Reverts coder/coder#26239
We cannot disable a feature which was previously enabled; this is a BC
break.
This is also using `AIGatewayRoutingEnabled` which will be removed in
the next release.
Problem: CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ENABLED defaulted to true, which both started
the in-memory gateway and enabled the licensed FeatureAIBridge. As a
result, deployments that never configured AI Gateway saw a spurious "AI
Governance add-on is required" warning whenever they had an older
(non-add-on) Premium license, since the feature was enabled-and-entitled
by default.
Fix: Decouple "external AI Gateway API enabled" from "in-memory daemon
running," so the external/licensed surface is off by default while Coder
Agents retain access by default.
Resolves the issue of `--prompt-ephemeral-parameters` and
`--ephemeral-parameter` not being available for use in the `coder
create` workspace creation command (they are only available in `coder
start` command). Back when they were [added
originally](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/15030) it seems to have
been an oversight that they were left out.
The problem this solves:
```
coder create --parameter my_ephemeral_parameter=foo
error: prepare build: ephemeral parameter "my_ephemeral_parameter" can be used only with --prompt-ephemeral-parameters or --ephemeral-parameter flag
```
```
coder create my-test-ws -t general --ephemeral-parameter my_ephemeral_parameter=foo
parsing flags ([create my-test-ws -t general --ephemeral-parameter my_ephemeral_parameter=foo]) for "coder create": unknown flag: --ephemeral-parameter
```
Tested on a template with the following:
```
data "coder_parameter" "my_ephemeral_parameter" {
name = "my_ephemeral_parameter"
type = "bool"
description = "true or false?"
mutable = true
default = false
ephemeral = true
}
resource "coder_env" "debug_ephemeral" {
agent_id = coder_agent.main.id
name = "EPHEMERAL_TEST"
value = data.coder_parameter.my_ephemeral_parameter.value
}
```
By running:
```
➜ coder git:(rowan/coder-create-5495) ✗ go run cmd/coder/main.go create --ephemeral-parameter my_ephemeral_parameter=true
> Specify a name for your workspace: ws4
Select a template below to preview the provisioned infrastructure:
? kasmvnc-ubuntu-coder-dev used by 1 active developer
Select a preset below:
? Small (2 CPU / 4 GB)
....
...
The ws4 workspace has been created at Jun 3 12:36:38!
➜ coder git:(rowan/coder-create-5495) ✗ coder ssh ws4
workspace-ws4-5d6994756f-qlwnl% echo $EPHEMERAL_TEST
true
workspace-ws4-5d6994756f-qlwnl% exit
```
Closes [DOCS-256](https://linear.app/coder/issue/DOCS-256). Sibling to
[DOCS-253](https://linear.app/coder/issue/DOCS-253) (#25740).
Updates docs URL references across the non-TypeScript surface of
`coder/coder` to match the current docs site structure. Source-of-truth
for redirects is `coder/coder.com/redirects.json` (parent ticket
[DOCS-209](https://linear.app/coder/issue/DOCS-209)).
## What changed
| Area | Files | URL mapping |
|---|---|---|
| Top-level README | `README.md` | `/docs/workspaces` ->
`/docs/user-guides/workspace-management`, `/docs/templates` ->
`/docs/admin/templates`, `/docs/ides` ->
`/docs/user-guides/workspace-access` |
| Docs source | `docs/admin/security/0001_user_apikeys_invalidation.md`
| `/docs/admin/audit-logs` -> `/docs/admin/security/audit-logs` |
| Docs source | `docs/install/cloud/azure-vm.md` |
`/docs/coder-oss/latest/install` -> `/docs/install` |
| Dogfood | `dogfood/coder/guide.md` | `/docs/ides` ->
`/docs/user-guides/workspace-access` |
| Helm | `helm/coder/values.yaml` | `/docs/admin/workspace-proxies` ->
`/docs/admin/networking/workspace-proxies` |
| Enterprise coderd | `enterprise/coderd/coderd.go` |
`/docs/admin/encryption` -> `/docs/admin/security/database-encryption`
(error message) |
| Release tooling | `scripts/release/main_internal_test.go` |
`/docs/admin/upgrade` -> `/docs/install/upgrade` (test fixture, matches
`generate_release_notes.sh`) |
| AI bridge | `aibridge/client.go` | repinned to current `main` SHA on
renamed `docs/ai-coder/ai-gateway/monitoring.md`, line range `#L47-L57`
|
| Example templates | 12 `examples/templates/*/README.md`,
`examples/parameters/*`,
`examples/parameters-dynamic-options/README.md`,
`examples/workspace-tags/README.md`, `examples/parameters/main.tf`,
`examples/examples.gen.json` (regenerated) | `/docs/workspaces` ->
`/docs/user-guides/workspace-management`, `/docs/templates/parameters`
-> `/docs/admin/templates/extending-templates/parameters`,
`/docs/templates/dev-containers` ->
`/docs/admin/integrations/devcontainers`, `/docs/dotfiles` ->
`/docs/user-guides/workspace-dotfiles`,
`/docs/about/architecture#agents` ->
`/docs/admin/infrastructure/architecture#agents` |
| Live notification templates (DB) | New migration
`000510_fix_dormancy_notification_docs_urls.up.sql` and `.down.sql` plus
the four regenerated SMTP/webhook goldens under
`coderd/notifications/testdata/rendered-templates/` |
`/docs/templates/schedule#dormancy-threshold-enterprise` ->
`/docs/admin/templates/managing-templates/schedule#dormancy-threshold`,
`/docs/templates/schedule#dormancy-auto-deletion-enterprise` ->
`/docs/admin/templates/managing-templates/schedule#dormancy-auto-deletion`
|
The migration uses `REPLACE(body_template, ...)` scoped by template id
and `LIKE '%/docs/templates/schedule%'`, so it works regardless of which
intermediate state (`000232`, `000262`, `000305`, or `000311`) is
currently in the row.
