Follow-up to #1359. Addresses a set of correctness and security gaps in
the initial docreader auth implementation.
- docker-compose: inject GRPC_TLS_*/GRPC_TLS_SERVER_NAME/GRPC_AUTH_TOKEN
into the WeKnora-app service. Without this the Go client never saw the
knobs, so enabling token auth on the server broke every RPC.
- client: bind tokenAuth.RequireTransportSecurity() to TLSEnabled so a
bearer token cannot be sent over an insecure channel once TLS is on.
- server: load_tls_credentials now raises TLSConfigError on misconfig
(cert/key missing, file unreadable, mTLS without CA); main.py exits 1
instead of silently downgrading to insecure.
- server: replace endswith("/Check"|"/Watch") health bypass with exact
match against /grpc.health.v1.Health/{Check,Watch}.
- server: compare tokens with hmac.compare_digest, warn on tokens < 16B.
- server: AuthInterceptor now returns an abort handler matching the
original RPC kind (unary/stream) and uses context.abort, so streaming
RPCs surface UNAUTHENTICATED instead of INTERNAL.
- internal/infrastructure/docparser/grpc_parser.go: drop the duplicated
TLS/tokenAuth block and reuse docreader/client.LoadAuthConfigFromEnv +
BuildDialOptions. Single source of truth for client-side auth.
- Add GRPC_TLS_SERVER_NAME (client SNI override) and
GRPC_MTLS_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERT (server explicit mTLS toggle); document
the differing CA semantics between client and server in .env*.example.
- Reject half-configured client mTLS (cert XOR key) loudly.
- Fix missing trailing newline in .env.lite.example.
Verified locally: go build ./... and go vet ./... clean; auth.py
fail-fast / token paths smoke-tested.