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401aa58eebe422c27aa13ea54d38e81f256d3c53
490
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jon Ayers
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401aa58eeb | feat: add schema changes for autostop notification (#26417) | ||
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Sas Swart
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491a75294e |
feat: GET /api/v2/agent-firewall/sessions/{id} (#24814)
Add a GET endpoint at `/api/v2/agent-firewall/sessions/{id}` that
returns agent firewall session metadata (`id`, `workspace_id`,
`owner_id`, `confined_process`, `started_at`). The handler authorizes
against the `boundary_log` resource with `ActionRead` via dbauthz.
The endpoint is enterprise-only, gated behind the `FeatureBoundary`
entitlement.
The `GetBoundarySessionByID` SQL query JOINs through `workspace_agents`
→ `workspace_resources` → `workspace_builds` → `workspaces` to return
`workspace_id` and `workspace_owner_id` directly, avoiding a separate
query.
Also adds an `owner_id` column to the `boundary_logs` table (migration
000526) with a FK to `users(id)` and a backfill from
`boundary_sessions`. This enables user-scoped RBAC authorization for
`InsertBoundaryLogs` via `.WithOwner()`, ensuring workspace agents can
only insert logs for their own owner.
Depends on #24810
**RBAC behaviour:**
| Role | Result |
|---------|--------|
| Owner | read |
| Auditor | read |
| Member | 404 |
> [!NOTE]
> This PR was authored by Coder Agents.
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Kyle Carberry
|
53a6459ecd |
feat(coderd/database): add chat_context_resources table (#26430)
Adds chat_context_resources: a per-chat pinned copy of the agent context resources a chat is hydrated against. The agent-side table (workspace_agent_context_resources) is last-writer-wins with no history, so a chat copies its resources at hydration/refresh to keep a stable view while the agent drifts. Schema foundation only (no queries/dbauthz/prepareGeneration/SDK yet). chat_id FK ON DELETE CASCADE for cleanup parity; no agent FK so the pin survives agent replacement; PK (chat_id, source); reuses the 000522 enum types. |
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Yevhenii Shcherbina
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b6fcb9a30a |
feat: record cost on aibridge token usages (#26229)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-286/add-interception-cost-calculation-to-aibridge-token-usages Adds spend attribution to AI Gateway. After the upstream response, each token-usage record now captures the user's effective group, the per-token prices in effect at that moment, and a computed cost — so spend is recorded as an immutable, point-in-time snapshot. Concretely, `aibridge_token_usages` gains `effective_group_id`, `input_price_micros`, `output_price_micros`, `cache_read_price_micros`, `cache_write_price_micros`, and `cost_micros`. When a usage record is written, the effective group is resolved (per-user override, else the deployment budget policy), the `(provider, model)` price is looked up and snapshotted onto the row, and cost is computed from the provider-reported token counts. A model that isn't in the price table records its tokens with a `NULL` cost; any *other* resolution failure fails the write, so a `NULL` cost unambiguously means "model not priced" rather than "lookup errored." All values are stored in micro-units (1 unit = 1,000,000 micro-units; Phase 1 assumes USD, so 1 micro-unit = $0.000001). Prices are quoted per million tokens. This also grants the AI Bridge RBAC subject `read` on `ai_model_prices` (the per-interception price lookup needs it; it previously only had `update` for the startup seeder). ## Cost precision Cost is computed per token category as `tokens × price / 1_000_000` with integer division, then the four categories are summed. The division is done **per category** (not once over the summed numerator) on purpose: it keeps the per-category line items summing exactly to the stored total — no "the parts don't add up to the whole" in reporting). Integer division truncates sub-micro-unit fractions. For example, a cheap model at $0.10 per million tokens is a price of `100_000`; 9 tokens cost `9 × 100_000 / 1_000_000 = 900_000 / 1_000_000 = 0` (the true 0.9 micro-units floors to 0). At real list prices this rarely bites — $3/M input is a price of `3_000_000`, so even a single token is 3 micro-units. The per-record under-count is bounded below 1 micro-unit per category, so under $0.000004 total across the four categories, which is acceptable for list-price-based cost approximation. ## Overflow safety `cost_micros` is a `BIGINT` (int64), and the largest intermediate value is a single category's `tokens × price` before division. int64's ceiling is ≈ `9.223e18`. - At a steep $75/M model (price `75_000_000`), overflow would require ~123 billion tokens in one response: `123e9 × 75e6 = 9.225e18`, just over the limit. `122e9` stays under at `9.15e18`. - A realistically maxed-out Opus 4.8 response (≈1M input + 128K output at list prices) costs about $15, with a numerator around `1.5e13` — roughly six orders of magnitude below the ceiling. So overflow is unreachable from real token counts. ### Multi-currency support In the future, we may encounter issues with multi-currency support, especially when dealing with currencies that have very large exchange rates relative to USD, for example: IRR: ~1,300,000 IRR ≈ 1 USD VND: ~26,000 VND ≈ 1 USD For currencies with such large denominations, numeric overflow is technically possible, considering that we have only about six orders of magnitude of headroom before reaching the limit (see above). ## `effective_group_id` has no foreign key `effective_group_id` records the group a spend was attributed to, as an immutable historical fact. It is intentionally **not** a foreign key, so the record survives deletion of the group. Alternatives were considered and rejected: - **`ON DELETE SET NULL`** would mutate an "immutable" record — deleting a group silently erases that interception's attribution and under-counts the group's historical spend. - **`RESTRICT` / `NO ACTION`** would block group deletion entirely (groups are hard-deleted). - **`CASCADE`** would delete spend history when a group is deleted — the worst outcome for an audit record. There is also no insert-time check that the group still exists: the id comes from a budget that was just resolved, meaning it was valid at some point. ## Open question: group name snapshotting Should we also snapshot the group *name* onto each record? Two options: - **Denormalize it now** — readable in historical reports even after a group is deleted, but the snapshot can drift from the current name on rename, raising a "show point-in-time vs. current name" question. - **Postpone until needed** — it's a purely additive column later, and the name is display-only (not correctness-bearing like the price). The cost: names of groups deleted before the column is added can't be backfilled. Leaning toward postponing until a concrete reporting need settles the drift question. |
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Kyle Carberry
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210261b143 |
feat: add chat context pinning storage and push trigger (#26385)
Foundation for the Workspace Context Sources RFC (phase 3). The agent push (#25983) and coderd snapshot storage (#26145) already persist per-agent context snapshots; this PR lands the **chat-side storage** plus the **`agentapi` push trigger** that a follow-up will use to read them. It does **not** touch `chatd` and changes no behavior — nothing wires an implementation yet. ## What changed - Adds four nullable columns to `chats` — `context_aggregate_hash`, `context_dirty_since`, `context_dirty_resources`, and `context_error` — and rebuilds the `chats_expanded` view. - Adds three queries — `SetChatContextSnapshot`, `HydrateAgentChatsContext`, `MarkChatsContextDirtyByAgent` — with `dbauthz` wrappers and `audit` entries. They are store-interface methods covered by a Postgres test (`TestChatContextHydration`). - Adds the `agentapi.ContextDirtyMarker` interface and invokes it inside the `PushContextState` transaction, publishing collected events only after commit. ## Intentionally inert There are **no production callers** of the three queries and **no implementation** wired for `ContextDirtyMarker`, so the push trigger is dormant. This is deliberate: the PR is the durable storage/query foundation only. The actual integration — the `chatd` implementation that hydrates/dirties chats and backs a refresh endpoint, consuming the pinned context in prompt building, the rich SDK types + UI, and retiring the live per-turn pull — lands as a single follow-up PR. Splitting this way keeps the schema/query layer reviewable on its own and keeps the integration whole in one place. Refs #25983, #26145. <details> <summary>Decision log</summary> - **Columns over a side table.** The four `chats` columns are the durable model (accepting the one-time `chats_expanded` view/CTE churn). `last_injected_context` is deliberately left untouched — it is load-bearing for the live per-turn context pull. - **Keep `agentapi`, drop `chatd`.** The earlier revision wired the hydrate/dirty implementation through `chatd` and added a `PUT /chats/{chat}/context` refresh endpoint. Those were removed so this PR is pure foundation; `agentapi` defines the trigger + interface (it does not import `chatd`), and the `chatd` implementation arrives with the full integration. - **No new experiment flag.** The columns are dark and unread by prompt building. - **Authz.** The new query wrappers authorize chat updates under the chat RBAC object / `ResourceChat`, consistent with the existing system chat mutators. </details> --- 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents on behalf of @kylecarbs. |
