table/orchestration the single implementation Column update was implemented four times — the UI route, v1, v2, and the copilot table tool — each calling the same column services but owning its own guards, error mapping, and audit. The copies had drifted, and the drift was the bug: v2 was missing both guards, only the copilot copy minted stable option ids, and only v1/v2 audited. performUpdateTableColumn, performDeleteTable, and performDeleteTableRow now own that logic; all ten call sites reduce to auth, parse, call, render. The guards are asserted once in lib/table/orchestration rather than four times against four routes. Behavior this consolidates, previously true on only some paths: - The typeChanging guard. updateColumnType early-returns on an unchanged type and drops any options sent with it, so restating the current type alongside new options silently discarded them. v2 had no guard at all and, since its contract shares v1's body schema, accepted options and ignored them. - The select-unique guard. Each write is its own locked transaction, so a rename or type change paired with a constraint write that is going to fail commits first and then throws, half-applying the schema change. - Stable select-option ids. Cells reference the option id, so an edit that re-sends an option by name has to reuse it or every cell holding it is orphaned. Only the copilot path did this; normalizeSelectOptionsInput moves to lib/table/select-options and now covers every caller. It preserves a supplied id, so it is a no-op for the fully-formed options the HTTP contracts accept. - required forwarded into the type and options writes, so a conversion validates against the constraint the same request is setting. - An audit on every successful update. The UI route and the copilot tool emitted none. - Single-row delete through the row service. v2 did a raw db.delete, skipping assertRowDelete and deleteOrderedRow, so a delete-locked table returned 200 and the row-count bookkeeping never ran. - The delete actor handed to deleteTable, which audits only when a row was actually archived. v1 and v2 omitted it and audited themselves outside that check, emitting TABLE_DELETED for a no-op delete of an archived table. Failure classes come back as OrchestrationErrorCode; v2 renders them through a new v2ErrorForOrchestration, mirroring statusForOrchestrationError on the v1 and UI surfaces, so a given failure maps to the same status everywhere. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(tables): bind the column-update tests to the orchestration function The base's route tests assert which column service each payload reaches — the behavior that now lives in performUpdateTableColumn. They mocked the `@/lib/table` barrel; the orchestration module imports the service directly, so they mock that too and keep asserting the same thing through the extracted implementation. The orchestration tests move onto the base's semantics: writes address the stable column id, a rename rides inside the write it accompanies rather than running first, and the currency guards replace the non-select options guard the service now owns. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(copilot): drop the column-type import the delegation made dead Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(tables): move the audit log out of the table service `lib/table/service.ts` wrote its own audit rows, so whether an operation was audited depended on which function a caller reached for rather than on a user having performed it. That is what let v1 and v2 audit a no-op delete, and what made `deleteTable`'s optional `actingUserId` double as an audit opt-out flag. Worse, most sites fell back to `actingUserId ?? createdBy`, so an unattributed call was logged against the table's *creator*. The copilot `mv` path passed no actor at all: renaming someone else's table recorded them as the renamer. Audit now lives in the orchestration functions — performDeleteTable, performRenameTable, performMoveTableToFolder, performUpdateTableLocks — and the services just write. Internal callers (folder cascade, import rollback) keep calling the service and are silent by construction rather than by remembering to omit an argument. Two services now return what the audit needs: `deleteTable` reports whether it actually archived a row, so a repeat delete logs nothing; `updateTableLocks` returns the before/after locks, since only the locked write can observe the transition its description names. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tables): restore audit provenance and conflict status in orchestration Moving the audits into the orchestration functions dropped three things the routes had been carrying, and added one the orchestration now owns twice. - The v1 and v2 column-update routes passed `request` to `recordAudit`, so their audit rows recorded the caller's IP and user-agent. The orchestration function had no way to receive it. Every table orchestration function now takes an optional `OrchestrationRequestContext` and every HTTP route forwards it; the copilot and VFS callers, which have no request, omit it. - `classifyTableMutation` matched `TableConflictError` on "already exists" appearing in the message and reported it as `validation`, turning the UI route's 409 on a duplicate table rename into a 400. It now matches the type, the way `performRestoreTable` already did. - `captureServerEvent` ran on every delete while the audit was gated on a row actually being archived, so a repeat delete of an archived table still reported `table_deleted`. Both now hang off the same evidence. - The copilot delete path kept its own `captureServerEvent` from when the service did not emit one, double-counting every copilot table delete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a * fix(tables): say which type a no-op column update restated A copilot `update_column` payload whose only content was the column's current type used to return success with the live schema, while the v1, v2, and UI routes rejected the same payload with "No updates specified". Delegating to `performUpdateTableColumn` unified them onto the routes' rejection — correct, but the message tells the caller its request was empty when it named a type. The orchestration function now reports the same thing `updateColumnType` reports when it loses this race concurrently: the column is already that type, re-issue without the type change. An empty payload still reads "No updates specified". Drops the copilot's `outcome.table ?? tableForUpdate` fallback with it — the comment described the no-op that can no longer reach that line, and a success always carries a table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a * refactor(tables): classify failures by type instead of by message text The table module decided HTTP statuses by searching error messages for phrases. `VALIDATION_MESSAGE_FRAGMENTS` and `ROW_WRITE_ERROR_PATTERNS` held 32 substrings between them, and fifteen more lists were inlined in routes — 83 matchers over 17 files, each its own copy of the guesswork and already drifted apart. It made message wording load-bearing: `TableRowLimitError`'s own doc comment noted that its text had to contain "row limit" for a route to answer 400, and adding "already exists" to a rename message silently demoted a 409 to a 400 (the bug fixed one commit ago, by adding another special case). Services now throw `OrchestrationError`, which carries the transport-neutral `OrchestrationErrorCode` the layers above already speak. Classification is one `instanceof` in `orchestrationErrorResponse` (UI + v1) and `v2CaughtOrchestrationError` (v2). Every pattern list is gone. Wording is free to change; an unclassified error still becomes a generic 500, which is what an unexpected fault should be. `asOrchestrationError` walks the `cause` chain rather than testing the caught value directly: drizzle wraps a throw raised inside a transaction callback in a `DrizzleQueryError` whose own message is the failed SQL, so a bare `instanceof` would drop every failure raised inside `withLockedTable`. That is the same reason `rootErrorMessage` had to dig for a root cause before. Three throws stay bare `Error` deliberately — `Table ID mismatch`, `Workspace ID mismatch`, and `Failed to build upsert conflict predicate` are internal invariants no consumer classified, and they keep falling through to a 500. `Insufficient capacity` was in the pattern list with no producer anywhere in the codebase. Status changes, all deliberate: - `'forbidden'` joins the code union so the table-row-limit ceiling keeps its 403; without it this refactor would have flattened it to 400. - import-async's table-limit rejection: 400 -> 403, matching the two other create routes it had drifted from. - Renaming a table to an invalid name: 500 -> 400. `validateTableName` messages don't contain "Invalid", so no matcher ever caught them. - Restoring a table that isn't archived, or into an archived workspace: 500 -> 400. - A duplicate *column* name stays `validation`/400 rather than becoming a 409 like a duplicate table name. Both v1 and the orchestration have always answered 400 for it; changing a published status is not this refactor's job. The twelve tests that changed were asserting the substring mechanism itself, constructing plain `Error`s with magic strings. They now assert the real contract, plus new cases pinning that identical wording carrying no classification stays internal and keeps its message off the wire. