Files
coder/coderd/rbac
cccdf1ecac feat: implement WorkspaceCreationBan org role (#16686)
Using negative permissions, this role prevents a user's ability to
create & delete a workspace within a given organization.

Workspaces are uniquely owned by an org and a user, so the org has to
supercede the user permission with a negative permission.

# Use case

Organizations must be able to restrict a member's ability to create a
workspace. This permission is implicitly granted (see
https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16546#issuecomment-2655437860).

To revoke this permission, the solution chosen was to use negative
permissions in a built in role called `WorkspaceCreationBan`.

# Rational

Using negative permissions is new territory, and not ideal. However,
workspaces are in a unique position.

Workspaces have 2 owners. The organization and the user. To prevent
users from creating a workspace in another organization, an [implied
negative
permission](https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/36d9f5ddb3d98029fee07d004709e1e51022e979/coderd/rbac/policy.rego#L172-L192)
is used. So the truth table looks like: _how to read this table
[here](https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/36d9f5ddb3d98029fee07d004709e1e51022e979/coderd/rbac/README.md#roles)_

| Role (example)  | Site | Org  | User | Result |
|-----------------|------|------|------|--------|
| non-org-member  | \_   | N    | YN\_ | N      |
| user            | \_   | \_   | Y    | Y      |
| WorkspaceBan    | \_   | N    | Y    | Y      |
| unauthenticated | \_   | \_   | \_   | N      |


This new role, `WorkspaceCreationBan` is the same truth table condition
as if the user was not a member of the organization (when doing a
workspace create/delete). So this behavior **is not entirely new**.

<details>

<summary>How to do it without a negative permission</summary>

The alternate approach would be to remove the implied permission, and
grant it via and organization role. However this would add new behavior
that an organizational role has the ability to grant a user permissions
on their own resources?

It does not make sense for an org role to prevent user from changing
their profile information for example. So the only option is to create a
new truth table column for resources that are owned by both an
organization and a user.

| Role (example)  | Site | Org  |User+Org| User | Result |
|-----------------|------|------|--------|------|--------|
| non-org-member  | \_   | N    |  \_    | \_   | N      |
| user            | \_   | \_   |  \_    | \_   | N      |
| WorkspaceAllow  | \_   | \_   |   Y    | \_   | Y      |
| unauthenticated | \_   | \_   |  \_    | \_   | N      |

Now a user has no opinion on if they can create a workspace, which feels
a little wrong. A user should have the authority over what is theres.

There is fundamental _philosophical_ question of "Who does a workspace
belong to?". The user has some set of autonomy, yet it is the
organization that controls it's existence. A head scratcher 🤔

</details>

## Will we need more negative built in roles?

There are few resources that have shared ownership. Only
`ResourceOrganizationMember` and `ResourceGroupMember`. Since negative
permissions is intended to revoke access to a shared resource, then
**no.** **This is the only one we need**.

Classic resources like `ResourceTemplate` are entirely controlled by the
Organization permissions. And resources entirely in the user control
(like user profile) are only controlled by `User` permissions.


![Uploading Screenshot 2025-02-26 at 22.26.52.png…]()

---------

Co-authored-by: Jaayden Halko <jaayden.halko@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: ケイラ <mckayla@hey.com>
2025-02-27 06:23:18 -05:00
..

Authz

Package rbac implements Role-Based Access Control for Coder.

See USAGE.md for a hands-on approach to using this package.

Overview

Authorization defines what permission a subject has to perform actions to objects:

  • Permission is binary: yes (allowed) or no (denied).
  • Subject in this case is anything that implements interface rbac.Subject.
  • Action here is an enumerated list of actions. Actions can differ for each object type. They typically read like, Create, Read, Update, Delete, etc.
  • Object here is anything that implements rbac.Object.

Permission Structure

A permission is a rule that grants or denies access for a subject to perform an action on a object. A permission is always applied at a given level:

  • site level applies to all objects in a given Coder deployment.
  • org level applies to all objects that have an organization owner (org_owner)
  • user level applies to all objects that have an owner with the same ID as the subject.

Permissions at a higher level always override permissions at a lower level.

The effect of a permission can be:

  • positive (allows)
  • negative (denies)
  • abstain (neither allows or denies, not applicable)

Negative permissions always override positive permissions at the same level. Both negative and positive permissions override abstain at the same level.

This can be represented by the following truth table, where Y represents positive, N represents negative, and _ represents abstain:

Action Positive Negative Result
read Y _ Y
read Y N N
read _ _ _
read _ N N

Permission Representation

Permissions are represented in string format as <sign>?<level>.<object>.<id>.<action>, where:

  • negated can be either + or -. If it is omitted, sign is assumed to be +.
  • level is either site, org, or user.
  • object is any valid resource type.
  • id is any valid UUID v4.
  • id is included in the permission syntax, however only scopes may use id to specify a specific object.
  • action is typically create, read, modify, delete, but you can define other verbs as needed.

Example Permissions

  • +site.app.*.read: allowed to perform the read action against all objects of type app in a given Coder deployment.
  • -user.workspace.*.create: user is not allowed to create workspaces.

Roles

A role is a set of permissions. When evaluating a role's permission to form an action, all the relevant permissions for the role are combined at each level. Permissions at a higher level override permissions at a lower level.

The following table shows the per-level role evaluation. Y indicates that the role provides positive permissions, N indicates the role provides negative permissions, and indicates the role does not provide positive or negative permissions. YN indicates that the value in the cell does not matter for the access result.

Role (example) Site Org User Result
site-admin Y YN_ YN_ Y
no-permission N YN_ YN_ N
org-admin _ Y YN_ Y
non-org-member _ N YN_ N
user _ _ Y Y
_ _ N N
unauthenticated _ _ _ N

Scopes

Scopes can restrict a given set of permissions. The format of a scope matches a role with the addition of a list of resource ids. For a authorization call to be successful, the subject's roles and the subject's scopes must both allow the action. This means the resulting permissions is the intersection of the subject's roles and the subject's scopes.

An example to give a readonly token is to grant a readonly scope across all resources +site.*.*.read. The intersection with the user's permissions will be the readonly set of their permissions.

Resource IDs

There exists use cases that require specifying a specific resource. If resource IDs are allowed in the roles, then there is an unbounded set of resource IDs that be added to an "allow_list", as the number of roles a user can have is unbounded. This also adds a level of complexity to the role evaluation logic that has large costs at scale.

The use case for specifying this type of permission in a role is limited, and does not justify the extra cost. To solve this for the remaining cases (eg. workspace agent tokens), we can apply an allow_list on a scope. For most cases, the allow_list will just be ["*"] which means the scope is allowed to be applied to any resource. This adds negligible cost to the role evaluation logic and 0 cost to partial evaluations.

Example of a scope for a workspace agent token, using an allow_list containing a single resource id.

    "scope": {
      "name": "workspace_agent",
      "display_name": "Workspace_Agent",
      // The ID of the given workspace the agent token correlates to.
      "allow_list": ["10d03e62-7703-4df5-a358-4f76577d4e2f"],
      "site": [/* ... perms ... */],
      "org": {/* ... perms ... */},
      "user": [/* ... perms ... */]
    }

Testing

You can test outside of golang by using the opa cli.

Evaluation

opa eval --format=pretty "data.authz.allow" -d policy.rego -i input.json

Partial Evaluation

opa eval --partial --format=pretty 'data.authz.allow' -d policy.rego --unknowns input.object.owner --unknowns input.object.org_owner --unknowns input.object.acl_user_list --unknowns input.object.acl_group_list -i input.json