Adds the deployment option `--user-secrets-disable-file-path` /
`CODER_USER_SECRETS_DISABLE_FILE_PATH` / `userSecretsDisableFilePath`
(default `false`). When it is set, the create and batch-create
user-secret endpoints reject requests with a non-empty file path, and
PATCH validates the post-update state under a `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`
row lock, rejecting a new or changed file path as well as enabled states
that would have no effective delivery target. Legacy stored paths are
preserved, so users can still edit, disable, clear the path, or migrate
the secret to env delivery.
This is PR 1 of a 4-PR stack; follow-ups cover manifest filtering, the
dashboard, and CLI/docs.
Refs #27488
Reviewed and updated by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
## Summary
`httpapi.Read` decoded request bodies with no size limit, so a single
request could allocate memory without bound. This adds a 4 MiB default
ceiling, leaves the endpoints that legitimately need more explicitly
exempted, and counts the rejections so a limit set too tight is visible.
This is the first of three PRs split out of #28048, covering the
endpoints that answer in `codersdk.Response` shape. The OAuth2 decode
paths (RFC 6749, RFC 7591) and the SCIM ones (RFC 7644) answer in their
own error shapes and follow in separate PRs, along with the lint rule
that pins the invariant.
Closes PLAT-463. Remediates SEC-416 (CWE-770, CVSS 7.5) and SEC-392.
## Problem
`httpapi.Read` calls `json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(value)` with no
ceiling, and no middleware in the chain bounds body size. The exposure
is pre-authentication: login, OTP, and first-user creation all read a
body before any authorization decision is reached. The existing rate
limiter bounds request *rate*, which is orthogonal to the memory a
single admitted request may consume.
## Fix
`Read` is split into `Read` and `ReadLimit`. `ReadLimit` wraps `r.Body`
in an `http.MaxBytesReader` and keeps the existing decode and validate
logic; `Read` delegates to it with a new `DefaultMaxRequestBodyBytes` of
4 MiB, which covers the 124 remaining non-test callers at a single site.
`http.MaxBytesReader` composes as tightest-wins, so the handlers that
pre-wrapped their own bodies pass their limit to `ReadLimit` rather than
wrapping, and each keeps its previous ceiling byte for byte. That
matters most for the bulk secrets import at `8 * MaxSecretsFileBytes`:
an unconditional wrap inside `Read` would have silently halved it to the
default. `TestImportUserSecretsBodyLargerThanDefaultLimit` is the
regression guard for that specific failure, and
`TestMaxBytesReaderNesting` pins the composition behavior the whole
requirement rests on.
Every rejection site calls `httpapi.RecordRequestBodyLimit`, which names
the limit that tripped on the request's existing log line and marks the
request so `coderd_api_requests_too_large_total{reason="request_body"}`
counts body rejections apart from the 413s coderd answers for other
causes, such as agent log storage overflow. A limit set too tight for a
legitimate payload therefore surfaces without waiting for a user report.
The limit is a constant rather than a deployment option: an operator
raising it to unblock something would reopen the vulnerability as
configuration, where a security scan will not find it. A legitimate 413
is answered with a targeted `ReadLimit` on that endpoint.
## Behavior change
`POST /api/v2/files` now answers 413 rather than 400 when a request body
exceeds `HTTPFileMaxBytes`. It installed that bound already but reported
the rejection as a read failure, which leaked the stdlib `http: request
body too large` string through `Detail` and kept the largest limit in
the tree off the metric. The separate 413 for an oversized expanded
archive is unchanged.
The task log snapshot endpoint now answers 413 rather than 400 when its
64 KiB cap is exceeded. Routing it through `ReadLimit` also changes its
decode-failure message from "Failed to decode request payload." to
"Request body must be valid JSON.", which is what every other endpoint
answers. Its tests are updated to match both.
`coderd_api_requests_too_large_total` is new, so there is no existing
query to migrate. It counts the 413s coderd answers, labeled `method`,
`path`, and `reason`. `reason="request_body"` is a rejection by one of
the limits above; `reason="other"` is a 413 that has nothing to do with
body size, such as agent log storage overflow.
## Reading this
The commits are ordered to be read in sequence. Commits 1 and 2 are the
security fix; commits 3 to 5 are the observability consequences, and
commit 3 is the one that touches dashboards. Commit 7 documents the
limit on the REST API reference index. Commits 6 and 8 add and revert an
exhaustive `@Failure 413` annotation pass, which buried the fix under
its regenerated swagger, and cancel out.
Users can now disable a secret to stop it from being injected into
workspaces without deleting it, and re-enable it later. Disabled secrets
stay visible and editable everywhere they already appear.