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Kyle Carberry
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b439b06ee6 |
feat: persist agent-pushed workspace context snapshots in coderd (#26145)
Replaces the v2.10 `PushContextState` stub with a real coderd write path. Phase 1 of the chat-side persistence story; nothing reads these rows yet. Follows [#25983](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25983) and unblocks [CODAGT-569](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-569/enable-agent-api-v210-pushcontextstate-bump-currentminor-wire-coderd). ## What ships ### Schema (`000517_workspace_agent_context.{up,down}.sql`) Two new tables plus `api_key_scope` enum extensions: - `workspace_agent_context_snapshots` (PK `workspace_agent_id` to `workspace_agents(id) ON DELETE CASCADE`): one row per agent, overwritten per push. Holds `version`, `schema_version`, `aggregate_hash`, `snapshot_error`, `received_at`. - `workspace_agent_context_resources` (PK `(workspace_agent_id, source)`): per-resource state. `body_kind` and `status` are `TEXT` + `CHECK` so adding new wire kinds (the RFC's reserved PLUGIN/HOOK/SUBAGENT/COMMAND) is a one-line CHECK update plus a Go switch case. ### SQLC queries (`coderd/database/queries/workspaceagentcontext.sql`) - `UpsertWorkspaceAgentContextSnapshot` - `UpsertWorkspaceAgentContextResource` - `DeleteStaleWorkspaceAgentContextResources` (delete-where-source-not-in) - `GetLatestWorkspaceAgentContextSnapshot` - `ListWorkspaceAgentContextResources` ### Handler (`coderd/agentapi/context.go`) `ContextAPI` is a new sub-API. `PushContextState`: 1. Rejects `schema_version > 1` with a non-`Unimplemented` error so a forward-incompatible agent fails loudly during rollout instead of slipping into the permanent fallback path the `Unimplemented` translation reserves for old coderd deployments. 2. Validates resources: no empty/duplicate sources, every variant maps to a known body kind, every status maps to a known enum value, the `Body` oneof is set (even when status is non-OK, mirroring the wire guarantee so coderd can attribute failures to a known kind). 3. Inside `Database.InTx`, reads the existing snapshot. If the push is not `initial` and `version` is not strictly greater, returns `accepted = false` and leaves stored state untouched. Otherwise upserts the snapshot row, upserts each resource, then runs the stale-source prune so the snapshot and resource rows always agree. 4. Returns `accepted = true` on success. Resource bodies are stored as `protojson(body oneof variant)` in `body JSONB` with `body_kind` as the discriminator. Adding a new field to an existing variant is zero work since `protojson` tolerates new fields; adding a new variant is a CHECK + switch case. ### RBAC + dbauthz - New `ResourceWorkspaceAgentContext` (Create/Read/Update/Delete). - New `SubjectTypeAgentContext` plus `subjectAgentContext` system role and `dbauthz.AsAgentContext` helper. The push handler elevates to this subject; the agent's own role does not get direct write access to the table. - New `workspace_agent_context:*` API key scopes registered in the enum migration; internal-only (not added to `externalLowLevel`). ### Audit These rows are agent-pushed state, not user-authored. They are intentionally not added to `AuditActionMap` and not enumerated in `enterprise/audit/table.go`, matching `boundary_logs`, `workspace_agent_memory_resource_monitor`, etc. `enterprise/audit` tests pass unchanged. ## Tests - `coderd/agentapi/context_test.go`: 12 subtests covering accepts/rejects (schema version, empty/duplicate source, unknown status, missing body), version semantics (stale dropped, same-version replay dropped, `initial=true` overwrites lower version), variant coverage, non-OK status persistence, and the empty-active-set prune case. - `coderd/database/dbauthz/dbauthz_test.go`: 5 `MethodTestSuite` cases covering the new queries. - `coderd/rbac/roles_test.go`: `WorkspaceAgentContext` permission row asserting no human role currently has access. - `coderd/database/migrations/testdata/fixtures/000517_workspace_agent_context.up.sql`: one snapshot + one resource per known body kind plus a non-OK status, so the migration test suite never lands with these tables empty. ## Out of scope (later phases) - Chat hydration (`chats.context_aggregate_hash`, `last_injected_context`). - Dirty-bit fan-out and `PUT /chats/{id}/context`. - Agent-side `POST /api/v0/context/resync` barrier and the `coder exp chat context` CLI. - `codersdk` chat-context wire types and the dashboard Sources drawer. - Removal of the chatd per-turn pull fallback. ## Compat property This is a pure write path. If anything here returns errors the agent's `RunPush` loop backs off, no chat behavior changes, and the workspace keeps behaving exactly like it did before v2.10. <details> <summary>Implementation plan and decision log</summary> Key design calls: 1. **Concurrency**: Accept iff `req.Initial || req.Version > existing.Version`. The strict RFC reading ("version comparison is authoritative") locks restarted agents out because their per-process counter resets to 1; honoring `initial=true` reflects the real reboot reality while still rejecting steady-state replays/out-of-order pushes. 2. **Body encoding**: `protojson` over the oneof variant body proto, stored in JSONB with `body_kind` discriminator. Structured at the API/Go layer, schema-tolerant at the storage layer, and Phase 2 readers round-trip back via `protojson.Unmarshal`. 3. **Schema version rejection**: returns a normal error, not `Unimplemented`. The agent's `RunPush` loop only short-circuits on `Unimplemented`; that escape hatch is reserved for old coderd deployments. A forward-incompatible agent should retry-and-back-off, not flip the connection into permanent fallback. 4. **Validation strictness**: empty sources, duplicate sources, `STATUS_UNSPECIFIED`, and missing `Body` oneof variants are rejected before any write so a misbehaving agent cannot poison the snapshot table. Phase 2 readers can trust every row maps to a known proto variant. </details> _This PR was authored by Coder Agents on Kyle Carberry's behalf._ |
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Sas Swart
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f0ac52e83c |
feat: persist boundary logs (#24812)
Add database persistence to `ReportBoundaryLogs`. On first log for a session, the handler lazy-creates a `boundary_sessions` row, then batch-inserts all `BoundaryLog` entries into `boundary_logs`. Structured logging and usage tracking are preserved. Old boundary clients (no `session_id`) fall back to log-only mode. > [!NOTE] > This PR was authored by Coder Agents. |
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Sas Swart
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e1c7e61eb9 |
feat(coderd): add Agent Firewall correlation columns to aibridge_interceptions (#24817)
Add `agent_firewall_session_id` (UUID NULL) and `agent_firewall_sequence_number` (INT NULL) to `aibridge_interceptions` with a partial index on `agent_firewall_session_id`. No FK to `boundary_sessions` (soft reference, resolved at query time). `RecordInterception` reads the new fields from the proto request (merged in #25884) via `parseOptionalUUID` / `parseOptionalInt32` helpers. > This PR was authored by Coder Agents. |
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Hugo Dutka
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4debd23cbb |
fix: chatd refactor (#26270)
Implements the chatd stabilization RFC. Combines: - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25908 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25923 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26109 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26110 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26111 - https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26112 |
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Yevhenii Shcherbina
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360611ea15 |
feat: audit user AI budget override mutations (#25745)
Relates to https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285/add-user-budget-overrides-table-and-crud-api Adds audit-log support for `user_ai_budget_override` mutations. Without it, an admin could quietly change a user's per-user spend cap (e.g. from `$500` to `$50`), reassign it to a different group, or delete it entirely with no record of who did it. Both write (`create-or-update`) and delete actions now generate audit log entries. Unlike group AI budgets, which only track `spend_limit`, overrides also track `group_name`: an override can be reassigned to a different attributed group, so that change needs to show up in the diff. The raw `spend_limit_micros`, IDs, and timestamps are ignored in favor of the human-readable `spend_limit` and `group_name`. Depends on #25439. ## Screenshot <img width="1343" height="514" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/aee30f58-6e81-435e-9bca-5bc98f49d8d3" /> |
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Steven Masley
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938c2080f3 |
feat: configurable default org member roles (#25994)
Refs #25936. Adds a configurable per-org default member role set. Unioned into each member's effective roles at read time. <sub>with Coder Agents on behalf of @Emyrk.</sub> |
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Zach
