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e96d8646e2 |
fix(coderd): give chat message ids an append-order guarantee (#27495)
Chat message ordering was derived from `created_at`, which is `now()` and therefore the transaction start time. That makes it unusable as an append-order column for two independent reasons: every row in one `InsertChatMessages` batch shares a single timestamp, and two concurrent transactions can commit in the opposite order to the one they started in. This PR gives `chat_messages.id` a real append-order guarantee and moves the history reads onto it. ## Changes **`InsertChatMessages` had no input-order guarantee.** Callers index the returned slice by input position. That only worked because PostgreSQL happens to evaluate the `BIGSERIAL` default in row order. Ids are now allocated up front and the k-th smallest is assigned to input index k, so the pairing does not depend on where the column default is evaluated. Returned rows are explicitly `ORDER BY id`. **Three history reads now order by `id`.** | Query | Was | Now | |---|---|---| | `GetChatMessagesByChatID` | `created_at ASC` | `id ASC` | | `GetChatMessagesByRevisionForStream` | `created_at ASC, id ASC` | `id ASC` | | `GetLastChatMessageByRole` | `created_at DESC, id DESC` | `id DESC` | `GetChatMessagesByChatID` paginated by `id` while ordering by `created_at`, which is incoherent on its own terms. The other two matter because of who consumes them. The stream query supplies incremental updates on the same socket that emits a full `GetChatMessagesByChatID` snapshot on history reset, so once that snapshot moved to `id` the two disagreed under timestamp skew. `GetLastChatMessageByRole` returns an id that is then used as an id cursor, both as `AfterID` when synthesizing tool cancellations and as `chats.last_read_message_id`, where a stale anchor leaves later assistant messages permanently unread. A tie-breaker would not have fixed either one. It only resolves equal timestamps; leading with `created_at` is the actual defect. **`GetLastChatMessageByRole` loses its index, so this adds one.** `ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC` could take an ordered scan of `idx_chat_messages_chat_created`. Nothing in the schema can supply `ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1` for a given `chat_id` and `role`, so the planner switches to a backward scan of the primary key and filters every newer row in the table, scanning all of it when the chat has no message in that role, which is the routine case for a fresh chat. Migration `000559` adds `(chat_id, role, id DESC) WHERE deleted = false`, the same shape as the existing `idx_chat_messages_user_prompts`. This matters because the query is hot: it runs on every stream connect and disconnect, and once per turn when synthesizing tool cancellations. `GetChatMessagesForPromptByChatID` has the same defect and is fixed in the stacked PR, because its compaction boundary change is semantic and deserves a separate review. Auto-archive stays timestamp-based deliberately: it measures activity, not order. Wrapping the insert in a CTE (needed because `INSERT` cannot take `ORDER BY`) makes sqlc synthesize `InsertChatMessagesRow`. It is structurally identical to `ChatMessage`, so the call sites use a direct struct conversion that stops compiling if the two ever diverge. ## Testing Behavior tests write `created_at` values inverted against id order, so a reader that leads with `created_at` returns the batch backwards. All three queries were verified red by reverting the `ORDER BY` and regenerating: the stream query returned `[3,2,1]` for `[1,2,3]`, and `GetLastChatMessageByRole` picked id 1 instead of id 3. `TestInsertChatMessagesOrderContract` asserts against the generated SQL, covering what a behavior test cannot: PostgreSQL evaluates the id default in row order anyway, so a batch still looks ordered once the guarantee is removed. `TestChatMessagesSequenceCacheIsOne` guards the cross-batch half of the invariant. Ids follow chat row lock order only while the sequence hands out one value at a time; sequence cache blocks are per session, so with a cache above one a backend holding stale cached values can lock second and still commit lower ids. Bumping a sequence cache is an ordinary throughput tweak, and it would silently corrupt history order. The index was checked on a 200k row fixture. Without it, the zero-match lookup filters all 200,000 rows over 2763 buffers; with it, the plan is an index scan with both `chat_id` and `role` in the index condition, no sort node, and 3 buffers. Note that the within-batch mapping does not depend on the cache size. It is established by `ROW_NUMBER() OVER (ORDER BY id)` over the allocated ids, so it holds regardless of `nextval` evaluation order. ## Note on the deleted subagent hand-sort The subagent history reader's hand-sort stays deleted, but calling it redundant was imprecise. It sorted by `created_at` then `id`, so it is only equivalent to `id` ordering when the two agree. When they disagree the old code selected a different "latest assistant". This is a deliberate behavior change to match the new invariant, not dead-code removal. > Opened by Mux on behalf of Mike. |
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fbac602456 |
feat!: add admin-controlled dynamic client registration toggle (#27316)
`POST /oauth2/register` (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) has exactly one gate today: `ExperimentOAuth2`, a static, process-lifetime flag that wraps the entire `/oauth2/*` route tree as an all-or-nothing switch. That flag is scheduled for removal at GA, which would leave DCR with zero admin control at all once it is gone. Add a persistent, DCR-specific `oauth2_dcr_enabled` deployment setting, independent of the experiment system, so admin control over DCR survives GA. `POST /oauth2/register` checks the flag and rejects new registrations with an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled; discovery metadata (`GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`) conditionally omits `registration_endpoint`. A new audited `GET`/`PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings` endpoint lets an owner toggle it live, no restart required. The setting defaults to disabled, matching the canonical design proposal; disabling only stops new self-registrations, clients that already registered continue to authorize and exchange tokens normally. Address issue described in [ENG-3056](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3056/oauth2-dcr-admin-configurable-enabledisable). ## Where this sits in the request path ```mermaid sequenceDiagram autonumber participant A as Admin participant S as coderd participant DB as site_configs<br/>(oauth2_dcr_enabled) participant C as OAuth2/MCP Client Note over A,S: Admin toggles DCR (new) A->>S: PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings<br/>{dynamic_client_registration_enabled: false} S->>S: authorizeContext(ActionUpdate, ResourceDeploymentConfig) S->>DB: UPSERT oauth2_dcr_enabled = false S-->>A: 200 OK (audited) Note over C,S: Client discovery + registration afterward C->>S: GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache) DB-->>S: false S-->>C: 200 metadata, registration_endpoint omitted C->>S: POST /oauth2/register S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache) DB-->>S: false S-->>C: 403 invalid_request,<br/>"Dynamic client registration is disabled" Note over C,S: A client that registered before the change is unaffected C->>S: GET /oauth2/authorize?client_id=... Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally) C->>S: PUT/DELETE /oauth2/clients/{client_id} (RFC 7592 self-management) Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path either S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally) ``` ## Files changed: manual vs. generated Reviewers should focus on the **manual** files. The **generated** ones are `make gen` output that follows mechanically from the manual changes and don't need direct review. <details> <summary><b>Manual files (26)</b> — click to expand, grouped the same way as "Suggested review order" below</summary> **1. Database** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` | New `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` query pair on the existing generic `site_configs` table. No schema change. | | `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` | RBAC check (`rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig`) on the two new query methods; extends the `subjectSystemOAuth2` system-actor role with read-only `ResourceDeploymentConfig` access, needed so the public discovery/registration endpoints can read the flag via `dbauthz.AsSystemOAuth2`. | | `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` | RBAC assertion coverage for `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` in the method-coverage test suite. | **2. Request gating (the actual feature)** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` | The actual gate: `CreateDynamicClientRegistration` reads the flag first and returns an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled (defaults disabled if never configured). | | `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` | New unit test, `TestCreateDynamicClientRegistration_DCREnabled`: calls the handler directly (no HTTP server), covering enabled / explicitly disabled / never-configured. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` | `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` conditionally omits `registration_endpoint` from discovery metadata when DCR is disabled. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` | New unit test, `TestGetAuthorizationServerMetadata_DCREnabled`: same three states, for the discovery handler. | **3. Admin settings endpoint** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `codersdk/oauth2.go` | New `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type plus `Client.OAuth2ProviderSettings`/`PutOAuth2ProviderSettings` methods. | | `coderd/oauth2.go` | New `oauth2ProviderSettings`/`putOAuth2ProviderSettings` admin handlers (audited via `audit.InitRequest`); updates the `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` call site to pass `api.Database`. | | `coderd/coderd.go` | Registers `GET`/`PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings`. | | `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` | New test file: admin `GET`/`PUT` round-trip, default-disabled-before-any-`PUT`, and `403` for a non-owner on both `GET` and `PUT`. | **4. Audit wiring** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/database/types.go` | New `database.OAuth2ProviderSettings` audit-only struct (mirrors `NotificationsSettings`). | | `coderd/audit/diff.go` | Adds the new struct to the `Auditable` type union. | | `coderd/audit/request.go` | Adds the new struct to all four dispatch switches (`ResourceTarget`, `ResourceID`, `ResourceType`, `ResourceRequiresOrgID`). | | `codersdk/audit.go` | New API-facing `ResourceTypeOAuth2ProviderSettings` constant and its `FriendlyString` case. | | `enterprise/audit/table.go` | Field-level audit action map (`ActionTrack`/`ActionIgnore`) for the new struct. | | `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.up.sql` | Adds `oauth2_provider_settings` to the `resource_type` Postgres enum, required for the audit wiring above (`resource_type` is a real enum, not a Go-only value). | | `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.down.sql` | No-op (`ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE` can't be reverted). | **5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` | New shared test helper, `EnableDCR`, since DCR now defaults to disabled and many pre-existing tests need it turned on to register a client. | | `coderd/oauth2_test.go` | Adds `TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled` (registers a client, disables DCR, verifies new registration is rejected while the existing client's self-management, authorize, and token exchange all keep working); calls `EnableDCR` in every pre-existing test that registers a client. | | `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go` | Calls `EnableDCR` in every test that registers a client, so RFC-error-format assertions aren't masked by the new disabled-by-default gate. | | `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` | Same: `EnableDCR` added to every registration-dependent test. | | `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go` | Same. