Files
coder/agent/agentcontext/resolve.go
T
Kyle Carberry 1742003785 fix(agent): gate workspace context collection until the agent is ready (#26715)
## Problem

Workspace context surfaced in chat (Coder Agents) is incomplete and racy
on a fresh boot:

- The context panel is missing personal skills (only repo-level skills
under `.claude/skills` show up).
- The MCP section lists `.mcp.json` files but no MCP servers are
registered.
- The Issues panel reports instruction files as unreadable, e.g.
`CLAUDE.md (file: unreadable)` and `.cursorrules (file: unreadable)`
with `symlink resolve: lstat .../AGENTS.md: no such file or directory`.

## Root cause

`agentcontext.Manager` collected and pushed context too eagerly:

- `NewManager` ran an eager resolve at agent `init()`.
- `RunPush` starts as a normal connection routine (`startAgentAPI210`)
with no lifecycle gating, so the first snapshot was pushed
(`Initial=true`) as soon as the agent API connected.

Both happened **before startup scripts finish** and before the lifecycle
reaches `ready`. At that point:

- `CLAUDE.md` / `.cursorrules` symlinks to `AGENTS.md` don't resolve
yet, so `EvalSymlinks` fails and the resolver emits `StatusUnreadable`
"symlink resolve" issues.
- Personal skills haven't synced yet, so they're missing.
- MCP servers connect via `mcpManager.Reload(...)` only **after**
`ready`, so only `.mcp.json` configs appear, with no servers.

That partial, error-laden snapshot is persisted by coderd and can
hydrate a chat.

## Fix

Gate `agentcontext.Manager` until the agent is ready, unconditionally:

- The Manager always starts gated. `NewManager` leaves the zero-value
(version 0) snapshot in place and never walks the filesystem; `RunPush`
withholds version-0 snapshots, so nothing reaches coderd.
- The agent calls `Manager.SetReady()` from the lifecycle transition in
`handleManifest`, right after startup scripts finish (`ready`, or
terminal `start_error` / `start_timeout` so a failed startup still
surfaces whatever context exists).
- On `SetReady`, the Manager performs the first real resolve (version 1)
and broadcasts it; `RunPush` ships it with `Initial=true`. Later changes
(MCP connect, skill edits) re-resolve and push as before.

Eager resolution before `ready` was the bug, not a mode worth
preserving, so the gate is always on rather than an opt-in option. This
aligns the agent-side push with chatd, which already waits for agent
readiness before loading context. No proto/coderd/DB changes: coderd
simply never receives a pre-ready snapshot.

<details>
<summary>Design notes &amp; decisions</summary>

- **Unconditional, not opt-in.** An earlier iteration added the gate as
an opt-in `ManagerOptions.GateUntilReady`. Since the eager
resolve-on-construct was the defect, the option, the eager first
resolve, and the now-dead `resolveLocked` helper were all removed; the
Manager is always gated until `SetReady`.
- **Version 0 is the pre-ready sentinel.** The gated placeholder is just
the zero-value snapshot (version 0); the first real resolve is version
1, so the push loop withholds anything at version 0. An earlier revision
carried a dedicated `Snapshot.Initializing` bool plus an HTTP `/resync`
field, but the push loop was the only consumer and nothing read the HTTP
field, so both were dropped.
- **Defer, don't retry symlinks.** Transient "unreadable" symlinks are
an artifact of collecting before checkout. Deferring until `ready` fixes
all three symptom classes at once and avoids masking genuine post-ready
errors (a broken symlink at `ready` is still reported).
- **Release on terminal startup states too** (`start_error`,
`start_timeout`), so a failed startup still surfaces whatever context
exists instead of gating forever. On reconnect the Manager instance is
reused and stays ready.

</details>

## Tests

- `agentcontext.TestManager_WithholdsCollectionUntilReady` simulates
collection running before startup finishes (broken `CLAUDE.md` /
`.cursorrules` -> `AGENTS.md` symlinks): asserts the gated snapshot is
the empty version-0 placeholder with no resources and no `unreadable`
issues, and that after `SetReady` (target now present) the inventory
resolves cleanly to a single instruction file with no spurious issues.
- `agentcontext.TestRunPush_WaitsForReady` asserts the push loop ships
nothing while gated even when content exists, then ships the full
inventory with `Initial=true` after `SetReady`.
- `agentcontext.TestManager_SetReadyIsIdempotent` covers the version-0
placeholder before ready, the single resolve to version 1 on `SetReady`,
and idempotency across repeated calls.
- Updated `agent.TestAgent_ContextStatePushed`: the first push now
already contains `AGENTS.md` with `Initial=true` and no `UNREADABLE`
resources (no pre-startup empty/partial push).

Validated on the changed packages: `go test -race
./agent/agentcontext/...`, `go test ./agent/ -run
TestAgent_ContextStatePushed`, `golangci-lint run`, `go vet`, `gofmt`
(all clean).