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170c33a475 |
feat: encrypt gitsshkeys.private_key at rest via dbcrypt (#25872)
Adds an optional dbcrypt wrapper around gitsshkeys.private_key. The column is encrypted on insert and update through enterprise/dbcrypt when external token encryption is configured, and decrypted on read. A new private_key_key_id column references dbcrypt_keys(active_key_digest) so revocation safety is enforced by the existing foreign key. Rows with a NULL key_id stay plaintext and remain readable. Existing plaintext rows can be backfilled by running `coder server dbcrypt rotate`. Generated with assistance from Coder Agents. |
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Paweł Banaszewski
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f22d4e2cbb |
feat: add ai_gateway_keys table and related RBAC (#25563)
Adds table to store keys that AI Gateway standalone replicas will use to authenticate into Coderd. Also adds RBAC and audit boilerplate. |
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Yevhenii Shcherbina
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1a91d31793 |
feat: add user AI budget override endpoints (#25439)
Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-285 Follow the structure established in https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25203 ## Summary Adds the `user_ai_budget_overrides` table and CRUD API at `/api/v2/users/{user}/ai/budget`. An override sets a custom per-user spend cap that supersedes group-budget resolution, attributing spend to a specific group. ## Schema ```sql CREATE TABLE user_ai_budget_overrides ( user_id UUID PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, spend_limit_micros BIGINT NOT NULL CHECK (spend_limit_micros >= 0), created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(), updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW() ); ``` ## Membership lifecycle The membership invariant — a user must be a member of the attributed group, including when that group is "Everyone" — would naturally be expressed as a composite FK on `(user_id, group_id) → group_members_expanded(user_id, group_id)`. PostgreSQL doesn't allow foreign keys to reference views, so enforcement is split across two mechanisms: - **Write-time check.** A CHECK constraint on the table (`user_ai_budget_overrides_must_be_group_member`) calls a `STABLE` function `is_group_member(user_id, group_id)` that queries `group_members_expanded`. The view surfaces both regular group memberships and the implicit "Everyone" group memberships from `organization_members`. Any INSERT or UPDATE that violates the predicate is rejected with a Postgres `check_violation`, which the handler maps to a 400. `is_group_member` is defined as a general predicate, reusable by any future table that needs the same check. - **Cascade on removal.** Two `BEFORE DELETE` triggers handle membership loss: - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_group_member_delete` on `group_members` — covers regular group removals (admin action, OIDC sync). - `trigger_delete_user_ai_budget_overrides_on_org_member_delete` on `organization_members` — covers the "Everyone" group, whose membership lives in `organization_members`. The single-column FKs on `users(id)` and `groups(id)` remain to cascade on user or group deletion (those paths don't pass through `group_members`). ## Authorization The dbauthz layer gates each operation against the `User` and (for writes) `Group` resources: | Operation | User resource | Group resource | |-----------|----------------|----------------| | `GET` | `ActionRead` | — | | `PUT` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | | `DELETE` | `ActionUpdate` | `ActionUpdate` | For `DELETE`, the dbauthz layer fetches the existing override first to learn the attributed `group_id`, then runs both checks. ### Role matrix | Role | GET | PUT | DELETE | |--------------|-----|-----|--------| | Owner | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | UserAdmin | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | OrgAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | | OrgUserAdmin | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | Internal discussion: https://codercom.slack.com/archives/C096PFVBZKN/p1779392747885359 ## Audit logs Audit logs will be addressed in a follow-up PR. |
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a586b7e5e0 |
feat: add boundary_log rbac resource (#24810)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`, `read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder `rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously used in the dbauthz layer. Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role (including owner) can delete boundary logs. | Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete | |---|---|---|---|---| | Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no | | Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no | | Auditor | no | no | yes | no | | DBPurge | no | no | no | yes | ### Changes - **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to `policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants, and codersdk/TypeScript types. - **dbauthz authorization**: replace all `ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with `ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession` derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with `.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create. - **Role assignments:** - **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard; create is inherited from member at user-level. - **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write logs they own. - **Auditor (site):** read. - `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with `ResourceBoundaryUsage`. - **System subjects:** - **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can remove boundary logs. - **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access. - **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`, `boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum values to `api_key_scope`. - **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied), `BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace agent lookups for owner derivation. - **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and frontend type definitions. --------- Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ethan
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eb2c2799ca |
fix: strip deleted MCP IDs from chats on delete (#25763)
Adds a database migration that reconciles existing stale chat MCP server IDs, then installs a `BEFORE DELETE` trigger on `mcp_server_configs` to remove the deleted ID from `chats.mcp_server_ids`. This keeps chat continuation from failing with `400 One or more MCP server IDs are invalid` after an MCP server config is deleted. This matches the existing repo precedent in `coderd/database/migrations/000241_delete_user_roles.up.sql`, where deleting a custom role cleans `organization_members.roles`, a similarly structured array of references that cannot be protected by a normal foreign key. Closes CODAGT-505 |
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Zach
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47ac4b309a |
feat: enforce per-user limits on user_secrets (#25588)
Add a Postgres trigger and matching codersdk constants that cap each user's secrets in four dimensions: count (50), total stored value bytes (200 KiB), env-injected stored value bytes (24 KiB), and env name length (256 bytes). Without these caps a user could overflow the 4 MiB DRPC agent manifest, the ~32 KiB Windows process env block, or Linux/macOS ARG_MAX at workspace start. The trigger is the source of truth on aggregates; the handler maps its check_violation error into a 400 that names the per-user budget in stored (post-encryption) bytes. A handler test exercises off-by-one at each cap across POST and PATCH, plus per-user budget isolation. Generated with help from Coder Agents. |
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Michael Suchacz
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8b1705eb65 |
feat: route chatd provider traffic through aibridge (#25629)
## Summary Routes chatd model calls backed by concrete AI Provider rows through the in-process aibridge transport by default, with deployment options to use direct provider routing when AI Gateway is disabled or chat AI Gateway routing is disabled. - Splits model routing into common, direct provider, and AI Gateway paths behind a single deployment-mode entry point. - Builds chatd models through explicit request, route, and options data. Active API key attribution is passed explicitly instead of being hidden inside generic model construction. - For AI Gateway BYOK routes, resolves the user's provider key in chatd, forwards it through provider-specific auth headers, and sets `X-Coder-AI-Governance-Token` to the `delegated` marker so aibridge preserves those headers while still stripping Coder-specific metadata. - Keeps central provider credentials and deployment fallback credentials out of forwarded provider auth headers, so AI Gateway central policy remains authoritative. - Redacts delegated provider auth from default string formatting to avoid accidental plaintext logging of user BYOK credentials. - Covers selected chat models, advisor overrides, title and quickgen paths, subagent overrides, computer use model selection, and an integration-style chat turn through the aibridge transport path. - Persists initiating API key IDs on chat and queued user messages, including subagent child messages, and fails closed for AI Gateway-routed model builds without an active key. - Removes unused `api_key_id` indexes while keeping the persistence columns and foreign keys. - Keeps the deployment option available through config and env parsing, but hides it from CLI help and generated docs. - Stabilizes the subagent poll fallback test so background CreateChat processing cannot win the state transition under slower CI environments. ## Tests - `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'TestAIGatewayProviderAuthForUser|TestAIGatewayProviderAuthRedactsFormatting|TestResolveModelRouteForConfigAIGatewayProviderAuth|TestAIGatewayModelForwardsProviderAuth|TestProcessChat_AIGatewayRoutingUsesDelegatedAPIKey|TestAwaitSubagentCompletion' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd/aibridged -run 'TestServeHTTP_DelegatedAPIKey|TestServeHTTP_StripCoderToken' -count=1` - `git diff --check HEAD~1..HEAD` - `make lint` > Mux working on behalf of Mike. |
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Sas Swart