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YGzbVDZpe2dEALbu2BUU8a --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): add v2 endpoints for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, folders, and credentials (#6150) * feat(api): add v2 endpoints for MCP servers, skills, custom tools, folders, and credentials * fix(api): correct credential role, skill permission bar, MCP url identity, and custom-tool conflict mapping * fix(api): align credential mutation gating, provider-outage status, and unique-violation conflicts * fix(api): close unique-violation, revival, orphan-write, and env-rename gaps * fix(api): treat every provider-outage code as unavailable on create and update * fix(credentials): use the shared outage predicate on the session update path * fix(contracts): anchor the predicate double-cast annotation to the cast `check:api-validation:strict` counted 9 unannotated double-casts against a baseline of 8, failing CI. The predicate leaf schema was annotated, but the annotation sat above the declaration while the checker anchors on the line carrying the cast — five lines below, at the close of the object literal. The scanner walks back at most three lines and stops at the first non-comment one, so it hit `value: z.unknown().optional(),` and never saw the reason. Splitting the object schema from the cast puts them adjacent, so the existing reason binds. No behavior change — the cast, the schema, and the reasoning are unchanged. Also lowers the rawJsonReads ratchet 6 -> 5 to match the current count, which had drifted down; leaving it high lets a removed raw read silently come back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(skills): point the orchestration error contract at its moved module #6150 branched before #6134, so skill-lifecycle.ts imports @/lib/workflows/orchestration/types — the module #6134 moved to @/lib/core/orchestration/types. Git merged a file deletion on one side with a new file referencing it on the other: no textual conflict, broken build. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(knowledge): make lib/knowledge/orchestration the single implementation (#6154) * refactor(knowledge): make lib/knowledge/orchestration the single implementation Knowledge base create was implemented four times — the internal route, v1, v2, and the copilot tool — and the orchestration around the shared write had drifted. Extract it the same way lib/table/orchestration was: services write, orchestration decides which writes run, guards them, audits them, and returns a transport-neutral failure. Behavior converged, not preserved: - One chunking default (DEFAULT_CHUNKING_CONFIG). The agent defaulted minSize to 1 against the API's 100, so identical input produced differently-chunked knowledge bases depending on who created it. The agent path now chunks at 100. - Every successful mutation is audited inside the orchestration function. The copilot tool called recordAudit zero times, so agent-created knowledge bases, document uploads, updates and deletes left no audit trail at all. - Failures classify by class, not by message text. The knowledge service errors are OrchestrationError subclasses and storage-quota rejections throw a shared StorageLimitExceededError, replacing four separate message greps for "already exists" / "does not have permission" / "storage limit". delete_connector reported the opposite of what happened. It reached the route through an internal HTTP self-call that sent no query string, so the route's keep-documents default always applied while the agent told the user the documents had been removed. The self-call is gone — all four connector operations run in-process — and the orchestration returns the real counts. Also: - OrchestrationErrorCode gains 'payload_too_large' (413 / PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE). Without it, dropping the storage-limit message match would have regressed the documented 413 on knowledge base create and document upload to a 500. - messageForOrchestrationError renders a route's own wording for an unclassified fault, so a driver's message no longer reaches the client on a 500. - v1 and v2 knowledge base update now forward actorUserId, which the service requires for a workspace move; both omitted it. - The connector DELETE route reads deleteDocuments through parseRequest. Its contract declared z.boolean(), which would have rejected the string a query param actually is. - Drop the 409 from POST /api/v2/knowledge/{id}/documents in the OpenAPI spec. Nothing on the upload path throws a conflict; it was only ever reachable by the message match this change removes. Behavior change worth noting: a v1/v2 PUT carrying only the workspaceId scope field and no actual updates now returns 400 rather than 200 with the unchanged knowledge base. Deliberately deferred: document update remains internal-only. Extracting performUpdateKnowledgeDocument makes exposing it on v1/v2 a contract and a route away, but that is a new public surface rather than part of this consolidation. * fix(knowledge): make connector create atomic and stop flattening failures Review round 1 on #6154. - Resolve the billing payer before the connector is committed, not after. A malformed attribution header rejected post-commit left a live connector behind a 500, and a retry created a duplicate plus duplicate sync work. Manual sync resolves before writing its audit for the same reason. - Let the source-config validator carry its own failure class. Collapsing every rejection to `validation` flattened the connector PATCH route's 401 (stale stored credential) and 409 (missing workspace context) into a 400. - Add `unauthorized` to OrchestrationErrorCode. It is the class that 401 was already expressing on this route, and the v2 vocabulary already had UNAUTHORIZED; only the shared union was missing it. - Report a knowledge base that exists but failed to