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go` | Same (near-duplicate of `oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` in a different package). | | `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go` | Same. | | `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go` | Same, for the MCP end-to-end dynamic-registration flow test. | </details> <details> <summary><b>Generated files (12)</b> — from <code>make gen</code>, no need to review directly</summary> `coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`, `coderd/database/dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`, `coderd/database/dbmock/dbmock.go`, `coderd/database/dump.sql`, `coderd/database/models.go`, `coderd/database/querier.go`, `coderd/database/queries.sql.go`, `docs/admin/security/audit-logs.md`, `docs/reference/api/enterprise.md`, `docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`. </details> ## Suggested review order ### 1. Database Establishes the persisted setting and its RBAC rule; everything else builds on `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled`. 1. `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` — the two new queries. Same boolean-encoding pattern as the existing `oauth2_github_default_eligible` key right above them in the same file. 2. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` — the RBAC wrapper for those two queries, plus the `subjectSystemOAuth2` role extension (search this file for `ResourceDeploymentConfig`, it appears in both spots). 3. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` — asserts the RBAC checks from (2) actually fire. ### 2. Request gating (the actual feature) Where `POST /oauth2/register` and discovery metadata change behavior. 1. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` — the primary gate. Read this first; it's the feature. 2. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` — its new unit test, exercising the gate's three states directly against the handler. 3. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` — the same gating pattern applied to the discovery `GET` endpoint. 4. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` — its new unit test. ### 3. Admin settings endpoint How an owner flips the setting live. 1. `codersdk/oauth2.go` — the `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type and `Client` methods first; this is the public contract everything below implements against. 2. `coderd/oauth2.go` — the `GET`/`PUT` handlers themselves. 3. `coderd/coderd.go` — route registration, to see where those handlers get wired in. 4. `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` — round-trip and permission tests. ### 4. Audit wiring Plumbing required so step 3's `PUT` is auditable; mechanical except for (3). 1. `coderd/database/types.go` — the audit-only struct; everything else in this layer exists to plumb it through. 2. `coderd/audit/diff.go` — adds it to the `Auditable` type union (the compiler enforces this one). 3. `coderd/audit/request.go` — the four dispatch switches; the one part of this layer worth reading closely. 4. `codersdk/audit.go` — the API-facing resource type constant. 5. `enterprise/audit/table.go` — the field-action map. 6. `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.{up,down}.sql` — read last; a consequence of needing a new `resource_type` enum value for (1)-(5), not a design decision of its own. ### 5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip 1. `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` — the new `EnableDCR` helper. Read first to understand the fix pattern before seeing it applied repeatedly. 2. `coderd/oauth2_test.go` — next, since it also contains the new `TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled`, not just `EnableDCR` call sites. 3. The rest, in any order, they're mechanical repeats of the same one-line addition: `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go`, `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go`. ## Explicitly out of scope Per the design proposal: rate limiting on `POST /oauth2/register` (tracked separately), retroactively affecting already-registered clients when DCR is disabled (this only gates new self-registration), and an Initial Access Token requirement (a separate, follow-up ticket). |
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c3895ff9c0 |
feat: add CSV export for AI spend data (#27491)
## Description
Adds `GET /api/v2/organizations/{organization}/ai/spend/export`,
returning `text/csv` with per-user, per-group, per-model, per-provider
aggregated AI spend. The data is built from the raw AI Gateway token
usage tables rather than the `ai_user_daily_spend` rollup, but stays
consistent with it: spend is attributed through the token usage's
effective group and bucketed by the token usage `created_at`, the same
values the daily rollup derives from.
The period defaults to the current UTC month, narrowed to the configured
AI Gateway retention window when the month begins before retained data
does. Explicit `period_start`/`period_end` params must be provided
together, are interpreted as UTC, and may span at most 31 days. Unlike
the default period, an explicit period that begins before the retention
window is rejected rather than narrowed. Every row echoes the applied
bounds, so a narrowed window is visible in the export.
The endpoint requires organization-level admin permissions.
## Changes
- Add the `ExportOrganizationAISpend` query aggregating
`aibridge_token_usages` joined to `aibridge_interceptions`, scoped to
the organization via the effective group, resolving the username, group
name, and organization name alongside their IDs.
- Add the `exportOrganizationAISpend` handler and route, gated by the
`aigateway-cost-control` experiment and the `AIBridge` feature,
returning the CSV in a single response.
- Add the `ExportOrganizationAISpend` codersdk client method.
- Require organization-wide `ResourceGroupMember` read, since the export
aggregates every user in the organization. The per-row filter stays in
`dbauthz` as defence in depth.
- Escape leading formula characters in the free-text columns, so a model
or provider name recorded from an intercepted request cannot be
evaluated when the CSV is opened in a spreadsheet.
- Add an index on `aibridge_token_usages (effective_group_id,
created_at)`, which the period and group predicates otherwise cannot
use.
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-293/add-csv-export-for-ai-spend-data
> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira
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c351280a37 |
feat: add Prometheus metrics for AI Governance cost control (#27490)
## Description Adds Prometheus metrics for AI budget cost control, emitted by the aibridged server under the `cost_control` subsystem (full names are prefixed `coder_ai_gateway_`). - `blocked_requests_total` (counter) — labels: `group_id` - `blocked_users` (gauge) — labels: `group_id` - `unpriced_requests_total` (counter) — labels: `provider`, `model` - `enforcement_duration_seconds` (histogram) — labels: `outcome` ## Changes - Add `GetOverBudgetUsersPerGroup` query (plus dbauthz/dbmetrics/dbmock wiring) to count over-budget users per effective group. - Add a background collector that refreshes the `blocked_users` gauge on an interval, started only when Prometheus is enabled. - Wire `Metrics` through the aibridged server, coderd API, `cli/server.go`, and the enterprise AI gateway handler; recording is nil-safe when metrics are unset. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-296/add-prometheus-metrics-for-cost-control > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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6c102cc3f3 |
feat: count only workspace-capable users toward license seats (#27279)
Adds permission-based license seat counting behind the
`workspace-capable-licensing` experiment. When the experiment is enabled
and a valid license carries the AI Governance add-on, the `user_limit`
feature counts only active users the RBAC engine authorizes to create a
workspace, instead of every active user. Users without workspace-create
capability ("gateway accounts", e.g. AI-Gateway-only users) no longer
consume seats.
## How it works
- A new `GetActiveUsersAuthorizationRoles` bulk query returns effective
roles (implied member roles, org default member roles) and group
memberships for every seat-eligible user (active, not deleted, not
system, not a service account), matching `GetActiveUserCount` semantics.
- `license.CountWorkspaceCapableUsers` evaluates `workspace.create`
against the any-organization object form, which covers site-wide grants,
membership grants, and org-scoped bans in one check. Evaluation is
deduplicated on a sha256 of each user's canonical subject JSON (a fixed
sentinel user ID, sorted deduplicated roles and groups), so cost scales
with unique subjects rather than user count, and every subject field
participates in both the evaluation and the key.
- The AI Governance add-on is only known after license claims are
parsed, so `Entitlements()` passes a lazy `WorkspaceCapableUserCountFn`
(following the `ManagedAgentCountFn` precedent) and
`LicensesEntitlements` resolves it when a validated add-on is present.
Each license's `user_limit` claim becomes a candidate pair of limit and
counting mode, the most favorable pair is selected (see Behavior notes),
and the selected pair's limit, entitlement, and count become the
`user_limit` feature's terms; the warnings read the same values.
`license.Entitlements` gains `logger`, `authorizer`, and `experiments`
parameters.
- All custom roles are prefetched in a single query before evaluation
(new exported `rolestore.PrefetchCustomRoles`), and each count emits one
Info log line (capable count, eligible active users, unique subjects,
elapsed) whose presence identifies the counting mode. The count is
bounded by a 60s timeout.
## Behavior notes
- Without the experiment or without the add-on, the legacy
`GetActiveUserCount` path is unchanged.
- When the mode is active, the over-limit and expired-limit warnings say
"workspace-capable users" instead of "active users", since that is what
was counted.
- With multiple licenses, each license's `user_limit` claim forms a
candidate pair of limit and counting mode (workspace-capable for add-on
licenses, all active users otherwise), and the most favorable pair is
enforced: a pair satisfied by its own count wins over any unsatisfied
one, then higher entitlement, then higher limit. One license's limit is
never combined with another license's counting mode, so a small add-on
license can neither borrow a bigger non-add-on limit nor suppress it.
- Licenses in their grace period still gate the count; it reverts to the
legacy count only on hard expiry. While the add-on exists only on
grace-period licenses, a warning tells admins the counting mode will
revert and states the legacy active-user count they will then be
measured by.
- Count errors (database failures, timeout) abort the entitlements
computation, matching the legacy count's error semantics: the refresh
fails and the caller keeps the previous entitlements rather than a
silently different count. One exception: a stored role string that fails
to parse is logged and treated as not workspace-capable instead of
failing the refresh, since authorization fails closed on such roles
anyway.
- The experiment is deliberately not in `ExperimentsSafe`.
Part of the gateway-accounts feature; no behavior changes for
deployments without the experiment.
## Stack
Part 1 of the gateway-accounts stack. Each PR builds on the previous:
1. **#27279 (this PR)**: permission-based license seat counting. Behind
the `workspace-capable-licensing` experiment and gated on the AI
Governance add-on, `user_limit` counts only users the RBAC engine
authorizes to create workspaces.
2. **#27280**: adds the `organization-ai-gateway-access` org role
carrying the AI Bridge interception permissions (extracted from the
member floors, backfilled into org default roles by migration) and
enforces it at AI Gateway authentication; bridge usage stops claiming AI
Governance seats under the experiment.
