Moves `mcp_server_configs` from deployment scope to organization scope
so each organization fully controls the MCP servers its members can use
with Coder Agents.
## Summary
- Migration: adds `organization_id` (NOT NULL, FK) and keeps existing
rows as the default organization's originals with credentials intact.
Other organizations start with no MCP servers and configure their own;
nothing is copied across organizations. Chats outside the default
organization keep any now-cross-organization `mcp_server_ids` entries;
the runtime already ignores IDs that do not resolve in the chat's
organization, so no data rewrite is needed. Slug uniqueness becomes
`(organization_id, slug)`.
- RBAC: new org-scoped `ResourceMCPServerConfig` with regosql converter
and `GetAuthorizedMCPServerConfigs`; org admins get in-org CRUD, org
members get read (replaced by ACL evaluation in the follow-up ACL PR in
this stack).
- API: all config routes nest under the organization, matching
templates: `POST|GET
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers` and
`GET|PATCH|DELETE .../mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}` (plus
`oauth2/connect`), resolved by a read-only param middleware that
conceals read-denied and cross-organization access as 404. Two routes
stay on the frozen `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block:
the OAuth2 callback (the redirect URI baked into existing AS-side client
registrations) and `oauth2/disconnect`, which must remain reachable by
users removed from the organization so they can still revoke their token
grant.
- Chat runtime: selection validation and generation resolve configs
strictly by IDs, enabled state, and the chat's organization in SQL;
requested duplicates are normalized; invalid or cross-org IDs are
rejected with the precise ID list. IDs already persisted on a chat are
exempt from message-time rejection so disabling a selected server never
blocks sends; generation skips servers that are no longer usable.
- Frontend: API layer and admin settings pages target the new endpoints.
The admin page manages the default organization's servers; the org
picker is tracked separately (CODAGT-714).
- Security hardening from review: OAuth user grants are additionally
bound to `oauth2_revocation_url` (changing it invalidates grants, and a
racing OAuth callback gets 409 instead of recreating a grant).
Stack-wide SSRF protection for MCP config-directed traffic was split
into its own PR at the top of this stack (#28242) to keep this diff
reviewable; this PR keeps main's existing discovery IP-range guard.
OAuth2 auto-discovery now completes before the config row is inserted: a
failed discovery persists nothing, and there is no provisional row that
concurrent updates could race against.
Two follow-up PRs in this stack were split out to keep this diff
reviewable: #28064 completes the swagger annotations for the moved
routes (main already ships these experimental MCP handlers unannotated),
and #28065 carries hardening fixes and regression pins on top of the
cutover.
- Force On enforcement (landed on main mid-review) is org-scoped: the
forced set is read per chat organization
(`GetForcedMCPServerConfigsByOrganization`), so another organization's
`force_on` server never attaches to a chat.
## Breaking changes (experimental API)
The MCP server config endpoints move from the deployment-scoped
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers` block to organization-nested paths:
`POST|GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers`
and `GET|PATCH|DELETE
/api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{mcpserverconfig}`
(plus `oauth2/connect`). The old paths are removed, so API consumers
must supply an organization. Two routes intentionally stay on the frozen
`/api/experimental/mcp/servers/{mcpServer}` block: the OAuth2 callback
(its redirect URI is baked into existing AS-side client registrations)
and `oauth2/disconnect` (must remain reachable by users removed from the
organization). These endpoints are under `/api/experimental`, so no
deprecation window is provided.
## Rolling upgrades
During a rolling deploy, an old replica creating an MCP config can fail
the new `NOT NULL organization_id` constraint until it is upgraded
(reads are unaffected: old binaries' generated queries select their own
column lists). This matches the repo's existing precedent for additive
NOT NULL migrations (000562) and affects only the admin config-create
path in the upgrade window.
Upgrades are expected to run in scheduled maintenance downtime with the
database locked during migration, so the migration ships no
rolling-upgrade compatibility machinery. The down migration deletes
organization-created configs (their chat references are cleaned by the
000510 delete trigger) and restores deployment-wide slug uniqueness.
Part of the MCP org-separation stack (CODAGT-711 -> CODAGT-717 audit ->
CODAGT-712 ACLs -> CODAGT-806 token RBAC).
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-711
UAT: validated end to end on a two-org dogfood deployment, including a
real pre-migration to post-migration upgrade, cross-org isolation
(404s), same-slug-two-orgs, chat selection gating, and a live MCP tool
call through the org-scoped generation path. The migration was later
revised to keep existing rows in the default organization only (no
per-organization copies); that revision is covered by the migration test
suite.
> Mux (AI agent) authored this PR on Mike's behalf.
<!-- mux-attribution: model=claude-fable-5 thinking=high -->
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
Authz
Package rbac implements Role-Based Access Control for Coder.
See USAGE.md for a hands-on approach to using this package.
Overview
Authorization defines what permission a subject has to perform actions to objects:
- Permission is binary: yes (allowed) or no (denied).
