Removes 6 fragile `require.Equal(t, codersdk.ChatStatusPending,
chat.Status)` assertions from chat relay and creation tests.
**Root cause**: In HA tests with two replicas sharing the same DB, the
worker can acquire a just-created chat (flipping `pending → running` via
`AcquireChats`) before the HTTP response reaches the test. All affected
tests already synchronize via `require.Eventually` waiting for `running`
status, making the initial assertion both redundant and racy.
- Remove 5 assertions in `enterprise/coderd/exp_chats_test.go` (all
`TestChatStreamRelay` subtests)
- Remove 1 assertion in `coderd/exp_chats_test.go` (`TestPostChats`)
- An existing comment in `TestPostChats/Success` already documents this
exact race
Fixes flake:
https://github.com/coder/coder/actions/runs/23807597632/job/69385425724
> 🤖 Written by a Coder Agent. Will be reviewed by a human.
Registers a new aibridge provider for ChatGPT by reusing the existing
OpenAI provider with a different `Name` and `BaseURL`
(https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex). The ChatGPT backend API is
OpenAI-compatible, so no new provider type is needed.
ChatGPT authenticates exclusively via per-user OAuth JWTs (BYOK mode) —
no centralized API key is configured. The OpenAI provider already
handles this: when no key is set, it falls through to the bearer token
from the request's Authorization header.
Depends on #23811
## Description
Adds support for multiple Copilot provider instances to route requests to different Copilot upstreams (individual, business, enterprise). Each instance has its own name and base URL, enabling per-upstream metrics, logs, circuit breakers, API dump, and routing.
## Changes
* Add Copilot business and enterprise provider names and host constants
* Register three Copilot provider instances in aibridged (default, business, enterprise)
* Update `defaultAIBridgeProvider` in `aibridgeproxy` to route new Copilot hosts to their corresponding providers
## Related
* Depends on: https://github.com/coder/aibridge/pull/240
* Closes: https://github.com/coder/aibridge/issues/152
Note: documentation changes will be added in a follow-up PR.
_Disclaimer: initially produced by Claude Opus 4.6, heavily modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira ._
_Disclaimer: produced using Claude Opus 4.6, reviewed by me, and
validated against Dogfood dataset._
The `ListAIBridgeSessions` query materialized and aggregated all
matching interceptions before paginating, then ran expensive
token/prompt lookups across the full dataset. For a page of 25 sessions
against ~200k interceptions (our dogfood dataset), this meant:
- Three CTEs scanning all rows (filtered_interceptions, session_tokens,
session_root)
- ARRAY_AGG(fi.id) collecting every interception ID per session
- Lateral prompt lookup via ANY(array_of_all_ids) running for every
session, not just the page
- ~90MB of disk sorts and JIT compilation kicking in
The improvement is to restructure to paginate first and enrich after: a
single CTE groups interceptions into sessions with only cheap aggregates
(MIN, MAX, COUNT), applies cursor pagination and LIMIT, then lateral
joins fetch metadata, tokens, and prompts for just the ~25-row page.
Measured against 220k interceptions / 160k sessions:
| Metric | Before | After |
|--------------------|--------|-------|
| Execution time | 1800ms | 185ms |
| Shared buffer hits | 737k | 2.6k |
| Disk sort spill | 86MB | 16MB |
| Lateral loops | 160k | 25 |
https://grafana.dev.coder.com/goto/fbODPGtvR?orgId=1 the results are
identical, just _much_ faster.
---
Also includes some additional tests which I added prior to refactoring
the query to ensure no regressions on edge-cases.
---------
Signed-off-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
- Add `chat-access` built-in role granting chat CRUD at User scope
- Exclude `ResourceChat` from member, org member, and org service
account `allPermsExcept` calls
- Allow system, owner, and user-admin to assign the new role
- Migration auto-assigns role to users who have ever created a chat
- Update RBAC test matrix: `memberMe` denied, `chatAccessUser` allowed
**Breaking change**: Members without `chat-access` lose chat creation
ability. Migration covers existing chat creators. Members who have never
created a chat do not get this role automatically applied.
> 🤖 This PR was created by a Coder Agent and reviewed by me.
## Problem
`aibridgeproxyd` sends `X-AI-Bridge-Request-Id` on every MITM request to
`aibridged` for cross-service log correlation, but aibridged never reads
it. The header is silently forwarded to upstream LLM providers.