---
🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @kylecarbs.
2026-06-25 14:17:50 -06:00

1045 lines
36 KiB
Go

package agentcontext
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"math"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/xerrors"
"github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk/workspacesdk"
)
// Default caps. Copied from the RFC. The Manager exposes
// overrides via Options.
const (
// DefaultMaxResourceBytes is the per-resource payload cap.
// Resources whose payload exceeds this size are emitted
// with Status == StatusOversize and an empty Payload.
DefaultMaxResourceBytes = 64 * 1024
// DefaultMaxSnapshotBytes is the aggregate payload cap.
// Resources past this cap are emitted with Status ==
// StatusExcluded.
DefaultMaxSnapshotBytes = 2 * 1024 * 1024
// DefaultMaxResources is the resource count cap. Resources
// past this cap are emitted with Status == StatusExcluded.
DefaultMaxResources = 500
)
// File-name conventions recognized by the v1 resolver.
var (
// instructionFileNames are picked up from the top level of a
// scan root. Matching is case-sensitive on the basename,
// mirroring codex: it keys on the exact name "AGENTS.md" and
// never case-folds, so a lower-case agents.md (for example a
// generated API reference doc) is not mistaken for an
// instruction file.
instructionFileNames = []string{
"AGENTS.md",
"CLAUDE.md",
".cursorrules",
}
// mcpConfigFileName is recognized at the top level of a scan
// root only, not at arbitrary depth.
mcpConfigFileName = ".mcp.json"
// skillMetaFileName is the file inside a skill directory
// that carries the skill front-matter.
skillMetaFileName = "SKILL.md"
)
// skillContainerRelPaths are the directories, relative to a scan
// root, under which skills are discovered. A skill is an immediate
// subdirectory of a container that holds a SKILL.md. The list
// covers the cross-tool conventions Coder supports; codex itself
// uses .agents/skills and .codex/skills.
var skillContainerRelPaths = []string{
"skills",
filepath.Join(".agents", "skills"),
filepath.Join(".claude", "skills"),
filepath.Join(".codex", "skills"),
}
// recognizedInstructionFile reports whether name is one of the
// instruction-file conventions. Matching is case-sensitive:
// codex keys on the exact basename "AGENTS.md", so a lower-case
// agents.md is intentionally not recognized.
func recognizedInstructionFile(name string) bool {
for _, candidate := range instructionFileNames {
if name == candidate {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// skillContainersFor returns the existing skill-container
// directories reachable from rootPath without recursing the tree:
// rootPath itself when it is already a "skills" directory, plus
// each skillContainerRelPaths entry that exists. Skills live in
// the immediate children of a container, so the resolver and the
// watcher both stop here.
func skillContainersFor(rootPath string) []string {
var out []string
if filepath.Base(rootPath) == "skills" {
out = append(out, rootPath)
}
for _, rel := range skillContainerRelPaths {
container := filepath.Join(rootPath, rel)
if info, err := os.Stat(container); err == nil && info.IsDir() {
out = append(out, container)
}
}
return out
}
// Resolver walks one or more scan roots and produces a snapshot
// of every recognized resource it finds. The Resolver is
// stateless; the Manager owns the scan-root list and orchestrates
// successive resolves.
type Resolver struct {
// MaxResourceBytes caps the per-resource payload size. Use
// DefaultMaxResourceBytes if zero.
MaxResourceBytes uint64
// MaxSnapshotBytes caps the aggregate payload size. Use
// DefaultMaxSnapshotBytes if zero.
MaxSnapshotBytes uint64
// MaxResources caps the resource count. Use
// DefaultMaxResources if zero.
MaxResources int
// MCPResources, when non-nil, is consulted after the
// filesystem pass and returns the KindMCPServer resources
// for live MCP servers. It must not block: the resolver
// calls it on every re-resolve. In production the manager
// wires this to its MCP runner's snapshot; tests inject a
// closure directly.
MCPResources func() []Resource
}
// ScanRoot describes a single directory or file the resolver
// should examine.
type ScanRoot struct {
// Path is the absolute path. Symlinks should already be
// resolved.
Path string
// UserSource is the canonical source path the user
// declared, when this root came from a user-added Source.
// Empty for built-in roots.
UserSource string
}
// Resolve walks the supplied scan roots and returns a Snapshot.
// The version and schemaVersion fields are stamped by the
// caller; Resolve fills everything else. Resolve is the
// non-cancellable convenience wrapper around ResolveContext
// using context.Background.
func (r *Resolver) Resolve(roots []ScanRoot) Snapshot {
return r.ResolveContext(context.Background(), roots)
}
// ResolveContext is the cancellable variant of Resolve. The
// context is checked between scan roots so callers can bail out
// of a long pass without waiting for the current root's walk to
// finish. Cancellation never partially populates the returned
