Files
coder/coderd/httpapi/httpapi.go
T
Bobby Ho 166d92ba73 fix: bound request body size on JSON API endpoints (#28168)
## Summary

`httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single
request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default
ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly
exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible.

This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the
endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode
paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their
own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule
that pins the invariant.

Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392.

## Problem

`httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no
ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure
is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a
body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate
limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a
single admitted request may consume.

## Fix

`Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body`
in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate
logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of
4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site.

`http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that
pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than
wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That
matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`:
an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the
default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the
regression guard for that specific failure, and
`TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole
requirement rests on.

Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names
the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the
request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}`
counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other
causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a
legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report.

The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator
raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as
configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413
is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint.

## Behavior change

`POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body
exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported
the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request
body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in
the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded
archive is unchanged.

The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its
64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its
decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to
"Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint
answers. Its tests are updated to match both.

`coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing
query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`,
`path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of
the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with
body size, such as agent log storage overflow.

## Reading this

The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the
security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and
commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the
limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an
exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under
its regenerated swagger, and cancel out.
2026-08-18 12:54:45 -07:00

561 lines
17 KiB
Go

package httpapi
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-playground/validator/v10"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi/httpapiconstraints"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/tracing"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
"github.com/coder/websocket"
"github.com/coder/websocket/wsjson"
)
var Validate *validator.Validate
// This init is used to create a validator and register validation-specific
// functionality for the HTTP API.
//
// A single validator instance is used, because it caches struct parsing.
func init() {
Validate = validator.New()
Validate.RegisterTagNameFunc(func(fld reflect.StructField) string {
name := strings.SplitN(fld.Tag.Get("json"), ",", 2)[0]
if name == "-" {
return ""
}
return name
})
nameValidator := func(fl validator.FieldLevel) bool {
f := fl.Field().Interface()
str, ok := f.(string)
if !ok {
return false
}
valid := codersdk.NameValid(str)
return valid == nil
}
for _, tag := range []string{"username", "organization_name", "template_name", "workspace_name", "oauth2_app_name"} {
err := Validate.RegisterValidation(tag, nameValidator)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
displayNameValidator := func(fl validator.FieldLevel) bool {
f := fl.Field().Interface()
str, ok := f.(string)
if !ok {
return false
}
valid := codersdk.DisplayNameValid(str)
return valid == nil
}