## Changes
* Renamed the header to `X-Coder-AI-Governance-Request-Id` to match the
existing `X-Coder-AI-Governance-*` convention.
* `aibridged` now extracts the header, logs it and strips it before
forwarding upstream.
* Added `TestServeHTTP_StripInternalHeaders` to verify no `X-Coder-*`
headers leak to upstream
Previously, when a CONNECT tunnel was blocked because the destination
resolved to
a private/reserved IP range, the proxy returned 502 Bad Gateway —
implying an
upstream failure rather than a deliberate policy block.
Introduce `blockedIPError` as a sentinel type returned by both
`checkBlockedIP`
and `checkBlockedIPAndDial`. `ConnectionErrHandler` now inspects the
error with
`errors.As` and returns 403 Forbidden for policy blocks, keeping 502 for
genuine
dial failures.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
These chatd relay tests were seeding chats through
`subscriber.CreateChat(...)`, which wakes the subscriber and can race
local acquisition against the intended remote-worker setup.
Seed waiting and remote-running chats directly in the database instead,
and point the default OpenAI provider at a local safety-net server so
accidental processing fails locally instead of reaching the live API.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1430
Closes#22136
This pull-request implements a `<ClientFilter />` to our `Request Logs`
page for AI Bridge. This will allow the user to select a client which
they wish to filter against. Technically the backend is able to actually
filter against multiple clients at once however the frontend doesn't
currently have a nice way of supporting this (future improvement).
<img width="1447" height="831" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0be234e2-25f2-4a89-b971-d74817395da1"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Ruppel <jeremy.ruppel@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
## Summary
Add site-wide banners for AI Governance seat usage thresholds:
1. **90% capacity warning (admin-only):** When actual AI Governance
seats are ≥90% and <100% of the license limit, admins see:
> "You have used 90% of your AI governance add-on seats."
2. **Over-limit banner (admin-only):** When actual seats exceed the
license limit, admins see a prominent warning:
> "Your organization is using {actual} / {limit} AI Governance user
seats ({X}% over the limit). Contact sales@coder.com"
- Uses floor whole percentage (Go int division / `Math.floor`)
- Includes a clickable `mailto:sales@coder.com` link
> **PR Stack**
> 1. **#23351** ← `#23282` *(you are here)*
> 2. #23282 ← `#23275`
> 3. #23275 ← `#23349`
> 4. #23349 ← `main`
---
## Summary
`chatretry.Retry()` used pure exponential backoff (1 s, 2 s, 4 s, …) and
never consulted provider `Retry-After` headers. Fantasy's
`ProviderError` carries `ResponseHeaders` including `Retry-After`, but
`chaterror.Classify()` only parsed error text and silently dropped the
structured transport metadata.
This makes `Retry-After` a first-class signal in the classification →
retry pipeline.
<img width="853" height="346" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/65f012b6-8173-43d2-957e-ab9faddea525"
/>
## Changes
### `coderd/chatd/chaterror/classify.go`
- Added `RetryAfter time.Duration` field to `ClassifiedError` — a
normalized minimum retry delay derived from provider response metadata.
- `Classify()` now calls `extractProviderErrorDetails()` before falling
back to text heuristics. Structured `ProviderError.StatusCode` takes
priority over regex extraction.
- `normalizeClassification()` preserves and clamps `RetryAfter`.
### `coderd/chatd/chaterror/provider_error.go` (new)
Provider-specific extraction, isolated from the text-based
classification logic:
- `extractProviderErrorDetails()` unwraps `*fantasy.ProviderError` from
the error chain via `errors.As`.
- `retryAfterFromHeaders()` parses headers in priority order:
1. `retry-after-ms` (OpenAI-specific, millisecond precision)
2. `retry-after` (standard HTTP — integer seconds or HTTP-date)
- Case-insensitive header key lookup.
### `coderd/chatd/chatretry/chatretry.go`
- `effectiveDelay(attempt, classified)` computes `max(Delay(attempt),
classified.RetryAfter)` — the provider hint acts as a floor without
weakening the local exponential backoff.
- `Retry()` now uses `effectiveDelay` and passes the effective delay to
both `onRetry(...)` and the sleep timer, so downstream payloads, logs,
and the frontend countdown stay aligned automatically.
### Tests
- `classify_test.go`: Structured provider status + `Retry-After`
extraction, `retry-after-ms` priority, HTTP-date parsing, invalid header
fallback, `WithProvider` preservation.