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3bf5f80277 |
feat(coderd/database): add boundary_sessions and boundary_logs tables (#25441)
RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9) Add up/down migrations and matching sqlc queries for persisting Boundary audit events, as specified in the Bridge/Boundaries Correlation RFC. **Tables:** - `boundary_sessions`: session metadata with `workspace_agent_id` FK, `confined_process_name`, and timestamps (`started_at`, `updated_at`). ID is externally supplied by the Boundary process (no DB-side default). Created lazily when the first log for a session arrives. - `boundary_logs`: individual audit events with `session_id` FK, `sequence_number` (INT, primary ordering key), protocol/method/detail fields, and `matched_rule` (nullable; non-NULL implies allowed). **Indexes (per RFC):** - `(session_id, sequence_number)` for the ordering query path - `(captured_at)` for the retention purge path **Queries:** - `InsertBoundarySession` / `GetBoundarySessionByID` - `InsertBoundaryLog` / `GetBoundaryLogByID` - `ListBoundaryLogsBySessionID` with nullable `seq_after`/`seq_before` exclusive bounds for fetching events between two known interception sequence numbers - `DeleteOldBoundaryLogs` with row limit to avoid long-running transactions **Also includes:** dbgen helpers (`BoundarySession`, `BoundaryLog`), dbauthz implementations (reads gated on `ResourceAuditLog`, deletes on `ResourceSystem`), and all generated wrappers (dbmock, dbmetrics). No callers yet. A follow-up PR will add the dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type. > Generated by Coder Agents |
||
|
Danny Kopping
|
0d9718e217 | feat: add 'copilot' to ai_provider_type (#25616) | ||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
ca1f6b19a2 | feat: remove legacy chat provider tables (#25416) | ||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
40878eeba4 | feat: add AI provider schema expansion (#25412) | ||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
5a8d0016a5 |
feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363)
> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike. ## Stack Context This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is restacked directly on `main`. Stack order: 1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK 2. #25365 API test coverage 3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration 4. #25066 settings UI and docs 5. #25386 personal skills slash menu ## What? Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types. Follow-up review and restack fixes: - Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database constraints. - Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts. - Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are targeted. - Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read and delete but not create or update. - Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants covered by tests. - Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type. - Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database default. - Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to `000502_user_skills`. ## Why? Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface before chatd can consume them. ## Validation - `make gen` - `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run '^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1` - `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk` - `make lint` - pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d` |
||
|
Danielle Maywood
|
170a6e1fe9 | feat: add chat sharing foundation (#25041) | ||
|
Yevhenii Shcherbina
|
2732378da2 |
feat: audit group AI budget mutations (#25374)
Relates to https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-284/add-group-budgets-table-and-crud-api Adds audit-log support for `group_ai_budget` mutations. Without it, an admin could silently lower a spend limit from `$500` to `$50` or delete a budget entirely, with no record of who performed the action. Both write (`create-or-update`) and delete actions now produce audit log entries, including before/after diffs for `spend_limit_micros`. Depends on #25203. ## Old Version <img width="1340" height="456" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e9ff52fb-a905-4aef-a4ee-7cdc58e68b75" /> ## New Version (see https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25374/changes/9d22833de87cc106c24142c1d471a3f71872bf67) <img width="1347" height="496" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b9bbfa1-f86d-48e3-a0b1-266eb76f851f" /> |
||
|
Danny Kopping
|
c69dd9c5dc |
feat: widen ai_provider_type enum for chatd providers (#25394)
|
||
|
Yevhenii Shcherbina
|
238968cfa0 |
feat: add per-group AI budget table and endpoints (#25203)
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-284/add-group-budgets-table-and-crud-api ## Summary Adds the `group_ai_budgets` table and the following endpoints: - `GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` - `PUT /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` - `DELETE /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget` Each group may have at most one budget row. If no row exists, no budget is enforced. ### Feature gate Added `RequireFeatureMW(FeatureAIBridge)` on the `/ai/budget` sub-route. ## RBAC Authorization reuses `rbac.ResourceGroup` with the existing `.InOrganization(...).WithID(...)` scoping model. The `dbauthz` wrappers load the parent `groups` row and authorize against it. No new resource type is introduced. As a result, anyone with `group:update` permissions (Owner, OrgAdmin, or UserAdmin within the organization) can manage AI budgets for that group. ## Read access for group members `database.Group.RBACObject()` grants `policy.ActionRead` to all members of the group through the group ACL: ```go func (g Group) RBACObject() rbac.Object { return rbac.ResourceGroup.WithID(g.ID). InOrg(g.OrganizationID). // Group members can read the group. WithGroupACL(map[string][]policy.Action{ g.ID.String(): { policy.ActionRead, }, }) } ``` Because the `GET` endpoint authorizes against the same loaded `Group` object, any group member can call: ```text GET /api/v2/groups/{group}/ai/budget ``` `PUT` and `DELETE` remain admin-only. The group ACL grants only `ActionRead`, so write operations continue to require role-based `group:update` permissions. ## Alternative considered A dedicated `rbac.ResourceGroupAiBudget` resource would allow budget management to be separated from general group administration. We decided not to add that complexity for now. |
||
|
Danielle Maywood
|
9ddfafe2b1 | feat: add chat ACL database foundation (#25080) | ||
|
Danny Kopping
|
841b777ccd | feat: add ai_providers table, queries, dbauthz, audit, RBAC (#24892) | ||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
cb37047dce |
feat: dedicated /prompts endpoint for chat history cycle (#25083)
Follow-up to #25004. The merged change cycles only through messages
already loaded in the in-memory chat store (page size 50). Long chats
and chats whose oldest turns have rolled out of the page lose access to
their earlier prompts in the composer's up/down arrow cycle. This PR
adds a dedicated server endpoint that returns the full prompt history,
newest first, and rewires the composer to use it.
## What changed
### Endpoint
`GET /api/experimental/chats/{chat}/prompts?limit=N`
```go
type ChatPrompt struct { ID int64; Text string }
type ChatPromptsResponse struct { Prompts []ChatPrompt }
```
- `limit`: `0..2000`. `0` (the default) is treated as the server-side
default of 500; out-of-range values return `400`. Negative values are
rejected by the SDK's `PositiveInt32` parser before reaching the
handler.
- Auth: parent-chat read in `dbauthz`, mirroring
`GetChatMessagesByChatID`.
- The SQL filters `role='user'`, `deleted=false`, `visibility IN
('user','both')`, guards the lateral with `jsonb_typeof(content) =
'array'` so legacy V0 scalar-string rows are silently skipped, then
unrolls `content` JSONB with `WITH ORDINALITY` and concatenates only
`type='text'` parts in original order via `string_agg(... ORDER BY
ordinality)`. Messages whose joined text is whitespace-only are dropped
via `HAVING ... ~ '\S'` so cycling never lands on a blank entry.
### Partial index (migration `000494`)
```sql
CREATE INDEX idx_chat_messages_user_prompts
ON chat_messages (chat_id, id DESC)
WHERE deleted = false
AND role = 'user'
AND visibility IN ('user', 'both');
```
The partial WHERE matches the query's filter exactly and the key order
matches `ORDER BY id DESC`, so the planner gets both the filter and the
ordering from the index without a sort step.
