diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci-pull-requests.yml b/.github/workflows/ci-pull-requests.yml
index c97655c79b9..2f7bceba7a6 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci-pull-requests.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci-pull-requests.yml
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ jobs:
     outputs:
       frontend_changed: ${{ steps.paths-filter.outputs.frontend == 'true' }}
       non_python_changed: ${{ steps.paths-filter.outputs.non-python == 'true' }}
+      workflows_changed: ${{ steps.paths-filter.outputs.workflows == 'true' }}
       commit_sha: ${{ steps.commit-sha.outputs.sha }}
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
@@ -46,6 +47,8 @@ jobs:
             non-python:
               - '**'
               - '!packages/@n8n/task-runner-python/**'
+            workflows:
+              - .github/**
       - name: Setup and Build
         if: steps.paths-filter.outputs.non-python == 'true'
         uses: ./.github/actions/setup-nodejs
@@ -136,19 +139,37 @@ jobs:
       branch: ${{ needs.install-and-build.outputs.commit_sha }}
     secrets: inherit
 
+  security-checks:
+    name: Security Checks
+    needs: install-and-build
+    if: needs.install-and-build.outputs.workflows_changed == 'true'
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/ci-security.yml
+    with:
+      ref: ${{ needs.install-and-build.outputs.commit_sha }}
+    secrets: inherit
+
   # This job is required by GitHub branch protection rules.
   # PRs cannot be merged unless this job passes.
-  # If you add/remove jobs that should block merging, update the 'needs' array below.
+  # If you add/remove jobs that should block merging, update the 'needs' array
+  # and the skip conditions in the 'if' block below.
   required-checks:
     name: Required Checks
-    needs: [install-and-build, unit-test, typecheck, lint, e2e-tests]
+    needs: [install-and-build, unit-test, typecheck, lint, e2e-tests, security-checks]
     if: always()
     runs-on: ubuntu-slim
     steps:
       - name: Fail if any required job failed or was skipped unexpectedly
-        # The non_python_changed check allows jobs to be skipped for python-only changes,
-        # since those jobs don't run when only python files are modified.
+        # Explicit checks for each job's skip conditions:
+        # - Non-python jobs (unit-test, typecheck, lint, e2e-tests): can skip when non_python_changed == false
+        # - security-checks: can skip when workflows_changed == false
         if: |
           contains(needs.*.result, 'failure') ||
-          (needs.install-and-build.outputs.non_python_changed == 'true' && contains(needs.*.result, 'skipped'))
+          (needs.install-and-build.outputs.non_python_changed == 'true' && (
+            needs.unit-test.result == 'skipped' ||
+            needs.typecheck.result == 'skipped' ||
+            needs.lint.result == 'skipped' ||
+            needs.e2e-tests.result == 'skipped'
+          )) ||
+          (needs.install-and-build.outputs.workflows_changed == 'true' &&
+            needs.security-checks.result == 'skipped')
         run: exit 1
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci-security.yml b/.github/workflows/ci-security.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..48b3b596bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci-security.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+name: Security Checks
+
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    inputs:
+      ref:
+        description: GitHub ref to scan.
+        required: false
+        type: string
+        default: ''
+
+jobs:
+  poutine-scan:
+    name: Poutine Security Scan
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/security-poutine-scan-callable.yml
+    with:
+      ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
+    secrets: inherit
+
+  # Future security checks can be added here:
+  # - dependency-scan:
+  # - secret-detection:
+  # - container-scan:
diff --git a/.github/workflows/security-poutine-scan-callable.yml b/.github/workflows/security-poutine-scan-callable.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6039aa7b666
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/security-poutine-scan-callable.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+name: Security - Scan GitHub Actions with Poutine
+
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  workflow_call:
+    inputs:
+      ref:
+        description: GitHub ref to scan.
+        required: false
+        type: string
+        default: ''
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  security-events: write
+
+jobs:
+  poutine_scan:
+    name: Poutine Security Scan
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
+
+      - name: Run Poutine Security Scanner
+        uses: boostsecurityio/poutine-action@84c0a0d32e8d57ae12651222be1eb15351429228 # v0.15.2
+
+      - name: Upload SARIF results
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@48ab28a6f5dbc2a99bf1e0131198dd8f1df78169 # v3.28.0
+        if: always()
+        with:
+          sarif_file: results.sarif
diff --git a/.poutine.yml b/.poutine.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b7d72c748fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.poutine.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Poutine Security Scanner Configuration
+# https://github.com/boostsecurityio/poutine
+#
+# This file defines skip rules for known-safe patterns.
+# Add new entries only after security review.
+
+skip:
+  # === SELF-HOSTED RUNNERS ===
+  # We use Blacksmith (trusted CI provider) for self-hosted runners.
+  # The ubuntu-slim runner is also a trusted provider.
+  - rule: pr_runs_on_self_hosted
+
+  # === UNVERIFIED ACTIONS ===
+  # Third-party actions from non-verified GitHub Marketplace creators.
+  # These have been reviewed and approved for use.
+  # Add new actions here only after security review.
+  - rule: github_action_from_unverified_creator_used
+    purl:
+      - pkg:githubactions/act10ns/slack
+      - pkg:githubactions/anthropics/claude-code-action
+      - pkg:githubactions/astral-sh/setup-uv
+      - pkg:githubactions/chromaui/action
+      - pkg:githubactions/dorny/paths-filter
+      - pkg:githubactions/extractions/setup-just
+      - pkg:githubactions/fjogeleit/http-request-action
+      - pkg:githubactions/isbang/compose-action
+      - pkg:githubactions/lironer/bundlemon-action
+      - pkg:githubactions/ncipollo/release-action
+      - pkg:githubactions/peter-evans/create-or-update-comment
+      - pkg:githubactions/peter-evans/create-pull-request
+      - pkg:githubactions/pnpm/action-setup
+      - pkg:githubactions/rharkor/caching-for-turbo
+      - pkg:githubactions/tomi/paths-filter-action
+      - pkg:githubactions/useblacksmith/setup-docker-builder
+
+  # === TEMPORARY SKIPS ===
+  # These findings need to be addressed in a follow-up ticket.
+  # Do not add new entries to this section.
+
+  # TODO: Fix injection vulnerability - use environment variable instead of
+  # direct interpolation of github.event.inputs.dataset
+  - rule: injection
+    path:
+      - .github/workflows/ci-evals.yml
+
+  # TODO: Review untrusted checkout execution patterns.
+  # These workflows run local actions or package managers after checking out
+  # untrusted PR code, which is a potential security risk.
+  - rule: untrusted_checkout_exec
+    path:
+      - .github/workflows/sbom-generation-callable.yml
+      - .github/workflows/linting-reusable.yml
+      - .github/workflows/test-workflows-callable.yml
+      - .github/workflows/units-tests-reusable.yml