feat: add boundary_log rbac resource (#24810)

RFC: [Bridge ↔ Boundaries Correlation
RFC](https://www.notion.so/coderhq/Gateway-and-Firewall-Correlation-RFC-31ad579be592803aa8b3d48348ccdde9)

Register a dedicated `boundary_log` RBAC resource type with `create`,
`read`, and `delete` actions, replacing the placeholder
`rbac.ResourceAuditLog` and `rbac.ResourceSystem` references previously
used in the dbauthz layer.

Create is granted at user-level so workspace agents can only write logs
owned by their workspace owner, preventing cross-workspace log
fabrication. Delete is restricted to `DBPurge` only; no human role
(including owner) can delete boundary logs.

| Subject | Create (own) | Create (other) | Read (all) | Delete |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Workspace agent | yes | no | no | no |
| Owner (site admin) | yes (via member) | no | yes | no |
| Auditor | no | no | yes | no |
| DBPurge | no | no | no | yes |

### Changes

- **RBAC policy & resource definition**: add `boundary_log` to
`policy.go` and generate `ResourceBoundaryLog` object, scope constants,
and codersdk/TypeScript types.
- **dbauthz authorization**: replace all
`ResourceAuditLog`/`ResourceSystem` placeholders with
`ResourceBoundaryLog`. `InsertBoundaryLog` and `InsertBoundarySession`
derive the workspace owner from the agent and authorize with
`.WithOwner()` for user-scoped create.
- **Role assignments:**
- **Owner (site):** read only. Excluded from `allPermsExcept` wildcard;
create is inherited from member at user-level.
- **Member (user-level):** create. User-scoped so agents can only write
logs they own.
  - **Auditor (site):** read.
- `boundary_log` is excluded from org-admin, org-member, and
org-service-account `allPermsExcept` calls for consistency with
`ResourceBoundaryUsage`.
- **System subjects:**
- **DB Purge** (`SubjectTypeDBPurge`): delete. The only subject that can
remove boundary logs.
- **Workspace agent scope**: `ResourceBoundaryLog` with wildcard ID in
the agent scope allow-list (necessary for creation since no pre-existing
ID exists). User-level role scoping prevents deployment-wide access.
- **DB migration** (`000510_boundary_log_scopes`): add `boundary_log:*`,
`boundary_log:create`, `boundary_log:delete`, `boundary_log:read` enum
values to `api_key_scope`.
- **Test coverage**: `BoundaryLogCreate` (user-scoped, only matching
owner succeeds), `BoundaryLogDelete` (all human roles denied),
`BoundaryLogRead` (owner + auditor). dbauthz mock tests set up workspace
agent lookups for owner derivation.
- **Generated docs**: update OpenAPI specs, API reference docs, and
frontend type definitions.

---------

Co-authored-by: Muhammad Danish <mdanishkhdev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Coder Agents <coder-agents-review[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

coderd/database/queries/boundarylogs.sql

@@ -2,12 +2,14 @@
 INSERT INTO boundary_sessions (
     id,
     workspace_agent_id,
+    owner_id,
     confined_process_name,
     started_at,
     updated_at
 ) VALUES (
     @id,
     @workspace_agent_id,
+    @owner_id,
     @confined_process_name,
     @started_at,
     @updated_at
@@ -16,7 +18,7 @@ INSERT INTO boundary_sessions (
 -- name: GetBoundarySessionByID :one
 SELECT * FROM boundary_sessions WHERE id = @id;
 
--- name: InsertBoundaryLog :one
+-- name: InsertBoundaryLogs :many
 INSERT INTO boundary_logs (
     id,
     session_id,
@@ -27,17 +29,18 @@ INSERT INTO boundary_logs (
     method,
     detail,
     matched_rule
-) VALUES (
-    @id,
-    @session_id,
-    @sequence_number,
-    @captured_at,
-    @created_at,
-    @proto,
-    @method,
-    @detail,
-    @matched_rule
-) RETURNING *;
+)
+SELECT
+    unnest(@id :: uuid[]),
+    @session_id :: uuid,
+    unnest(@sequence_number :: int[]),
+    unnest(@captured_at :: timestamptz[]),
+    unnest(@created_at :: timestamptz[]),
+    unnest(@proto :: text[]),
+    unnest(@method :: text[]),
+    unnest(@detail :: text[]),
+    unnest(@matched_rule :: text[])
+RETURNING *;
 
 -- name: GetBoundaryLogByID :one
 SELECT * FROM boundary_logs WHERE id = @id;