Removes the coder agents PR Insights page (`/agents/settings/insights`) and all of its backend support. The page had previously been hidden and was only reachable via deep link. It had previously been hidden due to the dubious value provided in the current iteration.
Noticed when enabling the goleak checker in chatd:
```
=== FAIL: coderd/x/chatd (0.00s)
PASS
goleak: Errors on successful test run: found unexpected goroutines:
[Goroutine 108179 in state select, with github.com/coder/coder/v2/tailnet.(*Conn).AwaitReachable on top of the stack:
github.com/coder/coder/v2/tailnet.(*Conn).AwaitReachable(0x2c35e171d760, {0x74b37a8?, 0x2c35f6886330?}, {{0x0?, 0x0?}, {0x2c35def838c0?}})
/home/runner/work/coder/coder/tailnet/conn.go:647 +0x2ae
github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk/workspacesdk.(*agentConn).AwaitReachable(0x2c35e4f18440, {0x74b37e0?, 0x2c35f45680a0?})
/home/runner/work/coder/coder/codersdk/workspacesdk/agentconn.go:172 +0x12b
github.com/coder/coder/v2/codersdk/workspacesdk.(*agentConn).apiRequest.(*agentConn).apiClient.func1({0x74b37e0, 0x2c35f45680a0}, {0x61a8946?, 0x60fa2a0?}, {0x2c35e0af7380, 0x2b})
/home/runner/work/coder/coder/codersdk/workspacesdk/agentconn.go:1381 +0x212
net/http.(*Transport).dial(0x2c35e0af6210?, {0x74b37e0?, 0x2c35f45680a0?}, {0x61a8946?, 0xa0e255?}, {0x2c35e0af7380?, 0xa1456f?})
/home/runner/work/_temp/mise-data/installs/go/1.26.4/src/net/http/transport.go:1307 +0xd2
net/http.(*Transport).dialConn(0x2c35f8d8b380, {0x74b37e0, 0x2c35f45680a0}, {{}, 0x0, {0x2c35fc5a3e50, 0x4}, {0x2c35e0af7380, 0x2b}, 0x0}, ...)
/home/runner/work/_temp/mise-data/installs/go/1.26.4/src/net/http/transport.go:1815 +0x847
net/http.(*Transport).dialConnFor(0x2c35f8d8b380, 0x2c35e287a580)
/home/runner/work/_temp/mise-data/installs/go/1.26.4/src/net/http/transport.go:1648 +0xd2
net/http.(*Transport).startDialConnForLocked.func1()
/home/runner/work/_temp/mise-data/installs/go/1.26.4/src/net/http/transport.go:1629 +0x35
created by net/http.(*Transport).startDialConnForLocked in goroutine 107872
/home/runner/work/_temp/mise-data/installs/go/1.26.4/src/net/http/transport.go:1628 +0x112
Goroutine 108180 in state select, with github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4.(*Ticker).run on top of the stack:
github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4.(*Ticker).run(0x2c35f8517860)
/home/runner/go/pkg/mod/github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4@v4.3.0/ticker.go:70 +0x13f
created by github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4.NewTickerWithTimer in goroutine 108179
/home/runner/go/pkg/mod/github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4@v4.3.0/ticker.go:49 +0x16c
]
FAIL github.com/coder/coder/v2/coderd/x/chatd 126.492s
```
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1595
The workspace-app and port preview tabs in the Coder Agents right panel
were previously gated behind a `devel` prerelease build check, which
can't be toggled in real deployments.
This replaces that check with a proper `agent-app-tabs` deployment
experiment, registered in `ExperimentsKnown`, so the feature can be
enabled via `CODER_EXPERIMENTS=agent-app-tabs` like any other
experiment. The frontend now reads
`experiments.includes("agent-app-tabs")` from the dashboard instead of
`getPrereleaseFlag(buildInfo) === "devel"`.
Depends on #26208
Implements
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-286/add-interception-cost-calculation-to-aibridge-token-usages
Adds spend attribution to AI Gateway. After the upstream response, each
token-usage record now captures the user's effective group, the
per-token prices in effect at that moment, and a computed cost — so
spend is recorded as an immutable, point-in-time snapshot.
Concretely, `aibridge_token_usages` gains `effective_group_id`,
`input_price_micros`, `output_price_micros`, `cache_read_price_micros`,
`cache_write_price_micros`, and `cost_micros`. When a usage record is
written, the effective group is resolved (per-user override, else the
deployment budget policy), the `(provider, model)` price is looked up
and snapshotted onto the row, and cost is computed from the
provider-reported token counts. A model that isn't in the price table
records its tokens with a `NULL` cost; any *other* resolution failure
fails the write, so a `NULL` cost unambiguously means "model not priced"
rather than "lookup errored."
All values are stored in micro-units (1 unit = 1,000,000 micro-units;
Phase 1 assumes USD, so 1 micro-unit = $0.000001). Prices are quoted per
million tokens.
This also grants the AI Bridge RBAC subject `read` on `ai_model_prices`
(the per-interception price lookup needs it; it previously only had
`update` for the startup seeder).
## Cost precision
Cost is computed per token category as `tokens × price / 1_000_000` with
integer division, then the four categories are summed. The division is
done **per category** (not once over the summed numerator) on purpose:
it keeps the per-category line items summing exactly to the stored total
— no "the parts don't add up to the whole" in reporting).