`EXPLAIN ANALYZE` on a synthetic 51-chat × 5,000-message dataset (≈260k
rows, 10k user prompts in the target chat, `random_page_cost=1.1`):
| | Plan | Buffers hit | Time |
|---|---|---|---|
| Without index | `Index Scan Backward using chat_messages_pkey`,
**250,848 rows removed by filter** | 6,683 | 32.4 ms |
| With index | `Index Scan using idx_chat_messages_user_prompts`, no
filter | 38 | 1.3 ms |
≈25× faster, 175× fewer buffer hits.
### Frontend
- `chatPromptsKey` / `chatPromptsQuery` factories in
`site/src/api/queries/chats.ts` (`staleTime: 30s`, `enabled: chatId !==
""`, asks the server for 500 prompts).
- `ChatPageContent.tsx` replaces the in-memory derivation with
`useQuery(chatPromptsQuery(chatId ?? ""))`. The composer's existing
`cycleHistorySnapshotRef` anchors the in-flight cycle so a refetch
arriving mid-cycle cannot shift the indexed prompt out from under the
user.
- `getEditableUserMessagePayload` now concatenates user-message text
parts verbatim, mirroring the server's `string_agg(part->>'text', ''
ORDER BY ordinality)`, instead of routing through the streaming-oriented
`parseMessageContent` / `appendText` pipeline (which drops
whitespace-only chunks — correct for assistant streams, wrong for a
user's persisted message). This keeps the cycle and the edit path in
agreement on the same message. File blocks are still pulled separately
via
`parseMessageContent(...).blocks.filter(isEditableUserMessageFileBlock)`.
- Cache invalidation in `createChatMessage.onSuccess`,
`editChatMessage.onSettled`, and `useChatStore.upsertCacheMessages`
(only when an upserted message has `role === "user"`).
- Page-level stories pre-seed `chatPromptsKey(CHAT_ID)` from the same
`messagesData` to keep them offline.
## Tests
- New `TestGetChatUserPrompts` in `coderd/exp_chats_test.go` with five
subtests:
- `NewestFirstFiltering` — multi-part concatenation, non-text parts
skipped, whitespace-only filtered, soft-deleted excluded, `model`-only
visibility excluded, assistant-role excluded by `cm.role = 'user'`,
legacy V0 scalar row silently excluded by the `jsonb_typeof` guard,
ordering newest first.
- `LimitClampsResults` — explicit `limit=2` returns the two newest
prompts.
- `InvalidLimitRejected` — `limit=5000` is `400 Bad Request`.
- `NotFoundForOtherUsers` — a separate user in the same org gets `404`,
not the prompts.
- `EmptyResultIsJSONArray` — zero-message chat and assistant-only chat
both return `Prompts: []` (non-nil, empty).
- New unit test in `messageParsing.test.ts` asserting that
`getEditableUserMessagePayload(["hello", " ", "world"])` returns `"hello
world"`, locking in the agreement with the SQL `string_agg`.
- `dbauthz_test.go` adds the
`MethodTestSuite.TestChats/GetChatUserPromptsByChatID` entry, asserting
parent-chat `policy.ActionRead`.
- `pnpm test src/pages/AgentsPage` — 1159 passed, 2 skipped.
- `make gen` produces no diff.
## Manual verification
Seeded a dev chat with Claude Sonnet 4.6 via the aibridge Anthropic
provider and posted 20 user prompts end-to-end. Verified that the
`/prompts` endpoint returns 20 rows newest-first, that `limit=10` clamps
correctly, that `limit=0` uses the server default of 500, and that the
up/down keyboard cycle in the composer walks the same sequence (and
reverses correctly back to the empty draft).
## Out of scope
- Cross-chat history.
- Per-user opt-out for the cycle.
- File-reference / attachment cycling — the cycle continues to reproduce
plain text only, by design.
<details>
<summary>Implementation plan</summary>
# CODAGT-319 Follow-up — Dedicated `/prompts` endpoint
## Context
The merged feature ([#25004](https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/25004)
/ [
|
||
|
Kyle Carberry
|
5040ab6fca |
feat: filter chats by diff URL via the q search parameter (#24970)
Adds a `diff_url:` term to the `q` search parameter on `GET /api/experimental/chats` so callers can look up the chat associated with a particular pull request, merge request, or any other URL persisted on the chat's diff status. ``` q=diff_url:"https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/123" ``` Match is case-insensitive. When the URL lives on a delegated sub-agent's diff status, the parent chat is returned so the relationship surfaces from a single lookup. <details> <summary>Design notes</summary> - **Forge-agnostic.** Reuses the existing `chat_diff_statuses.url` column rather than introducing a `pr:` vocabulary, since the SDK already documents the URL as "may point to a pull request or a branch page depending on whether a PR has been opened." Works for GitHub PRs, GitLab MRs, branch pages, etc. - **Composes with `archived:`.** The two terms can be combined: `q=archived:true diff_url:"..."`. - **Case handling.** The parser used to lowercase the entire `q` string up front, which would mangle URL path segments. Switched to lowercasing only the field key inside `searchTerms` (already happens there) and keeping the value as the caller typed it. The SQL comparison lowercases on both sides. - **Validation.** `diff_url` must be a syntactically valid HTTP(S) URL with a non-empty host. No forge-specific validation. - **Index.** Adds `idx_chat_diff_statuses_url_lower` on `LOWER(url)` so the lookup is cheap even on large datasets. - **Sub-agent fan-in.** `EXISTS` clause matches when the URL lives on the chat itself or any chat with `root_chat_id` equal to the chat's id, so a delegated sub-agent's PR pulls in its parent. - **Deferred.** Sentinels like `pr:any` / `pr:none` and a forge-agnostic state filter (`diff_state:open|merged|closed`) were intentionally left out of this change. They couple cleanly to a second forge or a clearer product call, and shipping them now would lock in vocabulary we may want to revisit. </details> ## Tests - `coderd/searchquery`: parser tests for valid URLs, case handling (key insensitive, value preserved), composition with `archived:`, and validation errors (non-HTTP scheme, missing host, malformed URL). - `coderd/exp_chats_test.go`: end-to-end coverage hitting `ListChats`. Verifies a root chat matches its own URL, a parent chat surfaces when only a sub-agent has the URL, lookups are case-insensitive, non-matching URLs return empty, and invalid URLs return `400`. --- _This PR was authored by a Coder Agent on behalf of @kylecarbs._ |
||
|
Seth Shelnutt
|
f355e010e8 |
fix(coderd/database): clean up org memberships when user is soft-deleted (#25149)
The soft-delete cleanup trigger (`delete_deleted_user_resources`)
removed `api_keys`, `user_links`, and `user_secrets` but left
`organization_members` rows intact. When a new user was created with a
previously-deleted user's email, both user IDs had org membership rows
in the same organization, producing duplicate-email members.
Extend the trigger to also delete `organization_members` for the
soft-deleted user. This cascades through the existing
`trigger_delete_group_members_on_org_member_delete`, which cleans up
group memberships automatically. The migration backfills by removing
zombie rows for already-deleted users.
Fixes ENG-831
> [!NOTE]
> 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents
<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>
**Root cause**: `GetOrganizationIDsByMemberIDs` does not join on
`users.deleted = false`, so stale org membership rows for soft-deleted
users were visible to internal queries. Even the filtered queries
(`OrganizationMembers`, `PaginatedOrganizationMembers`) could surface
duplicate emails when a new active user reused a deleted user's email.