- `chatretry_test.go`: Retry-after-as-floor semantics — longer hint
wins, shorter hint keeps base delay.
## Design notes
- **No SDK/API/frontend changes needed.** `codersdk.ChatStreamRetry`
already carries `DelayMs` and `RetryingAt`, and the frontend already
consumes them. The fix is purely in the server-side delay computation.
- **Existing retryability rules unchanged.** This fixes *when* we sleep,
not *whether* an error is retryable.
- **Provider hint is a floor:** `max(baseDelay, RetryAfter)` ensures we
never retry earlier than the provider asks, and never weaken our own
backoff curve.
## Changes
- **Commit 1**: Remove 17 unnecessary `//nolint` directives:
- `//nolint:varnamelen` — linter not active
- `//nolint:unused` on exported `SlimUnsupported`
- `//nolint:govet` in `coderd/httpmw/csrf` — no longer fires
- `//nolint:revive` on functions refactored since the nolint was added
- `//nolint:paralleltest` citing Go 1.22 loop variable capture
(obsolete)
- Bare `//nolint` narrowed to specific `//nolint:gocritic` with
justification
- **Commit 2**: Fix root causes behind 5 dangerous nolint suppressions:
- Add `MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12` to TLS client config (removes
`gosec` G402)
- Delete trivial unexported wrappers `apiKey()`/`normalizeProvider()` in
chatprovider (removes `revive` confusing-naming)
- Add doc comments to `StartWithAssert` and `Router` (removes `revive`
exported)
- Rename unused parameters to `_` in integration test helpers
> 🤖 This PR was created using Coder Agents and reviewed by me.
*Disclaimer: implemented by a Coder Agent using Claude Opus 4.6,
reviewed by me.*
Replace the transitional soft warning message:
> AI Bridge is now Generally Available in v2.30. In a future Coder
version, your deployment will require the AI Governance Add-On to
continue using this feature. Please reach out to your account team or
sales@coder.com to learn more.
with the definitive requirement message:
> The AI Governance Add-On is required to use AI Bridge. Please reach
out to your account team or sales@coder.com to learn more.
Updated in:
- `enterprise/coderd/license/license.go`
- `enterprise/coderd/license/license_test.go` (2 occurrences)
### Changes
**coder/coder:**
- `coderd/aibridge/aibridge.go` — Added `HeaderCoderBYOKToken` constant,
`IsBYOK()` helper, and updated `ExtractAuthToken` to check the BYOK
header first.
- `enterprise/aibridged/http.go` — BYOK-aware header stripping: in BYOK
mode only the BYOK header is stripped (user's LLM credentials
preserved); in centralized mode all auth headers are stripped.
<hr/>
**NOTE**: `X-Coder-Token` was removed! As of now `ExtractAuthToken`
retrieves token either from `X-Coder-AI-Governance-BYOK-Token` or from
`Authorization`/`X-Api-Key`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Susana Ferreira <susana@coder.com>
Co-authored-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
> **PR Stack**
> 1. #23351 ← `#23282`
> 2. #23282 ← `#23275`
> 3. **#23275** ← `#23349` *(you are here)*
> 4. #23349 ← `main`
---
## Summary
Extracts a structured error classification subsystem for agent chat
(`chatd`) so that retry and error payloads carry machine-readable
metadata — error kind, provider name, HTTP status code, and retryability
— instead of raw error strings.
This is the **backend half** of the error-handling work. The frontend
counterpart is in #23282.
## Changes
### New package: `coderd/chatd/chaterror/`
Canonical error classification — extracts error kind, provider, status
code, and user-facing message from raw provider errors. One source of
truth that drives both retry policy and stream payloads.
- **`kind.go`**: Error kind enum (`rate_limit`, `timeout`, `auth`,
`config`, `overloaded`, `unknown`).
- **`signals.go`**: Signal extraction — parses provider name, HTTP
status code, and retryability from error strings and wrapped types.
- **`classify.go`**: Classification logic — maps extracted signals to an
error kind.
- **`message.go`**: User-facing message templates keyed by kind +
signals.
- **`payload.go`**: Projectors that build `ChatStreamError` and
`ChatStreamRetry` payloads from a classified error.
### Modified
- **`codersdk/chats.go`**: Added `Kind`, `Provider`, `Retryable`,
`StatusCode` fields to `ChatStreamError` and `ChatStreamRetry`.
- **`coderd/chatd/chatretry/`**: Thinned to retry-policy only;
classification logic moved to `chaterror`.
