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a586b7e5e0
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`, `read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder `rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously used in the dbauthz layer. Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role (including owner) can delete boundary logs. | Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete | |---|---|---|---|---| | Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no | | Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no | | Auditor | no | no | yes | no | | DBPurge | no | no | no | yes | ### Changes - **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to `policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants, and codersdk/TypeScript types. - **dbauthz authorization**: replace all `ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with `ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession` derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with `.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create. - **Role assignments:** - **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard; create is inherited from member at user-level. - **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write logs they own. - **Auditor (site):** read. - `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with `ResourceBoundaryUsage`. - **System subjects:** - **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can remove boundary logs. - **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access. - **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`, `boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum values to `api_key_scope`. - **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied), `BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace agent lookups for owner derivation. - **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and frontend type definitions. --------- Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
43 lines
1.0 KiB
SQL
43 lines
1.0 KiB
SQL
-- Re-insert boundary session and log fixture data after migration 000511
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-- deletes orphaned rows (the original fixture's workspace_agent links to a
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-- template_version_import job, not a workspace_build, so the backfill
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-- cannot resolve the owner).
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INSERT INTO boundary_sessions (
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id,
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workspace_agent_id,
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confined_process_name,
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started_at,
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updated_at,
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owner_id
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) VALUES (
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'a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4890-abcd-ef1234567890',
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'45e89705-e09d-4850-bcec-f9a937f5d78d',
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'claude-code',
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'2026-04-01 10:00:00+00',
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'2026-04-01 10:00:00+00',
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'30095c71-380b-457a-8995-97b8ee6e5307'
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);
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INSERT INTO boundary_logs (
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id,
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session_id,
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sequence_number,
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captured_at,
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created_at,
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proto,
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method,
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detail,
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matched_rule
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) VALUES (
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'b2c3d4e5-f6a7-4901-bcde-f12345678901',
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'a1b2c3d4-e5f6-4890-abcd-ef1234567890',
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0,
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'2026-04-01 10:00:01+00',
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'2026-04-01 10:00:00+00',
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'http',
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'GET',
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'https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages',
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'domain=api.anthropic.com'
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);
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