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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Bobby Ho	166d92ba73	fix: bound request body size on JSON API endpoints (#28168 ) ## Summary `httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible. This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule that pins the invariant. Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392. ## Problem `httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate limiter bounds request rate, which is orthogonal to the memory a single admitted request may consume. ## Fix `Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body` in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of 4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site. `http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`: an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the regression guard for that specific failure, and `TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole requirement rests on. Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}` counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report. The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413 is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint. ## Behavior change `POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded archive is unchanged. The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its 64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to "Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint answers. Its tests are updated to match both. `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`, `path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with body size, such as agent log storage overflow. ## Reading this The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under its regenerated swagger, and cancel out.	2026-08-18 12:54:45 -07:00
Michael Suchacz	5a8d0016a5	feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363 ) > Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike. ## Stack Context This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is restacked directly on `main`. Stack order: 1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK 2. #25365 API test coverage 3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration 4. #25066 settings UI and docs 5. #25386 personal skills slash menu ## What? Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types. Follow-up review and restack fixes: - Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database constraints. - Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts. - Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are targeted. - Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read and delete but not create or update. - Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants covered by tests. - Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type. - Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database default. - Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to `000502_user_skills`. ## Why? Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface before chatd can consume them. ## Validation - `make gen` - `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run '^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1` - `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1` - `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk` - `make lint` - pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d`	2026-05-20 00:09:09 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Bobby Ho

166d92ba73

fix: bound request body size on JSON API endpoints (#28168 )

## Summary

`httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single
request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default
ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly
exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible.

This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the
endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode
paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their
own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule
that pins the invariant.

Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392.

## Problem

`httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no
ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure
is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a
body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate
limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a
single admitted request may consume.

## Fix

`Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body`
in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate
logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of
4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site.

`http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that
pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than
wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That
matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`:
an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the
default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the
regression guard for that specific failure, and
`TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole
requirement rests on.

Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names
the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the
request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}`
counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other
causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a
legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report.

The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator
raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as
configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413
is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint.

## Behavior change

`POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body
exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported
the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request
body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in
the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded
archive is unchanged.

The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its
64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its
decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to
"Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint
answers. Its tests are updated to match both.

`coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing
query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`,
`path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of
the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with
body size, such as agent log storage overflow.

## Reading this

The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the
security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and
commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the
limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an
exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under
its regenerated swagger, and cancel out.

2026-08-18 12:54:45 -07:00

Michael Suchacz

5a8d0016a5

feat: add personal skill storage, API, and SDK (#25363 )

> Mux updated this PR on behalf of Mike.

## Stack Context

This PR is the storage, permissions, API, and SDK layer for experimental
personal skills. #25362 has landed on `main`, so this branch is
restacked directly on `main`.

Stack order:
1. #25363 storage, permissions, API, and SDK
2. #25365 API test coverage
3. #25366 chattool and chatd integration
4. #25066 settings UI and docs
5. #25386 personal skills slash menu

## What?

Adds the `user_skills` database table, generated queries, RBAC resources
and scopes, audit resource handling, experimental user-scoped CRUD
endpoints, SDK types, and generated API/site types.

Follow-up review and restack fixes:
- Enforce a bounded personal skill description in parser and database
constraints.
- Return `403 Forbidden` for unauthorized create and update attempts.
- Return explicit conflict responses when soft-deleted users are
targeted.
- Keep user admins out of personal skills, while site owners can read
and delete but not create or update.
- Document trigger-raised constraint names and keep schema constants
covered by tests.
- Reuse `UserSkillMetadata` in the full `UserSkill` SDK response type.
- Generate user skill IDs in Go instead of relying on a database
default.
- Rebase on latest `main` and renumber the user skills migration to
`000502_user_skills`.

## Why?

Personal skills need durable user-owned storage with owner
authorization, limited site-owner moderation, and a hidden API surface
before chatd can consume them.

## Validation

- `make gen`
- `go test ./coderd/database -run '^TestUserSkillSchemaConstants$'
-count=1`
- `go test ./coderd/database/dbauthz -run
'^TestMethodTestSuite/TestUserSkills$' -count=1`
- `go test ./coderd -run '^TestPatchUserSkill$' -count=1`
- `go test ./codersdk ./coderd/database/db2sdk`
- `make lint`
- pre-commit hook on `97fd58108d`

2026-05-20 00:09:09 +02:00