## Summary
`httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single
request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default
ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly
exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible.
This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the
endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode
paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their
own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule
that pins the invariant.
Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392.
## Problem
`httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no
ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure
is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a
body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate
limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a
single admitted request may consume.
## Fix
`Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body`
in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate
logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of
4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site.
`http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that
pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than
wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That
matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`:
an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the
default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the
regression guard for that specific failure, and
`TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole
requirement rests on.
Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names
the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the
request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}`
counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other
causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a
legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report.
The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator
raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as
configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413
is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint.
## Behavior change
`POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body
exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported
the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request
body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in
the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded
archive is unchanged.
The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its
64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its
decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to
"Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint
answers. Its tests are updated to match both.
`coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing
query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`,
`path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of
the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with
body size, such as agent log storage overflow.
## Reading this
The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the
security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and
commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the
limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an
exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under
its regenerated swagger, and cancel out.
Adds `POST /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets/batch` and
`codersdk.Client.ImportUserSecrets` to import env, JSON, or YAML secrets
atomically. The endpoint validates each entry, rolls back the full batch
on conflicts or limits, omits secret values from responses and audit
logs, and imports keys that cannot be injected as environment variables
with an empty `env_name`.
Part of the [PLAT-240 bulk secret import
stack](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-240). Reviewed and updated
by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
Relates to CODAGT-115
Adds metric `coderd_api_websocket_probes_total`. Every successful
heartbeat for a given path will increment the metric.
Comparing this with `coderd_api_concurrent_websockets` will give an
indication of how many websocket connections are open but in a 'wedged'
state (when heartbeats stopped versus when we closed the connection).
The `mockEventSenderWrite` function in `newOneWayWriter()` wrote
WebSocket frame data to both the `net.Pipe` and the
`httptest.ResponseRecorder`. After `websocket.Accept()` calls
`WriteHeader(101)`, the recorder rejects body writes with `"response
status code does not allow body"`. When `HeartbeatClose` sends a ping,
the control frame flush routes through the recorder, producing an
ERROR-level log that `slogtest` catches as a test failure.
Removed the `recorder.Write(b)` call from the write function. The
recorder is only needed for header/status inspection; WebSocket frame
data should only go through the `net.Pipe`.
Closes https://github.com/coder/internal/issues/1521
> 🤖 Generated by Coder Agents
Relates to https://github.com/coder/coder/pull/21676
* Replaces all existing usages of `httpapi.Heartbeat` with `httpapi.HeartbeatClose`
* Removes `httpapi.HeartbeatClose`
Closes https://github.com/coder/coder/issues/16775
## Changes made
- Added `OneWayWebSocket` function that establishes WebSocket
connections that don't allow client-to-server communication
- Added tests for the new function
- Updated API endpoints to make new WS-based endpoints, and mark
previous SSE-based endpoints as deprecated
- Updated existing SSE handlers to use the same core logic as the new WS
handlers
## Notes
- Frontend changes handled via #16855
* chore: add /v2 to import module path
go mod requires semantic versioning with versions greater than 1.x
This was a mechanical update by running:
```
go install github.com/marwan-at-work/mod/cmd/mod@latest
mod upgrade
```
Migrate generated files to import /v2
* Fix gen
It's possible for websocket close messages to be too long, which cause
them to silently fail without a proper close message. See error below:
```
2022-03-31 17:08:34.862 [INFO] (stdlib) <close_notjs.go:72> "2022/03/31 17:08:34 websocket: failed to marshal close frame: reason string max is 123 but got \"insert provisioner daemon:Cannot encode []database.ProvisionerType into oid 19098 - []database.ProvisionerType must implement Encoder or be converted to a string\" with length 161"
```
* chore: Move httpmw to /coderd directory
httpmw is specific to coderd and should be scoped under coderd
* chore: Move httpapi to /coderd directory
httpapi is specific to coderd and should be scoped under coderd
* chore: Move database to /coderd directory
database is specific to coderd and should be scoped under coderd
* chore: Update codecov & gitattributes for generated files
* chore: Update Makefile
Bobby Ho