## What did not change
Historical SQL migrations `000232`, `000262`, `000305`, and `000311` are
not modified because migrations are immutable history. The 18 remaining
stale URL references in those files are superseded at runtime by
migration `000510`. This decision matches the pattern used in the A1
sister PR (#25740).
## Verification
- `go test ./coderd/database/migrations/... -count=1` (UP+DOWN)
- `go test ./coderd/notifications/ -run TestNotificationTemplates_Golden
-update -count=1` to regenerate the four `.golden` files
- `go test ./scripts/release/ -run Test_removeMainlineBlurb -count=1`
- `make pre-commit` (gen + fmt + lint + slim build) ran clean as part of
the commit hook
I also fixed a pre-existing emdash on line 35 of
`examples/templates/azure-linux/README.md` that the lint flagged once
the file entered my diff. The line was already in `main`, but `make gen`
rewrites `examples/examples.gen.json` whenever a `README.md` changes, so
the line came back as a `+` in the diff against `origin/main` and the
`lint/emdash` step refused it.
<details>
<summary>Pre-mortem</summary>
| Risk | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Migration overwrites future template edits | Used `REPLACE` instead of
full body overwrite. `WHERE id IN (...) AND body_template LIKE
'%/docs/templates/schedule%'` further scopes the write |
| Goldens drift from migrated body | Regenerated goldens via `-update`
after the migration was in place, so the goldens reflect the
post-migration state |
| Down migration leaves stale URLs | Down migration reverses the REPLACE
so a rollback restores the prior URLs |
| Fragment loss when redirect strips fragment | Verified the destination
`schedule.md` contains `## Dormancy threshold` and `## Dormancy
auto-deletion` anchors |
| Terraform parse breakage in `examples/parameters/main.tf` | Only
comments changed; Terraform parser is unaffected |
| Test fixtures in `scripts/release` diverging from
`generate_release_notes.sh` | Updated to match the script, which already
emits `/docs/install/upgrade` |
</details>
---
Generated by Coder Agent on behalf of @nickvigilante.
- Adds server-side and client-side validation for
CODER_CONFIGSSH_HOSTNAME_SUFFIX and CODER_SSH_CONFIG_OPTIONS.
- **Server-side breaking change:** invalid values for either of these will cause `coderd` to exit with an error.
- Client-side: `coder config-ssh` will exit with an error if it detects invalid config.
- Adds tests for the above
Local smoke-testing: ran `develop.sh --env-file <path to an env file
containing badness>`. Validated that server startup failed as expected.
> 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents with supervision from a human.
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Relates to
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285/add-user-budget-overrides-table-and-crud-api
Adds audit-log support for `user_ai_budget_override` mutations. Without
it, an admin could quietly change a user's per-user spend cap (e.g. from
`$500` to `$50`), reassign it to a different group, or delete it
entirely with no record of who did it.
Both write (`create-or-update`) and delete actions now generate audit
log entries. Unlike group AI budgets, which only track `spend_limit`,
overrides also track `group_name`: an override can be reassigned to a
different attributed group, so that change needs to show up in the diff.
The raw `spend_limit_micros`, IDs, and timestamps are ignored in favor
of the human-readable `spend_limit` and `group_name`.
Depends on #25439.
## Screenshot
<img width="1343" height="514" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/aee30f58-6e81-435e-9bca-5bc98f49d8d3"
/>
Renames all user-visible "AI Bridge" strings to "AI Gateway" in the
browser UI as part of the AI Bridge to AI Gateway rebrand (AIGOV-233).