for _, displayNameTag := range []string{"organization_display_name", "template_display_name", "group_display_name"} {
err := Validate.RegisterValidation(displayNameTag, displayNameValidator)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
templateVersionNameValidator := func(fl validator.FieldLevel) bool {
f := fl.Field().Interface()
str, ok := f.(string)
if !ok {
return false
}
valid := codersdk.TemplateVersionNameValid(str)
return valid == nil
}
err := Validate.RegisterValidation("template_version_name", templateVersionNameValidator)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
userRealNameValidator := func(fl validator.FieldLevel) bool {
f := fl.Field().Interface()
str, ok := f.(string)
if !ok {
return false
}
valid := codersdk.UserRealNameValid(str)
return valid == nil
}
err = Validate.RegisterValidation("user_real_name", userRealNameValidator)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
groupNameValidator := func(fl validator.FieldLevel) bool {
f := fl.Field().Interface()
str, ok := f.(string)
if !ok {
return false
}
valid := codersdk.GroupNameValid(str)
return valid == nil
}
err = Validate.RegisterValidation("group_name", groupNameValidator)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
// Is404Error returns true if the given error should return a 404 status code.
// Both actual 404s and unauthorized errors should return 404s to not leak
// information about the existence of resources.
func Is404Error(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// This tests for dbauthz.IsNotAuthorizedError and rbac.IsUnauthorizedError.
if IsUnauthorizedError(err) {
return true
}
return xerrors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows)
}
func IsUnauthorizedError(err error) bool {
if err == nil {
return false
}
// This tests for dbauthz.IsNotAuthorizedError and rbac.IsUnauthorizedError.
var unauthorized httpapiconstraints.IsUnauthorizedError
if errors.As(err, &unauthorized) && unauthorized.IsUnauthorized() {
return true
}
return false
}
// Convenience error functions don't take contexts since their responses are
// static, it doesn't make much sense to trace them.
var ResourceNotFoundResponse = codersdk.Response{Message: "Resource not found or you do not have access to this resource"}
// ResourceNotFound is intentionally vague. All 404 responses should be identical
// to prevent leaking existence of resources.
func ResourceNotFound(rw http.ResponseWriter) {
Write(context.Background(), rw, http.StatusNotFound, ResourceNotFoundResponse)
}
var ResourceForbiddenResponse = codersdk.Response{
Message: "Forbidden.",
Detail: "You don't have permission to view this content. If you believe this is a mistake, please contact your administrator or try signing in with different credentials.",
}
func Forbidden(rw http.ResponseWriter) {
Write(context.Background(), rw, http.StatusForbidden, ResourceForbiddenResponse)
}
func InternalServerError(rw http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
var details string
if err != nil {
details = err.Error()
}
Write(context.Background(), rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "An internal server error occurred.",
Detail: details,
})
}
func RouteNotFound(rw http.ResponseWriter) {
Write(context.Background(), rw, http.StatusNotFound, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Route not found.",
})
}
// Write outputs a standardized format to an HTTP response body. ctx is used for
// tracing and can be nil for tracing to be disabled. Tracing this function is
// helpful because JSON marshaling can sometimes take a non-insignificant amount
// of time, and could help us catch outliers. Additionally, we can enrich span
// data a bit more since we have access to the actual interface{} we're
// marshaling, such as the number of elements in an array, which could help us
// spot routes that need to be paginated.
func Write(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, status int, response interface{}) {
// Pretty up JSON when testing.
if flag.Lookup("test.v") != nil {
WriteIndent(ctx, rw, status, response)
return
}
_, span := tracing.StartSpan(ctx)
defer span.End()
SetAuthzCheckRecorderHeader(ctx, rw)
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
rw.WriteHeader(status)
enc := json.NewEncoder(rw)
enc.SetEscapeHTML(true)
// We can't really do much about these errors, it's probably due to a
// dropped connection.
_ = enc.Encode(response)
}
func WriteIndent(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, status int, response interface{}) {
_, span := tracing.StartSpan(ctx)
defer span.End()
SetAuthzCheckRecorderHeader(ctx, rw)
rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
rw.WriteHeader(status)
enc := json.NewEncoder(rw)
enc.SetEscapeHTML(true)
enc.SetIndent("", "\t")
// We can't really do much about these errors, it's probably due to a
// dropped connection.
_ = enc.Encode(response)
}
// DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes bounds the request body that a JSON endpoint will
// decode. It exists so that a single request, including an unauthenticated one,
// cannot exhaust server memory with an oversized body. Endpoints that need a
// different limit must call ReadLimit rather than change this constant.
const DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes = 4 << 20 // 4 MiB
// Read decodes JSON from the HTTP request into the value provided, reading at
// most DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes from the body. It uses go-validator to
// validate the incoming request body. ctx is used for tracing and can be nil.
// Although tracing this function isn't likely too helpful, it was done to be
// consistent with Write.
func Read(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, value interface{}) bool {
return ReadLimit(ctx, rw, r, DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes, value)
}
// ReadLimit is Read with an explicit request body size limit, for endpoints
// that need one above or below DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes. Most callers set a
// tighter one.
//
// Callers must use this rather than wrapping r.Body in an http.MaxBytesReader
// themselves. Read installs its own limit, and nested readers compose as
// tightest-wins, so the default would override a larger caller-supplied limit.
func ReadLimit(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, limit int64, value interface{}) bool {
ctx, span := tracing.StartSpan(ctx)
defer span.End()
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(rw, r.Body, limit)
err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)
if err != nil {
// Report the limit the error carries, not the one this call installed.
// Nested readers compose as tightest-wins and the error carries the
// winner, so a caller that wrapped r.Body tighter would otherwise be
// told a limit far looser than the one that rejected it.
if mbe, ok := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); ok {
// Must be r.Context(), not ctx: ctx is the caller's and need not
// be the request's, but the tracker rides the request's.
RecordRequestBodyLimit(r.Context(), mbe.Limit)
Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Request body too large.",
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Maximum request body size is %d bytes.", mbe.Limit),
})
return false
}
Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Request body must be valid JSON.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return false
}
err = Validate.Struct(value)
var validationErrors validator.ValidationErrors
if errors.As(err, &validationErrors) {
apiErrors := make([]codersdk.ValidationError, 0, len(validationErrors))
for _, validationError := range validationErrors {
apiErrors = append(apiErrors, codersdk.ValidationError{
Field: validationError.Field(),
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Validation failed for tag %q with value: \"%v\"", validationError.Tag(), validationError.Value()),
})
}
Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Validation failed.",
Validations: apiErrors,
})
return false
}
if err != nil {
Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusInternalServerError, codersdk.Response{
Message: "Internal error validating request body payload.",
Detail: err.Error(),
})
return false
}
return true
}
const websocketCloseMaxLen = 123
// WebsocketCloseSprintf formats a websocket close message and ensures it is
// truncated to the maximum allowed length.
func WebsocketCloseSprintf(format string, vars ...any) string {
msg := fmt.Sprintf(format, vars...)
// Cap msg length at 123 bytes. coder/websocket only allows close messages
// of this length.
if len(msg) > websocketCloseMaxLen {
// Trim the string to 123 bytes. If we accidentally cut in the middle of
// a UTF-8 character, remove it from the string.
return strings.ToValidUTF8(msg[:websocketCloseMaxLen], "")
}
return msg
}
type EventSender func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (
sendEvent func(sse codersdk.ServerSentEvent) error,
done <-chan struct{},
err error,
)
// ServerSentEventSender establishes a Server-Sent Event connection and allows
// the consumer to send messages to the client.
//
// The function returned allows you to send a single message to the client,
// while the channel lets you listen for when the connection closes.
//
// As much as possible, this function should be avoided in favor of using the
// OneWayWebSocket function. See OneWayWebSocket for more context.
func ServerSentEventSender(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (
func(sse codersdk.ServerSentEvent) error,
<-chan struct{},
error,
) {
h := rw.Header()
h.Set("Content-Type", "text/event-stream")
h.Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
h.Set("Connection", "keep-alive")
h.Set("X-Accel-Buffering", "no")
f, ok := rw.(http.Flusher)
if !ok {
panic("http.ResponseWriter is not http.Flusher")
}
ctx := r.Context()
closed := make(chan struct{})
type sseEvent struct {
payload []byte
errC chan error
}
eventC := make(chan sseEvent)
// Synchronized handling of events (no guarantee of order).
go func() {
defer close(closed)
ticker := time.NewTicker(HeartbeatInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
var event sseEvent
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case event = <-eventC:
case <-ticker.C:
event = sseEvent{
