mirror of
https://github.com/coder/coder.git
synced 2026-09-21 20:51:01 +08:00
Bobby Ho
166d92ba73
## Summary `httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible. This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule that pins the invariant. Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392. ## Problem `httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a single admitted request may consume. ## Fix `Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body` in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of 4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site. `http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`: an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the regression guard for that specific failure, and `TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole requirement rests on. Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}` counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report. The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413 is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint. ## Behavior change `POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded archive is unchanged. The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its 64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to "Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint answers. Its tests are updated to match both. `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`, `path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with body size, such as agent log storage overflow. ## Reading this The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under its regenerated swagger, and cancel out.
67 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
67 lines
2.0 KiB
Go
package coderd
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"cdr.dev/slog/v3"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/httpapi"
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"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk"
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)
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// cspReportMaxBytes bounds the size of a single CSP violation report. This
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// endpoint is unauthenticated and CSRF-exempt (it's the browser's
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// `report-uri` target), so it must not allow unbounded body sizes to reach
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// json.Decode. Real CSP reports are small JSON objects; 64KB is generous.
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const cspReportMaxBytes = 64 * 1024
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type cspViolation struct {
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Report map[string]interface{} `json:"csp-report"`
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}
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// logReportCSPViolations will log all reported csp violations.
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//
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// @Summary Report CSP violations
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// @ID report-csp-violations
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// @Security CoderSessionToken
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// @Accept json
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// @Tags General
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// @Param request body cspViolation true "Violation report"
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// @Success 200
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// @Failure 413 {object} codersdk.Response "Request body exceeds 64 KiB"
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// @Router /api/v2/csp/reports [post]
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func (api *API) logReportCSPViolations(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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var v cspViolation
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(rw, r.Body, cspReportMaxBytes)
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dec := json.NewDecoder(r.Body)
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err := dec.Decode(&v)
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if err != nil {
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if _, ok := errors.AsType[*http.MaxBytesError](err); ok {
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httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit(ctx, cspReportMaxBytes)
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge, codersdk.Response{
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Message: "Request body too large.",
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Detail: fmt.Sprintf("Maximum CSP report size is %d bytes.", cspReportMaxBytes),
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})
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return
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}
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api.Logger.Warn(ctx, "CSP violation reported", slog.Error(err))
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.Response{
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Message: "Failed to read body, invalid json.",
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Detail: err.Error(),
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})
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return
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}
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fields := make([]slog.Field, 0, len(v.Report))
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for k, v := range v.Report {
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fields = append(fields, slog.F(k, v))
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}
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api.Logger.Debug(ctx, "CSP violation reported", fields...)
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httpapi.Write(ctx, rw, http.StatusOK, "ok")
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}
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