// Snapshot: a canceled context returns an empty Snapshot with
// SnapshotError set to the context error.
func (r *Resolver) ResolveContext(ctx context.Context, roots []ScanRoot) Snapshot {
res := r.normalize()
resources, snapErrs := res.walk(ctx, roots)
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return Snapshot{SnapshotError: err.Error()}
}
resources, totalBytes := res.applyCaps(resources)
// Append MCP server resources after the filesystem caps
// are applied so a runaway MCP server cannot crowd out
// instruction files.
if r.MCPResources != nil {
mcp := r.MCPResources()
startIdx := len(resources)
resources = append(resources, mcp...)
// MCP resources may push the aggregate over the
// count or byte cap. Apply both, picking up
// where applyCaps left off.
resources, snapErrs = res.applyMCPCaps(resources, startIdx, totalBytes, snapErrs)
}
// Deterministic order by ID for stable IDs and hashes.
slices.SortFunc(resources, func(a, b Resource) int {
return strings.Compare(a.ID, b.ID)
})
var payloadBytes uint64
for _, r := range resources {
payloadBytes += uint64(len(r.Payload))
}
// The drift hash covers only pinned prompt content; MCP resources are
// excluded (see driftResources). Snapshot.Resources still carries the
// full set so MCP servers stay visible in the chat-context snapshot.
hash := ComputeAggregateHash(driftResources(resources))
snap := Snapshot{
Resources: resources,
AggregateHash: hash,
PayloadBytes: payloadBytes,
}
if len(snapErrs) > 0 {
// Pick the most severe single error. Today every
// snapshot-level problem is "warning equivalent" so
// the first one wins; the design reserves the field
// for a singular message.
snap.SnapshotError = snapErrs[0]
}
return snap
}
func (r *Resolver) normalize() *Resolver {
out := *r
if out.MaxResourceBytes == 0 {
out.MaxResourceBytes = DefaultMaxResourceBytes
}
if out.MaxSnapshotBytes == 0 {
out.MaxSnapshotBytes = DefaultMaxSnapshotBytes
}
if out.MaxResources == 0 {
out.MaxResources = DefaultMaxResources
}
return &out
}
// walk visits every scan root and produces an unordered resource
// list. Aggregate caps are applied separately. The ctx is checked
// between roots so callers can bail out promptly.
//
// Discovery is deliberately shallow. For each scan root the
// resolver inspects only that directory's top level (instruction
// files and .mcp.json) plus a fixed set of skill-container
// locations under it. It never descends into subdirectories and
// never climbs to a parent directory; additional directories must
// be added explicitly as scan roots.
func (r *Resolver) walk(ctx context.Context, roots []ScanRoot) (resources []Resource, snapErrs []string) {
// Dedup roots by canonical path. The first occurrence
// wins so user-added roots that overlap with a built-in
// root attribute resources to the built-in.
seenRoot := make(map[string]struct{}, len(roots))
dedup := make([]ScanRoot, 0, len(roots))
for _, root := range roots {
if root.Path == "" {
continue
}
if _, ok := seenRoot[root.Path]; ok {
continue
}
seenRoot[root.Path] = struct{}{}
dedup = append(dedup, root)
}
// Deduplicate resources across roots by ID so two roots that
// resolve to the same file (e.g. overlapping ancestors, or a
// built-in root nested under a project root) do not
// double-count it.
seenID := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, root := range dedup {
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, []string{err.Error()}
}
r.discoverIn(root, &resources, seenID)
}
return resources, snapErrs
}
// discoverIn inspects a single scan root. A root that points at a
// file is classified directly. A directory root contributes its
// top-level instruction files and .mcp.json plus skills from the
// fixed container locations under it. The walk goes no deeper.
func (r *Resolver) discoverIn(root ScanRoot, out *[]Resource, seenID map[string]struct{}) {
info, err := os.Stat(root.Path)
if err != nil {
// Missing roots silently fall through. The user either
// added a path that does not exist yet or removed it
// later; the watcher surfaces re-creation as a change.
return
}
if !info.IsDir() {
if res, ok := r.classifyFile(root.Path, root.Path, info, root.UserSource); ok {
appendResource(out, seenID, res)
}
return
}
r.discoverTopLevelFiles(root, out, seenID)
for _, container := range skillContainersFor(root.Path) {
r.emitSkillsFromContainer(container, root, out, seenID)
}
}
// discoverTopLevelFiles classifies the instruction files and
// .mcp.json that sit directly in root.Path. Nested files are
// ignored: instruction files and MCP configs are recognized only
// at a scan root's top level.
func (r *Resolver) discoverTopLevelFiles(root ScanRoot, out *[]Resource, seenID map[string]struct{}) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(root.Path)
if err != nil {
return
}
for _, e := range entries {
name := e.Name()
isInstruction := recognizedInstructionFile(name)
if !isInstruction && name != mcpConfigFileName {
continue
}
// A directory that happens to share a recognized basename
// is not a resource. resolveReadTarget separately rejects
// symlinks whose targets are not regular files.
if e.IsDir() {
continue
}
info, err := e.Info()
if err != nil {
