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Commits
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6348c83142 |
feat: register public clients without a secret (#28046)
Third in the stack, split out of #27873. This is where dynamic client registration first produces a public client. - A registration requesting token_endpoint_auth_method `none` issues no secret and persists the client_type derived in #28043. The response omits client_secret entirely, per RFC 7591 §3.2.1. - Discovery still advertises only the two secret-based methods. `none` is withheld until the token endpoint honors it, so a conforming client is not told to attempt an exchange that would be rejected. - The app and its secret are written in one transaction. They were two independent inserts, so a failed second one left a committed app that could never authenticate while still holding a registration access token. Pre-existing, but a public client's missing secret row makes the orphaned case unspottable by inspection. - registration_client_uri uses url.JoinPath, fixing a trailing-slash access URL producing //oauth2/clients/{id}. - Docs state both limits above, so the page does not describe a flow that returns 400 until #28047 lands. A client registered here cannot obtain a token yet; #28047 adds that. Dynamic client registration is off by default, so none of this is user-visible until then. Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client |
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663f41ffa9 |
feat: derive OAuth2 client type from token_endpoint_auth_method (#28043)
Adds an OAuth2 client type (public vs confidential, RFC 7591 §2) derived from the requested auth method instead of hardcoded confidential. The type is stored and guarded here, but no endpoint enforces on it yet; public behavior at the token endpoint follows in the next PR in the stack. - Client type is derived once and reused by both registration and redirect URI validation, so they can't disagree - IsPublic() fails closed: an unrecognized or missing value reads as confidential - RFC 7592 update (PUT) now rejects moving a client between public and confidential (400) instead of silently flipping it when the auth method is omitted - Discovery still doesn't advertise "none"; follows once the token endpoint honors it ### Behavior by client shape `client_type` is derived from `token_endpoint_auth_method` at POST and pinned at PUT. RFC 7592 GET/PUT authenticate with the registration access token, not the client secret, so neither endpoint reads a secret. | Registered with | Stored `client_type` / method | GET reports | PUT that flips the method | |------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------| | omitted, or `client_secret_basic` | `confidential` / `client_secret_basic` | `client_secret_basic` | `none` → 400 `invalid_client_metadata` | | `none` (new) | `public` / `none` | `none` | `client_secret_*` → 400 `invalid_client_metadata` | | `none` (before this PR) | `confidential` / `none` | `none` | either → 200, type stays `confidential` | - PUT still replaces every other RFC 7591 field. `client_type` is the only pinned one; the method may move within a type (`client_secret_basic` ↔ `client_secret_post`). - Row 3 is the only shape where the two columns disagree. The guard fires only on a method change that crosses the type line, so those clients keep managing themselves instead of being locked out of their own configuration endpoint. - The token endpoint does not consult `client_type` yet, so every client still authenticates with a secret and registration still issues one. Split out of #27873, second in the stack (on top of #28041). Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3029/oauth2-support-public-client |
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76ae64391a |
refactor(codersdk): use ReadBodyAsJSON in typed endpoints (#27857)
This PR migrates 224 typed JSON response sites across 46 files to `codersdk.ReadBodyAsJSON`, so invalid 2xx bodies return structured errors while preserving URL credential redaction. It intentionally excludes agent-direct HTTP, Azure IMDS, `UseNumber`, and chat paths; stacked on coder/coder#27804, with chat and lint follow-ups in coder/coder#27858 and coder/coder#27859. Refs coder/coder#27044. Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder. |
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fbac602456 |
feat!: add admin-controlled dynamic client registration toggle (#27316)
