Categorises the terminal error of a failed interception and persists it
on the interception record, then surfaces it on the AI Gateway API.
- Categorise into an enum (`bad_request`, `unauthorized`,
`rate_limited`, `overloaded`, `server_error`, `unknown`), unwrapping
the ResponseError envelope, the upstream Anthropic/OpenAI SDK errors,
and key-pool exhaustion so blocking and streaming paths agree.
- Thread the type and raw message through the recorder dRPC into the
`aibridge_interceptions` row (optional proto fields; NULL on success).
- Expose the error on the AI Gateway thread API from the root
interception.
*This PR was produced by opencode (agent) using the `anthropic/claude-opus-4-8` model, under human direction and review.*
## Why
PR #26797 was accidentally merged into the stale `graphite-base/26797`
branch instead of `main` (Graphite picked the wrong base), so its
changes never landed on `main`. This PR re-lands that work as a clean
cherry-pick onto the current `main`.
## What
Adds a `WatchAIProviders` streaming RPC to the `ProviderConfigurator`
service so a running standalone AI Gateway refetches its provider set
when the provider configuration changes. The server subscribes to
`AIProvidersChangedChannel` (published by the provider CRUD endpoints)
and forwards each event as a payload-free signal, plus one signal on
subscribe; the gateway calls `GetAIProviders` on each signal to rebuild
its pool. The aibridged API is bumped to v1.2.
Env-seeded providers don't need a signal: seeding finishes before coderd
serves the gateway connection, so the gateway's initial fetch already
reflects the seeded set.
## For reviewers
The change is split into two commits to make review easy:
1. **`feat: synchronise provider changes with WatchAIProviders`** is a
faithful cherry-pick of #26797, identical to the originally reviewed PR.
It is committed without pre-commit hooks because it does not build
against current `main` on its own.
2. **`fix: resolve cherry-pick conflicts against main`** contains only
the deltas needed to re-land on current `main`, and passes the full
pre-commit suite:
- `coderd/aibridged/proto/aibridged.pb.go` regenerated via the proto
make target (the cherry-picked copy was generated against the older
proto).
- `enterprise/cli/aigatewaystart.go` import block unioned; `main` added
`os` and `strings` while the PR added `sync`.
- Three `aibridgedserver.NewServer` test call sites that landed on
`main` after the original branch diverged now pass the new `pubsub`
argument.
Refs https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-465
*This PR was produced by opencode (agent) using the
`anthropic/claude-opus-4-8` model, under human direction and review.*
> AI Tools were used to produce this PR
This PR adds `coder ai-gateway start` command that runs the AI Gateway
as an independent process.
- Standalone process doesn't have access to DB. Uses DRPC services under
`/api/v2/ai-gateway/serve`for auth, recording and provider
initialization.
- It only handles LLM traffic, other endpoints (eg. `/sessions`) are
only available though `coderd`.
- The standalone gateway reuses applicable flags from AI Gateway
deployment options. Provider-seeding and coderd-only options are
excluded.
- Only added to fat build, the slim build stub rejects the command.
Some wiring used by this new command is added.
**`NewWebsocketDialer`** - implements the standalone gateway's
connection to coderd's `/api/v2/ai-gateway/serve` endpoint. It upgrades
to a WebSocket, multiplexes with yamux, and wires all DRPC services.
**`AIGatewayDataPlaneMiddleware`** - extracts the per-request middleware
chain (concurrency limiting, rate limiting, BYOK gating) into a shared
function used by both the embedded route and the standalone gateway.
**`RootCmd.ResolveClientConnection`** - resolve the deployment URL and
builds an HTTP transport without requiring a session token. Used in
`ai-gateway start`command as it authenticates using different credential
type.
---------
Co-authored-by: Danny Kopping <danny@coder.com>
## Summary
Plumbs the Responses output item id (added as `ToolUsageRecord.ItemID` in #26855) through to the database, captured independently of the `provider_tool_call_id` correlation key. Hosted tools (`web_search_call`, etc.) only have an item id; agentic tools have both.
`provider_item_id` is specific to the OpenAI Responses API; it stays empty for chat completions and Anthropic messages, which have no separate item id.
## Changes
- Migration `000534`: nullable `provider_item_id` column on `aibridge_tool_usages`.
- Proto: `item_id` field 11 on `RecordToolUsageRequest`.
- Server handler: persists `provider_item_id` and adds it to structured logging.
- Translator: maps `ToolUsageRecord.ItemID` to the proto field.
## Tests
- `TestRecordToolUsageProviderItemID`: real-database round-trip asserting `provider_item_id` persists for both hosted and agentic tools, independently of `provider_tool_call_id`.