continue
}
path := filepath.Join(root.Path, name)
var res Resource
if isInstruction {
res = r.readInstructionFile(root.Path, path, info, root.UserSource)
} else {
res = r.readMCPConfig(root.Path, path, info, root.UserSource)
}
appendResource(out, seenID, res)
}
}
// appendResource adds res to out unless an earlier resource
// already claimed its ID.
func appendResource(out *[]Resource, seenID map[string]struct{}, res Resource) {
if _, dup := seenID[res.ID]; dup {
return
}
seenID[res.ID] = struct{}{}
*out = append(*out, res)
}
// resolveReadTarget produces the path and FileInfo that should
// be used to read the resource. When the input is not a
// symlink the original path and info are returned unchanged.
// When it is a symlink the target is resolved and validated
// against scanRoot so a malicious AGENTS.md ->
// ~/.ssh/id_rsa cannot exfiltrate files outside the
// contributing scan root.
//
// codex follows symlinks unconditionally because it trusts the
// local user's filesystem. Coder workspaces may execute
// templates and repositories that the agent operator did not
// author, so the resolver follows symlinks only within the
// scan-root boundary. Symlinks whose targets escape the
// boundary are emitted as StatusInvalid; broken symlinks and
// non-regular targets are emitted as StatusUnreadable.
func resolveReadTarget(path string, info fs.FileInfo, scanRoot string) (readPath string, readInfo fs.FileInfo, ok bool, status ResourceStatus, errMsg string) {
if info.Mode()&fs.ModeSymlink == 0 {
return path, info, true, StatusOK, ""
}
target, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(path)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, false, StatusUnreadable, fmt.Sprintf("symlink resolve: %v", err)
}
// Canonicalize scanRoot symmetrically with the target so the
// boundary check survives platform-level symlinks in the scan
// root prefix. macOS, for example, exposes /var as a symlink
// to /private/var; EvalSymlinks on the target produces a
// /private/var path while the caller's scanRoot may still be
// /var, which would incorrectly trip the prefix check.
rootClean := filepath.Clean(scanRoot)
if resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(rootClean); err == nil {
rootClean = resolved
}
if !pathHasPrefix(target, rootClean) {
return "", nil, false, StatusInvalid, fmt.Sprintf("symlink target %q escapes scan root %q", target, scanRoot)
}
tgtInfo, err := os.Stat(target)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, false, StatusUnreadable, err.Error()
}
if !tgtInfo.Mode().IsRegular() {
return "", nil, false, StatusInvalid, fmt.Sprintf("symlink target %q is not a regular file", target)
}
return target, tgtInfo, true, StatusOK, ""
}
// classifyFile inspects a single-file scan root and produces a
// Resource when the basename matches a recognized convention.
// Directory roots are handled by discoverIn; this is reached only
// for sources that point directly at a file.
func (r *Resolver) classifyFile(scanRoot, path string, info fs.FileInfo, userSource string) (Resource, bool) {
name := info.Name()
switch {
case recognizedInstructionFile(name):
return r.readInstructionFile(scanRoot, path, info, userSource), true
case name == mcpConfigFileName:
return r.readMCPConfig(scanRoot, path, info, userSource), true
case name == skillMetaFileName:
// SKILL.md as an explicit single-file source is still a
// valid skill when its parent directory name matches the
// front-matter name.
return r.readSkillMeta(scanRoot, path, info, userSource)
default:
return Resource{}, false
}
}
// readInstructionFile reads an instruction file and produces a
// KindInstructionFile resource. The file is read into memory
// with the per-resource cap applied.
//
// The bytes are returned verbatim. The legacy code path in
// agentcontextconfig/api.go strips HTML comments and invisible
// Unicode before serving instruction-file contents to chat; the
// equivalent sanitization for this pipeline lives in the
// follow-up chatd integration that consumes Snapshot.Resources.
// Until that lands, downstream consumers that render these
// payloads must sanitize themselves.
func (r *Resolver) readInstructionFile(scanRoot, path string, info fs.FileInfo, userSource string) Resource {
res := r.readFileResource(KindInstructionFile, scanRoot, path, info, userSource)
if res.Status == StatusOK {
res.Description = firstLine(string(res.Payload))
}
return res
}
// readMCPConfig reads a .mcp.json file and produces a
// KindMCPConfig resource carrying only path metadata and a
// content hash.
//
// .mcp.json fragments frequently embed secret-bearing fields
// (Env tokens, Authorization headers). The resolver hashes the
// file for change detection but intentionally does not ship
// the bytes; the live MCP server's tool list arrives
// separately as a KindMCPServer resource, which is what
// downstream consumers actually need.
func (r *Resolver) readMCPConfig(scanRoot, path string, info fs.FileInfo, userSource string) Resource {
res := Resource{
ID: resourceID(KindMCPConfig, path),
Kind: KindMCPConfig,
Source: path,
SizeBytes: safeUint64(info.Size()),
SourcePath: userSource,
}