`POST /oauth2/register` (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) has exactly one gate today: `ExperimentOAuth2`, a static, process-lifetime flag that wraps the entire `/oauth2/*` route tree as an all-or-nothing switch. That flag is scheduled for removal at GA, which would leave DCR with zero admin control at all once it is gone. Add a persistent, DCR-specific `oauth2_dcr_enabled` deployment setting, independent of the experiment system, so admin control over DCR survives GA. `POST /oauth2/register` checks the flag and rejects new registrations with an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled; discovery metadata (`GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`) conditionally omits `registration_endpoint`. A new audited `GET`/`PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings` endpoint lets an owner toggle it live, no restart required. The setting defaults to disabled, matching the canonical design proposal; disabling only stops new self-registrations, clients that already registered continue to authorize and exchange tokens normally. Address issue described in [ENG-3056](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/ENG-3056/oauth2-dcr-admin-configurable-enabledisable). ## Where this sits in the request path ```mermaid sequenceDiagram autonumber participant A as Admin participant S as coderd participant DB as site_configs<br/>(oauth2_dcr_enabled) participant C as OAuth2/MCP Client Note over A,S: Admin toggles DCR (new) A->>S: PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings<br/>{dynamic_client_registration_enabled: false} S->>S: authorizeContext(ActionUpdate, ResourceDeploymentConfig) S->>DB: UPSERT oauth2_dcr_enabled = false S-->>A: 200 OK (audited) Note over C,S: Client discovery + registration afterward C->>S: GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache) DB-->>S: false S-->>C: 200 metadata, registration_endpoint omitted C->>S: POST /oauth2/register S->>DB: GetOAuth2DCREnabled (system ctx, every request, no cache) DB-->>S: false S-->>C: 403 invalid_request,<br/>"Dynamic client registration is disabled" Note over C,S: A client that registered before the change is unaffected C->>S: GET /oauth2/authorize?client_id=... Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally) C->>S: PUT/DELETE /oauth2/clients/{client_id} (RFC 7592 self-management) Note over S: no DCR-enabled check on this path either S-->>C: 200 (proceeds normally) ``` ## Files changed: manual vs. generated Reviewers should focus on the **manual** files. The **generated** ones are `make gen` output that follows mechanically from the manual changes and don't need direct review. <details> <summary><b>Manual files (26)</b> — click to expand, grouped the same way as "Suggested review order" below</summary> **1. Database** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` | New `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` query pair on the existing generic `site_configs` table. No schema change. | | `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` | RBAC check (`rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig`) on the two new query methods; extends the `subjectSystemOAuth2` system-actor role with read-only `ResourceDeploymentConfig` access, needed so the public discovery/registration endpoints can read the flag via `dbauthz.AsSystemOAuth2`. | | `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` | RBAC assertion coverage for `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled` in the method-coverage test suite. | **2. Request gating (the actual feature)** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` | The actual gate: `CreateDynamicClientRegistration` reads the flag first and returns an RFC 7591-shaped `403` when disabled (defaults disabled if never configured). | | `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` | New unit test, `TestCreateDynamicClientRegistration_DCREnabled`: calls the handler directly (no HTTP server), covering enabled / explicitly disabled / never-configured. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` | `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` conditionally omits `registration_endpoint` from discovery metadata when DCR is disabled. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` | New unit test, `TestGetAuthorizationServerMetadata_DCREnabled`: same three states, for the discovery handler. | **3. Admin settings endpoint** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `codersdk/oauth2.go` | New `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type plus `Client.OAuth2ProviderSettings`/`PutOAuth2ProviderSettings` methods. | | `coderd/oauth2.go` | New `oauth2ProviderSettings`/`putOAuth2ProviderSettings` admin handlers (audited via `audit.InitRequest`); updates the `GetAuthorizationServerMetadata` call site to pass `api.Database`. | | `coderd/coderd.go` | Registers `GET`/`PUT /api/v2/oauth2-provider/settings`. | | `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` | New test file: admin `GET`/`PUT` round-trip, default-disabled-before-any-`PUT`, and `403` for a non-owner on both `GET` and `PUT`. | **4. Audit wiring** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/database/types.go` | New `database.OAuth2ProviderSettings` audit-only struct (mirrors `NotificationsSettings`). | | `coderd/audit/diff.go` | Adds the new struct to the `Auditable` type union. | | `coderd/audit/request.go` | Adds the new struct to all four dispatch switches (`ResourceTarget`, `ResourceID`, `ResourceType`, `ResourceRequiresOrgID`). | | `codersdk/audit.go` | New API-facing `ResourceTypeOAuth2ProviderSettings` constant and its `FriendlyString` case. | | `enterprise/audit/table.go` | Field-level audit action map (`ActionTrack`/`ActionIgnore`) for the new