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## Summary Closes PLAT-305. When a provisioner key is deleted, the associated daemon kept operating on its existing WebSocket connection, because authentication was only checked at connection establishment and deletion was a bare `DELETE` with no session invalidation. This adds four layers of defense so a deleted key promptly stops doing work: 1. **Publish on delete.** `deleteProvisionerKey` publishes to a new per-key pubsub channel (`coderd/pubsub.ProvisionerKeyDeletedChannel`) after a successful delete. Publish errors are logged but still return `204`, since layer 3 is the durable backstop. 2. **Subscribe and tear down.** The daemon serve handler subscribes to its key's channel and terminates the DRPC session on a deletion event. Termination is deferred while a job claimed by the session is active: the daemon may finish and report the in-flight job (`UpdateJob`/`CompleteJob` have no key check), and the last active job's completion performs the cancellation. Because Postgres `LISTEN`/`NOTIFY` does not buffer for non-listeners, the handler also performs a synchronous key-existence re-check immediately after subscribing to close the race between auth and subscription. The subscription uses `SubscribeWithErr` so that an `ErrDroppedMessages` signal (emitted when the pubsub listener reconnects) triggers the same key re-check, closing the listener-outage window in which a deletion notification could be missed. 3. **Backstop on acquire.** `AcquireJob` and `AcquireJobWithCancel` verify the key still exists before waiting for a job, and the `Acquirer` claims jobs in a transaction that first locks the worker's deletable key (`LockProvisionerKeyByIDForShare`, a `FOR KEY SHARE` row lock held until commit) before running the `AcquireProvisionerJob` claim, so a claim cannot commit after the key's deletion. This guards against a missed pubsub message. A missing key row surfaces as its own result rather than overloading the claim query's no-rows response: the acquire terminates with `ErrProvisionerKeyDeleted` (terminating the session, with the same active-job deferral) and hands the consumed wakeup to another waiting daemon in the same domain, rather than silently re-parking and starving peers of job postings. 4. **Heartbeat watchdog.** The per-session heartbeat loop (1m interval) also re-checks the key, so even a session whose deletion notification was silently lost terminates within one heartbeat interval instead of living until the connection breaks (same active-job deferral as layer 2). Reserved keys skip the check. A job that is claimed but never delivered (the session or connection dies between the database claim and the stream send) is marked failed immediately on a fresh context, instead of staying assigned to the worker until the job reaper. Reserved keys (built-in, user-auth, PSK) are exempt throughout, since they are not deletable rows. The acquire-time lookup runs as `dbauthz.AsSystemReadProvisionerDaemons`, because the provisionerd role cannot read provisioner keys and a provisioner key's RBAC object is a provisioner daemon. A single key can back many daemons (and span HA replicas), so the per-key channel fans out to invalidate all of them at once. Per-key channels keep the `LISTEN` count proportional to distinct keys rather than waking every daemon on unrelated deletions. ### Known limitations - **`UpdateJob`/`CompleteJob` intentionally have no key check.** By the time those RPCs arrive the work has already run; rejecting completion would strand a build in "running" (until the job reaper fails it) with real infrastructure left unreconciled. Session termination is deferred while a job is active so the completion can be reported; the daemon may not receive the final RPC response when the deferred termination fires, but the job's outcome is already persisted. - **After termination, the daemon process redials and receives 401s until restarted.