readPath, readInfo, ok, status, errMsg := resolveReadTarget(path, info, scanRoot)
if !ok {
res.Status = status
res.Error = errMsg
return res
}
res.SizeBytes = safeUint64(readInfo.Size())
if safeUint64(readInfo.Size()) > r.MaxResourceBytes {
res.Status = StatusOversize
res.Error = fmt.Sprintf("file size %d exceeds per-resource cap of %d bytes", readInfo.Size(), r.MaxResourceBytes)
if data, err := readFileCapped(readPath, safeInt64(r.MaxResourceBytes)); err == nil {
res.ContentHash = sha256.Sum256(data)
}
return res
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(readPath)
if err != nil {
res.Status = StatusUnreadable
res.Error = err.Error()
return res
}
res.ContentHash = sha256.Sum256(data)
// A .mcp.json with broken JSON yields no MCP servers at all; the
// MCP manager logs and skips it, so the failure is otherwise
// invisible. Flag structural problems here as StatusInvalid so the
// chat context surfaces them as an issue rather than silently
// dropping every server in the file.
if err := validateMCPConfig(data); err != nil {
res.Status = StatusInvalid
res.Error = err.Error()
}
return res
}
// validateMCPConfig performs lightweight structural validation of a
// .mcp.json document so syntactically broken files surface as
// StatusInvalid instead of silently producing no MCP servers. It is
// deliberately self-contained and does not import the MCP package: it
// only checks that the document is valid JSON shaped like
// {"mcpServers": {<name>: {...}}}. Individual server fields
// (command/url/env/...) are not validated here; the MCP manager owns
// that when it connects. An absent or empty mcpServers map is valid.
func validateMCPConfig(data []byte) error {
var shape struct {
MCPServers map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"mcpServers"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &shape); err != nil {
return err
}
// Each server entry must be a JSON object; a scalar or array
// entry is a structural error the MCP manager would reject.
// The top-level Unmarshal above already rejects malformed JSON,
// so a well-formed value starting with '{' is a complete object.
for name, raw := range shape.MCPServers {
trimmed := bytes.TrimSpace(raw)
if len(trimmed) == 0 || trimmed[0] != '{' {
return xerrors.Errorf("server %q must be a JSON object", name)
}
}
return nil
}
// readFileResource is the shared plumbing for kinds whose only
// difference is the enum stamped on the Resource: build the
// Resource header, enforce the per-resource size cap, read the
// file, hash it, attach the bytes. Callers add kind-specific
// post-processing (e.g. firstLine for instruction files) by
// inspecting Status==StatusOK.
func (r *Resolver) readFileResource(kind ResourceKind, scanRoot, path string, info fs.FileInfo, userSource string) Resource {
readPath, readInfo, ok, status, errMsg := resolveReadTarget(path, info, scanRoot)
// Attribute the resource to the resolved target rather than
// the path we walked. When several names point at the same
// file (e.g. CLAUDE.md and .cursorrules symlinked to
// AGENTS.md), they share an ID and collapse to a single
// resource via the walk's ID-based dedup, instead of shipping
// identical content multiple times. On resolve failure the
// original path is kept so the error points at the offending
// link.
idPath := path
if ok {
idPath = readPath
}
res := Resource{
ID: resourceID(kind, idPath),
Kind: kind,
Source: idPath,
SizeBytes: safeUint64(info.Size()),
SourcePath: userSource,
}
if !ok {
res.Status = status
res.Error = errMsg
return res
}
res.SizeBytes = safeUint64(readInfo.Size())
if safeUint64(readInfo.Size()) > r.MaxResourceBytes {
res.Status = StatusOversize
res.Error = fmt.Sprintf("file size %d exceeds per-resource cap of %d bytes", readInfo.Size(), r.MaxResourceBytes)
// Still hash the (capped) content so a fix is
// detectable.
if data, err := readFileCapped(readPath, safeInt64(r.MaxResourceBytes)); err == nil {
res.ContentHash = sha256.Sum256(data)
}
return res
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(readPath)
if err != nil {
res.Status = StatusUnreadable
res.Error = err.Error()
return res
}
res.Payload = data
res.ContentHash = sha256.Sum256(data)
return res
}
// readSkillMeta reads a SKILL.md file, parses its front-matter,
// and emits a KindSkill resource. The name encoded in the
// front-matter must match the parent directory's basename to
// be considered valid; otherwise Status is StatusInvalid.
func (r *Resolver) readSkillMeta(scanRoot, path string, info fs.FileInfo, userSource string) (Resource, bool) {
parent := filepath.Base(filepath.Dir(path))
res := Resource{
ID: resourceID(KindSkill, filepath.Dir(path)),
Kind: KindSkill,
Source: filepath.Dir(path),
SizeBytes: safeUint64(info.Size()),
SourcePath: userSource,
}
readPath, readInfo, ok, status, errMsg := resolveReadTarget(path, info, scanRoot)
if !ok {
res.Status = status
res.Error = errMsg
return res, true
}
res.SizeBytes = safeUint64(readInfo.Size())
if safeUint64(readInfo.Size()) > r.MaxResourceBytes {
res.Status = StatusOversize
res.Error = fmt.Sprintf("file size %d exceeds per-resource cap of %d bytes", readInfo.Size(), r.MaxResourceBytes)