Changes:
- Page titles and headings ("AI Bridge Logs" to "AI Gateway Logs",
`pageTitle` calls)
- Help popover title, description, and doc link
- Setup alert title, description, and doc link
- Back-link tooltip on session threads page
- AI add-on help popover text
- License entitlement warning shown in the dashboard banner
Doc links updated from `/ai-coder/ai-bridge` to `/ai-coder/ai-gateway`
(directory already exists).
This PR intentionally does not rename internal identifiers,
file/directory names, API endpoints, routes, CLI help, deployment config
options, or generated types. Those will be tracked separately.
Related to: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-233
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @ssncferreira
## Problem
aibridgeproxyd's HTTP transport (`proxy.Tr`) was configured with secure
TLS defaults only when an upstream proxy was set. Without one, it fell
back to [goproxy's default
transport](https://github.com/elazarl/goproxy/blob/v1.8.0/proxy.go#L152),
which has `InsecureSkipVerify: true`, leaving the connection between the
proxy and aibridge vulnerable to MITM on HTTPS deployments.
This PR moves the secure transport assignment outside the upstream proxy
branch so it applies unconditionally.
## Changes
* Apply secure TLS defaults to `proxy.Tr` unconditionally (verified
`RootCAs`, `MinVersion: TLS 1.2`).
* Add `TestProxy_AIBridgeTLSVerification` to cover the verification path
between the proxy and aibridge.
## Notes
* **Behavior change for `HTTPS_PROXY` env var**: previously, when
`UpstreamProxy` was unset, `proxy.Tr` honored `HTTP_PROXY` and
`HTTPS_PROXY` env vars. After this PR it does not, since MITM'd requests
now always go directly to aibridge. This matches the behavior when
`UpstreamProxy` is configured, which already ignored env vars.
* **HTTPS deployments with a private CA**: when `CoderAccessURL` is
HTTPS and its TLS certificate (or the load balancer's certificate
fronting it) is signed by a CA not in the system trust store, the proxy
will now fail with `x509: certificate signed by unknown authority`.
Closes
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-386/ai-bridge-proxy-uses-goproxy-default-with-tls-verification-disabled
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by
@ssncferreira
## Description
This PR adds Prometheus metrics for aibridge's API-key failover, giving visibility into key pool health and failover behavior per provider.
The following metrics are introduced:
- **`key_pool_state`** (gauge): number of keys currently in each state (`valid`, `temporary`, `permanent`) per provider, sampled at scrape time.
- **`key_pool_state_transitions_total`** (counter): key state transitions during failover, labeled by `reason` (`rate_limited`, `unauthorized`, `forbidden`).
- **`key_pool_exhaustions_total`** (counter): times a pool ran out of usable keys, labeled by `outcome` (`rate_limited`, `auth_failed`).
- **`key_pool_failover_attempts`** (histogram): keys attempted before success or exhaustion (per interception for bridged requests, per request for passthrough).
## Changes
- Moves `MarkKeyOnStatus` and key-pool error handling onto `*keypool.Pool`.
- Attaches metrics to each provider's key pool at install time, on construction and on provider reload.
- Adds a scrape-time state collector and a `KeyPools()` accessor on the bridge pool to feed it.
- Tracks per-request key attempts in the bridged and passthrough failover paths.
- Adds test coverage for the new metrics across the keypool unit tests, the bridged intercept failover tests, and the passthrough failover test.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1447
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-198/aibridge-key-failover-observability
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
Refs #25936.
Adds a configurable per-org default member role set. Unioned into each member's effective roles at read time.
<sub>with Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub>
`TestExecutorAutostartOK` and its sibling positive autostart tests
compute the autobuild tick from
`sched.Next(workspace.LatestBuild.CreatedAt)`, but the server persists
`next_start_at` from the build's completion time. When build creation
and completion straddle the schedule's next fire time, the persisted
value advances past the test's tick, the executor's eligibility query
(`next_start_at <= tick`) drops the workspace, and the test fails with
an empty transitions map. This surfaced in flaky test runs.
Add `coderdtest.NextAutostartTick(t, workspace)` which returns
`*workspace.NextStartAt`, and use it across the affected positive
autostart paths in `coderd/autobuild`, `coderd`, and
`enterprise/coderd`.
Generated with assistance from Coder Agents.
<!-- Authored by Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk. -->
Refs
[PLAT-217](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-217/rfc-for-gateway-accounts).
Extracts an `organization-workspace-access` role so workspace elevation
can be split off the organization-member floor without changing
behavior.
