feat: handle revoked OAuth grants for MCP servers gracefully (#27264)

Closes
[CODAGT-792](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-792/handle-revoked-oauth-grants-for-mcp-servers-gracefully).

When a user revokes an upstream OAuth grant for an MCP server used by
Coder Agents, Coder kept treating the cached token as valid:
`invalid_grant` refresh failures were logged and swallowed, the dead
bearer token kept being attached, the list endpoints re-attempted the
refresh on every call, and the UI kept showing the server as
authenticated.

## Changes

Backend, mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art:

- New migration adds
`mcp_server_user_tokens.oauth_refresh_failure_reason`.
`UpsertMCPServerUserToken` clears it, so completing the OAuth flow again
recovers the row.
- New `MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure` query records the failure
and clears all token material, guarded by an `updated_at` optimistic
lock so a stale failure never clobbers a concurrently refreshed token
(on a lock miss the winner's row is used).
- `mcpclient.IsPermanentRefreshError` classifies `*oauth2.RetrieveError`
codes: only `invalid_grant` and `bad_refresh_token` are permanent.
Client/config errors (`invalid_client`, `unauthorized_client`, ...) stay
transient for the user row since reconnecting cannot fix them.
- chatd token refresh and the MCP list/get endpoints persist permanent
failures, return cleared tokens for the in-flight request, and skip
provider calls for already-failed rows.
- `buildAuthHeaders` no longer attaches an Authorization header for
failed tokens, so chat degrades by omitting that server's tools instead
of sending a dead bearer.

API and UI:

- No new API surface. A permanently failed token simply reports
`auth_connected: false`, so the existing "Auth" button and "Not
authenticated" tooltip appear and the user re-runs the same OAuth flow
to recover. An earlier revision added an `auth_status` enum (`connected`
/ `not_connected` / `reconnect_required`) with a dedicated "Reconnect"
button; it was collapsed to keep the API minimal since both states lead
to the identical re-auth action.

Out of scope (follow-up): typed 401-on-connect detection and forced
refresh. mcp-go exposes no stable typed 401 signal in the static-header
path, so a revocation while the access token still looks valid locally
stays undetected until expiry triggers a refresh.

## Testing

- Unit and integration tests: classifier, chatd refresh paths
(permanent/transient/race/persist-failure), API endpoints (revoked,
transient, no-retry caching, re-auth recovery, stale-lock), dbauthz,
dbcrypt, migrations.
- Dogfood UAT against a dev instance with a mock IdP returning
`invalid_grant`: revoked grant detected on refresh and persisted once
(no repeated IdP calls), chat with the revoked server selected completes
with the server's tools omitted, and re-auth restores the connected
state.

> This PR was authored by Mux, working on Mike's behalf.
This commit is contained in:
Michael Suchacz
2026-07-16 11:43:05 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 213f5ce606
commit e489092154
20 changed files with 913 additions and 25 deletions
+7
View File
@@ -6869,6 +6869,13 @@ func (q *querier) MarkChatsContextDirtyByAgent(ctx context.Context, arg database
return q.db.MarkChatsContextDirtyByAgent(ctx, arg)
}
func (q *querier) MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure(ctx context.Context, arg database.MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailureParams) (database.MCPServerUserToken, error) {
if err := q.authorizeContext(ctx, policy.ActionUpdate, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig); err != nil {
return database.MCPServerUserToken{}, err
}
return q.db.MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure(ctx, arg)
}
func (q *querier) OIDCClaimFieldValues(ctx context.Context, args database.OIDCClaimFieldValuesParams) ([]string, error) {
resource := rbac.ResourceIdpsyncSettings
if args.OrganizationID != uuid.Nil {
+10
View File
@@ -1925,6 +1925,16 @@ func (s *MethodTestSuite) TestChats() {
dbm.EXPECT().UpsertMCPServerUserToken(gomock.Any(), arg).Return(token, nil).AnyTimes()
check.Args(arg).Asserts(rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig, policy.ActionUpdate).Returns(token)
}))
s.Run("MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure", s.Mocked(func(dbm *dbmock.MockStore, faker *gofakeit.Faker, check *expects) {
token := testutil.Fake(s.T(), faker, database.MCPServerUserToken{})
arg := database.MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailureParams{
ID: token.ID,
UpdatedAt: token.UpdatedAt,
OauthRefreshFailureReason: "invalid_grant",
}
dbm.EXPECT().MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure(gomock.Any(), arg).Return(token, nil).AnyTimes()
check.Args(arg).Asserts(rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig, policy.ActionUpdate).Returns(token)
}))
}
func (s *MethodTestSuite) TestFile() {