**What changed**:
- Migration 000491 extends `delete_deleted_user_resources()` to `DELETE
FROM organization_members WHERE user_id = OLD.id`
- Backfill removes existing zombie org memberships for soft-deleted
users
- `TestOrgMembersSoftDeleteTrigger` covers org membership removal, raw
row cleanup, and cascading group membership cleanup
</details>
|
||
|
Kyle Carberry
|
b0b07536fc | feat: add opt-in Coder identity headers for MCP servers (#25153) | ||
|
Zach
|
b221632615 |
fix: wipe user secrets when user is soft-deleted (#24985)
Extend the delete_deleted_user_resources() trigger so that secrets belonging to a soft-deleted user are removed in the same transaction as the existing api_keys and user_links cleanup. user_secrets.user_id has ON DELETE CASCADE, but Coder soft-deletes users by flipping users.deleted rather than removing the row, so the foreign key cascade never fires and secrets would otherwise survive deletion. Assisted by Coder Agents. |
||
|
Yevhenii Shcherbina
|
4124d1137d |
feat: add ai_model_prices table (#24932)
# Summary Implements https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-282/add-ai-model-price-table-and-seed-generator This PR lays the groundwork for AI Bridge cost controls (per the AI Governance RFC). It adds the foundation needed for future cost tracking: a place to store per-model token prices, a way to keep those prices in sync with upstream pricing data, and a startup mechanism that ensures every deployment has prices loaded before AI Bridge starts processing requests. The price data comes from [models.dev](https://models.dev/), a community-maintained catalogue of AI provider pricing. A generator script fetches the latest prices, filters to Anthropic and OpenAI for now, and produces a seed file checked into the repository. On every server startup the seed is applied to the database, so new releases automatically pick up any price corrections that landed since the previous one. Existing rows are overwritten with the latest prices; rows for models no longer in the seed are left untouched. # Batching the AI model price seed: three approaches Context: at server startup we seed the `ai_model_prices` table from an embedded JSON price book (~70 rows today, will grow as we add providers, potentially 4000+). Each row is: ```text (provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price) ``` Any of the four price columns can be: - `NULL` → “price unknown for this dimension” - explicit `0` → “free” The batch must be an UPSERT so re-running is idempotent and existing rows pick up new prices. We considered three implementations. --- ## Approach 1 — Per-row UPSERT in a Go loop ```go for _, row := range rows { if err := db.UpsertAIModelPrice(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPriceParams{ Provider: row.Provider, Model: row.Model, InputPrice: nullInt64(row.InputPrice), // ... }); err != nil { return err } } ``` ### Pros - Trivial. - NULL handling falls out naturally from `sql.NullInt64`. ### Cons - `N` round-trips per seed. - With ~70 rows that means ~70 statement executions on every startup, even inside a transaction. - Doesn't scale gracefully as the price book grows, potentially 4000+. --- ## Approach 2 — `UNNEST` with parallel arrays Pass each column as a separate Go slice. Postgres unnests them in parallel into a virtual table, then `INSERT ... SELECT`. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT UNNEST(@providers::text[]), UNNEST(@models::text[]), NULLIF(UNNEST(@input_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@output_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_read_prices::bigint[]), -1), NULLIF(UNNEST(@cache_write_prices::bigint[]), -1) ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side: flatten rows into six parallel slices. Use a sentinel (`-1`) for “missing”, since `lib/pq` can't encode `NULL` into a `bigint[]` element. ```go providers := make([]string, len(rows)) models := make([]string, len(rows)) inputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) outputs := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheR := make([]int64, len(rows)) cacheW := make([]int64, len(rows)) for i, r := range rows { providers[i] = r.Provider models[i] = r.Model inputs[i] = -1 if r.InputPrice != nil { inputs[i] = *r.InputPrice } outputs[i] = -1 if r.OutputPrice != nil { outputs[i] = *r.OutputPrice } cacheR[i] = -1 if r.CacheReadPrice != nil { cacheR[i] = *r.CacheReadPrice } cacheW[i] = -1 if r.CacheWritePrice != nil { cacheW[i] = *r.CacheWritePrice } } return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, database.UpsertAIModelPricesParams{ Providers: providers, Models: models, InputPrices: inputs, OutputPrices: outputs, CacheReadPrices: cacheR, CacheWritePrices: cacheW, }) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. ### Cons - The generated `sqlc` params become plain `[]int64`, which can't represent `NULL`. --- ## Approach 3 — `jsonb_array_elements` over a single `@seed::jsonb` (chosen) Pass the raw seed JSON as one parameter; let Postgres expand and parse it. ```sql INSERT INTO ai_model_prices ( provider, model, input_price, output_price, cache_read_price, cache_write_price ) SELECT elem->>'provider', elem->>'model', (elem->>'input_price')::bigint, (elem->>'output_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_read_price')::bigint, (elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint FROM jsonb_array_elements(@seed::jsonb) AS elem ON CONFLICT (provider, model) DO UPDATE SET input_price = EXCLUDED.input_price, output_price = EXCLUDED.output_price, cache_read_price = EXCLUDED.cache_read_price, cache_write_price = EXCLUDED.cache_write_price, updated_at = NOW(); ``` Go side reduces to: ```go return db.UpsertAIModelPrices(ctx, seedJSON) ``` ### Pros - Single round-trip. - NULLs fall out naturally: - `(elem->>'cache_write_price')::bigint` becomes `NULL` - no sentinels - The seed is already JSON: - Existing precedent: - `jsonb_array_elements` is already used elsewhere in the codebase ### Cons - Less type-safe at the SQL boundary than `UNNEST` - Slightly less standard than `UNNEST` - Readers need familiarity with: - `jsonb_array_elements` - `->>` extraction syntax - Postgres pays JSON parse cost - negligible at our scale --- --- # Decision We picked Approach 3. It collapses the round-trips like `UNNEST` does, but without: - nullable-array workarounds - sentinel values |
||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
0bfb9f6f13 |
feat: show agent turn summary in agents sidebar (#24942)
Persists the agent-generated turn-end summary on `chats` and shows it as the Agents sidebar subtitle when present, falling back to the model name. Errors still take precedence. > Mux is acting on Mike's behalf. ## What changes **Storage.** New nullable `last_turn_summary` column on `chats` (migration `000486`). New `UpdateChatLastTurnSummary` query normalizes blank/whitespace input to `NULL`, preserves `updated_at` (so the chat does not jump to the top of the sidebar on summary writes), and uses an `expected_updated_at` stale-write guard so an older async summary cannot overwrite a newer turn. **Backend.** `coderd/x/chatd/chatd.go` decouples summary generation from webpush. Generated summaries persist for completed parent turns even when webpush is unconfigured or has no subscriptions. The same generated text is reused as the webpush body when webpush is configured, so the summary model is not called twice. Generic fallback push text is no longer persisted; it clears any stale summary instead. Error/interrupt/pending-action terminal paths clear `last_turn_summary` for the latest turn. **Frontend.** `AgentsSidebar.tsx` subtitle priority is now `errorReason || lastTurnSummary || modelName`, normalized via the existing `asNonEmptyString` helper from `blockUtils.ts`. ## Tests - `TestUpdateChatLastTurnSummary` (database): success, whitespace-to-NULL, stale guard rejects, `updated_at` preserved. - `TestUpdateLastTurnSummaryRejectsStaleWrites` (chatd internal): direct stale-`expected_updated_at` test. - `TestSuccessfulChatPersistsTurnSummaryWithoutWebPush`: persistence works without webpush subscriptions. - `TestSuccessfulChatSendsWebPushWithSummary`: same generated text drives both DB and push body. - `TestSuccessfulChatSendsWebPushFallbackWithoutSummaryForEmptyAssistantText`: fallback text is not persisted. - `TestErroredChatClearsLastTurnSummaryAndSendsWebPush`: error path clears the field. - `TestInterruptChatDoesNotSendWebPushNotification`: interrupt path clears the field, no push fires. - `AgentsSidebar.test.tsx`: subtitle priority for summary-present, error-wins, no-summary fallback, whitespace fallback. - `AgentsSidebar.stories.tsx`: `ChatWithTurnSummary` and `ChatWithTurnSummaryAndError`. ## Notes - No backfill. Existing chats keep showing the model name until their next turn completes. - Parent chats only in this iteration; the field is rendered on any `Chat` if a future change extends generation to children. - Decoupling generation from webpush adds quickgen model calls for completed parent turns that previously skipped generation when no subscriptions existed. Existing parent-only, assistant-text-present, `PushSummaryModel` configured, and bounded-timeout gates keep this behavior bounded. |
||
|
Michael Suchacz
|
2874d4b4cd |
feat: add chat debug retention purge (#24943)
> Mux is acting on Mike's behalf. Adds configurable retention for chat debug data, including the purge query, updated_at index, site config, experimental API, SDK types, frontend lifecycle setting, and docs. The purge deletes debug runs older than the configured retention window and relies on existing cascades to delete steps. The default retention is 30 days, and setting the value to 0 disables the purge. |
||
|
Zach
|
1b2a1af097 |
feat: report user secrets adoption summary in telemetry (#24854)
Add a deployment-wide user secrets summary to the telemetry snapshot so we can track adoption of user secrets The summary reports: - A breakdown of secrets by which injection fields are populated: EnvNameOnly, FilePathOnly, Both, Neither - The distribution of secrets per user (max, p25, p50, p75, p90) All metrics are scoped to active non-system users. Soft-deleted users are excluded. The percentile distribution is computed across the entire active non-system user base, including users with zero secrets, so the percentiles reflect deployment-wide adoption. Assisted by Coder Agents. |
||
|
Ethan
|
4751416b29 |
fix!: persist structured chat errors (#24919)
**Breaking change for changelog:**
> `codersdk.Chat.last_error` now returns a structured `ChatError` object
(`{message, kind, provider, retryable, status_code, detail}`) instead of
a plain string. The chats API is experimental
(`/api/experimental/chats`), so this ships without a deprecation cycle;
consumers reading `chat.last_error` as a string must update to read
`chat.last_error.message`. SDK/generated TypeScript terminal error
payloads now use the single `ChatError` type; the live stream error
payload type is renamed from `ChatStreamError` to `ChatError`.