- **`coderd/chatd/chatloop/`**: Added per-attempt first-chunk timeout
(60 s) via `guardedStream` wrapper — produces retryable
`startup_timeout` errors instead of hanging forever.
- **`coderd/chatd/chatd.go`**: Publishes normalized retry/error payloads
via `chaterror` projectors.
_Disclaimer:_ _produced_ _by_ _Claude_ _Opus_ _4\.6,_ _reviewed_ _by_ _me._
**This is a breaking change.** Users who are not have `owner` or sitewide `auditor` roles will no longer be able to view interceptions.
Regular users should not need to view this information; in fact, it could be used by a malicious insider to see what information we track and don't track to exfiltrate data or perform actions unobserved.
---
Changed authorization for AI Bridge interception-related operations from system-level permissions to resource-specific permissions. The following functions now authorize against `rbac.ResourceAibridgeInterception` instead of `rbac.ResourceSystem`:
- `ListAIBridgeTokenUsagesByInterceptionIDs`
- `ListAIBridgeToolUsagesByInterceptionIDs`
- `ListAIBridgeUserPromptsByInterceptionIDs`
Updated RBAC roles to grant AI Bridge interception permissions:
- **User/Member roles**: Can create and update AI Bridge interceptions but cannot read them back
- **Service accounts**: Same create/update permissions without read access
- **Owners/Auditors**: Retain full read access to all interceptions
Removed system-level authorization bypass in `populatedAndConvertAIBridgeInterceptions` function, allowing proper resource-level authorization checks.
Updated tests to reflect the new permission model where members cannot view AI Bridge interceptions, even their own, while owners and auditors maintain full visibility.
<!--
If you have used AI to produce some or all of this PR, please ensure you have read our [AI Contribution guidelines](https://coder.com/docs/about/contributing/AI_CONTRIBUTING) before submitting.
-->
_Disclaimer:_ _initially_ _produced_ _by_ _Claude_ _Opus_ _4\.6,_ _heavily_ _modified_ _and_ _reviewed_ _by_ _me._
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1360
Adds a new `/api/v2/aibridge/sessions` API which returns "sessions".
Sessions, as defined in the [RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/AI-Bridge-Sessions-Threads-2ccd579be59280f28021d3baf7472fbe?source=copy_link), are a set of interceptions logically grouped by a session key issued by the client.
The API design for this endpoint was done in [this doc](https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1360).
If the client has not provided a session ID, we will revert to the thread root ID, and if that's not present we use the interception's own ID (i.e. a session of a single interception - which is effectively what we show currently in our `/api/v2/aibridge/interceptions` API).
The SQL query looks gnarly but it's relatively simple, and seems to perform well (~200ms) even when I import dogfood's `aibridge_*` tables into my workspace. If we need to improve performance on this later we can investigate materialized views, perhaps, but for now I don't think it's warranted.
---
_The PR looks large but it's got a lot of generated code; the actual changes aren't huge._
- Moves `coderd/chatd/`, `coderd/gitsync/`, `enterprise/coderd/chatd/`
under `x/` parent directories to signal instability
- Adds `Experimental:` glue code comments in `coderd/coderd.go`
> 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and was
reviewed by my human. 🧑💻
- Changes all 41 chat method receivers in `codersdk/chats.go` from
`*Client` to `*ExperimentalClient` to ensure that callers are aware that
these reference potentially unstable `/api/experimental` endpoints.
> 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and has been
reviewed by my human. 🧑💻
Partially addresses #21813 (still need to make changes to the "add user"
button to be complete)
Since there are a lot of user tests already, I moved them into
`coderdtest` to be shared.
> **PR Stack**
> 1. #23351 ← `#23282`
> 2. #23282 ← `#23275`
> 3. #23275 ← `#23349`
> 4. **#23349** ← `main` *(you are here)*
---
Retry events were published only to the local in-process stream via
`publishEvent()`. When pubsub is active, `Subscribe()`'s merge loop only
forwarded durable events (messages, status, errors) from pubsub
notifications,
so retry events were silently dropped for cross-replica subscribers.
This adds a `publishRetry()` helper that publishes both locally and via
pubsub,
and extends the `Subscribe()` notification handler to forward retry
events.