// Hash the (capped) prefix so an edit that keeps
// the file oversize still shifts the aggregate
// hash and triggers a re-broadcast. Mirrors the
// behavior in readFileResource.
if data, err := readFileCapped(readPath, safeInt64(r.MaxResourceBytes)); err == nil {
res.ContentHash = sha256.Sum256(data)
}
return res, true
}
data, err := os.ReadFile(readPath)
if err != nil {
res.Status = StatusUnreadable
res.Error = err.Error()
return res, true
}
res.ContentHash = sha256.Sum256(data)
name, description, _, err := workspacesdk.ParseSkillFrontmatter(string(data))
if err != nil {
res.Status = StatusInvalid
res.Error = err.Error()
return res, true
}
if name != parent {
res.Status = StatusInvalid
res.Error = fmt.Sprintf("front-matter name %q does not match directory %q", name, parent)
return res, true
}
if !workspacesdk.SkillNamePattern.MatchString(name) {
res.Status = StatusInvalid
res.Error = fmt.Sprintf("skill name %q is not kebab-case", name)
return res, true
}
res.Description = description
res.Name = name
res.Payload = data
return res, true
}
// emitSkillsFromContainer scans the immediate children of a
// recognized skills-container directory and emits one Skill
// resource per subdirectory whose SKILL.md parses cleanly.
func (r *Resolver) emitSkillsFromContainer(container string, root ScanRoot, out *[]Resource, seenID map[string]struct{}) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(container)
if err != nil {
return
}
for _, e := range entries {
if !e.IsDir() {
continue
}
meta := filepath.Join(container, e.Name(), skillMetaFileName)
// Lstat (not Stat) so a symlinked SKILL.md is
// detected and routed through resolveReadTarget,
// which enforces the scan-root boundary.
info, err := os.Lstat(meta)
if err != nil {
continue
}
res, ok := r.readSkillMeta(root.Path, meta, info, root.UserSource)
if !ok {
continue
}
appendResource(out, seenID, res)
}
}
// applyCaps enforces the resource-count cap and aggregate
// payload cap. Resources past either cap have their Status set
// to StatusExcluded and their Payload cleared. The returned
// byte total is the sum of surviving payloads, so callers that
// append additional resources (e.g. MCP server tool lists) can
// apply the same byte cap to the appended slice.
func (r *Resolver) applyCaps(resources []Resource) ([]Resource, uint64) {
// Stable sort by (Kind asc, Source asc) so excluded
// resources are deterministic.
slices.SortStableFunc(resources, func(a, b Resource) int {
if a.Kind != b.Kind {
return int(a.Kind) - int(b.Kind)
}
return strings.Compare(a.Source, b.Source)
})
var total uint64
for i := range resources {
if i >= r.MaxResources {
resources[i] = excluded(resources[i],
fmt.Sprintf("dropped to fit %d-resource snapshot count cap", r.MaxResources))
continue
}
if resources[i].Status != StatusOK {
continue
}
size := uint64(len(resources[i].Payload))
if total+size > r.MaxSnapshotBytes {
resources[i] = excluded(resources[i],
fmt.Sprintf("dropped to fit %d-byte aggregate cap", r.MaxSnapshotBytes))
continue
}
total += size
}
return resources, total
}
// applyMCPCaps enforces both the count cap and the remaining
// aggregate byte cap on MCP resources appended after
// applyCaps. startIdx is the first index of the appended tail.
// priorBytes is the sum of payload bytes already committed by
// the filesystem pass; MCP resources whose payloads would push
// the running total past MaxSnapshotBytes are stamped
// StatusExcluded. Without this guard a provider returning one
// large KindMCPServer payload would exceed the aggregate cap
// with StatusOK, breaking the contract in
// DefaultMaxSnapshotBytes.
func (r *Resolver) applyMCPCaps(resources []Resource, startIdx int, priorBytes uint64, snapErrs []string) ([]Resource, []string) {
total := priorBytes
countCapHit := false
byteCapHit := false
for i := startIdx; i < len(resources); i++ {
if i >= r.MaxResources {
resources[i] = excluded(resources[i],
fmt.Sprintf("dropped to fit %d-resource snapshot count cap", r.MaxResources))
countCapHit = true
continue
}
if resources[i].Status != StatusOK {
continue
}
size := uint64(len(resources[i].Payload))
if total+size > r.MaxSnapshotBytes {
resources[i] = excluded(resources[i],
fmt.Sprintf("dropped to fit %d-byte aggregate cap", r.MaxSnapshotBytes))
byteCapHit = true
continue
}
total += size
}
if countCapHit {
snapErrs = append(snapErrs, fmt.Sprintf("snapshot exceeds %d-resource count cap", r.MaxResources))
}
if byteCapHit {
snapErrs = append(snapErrs, fmt.Sprintf("snapshot exceeds %d-byte aggregate cap", r.MaxSnapshotBytes))
}
return resources, snapErrs
}
// excluded mutates and returns the supplied resource with the
// StatusExcluded outcome.
func excluded(r Resource, reason string) Resource {
r.Status = StatusExcluded
r.Error = reason
r.Payload = nil
return r
}
// resourceID builds a stable resource ID. Kind plus canonical
// source path is enough; sources never collide across kinds for
// v1 because each kind owns a distinct file-name pattern.
func resourceID(kind ResourceKind, source string) string {
return kind.String() + ":" + source
}
// readFileCapped reads up to maxBytes from path. It returns the
// truncated payload on success.