Persisted chat errors now carry the same provider-specific detail (kind,
provider, retryable, HTTP status, optional detail) as the live stream,
so refreshing a failed chat rehydrates with the full structured error
instead of a one-line headline.
Existing rows are migrated in place: legacy text errors are wrapped into
`{message, kind: "generic"}` so already-errored chats still render, and
rows with `last_error IS NULL` stay NULL. Internally, persisted fallback
decoding now reuses the existing `chaterror.KindGeneric` constant, with
no JSON value change.
Closes CODAGT-239
|
||
|
Kyle CarberryandCoder Agents
|
d889ba1842 |
feat: add user_oidc auth type for MCP servers (#24793)
Adds a 5th MCP server authentication mode, `user_oidc` ("User OIDC
Identity"), that forwards the calling user's OIDC access token from
`user_links.oauth_access_token` to the upstream MCP server as
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
The token is read from `user_links` and refreshed transparently via
`oauth2.TokenSource` before each MCP request. No new per-MCP-server
secret storage and no per-user connect/disconnect step.
**Limitation**: only users who logged in via OIDC have a forwardable
token. Users authenticated via password or GitHub will see requests sent
without an `Authorization` header, and the upstream MCP server is
expected to respond with 401. A pluggable token source (e.g. CLI-minted
E2E tokens) is left as future work.
<details>
<summary>Implementation notes</summary>
- Schema: new
`coderd/database/migrations/000481_mcp_user_oidc_auth.{up,down}.sql`
relaxes the `mcp_server_configs.auth_type` CHECK constraint to include
`user_oidc`. Down migration deletes affected rows before restoring the
old constraint.
- SDK validation: `codersdk/mcp.go` extends `oneof` for
`CreateMCPServerConfigRequest` and `UpdateMCPServerConfigRequest`.
- Handler: `coderd/mcp.go` adds `case "user_oidc":` to the
field-clearing switch on update. The existing list and detail handlers
already report `auth_connected = true` for any non-`oauth2` auth type.
- Header construction: `coderd/x/chatd/mcpclient/mcpclient.go`
introduces a `UserOIDCTokenSource` interface and adds the `user_oidc`
case to `buildAuthHeaders`. `ConnectAll` / `connectOne` /
`buildAuthHeaders` gain `userID uuid.UUID, oidcSrc UserOIDCTokenSource`
parameters.
- Wiring: `coderd/x/chatd/chatd.go` adds `OIDCTokenSource` to `Config` /
`Server` and passes `chat.OwnerID` plus the source through `ConnectAll`.
`coderd/coderd.go` constructs the source next to the `chatd.New` call
when `options.OIDCConfig` is non-nil.
- Token source: `oidcMCPTokenSource` lives in `coderd/mcp.go`. It reads
the user's OIDC link, refreshes via `oauth2.TokenSource`, and writes the
refreshed token back to `user_links`. Logic is duplicated from
`provisionerdserver.ObtainOIDCAccessToken` to avoid an MCP ->
provisionerdserver dependency. The two copies must be kept in sync; a
comment on `oidcMCPTokenSource` records this.
- Frontend: `MCPServerAdminPanel.tsx` adds the new dropdown option, an
explanatory helper block (no admin-configurable fields), and a Storybook
story (`CreateServerUserOIDC`).
- Tests:
- `mcpclient_test.go`: `TestConnectAll_UserOIDCAuth`,
`TestConnectAll_UserOIDCAuth_NoLink`,
`TestConnectAll_UserOIDCAuth_NilSource`. All existing tests updated for
the new signature.
- `mcp_test.go`: extends `TestMCPServerConfigsAuthConnected` to assert
`auth_connected=true` for `user_oidc`; adds
`TestMCPServerConfigsUserOIDCClearsFields` and
`TestMCPServerConfigsUserOIDCDirect`.
- Docs: `docs/ai-coder/agents/platform-controls/mcp-servers.md`
describes the new mode and its OIDC-only limitation.
</details>
This PR was created by Coder Agents.
---------
Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <agents@coder.com>
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Jon Ayers
|
6b9637d85a | feat: replace pgcoordinator pg_notify triggers with app-level Publish() (#24717) | ||
|
Marcin Tojek
|
f993b72628 |
fix: introduce ResourceAiSeat for fine-grained AI seat RBAC (#24613)
Fixes: https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1444 |
||
|
Zach
|
1c30d52b2b |
feat: audit user secret create, update, and delete (#24756)
Emit user secret audit log entries for create/update/delete operations. Reads stay un-audited, matching every other resource. Audit log entries record changes in user secret name, environment variable name, file path, and value. The secret value column is marked `ActionSecret` so the diff records the change without showing the ciphertext or plaintext. Closes a TOCTOU window on delete to ensure no phantom audit logs for a delete of a non-existent secret. Secret update accepts a small TOCTOU window matching the other audited resources (templates, workspaces, chats). The two-query pattern is wrapped in a transaction so audit state can't leak from a failed mutation. |
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Kyle Carberry
|
069223ae26 | fix: recover web push subscriptions after PWA reinstall (#24720) | ||
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Michael Suchacz
|
c7cac9debe |
fix: persist per-turn model on chats and queued messages (#24688)
Previously, `chats.last_model_config_id` was not updated when a user sent a mid-chat message with a different model, and queued messages did not store their own per-turn model, so promotion ran against whatever the chat row said at promote time. Chat watch events also did not merge `last_model_config_id` into the site's root, child, and per-chat caches, so sidebar labels stayed stale after direct sends and queued promotions. - Add nullable `chat_queued_messages.model_config_id`, backfilled from `chats.last_model_config_id`. Queued inserts round-trip the effective model id at enqueue time. - In `coderd/x/chatd`, direct sends update `chats.last_model_config_id` inside the same transaction that inserts the admitted user message. Manual promotion and auto-promotion use the queued row's stored `model_config_id`, with a fallback to `chats.last_model_config_id` for legacy NULL rows during rollout. `PromoteQueuedOptions.ModelConfigID` is now ignored. - On the site, extract `mergeWatchedChatSummary` and `mergeWatchedChatIntoCaches` in `site/src/api/queries/chats.ts` so status-change watch events merge `last_model_config_id` into the root infinite chat list, the parent-embedded child entry, and the per-chat `chatKey(chatId)` cache. `updated_at` guards against stale watch payloads clobbering newer cached state, while diff status events still merge their PR metadata because they are timestamped outside the chat row. Watch timestamps are compared as instants so variable fractional precision does not make fresh events look stale. - Queued promotion validates stored model config IDs before admission. Invalid legacy queued IDs fall back to the chat's current model config instead of dropping the queued message during auto-promotion. - Backend and frontend regression coverage added for admission, queue promotion (including FIFO across mixed models, legacy NULL fallback, and invalid queued model IDs), and chat watch cache merging. > Mux is acting on Mike's behalf. |
||
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Cian Johnston
|
a876287d36 |
feat: auto-archive inactive chats with audit trail (#24642)
Adds a background job in `dbpurge` that periodically archives chats inactive beyond a configurable threshold. Each archived root chat gets a background audit entry tagged `chat_auto_archive`. Disabled by default. * New `AutoArchiveInactiveChats` SQL query with LATERAL last-activity subquery and partial index on archive candidates * `site_configs`-backed `auto_archive_days` setting with admin-only PUT, any-authenticated-user GET * Cascade archive via `root_chat_id`; pinned chats and active threads exempt * Root-only audit dispatch on detached context, matching manual archive (`patchChat`) behavior * 11 subtests covering disabled no-op, boundary, deleted messages, child activity, pinned exemption, multi-owner, idempotency, and batch pagination PR #24643 adds per-owner digest notifications. PR #24704 adds the requisite UI controls. > 🤖 |
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Cian Johnston
|
c602a31856 |
fix(coderd): reject pinning child chats in patchChat handler (#24669)
The UI already prevents child (delegated/subagent) chats from being
pinned, but the `PATCH /api/experimental/chats/{chat}` endpoint did not
enforce this. A direct API call could pin a child chat.