- Subject in this case is anything that implements interface
rbac.Subject. - Action here is an enumerated list of actions. Actions can differ for each object type. They typically read like,
Create,Read,Update,Delete, etc. - Object here is anything that implements
rbac.Object.
Permission Structure
A permission is a rule that grants or denies access for a subject to perform an action on a object. A permission is always applied at a given level:
- site level applies to all objects in a given Coder deployment.
- org level applies to all objects that have an organization owner (
org_owner) - user level applies to all objects that have an owner with the same ID as the subject.
Permissions at a higher level always override permissions at a lower level.
The effect of a permission can be:
- positive (allows)
- negative (denies)
- abstain (neither allows or denies, not applicable)
Negative permissions always override positive permissions at the same level. Both negative and positive permissions override abstain at the same level.
This can be represented by the following truth table, where Y represents positive, N represents negative, and _ represents abstain:
| Action | Positive | Negative | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| read | Y | _ | Y |
| read | Y | N | N |
| read | _ | _ | _ |
| read | _ | N | N |
Permission Representation
Permissions are represented in string format as <sign>?<level>.<object>.<id>.<action>, where:
negatedcan be either+or-. If it is omitted, sign is assumed to be+.levelis eithersite,org, oruser.objectis any valid resource type.idis any valid UUID v4.idis included in the permission syntax, however only scopes may useidto specify a specific object.actionis typicallycreate,read,modify,delete, but you can define other verbs as needed.
Example Permissions
+site.app.*.read: allowed to perform thereadaction against all objects of typeappin a given Coder deployment.-user.workspace.*.create: user is not allowed to create workspaces.
Levels
A user can be given (or deprived) a permission at several levels. Currently, those levels are:
- Site-wide level
- Organization level
- User level
- Organization member level
The site-wide level is the most authoritative. Any permission granted or denied at the side-wide level is absolute. After checking the site-wide level, depending of if the resource is owned by an organization or not, it will check the other levels.
-
If the resource is owned by an organization, the next most authoritative level is the organization level. It acts like the site-wide level, but only for resources within the corresponding organization. The user can use that permission on any resource within that organization.
- After the organization level is the member level. This level only applies to resources that are owned by both the organization and the user.
-
If the resource is not owned by an organization, the next level to check is the user level. This level only applies to resources owned by the user and that are not owned by any organization.
┌──────────┐
│ Site │
└─────┬────┘
┌──────────┴───────────┐
┌──┤ Owned by an org? ├──┐
│ └──────────────────────┘ │
┌──┴──┐ ┌──┴─┐
│ Yes │ │ No │
└──┬──┘ └──┬─┘
┌────────┴─────────┐ ┌─────┴────┐
│ Organization │ │ User │
└────────┬─────────┘ └──────────┘
┌─────┴──────┐
│ Member │
└────────────┘
Roles
A role is a set of permissions. When evaluating a role's permission to form an action, all the relevant permissions for the role are combined at each level. Permissions at a higher level override permissions at a lower level.
The following tables show the per-level role evaluation. Y indicates that the role provides positive permissions, N indicates the role provides negative permissions, and indicates the role does not provide positive or negative permissions. YN indicates that the value in the cell does not matter for the access result. The table varies depending on if the resource belongs to an organization or not.
If the resource is owned by an organization, such as a template or a workspace:
| Role (example) | Site | Org | OrgMember | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| site-admin | Y | YN_ | YN_ | Y |
| negative-site-permission | N | YN_ | YN_ | N |
| org-admin | _ | Y | YN_ | Y |
| non-org-member | _ | N | YN_ | N |
| member-owned | _ | _ | Y | Y |
| not-member-owned | _ | _ | N | N |
| unauthenticated | _ | _ | _ | N |
If the resource is not owned by an organization:
| Role (example) | Site | User | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| site-admin | Y | YN_ | Y |
| negative-site-permission | N | YN_ | N |
| user-owned | _ | Y | Y |
| not-user-owned | _ | N | N |
| unauthenticated | _ | _ | N |
Scopes
Scopes can restrict a given set of permissions. The format of a scope matches a role with the addition of a list of resource ids. For a authorization call to be successful, the subject's roles and the subject's scopes must both allow the action. This means the resulting permissions is the intersection of the subject's roles and the subject's scopes.
An example to give a readonly token is to grant a readonly scope across all resources +site.*.*.read. The intersection with the user's permissions will be the readonly set of their permissions.
Resource IDs
There exists use cases that require specifying a specific resource. If resource IDs are allowed in the roles, then there is an unbounded set of resource IDs that be added to an "allow_list", as the number of roles a user can have is unbounded. This also adds a level of complexity to the role evaluation logic that has large costs at scale.
The use case for specifying this type of permission in a role is limited, and does not justify the extra cost. To solve this for the remaining cases (eg. workspace agent tokens), we can apply an allow_list on a scope. For most cases, the allow_list will just be ["*"] which means the scope is allowed to be applied to any resource. This adds negligible cost to the role evaluation logic and 0 cost to partial evaluations.