struct. | | `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.up.sql` | Adds `oauth2_provider_settings` to the `resource_type` Postgres enum, required for the audit wiring above (`resource_type` is a real enum, not a Go-only value). | | `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.down.sql` | No-op (`ALTER TYPE ... ADD VALUE` can't be reverted). | **5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip** | File | What changed | |---|---| | `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` | New shared test helper, `EnableDCR`, since DCR now defaults to disabled and many pre-existing tests need it turned on to register a client. | | `coderd/oauth2_test.go` | Adds `TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled` (registers a client, disables DCR, verifies new registration is rejected while the existing client's self-management, authorize, and token exchange all keep working); calls `EnableDCR` in every pre-existing test that registers a client. | | `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go` | Calls `EnableDCR` in every test that registers a client, so RFC-error-format assertions aren't masked by the new disabled-by-default gate. | | `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` | Same: `EnableDCR` added to every registration-dependent test. | | `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go` | Same. | | `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go` | Same (near-duplicate of `oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go` in a different package). | | `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go` | Same. | | `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go` | Same, for the MCP end-to-end dynamic-registration flow test. | </details> <details> <summary><b>Generated files (12)</b> — from <code>make gen</code>, no need to review directly</summary> `coderd/apidoc/docs.go`, `coderd/apidoc/swagger.json`, `coderd/database/dbmetrics/querymetrics.go`, `coderd/database/dbmock/dbmock.go`, `coderd/database/dump.sql`, `coderd/database/models.go`, `coderd/database/querier.go`, `coderd/database/queries.sql.go`, `docs/admin/security/audit-logs.md`, `docs/reference/api/enterprise.md`, `docs/reference/api/schemas.md`, `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`. </details> ## Suggested review order ### 1. Database Establishes the persisted setting and its RBAC rule; everything else builds on `GetOAuth2DCREnabled`/`UpsertOAuth2DCREnabled`. 1. `coderd/database/queries/siteconfig.sql` — the two new queries. Same boolean-encoding pattern as the existing `oauth2_github_default_eligible` key right above them in the same file. 2. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go` — the RBAC wrapper for those two queries, plus the `subjectSystemOAuth2` role extension (search this file for `ResourceDeploymentConfig`, it appears in both spots). 3. `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go` — asserts the RBAC checks from (2) actually fire. ### 2. Request gating (the actual feature) Where `POST /oauth2/register` and discovery metadata change behavior. 1. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration.go` — the primary gate. Read this first; it's the feature. 2. `coderd/oauth2provider/registration_test.go` — its new unit test, exercising the gate's three states directly against the handler. 3. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata.go` — the same gating pattern applied to the discovery `GET` endpoint. 4. `coderd/oauth2provider/metadata_test.go` — its new unit test. ### 3. Admin settings endpoint How an owner flips the setting live. 1. `codersdk/oauth2.go` — the `OAuth2ProviderSettings` SDK type and `Client` methods first; this is the public contract everything below implements against. 2. `coderd/oauth2.go` — the `GET`/`PUT` handlers themselves. 3. `coderd/coderd.go` — route registration, to see where those handlers get wired in. 4. `coderd/oauth2_provider_settings_test.go` — round-trip and permission tests. ### 4. Audit wiring Plumbing required so step 3's `PUT` is auditable; mechanical except for (3). 1. `coderd/database/types.go` — the audit-only struct; everything else in this layer exists to plumb it through. 2. `coderd/audit/diff.go` — adds it to the `Auditable` type union (the compiler enforces this one). 3. `coderd/audit/request.go` — the four dispatch switches; the one part of this layer worth reading closely. 4. `codersdk/audit.go` — the API-facing resource type constant. 5. `enterprise/audit/table.go` — the field-action map. 6. `coderd/database/migrations/000546_audit_oauth2_provider_settings.{up,down}.sql` — read last; a consequence of needing a new `resource_type` enum value for (1)-(5), not a design decision of its own. ### 5. Test-suite ripple from the disabled-by-default flip 1. `coderd/oauth2provider/oauth2providertest/helpers.go` — the new `EnableDCR` helper. Read first to understand the fix pattern before seeing it applied repeatedly. 2. `coderd/oauth2_test.go` — next, since it also contains the new `TestOAuth2DynamicClientRegistrationDisabled`, not just `EnableDCR` call sites. 3. The rest, in any order, they're mechanical repeats of the same one-line addition: `coderd/oauth2_error_compliance_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2_metadata_validation_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2_security_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2provider/validation_test.go`, `coderd/oauth2provider/provider_test.go`, `coderd/mcp/mcp_e2e_test.go`. ## Explicitly out of scope Per the design proposal: rate limiting on `POST /oauth2/register` (tracked separately), retroactively affecting already-registered clients when DCR is disabled (this only gates new self-registration), and an Initial Access Token requirement (a separate, follow-up ticket). |
