diff --git a/docker-compose.dev.yml b/docker-compose.dev.yml
index e974ae98b..53571dd76 100644
--- a/docker-compose.dev.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.dev.yml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 services:
   # 只启动依赖的基础设施服务
   postgres:
-    image: paradedb/paradedb:v0.18.9-pg17
+    image: paradedb/paradedb:v0.21.4-pg17
     container_name: WeKnora-postgres-dev
     ports:
       - "${DB_PORT:-5432}:5432"
diff --git a/internal/application/service/knowledge.go b/internal/application/service/knowledge.go
index e72bc8be0..30e1f9fec 100644
--- a/internal/application/service/knowledge.go
+++ b/internal/application/service/knowledge.go
@@ -6389,7 +6389,16 @@ func (s *knowledgeService) ProcessDocument(ctx context.Context, t *asynq.Task) e
 	// 处理不同类型的导入：文件、URL、文本段落
 	var chunks []*proto.Chunk
 	if payload.URL != "" {
-		// URL导入
+		// URL导入 - 再次进行 SSRF 验证（防止 DNS 重绑定攻击）
+		if safe, reason := secutils.IsSSRFSafeURL(payload.URL); !safe {
+			logger.Errorf(ctx, "URL rejected for SSRF protection in ProcessDocument: %s, reason: %s", payload.URL, reason)
+			knowledge.ParseStatus = "failed"
+			knowledge.ErrorMessage = "URL is not allowed for security reasons"
+			knowledge.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
+			s.repo.UpdateKnowledge(ctx, knowledge)
+			return nil
+		}
+
 		urlResp, err := s.docReaderClient.ReadFromURL(ctx, &proto.ReadFromURLRequest{
 			Url:   payload.URL,
 			Title: knowledge.Title,
diff --git a/internal/utils/security.go b/internal/utils/security.go
index c8fd85e87..3a200a9c3 100644
--- a/internal/utils/security.go
+++ b/internal/utils/security.go
@@ -354,15 +354,21 @@ func IsSSRFSafeURL(rawURL string) (bool, string) {
 	// Perform DNS resolution to check the resolved IP
 	// This prevents DNS rebinding attacks where a domain resolves to internal IPs
 	ips, err := net.LookupIP(hostname)
-	if err == nil {
-		for _, resolvedIP := range ips {
-			if restricted, reason := isRestrictedIP(resolvedIP); restricted {
-				return false, fmt.Sprintf("hostname %s resolves to restricted IP %s: %s", hostname, resolvedIP.String(), reason)
-			}
+	if err != nil {
+		// DNS resolution failed - reject the URL for security
+		// This prevents attacks where:
+		// 1. The domain is only resolvable within internal network (intranet domains)
+		// 2. Different DNS servers between validation and actual request
+		// 3. Attacker-controlled DNS that selectively responds
+		return false, fmt.Sprintf("DNS resolution failed for hostname %s: cannot verify if it resolves to safe IP", hostname)
+	}
+
+	// Check if any resolved IP is restricted
+	for _, resolvedIP := range ips {
+		if restricted, reason := isRestrictedIP(resolvedIP); restricted {
+			return false, fmt.Sprintf("hostname %s resolves to restricted IP %s: %s", hostname, resolvedIP.String(), reason)
 		}
 	}
-	// If DNS resolution fails, we allow the URL (the actual request will fail anyway)
-	// This prevents blocking legitimate URLs when DNS is temporarily unavailable
 
 	// Check for suspicious port numbers
 	port := parsed.Port()