Integer division truncates sub-micro-unit fractions. For example, a
cheap model at $0.10 per million tokens is a price of `100_000`; 9
tokens cost `9 × 100_000 / 1_000_000 = 900_000 / 1_000_000 = 0` (the
true 0.9 micro-units floors to 0). At real list prices this rarely bites
— $3/M input is a price of `3_000_000`, so even a single token is 3
micro-units. The per-record under-count is bounded below 1 micro-unit
per category, so under $0.000004 total across the four categories, which
is acceptable for list-price-based cost approximation.
## Overflow safety
`cost_micros` is a `BIGINT` (int64), and the largest intermediate value
is a single category's `tokens × price` before division. int64's ceiling
is ≈ `9.223e18`.
- At a steep $75/M model (price `75_000_000`), overflow would require
~123 billion tokens in one response: `123e9 × 75e6 = 9.225e18`, just
over the limit. `122e9` stays under at `9.15e18`.
- A realistically maxed-out Opus 4.8 response (≈1M input + 128K output
at list prices) costs about $15, with a numerator around `1.5e13` —
roughly six orders of magnitude below the ceiling.
So overflow is unreachable from real token counts.
### Multi-currency support
In the future, we may encounter issues with multi-currency support,
especially when dealing with currencies that have very large exchange
rates relative to USD, for example:
IRR: ~1,300,000 IRR ≈ 1 USD
VND: ~26,000 VND ≈ 1 USD
For currencies with such large denominations, numeric overflow is
technically possible, considering that we have only about six orders of
magnitude of headroom before reaching the limit (see above).
## `effective_group_id` has no foreign key
`effective_group_id` records the group a spend was attributed to, as an
immutable historical fact. It is intentionally **not** a foreign key, so
the record survives deletion of the group.
Alternatives were considered and rejected:
- **`ON DELETE SET NULL`** would mutate an "immutable" record — deleting
a group silently erases that interception's attribution and under-counts
the group's historical spend.
- **`RESTRICT` / `NO ACTION`** would block group deletion entirely
(groups are hard-deleted).
- **`CASCADE`** would delete spend history when a group is deleted — the
worst outcome for an audit record.
There is also no insert-time check that the group still exists: the id
comes from a budget that was just resolved, meaning it was valid at some
point.
## Open question: group name snapshotting
Should we also snapshot the group *name* onto each record? Two options:
- **Denormalize it now** — readable in historical reports even after a
group is deleted, but the snapshot can drift from the current name on
rename, raising a "show point-in-time vs. current name" question.
- **Postpone until needed** — it's a purely additive column later, and
the name is display-only (not correctness-bearing like the price). The
cost: names of groups deleted before the column is added can't be
backfilled.
Leaning toward postponing until a concrete reporting need settles the
drift question.
Makes the chat context foundation from #26385 live. That PR added the
storage columns, writer queries, and a dormant
`agentapi.ContextDirtyMarker` trigger with no production callers; this
PR wires them together end to end.
When a workspace agent pushes a context snapshot, bound chats now
hydrate to that snapshot's hash, and a later push with a different hash
flips already-pinned chats to dirty (emitting a `context_dirty` watch
event after the transaction commits). Chat creation pins the agent's
latest snapshot when one already exists. The experimental chat API
exposes this as `Chat.Context` (`*ChatContext` with `dirty`,
`dirty_since`, `error`), and a new `PUT
/api/experimental/chats/{chat}/context` endpoint re-pins the agent's
latest snapshot and clears the dirty marker.
`context_dirty_resources` stays NULL (the resource-level diff is
deferred to the UI phase) and the live per-turn context pull is
unchanged.
The end-to-end test provisions a workspace agent via the echo
provisioner, connects it over the Agent API v2.10, and exercises the
full path: an initial push hydrates a bound chat (clean), a second push
with a different hash marks it dirty, the API reports the dirty state,
and the refresh endpoint clears it.
<details>
<summary>Decision log</summary>
- **API shape — sub-struct.** Dirty state is surfaced as
`codersdk.Chat.Context *ChatContext { Dirty bool; DirtySince *time.Time;
Error string }` rather than flat fields, matching the RFC's named
`ChatContext` type and leaving room for future fields (resource diff,
sources). `db2sdk.Chat` populates it when the chat is context-tracked
(`len(ContextAggregateHash) > 0`), dirty, or carries a snapshot error,
and leaves it nil (`omitempty`) otherwise. `Dirty` mirrors
`context_dirty_since` being set.
- **Marker wiring.** The chat daemon is injected directly as the
`agentapi.ContextDirtyMarker`. It is unconditionally constructed (only
its background worker is gated), so the marker is always non-nil and the
wiring matches every other `api.chatDaemon` call site. `agentapi` still
treats a nil marker as "chatd absent", so `PushContextState` stays a
pure write path for any future caller that does not wire chatd in.
- **Refresh is atomic.** `RefreshChatContext` reads the agent's latest
snapshot and re-pins the chat in one repeatable-read transaction, so a
concurrent push cannot land between the read and the write and leave the
chat pinned to a stale hash with the dirty marker cleared.
- **Hydrate + dirty run inside the push transaction.** The fan-out
shares the push's transaction so a concurrent refresh cannot interleave
with the version gate; `context_dirty` watch events publish only after
commit. The pinned hash on dirtied chats is intentionally left unchanged
— the refresh endpoint re-pins it.