** The dial-time exit logic only triggers on 403, and the auth middleware returns 401 for an invalid key; this dial behavior predates this PR and is tracked as a follow-up in [PLAT-452](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-452) (return 403 for invalid provisioner keys). ## Tests - `coderd/provisionerdserver`: `TestAcquireJob_ProvisionerKeyDeleted` (both RPC variants), `TestAcquireJob_ReservedProvisionerKey`, `TestHeartbeat_ProvisionerKeyDeleted` (heartbeat watchdog cancels the session after key deletion), `TestAcquirer_ProvisionerKeyDeleted` (a dead-key acquiree exits terminally and its clearance is promoted to a peer in the same domain), and `TestTerminateSession_Deferral` (termination is immediate when idle and deferred until the last active job finishes). - `coderd/database`: `TestAcquireProvisionerJob/ProvisionerKeyLock` covers the lock query against real Postgres: it returns the key ID while the row exists and no rows once it is deleted. The lock-then-claim composition is pinned by `TestAcquirer_ProvisionerKeyDeleted`. - `enterprise/coderd`: `TestProvisionerDaemonServe/KeyDeletionClosesSession` asserts an active session closes after its key is deleted. `KeyDeletedDuringSetupClosesSession` covers the post-subscribe re-check when a key is deleted between auth and subscription, and `DroppedMessageClosesSession` covers the `ErrDroppedMessages` re-check when a deletion is missed during a listener outage. ## Validation - `make` pre-commit (gen/fmt/lint/build) passed via git hooks. - Targeted tests pass; existing acquire tests pass with no regression. - Manual: brought up a dev deployment (coder-in-coder) with a Premium license, created a deletable provisioner key, and started an external daemon with `coder provisionerd start`. Confirmed it authenticated via the key and connected, appearing as `idle` in both `coder provisioner list` (with the key name) and the organization Provisioners UI. - Manual, idle teardown: deleted the key while the daemon was idle. The server logged `provisioner key deleted, terminating session`, the daemon's session closed immediately, and it dropped from `coder provisioner list` (then entered the known 401 redial loop, PLAT-452). - Manual, deferred termination: ran a workspace build (tagged template, `sleep 45` in `local-exec`) pinned to the external daemon and deleted the key mid-build. The server logged `deferring session cancellation until active jobs finish`; the heartbeat watchdog re-checked mid-build and re-deferred rather than force-killing. The build ran to completion (`Apply complete`, workspace `Started`) and only then did `canceling session after job completion` fire. The documented caveat reproduced: the daemon lost the final `CompleteJob` ack, and the build outcome was still persisted correctly. <details> <summary>Implementation plan and design decisions</summary> ### Design - **Per-key vs global channel:** chose per-key (`provisioner_key_deleted:<keyID>`) so daemons do not wake on unrelated deletions. The cost is one `LISTEN` per distinct key per replica on the shared listener connection, which is negligible against Coder's existing channels. - **Missing-key behavior on acquire:** returns an error that tears down the acquire rather than silently returning an empty job. - **Subscribe-startup race:** ordering is `authorize -> UpsertProvisionerDaemon -> Subscribe -> GetProvisionerKeyByID`. The post-subscribe re-check handles a deletion that committed before the `LISTEN` registered (Postgres does not buffer notifications for non-listeners; the in-process buffer only smooths bursts and drops on overflow). - **`NewServer` change:** `KeyID` was added to `provisionerdserver.Options` to avoid a positional signature change across call sites. The in-memory (built-in) daemon leaves it unset and is therefore exempt. ### Files - `coderd/pubsub/provisionerkeydeleted.go` (new) — channel helper. - `enterprise/coderd/provisionerkeys.go` — publish on delete. - `enterprise/coderd/provisionerdaemons.go` — subscribe, re-check, cancel session; pass `KeyID`. - `coderd/provisionerdserver/provisionerdserver.go` — `KeyID` option and acquire-time existence check. </details> --- This pull request was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @jscottmiller.