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b776a14b46 |
fix(coderd): harden OAuth2 provider security (#22194)
## Summary Harden the OAuth2 provider with multiple security fixes addressing `coder/security#121` (CSRF session takeover) and converge on OAuth 2.1 compliance. ### Security Fixes | Fix | Description | Commits | |-----|-------------|---------| | **CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize`** | Enforce CSRF protection on the authorize endpoint POST (consent form submission) | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` | | **Clickjacking: `frame-ancestors` CSP** | Prevent consent page from being iframed (`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` + `X-Frame-Options: DENY`) | `597aeb2` | | **Exact redirect URI matching** | Changed from prefix matching to full string exact matching per OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1 | `73d64b1`, `93897f1` | | **Store & verify `redirect_uri`** | Store redirect_uri with auth code in DB, verify at token exchange matches exactly (RFC 6749 §4.1.3) | `50569b9`, `d7ca315` | | **Mandatory PKCE** | Require `code_challenge` at authorization (for `response_type=code`) + unconditional `code_verifier` verification at token exchange | `d7ca315`, `1cda1a9` | | **Reject implicit grant** | `response_type=token` now returns `unsupported_response_type` error page (OAuth 2.1 removes implicit flow) | `d7ca315`, `91b8863` | ### Changes by File **`coderd/httpmw/csrf.go`** — Extended the CSRF `ExemptFunc` to enforce CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` in addition to `/api` routes. The consent form POST is now CSRF-protected to prevent cross-site authorization code theft. **`site/site.go`** — Added `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'` and `X-Frame-Options: DENY` headers to `RenderOAuthAllowPage` (consent page only — does not affect the SPA/global CSP used by AI tasks). **`coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go`** — Changed `RedirectURL` from prefix matching (`strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path)`) to full URI exact matching (`v.String() != base.String()`), comparing scheme, host, path, and query. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Added PKCE enforcement: `code_challenge` is required when `response_type=code` (via a conditional check, not `RequiredNotEmpty`, so `response_type=token` can reach the explicit rejection path). `ShowAuthorizePage` (GET) validates `response_type` before rendering and returns a 400 error page for unsupported types. `ProcessAuthorize` (POST) stores the `redirect_uri` with the auth code when explicitly provided. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`** — PKCE verification is now unconditional (not gated on `code_challenge` being present in DB). If the stored code has a `redirect_uri`, the token endpoint verifies it matches exactly — mismatch returns `errBadCode` → `invalid_grant`. Missing `code_verifier` returns `invalid_grant`. **`codersdk/oauth2.go`** — `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` constant and `Valid()` acceptance are **kept** so the authorize handler can parse `response_type=token` and return the proper `unsupported_response_type` error rather than failing at parameter validation. **`coderd/database/migrations/000421_*`** — Added `redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`. ### Design Decisions **`state` parameter remains optional** — The plan initially required `state` via `RequiredNotEmpty`, but this was reverted in `376a753` to avoid breaking existing clients. The `state` is still hashed and stored when provided (via `state_hash` column), securing clients that opt in. **`response_type=token` kept in `Valid()`** — Removing it from `Valid()` would cause the parameter parser to reject the request before the authorize handler can return the proper `unsupported_response_type` error. The constant is kept for correct error handling flow. **CSP scoped to consent page only** — `frame-ancestors 'none'` is set only on the OAuth consent page renderer, not globally. The SPA/global CSP was previously changed to allow framing for AI tasks ([#18102](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/18102)); this change does not regress that. ### Out of Scope (follow-up PRs) - Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit) - Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens - Rate limiting on dynamic client