- **Dirtied chats keep their pinned hash.** Drift is advisory: a dirty
chat stays usable, and refreshing is the only path that advances the
pinned hash.
- **Test binds `chats.agent_id` directly.** In production the binding is
set lazily during a chat turn (`chatd.persistBuildAgentBinding`); the
test sets it via `dbgen` so it exercises the context flow rather than
turn resolution.
Plan: `coderd/x/chatd` context integration + E2E (sub-struct API,
create-time + push-time hydration, refresh endpoint;
`context_dirty_resources` and the per-turn pull untouched).
</details>
🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @kylecarbs
Add a periodic purge job for `boundary_logs` rows past their retention
threshold, following the same pattern as the existing audit log and
connection log purge jobs in `dbpurge`.
Expose a `--boundary-log-retention` deployment flag (env
`CODER_BOUNDARY_LOG_RETENTION`, YAML `retention.boundary_logs`). Default
is `0` (keep indefinitely). When set to a positive duration, `purgeTick`
deletes rows where `captured_at` is older than the threshold in batches
of 10,000, matching other log purge operations. The `boundary_logs`
label is added to the `records_purged_total` Prometheus counter.
Also removes the random-UUID fallback for `OwnerID` in
`dbgen.BoundarySession`. The previous fallback generated a UUID that
could never satisfy the `boundary_sessions_owner_id_fkey` FK constraint,
masking test setup bugs. Callers must now provide a valid user ID or
accept NULL (the legitimate "user deleted" state).
Adds the `ai-gateway-cost-control` experiment flag to gate new cost
control endpoints and upcoming frontend UI behind an explicit opt-in.
Currently AI Gateway cost control supports the following endpoints:
- `GET/PUT/DELETE /api/v2/organizations/{org}/groups/{group}/ai/budget`
- `GET/PUT/DELETE /api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`
Note: the group-level endpoints were already released in v2.34.0 and
remain ungated. Only the user-level endpoints are gated behind this
experiment. Future cost control endpoints and UI should use this
experiment for gating until the feature is stable.
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira
Adds `POST /api/v2/templatebuilder/compose/template`, a synchronous
endpoint that composes a template from a base and modules, validates it
via a provisioner import job, and creates the template in a single
request.
The handler composes terraform files, bundles them as a tar, inserts the
file with hash-based dedup, creates a template version with an import
job, waits up to 2 minutes for the job to complete, classifies errors
for known failure modes (network-unreachable registry, DNS failures),
then creates the template on success. Canceled and failed jobs return
appropriate error responses.
Also adds `hclwrite.Format` to composed terraform output for canonical
HCL formatting.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-279
<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>
- SDK types and client method in `codersdk/templatebuilder.go` with
validation tags matching the standard template creation path
(`template_display_name`, `lt=128`)
- `ClassifyProvisionerError` in `coderd/templatebuilder/errors.go`
detects DNS, connection refused, i/o timeout, and TLS handshake failures
and returns actionable messages
- `waitForProvisionerJob` polls with a ramp-up interval schedule (100ms,
200ms, 500ms, then 1s steady) and accepts an `onUpdate` callback for
future SSE streaming
- Audit logging for both template and template version creation
- TOCTOU name uniqueness: early check for fast feedback, DB unique
constraint catch for the race window (returns 409, not 500)
- Swagger annotations for all error responses (400, 404, 409, 504)
</details>
> 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents
> [!NOTE]
> This PR was authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel.
Part 3 of DEVEX-277 (POST /api/v2/templatebuilder/compose).
Adds SDK types and client method for the compose endpoint:
- `TemplateBuilderComposeRequest` with `BaseTemplateID` and `Modules` (list of `{ID, Variables}`). Registry URL is omitted from the request; it comes from server-side deployment config.
- `TemplateBuilderCompose(ctx, req)` client method that POSTs the request and returns raw `application/x-tar` bytes (matching the `Download` pattern in `codersdk/files.go`).
- Generated TypeScript types updated.
Implement `GET /api/v2/templatebuilder/modules`, which returns the
filtered list of modules available for a given base template. Reads from
the bundled catalog via `LoadModules()` and applies OS-compatibility
filtering based on the `base` query param.
Computed variables (e.g. `agent_id`) are excluded from the API response
at the `ToSDK()` conversion boundary since they are wired automatically
by the builder. The `Computed` field is removed from the SDK type. Adds
`CompatibleWithOS()` to `ModuleManifest` for OS filtering.
Returns 400 for unknown base IDs and 404 when the template builder is
disabled.
Depends on #26116
> [!NOTE]
> This PR was authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel.
Implement `GET /api/v2/templatebuilder/bases`, which returns the list of
base templates available in the template builder. Reads from the bundled
catalog by cross-referencing `templatebuilder.BaseTemplateIDs()` with
`examples.List()`, enriching each entry with the OS from the `exampleID
-> OS` map.
The endpoint is gated behind the template builder feature flag (returns
404 when disabled) and requires `policy.ActionRead` on
`rbac.ResourceTemplate`.
Depends on #26115
> [!NOTE]
> This PR was authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @jeremyruppel.
Scaffolds the `coderd/templatebuilder` package for the guided template
builder ([DEVEX-272](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/DEVEX-272),
[RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/RFC-Guided-Template-Creation-Workflow-342d579be59280dfbf8eea2e5006dbda)).