payload: []byte(fmt.Sprintf("event: %s\n\n", codersdk.ServerSentEventTypePing)),
}
}
_, err := rw.Write(event.payload)
if event.errC != nil {
event.errC <- err
}
if err != nil {
return
}
f.Flush()
}
}()
sendEvent := func(newEvent codersdk.ServerSentEvent) error {
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
_, err := buf.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("event: %s\n", newEvent.Type))
if err != nil {
return err
}
if newEvent.Data != nil {
_, err = buf.WriteString("data: ")
if err != nil {
return err
}
enc := json.NewEncoder(buf)
err = enc.Encode(newEvent.Data)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
err = buf.WriteByte('\n')
if err != nil {
return err
}
event := sseEvent{
payload: buf.Bytes(),
errC: make(chan error, 1), // Buffered to prevent deadlock.
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case <-closed:
return xerrors.New("server sent event sender closed")
case eventC <- event:
// Re-check closure signals after sending the event to allow
// for early exit. We don't check closed here because it
// can't happen while processing the event.
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
case err := <-event.errC:
return err
}
}
}
return sendEvent, closed, nil
}
// OneWayWebSocketEventSender establishes a new WebSocket connection that
// enforces one-way communication from the server to the client.
//
// The function returned allows you to send a single message to the client,
// while the channel lets you listen for when the connection closes.
//
// We must use an approach like this instead of Server-Sent Events for the
// browser, because on HTTP/1.1 connections, browsers are locked to no more than
// six HTTP connections for a domain total, across all tabs. If a user were to
// open a workspace in multiple tabs, the entire UI can start to lock up.
// WebSockets have no such limitation, no matter what HTTP protocol was used to
// establish the connection.
func OneWayWebSocketEventSender(log slog.Logger, watcher *WSWatcher) func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (
func(event codersdk.ServerSentEvent) error,
<-chan struct{},
error,
) {
return func(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (
func(event codersdk.ServerSentEvent) error,
<-chan struct{},
error,
) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(r.Context())
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
socket, err := websocket.Accept(rw, r, nil)
if err != nil {
cancel()
return nil, nil, xerrors.Errorf("cannot establish connection: %w", err)
}
ctx = watcher.Watch(ctx, log, socket)
eventC := make(chan codersdk.ServerSentEvent, 64)
socketErrC := make(chan websocket.CloseError, 1)
closed := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer cancel()
defer close(closed)
for {
select {
case event := <-eventC:
writeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
err := wsjson.Write(writeCtx, socket, event)
cancel()
if err == nil {
continue
}
_ = socket.Close(websocket.StatusInternalError, "Unable to send newest message")
case err := <-socketErrC:
_ = socket.Close(err.Code, err.Reason)
case <-ctx.Done():
_ = socket.Close(websocket.StatusNormalClosure, "Connection closed")
}
return
}
}()
// We have some tools in the UI code to help enforce one-way WebSocket
// connections, but there's still the possibility that the client could send
// a message when it's not supposed to. If that happens, the client likely
// forgot to use those tools, and communication probably can't be trusted.
// Better to just close the socket and force the UI to fix its mess
go func() {
_, _, err := socket.Read(ctx)
if errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
return
}
if err != nil {
socketErrC <- websocket.CloseError{
Code: websocket.StatusInternalError,
Reason: "Unable to process invalid message from client",
}
return
}
socketErrC <- websocket.CloseError{
Code: websocket.StatusProtocolError,
Reason: "Clients cannot send messages for one-way WebSockets",
}
}()
sendEvent := func(event codersdk.ServerSentEvent) error {
// Prioritize context cancellation over sending to the
// buffered channel. Without this check, both cases in
// the select below can fire simultaneously when the
// context is already done and the channel has capacity,
// making the result nondeterministic.
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
default:
}
select {
case eventC <- event:
case <-ctx.Done():
return ctx.Err()
}
return nil
}
return sendEvent, closed, nil
}
}
// WriteOAuth2Error writes an OAuth2-compliant error response per RFC 6749.
// This should be used for all OAuth2 endpoints (/oauth2/*) to ensure compliance.
func WriteOAuth2Error(ctx context.Context, rw http.ResponseWriter, status int, errorCode codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCode, description string) {
// RFC 6749 §5.2: invalid_client SHOULD use 401 and MUST include a
// WWW-Authenticate response header.
if status == http.StatusUnauthorized && errorCode == codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeInvalidClient {
rw.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="coder"`)
}
Write(ctx, rw, status, codersdk.OAuth2Error{
Error: errorCode,
ErrorDescription: description,
})
}