func readFileCapped(path string, maxBytes int64) ([]byte, error) {
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer f.Close()
return io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(f, maxBytes))
}
// firstLine returns the first non-empty trimmed line of s, used
// as a short description fallback.
func firstLine(s string) string {
for line := range strings.SplitSeq(s, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if line == "" {
continue
}
// Strip leading markdown heading markers for prettier
// descriptions.
return strings.TrimSpace(headingPrefixRegex.ReplaceAllString(line, ""))
}
return ""
}
var headingPrefixRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^#+\s*`)
// safeUint64 converts a non-negative int64 to uint64. Negative
// inputs are clamped to 0, which is safe for the size-tracking
// fields that use it; a negative os.FileInfo size is pathological
// and never indicates real content.
func safeUint64(n int64) uint64 {
if n < 0 {
return 0
}
return uint64(n)
}
// safeInt64 converts a uint64 to int64, clamping to math.MaxInt64
// when the input would overflow. The caps configured on the
// resolver never approach 2^63 bytes, so the clamp only guards
// against pathological caller input.
func safeInt64(n uint64) int64 {
if n > math.MaxInt64 {
return math.MaxInt64
}
return int64(n)
}
// ResourceKind describes the category of a resolved context
// resource. The values mirror the proto ContextResource.Kind
// enum reserved in the RFC; future kinds (PLUGIN, HOOK,
// SUBAGENT, COMMAND) are defined here so callers can switch
// exhaustively, but no v1 resolver emits them.
type ResourceKind int
const (
KindUnspecified ResourceKind = iota
// KindInstructionFile covers AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md,
// .cursorrules, and similar plain-text rule files that
// inject content into the model prompt.
KindInstructionFile
// KindSkill is a directory containing SKILL.md and any
// supporting files. Only the meta file is read at
// resolve time; bodies are fetched on demand.
KindSkill
// KindMCPConfig is a .mcp.json fragment declaring one or
// more MCP servers.
KindMCPConfig
// KindMCPServer is a live MCP server's resolved tool list,
// populated from the MCP runner's snapshot after the server
// has been connected.
KindMCPServer
// KindPlugin is reserved for Claude Code plugin manifests.
// Not emitted by v1.
KindPlugin
// KindHook is reserved for plugin hooks. Not emitted by v1.
KindHook
// KindSubagent is reserved for plugin-declared subagents.
// Not emitted by v1.
KindSubagent
// KindCommand is reserved for plugin slash commands.
// Not emitted by v1.
KindCommand
)
// String returns the lower-snake-case name used in IDs and
// metrics. Unknown values stringify to "unknown".
func (k ResourceKind) String() string {
switch k {
case KindInstructionFile:
return "instruction_file"
case KindSkill:
return "skill"
case KindMCPConfig:
return "mcp_config"
case KindMCPServer:
return "mcp_server"
case KindPlugin:
return "plugin"
case KindHook:
return "hook"
case KindSubagent:
return "subagent"
case KindCommand:
return "command"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// ResourceStatus describes whether a resource was successfully
// read and whether its payload survived the per-resource and
// aggregate caps.
//
// Note: these iota ordinals do NOT match the proto
// ContextResource.Status ordinals one-to-one. The proto enum
// reserves 0 for STATUS_UNSPECIFIED and shifts every value by
// one, so the conversion in resourceStatusToProto cannot be
// replaced with a direct int cast. ResourceKind, by contrast,
// does align with its proto counterpart.
type ResourceStatus int
const (
// StatusOK indicates the payload was populated.
StatusOK ResourceStatus = iota
// StatusOversize indicates the resource exceeded the
// per-resource size cap; payload is omitted.
StatusOversize
// StatusUnreadable indicates an IO error reading the
// resource (permission denied, broken symlink, etc.).
StatusUnreadable
// StatusInvalid indicates the resource was structurally
// malformed (bad JSON, missing front-matter, etc.).
StatusInvalid
// StatusExcluded indicates the resource was dropped to fit
// the aggregate snapshot or count cap.
StatusExcluded
)
// String returns the lower-snake-case name used in IDs and
// metrics. Unknown values stringify to "unknown".
func (s ResourceStatus) String() string {
switch s {
case StatusOK:
return "ok"
case StatusOversize:
return "oversize"
case StatusUnreadable:
return "unreadable"
case StatusInvalid:
return "invalid"
case StatusExcluded:
return "excluded"
default:
return "unknown"
}
}
// Resource is what the resolver emits for each recognized file
// or live server it discovers under a scan root. The struct is
// intentionally flat; the typed wire mapping happens in
// drpc.go where Kind selects the proto oneof variant.
type Resource struct {
// ID is stable across pushes for the same logical
// resource. The current scheme is "<kind>:<source>". It is
// used for in-snapshot dedup and as part of the aggregate
// hash; it is not transmitted on the wire.
ID string
// Kind classifies the resource. Drives which proto oneof
