Sas Swart
fc188fdaee
## Overview Part of the **boundary correlation** feature. Fixes lazy creation of `boundary_sessions` rows so it works within the agent's RBAC constraints, and consumes the new `ConfinedProcessName` field reported by boundary. Pairs with coder/boundary#206, which adds `ConfinedProcessName` to `ReportBoundaryLogsRequest`. This branch bumps the `github.com/coder/boundary` module to pick up that work. ## Problem `ensureSession` did a pre-insert existence check via `GetBoundarySessionByID`. Agents are **not permitted to read boundary sessions**, so that read path is not viable when the session is created from an agent-reported log batch. ## Changes - **Remove the pre-insert read.** `ensureSession` now inserts directly and treats a primary-key unique violation as success, covering sessions already created by a prior batch, a reconnection, or another coderd replica — without requiring read access. - **Per-connection guard.** Add a mutex-protected `ensuredSessions` set so repeated log batches on the same connection skip the existence check and insert entirely, touching the database only for the logs. On a transient insert failure the session is left unmarked so the next batch retries. - **Consume `ConfinedProcessName`.** Pass `req.GetConfinedProcessName()` through to the session insert. - **Bump boundary module** from `v0.9.0` to `v0.9.1-0.20260706095856-35ba90f9e8b2`. - **Tests.** - Add `TestReportBoundaryLogsAgentRBAC` (`coderd/boundary_logs_test.go`), an integration test that connects as a real workspace agent, verifies the session and log are persisted under agent RBAC, and asserts the agent subject cannot read boundary sessions — guarding against reintroducing a pre-insert read. - Add `TestReportBoundaryLogsSessionGuard` (session inserted once across two batches, logs inserted per batch) and `TestReportBoundaryLogsSessionRetriedOnError` (insert retried after a transient error). - Regenerate `agent-firewall` CLI docs/golden files and adjust the clidocgen template to render the YAML path when a flag has no long name. > 🤖 This PR was opened by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart.
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agent-firewall
Network isolation tool for monitoring and restricting HTTP/HTTPS requests
Usage
coder agent-firewall [flags] [args...]
Description
boundary creates an isolated network environment for target processes, intercepting HTTP/HTTPS traffic through a transparent proxy that enforces user-defined allow rules.
Options
--config
| Type | yaml-config-path |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_CONFIG |
Path to YAML config file.
--allow
| Type | string |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_ALLOW |
Allow rule (repeatable). These are merged with allowlist from config file. Format: "pattern" or "METHOD[,METHOD] pattern".
--log-level
| Type | string |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_LOG_LEVEL |
| YAML | log_level |
| Default | warn |
Set log level (error, warn, info, debug).
--log-dir
| Type | string |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_LOG_DIR |
| YAML | log_dir |
Set a directory to write logs to rather than stderr.
--proxy-port
| Type | int |
| Environment | $PROXY_PORT |
| YAML | proxy_port |
| Default | 8080 |
Set a port for HTTP proxy.
--pprof
| Type | bool |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_PPROF |
| YAML | pprof_enabled |
Enable pprof profiling server.
--pprof-port
| Type | int |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_PPROF_PORT |
| YAML | pprof_port |
| Default | 6060 |
Set port for pprof profiling server.
--jail-type
| Type | string |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_JAIL_TYPE |
| YAML | jail_type |
| Default | nsjail |
Jail type to use for network isolation. Options: nsjail (default), landjail.
--use-real-dns
| Type | bool |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_USE_REAL_DNS |
| YAML | use_real_dns |
Use real DNS in the jail instead of the dummy DNS (allows DNS exfiltration). Default: false.
--no-user-namespace
| Type | bool |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_NO_USER_NAMESPACE |
| YAML | no_user_namespace |
Do not create a user namespace. Use in restricted environments that disallow user NS (e.g. Bottlerocket in EKS auto-mode).
--disable-audit-logs
| Type | bool |
| Environment | $DISABLE_AUDIT_LOGS |
| YAML | disable_audit_logs |
Disable sending of audit logs to the workspace agent when set to true.
--log-proxy-socket-path
| Type | string |
| Environment | $CODER_AGENT_BOUNDARY_LOG_PROXY_SOCKET_PATH |
| Default | /tmp/boundary-audit.sock |
Path to the socket where the boundary log proxy server listens for audit logs.
--version
| Type | bool |
Print version information and exit.
--enable-session-correlation
| Type | bool |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_SESSION_CORRELATION_ENABLED |
| YAML | session_correlation_enabled |
Enable session correlation header injection. When no inject targets are configured, the target is auto-derived from CODER_AGENT_URL (set automatically inside Coder workspaces). Disable for deployments without Coder AI Gateway in front.
--session-id-inject-target
| Type | string |
| Environment | $BOUNDARY_SESSION_ID_INJECT_TARGET |
Inject target for session correlation headers. Repeat the flag once per target; each value describes exactly one target. Format: "domain= [path=]". Example: --session-id-inject-target "domain=prod.coder.com path=/api/v2/aibridge/*".