**Changes:**
- `coderd/pubsub/chatstreamnotify.go`: add `Retry` field to notify
message
- `coderd/chatd/chatd.go`: add `publishRetry()`, update `OnRetry`
callback,
extend `Subscribe()` to forward `notify.Retry`
- `coderd/chatd/chatd_internal_test.go`: focused pubsub delivery test
- `enterprise/coderd/chatd/chatd_test.go`: cross-replica end-to-end test
Audited exported helpers in `coderd/util/*`, `testutil`, `cryptorand`,
and friends, then replaced duplicated implementations with canonical
versions.
- **fix: `maps.SortedKeys` generic signature** — value type was
hardcoded to `any`, making it impossible to actually call. Added second
type parameter `V any`. Added table-driven tests with `cmp.Diff`.
- **refactor: replace ad-hoc ptr helpers with `ptr.Ref`** — removed
`int64Ptr`, `stringPtr`, `boolPtr`, `i64ptr`, `strPtr`, `PtrInt32`
across 6 files.
- **refactor: replace local `sortedKeys`/`sortKeys` with
`maps.SortedKeys`** — now that the signature is fixed, scripts can use
it.
- **refactor: replace hand-rolled `capitalize` with
`strings.Capitalize`** — the typegen version was also not UTF-8 safe.
> 🤖 This PR was created with the help of Coder Agents, and was reviewed
by my human. 🧑💻
## Description
Blocks `CONNECT` tunnels to private and reserved IP ranges in
aibridgeproxyd, preventing the proxy from being used to reach internal
networks.
The Coder access URL is always exempt (hostname+port match) so the proxy
can reach its own deployment. It is possible to exempt additional ranges
via `CODER_AIBRIDGE_PROXY_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_CIDRS`.
DNS rebinding is handled differently per path:
* Direct (no upstream proxy): validate the resolved IP right before the
TCP dial, no window between check and connect.
* Upstream proxy: Resolves and checks before forwarding to the upstream
dialer. A small rebinding window exists since the upstream proxy
re-resolves independently.
## Changes
* Add blocked IP denylist covering private, reserved, and
special-purpose ranges
* Add `AllowedPrivateCIDRs` option with CLI flag and env var
* Wire IP checks into `proxy.ConnectDial` for both upstream and direct
paths
* Add tests for blocked/allowed cases across direct dial, upstream
proxy, CIDR exemptions, and CoderAccessURL exemption
Notes: documentation will be handled in a follow-up PR.
Closes: https://github.com/coder/security/issues/124
## Summary
Adds the database schema, API endpoints, SDK types, and encryption
wrappers for admin-managed MCP (Model Context Protocol) server
configurations that chatd can consume. This is the backend foundation
for allowing external MCP tools (Sentry, Linear, GitHub, etc.) to be
used during AI chat sessions.
## Database
Two new tables:
- **`mcp_server_configs`**: Admin-managed server definitions with URL,
transport (Streamable HTTP / SSE), auth config (none / OAuth2 / API key
/ custom headers), tool allow/deny lists, and an availability policy
(`force_on` / `default_on` / `default_off`). Includes CHECK constraints
on transport, auth_type, and availability values.
- **`mcp_server_user_tokens`**: Per-user OAuth2 tokens for servers
requiring individual authentication. Cascades on user/config deletion.
New column on `chats` table:
- **`mcp_server_ids UUID[]`**: Per-chat MCP server selection, following
the same pattern as `model_config_id` — passed at chat creation,
changeable per-message with nil-means-no-change semantics.
## API Endpoints
All routes are under `/api/experimental/mcp/servers/` and gated behind
the `agents` experiment.
**Admin endpoints** (`ResourceDeploymentConfig` auth):
- `POST /` — Create MCP server config
- `PATCH /{id}` — Update MCP server config (full-replace)
- `DELETE /{id}` — Delete MCP server config
**Authenticated endpoints** (all users, enabled servers only for
non-admins):
- `GET /` — List configs (admins see all, members see enabled-only with
admin fields redacted)
- `GET /{id}` — Get config by ID (with `auth_connected` populated
per-user)
**OAuth2 per-user auth flow:**
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/connect` — Initiate OAuth2 flow (state cookie CSRF
protection)
- `GET /{id}/oauth2/callback` — Handle OAuth2 callback, store tokens
- `DELETE /{id}/oauth2/disconnect` — Remove stored OAuth2 tokens
## Security
- **Secrets never returned**: `OAuth2ClientSecret`, `APIKeyValue`, and
`CustomHeaders` are never in API responses — only boolean indicators
(`has_oauth2_secret`, `has_api_key`, `has_custom_headers`).