registration --- <details> <summary>📋 Implementation Plan</summary> # Plan: Harden OAuth2 Provider — Security Fixes + OAuth 2.1 Compliance ## Context & Why Security issue `coder/security#121` reports a critical session takeover via CSRF on the OAuth2 provider. This plan covers all remaining security fixes from that issue **plus** convergence on OAuth 2.1 requirements. The goal is a single PR that closes all actionable gaps. ## Current State (already committed on branch `csrf-sjx1`) | Fix | Status | Commits | |-----|--------|---------| | Fix 1: CSRF on `/oauth2/authorize` | ✅ Done | `ba7d646`, `b94a64e` | | CSRF token in consent form HTML | ✅ Done | `b94a64e` | | `state_hash` column + storage | ✅ Done (hash stored, but state still optional) | `9167d83`, `b94a64e` | | Tests for CSRF + state hash | ✅ Done | `e4119b5` | ## Remaining Work ### ~~Fix 2 — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED) > **Decision:** Do not enforce `state` as required. The `state` parameter is still hashed and stored when provided (via `hashOAuth2State` / `state_hash` column from prior commits), but clients are not forced to supply it. This avoids breaking existing integrations that omit state. **Rollback:** Remove `"state"` from the `RequiredNotEmpty` call in `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go:42`: ```go // BEFORE (current on branch) p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "state", "code_challenge") // AFTER p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge") ``` No test changes needed — tests already pass `state` voluntarily. ### Fix 4 — Exact redirect URI matching Currently `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go:233` uses prefix matching: ```go // CURRENT — prefix match if v.Host != base.Host || !strings.HasPrefix(v.Path, base.Path) { ``` OAuth 2.1 requires **exact string matching**. Change to: ```go // AFTER — exact match (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.2.1) if v.Host != base.Host || v.Path != base.Path { ``` **File: `coderd/httpapi/queryparams.go` — `RedirectURL` method** Also update the error message from "must be a subset of" to "must exactly match". **Additionally**, store `redirect_uri` with the auth code and verify at the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §4.1.3): 1. **New migration** (same migration file or a new `000421`): Add `redirect_uri text` column to `oauth2_provider_app_codes` 2. **Update INSERT query** in `coderd/database/queries/oauth2.sql` to include `redirect_uri` 3. **`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`**: Store `params.redirectURL.String()` when inserting the code 4. **`coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go`**: After retrieving the code from DB, verify that `redirect_uri` from the token request matches the stored value exactly. Currently `tokens.go:103` calls `p.RedirectURL(vals, callbackURL, "redirect_uri")` for prefix validation only — it must compare against the stored redirect_uri from the code, not just the app's callback URL. <details> <summary>Why both exact match AND store+verify?</summary> Exact matching at the authorize endpoint prevents open redirectors (attacker can't use a sub-path). Storing and verifying at the token endpoint prevents code injection — an attacker who steals a code can't exchange it with a different redirect_uri than was originally authorized. This is required by RFC 6749 §4.1.3 and OAuth 2.1. </details> ### Fix 7 — `frame-ancestors` CSP on consent page The consent page can be iframed by a workspace app (same-site), which is the attack vector. Add a `Content-Security-Policy` header to prevent framing. **File: `site/site.go` — `RenderOAuthAllowPage` function (~line 731)** Before writing the response, add: ```go func RenderOAuthAllowPage(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, data RenderOAuthAllowData) { rw.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") // Prevent the consent page from being framed to mitigate // clickjacking attacks (coder/security#121). rw.Header().Set("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'none'") rw.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY") ... ``` Both headers for defense-in-depth (CSP for modern browsers, X-Frame-Options for legacy). ### OAuth 2.1 — Mandatory PKCE Currently PKCE is checked only when `code_challenge` was provided during authorization (`tokens.go:258`): ```go // CURRENT — conditional check if dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid && dbCode.CodeChallenge.String != "" { // verify PKCE } ``` OAuth 2.1 requires PKCE for ALL authorization code flows. Change to: **File: `coderd/oauth2provider/authorize.go`** — Add `"code_challenge"` to required params: ```go p.RequiredNotEmpty("response_type", "client_id", "code_challenge") ``` **File: `coderd/oauth2provider/tokens.go:257-265`** — Make PKCE verification unconditional: ```go // AFTER — PKCE always required (OAuth 2.1) if req.CodeVerifier == "" { return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE } if !dbCode.CodeChallenge.Valid || dbCode.CodeChallenge.String == "" { // Code was issued without a challenge — should not