Stacked on #26855. Linear: AIGOV-96
---
_This PR was produced by opencode (agent) using the_ _`anthropic/claude-opus-4-8`_ _model, under human direction and review._
## Description
Adds pre-request AI budget enforcement to `aibridged`. Requests are rejected with HTTP 403 when the user's aggregated spend for the current period has reached their effective limit.
## Changes
- Add `IsBudgetExceeded` RPC to `aibridgedserver`. Resolves the user's effective budget, aggregates spend over the caller-supplied `[period_start, now]` window, and returns whether the limit has been reached along with the effective limit.
- Wire the check into `aibridged`'s HTTP handler. The caller computes the period start (monthly for now) and passes it in the request.
- Reject exceeded requests with HTTP 403 Forbidden and a message directing the user to contact an administrator.
- Add `dbtime.StartOfMonth` alongside `StartOfDay` for period computation.
- Add real-DB tests covering the enforcement path: month-boundary excludes prior-period spend, and a new user override unblocks a previously-exceeded user.
Closes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-428/add-pre-request-budget-enforcement
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by @ssncferreira
Implements:
https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-495/add-externalid-to-prevent-confused-deputy-problem
When a Bedrock provider assumes an IAM role via STS, the gateway now
generates a unique external ID for it and sends that value on every
`AssumeRole` call. The external ID guards against the [confused deputy
problem](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/confused-deputy.html)
on cross-account role assumption. Per [AWS's
recommendation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create_for-user_externalid.html),
the gateway generates and owns the value rather than accepting one from
the operator; that ownership is what makes it effective, since a party
who knows another's external ID can't induce the gateway to send it.
The external ID is server-owned and read-only over the API. It is
generated once, when a provider first has a `role_arn`, and is stable
thereafter. Clients cannot set it: create rejects any supplied
`external_id`, and update rejects a value that differs from the stored
one. An update may echo the stored value back unchanged, so the normal
read-modify-write flow (GET the provider, change a field, PATCH the full
settings object) keeps working. The value is not a secret and is
returned on GET so operators can copy it into the target role's trust
policy as an `sts:ExternalId` condition.
It is persisted in the existing JSON settings blob, so there is no
migration or audit-table change.
Closes [AIGOV-455](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-455/extend-drpc-with-buildproviders).
## Why
The AI Gateway (`aibridged`) is being split into a standalone process that must not touch the database. `coderd` stays the source of truth and seeds the `ai_providers` / `ai_provider_keys` tables from the environment. This PR adds a DRPC call so the gateway fetches provider config from `coderd` instead of reading the DB, for both the embedded and standalone daemons.
## What
- **Proto:** new `ProviderConfigurator` service with a unary `GetAIProviders` RPC, plus `AIProvider` / `AIProviderBedrock` messages. `CurrentMinor` bumped to 1 (additive).
- **Server (`coderd/aibridgedserver`):** `GetAIProviders` runs a read-only `InTx` under `LockIDAIProvidersEnvSeed` so it never returns a mid-seed snapshot, reads providers (incl. disabled) plus keys for enabled ones, and maps to proto under `dbauthz.AsAIBridged`. Unmappable rows are skipped and logged; plaintext keys and Bedrock secrets are never logged.
- **Client:** `DRPCProviderConfiguratorClient` wired into the client union, `dialer.go`, and `CreateInMemoryAIBridgeServer`.
- **cli:** `BuildProvidersFromProto` maps the response through the existing DB-neutral `buildProvider`. A shared `poolRPCReloader` does the fetch/build/replace for both daemons: the embedded daemon reloads on every `ai_providers` change and fails startup if it cannot subscribe; the standalone gateway drives the same reloader once at startup, retrying until success and staying interruptible.
- **Dead code removed:** `BuildProvidersFromConfig`, `ProvidersFromConfig`, `AIProviderFromConfig`, and the DB-read `BuildProviders` path.
Adds a new enterprise-only `GET /api/v2/ai-gateway/serve` endpoint that standalone AI Gateway replicas use to connect to `coderd` over a DRPC-over-WebSocket transport, mirroring the existing in-memory path used by the embedded AI Bridge daemon.
- The endpoint upgrades the HTTP connection to a WebSocket, multiplexes it with yamux, and finally serves the three DRPC services (Recorder, MCPConfigurator, Authorizer).
- The `X-AI-Governance-Gateway-Key` header is used for authentication.
- The key is looked up by its hashed secret
- Missing or revoked keys return `401`.
- API version negotiation is enforced via a new `aibridged/proto` version (`v1.0`).
- Incompatible versions return `400`.