// variant the DRPC adapter sets.
Kind ResourceKind
// Source is the file path or MCP server name.
Source string
// ContentHash is sha256 over the resource's original
// bytes (or transport-encoded server tool list).
ContentHash [32]byte
// Payload is the full bytes when Status == StatusOK; the
// per-resource and aggregate caps may leave it empty.
// Unused for KindMCPServer (Tools is used instead).
Payload []byte
// SizeBytes is the original payload size, populated
// regardless of Status.
SizeBytes uint64
// Status records OK or a reason the payload is absent.
Status ResourceStatus
// Error is populated whenever Status != StatusOK; may
// also carry a non-fatal warning when Status == StatusOK.
Error string
// Name is the resource's own short identifier. Currently
// populated for KindSkill (from front-matter) and
// KindMCPServer (server name); empty for other kinds.
Name string
// Description is a short human-readable summary (skill
// front-matter description, MCP server description,
// instruction-file first line). Shipped on the wire only
// for kinds whose body type carries a description field.
Description string
// SourcePath is the user-declared source that contributed
// the resource; empty for built-in scan roots.
SourcePath string
// Tools is populated for KindMCPServer with the live
// server's tool list; empty otherwise.
Tools []MCPTool
}
// MCPTool mirrors the wire MCPTool message. InputSchema is the
// JSON-Schema-shaped object the MCP server reported for the
// tool's arguments.
type MCPTool struct {
Name string
Description string
InputSchema map[string]any
}
// Snapshot is the immutable bundle of resources produced by a
// single resolver pass.
type Snapshot struct {
// Version is monotonically increasing per Manager instance; resets
// when the agent process restarts. Version 0 is the gated pre-ready
// placeholder (the first real resolve is version 1), which the push
// loop withholds.
Version uint64
// AggregateHash is sha256 over a canonical encoding of
// (ID, Kind, Source, ContentHash, Status) for every
// drift-relevant resource. MCP resources (KindMCPConfig and
// KindMCPServer) are excluded because they describe live,
// agent-global runtime capabilities discovered at turn time,
// not pinned prompt content; see driftResources. Identical
// inputs always produce identical hashes; see
// ComputeAggregateHash.
AggregateHash [32]byte
// Resources is sorted by ID for deterministic encoding.
Resources []Resource
// PayloadBytes is the sum of len(Resource.Payload) across
// emitted resources after caps were applied.
PayloadBytes uint64
// SnapshotError carries a single snapshot-level error
// string when present (count cap exceeded, watcher
// degraded, ENOSPC, etc.). Empty when healthy.
SnapshotError string
}
// driftResources returns the subset of resources that participate in
// chat-context drift detection. MCP resources (the .mcp.json config and
// connected MCP servers) are deliberately excluded: an agent connects to
// its MCP servers asynchronously after startup, and the chat model
// discovers their tools live at turn time, not from pinned prompt
// content. Hashing them would dirty an already-hydrated chat the moment
// a server finished connecting, even though nothing the user pinned
// changed. Instruction files and skills, whose content is pinned into
// the chat, stay drift-relevant.
func driftResources(resources []Resource) []Resource {
out := make([]Resource, 0, len(resources))
for _, r := range resources {
switch r.Kind {
case KindMCPConfig, KindMCPServer:
continue
default:
out = append(out, r)
}
}
return out
}
// ComputeAggregateHash produces the deterministic snapshot
// aggregate hash for the supplied resources. The caller does
// not need to pre-sort; the function sorts a copy of the slice
// to keep its inputs side-effect free.
//
// The encoding is a Netstring-style stream. Each string field
// is written as the decimal-ASCII length, the literal ':', and
// the raw UTF-8 bytes. ContentHash is written as 32 raw bytes
// without a length prefix because it is a fixed-size SHA-256
// digest. Resources are separated by a single NUL byte. The
// scheme is internal to the agent and coderd, but it is stable
// across platforms because every field has an unambiguous
// length.
func ComputeAggregateHash(resources []Resource) [32]byte {
indexed := make([]Resource, len(resources))
copy(indexed, resources)
slices.SortFunc(indexed, func(a, b Resource) int {
return strings.Compare(a.ID, b.ID)
})
h := sha256.New()
for _, r := range indexed {
writeLengthPrefixed(h, r.ID)
writeLengthPrefixed(h, r.Kind.String())
writeLengthPrefixed(h, r.Source)
_, _ = h.Write(r.ContentHash[:])
writeLengthPrefixed(h, r.Status.String())
_, _ = h.Write([]byte{0})
}
var out [32]byte
copy(out[:], h.Sum(nil))
return out
}
// writeLengthPrefixed writes a decimal-ASCII length prefix, a
// literal ':' separator, and the raw bytes of s. This matches
// the Netstring framing used by ComputeAggregateHash.
func writeLengthPrefixed(h interface{ Write([]byte) (int, error) }, s string) {
_, _ = h.Write([]byte(strconv.Itoa(len(s))))
_, _ = h.Write([]byte{':'})
_, _ = h.Write([]byte(s))
}