Subdomain app routing derived the app identity from
httpapi.RequestHost, which returned the client-supplied
X-Forwarded-Host header verbatim. No middleware validated or stripped
that header, so a request from an untrusted peer could forge it. Since
the application_connect cookie is scoped to the wildcard apps domain,
JavaScript in a share=authenticated app could fetch() with a forged
X-Forwarded-Host pointing at a victim's owner-only app; coderd routed
and authorized the request as the victim and returned the private app
response same-origin to the attacker.
Replace RequestHost with httpmw.EffectiveHost, which honors
X-Forwarded-Host only when the original socket peer is a configured
trusted origin, otherwise falling back to the received Host header.
This ties host trust to the same RealIPConfig model already used for
X-Forwarded-For and -Proto. Wire it into HandleSubdomain for both
coderd and wsproxy, and log both the effective host and the raw
received_host.
Add coverage: EffectiveHost unit tests assert the trust decision uses
the socket peer rather than the spoofable forwarded client IP, and a
HandleSubdomain test confirms a forged X-Forwarded-Host from an
untrusted peer never reaches token resolution.
Refs: https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-259
* chore: move app proxying code to workspaceapps pkg
Moves path-app, subdomain-app and reconnecting PTY proxying to the new
workspaceapps.WorkspaceAppServer struct. This is in preparation for
external workspace proxies.
Updates app logout flow to avoid redirecting to coder-logout.${app_host}
on logout. Instead, all subdomain app tokens owned by the logging-out
user will be deleted every time you logout for simplicity sake.
Tests will remain in their original package, pending being moved to an
apptest package (or similar).
Co-authored-by: Steven Masley <stevenmasley@coder.com>
Jon Ayers