archive as failed, with the reason, rather than as not found. The copilot delete loop folded every non-not-found failure into `notFound`, telling the user it was never there. - Route copilot failures through the same message helper the HTTP surfaces use, so an unclassified fault's raw text (a driver's failed SQL) no longer reaches the agent verbatim while the UI and public APIs get the generic wording. * feat(api): expand the public v2 files surface (#6160) * feat(api): expand the public v2 files surface Adds folder support, rename/restore, move, bulk archive, share, and content replace to /api/v2/files, so managing files by API no longer stops at upload + download + archive-one. Routes are thin: auth -> parse -> perform* -> serialize. Share and content replace get their orchestration extracted first so the session routes and the public ones cannot diverge on the effective-authType resolution, the EE public-sharing gate, or the storage-quota classification. Presigned upload stays session-only: presign does an advisory quota check and the real debit happens in the separate register step, so a caller that never registers leaves unaccounted bytes with no reaper. The buffered multipart path debits inside uploadWorkspaceFile's own transaction. * fix(files): classify folder and content failures instead of 500ing them Bugbot round 1. The v2 routes map errorCode straight to a status, so every manager failure that arrived unclassified became a 500 for what is really a caller-fixable 400 or 404. - Folder manager throws OrchestrationError: missing target/folder -> not_found, reparent cycle / self-parent / restore-into-archived-workspace -> validation. - File manager does the same for the in-transaction 'File not found' paths that the earlier pass missed. - updateWorkspaceFileContent's outer catch re-wrapped everything in a bare Error, which stripped the class off StorageLimitExceededError and the new not_found alike. It now rethrows a classified failure untouched and attaches cause to the generic wrap, so asOrchestrationError can still walk the chain. - Every remaining perform* gained the asOrchestrationError branch. - renameWorkspaceFile returned the pre-update read, so the v2 PATCH reported a stale updatedAt; it now returns the timestamp it actually wrote. Docs: upload auto-suffixes a duplicate name rather than rejecting it, matching the in-app uploader. The description claimed 409 and was simply wrong. * fix(files): surface a failed upload read-back as the real error getWorkspaceFile swallows a query failure and returns null unless throwOnError is set, so a transient blip on the post-upload read reported as 'file could not be read back'. Distinguish the two: a real null after a just-committed write is an invariant break, a query failure is itself. * revert(api): drop the dedicated v2 file-folder routes File folders already live in the shared folder table as resourceType 'file' (#6045 cut them over, #6051 dropped workspace_file_folders), and the remaining file-specific folder machinery is being folded into the generic folder engine. Publishing /api/v2/files/folders/** would pin that transitional split into a public contract we'd then have to keep or break. Files stay folder-aware — folderId/folderPath on the projection, folderId on upload, and the move route — because a folder id is a folder.id and survives the unification untouched. Folder management belongs on /api/v2/folders once that surface serves resourceType 'file'; until then there is no v2 way to enumerate file folders, which is the deliberate gap. The orchestration classification fixes stay: the internal routes and the copilot file-folder tools still call those perform* functions. * fix(files): classify upload failures instead of matching their wording Bugbot round 2. uploadWorkspaceFile had the same outer-catch rewrap that updateWorkspaceFileContent did, so a blown storage quota reached the route as a bare Error and the v2 handler recovered the status by substring-matching the message. Any rewording silently demoted a 413 to a 500. - uploadWorkspaceFile rethrows a classified failure untouched and attaches cause to the generic wrap. - FileConflictError is now an OrchestrationError('conflict'), so a duplicate name classifies like every other conflict. Its 'FILE_EXISTS' discriminator had no readers and is gone; the instanceof checks elsewhere still hold. - The v2 upload handler uses v2CaughtOrchestrationError, dropping all three string matches. Also documents that bulk-archive is best-effort: unknown or already-archived ids are skipped rather than failing the call, and deletedItems is what actually happened. That asymmetry with the single-id DELETE was undocumented. * feat(api): add search, filtering, and sorting to the v2 list endpoints (#6189) * feat(api): add search, filtering, and sorting to the v2 list endpoints One convention across every v2 list, documented on lib/api/contracts/v2/shared.ts: `search` (case-insensitive substring on the resource's natural name field), `sortBy` + `sortOrder` (per-resource enum, never a free string), and enumerated resource-specific filters. Reuses the sortBy/sortOrder