Adds the module catalog types and `go:embed` wiring that the template
builder endpoints will use:
- `codersdk.TemplateBuilderModule`, `TemplateBuilderModuleVariable`, and
related types matching the RFC schema
- Internal `ModuleManifest` type with `go:embed` wiring to bundle
`module.json` files from `coderd/templatebuilder/modules/`
- `LoadModules()` with defensive copy, unexported
`parseModulesFromFS(fs.FS)` for test isolation, `ToSDK()` conversion
- Real `code-server` module manifest as the first catalog entry
- Strict validation: ID uniqueness, version non-empty, variable
type/name validation, `DisallowUnknownFields`, and requiring
`module.json` in every module directory
- Tests via internal `catalog_internal_test.go` (for
`parseModulesFromFS` with `fstest.MapFS` fixtures) and external
`catalog_test.go` (for `LoadModules` and `ToSDK`), covering multi-module
parsing, all variable types, validation errors, nil-slice normalization,
and full SDK field assertions
> [!NOTE]
> Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com/agents) by
@jeremyruppel
---------
Co-authored-by: McKayla はな <mckayla@hey.com>
## Summary
Removes the deprecated `/api/v2/aibridge/interceptions` endpoint and the
Request Logs frontend page, both replaced by the session-based view.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-266
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-324
## Changes
### Backend
- Remove `GET /api/v2/aibridge/interceptions` HTTP handler and route
- Remove SDK types and client method (`AIBridgeInterception`,
`AIBridgeTokenUsage`, `AIBridgeUserPrompt`, `AIBridgeToolUsage`,
`AIBridgeListInterceptionsResponse`, `AIBridgeListInterceptionsFilter`)
- Remove SQL queries `CountAIBridgeInterceptions` and
`ListAIBridgeInterceptions`
- Remove `searchquery.AIBridgeInterceptions` parser
- Remove dbauthz wrappers, in-memory implementations, metrics, and mocks
for the interceptions list queries
- Remove the `coder aibridge interceptions list` CLI command and golden
files
- Regenerate API docs, swagger, mocks, and metrics
The `/models`, `/clients`, and `/sessions` endpoints stay; the sessions
list page still consumes all three.
### Frontend
- Delete the entire `RequestLogsPage/` directory (page, view, row,
filter, stories, tests)
- Remove the `/aibridge/request-logs` route and its lazy import
- Remove the `getAIBridgeInterceptions` API method,
`paginatedInterceptions` query, and mock interception entities
- `git mv` the shared filter and icon components used by the sessions
pages:
- `RequestLogsPage/RequestLogsFilter/{Client,Model,Provider}Filter.tsx`
→ `AIBridgePage/filters/`
- `RequestLogsPage/icons/AIBridge{Client,Model,Provider}Icon.tsx` →
`AIBridgePage/icons/`
- Drop the `getProviderIconName` hack and the duplicate `anthropic-neue`
icon case now that the FIXME no longer applies
## Commits
1. `refactor: remove interceptions API and request logs view` — the bulk
removal, with explicit renames for the shared filter/icon files.
2. `refactor(site/src/pages/AIBridgePage): drop getProviderIconName
hack` — cleanup of the FIXME that depended on RequestLogsPage existing.
> [!NOTE]
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dannykopping
Subdomain app routing derived the app identity from
httpapi.RequestHost, which returned the client-supplied
X-Forwarded-Host header verbatim. No middleware validated or stripped
that header, so a request from an untrusted peer could forge it. Since
the application_connect cookie is scoped to the wildcard apps domain,
JavaScript in a share=authenticated app could fetch() with a forged
X-Forwarded-Host pointing at a victim's owner-only app; coderd routed
and authorized the request as the victim and returned the private app
response same-origin to the attacker.
Replace RequestHost with httpmw.EffectiveHost, which honors
X-Forwarded-Host only when the original socket peer is a configured
trusted origin, otherwise falling back to the received Host header.
This ties host trust to the same RealIPConfig model already used for
X-Forwarded-For and -Proto. Wire it into HandleSubdomain for both
coderd and wsproxy, and log both the effective host and the raw
received_host.
Add coverage: EffectiveHost unit tests assert the trust decision uses
the socket peer rather than the spoofable forwarded client IP, and a
HandleSubdomain test confirms a forged X-Forwarded-Host from an
untrusted peer never reaches token resolution.
Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-259
Reverts coder/coder#26239
We cannot disable a feature which was previously enabled; this is a BC
break.
This is also using `AIGatewayRoutingEnabled` which will be removed in
the next release.
Problem: CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ENABLED defaulted to true, which both started
the in-memory gateway and enabled the licensed FeatureAIBridge. As a
result, deployments that never configured AI Gateway saw a spurious "AI
Governance add-on is required" warning whenever they had an older
(non-add-on) Premium license, since the feature was enabled-and-entitled
by default.
Fix: Decouple "external AI Gateway API enabled" from "in-memory daemon
running," so the external/licensed surface is off by default while Coder
Agents retain access by default.
- Adds server-side and client-side validation for
CODER_CONFIGSSH_HOSTNAME_SUFFIX and CODER_SSH_CONFIG_OPTIONS.
- **Server-side breaking change:** invalid values for either of these will cause `coderd` to exit with an error.
- Client-side: `coder config-ssh` will exit with an error if it detects invalid config.
- Adds tests for the above
Local smoke-testing: ran `develop.sh --env-file <path to an env file
containing badness>`. Validated that server startup failed as expected.