- **Field redaction for non-admins**: `convertMCPServerConfigRedacted`
strips `OAuth2ClientID`, auth URLs, scopes, and `APIKeyHeader` from
non-admin responses.
- **dbcrypt encryption at rest**: All 5 secret fields use `dbcrypt_keys`
encryption with full encrypt-on-write / decrypt-on-read wrappers (11
dbcrypt method overrides + 2 helpers), following the same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`.
- **OAuth2 CSRF protection**: State parameter stored in `HttpOnly`
cookie with `HTTPCookies.Apply()` for correct `Secure`/`SameSite` behind
TLS-terminating proxies.
- **dbauthz authorization**: All 18 querier methods have authorization
wrappers. Read operations use `ActionRead`, write operations use
`ActionUpdate` on `ResourceDeploymentConfig`.
## Governance Model
| Control | Implementation |
|---------|---------------|
| **Global kill switch** | `enabled` defaults to `false` |
| **Availability policy** | `force_on` (always injected), `default_on`
(pre-selected), `default_off` (opt-in) |
| **Per-chat selection** | `mcp_server_ids` on `CreateChatRequest` /
`CreateChatMessageRequest` |
| **Auth gate** | OAuth2 servers require per-user auth before tools are
injected |
| **Tool-level allow/deny** | Arrays on `mcp_server_configs` for
granular tool filtering |
| **Secrets encrypted at rest** | Uses `dbcrypt_keys` (same pattern as
`chat_providers.api_key`) |
## Tests
8 test functions covering:
- Full CRUD lifecycle (create, list, update, delete)
- Non-admin visibility filtering (enabled-only, field redaction)
- `auth_connected` population for OAuth2 vs non-OAuth2 servers
- Availability policy validation (valid values + invalid rejection)
- Unique slug enforcement (409 Conflict)
- OAuth2 disconnect idempotency
- Chat creation with `mcp_server_ids` persistence
## Known Limitations (Deferred)
These are documented and intentional for an experimental feature:
- **Audit logging** not yet wired — will add when feature stabilizes
- **Cross-field validation** (e.g., OAuth2 fields required when
`auth_type=oauth2`) — admin-only endpoint, will add when stabilizing
- **`force_on` auto-injection** — query exists but not yet wired into
chatd tool injection (follow-up)
- **Additional test coverage** — 403 auth tests, GET-by-ID tests,
callback CSRF tests planned for follow-up
## What's NOT in this PR
- Frontend UI (admin panel + chat picker)
- Actual MCP client connections (`chatd/chatmcp/` manager)
- Tool injection into `chatloop/`
Introduce a three-way workspace sharing setting (none, everyone,
service_accounts) replacing the boolean workspace_sharing_disabled.
In service_accounts mode, only service account-owned workspaces can be
shared while regular members' share permissions are removed. Adds a
new organization-service-account system role with per-org permissions
reconciled alongside the existing organization-member system role.
Related to:
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-28/feat-service-accounts-sharing-mode-and-rbac-role
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kayla はな <mckayla@hey.com>
Adds a `--no-wait` flag (CODER_CREATE_NO_WAIT) to the create command,
matching the existing pattern in `coder start`. When set, the `coder
create` command returns immediately after the workspace creation API
call succeeds instead of streaming build logs until completion.
This enables fire-and-forget workspace creation in CI/automation
contexts (e.g., GitHub Actions), where waiting for the build to finish
is unnecessary. Combined with other existing flags, users can create a
workspace with no interactivity, assuming the user is already
authenticated.
When a user uses an AI feature, we record them in the `ai_seat_state` as consuming a seat.
Added in debouching to prevent excessive writes to the db for this feature. There is no need for frequent updates.
File-reference parts in user messages were flattened to `TextContent` at
write time because fantasy has no file-reference content type. The
frontend never saw them as structured parts.
This moves all write paths (user, assistant, tool) from fantasy envelope
format to `codersdk.ChatMessagePart`. The streaming layer (`chatloop`)
is untouched, the conversion happens at the serialization boundary in
`persistStep`.
Old rows are still readable. `ParseContent` uses a structural heuristic
(`isFantasyEnvelopeFormat`) to distinguish legacy envelopes from SDK
parts. We chose this over try/fallback because fantasy envelopes
partially unmarshal into `ChatMessagePart` (the `type` field matches)
while silently losing content. A guard test enforces that no SDK part
can produce the envelope shape.