pair v2 logs and v2 knowledge-documents already ship rather than inventing a third dialect alongside the Logs filters and the Tables predicate grammar. Every filter and sort is pushed into SQL. GET /api/v2/files previously read the whole scope and sorted/sliced it in JS; it now goes through a new queryWorkspaceFiles that filters, orders, and bounds the page in one query. Cursors are stamped with the sort they were minted under, so replaying one under a different sort is a 400 instead of silently duplicated or skipped rows. * fix(api): validate v2 cursor key values and compare timestamps at ms precision Two review findings, fixed at the root by making a keyset key own its cursor codec instead of hand-writing a decoder per sort. Cursor key values are caller-controlled, and matching the sort stamp and key count was not enough: an unparseable timestamp or a non-numeric size reached the query as an Invalid Date or NaN and surfaced as a 500. Each key now type- checks its own value and rejects a cursor it cannot hold, which both routes render as the documented 400. Timestamp keys now order and compare on date_trunc('milliseconds', col). Postgres keeps microseconds and defaultNow() populates them, but a cursor value round-trips through a millisecond-only JS Date — comparing the raw column against the truncated value re-admitted the page's own last row, duplicating it and stalling pagination outright at a page size of one. Reachable today via workspace_files.updated_at, which insertFileMetadata leaves to defaultNow(). * feat(api): complete the v2 workflows resource with versions and CRUD (#6184) * feat(api): complete the v2 workflows resource with versions and CRUD Adds version listing/detail plus create, update, and delete to the v2 workflows surface, which previously covered only execution and deployment. - GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/versions — cursor-paginated, newest first - GET /api/v2/workflows/[id]/versions/[version] — version + pinned state - POST /api/v2/workflows, PATCH and DELETE /api/v2/workflows/[id] All six delegate to the existing orchestration and persistence helpers; no new domain logic. * fix(api): check folder containment before lock state; reject malformed version cursors assertFolderMutable walks a folder's ancestor chain without filtering on workspace, so inspecting it before containment let a caller tell a locked folder in someone else's workspace (423) from a nonexistent one (400). Create and update now assert containment first, matching the ordering import-workflow.ts already uses. A version cursor that decodes to JSON without a numeric version filtered every row out and returned an empty page with nextCursor null, which reads as a clean end-of-list. Malformed cursors are now a 400. * refactor(api): page workflow versions in the persistence helper listWorkflowVersions read every version row and the route filtered and sliced the result in memory, so the response was bounded but the query was not. It now takes optional limit/afterVersion, turning the cursor into a real keyset query; the route asks for limit + 1 and only trims the has-more probe. Both params are optional, so the internal, v1 admin, and copilot callers are unchanged. Also restores the untouched GET handler in [id]/route.ts to its original formatting — collapsing its signature had re-indented the whole body and buried the actual additions in whitespace churn. * feat(api): expand v2 tables with stateless multipart transfers (#6188) * feat(api): expand the public v2 tables surface Adds 16 operations so a v2 caller can do what the internal surface can: rename/move/lock a table, restore it, manage saved views, run enrichment columns, look up rows, and import/export with observable job control. Extracts lib/table/orchestration/import.ts (performTableCsvImport, performCreateTableFromCsv) and lib/table/export-stream.ts from the first-party routes, then repoints those routes at them, so v1 and v2 cannot drift on what an import or export actually does. events/stream, metadata and dispatches stay internal — they are editor state, not public API. * fix(api): make v2 table PATCH all-or-nothing and name the lock in every 423 Greptile P1: PATCH applied locks, rename and move as three sequential transactions, so a folder rejected mid-request left the earlier writes persisted while the response reported failure — and the schema-changed signal was skipped, leaving open clients on stale state. Every rejectable condition now runs before the first write, and the signal fires whenever anything did land. Cursor: v2TableLockError dropped the lock kind, so async import, column run, enrichment and table mutations returned a bare LOCKED. A table has four independent locks, so the caller could not tell which to clear. * fix(api): report the lock kind on classified 423s too, not just thrown ones The previous commit named the lock only where the rejection was thrown and caught at the route boundary. Where it instead arrives as a classified `errorCode: 'locked'` outcome — delete table, delete row, update column, and the table mutations — the kind was dropped, so those 