happen // with the authorize endpoint enforcement, but defend in // depth. return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE } if !VerifyPKCE(dbCode.CodeChallenge.String, req.CodeVerifier) { return codersdk.OAuth2TokenResponse{}, errInvalidPKCE } ``` **File: `codersdk/oauth2.go`** — Remove `OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeToken` from the enum or reject it explicitly in the authorize handler. Currently it's defined at line 216 but the handler ignores `response_type` and always issues a code. We should either: - (a) Remove the `"token"` variant from the enum and reject it with `unsupported_response_type`, OR - (b) Add an explicit check in `ProcessAuthorize` that rejects `response_type=token` Option (b) is simpler and more backwards-compatible: ```go // In ProcessAuthorize, after extracting params: if params.responseType != codersdk.OAuth2ProviderResponseTypeCode { httpapi.WriteOAuth2Error(ctx, rw, http.StatusBadRequest, codersdk.OAuth2ErrorCodeUnsupportedResponseType, "Only response_type=code is supported") return } ``` ### OAuth 2.1 — Bearer tokens in query strings `coderd/httpmw/apikey.go:743` accepts `access_token` from URL query parameters. OAuth 2.1 prohibits this. However, this may be used internally (e.g., workspace apps, DERP). Need to audit callers before removing. **Approach:** This is a larger change with potential breakage. Mark as a **separate follow-up issue** rather than including in this PR. Document the finding. ### OAuth 2.1 — Removed flows ✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go` only supports `authorization_code` and `refresh_token` grant types. The implicit grant (`response_type=token`) will be explicitly rejected per the PKCE section above. ### OAuth 2.1 — Refresh token rotation ✅ **Already compliant.** `tokens.go:442` deletes the old API key when a refresh token is used. ## Migration Plan All DB changes can go in a single new migration (or extend 000420 if the branch is rebased before merge). Columns to add: - `redirect_uri text` on `oauth2_provider_app_codes` The `state_hash` column is already added by migration 000420. ## Implementation Order 1. **Fix 7** — CSP headers on consent page (isolated, no deps) 2. ~~**Fix 2** — Require `state` parameter~~ (DROPPED — state stays optional) 3. **Fix 4** — Exact redirect URI matching + store/verify redirect_uri 4. **PKCE mandatory** — Require `code_challenge` + reject `response_type=token` 5. **Rollback** — Remove `"state"` from `RequiredNotEmpty` in `authorize.go` 6. **Tests** — Update/add tests for all changes 7. **`make gen`** after DB changes ## Out of Scope (separate PRs) - Bearer tokens in query strings (needs internal caller audit) - Scope enforcement on OAuth2 tokens - Rate limiting / quota on dynamic client registration </details> --- _Generated with [`mux`](https://github.com/coder/mux) • Model: `anthropic:claude-opus-4-6` • Thinking: `xhigh`_ |
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6683d807ac |
refactor: add RFC-compliant enum types and use SDK as source of truth (#21468)
Add comprehensive OAuth2 enum types to codersdk following RFC specifications: - OAuth2ProviderGrantType (RFC 6749) - OAuth2ProviderResponseType (RFC 6749) - OAuth2TokenEndpointAuthMethod (RFC 7591) - OAuth2PKCECodeChallengeMethod (RFC 7636) - OAuth2TokenType (RFC 6749, RFC 9449) - OAuth2RevocationTokenTypeHint (RFC 7009) - OAuth2ErrorCode (RFC 6749, RFC 7009, RFC 8707) Add OAuth2TokenRequest, OAuth2TokenResponse, OAuth2TokenRevocationRequest, and OAuth2Error structs to the SDK. Update OAuth2ClientRegistrationRequest, OAuth2ClientRegistrationResponse, OAuth2ClientConfiguration, and OAuth2AuthorizationServerMetadata to use typed enums instead of raw strings. This makes codersdk the single source of truth for OAuth2 types, eliminating duplication between SDK and server-side structs. Closes #21476 |
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54497f4f6b |
chore: add revocation endpoint to oauth well-known (#20561)
Was added to apps endpoints, but not the wider site ones. This is a site wide oauth route |
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13ca9ead3a |
chore!: ensure consistent secret token generation and hashing (#20388)
This PR uses the same sha256 hashing technique as we use for APIKeys. So now all randomly generated secrets will be hashed with sha256 for consistency. This is a breaking change for the oauth tokens. Since oauth is only allowed for dev builds and experimental, this is ok. |
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4bd7c7b7e0 |
feat: implement oauth2 RFC 7009 token revocation endpoint (#20362)
Adds RFC 7009 token revocation endpoint |
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74e1d5c4b6 |
feat: implement OAuth2 dynamic client registration (RFC 7591/7592) (#18645)
# Implement OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591/7592)
This PR implements OAuth2 Dynamic Client Registration according to RFC 7591 and Client Configuration Management according to RFC 7592. These standards allow OAuth2 clients to register themselves programmatically with Coder as an authorization server.