This is forward-only: new rows are unreadable by old code. Chat is
behind a feature flag so rollback risk is contained.
Also adds a typed `ChatMessageRole` to replace raw strings and
`fantasy.MessageRole*` casts at the persistence boundary. The type
covers `ChatMessage.Role`, `ChatStreamMessagePart.Role`, the
`PublishMessagePart` callback chain, and all DB write sites.
`fantasy.MessageRole*` remains only where we build `fantasy.Message`
structs for LLM dispatch.
Separately, `ProviderMetadata` was leaking to SSE clients via
`publishMessagePart`. `StripInternal` now runs on both the SSE and REST
paths, covering this.
Other cleanup:
- Old `db2sdk.contentBlockToPart` silently dropped metadata on
text/reasoning/tool-call content. New code preserves it.
- `providerMetadataToOptions` now logs warnings instead of silently
returning nil.
- `db2sdk` shrinks from ~250 lines of parallel conversion to ~15 lines
delegating to `chatprompt.ParseContent()`, removing the `fantasy` import
entirely.
Refs #22821
_Disclaimer: implemented by a Coder Agent using Claude Opus 4.6._
Marks the injected MCP approach in AI Bridge as deprecated across the
codebase.
## Changes
- **`codersdk/deployment.go`**: Deprecated `ExternalAuthConfig.MCPURL`,
`.MCPToolAllowRegex`, `.MCPToolDenyRegex` fields; deprecated and hid the
`--aibridge-inject-coder-mcp-tools` server flag; deprecated
`AIBridgeConfig.InjectCoderMCPTools`.
- **`coderd/externalauth/externalauth.go`**: Deprecated `Config.MCPURL`,
`.MCPToolAllowRegex`, `.MCPToolDenyRegex`.
- **`enterprise/aibridgedserver/aibridgedserver.go`**: Added runtime
deprecation warning when `CODER_AIBRIDGE_INJECT_CODER_MCP_TOOLS` is
enabled; deprecated `getCoderMCPServerConfig`.
- **`enterprise/aibridged/mcp.go`**: Deprecated `MCPProxyBuilder`
interface and `MCPProxyFactory` struct.
- **`docs/ai-coder/ai-bridge/mcp.md`**: Added deprecation warning
banner.
WaitBuffer is a thread-safe io.Writer that supports blocking until
accumulated output matches a substring or custom predicate. It
replaces ad-hoc safeBuffer/syncWriter types and time.Sleep-based
poll loops in tests with signal-driven waits.
- WaitFor/WaitForNth/WaitForCond for blocking on output
- Replace custom buffer types in cli/sync_test.go and
provisionersdk/agent_test.go
- Convert time.Sleep poll loops to require.Eventually/require.Never
in cli/ssh_test.go, coderd/activitybump_test.go,
coderd/workspaceagentsrpc_test.go, workspaceproxy_test.go, and
scaletest tests
The groupsToRows function was not setting the Group field on
groupTableRow, causing JSON output to contain zero-value structs. Table
output was unaffected since it uses separate fields.
BREAKING CHANGE: The JSON output structure changes from `{"Group":
{"id": ...}}` to `{"id": ...}` (flat). This is technically a breaking
change, but JSON output never contained real data (all fields were
zero-valued), so no working consumer could exist. We're taking the
opportunity to flatten the structure to match other list commands like
`coder list -o json`.
## Problem
When multiple concurrent callers (e.g., parallel workspace builds) read
the same single-use OAuth2 refresh token from the database and race to
exchange it with the provider, the first caller succeeds but subsequent
callers get `bad_refresh_token`. The losing caller then **clears the
valid new token** from the database, permanently breaking the auth link
until the user manually re-authenticates.
This is reliably reproducible when launching multiple workspaces
simultaneously with GitHub App external auth and user-to-server token
expiration enabled.
## Solution
Two layers of protection:
### 1. Singleflight deduplication (`Config.RefreshToken` +
`ObtainOIDCAccessToken`)
Concurrent callers for the same user/provider share a single refresh
call via `golang.org/x/sync/singleflight`, keyed by `userID`. The
singleflight callback re-reads the link from the database to pick up any
token already refreshed by a prior in-flight call, avoiding redundant
IDP round-trips entirely.
### 2. Optimistic locking on `UpdateExternalAuthLinkRefreshToken`
The SQL `WHERE` clause now includes `AND oauth_refresh_token =
@old_oauth_refresh_token`, so if two replicas (HA) race past
singleflight, the loser's destructive UPDATE is a harmless no-op rather
than overwriting the winner's valid token.