- New role holds the workspace-side resources currently granted by
`organization-member`.
- The `MinimumImplicitMember` floor preserves the existing behavior
until #26027 shrinks it.
- Prebuilds orchestrator inserts memberships via
`dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted` and no longer needs `OrganizationMember` or
`AssignOrgRole` grants.
<details><summary>Agent context</summary>
- `coderd/rbac/roles.go`: `OrgWorkspaceAccessMemberPerms()` grants
`Workspace`, `WorkspaceDormant`, `File` (Create+Read),
`ProvisionerDaemon` (Create+Read), and `Task`. Deliberate omissions
(`Template`, `Group`, `WorkspaceProxy`, etc.) are documented inline.
- `coderd/rbac/roles_test.go`: `orgWorkspaceAccessUser` is added to
`requiredSubjects`. `UserProvisionerDaemons` is split into
`UserProvisionerDaemonsCreate` and `UserProvisionerDaemonsUpdateDelete`
because the new role grants Create+Read only and the test framework
requires uniform pass/fail per case.
- `codersdk/rbacroles.go`: exposes `RoleOrganizationWorkspaceAccess`.
- `enterprise/coderd/prebuilds/membership.go`:
`InsertOrganizationMember` runs under `dbauthz.AsSystemRestricted`. The
orchestrator never acts with the elevation role; the membership row only
exists so prebuilt workspaces have a valid owner.
- `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz.go`: drops the now-dead
`OrganizationMember` and `AssignOrgRole` permissions from the
prebuilds-orchestrator role and the orchestrator's entry in
`assignRoles`.
</details>
---
<sub>Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub>
Fixes an issue where sub-agent apps created via CreateSubAgent would
bypass the check for the template's max port sharing level:
- Clamps dynamically inserted `workspace_apps` to the template max
sharing level in `coderd.agentapi.SubAgentAPI`.
- Emits a warning when clamping occurs.
- Adds unit test coverage for the max sharing level matrix.
- Adds an integration-ish test through the devcontainer sub-agent client
path.
> 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents with guidance from a human.
## Problem
The OIDC callback checks `email_verified` via a Go type assertion
(`verifiedRaw.(bool)`). When an IdP returns the claim as a string
(`"false"`), a number, or omits it entirely, the assertion fails
silently and the email is implicitly treated as verified. Several real
IdPs (SAML-to-OIDC bridges, certain Azure AD B2C configurations) emit
string-typed booleans, making this reachable in practice.
## Fix
Add `coerceEmailVerified()` to handle `bool`, `string`
(`"true"`/`"false"`/`"1"`/`"0"` via `strconv.ParseBool`), `float64`,
`json.Number`, and `int`/`int64` variants. Rewrite the check to be
fail-closed: an absent claim, an unrecognized type, or any non-truthy
value is treated as unverified and rejected. The existing
`IgnoreEmailVerified` config option remains as an escape hatch.
Fixes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-228
> Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com) by @f0ssel
<details><summary>Implementation plan</summary>
### Production code (`coderd/userauth.go`)
- Added `encoding/json` import
- Added `coerceEmailVerified(v interface{}) (verified bool, ok bool)`
helper near EOF
- Replaced the type-assertion block (lines ~1342-1363) with fail-closed
logic that uses `coerceEmailVerified`
### Unit tests (`coderd/userauth_internal_test.go`, new file)
- Table-driven test covering: `bool`, `string` (`"true"`, `"false"`,
`"1"`, `"0"`, `"TRUE"`, `"t"`, `"f"`, `"invalid"`, `""`), `json.Number`,
`float64`, `int`, `int64`, `nil`, `[]string{}`, `map[string]string{}`
### Integration tests (`coderd/userauth_test.go`,
`coderd/users_test.go`)
- Added 3 new test cases: `EmailVerifiedMissingIgnored` (200),
`EmailVerifiedAsStringTrue` (200), `EmailVerifiedAsStringFalse` (403)
- Updated existing test cases that omitted `email_verified` and expected
success to include `"email_verified": true`
### FakeIDP (`coderd/coderdtest/oidctest/idp.go`)
- `encodeClaims` now defaults `email_verified` to `true` (like `exp`,
`aud`, `iss`) so tests that don't care about the verification flow are
unaffected
</details>
When a Premium deployment has no AI Governance addon but has accumulated
`ai_seat_state` rows (from prior Gateway testing or Task usage), the
backend emitted an error in the `LicenseBanner`: "Your deployment has N
active AI Governance seats but the license is not entitled to this
feature." This is alarming and inactionable for customers who never
purchased the addon.
