The experimental functions in `golang.org/x/exp/slices` are now
available in the standard library since Go 1.21.
Reference: https://go.dev/doc/go1.21#slices
Signed-off-by: Eng Zer Jun <engzerjun@gmail.com>
Using negative permissions, this role prevents a user's ability to
create & delete a workspace within a given organization.
Workspaces are uniquely owned by an org and a user, so the org has to
supercede the user permission with a negative permission.
# Use case
Organizations must be able to restrict a member's ability to create a
workspace. This permission is implicitly granted (see
https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16546#issuecomment-2655437860).
To revoke this permission, the solution chosen was to use negative
permissions in a built in role called `WorkspaceCreationBan`.
# Rational
Using negative permissions is new territory, and not ideal. However,
workspaces are in a unique position.
Workspaces have 2 owners. The organization and the user. To prevent
users from creating a workspace in another organization, an [implied
negative
permission](https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/36d9f5ddb3d98029fee07d004709e1e51022e979/coderd/rbac/policy.rego#L172-L192)
is used. So the truth table looks like: _how to read this table
[here](https://github.com/coder/coder/blob/36d9f5ddb3d98029fee07d004709e1e51022e979/coderd/rbac/README.md#roles)_
| Role (example) | Site | Org | User | Result |
|-----------------|------|------|------|--------|
| non-org-member | \_ | N | YN\_ | N |
| user | \_ | \_ | Y | Y |
| WorkspaceBan | \_ | N | Y | Y |
| unauthenticated | \_ | \_ | \_ | N |
This new role, `WorkspaceCreationBan` is the same truth table condition
as if the user was not a member of the organization (when doing a
workspace create/delete). So this behavior **is not entirely new**.
<details>
<summary>How to do it without a negative permission</summary>
The alternate approach would be to remove the implied permission, and
grant it via and organization role. However this would add new behavior
that an organizational role has the ability to grant a user permissions
on their own resources?
It does not make sense for an org role to prevent user from changing
their profile information for example. So the only option is to create a
new truth table column for resources that are owned by both an
organization and a user.
| Role (example) | Site | Org |User+Org| User | Result |
|-----------------|------|------|--------|------|--------|
| non-org-member | \_ | N | \_ | \_ | N |
| user | \_ | \_ | \_ | \_ | N |
| WorkspaceAllow | \_ | \_ | Y | \_ | Y |
| unauthenticated | \_ | \_ | \_ | \_ | N |
Now a user has no opinion on if they can create a workspace, which feels
a little wrong. A user should have the authority over what is theres.
There is fundamental _philosophical_ question of "Who does a workspace
belong to?". The user has some set of autonomy, yet it is the
organization that controls it's existence. A head scratcher 🤔
</details>
## Will we need more negative built in roles?
There are few resources that have shared ownership. Only
`ResourceOrganizationMember` and `ResourceGroupMember`. Since negative
permissions is intended to revoke access to a shared resource, then
**no.** **This is the only one we need**.
Classic resources like `ResourceTemplate` are entirely controlled by the
Organization permissions. And resources entirely in the user control
(like user profile) are only controlled by `User` permissions.
![Uploading Screenshot 2025-02-26 at 22.26.52.png…]()
---------
Co-authored-by: Jaayden Halko <jaayden.halko@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: ケイラ <mckayla@hey.com>
resolvescoder/internal#392
In situations where a user accesses the org members without any
permissions beyond that of a normal member, they will only be able to
see themselves in the list of members.
This PR shows a warning to users who arrive at the members page in this
situation.
<img width="1145" alt="Screenshot 2025-02-26 at 18 36 59"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/16ad6ce1-2aa9-4719-bdae-914aff0fcd52"
/>
There is still some points to be aligned related to provisioners. I'm
going to rollback the latest changes until we are more confident on the
design changes so we don't block releases.
<img width="1512" alt="Screenshot 2025-02-25 at 13 46 35"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4bb3719c-4659-4442-b7b7-b647a9c0a916"
/>
Closes [this issue](https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/393)
This PR adds the`<RequirePermissions />` component to the following
routes:
- _/organizations/\<org\>/roles_
- _/organizations/\<org\>/roles/create_
Third and final PR to address
https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16230.
This PR enables GitHub OAuth2 login by default on new deployments.
Combined with https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/16629, this will allow
the first admin user to sign up with GitHub rather than email and
password.
We take care not to enable the default on deployments that would upgrade
to a Coder version with this change.
To disable the default provider an admin can set the
`CODER_OAUTH2_GITHUB_DEFAULT_PROVIDER` env variable to false.
Second PR to address https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16230. See
the issue for more context and discussion.
It adds a "Continue with GitHub" button to the `/setup` page, so the
deployment's admin can sign up with it. It also removes the "Username"
and "Full Name" fields to make signing up with email faster. In the
email flow, the username is now auto-generated based on the email, and
full name is left empty.
<img width="1512" alt="Screenshot 2025-02-21 at 17 51 22"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7c6986b-c05e-458b-bb01-c3aea3b74c0e"
/>
There's a separate, follow up issue to visually align the `/setup` page
with the new design system: https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16653
Niche edge case, assumes access_token is jwt.
Some `access_token`s are JWT's with potential useful claims.
These claims would be nearly equivalent to `user_info` claims.
This is not apart of the oauth spec, so this feature should not be
loudly advertised. If using this feature, alternate solutions are preferred.
Provisioner key permissions were never any different than provisioners.
Merging them for a cleaner permission story until they are required (if
ever) to be seperate.
This removed `ResourceProvisionerKey` from RBAC and just uses the
existing `ResourceProvisioner`.
- Add deleted column to organizations table
- Add trigger to check for existing workspaces, templates, groups and
members in a org before allowing the soft delete
---------
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <stevenmasley@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <Emyrk@users.noreply.github.com>
First PR in a series to address
https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16230.
Introduces support for logging in via the [GitHub OAuth2 Device
Flow](https://docs.github.com/en/apps/oauth-apps/building-oauth-apps/authorizing-oauth-apps#device-flow).
It's previously been possible to configure external auth with the device
flow, but it's not been possible to use it for logging in. This PR
builds on the existing support we had to extend it to sign ins.
When a user clicks "sign in with GitHub" when device auth is configured,
they are redirected to the new `/login/device` page, which makes the
flow possible from the client's side. The recording below shows the full
flow.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/90c06f1f-e42f-43e9-a128-462270c80fdd
I've also manually tested that it works for converting from
password-based auth to oauth.
Device auth can be enabled by a deployment's admin by setting the
`CODER_OAUTH2_GITHUB_DEVICE_FLOW` env variable or a corresponding config
setting.
Underscores and double hyphens are now blocked. The regex is almost the
exact same as the `coder_app` `slug` regex, but uppercase characters are
still permitted.
ケイラ