> 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents with supervision from a human.
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Relates to
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285/add-user-budget-overrides-table-and-crud-api
Adds audit-log support for `user_ai_budget_override` mutations. Without
it, an admin could quietly change a user's per-user spend cap (e.g. from
`$500` to `$50`), reassign it to a different group, or delete it
entirely with no record of who did it.
Both write (`create-or-update`) and delete actions now generate audit
log entries. Unlike group AI budgets, which only track `spend_limit`,
overrides also track `group_name`: an override can be reassigned to a
different attributed group, so that change needs to show up in the diff.
The raw `spend_limit_micros`, IDs, and timestamps are ignored in favor
of the human-readable `spend_limit` and `group_name`.
Depends on #25439.
## Screenshot
<img width="1343" height="514" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/aee30f58-6e81-435e-9bca-5bc98f49d8d3"
/>
Adds the agent half of the workspace context sources RFC. The agent now
resolves instruction files, skills, and MCP configs into a typed
`Snapshot`, watches the relevant paths recursively, exposes the source
list over a workspace-agent HTTP API, and pushes each `Snapshot` to
coderd over a new `PushContextState` RPC on Agent API v2.10.
The coderd-side handler is a stub returning `Unimplemented` for now.
Real persistence to `workspace_agent_context`, chatd hydration on dirty
events, and the `KindMCPServer` MCP provider are tracked by
[CODAGT-569](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-569/enable-agent-api-v210-pushcontextstate-bump-currentminor-wire-coderd).
This matches the pattern used for v2.7 `ReportBoundaryLogs` in
[#21293](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/21293), which bumped the
version and shipped a stub server so the wire and client could iterate
before the persistence layer landed.
## What ships
### agent/agentcontext (new package)
- `Source`, `Resource` (kinds `instruction_file`, `skill`, `mcp_config`,
`mcp_server` plus reserved `plugin`/`hook`/`subagent`/`command`),
`ResourceStatus`, `Snapshot`, `ComputeAggregateHash`.
- `Manager` owns the in-memory source list, performs the initial resolve
synchronously in `NewManager`, runs a re-resolve/watcher loop in `Run`,
exposes
`AddSource`/`RemoveSource`/`Sources`/`HasSource`/`Snapshot`/`SubscribeChanges`/`Resync`/`SeedSources`/`Close`.
- `Resolver` walks scan roots, classifies recognized files, enforces 64
KiB per-resource, 2 MiB aggregate, and 500-resource caps with
`StatusOversize`/`StatusExcluded`/`StatusUnreadable`/`StatusInvalid`
outcomes, skips `node_modules`/`vendor`/etc., validates symlink targets
stay inside the scan root, stamps `SourcePath` on user-derived
resources, and optionally pulls MCP server tool lists via an
`MCPProvider` interface. MCP config resources ship metadata only (size,
hash) so secrets in env blocks never leave the agent.
- `Watcher` is a recursive `fsnotify` wrapper with a 250 ms debounce,
dynamic arming of newly created directories, and an ENOSPC-tolerant
degraded mode that no-ops further syncs until the manager resyncs
explicitly.
- HTTP API for `GET/POST /sources`, `GET/DELETE /sources/{path}`, `POST
/resync` mounted at `/api/v0/context`.
- `Pusher` interface plus `RunPush` goroutine with exponential backoff
capped at 30 s. `DRPCPusher` adapts the generated `DRPCAgentClient210`
to `Pusher` and translates `drpcerr.Unimplemented` to
`ErrPushUnimplemented` so the push loop exits cleanly when talking to
coderd deployments that have not enabled the real handler.
### agent/proto (v2.10)
- New messages `ContextResource`, `PushContextStateRequest`,
`PushContextStateResponse` and the `PushContextState` RPC on `service
Agent`.
- Generated `DRPCAgentClient210` interface and
`codersdk/agentsdk.Client.ConnectRPC210` / `ConnectRPC210WithRole`.
- `tailnet/proto.CurrentMinor` bumped from `9` to `10`.
### Agent wiring
- `agent.Options.Client` declares both v2.9 and v2.10 connectors;
`run()` dials with `ConnectRPC210WithRole`.
- `apiConnRoutineManager` holds a `DRPCAgentClient210`. Existing v2.8
routines keep their narrower `DRPCAgentClient28` signature thanks to
interface embedding.
- `startAgentAPI210` is the v2.10 counterpart to `startAgentAPI` for
routines that need the new client. The push context state routine uses
it.
- A `contextManager` is constructed in `agent.init()`, seeded from the
existing `CODER_AGENT_EXP_*_DIRS` env vars, started in its own goroutine
under `gracefulCtx`, and closed in `agent.Close`.
- `handleManifest` calls `Manager.SeedSources` for sources rooted at the
manifest directory, then `Resync` after `manifest.Swap`, so the snapshot
reflects the workspace working directory immediately instead of waiting
for the next filesystem event.
- HTTP routes mounted at `/api/v0/context` when the manager is up.
### Coderd stub
`coderd/agentapi/context.go` returns `drpcerr.Unimplemented` for
`PushContextState`. The real handler that persists
`workspace_agent_context` rows, hydrates chats, and emits dirty events
lives in CODAGT-569.
