mirror of
https://github.com/coder/coder.git
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259 lines
6.7 KiB
Go
259 lines
6.7 KiB
Go
package tailnet
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"net/netip"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"golang.org/x/xerrors"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/tailnet/proto"
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)
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var legacyWorkspaceAgentIP = netip.MustParseAddr("fd7a:115c:a1e0:49d6:b259:b7ac:b1b2:48f4")
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type InvalidAddressBitsError struct {
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Bits int
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}
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func (e InvalidAddressBitsError) Error() string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("invalid address bits, expected 128, got %d", e.Bits)
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}
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type InvalidNodeAddressError struct {
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Addr string
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}
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func (e InvalidNodeAddressError) Error() string {
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return fmt.Sprintf("invalid node address, got %s", e.Addr)
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}
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type CoordinateeAuth interface {
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Authorize(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CoordinateRequest) error
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}
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// TunnelAuditor records AddTunnel authorization decisions. Audit must not
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// block because authorization may run while the coordinator mutex is held.
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type TunnelAuditor interface {
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Audit(agentID uuid.UUID, authorizationErr error)
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}
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// SingleTailnetCoordinateeAuth allows all tunnels because coderd and workspace
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// proxies may initiate a tunnel to any agent.
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type SingleTailnetCoordinateeAuth struct{}
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func (SingleTailnetCoordinateeAuth) Authorize(context.Context, *proto.CoordinateRequest) error {
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return nil
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}
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// ClientCoordinateeAuth allows connecting to a single agent.
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type ClientCoordinateeAuth struct {
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AgentID uuid.UUID
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Auditor TunnelAuditor
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}
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func (c ClientCoordinateeAuth) Authorize(_ context.Context, req *proto.CoordinateRequest) error {
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var agentID uuid.UUID
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authErr, report := func() (error, bool) {
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tun := req.GetAddTunnel()
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if tun == nil {
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return nil, false
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}
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var err error
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agentID, err = uuid.FromBytes(tun.Id)
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if err != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("parse add tunnel id: %w", err), false
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}
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if c.AgentID != agentID {
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return xerrors.Errorf("invalid agent id, expected %s, got %s", c.AgentID.String(), agentID.String()), true
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}
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return nil, true
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}()
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if report && c.Auditor != nil {
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c.Auditor.Audit(agentID, authErr)
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}
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if authErr != nil {
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return authErr
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}
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return handleClientNodeRequests(req)
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}
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// AgentCoordinateeAuth disallows tunnels because agents may not initiate them.
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type AgentCoordinateeAuth struct {
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ID uuid.UUID
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}
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func (a AgentCoordinateeAuth) Authorize(_ context.Context, req *proto.CoordinateRequest) error {
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if req.GetAddTunnel() != nil {
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return xerrors.New("agents cannot open tunnels")
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}
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if upd := req.GetUpdateSelf(); upd != nil {
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// Both Addresses and AllowedIPs are installed into the WireGuard peer
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// config and drive routing, so an agent may only advertise prefixes
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// derived from its own UUID. Without this an agent could claim a victim
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// agent's IP and have traffic routed to it.
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if err := a.authorizeNodePrefixes(upd.Node.Addresses); err != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("Addresses: %w", err)
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}
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if err := a.authorizeNodePrefixes(upd.Node.AllowedIps); err != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("AllowedIps: %w", err)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// authorizeNodePrefixes verifies that every prefix is a /128 address derived
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// from the agent's own UUID (or the legacy workspace agent IP).