## Changes
| File | Change |
|------|--------|
| `coderd/externalauth/externalauth.go` | Added `singleflight.Group` to
`Config`; split `RefreshToken` into public wrapper +
`refreshTokenInner`; pass `OldOauthRefreshToken` to DB update |
| `coderd/provisionerdserver/provisionerdserver.go` | Wrapped OIDC
refresh in `ObtainOIDCAccessToken` with package-level singleflight |
| `coderd/database/queries/externalauth.sql` | Added optimistic lock
(`WHERE ... AND oauth_refresh_token = @old_oauth_refresh_token`) |
| `coderd/database/queries.sql.go` | Regenerated |
| `coderd/database/querier.go` | Regenerated |
| `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` | Updated test params for
new field |
| `coderd/externalauth/externalauth_test.go` | Added
`ConcurrentRefreshDedup` test; updated existing tests for singleflight
DB re-read |
## Testing
- **New test `ConcurrentRefreshDedup`**: 5 goroutines call
`RefreshToken` concurrently, asserts IDP refresh called exactly once,
all callers get same token.
- All existing `TestRefreshToken/*` subtests updated and passing.
- `TestObtainOIDCAccessToken` passing.
- `dbauthz` tests passing.
`Test_ProxyServer_Headers` never passed `--http-address`, so it bound to
the default `127.0.0.1:3000`.
`TestWorkspaceProxy_Server_PrometheusEnabled`
used `RandomPort(t)` for `--http-address` (a drive-by from #14972 which
was
fixing the Prometheus port).
Both now use `--http-address :0`. `ConfigureHTTPServers` calls
`net.Listen("tcp", ":0")` and holds the listener open, so there is no
TOCTOU window. Neither test connects to the HTTP listener, so the
assigned port is irrelevant. This matches `cli/server_test.go` where
`:0` is used throughout.
Split from #22693 per review feedback.
Fixes multiple bugs in coderd/chatd and sub-packages including race
conditions, transaction safety, stream buffer bounds, retry limits, and
enterprise relay improvements.
See commit message for full list.
`time.Now()` has nanosecond precision while Postgres timestamps are
microsecond precision. When tests compare `time.Now()` against
DB-sourced timestamps using `Before`/`After`/`WithinRange`/etc., there
is a non-zero flake risk from the precision mismatch.
This replaces `time.Now()` with `dbtime.Now()` (which rounds to
microsecond precision) in all test assertions that compare against
database timestamps.
Follows from #22684.
## Changes (11 files)
| File | Changes |
|---|---|
| `coderd/apikey_test.go` | 11 comparisons with `ExpiresAt` |
| `coderd/users_test.go` | 2 comparisons with `ExpiresAt` |
| `coderd/oauth2_test.go` | 1 comparison with `token.Expiry` |
| `coderd/workspaces_test.go` | 2 comparisons with `DormantAt` |
| `coderd/workspaceagents_test.go` | 3 comparisons with
`ConnectedAt`/`DisconnectedAt` |
| `coderd/workspaceapps/db_test.go` | 1 comparison with `token.Expiry` |
| `coderd/provisionerdserver/provisionerdserver_test.go` | 1 comparison
with `key.ExpiresAt` |
| `enterprise/coderd/workspaces_test.go` | 1 comparison with `DormantAt`
|
| `enterprise/coderd/license/license_test.go` | 3 `NotBefore` values |
| `enterprise/coderd/licenses_test.go` | 2 `NotBefore` values |
| `enterprise/coderd/users_test.go` | 3 `Next()` comparisons |
## Not changed (intentionally)
- `scaletest/placebo/run_test.go` — compares wall-clock elapsed time,
not DB timestamps
- `cli/server_test.go`, `coderd/jwtutils/jwt_test.go`,
`enterprise/aibridgeproxyd/aibridgeproxyd_test.go` — TLS cert fields,
not DB-stored
- `coderd/azureidentity/azureidentity_test.go` — Azure cert expiry, not
DB
🤖 Generated by Claude Opus 4.6 but reviewed manually.
This PR does three things:
- Exports derp expvars to the pprof endpoint
- Exports the expvar metrics as prometheus metrics in both coderd and
wsproxy
- Updates our tailscale to a fix I also had to make to avoid a data race
condition
I generated this with mux but I also manually tested that the metrics
were getting properly emitted
Cian Johnston