423s stayed unactionable while their neighbours improved. The orchestration results now carry `lock`, and a shared `v2TableOrchestrationError` renders both arrival paths into the same `{ code, message, details: { lock } }` body. `details` is omitted rather than sent null when the kind is unknown, so a caller branching on it sees absence instead of a phantom value. * fix(api): make async table imports observable, not just startable `POST /import-async` pointed callers at `GET /api/v2/tables/jobs` to track progress, but that endpoint filters to `type = 'export'` — imports are derived onto the table itself, one write job at a time, and exports get a separate list precisely because they are excluded from that derivation. The public Table shape omitted those derived fields, so an async import could be started and cancelled but never observed to completion, failure, or progress. That is the gap the import/export/job-control set was meant to close. Table now carries `job` — id, type, status, rowsProcessed, error, or null when idle — and the import-async docs point at the table rather than the export list. * feat(api): make v2 table PATCH state which operations landed on failure Greptile held the PR at 4/5 on the residual non-atomicity and named two acceptable resolutions: make PATCH atomic, or have the contract adopt and expose partial-success explicitly. Atomicity would mean threading one transaction through renameTable, moveTableToFolder and updateTableLocks — three shared service functions with four non-test callers including the first-party route and two copilot tools — and deferring their per-operation audits to commit time. That is a refactor of shared write paths well outside this PR. So the contract states it instead. Every rejectable condition is already pre-validated, so a failure here is a genuine fault; when one follows a successful operation the error now carries `details.applied` listing what is live. Absent when nothing applied, so its presence always means "these changes took effect despite the error". Documented on the operation. `v2ErrorForOrchestration` gained the optional `details` this needs. * fix(api): make table lock flags read-only on the public v2 surface The new PATCH /api/v2/tables/[tableId] accepted a `locks` object, gated on workspace admin plus the table-locks feature. That still lets an API key clear the guard placed there to stop it: `write` is the floor for the endpoint, and admin keys are ordinary API keys, so a lock is no longer a boundary the key cannot cross. Locks stay readable on the table resource and enforcement is unchanged (a locked verb still returns 423). Changing one is now a first-party admin action only. The v2 body is declared here rather than reusing the first-party updateTableBodySchema, which keeps its `locks` field so the UI can still toggle them. It is .strict(), so a request carrying `locks` is rejected with a 400 naming the field instead of silently succeeding without applying it. * fix(api): keep reporting applied operations when the PATCH re-read fails The composite table PATCH promises that `error.details.applied` names the operations that are live despite an error, but `applied` was scoped inside the try. A rename or move that committed and was then followed by a throw in the final re-read — or a re-read finding the table archived — returned a bare 500/404 with no details, telling the caller nothing had landed. It would then retry into a duplicate-name conflict or repeat the move. `applied` is now function-scoped so every post-write exit carries it: the 404 on a missing re-read, a thrown lock error, a classified orchestration error, and the generic 500. `v2TableLockError` gains the same `extraDetails` parameter `v2TableOrchestrationError` already had. * feat(api): add workflow group writes to the v2 tables surface v2 exposed GET /groups but none of the writes, so the public API could run an enrichment or workflow column and read its binding, but never create one. A caller could add a plain data column and trigger the machine; wiring the two together still required the UI. Adds POST/PATCH/DELETE on /api/v2/tables/[tableId]/groups. The group is the unit that fills columns — one group feeds several — so creating one creates its output columns in the same call, matching the first-party shape rather than inverting it onto the column endpoint. Four departures from the first-party body, all public-surface concerns: - group.id is optional and server-generated. The UI mints an id to render optimistically; a public caller has no such need and a client-chosen id is a collision waiting to happen. - outputColumns[].workflowGroupId is dropped from the body and stamped from the resolved group, so it cannot disagree with it. - autoRun defaults to false. First-party defaults true so a UI add fills cells immediately; here it would make one POST fan out a metered run across every existing row. - A group naming neither a workflowId (type manual) nor an enrichmentId (type enrichment) is a 400 rather than a half-specified group the route has to guess about. Also rejects an outputColumns entry no group output feeds — the two arrays are joined by column name, and the first-party client builds both from one picker so it cannot desync, but a public caller can. Workspace containment on workflowId is asserted before it is persisted, on create and on any update that re-points the group; without it a table becomes a way to invoke workflows the key cannot otherwise reach. * improvement(api): make v2 table import and export async-only Drops the three synchronous entry points: POST /tables/[tableId]/import, POST /tables/import-csv, and GET /tables/[tableId]/export. Sync import tied a write to the lifetime of an HTTP request. The body *was* the data, so it carried a 10 MB cap that Next silently truncates past — a partial import reporting success. It also had no job, so a timeout mid-write left rows in place with nothing to poll and nothing to cancel. The async path reads the file from storage instead: upload via POST /api/v2/files for a key, start with POST /import-async, watch GET /tables/[tableId] -> job, stop with POST /job/cancel. Sync export carried no such hazard, but one shape per operation beats two: with both removed the surface has exactly one way to move a table in or out, and the CLI wraps the extra calls. This also removes the last multipart handling in v2 tables. Those were the only routes bypassing parseRequest — form fields were parsed by hand against separate form schemas, outside the contract system every other v2 write goes through. Create-a-table-from-CSV is now two calls: POST /tables, then /import-async with createColumns. csvImportModeSchema is append|replace, so there is no single-call create. Route baseline 1064 -> 1061. * docs(api): correct the import-async note about upload size limits The docstring claimed there is no synchronous upload endpoint and so no request-body size cliff. Both are wrong: POST /api/v2/files is a synchronous multipart upload with a 100 MB cap, and it is the only v2 upload path (presigned is deliberately absent). What async-only actually bought: the cap went 10 MB -> 100 MB, it fails on an explicit size check and a bounded body read rather than a proxy cap that silently truncates, authorization completes before any body is buffered, and the table write is a job that can be watched and cancelled. * feat(api): unify file and table transfers * improvement(api): make multipart transfers stateless * fix(api): make table import completion retries idempotent * feat(v2-tables): paginate the table list `GET /api/v2/tables` returned every table in the workspace in one response — it used the cursor envelope but hardcoded `nextCursor: null`, and had no `limit`. That was defensible when tables were only created through the UI; `POST /api/v2/tables` is public now, so a script can create them in bulk and the list has no way to ask for less. Adds `queryTables` alongside `listTables` rather than changing it, so the internal callers that genuinely want the whole scope are untouched — the same split `queryWorkspaceFiles` / `listWorkspaceFiles` already uses. Filter, order and slice all run in the query, so a `search` never costs a full-workspace read. A cursor whose values don't bind raises a validation error instead of being coerced to "no filter", which would have silently served page 1 under a resumed cursor. The keyset closes on `id` so a page boundary inside a run of equal names or timestamps stays stable. The shared `LimitQuery` doc component said "Maximum rows to return"; it now serves the table list too, so the wording is resource-neutral. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(api): add multipart knowledge document uploads * fix(api): keep usage admission at knowledge upload session creation * feat(knowledge): wire knowledge base uploads to multipart sessions * fix(knowledge): refuse to abort an upload once a document is bound * fix(uploads): prevent multipart cleanup races * Unify file creation and signed upload sessions (#6264) * feat(uploads): unify signed upload sessions * fix(uploads): preserve attachment storage semantics * feat(files): add authored file creation * fix(uploads): omit hoisted S3 metadata headers * feat(api): add file metadata endpoint * improvement(api): scope folders to resource paths (#6284) * improvement(api): scope folders to resource paths * fix(files): serialize folder resolution with uploads * fix(files): release folder lock before upload setup * fix(api): normalize folder paths and unblock resource mutations * fix(api): make resource cleanup and metadata consistent * improvement(uploads): persist multipart sessions in postgres * fix(db): store table row trigger timestamps in UTC * improvement(api): default folder deletion to non-recursive * fix(billing): unify chat usage source * improvement(logs): expose trace spans on log detail * fix(logs): parse list trace spans * improvement(api): replace workflow jobs with execution resources (#6294) * improvement(api): replace workflow jobs with execution resources * fix(api): preserve legacy jobs while preferring v2 executions * fix(api): make execution polling resume-aware * fix(ui): hide async examples for public workflows * fix(api): bridge