- Add a `400 Bad Request` guard in `patchChat` when `pinOrder > 0` and
the chat has a `ParentChatID`
- Add `TestChatPinOrder/RejectsChildChat` test
> 🤖
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||
|
Ethan
|
ad1906589d |
fix(coderd): allow deleting chat providers used in historical chats (#24568)
Drop the `chat_model_configs.provider -> chat_providers.provider` foreign key and soft-delete model configs when their provider is removed. The provider row is now hard-deleted inside a transaction that also tombstones its model configs and promotes a replacement default when needed. Historical chats and messages keep pointing at the soft-deleted model config rows, which are hidden from live/admin queries but still resolve for read. The runtime chat path already falls back to the default model config when a soft-deleted config is looked up. Replaces the lost FK validation in the create/update model-config handlers with an explicit provider lookup that returns the existing `Chat provider is not configured.` 400. ## UX **Admin deleting a chat provider that has historical usage** - Before: blocked with 400 `Provider models are still referenced by existing chats.` Admins had no in-product way to remove a provider that had ever been used. - After: delete succeeds (204). Any model configs under that provider are soft-deleted. If the removed provider owned the default model config, one of the remaining live configs is auto-promoted to the new default. The promotion is deterministic (`ensureDefaultChatModelConfig` picks the first live config by `provider ASC, model ASC, updated_at DESC, id DESC`); there is no picker, and no toast or response detail names which config became the new default. **End users with chats that used a deleted provider's model** - Old chats still open and their history still renders unchanged. - Sending a new turn in such a chat silently falls back to the current default model. No banner or warning tells the user the original model is gone. - The model picker no longer lists the deleted model. - If no default model config exists at all after the delete, sending a new turn fails with `no default chat model config is available`. **Admin creating or updating a model config against a provider that is not configured** - Same as before: 400 `Chat provider is not configured.` Only the detection mechanism changed (explicit `FOR UPDATE` lookup inside the transaction, which also serializes against a concurrent provider delete). **Admin updating a model config whose row disappears mid-transaction** - Now returns the standard 404 `Resource not found or you do not have access to this resource` instead of the previous 500 that leaked `sql: no rows in result set` in the detail. Unrelated internal races (for example a race on the promoted default candidate) are still reported as 500 so they are not misclassified as "your target is gone". Closes CODAGT-23 |
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|
Michael Suchacz
|
9d0469fc4c |
feat: allow approved external MCP tools in root plan mode (#24509)
## Summary
Allow root plan-mode chats to use MCP tools from external servers that
an admin has explicitly approved for plan mode. Workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents remain blocked.
## Problem
`chatd.go` excluded every MCP tool when `isPlanModeTurn` was true, so
planning had no access to tools like docs search, ticketing, etc.
Lifting that guard wholesale was unsafe: `mcp_server_configs` already
has centralized admin governance, but workspace-local MCP (discovered
from agent `.mcp.json`) does not, and subagents use a narrower trust
boundary.
## Fix
Add an admin-controlled per-server `allow_in_plan_mode` flag (default
`false`) and gate plan-mode MCP access on it.
### Backend / schema
- New migration `000472_mcp_server_allow_in_plan_mode.{up,down}.sql` and
matching fixture update.
- `mcpserverconfigs.sql` + generated code: persist and read the new
column.
- `codersdk/mcp.go`: thread the field through `MCPServerConfig`,
`Create*`, and `Update*` request types.
- `coderd/mcp.go`: validate, persist, and return the flag in
get/list/create/update handlers.
### chatd
- `coderd/x/chatd/chatd.go`: pre-filter selected external MCP configs by
`AllowInPlanMode` before calling `mcpclient.ConnectAll` on plan-mode
root turns. Workspace MCP discovery is skipped entirely on plan-mode
turns.
- Single helper decides whether a tool is available in plan mode, used
both at construction and for active-tool filtering (defense in depth).
Plan-mode subagents, dynamic tools, provider-native tools, computer-use,
and workspace MCP stay unchanged.
- `coderd/x/chatd/prompt.go`: update the root plan-mode overlay text to
match the new boundary.
### UI
- `MCPServerAdminPanel.tsx`: add an explicit toggle ("Allow all tools
from this MCP server in root plan mode") next to the existing governance
controls.
- Regenerated `site/src/api/typesGenerated.ts`.
### Docs
- `docs/ai-coder/agents/architecture.md`: replace the blanket "MCP is
unavailable in plan mode" note with the new root-only, external-only,
admin-approved policy. Explicitly call out that workspace MCP and
plan-mode subagents are still excluded.
### Tests
- Plan-mode visibility (approved vs non-approved external server).
- Plan-mode invocation of an approved external MCP tool.
- End-to-end plan-mode workflow that uses an approved MCP tool and then
reaches `propose_plan`.
- Regressions: workspace MCP still excluded in plan mode; plan-mode
subagents still on the restricted tool boundary; existing tool
allow/deny list filtering still applies.
## Policy precedence
`allow_in_plan_mode` is an **additional** requirement on top of existing
`enabled`, availability, chat-selected / forced server IDs, and tool
allow/deny lists. It approves **all tools on that server** for root plan
mode; a per-tool plan allowlist is deliberately deferred.
## Follow-ups (explicitly out of scope)
- Whether plan-mode subagents should inherit approved external MCP
tools.
- Workspace-local MCP safety model (agent-side `.mcp.json` schema vs. a
coderd-managed workspace MCP config).
## Validation
- `go vet ./coderd/x/chatd/...`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -run 'TestPlan.*|TestMCP.*' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/x/chatd -count=1 -timeout 5m` (full chatd suite)
- `make fmt` (no diff)
> Mux opened this PR on Mike's behalf.
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||
|
Cian Johnston
|
c968a1f3a3 |
feat: make database.Chat auditable (#24485)
Wire database.Chat into the audit system so chat lifecycle events
(creation, patches, etc.) produce audit log entries.
Part of CODAGT-200.
> 🤖
|