- `FeatureAIBridge` entitlement is required.
- Key liveness (`last_used_at`) is recorded immediately on connection and refreshed every 60 seconds while the session remains open.
- When key liveness detects the key was deleted (no rows where updated) session is closed.
#### Small refactors
* The three DRPC service registrations are extracted into `aibridgedserver.Register`, shared by both the in-memory and WebSocket paths.
* The literal `256 * 1024` used as the yamux-aligned WebSocket read limit is replaced with the named constant `drpcsdk.YamuxDefaultStreamWindowSize` in all call sites.
* as noted in review comment https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/26506#discussion_r3461905223 order of `SetReadLimit` and `WebsocketNetConn` calls was fixed.
Add `optional string boundary_session_id` (field 15) and `optional int64
boundary_sequence_number` (field 16) to `RecordInterceptionRequest` in
the AI Bridge proto definition. Regenerate Go bindings. No behavior
change.
## Context
The [Gateway and Firewall Correlation
RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9)
defines a system for linking Agent Firewall (boundary) audit events with
AI Bridge interceptions so that admins can trace an LLM request back to
the exact network activity that produced it.
The correlation mechanism works as follows:
1. Each boundary process generates a session UUID on startup and assigns
a monotonically increasing sequence number to every audit event it
records.
2. When boundary proxies a request to AI Bridge, it injects
`X-Coder-Agent-Firewall-Session-Id` and
`X-Coder-Agent-Firewall-Sequence-Number` headers.
3. AI Bridge reads these headers, records them on the interception, and
strips them before forwarding to the upstream LLM provider.
4. The persisted session ID and sequence number allow the frontend to
discover which boundary session an interception belongs to, and to fetch
only the boundary audit events that occurred between any two
interceptions by filtering on the sequence number range.
This PR implements the first step: adding the proto fields that carry
the correlation data from AI Bridge to coderd's recording service.
## How these fields will be used
The two immediate downstream issues depend on these fields:
**AIGOV-260** adds `boundary_session_id UUID NULL` and
`boundary_sequence_number BIGINT NULL` columns to the
`aibridge_interceptions` database table, with a partial index on
`boundary_session_id`. The `RecordInterception` server handler
(`coderd/aibridgedserver/aibridgedserver.go`) will read the new proto
fields via `GetBoundarySessionId()` and `GetBoundarySequenceNumber()`
and pass them through to the database insert query.
**AIGOV-259** adds the capture-and-strip logic in the AI Bridge
interception processor (`aibridge/bridge.go`). It reads the
`X-Coder-Agent-Firewall-Session-Id` and
`X-Coder-Agent-Firewall-Sequence-Number` headers from the incoming
request, adds `BoundarySessionID *string` and `BoundarySequenceNumber
*int64` fields to the `InterceptionRecord` struct
(`aibridge/recorder/types.go`), and strips the headers before forwarding
upstream. The translator (`coderd/aibridged/translator.go`) will then
map these struct fields onto the proto fields added here.
Fixes https://linear.app/codercom/issue/AIGOV-252
> [!NOTE]
> This PR was generated by [Coder Agents](https://coder.com).
## Problem
Centralized requests recorded *the first available key from the pool at
`CreateInterceptor` time* as `credential_hint`, so the interception
could be persisted in the database with a hint that didn't match the key
that actually served the request. The fix consists in storing, at
end-of-interception, the hint of the key that succeeded, or the last
attempted key if all keys are unavailable.
## Changes
- Add `Key.Hint()` and update `credential_hint` on every failover
attempt so it reflects the actually-used key.
- Stop pre-populating `credential_hint` at `CreateInterceptor`.
Centralized starts empty and is updated by the key failover loop.
- Persist the final hint via `RecordInterceptionEnded`; SQL updates
`credential_hint` only when `credential_kind = 'centralized'` so BYOK
keeps its start-time value.
- Log the actually-used hint on interception end/failure; start log uses
a `<keypool-pending>` placeholder for centralized.
> [!NOTE]
> Initially generated by Claude Opus 4.7, modified and reviewed by
@ssncferreira
Allows an `api_key_id` to be passed from a trusted in-memory transport
(currently: `chatd`) to `aibridged` for use in authenticating LLM
requests.
This value can _only_ be passed via context, and all users of the
in-memory transport _must_ provide it.
It can be used in conjunction with BYOK headers.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
In order to allow Coder Agents to use AI Gateway in OSS, we need to rehome the `aibridged`\-related code into the AGPL path.
The HTTP API is only registered under enterprise so will still require the AI Governance Add-on to be present in order to use it, whereas Coder Agents uses an in-memory pipe to the same handlers.