Suppress the `EntitlementNotEntitled` case that appended to
`entitlements.Errors`. Customers who purchased AI Governance still see
all their seat-limit warnings (90% threshold, over-limit, grace period)
since those are gated on `entitled` / `grace_period` and are unaffected.
Fixes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-392
> Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @SasSwart
Renames the `coder boundary` CLI subcommand to `coder agent-firewall` as
part of the Boundaries → Agent Firewall rebrand.
`coder boundary` is retained as a hidden, deprecated alias that prints a
deprecation notice to stderr before running. Both commands use separate
builder functions backed by the same boundary base command and license
verification logic.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-236
<details><summary>Implementation notes</summary>
**Approach:** Two separate `*serpent.Command` objects (not `Aliases`) so
the deprecated `boundary` path can print a stderr warning while
`agent-firewall` stays clean.
**Changes:**
- `enterprise/cli/boundary.go`: Split old `boundary()` into
`buildAgentFirewallCmd()` and `buildBoundaryAliasCmd()`. Error messages
in `verifyLicense` now reference "agent-firewall".
- `enterprise/cli/root.go`: Register both commands.
- `cli/root.go`: Update YAML-only option validation bypass for the new
command name.
- Tests: Rename to `TestAgentFirewallSubcommand`, add
`TestBoundaryAlias`, update license verification tests to use
`agent-firewall`.
- Golden files and CLI reference docs regenerated.
- `docs/ai-coder/agent-firewall/version.md` and `docs/manifest.json`
updated.
</details>
> Generated with [Coder Agents](https://coder.com/agents) by @SasSwart
Cleans the last few instances of ExpectMatch that didn't use the new `(ctx, ...)` variant, then deletes the deprecated method and renames `ExpectMatchContext` to drop the `Context` suffix.
Relates to CODAGT-115
Adds metric `coderd_api_websocket_probes_total`. Every successful
heartbeat for a given path will increment the metric.
Comparing this with `coderd_api_concurrent_websockets` will give an
indication of how many websocket connections are open but in a 'wedged'
state (when heartbeats stopped versus when we closed the connection).
Adds an optional dbcrypt wrapper around gitsshkeys.private_key. The
column is encrypted on insert and update through enterprise/dbcrypt when
external token encryption is configured, and decrypted on read.
A new private_key_key_id column references
dbcrypt_keys(active_key_digest) so revocation safety is enforced by the
existing foreign key. Rows with a NULL key_id stay plaintext and remain
readable. Existing plaintext rows can be backfilled by running `coder
server dbcrypt rotate`.
Generated with assistance from Coder Agents.
## Summary
Fixes all 9 Windows CI test failures caused by the mise CI refactor
(`fe257666d7`, PR #25727).
### Root cause
`jdx/mise-action` exports `Path` (Windows convention) via `GITHUB_ENV`.
Bash on Windows maintains its own `PATH`. When Go's `os.Environ()`
returns both, `cmd.exe` subprocesses non-deterministically pick the
MSYS-translated `PATH` (forward slashes), causing Windows executables
(`printf`, `powershell.exe`, `cmd.exe`) to be unresolvable.
These failures only appeared on `main` (where `-count=1` forces real
test execution) and were masked on PRs by Go test cache.
### Fixes applied
**CI (`setup-mise` action)**:
- Write both `Path` and `PATH` to `GITHUB_ENV` with Git usr/bin
prepended
**Code (`cli/root.go`)**:
- Add `appendAndDedupEnv` helper that deduplicates case-insensitive env
vars on Windows, preferring native Windows paths (backslashes) over MSYS
paths
**Code (`cli/configssh_windows.go`)**:
- Use absolute paths for `powershell.exe` and `cmd.exe` in the SSH
config `Match exec` escape function, avoiding PATH resolution entirely
**Tests**:
- Switch `--header-command` tests from `printf` to `echo` (cmd.exe
builtin) for reliable cross-platform execution
- Add env dedup in `Test_sshConfigMatchExecEscape` for subprocess PATH
consistency
Fixescoder/internal#1556, coder/internal#1558, coder/internal#1559
> 🤖 Generated by Coder agent, will be reviewed by @mafredri. 🏂🏻
Copilot is the only AI provider type that could not be added through the `/ai/settings` UI. The aibridge runtime and the env-var seeding path already supported it, but the runtime CRUD API rejected `type=copilot` and the UI omitted it entirely. The root cause is that Copilot's auth model (a per-request GitHub OAuth token, with no pre-shared key) does not fit the credential-centric add-provider flow that every other provider uses.
## Backend
Allow `type=copilot` in `CreateAIProviderRequest.Validate()`, and reject `api_keys` for Copilot on both create (validation) and update (handler sentinel), mirroring the existing Bedrock guards. Copilot carries no stored credential.