Key changes include:
1. Added database schema extensions to support RFC 7591/7592 fields in the `oauth2_provider_apps` table
2. Implemented `/oauth2/register` endpoint for dynamic client registration (RFC 7591)
3. Added client configuration management endpoints (RFC 7592):
- GET/PUT/DELETE `/oauth2/clients/{client_id}`
- Registration access token validation middleware
4. Added comprehensive validation for OAuth2 client metadata:
- URI validation with support for custom schemes for native apps
- Grant type and response type validation
- Token endpoint authentication method validation
5. Enhanced developer documentation with:
- RFC compliance guidelines
- Testing best practices to avoid race conditions
- Systematic debugging approaches for OAuth2 implementations
The implementation follows security best practices from the RFCs, including proper token handling, secure defaults, and appropriate error responses. This enables third-party applications to integrate with Coder's OAuth2 provider capabilities programmatically.
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33bbf18a4b |
feat: add OAuth2 protected resource metadata endpoint for RFC 9728 (#18643)
# Add OAuth2 Protected Resource Metadata Endpoint This PR implements the OAuth2 Protected Resource Metadata endpoint according to RFC 9728. The endpoint is available at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` and provides information about Coder as an OAuth2 protected resource. Key changes: - Added a new endpoint at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` that returns metadata about Coder as an OAuth2 protected resource - Created a new `OAuth2ProtectedResourceMetadata` struct in the SDK - Added tests to verify the endpoint functionality - Updated API documentation to include the new endpoint The implementation currently returns basic metadata including the resource identifier and authorization server URL. The `scopes_supported` field is empty until a scope system based on RBAC permissions is implemented. The `bearer_methods_supported` field is omitted as Coder uses custom authentication methods rather than standard RFC 6750 bearer tokens. A TODO has been added to implement RFC 6750 bearer token support in the future. |
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6f2834f62a |
feat: oauth2 - add authorization server metadata endpoint and PKCE support (#18548)
## Summary
This PR implements critical MCP OAuth2 compliance features for Coder's authorization server, adding PKCE support, resource parameter handling, and OAuth2 server metadata discovery. This brings Coder's OAuth2 implementation significantly closer to production readiness for MCP (Model Context Protocol)
integrations.
## What's Added
### OAuth2 Authorization Server Metadata (RFC 8414)
- Add `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` endpoint for automatic client discovery
- Returns standardized metadata including supported grant types, response types, and PKCE methods
- Essential for MCP client compatibility and OAuth2 standards compliance
### PKCE Support (RFC 7636)
- Implement Proof Key for Code Exchange with S256 challenge method
- Add `code_challenge` and `code_challenge_method` parameters to authorization flow
- Add `code_verifier` validation in token exchange
- Provides enhanced security for public clients (mobile apps, CLIs)
### Resource Parameter Support (RFC 8707)
- Add `resource` parameter to authorization and token endpoints
- Store resource URI and bind tokens to specific audiences
- Critical for MCP's resource-bound token model
### Enhanced OAuth2 Error Handling
- Add OAuth2-compliant error responses with proper error codes
- Use standard error format: `{"error": "code", "error_description": "details"}`
- Improve error consistency across OAuth2 endpoints
### Authorization UI Improvements
- Fix authorization flow to use POST-based consent instead of GET redirects
- Remove dependency on referer headers for security decisions
- Improve CSRF protection with proper state parameter validation
## Why This Matters
**For MCP Integration:** MCP requires OAuth2 authorization servers to support PKCE, resource parameters, and metadata discovery. Without these features, MCP clients cannot securely authenticate with Coder.