3. ~~**#27281**: gates workspace ACL grants on matching member-level
capability (each granted action only takes effect while the recipient
holds that action in the org), so workspace sharing is ineffective for
(and rejected toward) users without workspace capabilities, evaluated
live on every authorization.~~ Tabled — excluded from the
gateway-accounts MVP.
Related but independent: **#27278** hides the Workspaces page create
CTAs for users without workspace-create permission.
## Benchmarks
`BenchmarkCountWorkspaceCapableUsers` (in `usercount_bench_test.go`, run
manually with `go test ./enterprise/coderd/license/ -bench
BenchmarkCountWorkspaceCapableUsers -benchtime 5x -run '^$'` — never
executed by CI) measures the count across user-scale and role-diversity
shapes:
| Scenario | Users | ~Unique subjects | per count |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uniform | 1k | 4 | 8.5ms |
| Uniform | 10k | 4 | 71ms |
| Uniform | 50k | 4 | 344ms |
| ManyOrgs (100 orgs) | 10k | ~200 | 112ms |
| CustomRoles (1000 org-scoped roles) | 10k | ~1000 | 168ms |
| UniquePairs (every user a distinct subject) | 10k | ~10,000 | 2.66s |
Summary:
- **Row-side cost is ~7µs per user, linear** (role parsing, subject
canonicalization, and sha256 per row). The bulk query + subject dedupe
handles 50k users in ~350ms; extrapolated 100k ≈ 0.7s. A non-issue at
the 10-minute refresh cadence.
- **Unique subjects are the dominant axis at ~0.26ms each** (role
expansion + one any-organization rego evaluation per subject). The
worst-case scenario — every user a distinct subject — costs ~2.7s at 10k
users, extrapolating to ~13s at 50k.
- **Realistic deployments sit near the cheap rows.** Subject diversity
tracks orgs × role/group combinations, not user count; only per-user
custom roles or per-user org-membership patterns approach the worst
case.
- Caveat encountered while building the harness: the roles query's plan
depends on accurate table statistics. With stale stats (e.g. right after
a bulk user import, before autovacuum ANALYZEs), the planner picks a
nested-loop plan that re-runs the aggregation per user row — a ~300×
regression (1.08s for 1k users). Fresh statistics restore the hash-join
plan; the harness ANALYZEs after seeding, so the numbers above reflect
the healthy plan.
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6f2011af88 |
feat: add chat summary tab in the right sidebar and per-chat cost endpoint (#26649)
Stacked on #26657 (the persisted whole-chat summary backend). Base branch is `chat-summary-62j9`; review/merge that first. Adds a reusable `ChatSummary` component. The summary text is the persisted whole-chat summary (`chat.summary`) introduced by #26657. It is generated asynchronously and may be `null` until the first summary is produced, in which case the popover renders a muted empty state. Live updates arrive via that PR's `chat_summary_change` watch event, which is already merged into the chat caches. Cost is served by a new per-chat endpoint, `GET /api/experimental/chats/{chat}/cost`, which rolls up assistant-message cost across a chat's root and child (subagent) chats and is authorized like the other `{chat}` routes (read on the chat, 404 otherwise). Visual and interaction coverage lives in `ChatSummary.stories.tsx` and `ChatSummaryPopover.stories.tsx` (including populated-summary, empty-state, and cost-loading cases). --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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3c7a1d33e3 |
feat: add persisted whole-chat summary with background generation (#26657)
Adds a persisted whole-chat summary that backs the chat summary popover. A new nullable `chats.summary` column is populated in the background after a successful root-chat turn and pushed to clients via a new `chat_summary_change` watch event (distinct from `summary_change`, which is bound to `last_turn_summary`), so the popover reads `chat.summary` straight off the loaded `Chat` with no extra query. This is the data source for the popover and per-chat cost UI built in #26649; the popover can consume `chat.summary` once this lands (the field is nullable, so merge order does not matter). ## How it works - **Generation** runs in the existing successful-turn finalize hook, detached from the request so the user's turn is never blocked. A cadence gate generates the first summary after one completed turn, then regenerates every three turns, using the `chats.summary_generated_at` freshness marker. Generation reads compaction-aware history, renders it to a bounded plain-text transcript (short transcripts are skipped), and asks for a 1-3 sentence summary via structured output. Failures never clear an existing summary. - **Staleness** is guarded by `history_version` (mirroring `last_turn_summary`), so a background write racing a newer turn loses while worker lifecycle transitions cannot reject a fresh write. - **Model selection** uses the chat's configured model. ## Deferred to follow-ups - **Cost accounting**: the `chat_messages.cost_source` discriminator and summary/title usage recording were removed from this PR so summary persistence is not blocked by hidden accounting rows advancing `history_version`. Title usage recording stays on main's `InsertChatMessages` path. - **Model override**: deployment-wide summary generation model selection is split into #26803; the base feature always uses the chat model. ## Notes - Migration `000540` adds `chats.summary` and `chats.summary_generated_at`, and recreates `chats_expanded` to expose the new columns. - Root chats only; shared viewers pick up the summary on their next refetch (live watch events are owner-only). Refs #26649 --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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c23f2c0223 |
feat: fall back to the Everyone group for AI spend attribution (#27364)
## Description Previously, a user with no per-user override and no membership in a budgeted group had no effective group, so their AI spend was attributed nowhere and was, therefore, untracked. This change falls back to the organization's Everyone group when no override or group budget applies. Since every user in an organization is implicitly a member of that org's Everyone group, spend is now attributed and tracked for any user with organization membership. A user with no organization membership resolves to no group, so their daily spend is not incremented and a warning is logged. The fallback is unlimited, so enforcement is unaffected: only override and group budgets can block requests. For users in multiple organizations, an existing budget on any Everyone group is still chosen by the "highest" policy; when none is budgeted, the fallback prefers the default org, then orders by organization name. ## Changes - Add `ResolveUserEffectiveGroup` and the `GetUserEveryoneFallbackGroup` query: resolve override → group budget → Everyone group fallback. - Attribute token-usage spend and the user AI spend endpoint via the fallback, so unbudgeted users resolve to their Everyone group instead of null. - Update `GetGroupMembersAISpend` to surface the Everyone fallback as the effective group. - Update `GetHighestGroupAIBudgetByUser` to break ties by organization name then group name, keeping multi-org resolution deterministic and consistent with the fallback. - For multi-org users with no budget anywhere, the fallback picks the Everyone group deterministically: prefer the default org, then order by organization name. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-509/fall-back-to-the-everyone-group-for-spend-attribution > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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a9fdf87a2f |
feat: add GET /groups/{group}/members/ai/spend (#27130)
## Description
Adds `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/members/ai/spend?user_ids=...` (also available org-scoped at `/api/v2/organizations/{org}/groups/{groupName}/members/ai/spend`) to return per-member AI spend attributed to a group, along with each member's effective budget group and the applied spend limit when the queried group is their effective budget source.
In the UI, this endpoint is used alongside the existing `/api/v2/groups/{group}/members` endpoint. AI spend data is kept separate from that endpoint so that:
- Different concepts stay on different endpoints: identity (group members) vs. cost control (spend). Cost control is an additional feature layered on top of groups/orgs.
- Callers that don't need spend information don't pay for its computation.
UI flow:
1. Request `/api/v2/groups/{group}/members` → returns the group's members.
2. Request `/api/v2/groups/{group}/members/ai/spend?user_ids=...` with the IDs from step 1.
**Note:** Only current members of the queried group are returned. `spend_limit_micros` and `limit_source` are populated only when the queried group is the member's effective budget source (its own limit or a user override). `effective_group_id` is null when the member's budget resolves to a group in another organization, since an organization is treated as a tenant boundary.
<img width="2880" height="1904" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33ed395d-d1a3-4b46-bb04-c8d3f41c8886" />
## Changes
- Add `codersdk.GroupMembersAISpend` and `GroupMemberAISpend` types, reusing the shared `AISpendPeriodWindow`.
- Add `GetGroupMembersAISpend` SQL query with a dbauthz per-row filter that mirrors `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/members`.
- Add handler and routes under `/groups/{group}/members/ai/spend` (and the org-scoped alias) with a required `user_ids` query param (cap 100). Callers with more than 100 members are expected to batch across multiple requests.
- Add codersdk client method.
- Tests: dbauthz, raw SQL, endpoint, and role-access.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-471/backend-group-members-endpoint-with-members-spend
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
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2adc8f5272 |
feat: add GET /organizations/{org}/groups/ai/spend (#27123)
## Description
Adds `GET /api/v2/organizations/{org}/groups/ai/spend?group_ids=...` to return per-group AI spend and configured limits for a set of groups in an organization.
In the UI, this endpoint is used alongside the existing `/api/v2/organizations/{org}/groups` endpoint. AI spend data is kept separate from that endpoint so that:
- Different concepts stay on different endpoints: identity (groups) vs. cost control (spend). Cost control is an additional feature layered on top of groups/orgs.
- Callers that don't need spend information don't pay for its computation.
UI flow:
1. Request `/api/v2/organizations/{org}/groups` → returns the organization's groups.
2. Request `/api/v2/organizations/{org}/groups/ai/spend?group_ids=...` with the IDs from step 1.
The groups endpoint from 1) is currently not paginated, but if pagination is added later, this design keeps the two responses in sync. This spend endpoint intentionally takes `group_ids` rather than paginating on its own, since it depends on the group set from step 1. Pagination could be added in the future, especially for Cost Control-focused pages.
<img width="2880" height="1460" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ea83b74d-6a4f-45a6-af2f-1024e019da07" />
## Changes
- Add `codersdk.OrganizationGroupsAISpend` and `OrganizationGroupAISpend` types, plus a shared `AISpendPeriodWindow` embedded in the spend response.
- Add `GetOrganizationGroupsAISpend` SQL query with a dbauthz per-row filter that mirrors `GET /organizations/{org}/groups`.
- Add handler and route under `/organizations/{organization}/groups/ai/spend` with a required `group_ids` query param (cap 100). Callers with more than 100 groups are expected to batch across multiple requests.
- Add codersdk client method.
- Tests: dbauthz, raw SQL, endpoint, and role-access.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-466/backend-organization-groups-endpoint-with-groups-spend
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
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9f4ddea571 |
feat: revoke MCP server OAuth grants at the provider on disconnect (#27300)
Closes [CODAGT-805](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-805/revoke-oauth-grants-at-the-source-for-mcp-servers). The experimental MCP server OAuth2 disconnect endpoint previously deleted only the stored token row, leaving the grant active at the OAuth provider. This PR adds provider-side token revocation while keeping local disconnect independent of provider availability. ## Changes - Add `mcp_server_configs.oauth2_revocation_url` in migration `000547`. The value can be configured manually, discovered from RFC 8414 metadata, and managed through the MCP server settings UI. Non-admin responses redact it with the other OAuth2 fields. - Revoke the refresh token first through the RFC 7009 endpoint, then fall back to the access token only for `unsupported_token_type`. Public clients send `client_id`; confidential clients use `client_secret_basic`. - Delete the local token transactionally before best-effort provider revocation. Callers without a token receive the same response for hidden and nonexistent config IDs, and provider failures return a generic warning without exposing provider response bodies. - Require HTTPS revocation endpoints except for HTTP loopback URLs. Redirects must preserve the POST and remain on the configured origin. Redirect errors omit provider-controlled paths and query strings so reflected token material cannot enter logs. - Treat `200 OK` and `204 No Content` as completed revocations. `202 Accepted` remains a failure because it does not confirm completion. - Prevent an in-flight refresh from recreating a token deleted by disconnect. Refresh persistence now uses an optimistic update keyed by token ID and `updated_at`; only the OAuth callback can create a token row. Refresh conflicts reload the current row or clear in-memory auth when disconnect deleted it. - Return `{token_revoked, token_revocation_error}` from disconnect, while retaining SDK compatibility with the legacy `204` response. The UI surfaces provider revocation failures as warning toasts. - Document revocation endpoint discovery, HTTPS requirements, and best-effort disconnect behavior. No token or no configured revocation URL returns `token_revoked: false` without an error, so disconnect remains idempotent. > Updated by Mux, an AI coding agent, on Mike's behalf. |
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46d1823c0a |
feat: add workspace skills to agent chat slash menu (#25600)
> This Pull Request was updated by Mux working on behalf of Mike. Adds workspace skills to the agent chat slash menu, sourced entirely from the chat's pinned context resources (the single-chat GET response the page already fetches), the same inventory `read_skill` resolves from. No new API endpoint is introduced. Personal entries insert `/name`, or `/personal/name` when the name collides with a workspace skill or the chat's pinned context has not resolved yet; workspace entries insert `/workspace/name`. Qualified aliases stay searchable even when the displayed trigger is bare. Before a chat binds a workspace (new chat form, or a selected but unbound workspace), the menu lists personal skills only. Sending a message invalidates the chat detail query, and chatd broadcasts a context watch event when a first-turn bind pins the chat, so the menu picks up newly pinned context without a reload. Makes `UpdateChatWorkspaceBinding` a no-op when the requested workspace/build/agent binding is unchanged, preserving `updated_at` so chat list ordering and watch events stay stable. Includes regression coverage for the no-op binding guard, pinned-context skill mapping, collision qualification, and skills menu behavior. Refs [CODAGT-474](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-474/ux-improvements-for-coder-agents) (skills autocompleting in the editor). |
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997b5d0843 |
feat: add synthetic gateway keys (#27170)
> Mux is working on behalf of Mike. ## Summary Add a per-user synthetic API key for chatd AI Gateway attribution. Chatd resolves the key from the chat owner, extends it before expiry, and discards the generated bearer token so the key is never a usable credential. There is no mapping table. The key is resolved from `api_keys` by a deterministic token name (`chatd_<owner_id>_session_token`), mirroring the provisionerd session token model, with three deltas that chatd needs: - **Login type guard**: token names are unvalidated user input, so a user can create a bearer token with the colliding name. The lookup excludes `login_type = 'token'` rows, so chatd never picks up (or extends) a real user token. Synthetic keys are minted with the owner's login type, which is never `token`. - **In-place expiry extension instead of delete-and-reinsert**: chat generations have no stop boundary, and an in-flight generation may have already delegated the current key ID to aibridged. Extending `expires_at` keeps the key ID stable forever. - **Advisory-lock mint**: the unique index on token names is partial (`WHERE login_type = 'token'`), so nothing DB-enforces uniqueness for synthetic keys. A per-user advisory lock serializes concurrent mints. Keys carry a minimal scope (`api_key:read`) as defense in depth; the delegated gateway path never evaluates scopes and the secret is discarded at mint. Migration 000544 removes the foreign keys from the legacy message and queue `api_key_id` columns while chatd continues stamping them for rolling compatibility. Stale IDs are tolerated because routing uses `chats.owner_id`. Individual key deletion, delete-all, and password reset remove the key without changing chat history or queue versions, and the next lookup remints it. Suspension does not delete the key; delegated gateway authorization rejects inactive users at request time. This is the first PR in a three-PR rollout and must be fully deployed before #27171. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-561/maintain-synthetic-api-key-per-user-per-chat |
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f7481c5d08 |
feat: Add full text search over chat messages (#27126)
Closes CODAGT-721 Closes CODAGT-722 Closes CODAGT-723 Closes CODAGT-724 Closes CODAGT-725 This PR adds the database and API pieces necessary to support full-text chat message search. - Adds required chat schema for full-text search - Adds dbpurge job to populate search_tsv in the background - Adds `search` parameter to GetChats query - Adds `search` filter to `searchquery.Chats` - Wires chat search filter into chats API > Implemented by Coder Agents, reviewed and tested by a human. |
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e489092154 |
feat: handle revoked OAuth grants for MCP servers gracefully (#27264)
Closes [CODAGT-792](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-792/handle-revoked-oauth-grants-for-mcp-servers-gracefully). When a user revokes an upstream OAuth grant for an MCP server used by Coder Agents, Coder kept treating the cached token as valid: `invalid_grant` refresh failures were logged and swallowed, the dead bearer token kept being attached, the list endpoints re-attempted the refresh on every call, and the UI kept showing the server as authenticated. ## Changes Backend, mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art: - New migration adds `mcp_server_user_tokens.oauth_refresh_failure_reason`. `UpsertMCPServerUserToken` clears it, so completing the OAuth flow again recovers the row. - New `MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure` query records the failure and clears all token material, guarded by an `updated_at` optimistic lock so a stale failure never clobbers a concurrently refreshed token (on a lock miss the winner's row is used). - `mcpclient.IsPermanentRefreshError` classifies `*oauth2.RetrieveError` codes: only `invalid_grant` and `bad_refresh_token` are permanent. Client/config errors (`invalid_client`, `unauthorized_client`, ...) stay transient for the user row since reconnecting cannot fix them. - chatd token refresh and the MCP list/get endpoints persist permanent failures, return cleared tokens for the in-flight request, and skip provider calls for already-failed rows. - `buildAuthHeaders` no longer attaches an Authorization header for failed tokens, so chat degrades by omitting that server's tools instead of sending a dead bearer. API and UI: - No new API surface. A permanently failed token simply reports `auth_connected: false`, so the existing "Auth" button and "Not authenticated" tooltip appear and the user re-runs the same OAuth flow to recover. An earlier revision added an `auth_status` enum (`connected` / `not_connected` / `reconnect_required`) with a dedicated "Reconnect" button; it was collapsed to keep the API minimal since both states lead to the identical re-auth action. Out of scope (follow-up): typed 401-on-connect detection and forced refresh. mcp-go exposes no stable typed 401 signal in the static-header path, so a revocation while the access token still looks valid locally stays undetected until expiry triggers a refresh. ## Testing - Unit and integration tests: classifier, chatd refresh paths (permanent/transient/race/persist-failure), API endpoints (revoked, transient, no-retry caching, re-auth recovery, stale-lock), dbauthz, dbcrypt, migrations. - Dogfood UAT against a dev instance with a mock IdP returning `invalid_grant`: revoked grant detected on refresh and persisted once (no repeated IdP calls), chat with the revoked server selected completes with the server's tools omitted, and re-auth restores the connected state. > This PR was authored by Mux, working on Mike's behalf. |
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a567f6a89f | feat: allow admins to override the chat compaction model (#27151) | ||
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0f55c283f1 | fix: use backend-selected chat agent for desktop, git, terminal (#26959) | ||
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6f6d7539c8 |
feat: remove unused chat statuses pending, paused, and completed (#27064)
The chatd state machine only recognizes `waiting`, `running`, `error`, `requires_action`, and `interrupting`. Remove the unused `pending`, `paused`, and `completed` values from the database enum, backend, SDK, frontend, generated queries, and API docs. Migration `000543_chat_status_remove_unused` remaps existing `pending` rows to `running`, remaps `paused` and `completed` rows to `waiting`, drops the obsolete `idx_chats_pending` index, and recreates `chats_expanded` around the enum swap. It also removes the dead `AcquireChats` query and all remaining query literals for the deleted statuses. **NOTE**: The enum swap can break chat queries from older replicas during a mixed-version rollout because they still reference `'pending'::chat_status`. Chats are experimental, so this PR accepts that limited rollout window instead of adding a two-release expand and contract sequence. > This PR was authored by Mux (AI agent) on Mike's behalf. |
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2ad5af5b54 |
fix(coderd): use pasted-text attachments as chat title input (#27067)
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-268 ## Problem The chat UI collapses large pastes (>=10 lines or >=1000 chars) into a synthetic `pasted-text-*.txt` attachment. A chat created with only such an attachment had no title input anywhere: the create path derived `titleSource` only from text and file-reference parts (so the chat was named "New Chat"), async auto-titling extracted text the same way and silently skipped generation, and the manual propose/regenerate paths returned an empty title for the same reason. The regular prompt path already inlines these files for the model; only the title paths were blind. ## Fix Add a single title-input derivation in `chatprompt` and use it everywhere: - `chatprompt.TitleText` joins text and file-reference parts (unchanged formatting), and falls back to synthetic pasted-text attachment content (truncated to a 16 KiB title budget) when they yield nothing. - `chatprompt.SyntheticPasteFileIDs` identifies paste attachments; `chatprompt.FallbackTitle` consolidates the previously duplicated `chatTitleFromMessage` / `fallbackChatTitle`. - Chat creation captures paste blob references while validating file parts (the file row was already loaded there) and derives `titleSource` via `TitleText`. Only the create path derives titles; message send and edit reuse the same validation without copying any blob data. - `GenerateChatTitleAsync` and the manual propose/regenerate paths resolve paste content via `titlePasteText`, which only queries when a visible user message has no other title text, so chats with typed text never incur a file fetch. - Title-path paste fetches are bounded: a new `GetChatFileDataPrefixesByIDs` query returns only a `substr` prefix (`chatprompt.TitlePasteBytePrefix`, 64 KiB = 4 bytes x the 16 Ki-rune title budget) so full blobs (up to 10 MiB each) never leave the database for titling, and `chatprompt.TitlePasteText` applies the same bound to the create path which already holds the loaded row. Deliberate side effect: because generation-time extraction now matches create-time `titleSource` exactly, file-reference-only chats also become eligible for AI titles. They were previously skipped by the same derivation mismatch. Non-goals: no frontend changes (attachment chip UX stays as is), and non-synthetic user-uploaded `.txt` files still yield "New Chat". ## Testing - Unit tests for `TitleText`, `TitlePasteText`, `SyntheticPasteFileIDs`, `FallbackTitle`, `titleInput`, `titlePasteText`, and paste-aware `extractManualTitleTurns`. - Real-database test for `GetChatFileDataPrefixesByIDs` (prefix shorter and longer than stored data) plus dbauthz coverage for the new query. - Integration tests: paste-only create gets a fallback title from the paste content, async title generation fires with the paste content as input, and `RegenerateChatTitle` works on a paste-only chat. > This PR was written by [Mux](https://mux.coder.com) on Mike's behalf. |
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990f0a5529 |
chore(coderd/database): remove unused UpdateChatMessageByID query (#27099)
Removes the `UpdateChatMessageByID` query. Its only non-generated reference was its own dbauthz coverage test, so it is dead code. > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @johnstcn. |
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6af0f4d698 |
feat: add workspace restart functionality to API (#25757)
This models restart as durable orchestration of existing stop and start workspace builds instead of adding a new restart transition. Keeping restart as two existing transitions preserves the current build/provisioner model. The child start build is created only after the parent stop build succeeds, rather than being inserted immediately in a pending state. That keeps `workspace_builds` aligned with actual provisioner-ready work and avoids introducing a second pending-build lifecycle that the provisioner and build acquisition paths would need to understand. Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-143 |
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1eb5d579b0 |
fix: unblock manual chat title generation for unowned chats (#26963)
## Problem
The Generate button in the chat Rename dialog (POST
`/api/experimental/chats/{chat}/title/propose`) could fail in ways
unrelated to actual concurrent title generation:
- The manual title lock returned 409 for any `pending` chat and any
`running` chat without a worker. Legacy `pending` rows are never
acquired by workers, so those chats 409'd forever. Running chats are
unowned in the normal window between message submission and worker
acquisition (indefinitely when runners are down), producing spurious
409s.
- A missing default chat model config surfaced as a generic 500, and the
dialog hid the actionable cause carried in the error detail.
## Fix
Backend (`coderd/x/chatd`, `coderd`, `coderd/database`):
- Remove the manual title lock entirely. Races between title writers are
already resolved by `recordManualTitleUsage`, which re-reads the chat
under `GetChatByIDForUpdate` and only persists the generated title when
it is unchanged since the request snapshot, so concurrent regenerates
and renames settle by last write wins. The lock only suppressed
duplicate model calls (the dialog already disables the button in flight,
and usage limits bound spend), and its synthetic `worker_id` marker was
the source of the spurious 409s. The 409 responses, the marker and
staleness handling, and the now-unused
`UpdateChatStatusPreserveUpdatedAt` query are gone.
- New `ErrNoDefaultChatModelConfig` sentinel mapped to 400 "No default
chat model config is configured." in both title endpoints, matching the
POST `/chats` precedent.
Frontend (`site`):
- The Rename dialog error alert now renders the API error detail under
the message, reading `error.response.data.detail` directly so
detail-less API errors do not show the generic developer-console hint.
- Removed the dead regenerate-title UI plumbing (`onRegenerateTitle`
outlet wiring and the `regeneratingTitleChatIds` spinner pipeline). The
Rename dialog propose flow is the only live title-generation UX; the
endpoint, codersdk methods, and the `api.ts`/`queries/chats.ts` layer
are kept for API consumers.
## Tests
- chatd internal: a strict-mock test pinning the compare-and-swap guard
(a concurrently changed title must not be clobbered by a generated one),
plus the existing persist-and-broadcast coverage without lock
transactions.
- HTTP: `PendingWithoutWorker` expects 200 for both endpoints,
`NoDefaultModelConfig` (400) subtests, a stopped-workspace propose
regression, and an `Unauthenticated` propose subtest.
- Storybook: stories asserting the API error detail renders in the
dialog alert, and that detail-less API errors and plain errors do not
leak the developer-console hint.
> Authored by Mux on Mike's behalf.
---------
Co-authored-by: Mathias Fredriksson <mafredri@gmail.com>
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b21e0717d5 |
feat: remove chat chain mode (#26980)
Removes OpenAI Responses "chain mode" from chatd. Closes CODAGT-445.
- Deletes `chatopenai/responses.go` (chain detection, activation, prompt filtering, response ID extraction) and its tests.
- Deletes the `ChainBroken` classification in `chaterror` and the chatloop retry bookkeeping that disabled chain mode mid-generation.
- Drops the `chain_broken` label from the `coderd_chatd_stream_retries_total` metric.
- Stops reading and writing `chat_messages.provider_response_id`
- Deletes the dead `ClearChatMessageProviderResponseIDsByChatID` query. Dropping the column is a follow-up migration.
- Deletes three chatloop hooks no caller sets (`ReloadMessages`, `DisableChainMode`, `PrepareMessages`), the dead `const AgentChatContextSentinelPath`, and stale chain-mode comments.
🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @johnstcn.
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fcdd029d74 |
feat: add ai_user_daily_spend table and queries (#26562)
## Description Adds the spend tracking table and queries needed by [AIGOV-427](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-427/add-post-response-spend-accumulation) (post-response accumulation) and [AIGOV-428](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-428/add-pre-request-budget-enforcement) (pre-request enforcement). ## Changes - Add `ai_user_daily_spend` table to aggregate per-user, per-effective-group AI spend by UTC day. - Add `UpsertUserAIDailySpend` and `GetUserAISpendSince` queries. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-426/add-daily-spend-table-and-queries > [!NOTE] > Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira |
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047c47495b |
refactor: drop chat_model_configs provider column (#26877)
The provider type already lives authoritatively in ai_providers.type, reachable on every active row through ai_provider_id, which the chat_model_configs_ai_provider_required_when_active CHECK makes mandatory. The stored provider string was a denormalized copy the system kept in sync with a startup backfill and no longer needs. Every surface now derives provider type from the linked ai_providers row. Telemetry is the one exception: it keeps emitting provider, now sourced from ai_providers.type via a JOIN, so the BigQuery column and the Nexus dashboards that read it are unaffected. The experimental HTTP/SDK response drops provider and makes ai_provider_id required, since those endpoints return only active configs; consumers resolve provider type from ai_provider_id and the AI providers listing. This ships in a single release with no compatibility window: production reads the table via SELECT *, so a pre-drop binary fails config reads the moment the column is gone. Operators must scale to zero before upgrading, and there is no rollback. Closes CODAGT-599 |
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c15d483863 |
chore: rename 'last_used_at' column (#26749)
Renames the `last_used_at` column to `last_heartbeat_at` in `ai_gateway_keys` table. `ai_gateway_keys` table has not been released yet. All references updated. |
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0f1e792f3f |
feat(coderd/database): add AI Gateway key auth lookup and last-used queries (#26505)
Adds DB methods`GetAIGatewayKeyIDByHashedSecret` and `UpdateAIGatewayKeyLastUsedAt`. `GetAIGatewayKeyIDByHashedSecret` - returns AI Gateway key ID by hashed secret value. `UpdateAIGatewayKeyLastUsedAt` - updates last used timestamp for given AI Gateway key. Used by standalone AI Gateway for authentication and keeping track of currently used keys. |
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637a801a41 | feat: notify users before workspace autostop (#26676) | ||
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1961908ca7 | fix(coderd): scope provisioner module file downloads to the daemon's org (#26635) | ||
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cd56ab9e33 |
refactor: remove legacy live-read and injected-history chat context paths (#26585)
This PR makes the agent-pushed pinned snapshot (`chat_context_resources`) the sole source of workspace context for chats, completing the "Release 5" cleanup. It removes legacy mechanisms now superseded by the snapshot that agents push over dRPC (`PushContextState`) and refresh via `chat-context/refresh`. Removed: - **Live-read at turn time.** MCP tool discovery, skill live-body reads, and the instruction/skill history fallback that dialed the workspace on every turn. - **Context injected as message history.** The `persist_workspace_context` generation action and its decision-loop guard. - **The legacy write path.** `POST`/`DELETE /api/v2/workspaceagents/me/experimental/chat-context`, the agentsdk `AddChatContext`/`ClearChatContext` methods, and the CLI one-shot writer. - **The `chats.last_injected_context` column** and all of its plumbing (migration `000529`, queries, `db2sdk`, `dbauthz`, audit table, and the frontend `ContextUsageIndicator` fallback). Subagent context inheritance no longer copies parent context messages; children now hydrate the parent's pinned `chat_context_resources` on create, which yields an identical pin for the same workspace and agent. What stays (still served by the live agent connection, not the snapshot): `read_skill_file` supporting-file reads, `read_skill` supporting-file listing, and MCP tool execution. > [!NOTE] > Migration `000529` drops `chats.last_injected_context` and recreates the `chats_expanded` view without it. The down migration restores both. <details> <summary>Decision log (D1-D5)</summary> - **D1 (subagent inheritance):** Re-point inheritance from the legacy message copy to a pinned hydrate. Children call `hydrateChatContextOnCreate` instead of copying parent context messages. - **D2 (`persist_workspace_context`):** Remove the generation action entirely along with the decision-loop guard it existed to satisfy, since context is never injected into history anymore. - **D3 (legacy HTTP + CLI):** Remove the experimental `chat-context` POST/DELETE endpoints, the agentsdk methods, and the CLI one-shot. The dRPC push + `chat-context/refresh` replace them. - **D4 (frontend fallback):** Remove the `last_injected_context` fallback in `ContextUsageIndicator`; pinned `resources` are the sole source. - **D5 (sequencing):** Ship as a single PR rather than a stacked pair. </details> --- Coder Agents generated on behalf of @kylecarbs. |
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491a75294e |
feat: GET /api/v2/agent-firewall/sessions/{id} (#24814)
Add a GET endpoint at `/api/v2/agent-firewall/sessions/{id}` that
returns agent firewall session metadata (`id`, `workspace_id`,
`owner_id`, `confined_process`, `started_at`). The handler authorizes
against the `boundary_log` resource with `ActionRead` via dbauthz.
The endpoint is enterprise-only, gated behind the `FeatureBoundary`
entitlement.
The `GetBoundarySessionByID` SQL query JOINs through `workspace_agents`
→ `workspace_resources` → `workspace_builds` → `workspaces` to return
`workspace_id` and `workspace_owner_id` directly, avoiding a separate
query.
Also adds an `owner_id` column to the `boundary_logs` table (migration
000526) with a FK to `users(id)` and a backfill from
`boundary_sessions`. This enables user-scoped RBAC authorization for
`InsertBoundaryLogs` via `.WithOwner()`, ensuring workspace agents can
only insert logs for their own owner.
Depends on #24810
**RBAC behaviour:**
| Role | Result |
|---------|--------|
| Owner | read |
| Auditor | read |
| Member | 404 |
> [!NOTE]
> This PR was authored by Coder Agents.
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bc44cdda75 |
feat: rank chat workspace templates (#25037)
closes CODAGT-203
## Summary
`list_templates` now returns a ranked shortlist with a recommendation,
so the chat agent can pick the right template the way a colleague would:
prefer what matches the request, what the user already uses, and what
the rest of the organization uses. Instead of teaching the model an enum
protocol in prompts, every result carries a fixed `next_step`
instruction telling the agent what to do.
## How list_templates works
1. **Fetch**: active, non-deprecated templates in the chat's
organization, filtered by the admin template allowlist, authorized as
the chat owner (no system escalation).
2. **Query relevance** (optional `query` argument): each template
receives the highest tier any of its fields matches, and a higher tier
always outranks a lower one regardless of usage:
| Tier | Match |
|------|-------|
| 4 | name or display name equals the query |
| 3 | name or display name starts with the query |
| 2 | name or display name contains the query |
| 1 | description contains the query (checked only when no name field
matched) |
| 0 | no match; the template is excluded |
Matching is case-insensitive and ignores spaces/hyphens/underscores
(`python gpu` matches `python-gpu`).
3. **Usage signals**: a new `GetTemplateRankingSignalsByOwnerID` query
returns, per template, the owner's active and recently-deleted workspace
counts within a 60-day window, the last in-window usage, and the count
of distinct developers with an active workspace (unclaimed prebuilds
excluded).
4. **Affinity score** (computed in Go, per template, from that
template's signals only):
```text
affinity = 10 x (active + 0.5 x deleted) x 0.5^(days_since_last_use /
14)
+ ln(1 + active_developers)
```
`active`/`deleted` are the owner's in-window workspace counts,
`days_since_last_use` is measured from the most recent in-window usage
(the personal term is zero without in-window usage), and
`active_developers` is the org-wide count. Personal usage carries 10x
the weight of org popularity; the confidence floor is the score of two
active developers (`ln 3`) and the required lead over the runner-up is
`ln 3 - ln 2`.
5. **Rank**: query tier first (when a query is present), then affinity
score, then name/ID for determinism. Results paginate 10 per page with
`next_page` present only when more exist.
## Recommendation contract
The result tells the agent what to do next instead of describing
confidence levels:
- `recommended_template_id` is present only when the top template is a
clear winner: the only available template, a decisive query match, or an
affinity score that clears a floor and leads the runner-up by a derived
margin.
- `next_step` is always present and is one of four fixed sentences: use
the recommendation, ask the user to choose, retry a query that matched
nothing, or report that no templates are available.
Per-template items carry raw evidence (`active_developers`,
`your_workspace_count`, `last_used_by_you`) rather than derived labels.
When signals fail to load, the tool logs and degrades to asking the user
unless the query alone is decisive.
Prompts and the `create_workspace`/`read_template` descriptions
reference the field through the `chattool.NextStepField` constant, so
the instruction lives in one place and cannot drift. `create_workspace`
remains idempotent and allowlist-enforced.
## Authorization
The signals query runs with the chat owner's permissions: reading the
owner's own workspaces plus a template-metadata read for the cross-user
popularity count. dbauthz rejects the call if any requested template is
not readable by the owner (covered by allow and deny method tests).
## Docs
Adds `docs/ai-coder/agents/tools/` explaining how agent tool calls work,
with `list_templates` ranking and the `next_step` contract as the first
documented tools.
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8d725969bf |
chore!: remove coder agents insights page (#26457)
Removes the coder agents PR Insights page (`/agents/settings/insights`) and all of its backend support. The page had previously been hidden and was only reachable via deep link. It had previously been hidden due to the dubious value provided in the current iteration. |
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1c78bd84b7 |
feat(coderd): copy agent context resources into the per-chat pin (#26438)
## What Populates `chat_context_resources` (the per-chat pinned copy added in #26430) by copying from `workspace_agent_context_resources` at the points where a chat's `context_aggregate_hash` is set, in the same transaction, so the pinned hash and pinned bodies always agree. No prompt-building change yet; consuming the pinned copy in `prepareGeneration` is a later, experiment-gated PR. ## How - `HydrateAgentChatsContext` now hydrates NULL-hash chats **and** copies the agent's resources onto them in one statement (a data-modifying CTE), so the chat-create and agent-push paths need no Go change. - New queries `InsertAgentContextResourcesIntoChat`, `DeleteChatContextResources`, `ListChatContextResources`, each with a hand-written dbauthz wrapper (per-chat update/read) and a `MethodTestSuite` entry. - `RefreshChatContext` re-pins resources via a shared `repinChatContext` helper (clear-then-copy in a transaction). A dirty chat keeps its old bodies until refresh. - On agent rebind (e.g. a workspace rebuild produces a new agent), the chat's context is re-pinned to the new agent so it stops injecting the previous agent's resources. Best-effort: a context error never fails the binding. ## Invariant A chat's `chat_context_resources` always correspond to its `context_aggregate_hash`. Bodies are (re)written only when the hash is set (hydrate, refresh, rebind); a dirty chat keeps its old bodies until refresh. ## Testing Extends the context integration test to push real resources and assert the copy across hydrate, dirty (no re-copy), and refresh. The dbauthz `MethodTestSuite` covers the three new methods. <details> <summary>Why clear-then-copy (two statements)</summary> The refresh/rebind re-pin clears the chat's rows then inserts the agent's. It uses two sequential statements inside the transaction rather than a single `WITH cleared AS (DELETE ...) INSERT ...`, because a data-modifying CTE cannot see its own delete under snapshot isolation, so overlapping sources (the common case: the same files re-pinned) would collide on the `(chat_id, source)` primary key. The hydrate path inserts into never-pinned (NULL-hash) chats and uses `ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` defensively. </details> <details> <summary>Follow-ups</summary> - `prepareGeneration` consuming the pinned instructions and skills (experiment-gated). - `codersdk.ChatContext` resources plus changed diff, and the frontend indicator/refresh. - Removing the per-turn pull and `last_injected_context`. </details> --- *This PR was created by Coder Agents on behalf of @kylecarbs.* Builds on #26430. |
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1d03e63f4f | feat: implement package and cli tool for repairing oidc links (#26418) | ||
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2716e2181c |
feat: purge boundary logs past retention (#24815)
Add a periodic purge job for `boundary_logs` rows past their retention threshold, following the same pattern as the existing audit log and connection log purge jobs in `dbpurge`. Expose a `--boundary-log-retention` deployment flag (env `CODER_BOUNDARY_LOG_RETENTION`, YAML `retention.boundary_logs`). Default is `0` (keep indefinitely). When set to a positive duration, `purgeTick` deletes rows where `captured_at` is older than the threshold in batches of 10,000, matching other log purge operations. The `boundary_logs` label is added to the `records_purged_total` Prometheus counter. Also removes the random-UUID fallback for `OwnerID` in `dbgen.BoundarySession`. The previous fallback generated a UUID that could never satisfy the `boundary_sessions_owner_id_fkey` FK constraint, masking test setup bugs. Callers must now provide a valid user ID or accept NULL (the legitimate "user deleted" state). |
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a1330e3a8c |
refactor: rename Ai* database identifiers to AI* (AIGOV-369) (#26327)
Adds `ai` to sqlc's `gen.go.initialisms` in `coderd/database/sqlc.yaml` so the generated DB code follows Go's initialism convention. Adds the matching `ai` -> `AI` case to the dbgen PascalCase helper (`scripts/dbgen/main.go`) so the corresponding `dbmem` / mock identifiers stay in sync. `make gen` regenerates the rest; hand-written call sites that consume DB-generated identifiers (`enterprise/audit/table.go`, `coderd/database/modelmethods.go`, `enterprise/coderd/aigatewaykeys.go`, `coderd/database/dbauthz/*`, etc.) are updated to match. Scope is deliberately limited to the database layer: - `coderd/rbac/*` (resource and scope generators) is untouched — `ResourceAi*` / `ScopeAi*` constants stay on main's casing. - `codersdk/*` (Go SDK) is untouched — `codersdk.ResourceAi*` / `codersdk.APIKeyScopeAi*` constants stay on main's casing, so external Go SDK consumers see no source-level break. - `Aibridge*` identifiers (one SQL token `aibridge`, not `ai_bridge`) are out of scope. On-the-wire values are unchanged: enum strings, RBAC resource type strings, API key scope strings, and JSON tags all stay the same. The HTTP/JSON surface is unaffected. Refs: [AIGOV-369](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-369/change-ai-references-in-coderddatabasemodelsgo-to-ai) 🤖 Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com) |
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210261b143 |
feat: add chat context pinning storage and push trigger (#26385)
Foundation for the Workspace Context Sources RFC (phase 3). The agent push (#25983) and coderd snapshot storage (#26145) already persist per-agent context snapshots; this PR lands the **chat-side storage** plus the **`agentapi` push trigger** that a follow-up will use to read them. It does **not** touch `chatd` and changes no behavior — nothing wires an implementation yet. ## What changed - Adds four nullable columns to `chats` — `context_aggregate_hash`, `context_dirty_since`, `context_dirty_resources`, and `context_error` — and rebuilds the `chats_expanded` view. - Adds three queries — `SetChatContextSnapshot`, `HydrateAgentChatsContext`, `MarkChatsContextDirtyByAgent` — with `dbauthz` wrappers and `audit` entries. They are store-interface methods covered by a Postgres test (`TestChatContextHydration`). - Adds the `agentapi.ContextDirtyMarker` interface and invokes it inside the `PushContextState` transaction, publishing collected events only after commit. ## Intentionally inert There are **no production callers** of the three queries and **no implementation** wired for `ContextDirtyMarker`, so the push trigger is dormant. This is deliberate: the PR is the durable storage/query foundation only. The actual integration — the `chatd` implementation that hydrates/dirties chats and backs a refresh endpoint, consuming the pinned context in prompt building, the rich SDK types + UI, and retiring the live per-turn pull — lands as a single follow-up PR. Splitting this way keeps the schema/query layer reviewable on its own and keeps the integration whole in one place. Refs #25983, #26145. <details> <summary>Decision log</summary> - **Columns over a side table.** The four `chats` columns are the durable model (accepting the one-time `chats_expanded` view/CTE churn). `last_injected_context` is deliberately left untouched — it is load-bearing for the live per-turn context pull. - **Keep `agentapi`, drop `chatd`.** The earlier revision wired the hydrate/dirty implementation through `chatd` and added a `PUT /chats/{chat}/context` refresh endpoint. Those were removed so this PR is pure foundation; `agentapi` defines the trigger + interface (it does not import `chatd`), and the `chatd` implementation arrives with the full integration. - **No new experiment flag.** The columns are dark and unread by prompt building. - **Authz.** The new query wrappers authorize chat updates under the chat RBAC object / `ResourceChat`, consistent with the existing system chat mutators. </details> --- 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @kylecarbs. |
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b439b06ee6 |
feat: persist agent-pushed workspace context snapshots in coderd (#26145)
Replaces the v2.10 `PushContextState` stub with a real coderd write path. Phase 1 of the chat-side persistence story; nothing reads these rows yet. Follows [#25983](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25983) and unblocks [CODAGT-569](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-569/enable-agent-api-v210-pushcontextstate-bump-currentminor-wire-coderd). ## What ships ### Schema (`000517_workspace_agent_context.{up,down}.sql`) Two new tables plus `api_key_scope` enum extensions: - `workspace_agent_context_snapshots` (PK `workspace_agent_id` to `workspace_agents(id) ON DELETE CASCADE`): one row per agent, overwritten per push. Holds `version`, `schema_version`, `aggregate_hash`, `snapshot_error`, `received_at`. - `workspace_agent_context_resources` (PK `(workspace_agent_id, source)`): per-resource state. `body_kind` and `status` are `TEXT` + `CHECK` so adding new wire kinds (the RFC's reserved PLUGIN/HOOK/SUBAGENT/COMMAND) is a one-line CHECK update plus a Go switch case. ### SQLC queries (`coderd/database/queries/workspaceagentcontext.sql`) - `UpsertWorkspaceAgentContextSnapshot` - `UpsertWorkspaceAgentContextResource` - `DeleteStaleWorkspaceAgentContextResources` (delete-where-source-not-in) - `GetLatestWorkspaceAgentContextSnapshot` - `ListWorkspaceAgentContextResources` ### Handler (`coderd/agentapi/context.go`) `ContextAPI` is a new sub-API. `PushContextState`: 1. Rejects `schema_version > 1` with a non-`Unimplemented` error so a forward-incompatible agent fails loudly during rollout instead of slipping into the permanent fallback path the `Unimplemented` translation reserves for old coderd deployments. 2. Validates resources: no empty/duplicate sources, every variant maps to a known body kind, every status maps to a known enum value, the `Body` oneof is set (even when status is non-OK, mirroring the wire guarantee so coderd can attribute failures to a known kind). 3. Inside `Database.InTx`, reads the existing snapshot. If the push is not `initial` and `version` is not strictly greater, returns `accepted = false` and leaves stored state untouched. Otherwise upserts the snapshot row, upserts each resource, then runs the stale-source prune so the snapshot and resource rows always agree. 4. Returns `accepted = true` on success. Resource bodies are stored as `protojson(body oneof variant)` in `body JSONB` with `body_kind` as the discriminator. Adding a new field to an existing variant is zero work since `protojson` tolerates new fields; adding a new variant is a CHECK + switch case. ### RBAC + dbauthz - New `ResourceWorkspaceAgentContext` (Create/Read/Update/Delete). - New `SubjectTypeAgentContext` plus `subjectAgentContext` system role and `dbauthz.AsAgentContext` helper. The push handler elevates to this subject; the agent's own role does not get direct write access to the table. - New `workspace_agent_context:*` API key scopes registered in the enum migration; internal-only (not added to `externalLowLevel`). ### Audit These rows are agent-pushed state, not user-authored. They are intentionally not added to `AuditActionMap` and not enumerated in `enterprise/audit/table.go`, matching `boundary_logs`, `workspace_agent_memory_resource_monitor`, etc. `enterprise/audit` tests pass unchanged. ## Tests - `coderd/agentapi/context_test.go`: 12 subtests covering accepts/rejects (schema version, empty/duplicate source, unknown status, missing body), version semantics (stale dropped, same-version replay dropped, `initial=true` overwrites lower version), variant coverage, non-OK status persistence, and the empty-active-set prune case. - `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go`: 5 `MethodTestSuite` cases covering the new queries. - `coderd/rbac/roles_test.go`: `WorkspaceAgentContext` permission row asserting no human role currently has access. - `coderd/database/migrations/testdata/fixtures/000517_workspace_agent_context.up.sql`: one snapshot + one resource per known body kind plus a non-OK status, so the migration test suite never lands with these tables empty. ## Out of scope (later phases) - Chat hydration (`chats.context_aggregate_hash`, `last_injected_context`). - Dirty-bit fan-out and `PUT /chats/{id}/context`. - Agent-side `POST /api/v0/context/resync` barrier and the `coder exp chat context` CLI. - `codersdk` chat-context wire types and the dashboard Sources drawer. - Removal of the chatd per-turn pull fallback. ## Compat property This is a pure write path. If anything here returns errors the agent's `RunPush` loop backs off, no chat behavior changes, and the workspace keeps behaving exactly like it did before v2.10. <details> <summary>Implementation plan and decision log</summary> Key design calls: 1. **Concurrency**: Accept iff `req.Initial || req.Version > existing.Version`. The strict RFC reading ("version comparison is authoritative") locks restarted agents out because their per-process counter resets to 1; honoring `initial=true` reflects the real reboot reality while still rejecting steady-state replays/out-of-order pushes. 2. **Body encoding**: `protojson` over the oneof variant body proto, stored in JSONB with `body_kind` discriminator. Structured at the API/Go layer, schema-tolerant at the storage layer, and Phase 2 readers round-trip back via `protojson.Unmarshal`. 3. **Schema version rejection**: returns a normal error, not `Unimplemented`. The agent's `RunPush` loop only short-circuits on `Unimplemented`; that escape hatch is reserved for old coderd deployments. A forward-incompatible agent should retry-and-back-off, not flip the connection into permanent fallback. 4. **Validation strictness**: empty sources, duplicate sources, `STATUS_UNSPECIFIED`, and missing `Body` oneof variants are rejected before any write so a misbehaving agent cannot poison the snapshot table. Phase 2 readers can trust every row maps to a known proto variant. </details> _This PR was authored by Coder Agents on Kyle Carberry's behalf._ |
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4debd23cbb |
fix: chatd refactor (#26270)
Implements the chatd stabilization RFC. Combines: - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25908 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25923 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26109 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26110 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26111 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26112 |
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4a07f61c50 |
refactor!: remove interceptions API, request logs view, and associated code (#26213)
## Summary Removes the deprecated `/api/v2/aibridge/interceptions` endpoint and the Request Logs frontend page, both replaced by the session-based view. Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-266 Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-324 ## Changes ### Backend - Remove `GET /api/v2/aibridge/interceptions` HTTP handler and route - Remove SDK types and client method (`AIBridgeInterception`, `AIBridgeTokenUsage`, `AIBridgeUserPrompt`, `AIBridgeToolUsage`, `AIBridgeListInterceptionsResponse`, `AIBridgeListInterceptionsFilter`) - Remove SQL queries `CountAIBridgeInterceptions` and `ListAIBridgeInterceptions` - Remove `searchquery.AIBridgeInterceptions` parser - Remove dbauthz wrappers, in-memory implementations, metrics, and mocks for the interceptions list queries - Remove the `coder aibridge interceptions list` CLI command and golden files - Regenerate API docs, swagger, mocks, and metrics The `/models`, `/clients`, and `/sessions` endpoints stay; the sessions list page still consumes all three. ### Frontend - Delete the entire `RequestLogsPage/` directory (page, view, row, filter, stories, tests) - Remove the `/aibridge/request-logs` route and its lazy import - Remove the `getAIBridgeInterceptions` API method, `paginatedInterceptions` query, and mock interception entities - `git mv` the shared filter and icon components used by the sessions pages: - `RequestLogsPage/RequestLogsFilter/{Client,Model,Provider}Filter.tsx` → `AIBridgePage/filters/` - `RequestLogsPage/icons/AIBridge{Client,Model,Provider}Icon.tsx` → `AIBridgePage/icons/` - Drop the `getProviderIconName` hack and the duplicate `anthropic-neue` icon case now that the FIXME no longer applies ## Commits 1. `refactor: remove interceptions API and request logs view` — the bulk removal, with explicit renames for the shared filter/icon files. 2. `refactor(site/src/pages/AIBridgePage): drop getProviderIconName hack` — cleanup of the FIXME that depended on RequestLogsPage existing. > [!NOTE] > Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dannykopping |
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a4c867f11b |
fix: backfill legacy Bedrock AI provider rows and stale model config strings (#26155)
Fixes CODAGT-548
Adds two idempotent startup backfills run after `newAPI():
- `BackfillBedrockProviderType`: promotes `ai_providers` rows from
`type=anthropic` with Bedrock settings to `type=bedrock`.
- `BackfillChatModelConfigProviderStrings`: fixes stale
`chat_model_configs.provider = "anthropic"` strings on rows whose linked
provider was just promoted.
- `UpdateAIProvider` query now also writes the `type` column, so the
fix persists on any subsequent PATCH.
> 🤖 Generated by Claude with oversight from a human.
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1cada0649c |
feat(coderd): resolve effective user AI budget (#26142)
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-287/add-effective-group-resolution Implements the effective AI budget resolution from the AI Governance cost-controls RFC: for a given user, a `user_ai_budget_overrides` row wins if present, otherwise the deployment budget policy (`highest`) picks the largest group budget across the user's groups, ties broken alphabetically. For now, I keep the logic under `coderd/aibridge/budget`, but that may change during the implementation of budget enforcement. |
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4627b01415 |
fix: reduce agentfake manager startup time (#25669)
Signed-off-by: Callum Styan <callumstyan@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Mux <noreply@coder.com> |
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53d287a139 |
fix(coderd)!: restrict OIDC email fallback to first-time account linking (#25712)
## Problem `findLinkedUser` in `coderd/userauth.go` falls back to email-based user lookup when no `linked_id` match is found. This fallback was used for **all logins**, not just first-time linking. An attacker who registers the victim's email at the IdP (with a different OIDC subject) bypasses the `linked_id` check and gets matched to the victim's Coder account. Combined with the `email_verified` type assertion bypass (PLAT-228), this creates a chained account-takeover vector. ## Fix Restrict the email fallback in `findLinkedUser` so that when a user found by email already has a `user_link` with a non-empty `linked_id` that **differs** from the current login's `linked_id`, the function returns no user. This blocks account takeover while preserving: - **First-time linking**: No existing `user_link` exists, email fallback works as before. - **Legacy links**: Empty `linked_id` (pre-migration), email fallback still works. - **Normal logins**: Matching `linked_id` resolves via the primary path, no fallback needed. Also adds a `UpdateUserLinkedID` query to backfill `linked_id` on legacy links (only when currently empty) during login, gradually migrating them to the secure path. The `findLinkedUser` signature now accepts `loginType` explicitly instead of relying on `user.LoginType`, ensuring the correct link is checked in the legacy lookup. ## Breaking change Marked `release/breaking`. An account whose `user_link` already has a populated `linked_id` that does not match the subject the IdP presents will now be denied login (403) instead of silently resolving via the email fallback. The most likely trigger is changing `CODER_OIDC_ISSUER_URL` (the `linked_id` is `issuer||subject`), or two identities sharing one email. Accounts with an empty (legacy) `linked_id` are unaffected and are backfilled on their next login. Fixes: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-229 <details><summary>Implementation details</summary> ### Files changed - `coderd/userauth.go`: Core fix in `findLinkedUser` + backfill logic in `oauthLogin` - `coderd/database/queries/user_links.sql`: New `UpdateUserLinkedID` query - `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: Authorization for new query (`ActionUpdate` on the user object, matching `InsertUserLink`) - `coderd/userauth_test.go`: New OIDC and GitHub tests - Generated files: `queries.sql.go`, `querier.go`, `dbmock.go`, `querymetrics.go` ### New tests - `TestUserOIDC/OIDCEmailFallbackBlockedByExistingLink`: Attacker with a different `sub` but the same email is rejected (403) when the victim has an existing link (covers signups enabled and disabled). - `TestUserOIDC/OIDCFirstTimeLinkByEmailAllowed`: User created via SCIM/API (no `user_link`) can still link via email on first OIDC login, and the `linked_id` is populated. - `TestUserOIDC/OIDCLegacyLinkBackfill`: User with empty `linked_id` can login and their `linked_id` is backfilled with the correct value. - `TestUserOIDC/OIDCEmailFallbackBlockedByIssuerChange`: Existing link recorded under a previous issuer is rejected (403) after the issuer changes (documents the breaking behavior). - `TestUserOAuth2Github/EmailFallbackBlockedByExistingLink`: GitHub attacker with a different user ID but the victim's email is rejected (403). </details> > [!NOTE] > This PR was authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @f0ssel. --------- Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <agents@coder.com> |
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32aee9ea4c |
feat: add DB queries for ai_gateway_coderd_keys (#25564)
Adds Insert, List and Delete queries for `ai_gateway_coderd_keys ` table. |
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1a91d31793 |
feat: add user AI budget override endpoints (#25439)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285 Follow the structure established in https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203 ## Summary Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at `/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to a specific group. ## Schema ```sql CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides ( user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, spend_limit_micros BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0), created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW() ); ``` ## Membership lifecycle The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) → group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two mechanisms: - **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table (`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE` function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries `group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from `organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by any future table that needs the same check. - **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership loss: - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on `group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC sync). - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on `organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership lives in `organization_members`. The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through `group_members`). ## Authorization The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for writes) `Group` resources: | Operation | User resource | Group resource | |-----------|----------------|----------------| | `GET` | `ActionRead` | — | | `PUT` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | | `DELETE` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks. ### Role matrix | Role | GET | PUT | DELETE | |--------------|-----|-----|--------| | Owner | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | UserAdmin | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | OrgAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | | OrgUserAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | Internal discussion: https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359 ## Audit logs Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR. |
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a586b7e5e0 |
feat: add boundary_log rbac resource (#24810)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`, `read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder `rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously used in the dbauthz layer. Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role (including owner) can delete boundary logs. | Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete | |---|---|---|---|---| | Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no | | Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no | | Auditor | no | no | yes | no | | DBPurge | no | no | no | yes | ### Changes - **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to `policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants, and codersdk/TypeScript types. - **dbauthz authorization**: replace all `ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with `ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession` derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with `.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create. - **Role assignments:** - **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard; create is inherited from member at user-level. - **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write logs they own. - **Auditor (site):** read. - `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with `ResourceBoundaryUsage`. - **System subjects:** - **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can remove boundary logs. - **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access. - **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`, `boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum values to `api_key_scope`. - **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied), `BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace agent lookups for owner derivation. - **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and frontend type definitions. --------- Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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3bf5f80277 |
feat(coderd/database): add boundary_sessions and boundary_logs tables (#25441)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Add up/down migrations and matching sqlc queries for persisting Boundary audit events, as specified in the Bridge/Boundaries Correlation RFC. **Tables:** - `boundary_sessions`: session metadata with `workspace_agent_id` FK, `confined_process_name`, and timestamps (`started_at`, `updated_at`). ID is externally supplied by the Boundary process (no DB-side default). Created lazily when the first log for a session arrives. - `boundary_logs`: individual audit events with `session_id` FK, `sequence_number` (INT, primary ordering key), protocol/method/detail fields, and `matched_rule` (nullable; non-NULL implies allowed). **Indexes (per RFC):** - `(session_id, sequence_number)` for the ordering query path - `(captured_at)` for the retention purge path **Queries:** - `InsertBoundarySession` / `GetBoundarySessionByID` - `InsertBoundaryLog` / `GetBoundaryLogByID` - `ListBoundaryLogsBySessionID` with nullable `seq_after`/`seq_before` exclusive bounds for fetching events between two known interception sequence numbers - `DeleteOldBoundaryLogs` with row limit to avoid long-running transactions **Also includes:** dbgen helpers (`BoundarySession`, `BoundaryLog`), dbauthz implementations (reads gated on `ResourceAuditLog`, deletes on `ResourceSystem`), and all generated wrappers (dbmock, dbmetrics). No callers yet. A follow-up PR will add the dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type. > Generated by Coder Agents |
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ca1f6b19a2 | feat: remove legacy chat provider tables (#25416) |