## Frontend
Add Copilot to the provider type picker (with the `github-copilot.svg` icon) and give the form a credential-free branch: name, display name, and a free-text endpoint defaulting to `https://api.business.githubcopilot.com`, with copy explaining that authentication happens via the user's GitHub token at request time. Copilot maps to the distinct `copilot` wire type rather than collapsing to `openai`, and the edit flow recovers it correctly.
The endpoint stays required with a business-tier default; users on the individual or enterprise endpoints edit the field.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285
Follow the structure established in
https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203
## Summary
Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at
`/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user
spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to
a specific group.
## Schema
```sql
CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides (
user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
spend_limit_micros BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0),
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);
```
## Membership lifecycle
The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed
group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be
expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) →
group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow
foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two
mechanisms:
- **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table
(`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE`
function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries
`group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group
memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from
`organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate
is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to
a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by
any future table that needs the same check.
- **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership
loss:
- `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on
`group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC
sync).
- `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on
`organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership
lives in `organization_members`.
The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade
on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through
`group_members`).
## Authorization
The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for
writes) `Group` resources:
| Operation | User resource | Group resource |
|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| `GET` | `ActionRead` | — |
| `PUT` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` |
| `DELETE` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` |
For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to
learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks.
### Role matrix
| Role | GET | PUT | DELETE |
|--------------|-----|-----|--------|
| Owner | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| UserAdmin | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
| OrgAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
| OrgUserAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
Internal discussion:
https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359
## Audit logs
Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR.
_Disclosure: created with Coder Agents._
When providers are disabled, we should serve a sentinel error so the
requesting client (Claude Code, Coder Agents, etc) is informed. Coder
Agents can also conditionalize its display to show a helpful error
message.
---------
Signed-off-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add metrics for `aibridged` and `aibridgeproxyd`'s provider statuses. AI providers can be modified, and possibly misconfigured, at runtime. These metrics help operators understand the state of these provider definitions in case unexpected behaviour is observed.
Refactors the `aibridgeproxyd` provider reload mechanism which was unnecessarily complex.
Also ensures that providers are evaluated on each CONNECT request to prevent interception of requests to (newly) disabled providers; in this case the requests will passthrough unencrypted, by design.
Fake agents now fetch their manifest, spawn a single per-agent metadata
goroutine, and emit batched BatchUpdateMetadata calls with 3072-byte
base64 payloads so scaletest runs mirror the load shape of real agents.
This matches what the current scaletest workspace template does for
metadata. In the future we can extend the harness here to take in a
config option for the metadata payload size.
---------
Signed-off-by: Callum Styan <callumstyan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mux <mux@coder.com>
Previously the in-process aibridge daemon and the enterprise aibridgeproxy daemon both snapshotted their provider routing once at boot. Any `ai_providers` or `ai_provider_keys` mutation required a restart for either to pick it up.
Add an `ai_providers_changed` pubsub channel that the CRUD handlers publish on after Create / Update / Delete. Both daemons subscribe:
- **aibridged** rebuilds its `[]aibridge.Provider` snapshot via `BuildProviders` and swaps it into the pool atomically. Inflight requests keep serving against the bridge they already acquired; new acquires build against the new snapshot. Per-provider construction errors stay scoped to the offending row.
- **aibridgeproxyd** rebuilds its routing snapshot from `GetAIProviders` and swaps the host→provider map atomically. The MITM listener picks up new providers without restart.
DB read for aibridgeproxyd uses the existing `AsAIProviderMetadataReader` subject for routing-only access.
Adds an end-to-end enterprise CLI test to ensure legacy AI provider keys seeded at server startup are encrypted at rest when DBCrypt external token encryption is enabled, preventing regressions related to #25699.
> Partially implemented by Coder Agents, and massaged afterwards by me.
## Summary
Routes chatd model calls backed by concrete AI Provider rows through the
in-process aibridge transport by default, with deployment options to use
direct provider routing when AI Gateway is disabled or chat AI Gateway
routing is disabled.
- Splits model routing into common, direct provider, and AI Gateway
paths behind a single deployment-mode entry point.
- Builds chatd models through explicit request, route, and options data.
Active API key attribution is passed explicitly instead of being hidden
inside generic model construction.
- For AI Gateway BYOK routes, resolves the user's provider key in chatd,
forwards it through provider-specific auth headers, and sets
`X-Coder-AI-Governance-Token` to the `delegated` marker so aibridge
preserves those headers while still stripping Coder-specific metadata.
- Keeps central provider credentials and deployment fallback credentials
out of forwarded provider auth headers, so AI Gateway central policy
remains authoritative.