## Tests
24 tests across `agent/agentcontext` cover types, paths, resolver
behavior with file caps, skill containers, MCP secret omission, symlink
target validation, the recursive watcher firing on real fsnotify events,
manager source CRUD / `Resync` / `SeedSources` / `Run` lifetime, the
HTTP API, the DRPC adapter, and the push retry / initial-flag /
unimplemented paths. Passes `go test -race -count=2`.
`TestAgent_ContextStatePushed` boots a full agent against
`agenttest.FakeAgentAPI` (which now records `PushContextState` traffic)
and asserts the seeded `AGENTS.md` appears in a snapshot push with
`schema_version = 1`.
<details>
<summary>Notes for reviewers</summary>
- Source CRUD is workspace-agent-token only; coderd is not in the path
for source mutation.
- Per-resource cap 64 KiB, aggregate 2 MiB, count cap 500; resources
past the cap ship with `StatusExcluded` and an empty payload so the
aggregate hash still detects content edits. MCP-emitted resources
enforce both a per-provider count cap and the aggregate byte cap.
- Symlinks inside the scan root are followed; symlinks pointing outside
(or broken) are rejected with `StatusExcluded` so credentials reachable
via a stray symlink stay off the wire.
- The initial push gates `lifecycle = ready` in the eventual full
design. For this PR the `SeedSources` plus `handleManifest`-driven
`Resync` keeps the snapshot fresh; the live push loop ships now and
DRPCPusher translates the coderd `Unimplemented` stub into a clean exit.
- The `PLUGIN`/`HOOK`/`SUBAGENT`/`COMMAND` kinds are reserved in proto
and Go enums but unused; the Claude Code plugin resolver ships in a
follow-up that does not need a schema migration.
- Two follow-ups remain, both tracked by
[CODAGT-569](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-569/enable-agent-api-v210-pushcontextstate-bump-currentminor-wire-coderd):
(1) the chatd-side handler that persists snapshots and dirties chats;
(2) the `coder exp chat context` CLI command set for
`list`/`show`/`add`/`remove`/`refresh`.
</details>
_This PR was authored by Coder Agents on Kyle Carberry's behalf._
`TestResolveWorkspace/TransportError` could sometimes observe an HTTP
404 from a closing test server instead of a transport error.
Make the test deterministic by injecting a failing `http.RoundTripper`,
and add `testutil.RoundTripperFunc` for reuse.
Generated by Coder Agents.
<details>
<summary>Implementation plan</summary>
# Plan: Deterministic ResolveWorkspace transport error test
## Context
`TestResolveWorkspace/TransportError` relied on closing an
`httptest.Server` before making a request. CI showed this can race with
the request path and produce an HTTP 404 instead of a transport error.
The test should inject a transport failure directly.
## Red
1. Update the transport-error case to use a custom `http.RoundTripper`
that returns an error.
2. Confirm the test fails to compile until the reusable
`testutil.RoundTripperFunc` helper exists.
## Green
1. Add `testutil.RoundTripperFunc` in `testutil/http.go`.
2. Implement `RoundTrip` so the function type satisfies
`http.RoundTripper`.
3. Add a compile-time interface assertion for the helper.
4. Update `codersdk/workspaces_test.go` to inject a client using
`testutil.RoundTripperFunc`.
5. Keep the existing assertion that transport errors do not become
`*codersdk.Error`.
## Refactor
1. Run `gofmt` on touched Go files.
2. Check import cleanup and variable names after the implementation
compiles.
3. Keep the change limited to the reusable helper and this test.
## Verification
1. `go test ./codersdk -run TestResolveWorkspace -count=100`
2. `go test ./testutil ./codersdk -run TestResolveWorkspace -count=1`
3. `git diff --check`
</details>
Refs #25936.
Adds a configurable per-org default member role set. Unioned into each member's effective roles at read time.
<sub>with Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub>
<!-- Authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk. -->
Refs
[PLAT-217](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-217/rfc-for-gateway-accounts).
Extracts an `organization-workspace-access` role so workspace elevation
can be split off the organization-member floor without changing
behavior.
- New role holds the workspace-side resources currently granted by
`organization-member`.
- The `MinimumImplicitMember` floor preserves the existing behavior
until #26027 shrinks it.
- Prebuilds orchestrator inserts memberships via
`dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted` and no longer needs `OrganizationMember` or
`AssignOrgRole` grants.
<details><summary>Agent context</summary>
- `coderd/rbac/roles.go`: `OrgWorkspaceAccessMemberPerms()` grants
`Workspace`, `WorkspaceDormant`, `File` (Create+Read),
`ProvisionerDaemon` (Create+Read), and `Task`. Deliberate omissions
(`Template`, `Group`, `WorkspaceProxy`, etc.) are documented inline.
- `coderd/rbac/roles_test.go`: `orgWorkspaceAccessUser` is added to
`requiredSubjects`. `UserProvisionerDaemons` is split into
`UserProvisionerDaemonsCreate` and `UserProvisionerDaemonsUpdateDelete`
because the new role grants Create+Read only and the test framework
requires uniform pass/fail per case.
- `codersdk/rbacroles.go`: exposes `RoleOrganizationWorkspaceAccess`.
- `enterprise/coderd/prebuilds/membership.go`:
`InsertOrganizationMember` runs under `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`. The
orchestrator never acts with the elevation role; the membership row only
exists so prebuilt workspaces have a valid owner.
- `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: drops the now-dead
`OrganizationMember` and `AssignOrgRole` permissions from the
prebuilds-orchestrator role and the orchestrator's entry in
`assignRoles`.