An enabled secret must have at least one injection target; a secret with
no target can be stored only while disabled. Existing target-less secrets
are migrated to disabled to preserve current behavior.
Support spans the REST API, SDK, CLI, dashboard, and audit log.
Adds `POST /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets/batch` and
`codersdk.Client.ImportUserSecrets` to import env, JSON, or YAML secrets
atomically. The endpoint validates each entry, rolls back the full batch
on conflicts or limits, omits secret values from responses and audit
logs, and imports keys that cannot be injected as environment variables
with an empty `env_name`.
Part of the [PLAT-240 bulk secret import
stack](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-240). Reviewed and updated
by Coder Agents on behalf of @dylanhuff-at-coder.
Part of the **PLAT-240** bulk secret import stack: this PR adds the
`codersdk` parser and shared create-secret validator used by the
follow-up batch endpoint and UI PRs.
`ParseSecretsFile` parses `.env`, `.json`, and `.yaml` files into
`CreateUserSecretRequest` entries in source order, with size, count,
duplicate-key, structure, and malformed-input checks.
`ValidateCreateUserSecretRequest` now backs the single-create handler
too, so create validation has one SDK-level implementation.
Part of https://linear.app/codercom/issue/PLAT-240
> This PR was generated by Coder Agents on behalf of
@dylanhuff-at-coder.
Add a Postgres trigger and matching codersdk constants that cap each
user's secrets in four dimensions: count (50), total stored value bytes
(200 KiB), env-injected stored value bytes (24 KiB), and env name length
(256 bytes). Without these caps a user could overflow the 4 MiB DRPC
agent manifest, the ~32 KiB Windows process env
block, or Linux/macOS ARG_MAX at workspace start. The trigger is the
source of truth on aggregates; the handler maps its check_violation
error into a 400 that names the per-user budget in stored
(post-encryption) bytes. A handler test exercises off-by-one at each cap
across POST and PATCH, plus per-user budget isolation.
Generated with help from Coder Agents.
Removes the coder_secret Terraform integration: the data.coder_secret
consumption path through provisionerdserver → provisioner.proto →
provisioner/terraform, the dynamic-parameter secret-requirement
validation, and the workspace-update / resolve-autostart surfaces that
depended on it. This is being done due to a product/feature direction
change (see PLAT-243). User-secret CRUD (DB, REST, CLI, UI, telemetry, audit)
and the agent-manifest secret-injection path are untouched.
The provisionerd API is bumped from v1.17 to v1.18 rather than rolled
back: v1.17 shipped in v2.33.x, so user_secrets field numbers are
reserved and the changelog documents both versions.
Generated with assistance from Coder Agents.
Add frontend API methods, mocks, and form helpers for user secrets CRUD. The new client methods cover list, get, create, update, and delete requests, including URL encoding for secret names used in route paths.
Add user secret form utilities for create and update payload construction, required create field checks, and structured API validation error mapping back to form fields. User secret name validation now lives in codersdk with tests, and coderd returns field-level validation errors for create, update, and uniqueness conflicts so the frontend can show backend-owned validation results consistently.
Emit user secret audit log entries for create/update/delete operations.
Reads stay un-audited, matching every other resource.
Audit log entries record changes in user secret name, environment
variable name, file path, and value. The secret value column is marked
`ActionSecret` so the diff records the change without showing the
ciphertext or plaintext.
Closes a TOCTOU window on delete to ensure no phantom audit logs for a
delete of a non-existent secret. Secret update accepts a small TOCTOU
window matching the other audited resources (templates, workspaces,
chats). The two-query pattern is wrapped in a transaction so audit state
can't leak from a failed mutation.
Previously we reserved some env vars that may collide with AI gateway.
These were incomplete and take away flexibility from the user, which
we're prioritizing in the first iteration of the feature.
Add secret value validation to reject null bytes and values exceeding 32KB.
The 32KB limit applies uniformly to both env var and file secrets because the
value field is shared and the destination can change after creation.
Add file path validation to also reject null bytes and paths exceeding 4096
bytes.
Wire up secret value validation into both POST and PATCH handlers.
Add the five REST endpoints for managing user secrets, SDK client
methods, and handler tests.
Endpoints:
- `POST /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets`
- `GET /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets`
- `GET /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets/{name}`
- `PATCH /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets/{name}`
- `DELETE /api/v2/users/{user}/secrets/{name}`
Routes are registered under the existing `/{user}` group with
`ExtractUserParam`. The delete query was changed from `:exec` to
`:execrows` so the handler can distinguish "not found" from success
(DELETE with `:exec` silently returns nil for zero affected rows).
dylanhuff-at-coder