270 lines
8.6 KiB
Go
270 lines
8.6 KiB
Go
package coderd
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import (
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/database/db2sdk"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpmw"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/provisionerdserver"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/provisionerkey"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/pubsub"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
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)
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// @Summary Create provisioner key
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// @ID create-provisioner-key
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// @Security CoderSessionToken
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// @Produce json
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// @Tags Enterprise
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// @Param organization path string true "Organization ID"
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// @Success 201 {object} codersdk.CreateProvisionerKeyResponse
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// @Router /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/provisionerkeys [post]
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func (api *API) postProvisionerKey(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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organization := httpmw.OrganizationParam(r)
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var req codersdk.CreateProvisionerKeyRequest
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if !httpapi.Read(ctx, rw, r, &req) {
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return
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}
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if req.Name == "" {
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
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Message: "Name is required",
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Validations: []codersdk.ValidationError{
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{
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Field: "name",
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Detail: "Name is required",
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},
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},
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})
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return
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}
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if len(req.Name) > 64 {
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
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Message: "Name must be at most 64 characters",
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Validations: []codersdk.ValidationError{
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{
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Field: "name",
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Detail: "Name must be at most 64 characters",
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},
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},
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})
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return
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}
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if slices.ContainsFunc(codersdk.ReservedProvisionerKeyNames(), func(s string) bool {
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return strings.EqualFold(req.Name, s)
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}) {
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("Name cannot be reserved name '%s'", req.Name),
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Validations: []codersdk.ValidationError{
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{
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Field: "name",
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Name cannot be reserved name '%s'", req.Name),
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},
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},
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})
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return
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}
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params, token, err := provisionerkey.New(organization.ID, req.Name, req.Tags)
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if err != nil {
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httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
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return
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}
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_, err = api.Database.InsertProvisionerKey(ctx, params)
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if database.IsUniqueViolation(err, database.UniqueProvisionerKeysOrganizationIDNameIndex) {
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusConflict, codersdk.Response{
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("Provisioner key with name '%s' already exists in organization", req.Name),
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})
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return
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}
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if err != nil {
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httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
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return
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}
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusCreated, codersdk.CreateProvisionerKeyResponse{
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Key: token,
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})
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}
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// @Summary List provisioner key
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// @ID list-provisioner-key
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// @Security CoderSessionToken
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// @Produce json
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// @Tags Enterprise
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// @Param organization path string true "Organization ID"
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// @Success 200 {object} []codersdk.ProvisionerKey
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// @Router /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/provisionerkeys [get]
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func (api *API) provisionerKeys(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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organization := httpmw.OrganizationParam(r)
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pks, err := api.Database.ListProvisionerKeysByOrganizationExcludeReserved(ctx, organization.ID)
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if err != nil {
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httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
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return
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}
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, convertProvisionerKeys(pks))
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}
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// @Summary List provisioner key daemons
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// @ID list-provisioner-key-daemons
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// @Security CoderSessionToken
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// @Produce json
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// @Tags Enterprise
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// @Param organization path string true "Organization ID"
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// @Success 200 {object} []codersdk.ProvisionerKeyDaemons
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// @Router /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/provisionerkeys/daemons [get]
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func (api *API) provisionerKeyDaemons(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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organization := httpmw.OrganizationParam(r)
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pks, err := api.Database.ListProvisionerKeysByOrganization(ctx, organization.ID)
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if err != nil {
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httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
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return
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}
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sdkKeys := convertProvisionerKeys(pks)
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// For the default organization, we insert three rows for the special
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// provisioner key types (built-in, user-auth, and psk). We _don't_ insert
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// those into the database for any other org, but we still need to include the
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// user-auth key in this list, so we just insert it manually.
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if !slices.ContainsFunc(sdkKeys, func(key codersdk.ProvisionerKey) bool {
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return key.ID == codersdk.ProvisionerKeyUUIDUserAuth
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}) {
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sdkKeys = append(sdkKeys, codersdk.ProvisionerKey{
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ID: codersdk.ProvisionerKeyUUIDUserAuth,
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Name: codersdk.ProvisionerKeyNameUserAuth,
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Tags: map[string]string{},
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})
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}
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daemons, err := api.Database.GetProvisionerDaemonsByOrganization(ctx, database.GetProvisionerDaemonsByOrganizationParams{OrganizationID: organization.ID})
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if err != nil {
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httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
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return
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}
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// provisionerdserver.DefaultHeartbeatInterval*3 matches the healthcheck report staleInterval.