</details>
---
<sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub>
## Summary
- Updates Coder's pinned `github.com/coder/fantasy` fork to include
coder/fantasy#39.
- Exposes Anthropic `thinking_display` as a typed chat model provider
option with `summarized` and `omitted` values.
- Validates configured `thinking_display` values and maps them to
`fantasyanthropic.ProviderOptions.ThinkingDisplay`.
- Regenerates the API/UI option schemas so the admin model config form
gets a generated select field.
## Tests
- `go mod tidy`
- `make gen`
- `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/x/chatd/chatprovider ./coderd -run
'TestChatModelProviderOptions|TestAnthropicThinkingDisplayFromChat|TestProviderOptionsFromChatModelConfig_AnthropicThinkingDisplay|TestMergeMissingProviderOptions_AnthropicThinkingDisplay|TestValidateChatModelProviderOptions_AnthropicThinkingDisplay'`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd/... ./codersdk`
- `go test ./coderd -run
'TestValidateChatModelProviderOptions_AnthropicThinkingDisplay'`
- `pnpm --dir site exec -- biome lint --error-on-warnings
src/api/chatModelOptionsGenerated.json src/api/typesGenerated.ts`
- pre-commit hook, including fmt, lint, and slim build
> Mux working on behalf of Mike.
The wildcard entry in `externalLowLevel` was `"user.*"` (period) instead
of `"user:*"` (colon). Every other entry uses the `resource:action`
colon convention, and `parseLowLevelScope` rejects the period form, so
the wildcard was silently dropped from `ExternalScopeNames()` and could
not be requested via `coder tokens create --scope=user:*`.
Closes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/25623
Renames the Agents chat stream-silence error from `startup_timeout` to
`stream_silence_timeout` now that the timeout applies to any gap between
provider stream parts, not just first-token startup.
Updates the SDK enum, generated API docs/types, chat error copy, and
Agents UI stories/status labels so the user-facing wording describes a
stalled provider response instead of startup delay.
> **Breaking change:** This is a very minor breaking change for the
Coder Agents API: the public chat error kind enum no longer includes
`startup_timeout`, so clients matching that specific value should handle
`stream_silence_timeout` instead.
PowerShell's echo aliases to Write-Output, which rejects -e as
an ambiguous parameter and exits 1. Use plain echo with spaces
instead. Remove the Windows t.Skip and TestMain exception.
TestMain untested-tools check now only fails on full-suite runs.
Filtered runs (e.g. -run TestTools) warn instead.
Closes CODAGT-518
Copilot is the only AI provider type that could not be added through the `/ai/settings` UI. The aibridge runtime and the env-var seeding path already supported it, but the runtime CRUD API rejected `type=copilot` and the UI omitted it entirely. The root cause is that Copilot's auth model (a per-request GitHub OAuth token, with no pre-shared key) does not fit the credential-centric add-provider flow that every other provider uses.
## Backend
Allow `type=copilot` in `CreateAIProviderRequest.Validate()`, and reject `api_keys` for Copilot on both create (validation) and update (handler sentinel), mirroring the existing Bedrock guards. Copilot carries no stored credential.
## Frontend
Add Copilot to the provider type picker (with the `github-copilot.svg` icon) and give the form a credential-free branch: name, display name, and a free-text endpoint defaulting to `https://api.business.githubcopilot.com`, with copy explaining that authentication happens via the user's GitHub token at request time. Copilot maps to the distinct `copilot` wire type rather than collapsing to `openai`, and the edit flow recovers it correctly.
The endpoint stays required with a business-tier default; users on the individual or enterprise endpoints edit the field.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285
Follow the structure established in
https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203
## Summary
Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at
`/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user
spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to
a specific group.
## Schema
```sql
CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides (
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
spend_limit_micros BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0),
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
```
## Membership lifecycle
The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed
group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be
expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) →
group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow
foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two
mechanisms:
- **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table
(`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE`
function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries
`group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group
memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from
`organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate
is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to
a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by
any future table that needs the same check.
- **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership
loss:
- `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on
`group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC
sync).
- `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on
`organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership
lives in `organization_members`.
The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade
on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through
`group_members`).
## Authorization
The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for
writes) `Group` resources:
| Operation | User resource | Group resource |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| `GET` | `ActionRead` | — |
| `PUT` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` |
| `DELETE` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` |
For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to
learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks.
### Role matrix
| Role | GET | PUT | DELETE |
|--------------|-----|-----|--------|
| Owner | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| UserAdmin | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| OrgAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| OrgUserAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
Internal discussion:
https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359
## Audit logs
Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR.
Builds on top of https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25794
Adds a new `provider_disabled` error classification in `chatd` with the
corresponding plumbing to classify it as non-retryable. Also adds a
story for how this particular error kind is displayed in the UI.
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation
RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9)
Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`,
`read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder
`rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously
used in the dbauthz layer.
Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs
owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log
fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role
(including owner) can delete boundary logs.
| Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no |
| Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no |
| Auditor | no | no | yes | no |
| DBPurge | no | no | no | yes |
### Changes
- **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to
`policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants,
and codersdk/TypeScript types.
- **dbauthz authorization**: replace all
`ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with
`ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession`
derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with
`.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create.
- **Role assignments:**
- **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard;
create is inherited from member at user-level.
- **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write
logs they own.
- **Auditor (site):** read.