resume queue visibility lag * feat(api): add v2 workflow resume endpoint * fix(api): project pending resume attempts * fix(api): prefer terminal logs over stale resumes * improvement(api): unify v2 resource query layers (#6319) * improvement(api): unify v2 resource query layers * fix(api): address v2 review findings * fix(api): preserve cancelled queue status * fix(api): guard cancelled job transitions * fix(api): close v2 resume and log gaps * feat(api): rename v2 executions to runs * feat(api): split credentials and secrets * feat(api): add workspace metadata and email attribution * improvement(api): consolidate public v2 route handling * improvement(files): centralize operations across APIs and Copilot (#6392) * improvement(files): unify rename authorization * chore(skills): add file operation migration guide * improvement(files): consolidate file operation authorization * improvement(files): extract shared operation foundation * improvement(api): simplify internal route declarations * improvement(files): centralize application authorization * refactor(api): share workspace file name validation * refactor(files): centralize copilot application calls * docs(skills): generalize application operation migration * improvement(api): centralize remaining v2 resource operations (#6412) * improvement(api): centralize v2 resource operations * fix(api): preserve custom tool conflict errors * improvement(api): migrate policy-sensitive v2 reads (#6410) * improvement(workflows): centralize v2 application operations (#6411) * refactor(api): migrate v2 knowledge operations (#6413) * refactor(api): migrate v2 knowledge operations * fix(knowledge): fail upload completion on dispatch errors * fix(knowledge): preserve upload retry and VFS errors * improvement(tables): centralize v2 application operations (#6414) * improvement(tables): centralize v2 application operations * fix(tables): preserve run validation and signals * feat(auth): add scoped internal executor delegation (#6459) * feat(auth): add scoped internal executor delegation * fix(auth): derive delegation lifetime from one timestamp * Include share status in file metadata * feat(auth): centralize delegated identity policy (#6462) * improvement(copilot): consolidate application adapters (#6450) * improvement(api): harden application route boundaries (#6451) * improvement(api): harden application route boundaries * fix(folders): reject creates at workspace cap * fix(knowledge): enforce trusted workspace scope (#6452) * fix(knowledge): enforce trusted workspace scope * refactor(knowledge): declare v2 body lifecycle * finish knowledge application migration * refactor(knowledge): compose copilot batch commands * fix(knowledge): parse connector query flags * fix(knowledge): finalize partial batch effects * fix(knowledge): align merged application boundaries * fix(knowledge): close application boundary review gaps * style(knowledge): satisfy branch biome checks * fix(knowledge): page connector documents in editor * refactor: enforce Copilot table application boundary (#6453) * refactor: enforce copilot table application boundary * fix(tables): finish application boundary migration * fix(tables): restore scoped copilot imports * fix(tables): compose copilot commands atomically * fix(tables): preserve workflow group scheduling * fix(tables): complete fixed copilot composition * fix(tables): reject enrichment output mutation * fix(tables): complete authorized application boundary * fix(workflows): migrate Copilot application boundary (#6455) * fix(workflows): migrate Copilot application boundary * fix(workflows): finish delegated application migration * fix(workflows): encode VFS folder aliases * fix(workflows): close application composition gaps * fix(workflows): preserve VFS validation errors * fix(workflows): complete application boundary migration * test(workflows): format canonical binding coverage * fix(workflows): scope executor metadata reads * fix(workflows): bind executor metadata targets * improvement(skills): align application operation guidance (#6532) * feat(api): expose v2 resource owners * fix(api): distinguish visible resource authorization failures (#6537) * feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts (#6509) * feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts * fix(api): preserve string boolean wire defaults * fix(api): document file download headers * fix(docs): use TypeScript CLI with Next.js * fix(docs): avoid client-rendered theme script * fix(api): document departed audit default * feat(api): replace legacy core docs with v2 * feat(api): generate v2 OpenAPI from contracts * feat(api): refine generated v2 OpenAPI docs * fix(docs): align localized v2 execution examples * fix(ci): restore Helm diff and sync audit mock * fix CI regressions after staging merge --------- Co-authored-by: Waleed <walif6@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theodoreqili@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Siddharth Ganesan <33737564+Sg312@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Theodore Li <theo@sim.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |