Move chat model settings to
`/ai/settings/organizations/:organization/models`, add an organization
switcher, and redirect legacy settings paths. The pages use organization
permissions for read, create, update, and delete controls. They use
redacted provider descriptors.
Agent creation loads models for the selected organization. Existing
chats load models for the chat organization. Chat views warn about
unavailable historical models, select a usable local recovery model, and
disable generation when none exists. Settings that aggregate
organizations retain successful results when one request fails.
Depends on #27959
_This pull request description was generated by Coder Agents._
Adds an organization picker to the MCP server settings pages so
multi-org deployments can manage every organization's MCP servers
through the UI, not just the default organization's. Closes CODAGT-714
(scoped to MCP servers only; model configs stay deployment-wide until
CODAGT-709 lands).
## Stack Context
Top of the CODAGT-711/717/712/806 stack: MCP server configs are
org-scoped with RBAC, audit logging, per-config ACLs, and owner-scoped
user tokens. This layer makes the admin UI org-aware, resolving the
"default org only" limitation documented in the bottom PR.
## Summary
- The MCP servers list and add pages resolve the working organization
from an `org` search param (falling back to the default org), and render
an organization picker built on the existing `OrganizationAutocomplete`.
The picker only appears when more than one organization is visible, so
single-org deployments see no change.
- Selecting an organization rewrites the search param, refetches the
list for that org, and threads through to the add page so creation posts
to the selected organization.
- The update page now loads the server by ID (new organization-scoped
`GET /api/experimental/organizations/{organization}/mcp-servers/{id}`
frontend binding) instead of listing the default org and searching
client-side, so servers from any organization can be edited. Post-save
navigation returns to the owning organization's list via the server's
`organization_id`.
- Removes the now-unused `getDefaultOrganizationId` helper.
- Review hardening: organization display labels are disambiguated with
the unique org name when effective display names collide (picker
options, trigger text, and accessible name). Access is no longer
restricted to deployment admins: the pages, sidebar item, and nav entry
accept org-scoped `mcp_server_config` permissions, the picker lists only
organizations the user can view, content and affordances (add, edit,
delete) are gated on the selected organization's permissions, and
deployment admins keep full access everywhere.
## Testing
Storybook interaction stories cover: picker hidden with one org,
switching orgs refetches and swaps list contents, add posting to the
URL-selected org, add posting after an in-form org switch (asserting
typed form state survives the switch), and update loading by ID.
Red-green verified by breaking the search-param resolution and observing
the new stories fail.
> Mux acted on Mike's behalf for this PR.
Context: experiment `minimum-implicit-member ` added the ability to set
the default member-roles at a per-organization level. This, along with
the related PR stacked listed below, will be used to enable "gateway
accounts", which are accounts that are entitled to use the AI Gateway
but not create or use workspaces. The Workspaces tab is intentionally
left visible for now.
Hides the "New workspace" button and the empty-state creation CTA on the
Workspaces page for users who cannot create a workspace in any
organization, and guards the creation page itself.
Adds a shared `createWorkspace` authorization check (`workspace`
resource, `create` action, `owner_id: me`, `any_org: true`) to
`site/permissions.json` and threads the result through
`WorkspacesPageView`, `WorkspacesTable`, and `WorkspacesEmpty`. Users
without the permission see an empty state explaining they don't have
permission to create workspaces instead of a dead-end CTA. The create
CTAs on the Templates pages were already gated by per-organization
checks; this brings the Workspaces page in line.
`CreateWorkspacePage` is also gated: it adds an org-scoped
`createWorkspaceForUserID` check to its existing authorization batch and
wraps the view in `RequirePermission`, so a direct URL shows the
standard denial dialog instead of a form that 403s on submit. Users who
can create workspaces for others (`createWorkspaceForAny`) still see the
form.
To see this behavior, enable the experiment. As an admin, visit
Organization -> Roles, and remove "Organization Workspace Access" from
the default roles. Login as a user that is not granted workspace access
via a member role.
Storybook coverage: `CannotCreateWorkspace` (empty state + hidden
button), `CannotCreateWorkspaceWithWorkspaces` (button hidden while the
table renders), `CannotCreateWorkspaceWithFilter` (pins the filter empty
state's priority over the no-permission one), and `PermissionDenied` for
the CreateWorkspacePage gate. The Go SSR permissions test also asserts
the new `createWorkspace` entry.
## Stack
This PR is independent but related to the gateway-accounts stack:
1. **#27279**: permission-based license seat counting. Behind the
`permission-based-licensing` experiment and gated on the AI Governance
add-on, `user_limit` counts only users the RBAC engine authorizes to
create workspaces.
2. **#27280**: adds the `organization-ai-gateway-access` org role
carrying the AI Bridge interception permissions (extracted from the
member floors, backfilled into org default roles by migration) and
enforces it at AI Gateway authentication; bridge usage stops claiming AI
Governance seats under the experiment.
3. ~~**#27281**: gates workspace ACL grants on matching member-level
capability (each granted action only takes effect while the recipient
holds that action in the org), so workspace sharing is ineffective for
(and rejected toward) users without workspace capabilities, evaluated
live on every authorization.~~ Tabled - excluded from the
gateway-accounts MVP.
This PR (#27278) stands alone: it hides the Workspaces page create CTAs
for users without workspace-create permission and can merge in any
order.
> Vibe-coded using Coder Agents, author with limited frontend knowledge,
manually tested.
Adds an `AI Gateway Keys` page under `Admin settings > AI > AI Gateway
Keys` for key management of keys used by standalone AI Gateway replicas
to authenticate into `coderd`.
The page is shown to users with `viewAIGatewayKeys` permission and a
Premium license with AI Gateway enabled.
Adds Storybook coverage.
---------
Co-authored-by: Jake Howell <jacob@coder.com>
> 🤖 This PR was written by Coder Agents on behalf of Jake Howell.
Linear: [DEVEX-355](https://linear.app/coder/issue/DEVEX-355)
Second PR in a 5-PR stack splitting #25328. Adds the frontend layer that
talks to the existing `/api/v2/ai/providers` endpoints already shipped
on `main`:
- API client: `getAIProviders`, `getAIProvider`, `createAIProvider`,
`updateAIProvider`, `deleteAIProvider`.
- React Query wrappers in `queries/aiProviders.ts` with a shared key
helper and matching cache invalidations.
- Mock fixtures for OpenAI, Anthropic, and Bedrock providers in
`testHelpers/entities.ts` for stories and unit tests.
- `viewAnyAIProvider` registered in `permissions.json` so the existing
permissions hook can read it.
- `viewAnyAIProvider` added to `canViewDeploymentSettings` so admins who
can only manage providers still see the deployment dropdown.
The `aiProviders` query module and the per-provider mocks are
temporarily added to the `knip` ignore list / annotated with
`@lintignore`; the next PRs in the stack consume them and remove the
exclusions.
<details>
<summary>Stack</summary>
1. #25579 jakehwll/DEVEX-355/01-primitives, primitives
2. **jakehwll/DEVEX-355/02-api, API client and query layer (this PR)**
3. jakehwll/DEVEX-355/03-components, provider form components
4. jakehwll/DEVEX-355/04-pages, pages and routes
5. jakehwll/DEVEX-355/05-section, section reshuffle
Replaces #25328 once the stack lands.
</details>
The agents-access role previously granted chat permissions at user
scope, but chats are org-scoped objects. Rego skips user-level perms
when org_owner is set, making the grants invisible. Handler-level
band-aids used synthetic non-org-scoped objects as a workaround.
- Migrates agents-access from users.rbac_roles (site-level) to
organization_members.roles (org-scoped) via DB migration
- Redefines agents-access as a predefined org-scoped builtin role
alongside organization-admin, organization-auditor, etc., with
Member permissions granting chat create/read/update
- Excludes ResourceChat from OrgMemberPermissions so org membership
alone no longer grants chat access
- Fixes handler Authorize checks to use org-scoped objects with
semantically correct actions (ActionUpdate for message/tool operations)
- Grants org admins the ability to assign agents-access
Closes#24250
Fixes CODAGT-174
Note: this does not update the "Usage" endpoints. Tracked by CODAGT-161.
> 🤖
Replaces the generic red `ErrorAlert` ("Forbidden.") with a proactive
permission check and friendly info alert when a user lacks the
`agents-access` role.
- Add `createChat` permission check to `permissions.json` using
`owner_id: "me"`
- Handle `"me"` owner substitution in `renderPermissions` (SSR path)
- Pass `canCreateChat` from `useAuthenticated().permissions` into
`AgentCreateForm`
- Show `ChatAccessDeniedAlert` and disable input immediately (no need to
trigger a 403 first)
- Also catch 403 errors as a fallback in case permissions aren't yet
loaded
- Add `ForbiddenNoAgentsRole` Storybook story with `play` assertions
- Add `TestRenderPermissionsResolvesMe` Go test to pin the `"me"`
sentinel substitution
<details><summary>Implementation plan & decision log</summary>
- Uses the existing `permissions.json` + `checkAuthorization` system
rather than a separate API call
- `owner_id: "me"` is resolved to the actor's ID by both the auth-check
API endpoint and the SSR `renderPermissions` function
- Go test uses a real `rbac.StrictCachingAuthorizer` (not a mock) so it
verifies both the sentinel substitution and the RBAC role evaluation
end-to-end
- Alert follows the exact same `Alert` pattern as the 409 usage-limit
block
- Uses `severity="info"` and links to the getting-started docs Step 3
- Textarea is disabled proactively so the user never sees the scary
generic error
</details>
> 🤖 Created by a Coder Agent and will be reviewed by a human.
## Problem
Two network requests were blocking the initial page render with
fullscreen `<Loader fullscreen />` spinners:
1. **`POST /api/v2/authcheck`** (permissions) — blocked in `RequireAuth`
via `AuthProvider.isLoading`
2. **`GET /api/v2/organizations`** — blocked in `DashboardProvider`
All other bootstrap queries (`user`, `entitlements`, `appearance`,
`experiments`, `build-info`, `regions`) already used server-side
metadata injection via `index.html` meta tags and resolved instantly.
These two did not.
## Solution
Follow the existing `cachedQuery` + `<meta>` tag pattern to inject both
datasets server-side:
### Server-side (`site/site.go`)
- Add `Permissions` and `Organizations` fields to `htmlState`
- Fetch organizations via `GetOrganizationsByUserID` in parallel with
existing queries
- Evaluate all `permissionChecks` using the RBAC authorizer directly
- Inject results as HTML-escaped JSON into `<meta>` tags
### Frontend
- Register `permissions` and `organizations` in `useEmbeddedMetadata`
- Update `checkAuthorization()` to accept optional metadata and use
`disabledRefetchOptions` when available
- Update `organizations()` to accept optional metadata and use
`cachedQuery` when available
- Wire metadata through `AuthProvider` and `DashboardProvider`
### Note
The Go `permissionChecks` map in `site/site.go` mirrors
`site/src/modules/permissions/index.ts` and must be kept in sync.
Ethan