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func (a AgentCoordinateeAuth) authorizeNodePrefixes(prefixes []string) error {
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for _, prefixStr := range prefixes {
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pre, err := netip.ParsePrefix(prefixStr)
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if err != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("parse node address: %w", err)
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}
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if pre.Bits() != 128 {
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return InvalidAddressBitsError{pre.Bits()}
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}
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if TailscaleServicePrefix.AddrFromUUID(a.ID).Compare(pre.Addr()) != 0 &&
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CoderServicePrefix.AddrFromUUID(a.ID).Compare(pre.Addr()) != 0 &&
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legacyWorkspaceAgentIP.Compare(pre.Addr()) != 0 {
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return InvalidNodeAddressError{pre.Addr().String()}
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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type ClientUserCoordinateeAuth struct {
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Auth TunnelAuthorizer
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Auditor TunnelAuditor
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}
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func (a ClientUserCoordinateeAuth) Authorize(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CoordinateRequest) error {
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var agentID uuid.UUID
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authErr, report := func() (error, bool) {
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tun := req.GetAddTunnel()
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if tun == nil {
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return nil, false
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}
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var err error
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agentID, err = uuid.FromBytes(tun.Id)
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if err != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("parse add tunnel id: %w", err), false
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}
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if err := a.Auth.AuthorizeTunnel(ctx, agentID); err != nil {
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return xerrors.New("workspace agent not found or you do not have permission"), true
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}
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return nil, true
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}()
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if report && a.Auditor != nil {
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a.Auditor.Audit(agentID, authErr)
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}
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if authErr != nil {
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return authErr
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}
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return handleClientNodeRequests(req)
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}
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// handleClientNodeRequests validates GetUpdateSelf requests and declines ReadyForHandshake requests
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func handleClientNodeRequests(req *proto.CoordinateRequest) error {
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if upd := req.GetUpdateSelf(); upd != nil {
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for _, addrStr := range upd.Node.Addresses {
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pre, err := netip.ParsePrefix(addrStr)
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if err != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("parse node address: %w", err)
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}
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if pre.Bits() != 128 {
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return InvalidAddressBitsError{pre.Bits()}
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}
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}
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}
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if rfh := req.GetReadyForHandshake(); rfh != nil {
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return xerrors.Errorf("clients may not send ready_for_handshake")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// tunnelStore contains tunnel information and allows querying it. It is not threadsafe and all
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// methods must be serialized by holding, e.g. the core mutex.
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type tunnelStore struct {
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bySrc map[uuid.UUID]map[uuid.UUID]struct{}
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byDst map[uuid.UUID]map[uuid.UUID]struct{}
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}
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func newTunnelStore() *tunnelStore {
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return &tunnelStore{
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bySrc: make(map[uuid.UUID]map[uuid.UUID]struct{}),
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byDst: make(map[uuid.UUID]map[uuid.UUID]struct{}),
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}
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}
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func (s *tunnelStore) add(src, dst uuid.UUID) {
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srcM, ok := s.bySrc[src]
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if !ok {
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srcM = make(map[uuid.UUID]struct{})
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s.bySrc[src] = srcM
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}
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srcM[dst] = struct{}{}
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dstM, ok := s.byDst[dst]
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if !ok {
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dstM = make(map[uuid.UUID]struct{})
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s.byDst[dst] = dstM
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}
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dstM[src] = struct{}{}
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}
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func (s *tunnelStore) remove(src, dst uuid.UUID) {
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delete(s.bySrc[src], dst)
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if len(s.bySrc[src]) == 0 {
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delete(s.bySrc, src)
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}
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delete(s.byDst[dst], src)
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if len(s.byDst[dst]) == 0 {
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delete(s.byDst, dst)
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}
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}
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func (s *tunnelStore) removeAll(src uuid.UUID) {
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for dst := range s.bySrc[src] {
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s.remove(src, dst)
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}
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}
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func (s *tunnelStore) findTunnelPeers(id uuid.UUID) []uuid.UUID {
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set := make(map[uuid.UUID]struct{})
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for dst := range s.bySrc[id] {
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set[dst] = struct{}{}
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}
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for src := range s.byDst[id] {
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set[src] = struct{}{}
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}
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out := make([]uuid.UUID, 0, len(set))
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for id := range set {
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out = append(out, id)
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}
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return out
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}
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func (s *tunnelStore) tunnelExists(src, dst uuid.UUID) bool {
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_, srcOK := s.bySrc[src][dst]
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_, dstOK := s.byDst[src][dst]
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return srcOK || dstOK
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}
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func (s *tunnelStore) htmlDebug() []HTMLTunnel {
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out := make([]HTMLTunnel, 0)
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for src, dsts := range s.bySrc {
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for dst := range dsts {
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out = append(out, HTMLTunnel{Src: src, Dst: dst})
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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