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feat: handle revoked OAuth grants for MCP servers gracefully (#27264)
Closes [CODAGT-792](https://linear.app/codercom/issue/CODAGT-792/handle-revoked-oauth-grants-for-mcp-servers-gracefully). When a user revokes an upstream OAuth grant for an MCP server used by Coder Agents, Coder kept treating the cached token as valid: `invalid_grant` refresh failures were logged and swallowed, the dead bearer token kept being attached, the list endpoints re-attempted the refresh on every call, and the UI kept showing the server as authenticated. ## Changes Backend, mirroring the `external_auth_links` prior art: - New migration adds `mcp_server_user_tokens.oauth_refresh_failure_reason`. `UpsertMCPServerUserToken` clears it, so completing the OAuth flow again recovers the row. - New `MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure` query records the failure and clears all token material, guarded by an `updated_at` optimistic lock so a stale failure never clobbers a concurrently refreshed token (on a lock miss the winner's row is used). - `mcpclient.IsPermanentRefreshError` classifies `*oauth2.RetrieveError` codes: only `invalid_grant` and `bad_refresh_token` are permanent. Client/config errors (`invalid_client`, `unauthorized_client`, ...) stay transient for the user row since reconnecting cannot fix them. - chatd token refresh and the MCP list/get endpoints persist permanent failures, return cleared tokens for the in-flight request, and skip provider calls for already-failed rows. - `buildAuthHeaders` no longer attaches an Authorization header for failed tokens, so chat degrades by omitting that server's tools instead of sending a dead bearer. API and UI: - No new API surface. A permanently failed token simply reports `auth_connected: false`, so the existing "Auth" button and "Not authenticated" tooltip appear and the user re-runs the same OAuth flow to recover. An earlier revision added an `auth_status` enum (`connected` / `not_connected` / `reconnect_required`) with a dedicated "Reconnect" button; it was collapsed to keep the API minimal since both states lead to the identical re-auth action. Out of scope (follow-up): typed 401-on-connect detection and forced refresh. mcp-go exposes no stable typed 401 signal in the static-header path, so a revocation while the access token still looks valid locally stays undetected until expiry triggers a refresh. ## Testing - Unit and integration tests: classifier, chatd refresh paths (permanent/transient/race/persist-failure), API endpoints (revoked, transient, no-retry caching, re-auth recovery, stale-lock), dbauthz, dbcrypt, migrations. - Dogfood UAT against a dev instance with a mock IdP returning `invalid_grant`: revoked grant detected on refresh and persisted once (no repeated IdP calls), chat with the revoked server selected completes with the server's tools omitted, and re-auth restores the connected state. > This PR was authored by Mux, working on Mike's behalf.
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@@ -6869,6 +6869,13 @@ func (q *querier) MarkChatsContextDirtyByAgent(ctx context.Context, arg database
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return q.db.MarkChatsContextDirtyByAgent(ctx, arg)
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}
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func (q *querier) MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure(ctx context.Context, arg database.MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailureParams) (database.MCPServerUserToken, error) {
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if err := q.authorizeContext(ctx, policy.ActionUpdate, rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig); err != nil {
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return database.MCPServerUserToken{}, err
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}
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return q.db.MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure(ctx, arg)
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}
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func (q *querier) OIDCClaimFieldValues(ctx context.Context, args database.OIDCClaimFieldValuesParams) ([]string, error) {
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resource := rbac.ResourceIdpsyncSettings
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if args.OrganizationID != uuid.Nil {
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@@ -1925,6 +1925,16 @@ func (s *MethodTestSuite) TestChats() {
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dbm.EXPECT().UpsertMCPServerUserToken(gomock.Any(), arg).Return(token, nil).AnyTimes()
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check.Args(arg).Asserts(rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig, policy.ActionUpdate).Returns(token)
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}))
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s.Run("MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure", s.Mocked(func(dbm *dbmock.MockStore, faker *gofakeit.Faker, check *expects) {
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token := testutil.Fake(s.T(), faker, database.MCPServerUserToken{})
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arg := database.MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailureParams{
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ID: token.ID,
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UpdatedAt: token.UpdatedAt,
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OauthRefreshFailureReason: "invalid_grant",
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}
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dbm.EXPECT().MarkMCPServerUserTokenRefreshFailure(gomock.Any(), arg).Return(token, nil).AnyTimes()
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check.Args(arg).Asserts(rbac.ResourceDeploymentConfig, policy.ActionUpdate).Returns(token)
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}))
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}
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func (s *MethodTestSuite) TestFile() {
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