- `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and
org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with
`ResourceBoundaryUsage`.
- **System subjects:**
- **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can
remove boundary logs.
- **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in
the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing
ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access.
- **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`,
`boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum
values to `api_key_scope`.
- **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching
owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied),
`BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace
agent lookups for owner derivation.
- **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and
frontend type definitions.
---------
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
_Disclosure:_ _produced_ _with_ _Claude_ _Opus_ _4\.7_
AI Gateway only supports Anthropic (+Bedrock), OpenAI, and Copilot providers at present. All other types (Vercel, Gemini, etc) will be mapped to OpenAI since they support OpenAI-compatible endpoints.
Add a Postgres trigger and matching codersdk constants that cap each
user's secrets in four dimensions: count (50), total stored value bytes
(200 KiB), env-injected stored value bytes (24 KiB), and env name length
(256 bytes). Without these caps a user could overflow the 4 MiB DRPC
agent manifest, the ~32 KiB Windows process env
block, or Linux/macOS ARG_MAX at workspace start. The trigger is the
source of truth on aggregates; the handler maps its check_violation
error into a 400 that names the per-user budget in stored
(post-encryption) bytes. A handler test exercises off-by-one at each cap
across POST and PATCH, plus per-user budget isolation.
Generated with help from Coder Agents.
## Summary
Routes chatd model calls backed by concrete AI Provider rows through the
in-process aibridge transport by default, with deployment options to use
direct provider routing when AI Gateway is disabled or chat AI Gateway
routing is disabled.
- Splits model routing into common, direct provider, and AI Gateway
paths behind a single deployment-mode entry point.
- Builds chatd models through explicit request, route, and options data.
Active API key attribution is passed explicitly instead of being hidden
inside generic model construction.
- For AI Gateway BYOK routes, resolves the user's provider key in chatd,
forwards it through provider-specific auth headers, and sets
`X-Coder-AI-Governance-Token` to the `delegated` marker so aibridge
preserves those headers while still stripping Coder-specific metadata.
- Keeps central provider credentials and deployment fallback credentials
out of forwarded provider auth headers, so AI Gateway central policy
remains authoritative.
- Redacts delegated provider auth from default string formatting to
avoid accidental plaintext logging of user BYOK credentials.
- Covers selected chat models, advisor overrides, title and quickgen
paths, subagent overrides, computer use model selection, and an
integration-style chat turn through the aibridge transport path.
- Persists initiating API key IDs on chat and queued user messages,
including subagent child messages, and fails closed for AI
Gateway-routed model builds without an active key.
- Removes unused `api_key_id` indexes while keeping the persistence
columns and foreign keys.
- Keeps the deployment option available through config and env parsing,
but hides it from CLI help and generated docs.
- Stabilizes the subagent poll fallback test so background CreateChat
processing cannot win the state transition under slower CI environments.
## Tests
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run
'TestAIGatewayProviderAuthForUser|TestAIGatewayProviderAuthRedactsFormatting|TestResolveModelRouteForConfigAIGatewayProviderAuth|TestAIGatewayModelForwardsProviderAuth|TestProcessChat_AIGatewayRoutingUsesDelegatedAPIKey|TestAwaitSubagentCompletion'
-count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/aibridged -run
'TestServeHTTP_DelegatedAPIKey|TestServeHTTP_StripCoderToken' -count=1`
- `git diff --check HEAD~1..HEAD`
- `make lint`
> Mux working on behalf of Mike.
Replace the env-based `BuildProviders` with a DB-backed loader. The database is now the single source of truth for runtime provider configuration; env config arrives via `SeedAIProvidersFromEnv` (run at boot) and `BuildProviders` reads it back as `aibridge.Provider` instances. `cli/server.go` and `enterprise/cli/server.go` both call the same path, so aibridged and aibridgeproxyd see the same provider set.
Per-provider `DumpDir` is replaced by a top-level `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_DUMP_DIR` base; each provider's effective dump path is `<base>/<provider name>`.
Normalize program names in shellparse.Parse to their basename.
Does not rely on filepath.Base because the server may run on either
Linux or Windows where the behavior would differ.
Closes CODAGT-470
My agent added `//nolint:testpackage` to a test file on one of my PRs.
Again. This PR cleans it up across the entire repo and updates the
in-repo conventions so future agents stop doing it.
The repo already has a precedent for white-box tests that need to touch
unexported symbols: `*_internal_test.go` (145+ existing files). The
`testpackage` linter's default `skip-regexp` exempts that filename
suffix, so the `//nolint:testpackage` directive is unnecessary in every
case where someone reached for it. This PR renames 51 such files to
`*_internal_test.go` via `git mv` so blame and history follow, and
strips the dead directive from 2 files that were already correctly named
(`coderd/oauth2provider/authorize_internal_test.go`,
`coderd/x/chatd/advisor_internal_test.go`).
`.claude/docs/TESTING.md` now documents the rule explicitly under *Test
Package Naming*, which is imported into the root `AGENTS.md` via
`@.claude/docs/TESTING.md`. The rule: prefer `package foo_test`; if you
need internal access, rename the file to `*_internal_test.go` rather
than adding a nolint directive.
`CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ENABLED` / `CODER_AIBRIDGE_ENABLED` is now being defaulted to `true` now that it will be used by Coder Agents.
If you previously had this value disabled explicitly, that value will persist.
Danielle Maywood