- Redacts delegated provider auth from default string formatting to
avoid accidental plaintext logging of user BYOK credentials.
- Covers selected chat models, advisor overrides, title and quickgen
paths, subagent overrides, computer use model selection, and an
integration-style chat turn through the aibridge transport path.
- Persists initiating API key IDs on chat and queued user messages,
including subagent child messages, and fails closed for AI
Gateway-routed model builds without an active key.
- Removes unused `api_key_id` indexes while keeping the persistence
columns and foreign keys.
- Keeps the deployment option available through config and env parsing,
but hides it from CLI help and generated docs.
- Stabilizes the subagent poll fallback test so background CreateChat
processing cannot win the state transition under slower CI environments.
## Tests
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run
'TestAIGatewayProviderAuthForUser|TestAIGatewayProviderAuthRedactsFormatting|TestResolveModelRouteForConfigAIGatewayProviderAuth|TestAIGatewayModelForwardsProviderAuth|TestProcessChat_AIGatewayRoutingUsesDelegatedAPIKey|TestAwaitSubagentCompletion'
-count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/aibridged -run
'TestServeHTTP_DelegatedAPIKey|TestServeHTTP_StripCoderToken' -count=1`
- `git diff --check HEAD~1..HEAD`
- `make lint`
> Mux working on behalf of Mike.
## Problem
Two related symptoms of the same architectural issue: the `dbcrypt`
wrapper is installed inside `enterprise/coderd.New`, so any access to
`options.Database` that happens before `newAPI` runs bypasses
encryption.
**Symptom 1 (reads):** Provider keys added via the admin UI are
encrypted at rest. `BuildProviders` was running *before* `newAPI`,
against the unwrapped store, so the ciphertext was read as-is and shoved
into the keypool as the upstream credential. Anthropic/OpenAI reject it,
and the interception log shows:
```
coderd.aibridged.pool: interception failed ... error="all configured keys failed authentication"
credential_kind=centralized credential_hint=PaPb...4A== credential_length=184
```
**Symptom 2 (writes):** `SeedAIProvidersFromEnv` was also running before
`newAPI`, against the unwrapped store, so env-derived keys
(`CODER_AIBRIDGE_OPENAI_KEY`, indexed `CODER_AIBRIDGE_PROVIDER_<N>_KEY`,
etc.) landed in `ai_provider_keys` as plaintext with `ApiKeyKeyID =
null` even when `CODER_EXTERNAL_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEYS` was set.
## Fix
Move both `SeedAIProvidersFromEnv` and `BuildProviders` to after
`newAPI`, where `options.Database` is the dbcrypt-wrapped store. Writes
encrypt correctly; reads decrypt correctly.
The enterprise closure (`enterprise/cli/server.go`) runs *inside*
`newAPI` and calls `BuildProviders` for the aibridgeproxyd at that
point. Once the agpl seed moves to after `newAPI`, the proxy on first
boot would see no env-seeded providers. Add a matching seed call inside
the enterprise closure before its `BuildProviders` to cover that case.
Seeding is idempotent, so the agpl-side seed running again post-`newAPI`
is a no-op when the rows already exist.
## Known shortcomings
The clean version of this fix would just inherit `ctx` like every other
startup step and place these calls naturally. It can't, for two reasons
that are both about the surrounding handler architecture rather than
this change:
1. **`dbcrypt` wrapping is positioned inside `newAPI`, not around
`options.Database` at creation.** That's why both seed and build have to
wait until after `newAPI` in the first place. The principled fix is to
install the wrapper at the point the store is created (behind a hook the
enterprise build supplies), so every consumer sees a single
authoritative view and the ordering stops mattering. This would also
collapse the duplicated seed call back to a single site.
2. **The handler's shutdown sequence is not deferred.**
`coderAPICloser.Close()` and the other teardown steps run only if
control reaches the `select` at the bottom of the handler. An early
`return` from anywhere in Phase 1 (e.g. seed/build returning
`context.Canceled` when the user hits ctrl-c during startup) skips that
block and orphans all the goroutines `newAPI` spawned — tailnet workers,
gitsync, telemetry batcher, etc. `goleak` then catches them at package
teardown and `TestServer_TelemetryDisabled_FinalReport` fails. Moving
the shutdown into deferred closers (with a `sync.Once`-guarded close to
avoid double-close from the explicit Phase 2 call) is the principled
fix.
For this PR I took the smallest change that fixes the reported bugs: a
detached context (`context.WithoutCancel(ctx)` + a 30s timeout) at the
seed and build call sites in both the agpl and enterprise paths. It lets
the calls complete even if the user cancels during startup, after which
the handler reaches its shutdown select naturally and tears down through
Phase 2. Both shortcomings above are worth addressing separately.