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recentDaemons := db2sdk.RecentProvisionerDaemons(time.Now(), provisionerdserver.DefaultHeartbeatInterval*3, daemons)
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pkDaemons := []codersdk.ProvisionerKeyDaemons{}
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for _, key := range sdkKeys {
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// The key.OrganizationID for the `user-auth` key is hardcoded to
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// the default org in the database and we are overwriting it here
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// to be the correct org we used to query the list.
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// This will be changed when we update the `user-auth` keys to be
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// directly tied to a user ID.
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if key.ID.String() == codersdk.ProvisionerKeyIDUserAuth {
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key.OrganizationID = organization.ID
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}
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daemons := []codersdk.ProvisionerDaemon{}
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for _, daemon := range recentDaemons {
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if daemon.KeyID == key.ID {
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daemons = append(daemons, daemon)
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}
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}
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pkDaemons = append(pkDaemons, codersdk.ProvisionerKeyDaemons{
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Key: key,
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Daemons: daemons,
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})
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}
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, pkDaemons)
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}
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// @Summary Delete provisioner key
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// @ID delete-provisioner-key
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// @Security CoderSessionToken
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// @Tags Enterprise
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// @Param organization path string true "Organization ID"
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// @Param provisionerkey path string true "Provisioner key name"
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// @Success 204
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// @Router /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/provisionerkeys/{provisionerkey} [delete]
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func (api *API) deleteProvisionerKey(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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provisionerKey := httpmw.ProvisionerKeyParam(r)
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if codersdk.IsReservedProvisionerKey(provisionerKey.ID) {
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("Cannot delete reserved '%s' provisioner key", provisionerKey.Name),
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})
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return
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}
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err := api.Database.DeleteProvisionerKey(ctx, provisionerKey.ID)
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if err != nil {
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httpapi.InternalServerError(rw, err)
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return
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}
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// Notify subscribers that this key was deleted so active sessions tear down.
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// Publishing is best effort; a failure does not leave the key usable.
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if err := api.Pubsub.Publish(pubsub.ProvisionerKeyDeletedChannel(provisionerKey.ID), nil); err != nil {
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api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "failed to publish provisioner key deletion",
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slog.F("provisioner_key_id", provisionerKey.ID), slog.Error(err))
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}
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusNoContent, nil)
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}
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// @Summary Fetch provisioner key details
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// @ID fetch-provisioner-key-details
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// @Security CoderProvisionerKey
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// @Produce json
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// @Tags Enterprise
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// @Param provisionerkey path string true "Provisioner Key"
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// @Success 200 {object} codersdk.ProvisionerKey
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// @Router /api/v2/provisionerkeys/{provisionerkey} [get]
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func (*API) fetchProvisionerKey(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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pk, ok := httpmw.ProvisionerKeyAuthOptional(r)
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// extra check but this one should never happen as it is covered by the auth middleware
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if !ok {
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusForbidden, codersdk.Response{
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Message: fmt.Sprintf("unable to auth: please provide the %s header", codersdk.ProvisionerDaemonKey),
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})
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return
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}
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, convertProvisionerKey(pk))
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}
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func convertProvisionerKey(dbKey database.ProvisionerKey) codersdk.ProvisionerKey {
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return codersdk.ProvisionerKey{
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ID: dbKey.ID,
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CreatedAt: dbKey.CreatedAt,
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OrganizationID: dbKey.OrganizationID,
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Name: dbKey.Name,
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Tags: codersdk.ProvisionerKeyTags(dbKey.Tags),
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// HashedSecret - never include the access token in the API response
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}
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}
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func convertProvisionerKeys(dbKeys []database.ProvisionerKey) []codersdk.ProvisionerKey {
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keys := make([]codersdk.ProvisionerKey, 0, len(dbKeys))
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for _, dbKey := range dbKeys {
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keys = append(keys, convertProvisionerKey(dbKey))
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}
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slices.SortFunc(keys, func(key1, key2 codersdk.ProvisionerKey) int {
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return key1.CreatedAt.Compare(key2.CreatedAt)
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})
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return keys
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}
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