Example of a scope for a workspace agent token, using an allow_list containing a single resource id.
{
"scope": {
"name": "workspace_agent",
"display_name": "Workspace_Agent",
// The ID of the given workspace the agent token correlates to.
"allow_list": ["10d03e62-7703-4df5-a358-4f76577d4e2f"],
"site": [/* ... perms ... */],
"org": {/* ... perms ... */},
"user": [/* ... perms ... */]
}
}
OPA (Open Policy Agent)
Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open source tool used to define and enforce policies.
Policies are written in a high-level, declarative language called Rego.
Coder’s RBAC rules are defined in the policy.rego file under the authz package.
When OPA evaluates policies, it binds input data to a global variable called input.
In the rbac package, this structured data is defined as JSON and contains the action, object and subject (see regoInputValue in astvalue.go).
OPA evaluates whether the subject is allowed to perform the action on the object across three levels: site, org, and user.
This is determined by the final rule allow, which aggregates the results of multiple rules to decide if the user has the necessary permissions.
Similarly to the input, OPA produces structured output data, which includes the allow variable as part of the evaluation result.
Authorization succeeds only if allow explicitly evaluates to true. If no allow is returned, it is considered unauthorized.
To learn more about OPA and Rego, see https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs.
Application and Database Integration
rbac/authz.go– Application layer integration: provides the core authorization logic that integrates with Rego for policy evaluation.database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go– Database layer integration: wraps the database layer with authorization checks to enforce access control.
There are two types of evaluation in OPA:
- Full evaluation: Produces a decision that can be enforced.
This is the default evaluation mode, where OPA evaluates the policy using
inputdata that contains all known values and returns output data with theallowvariable. - Partial evaluation: Produces a new policy that can be evaluated later when the unknowns become known.
This is an optimization in OPA where it evaluates as much of the policy as possible without resolving expressions that depend on unknown values from the
input. To learn more about partial evaluation, see this OPA blog post.
Application of Full and Partial evaluation in rbac package:
- Full Evaluation is handled by the
RegoAuthorizer.Authorize()method inauthz.go. This method determines whether a subject (user) can perform a specific action on an object. It performs a full evaluation of the Rego policy, which returns theallowvariable to decide whether access is granted (true) or denied (falseor undefined). - Partial Evaluation is handled by the
RegoAuthorizer.Prepare()method inauthz.go. This method compiles OPA’s partial evaluation queries intoSQL WHEREclauses. These clauses are then used to enforce authorization directly in database queries, rather than in application code.
Authorization Patterns:
- Fetch-then-authorize: an object is first retrieved from the database, and a single authorization check is performed using full evaluation via
Authorize(). - Authorize-while-fetching: Partial evaluation via
Prepare()is used to inject SQL filters directly into queries, allowing efficient authorization of many objects of the same type.dbauthzmethods that enforce authorization directly in the SQL query are prefixed withAuthorized, for example,GetAuthorizedWorkspaces.
Testing
- OPA Playground: https://play.openpolicyagent.org/
- OPA CLI (
opa eval): useful for experimenting with different inputs and understanding how the policy behaves under various conditions.opa evalreturns the constraints that must be satisfied for a rule to evaluate totrue.opa evalrequires aninput.jsonfile containing the input data to run the policy against. You can generate this file using the gen_input.go script. Note: the script currently produces a fixed input. You may need to tweak it for your specific use case.
Full Evaluation
opa eval --format=pretty "data.authz.allow" -d policy.rego -i input.json
This command fully evaluates the policy in the policy.rego file using the input data from input.json, and returns the result of the allow variable:
data.authz.allowaccesses theallowrule within theauthzpackage.data.authzon its own would return the entire output object of the package.
This command answers the question: “Is the user allowed?”
Partial Evaluation
opa eval --partial --format=pretty 'data.authz.allow' -d policy.rego --unknowns input.object.id --unknowns input.object.owner --unknowns input.object.org_owner --unknowns input.object.acl_user_list --unknowns input.object.acl_group_list -i input.json
This command performs a partial evaluation of the policy, specifying a set of unknown input parameters.
The result is a set of partial queries that can be converted into SQL WHERE clauses and injected into SQL queries.
This command answers the question: “What conditions must be met for the user to be allowed?”
Benchmarking
Benchmark tests to evaluate the performance of full and partial evaluation can be found in authz_test.go.
You can run these tests with the -bench flag, for example:
go test -bench=BenchmarkRBACFilter -run=^$
To capture memory and CPU profiles, use the following flags:
-memprofile memprofile.out-cpuprofile cpuprofile.out
The script benchmark_authz.sh runs the authz benchmark tests on the current Git branch or compares benchmark results between two branches using benchstat.
benchstat compares the performance of a baseline benchmark against a new benchmark result and highlights any statistically significant differences.
-
To run benchmark on the current branch:
benchmark_authz.sh --single -
To compare benchmarks between 2 branches:
benchmark_authz.sh --compare main prebuild_policy