## Test plan
- `make test RUN=TestServer_TelemetryDisabled_FinalReport` with `-race`;
passes locally with `-count=3`.
- Manually verified on a deployment with
`CODER_EXTERNAL_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEYS` set and env-configured providers:
`ai_provider_keys.api_key_key_id` is populated, `api_key` is base64
ciphertext, and upstream auth succeeds.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the env-based `BuildProviders` with a DB-backed loader. The database is now the single source of truth for runtime provider configuration; env config arrives via `SeedAIProvidersFromEnv` (run at boot) and `BuildProviders` reads it back as `aibridge.Provider` instances. `cli/server.go` and `enterprise/cli/server.go` both call the same path, so aibridged and aibridgeproxyd see the same provider set.
Per-provider `DumpDir` is replaced by a top-level `CODER_AI_GATEWAY_DUMP_DIR` base; each provider's effective dump path is `<base>/<provider name>`.
We weren't stripping the API base (`/api/v2/aibridge`), leading to 404s
when using the in-memory transport.
Signed-off-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
Since AI Gateway is now enabled by default, and if the AI Gateway Proxy is enabled too it's possible the server can start without any configured providers. This would previously block startup, which is unacceptable.
In an upstack PR we will handle reloading the providers at runtime, so the server needs to be able to start up even if it can't handle any proxy requests to AI Gateway.
This change was necessitated because if there are providers configured in the environment they need to be seeded _before_ the proxy starts.
In order to allow Coder Agents to use AI Gateway in OSS, we need to rehome the `aibridged`\-related code into the AGPL path.
The HTTP API is only registered under enterprise so will still require the AI Governance Add-on to be present in order to use it, whereas Coder Agents uses an in-memory pipe to the same handlers.
`CODER_AI_GATEWAY_ENABLED` / `CODER_AIBRIDGE_ENABLED` is now being defaulted to `true` now that it will be used by Coder Agents.
If you previously had this value disabled explicitly, that value will persist.
_Disclaimer: implemented by a Coder Agent using Claude Opus 4.7_
Part of the implementation of [RFC: Common AI Provider Configs](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/RFC-Common-AI-Provider-Configs-34bd579be59280ed958feffb82024797) (AIGOV-201).
## Note
This change can cause a previously working installation to fail to start should a conflict exist between the providers configured in the environment & those now migrated to the database.
I'll raise a PR upstack to document this process and workarounds should a startup fail.
## What this PR does
Reconciles environment-derived AI provider configuration with the `ai_providers` table at server startup. The seed runs **before** the aibridged daemon is initialized, so the runtime always reads providers from the database; the legacy `CODER_AIBRIDGE_*` environment variables become a one-shot migration source.
### Behavior
- Concurrent server starts are serialized through a Postgres advisory lock (`LockIDAIProvidersEnvSeed`).
- Missing rows are inserted with an audit entry attributed to the system actor.
- Existing rows whose canonical hash matches the env-derived hash are left alone (the common no-op restart path).
- Existing rows whose canonical hash does **not** match cause server startup to fail with a descriptive error so the operator can explicitly resolve the conflict in either env or DB.
- Soft-deleted rows are NOT resurrected from env; an explicit operator deletion is sticky across restarts.
- Indexed providers whose name conflicts with a legacy env var fail startup with a clear remediation message.
- Unknown provider types (e.g. `copilot`, until the DB enum is widened) are skipped with a log entry rather than failing startup.
### Canonical hashing
The `canonicalAIProvider` shape captures exactly the fields that determine runtime behavior — `type`, `base_url`, and the Bedrock subset of settings (access key, access key secret, region, model, small fast model) — and is hashed with SHA-256. The hash is **computed on demand from the row + env**, never persisted, so the database does not need a new column for it. API keys live in the separate `ai_provider_keys` table and are intentionally excluded from the hash so operators can rotate keys via the API without forcing a server restart.
<details>
<summary>Decision log</summary>
- The hash is intentionally not persisted in the database. The RFC discussed this trade-off; computing on demand keeps the schema minimal and lets the canonical shape evolve without a migration.
- The lock uses an `iota` slot in `coderd/database/lock.go` rather than `GenLockID` so it's stable, easy to audit, and matches the convention used for every other startup lock.
- A bearer-token Anthropic provider whose env vars also set Bedrock metadata but no AWS credentials does NOT store the Bedrock fields. Without credentials the discriminated settings would misrepresent the row as Bedrock auth.
- We deliberately do NOT publish to the `ai_providers_changed` pubsub channel from the seed because the seed completes before any subscriber is started; the follow-up PR introduces that channel.
</details>
Danny Kopping