**For Security:** PKCE prevents authorization code interception attacks, especially critical for public clients. Resource binding ensures tokens are only valid for intended services.
**For Standards Compliance:** These are widely adopted OAuth2 extensions that improve interoperability with modern OAuth2 clients.
## Database Changes
- **Migration 000343:** Adds `code_challenge`, `code_challenge_method`, `resource_uri` to `oauth2_provider_app_codes`
- **Migration 000343:** Adds `audience` field to `oauth2_provider_app_tokens` for resource binding
- **Audit Updates:** New OAuth2 fields properly tracked in audit system
- **Backward Compatibility:** All changes maintain compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows
## Test Coverage
- Comprehensive PKCE test suite in `coderd/identityprovider/pkce_test.go`
- OAuth2 metadata endpoint tests in `coderd/oauth2_metadata_test.go`
- Integration tests covering PKCE + resource parameter combinations
- Negative tests for invalid PKCE verifiers and malformed requests
## Testing Instructions
```bash
# Run the comprehensive OAuth2 test suite
./scripts/oauth2/test-mcp-oauth2.sh
Manual Testing with Interactive Server
# Start Coder in development mode
./scripts/develop.sh
# In another terminal, set up test app and run interactive flow
eval $(./scripts/oauth2/setup-test-app.sh)
./scripts/oauth2/test-manual-flow.sh
# Opens browser with OAuth2 flow, handles callback automatically
# Clean up when done
./scripts/oauth2/cleanup-test-app.sh
Individual Component Testing
# Test metadata endpoint
curl -s http://localhost:3000/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server | jq .
# Test PKCE generation
./scripts/oauth2/generate-pkce.sh
# Run specific test suites
go test -v ./coderd/identityprovider -run TestVerifyPKCE
go test -v ./coderd -run TestOAuth2AuthorizationServerMetadata
```
### Breaking Changes
None. All changes maintain backward compatibility with existing OAuth2 flows.
---
Change-Id: Ifbd0d9a543d545f9f56ecaa77ff2238542ff954a
Signed-off-by: Thomas Kosiewski <tk@coder.com>
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8c5e7007cd |
feat: support the OAuth2 device flow with GitHub for signing in (#16585)
First PR in a series to address https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16230. Introduces support for logging in via the [GitHub OAuth2 Device Flow](https://docs.github.com/en/apps/oauth-apps/building-oauth-apps/authorizing-oauth-apps#device-flow). It's previously been possible to configure external auth with the device flow, but it's not been possible to use it for logging in. This PR builds on the existing support we had to extend it to sign ins. When a user clicks "sign in with GitHub" when device auth is configured, they are redirected to the new `/login/device` page, which makes the flow possible from the client's side. The recording below shows the full flow. https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/90c06f1f-e42f-43e9-a128-462270c80fdd I've also manually tested that it works for converting from password-based auth to oauth. Device auth can be enabled by a deployment's admin by setting the `CODER_OAUTH2_GITHUB_DEVICE_FLOW` env variable or a corresponding config setting. |
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f74532ff50 |
feat: audit oauth2 app management (#12275)
* Audit oauth2 app management * Use 201 for creating secrets |
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3d742f64e6 |
fix: move oauth2 routes (#12240)
* fix: move oauth2 routes From /login/oauth2/* to /oauth2/*. /login/oauth2 causes /login to no longer get served by the frontend, even if nothing is actually served on /login itself. * Add forgotten comment on delete |
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4d39da294e |
feat: add oauth2 token exchange (#12196)
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <stevenmasley@gmail.com> |
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3014777d2a |
feat: add endpoints to oauth2 provider applications (#11718)
These will show up when configuring the application along with the client ID and everything else. Should make it easier to configure the application, otherwise you will have to go look up the URLs in the docs (which are not yet written). Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <stevenmasley@gmail.com> |
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5cfa34b31e |
feat: add OAuth2 applications (#11197)
* Add database tables for OAuth2 applications These are applications that will be able to use OAuth2 to get an API key from Coder. * Add endpoints for managing OAuth2 applications These let you add, update, and remove OAuth2 applications. * Add frontend for managing OAuth2 applications |